A critique of the constitutional provision for an independent complaints mechanism for the security services sector in Zimbabwe

Abstract

The increasing interaction between the civilian population and security sector institutions suggest the need for formal regulatory frameworks in the event such interaction degenerates into abuse of civilians by the uniformed forces. Although it is admitted that security sector institutions have plausible internal systems to deal with unlawful contact between civilians and security forces, the integrity and impartiality of these internal arrangements cannot be guaranteed, particularly where the stakes are high. The Zimbabwean Constitution makes provision for the establishment of an independent oversight institution to address unlawful conduct by security services that impinges on the human rights of civilians. This Chapter traces probable features that the ‘complaints mechanism’ must harness from comparable jurisdictions, and also from an in depth reading of the provisions of the Constitutions. It is argued that this institutional system is critical for Zimbabwe, and history provides the justifications. As a democratic state built on constitutionalism, justice and the rule of law, the independent complaints mechanism can go a long way in complementing the work of several institutions such as independent commissions and the courts. The paper concludes that certain principles for reparations must be developed by the mechanism and comparable experiences can assist in creating these principles to be part of the guiding jurisprudence for the independent complaints mechanism.