| dc.description.abstract | Humanitarian intervention under has been executed throughout history with authorisation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. With the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Protection of Civilians (POC) doctrines, intervention has been legalised for the purpose of protecting civilians in the event of grave humanitarian crises or armed conflict. Resolution 1973/2011 authorising humanitarian intervention in Libya – principally enforced by the Operation Unified Protector led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – aimed at enforcing these doctrinal norms in Libya. Thus, this study was undertaken to examine the implications of this Operation Unified Protector on the norm of protection in Libya. A qualitative case study research design was used to carry out empirical inquiry wherein, purposive or expert sampling was used to identify skilled personnel acknowledged for having in-depth information in the study. Interviews were conducted with those key informants to get primary data while documentary search was relied upon in collecting secondary data. Thematic analysis was used to analyse data. The findings of the study revealed that the post-intervention political situation in Libya has been marked by instability, growing insecurity and sporadic violence. The study found that the social welfare of the Libyans did not improve, rather, in the aftermath of the intervention, it is characterised by fall in the standards of living, and continued human rights abuses, killings, kidnappings with targets including both Libyan and foreign officials perpetrated by violent no state actors such as such as Muhammad Jamal Network and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The intervention left a power vacuum, without a legitimate and firm government to assume power which has escalated sporadic violence attributed to uprisings by non-state actors. It was concluded that in Libya, intervention was flawed by underlying motives of regime change and geo-strategic interest which changed the game play of Operation Unified Protector and nullified the mandate to protect. OUP took eclectic approach in implementing POC and R2P. NATO was only able to stick to POC rules of engagement by reporting a low civilian casualty and executing intervention in short period of time. The finding revealed that OUP mission violated right intent and just cause by pursuing regime change. Intervention violated reasonable prospects by worsening the Libyan situation without a legitimate central government to stabilize and progress the nation. Preventive measures were not fully exhausted in the intervention operation. The mission neglected the responsibility to re-build norm leaving the Libyans fragmented and scrambling for power. The mission left Libya as breeding ground for violent non-state actors exposing Libyans to human rights violations and abuses, eroding the purpose of safe guarding the Libyans and upholding of protection norms. Intervention by West is motivated given that their interests are at stake proving less rooted in protection of humanity. The study therefore suggests that there is need to carry out process evaluation to collect actual information surrounding the humanitarian crisis and record of adversities, incorporate non-intrusive measures of peacekeeping, diplomacy, regional organisations’ consent and mediation in responding to crisis. Incorporate post jus bellum and rebuilding measures to war torn states to prevent repulsive effects of intervention. The legitimization and authorisation should not be limited to UN Security Council alone but come from the General Assembly and incorporate a multilateral approach to decision making in event of crisis. | en_ZW |
