

**DYNAMICS AND COMPLEXITIES OF POLITICAL
CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
IN AFRICA: A CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN (2011-2015)**

BY

**MHLOMULI SIBANDA
(R114801M)**

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Mhlomuli Sibanda

University of Zimbabwe

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family and my late brother Mlungisi Sibanda

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
APSA	Africa Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	Africa Standby Force
AU	African Union
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
COHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Re-Integration
DPKO	Department Of Peace Keeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East Africa Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoS	Government of Sudan
GRSS	Government of the Republic Of South Sudan
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
MONUC	United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
MVM	Monitoring and Verification Mechanism
MVT	Monitoring and Verification Team
NCP	National Congress Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PDF	Protection and Deterrence Force
PNU	Party of National Unity
PSC	Peace and Security Council
REC	Regional Economic Community
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SPLA	South Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM	South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SPLM/A	South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army
SPLM/A-IO	South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army-In Opposition
SSAF	South Sudan Armed Forces
SSLM/A	South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

SSDM/A	South Sudan Democratic Movement/ Army
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNAMID	United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPDF	Uganda Peoples' Defence Force
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War 2

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ABSTRACT

The study focuses on the dynamics and complexities of conflicts in Africa and the effect on conflict resolution mechanisms in South Sudan. It covers the genesis of the conflict, highlighting the social, economic and political problems associated with it. It is based on the proposition that dynamic and complex conflicts inhibit the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms which results in the prolongation of conflicts. Theoretically the study has its foundations in the Ripeness and Readiness theories as propounded by William I Zartman and Dean G. Pruitt respectively. The two theories are also supported by Robert D Putnam's Two Level Game Theory which seeks to explain the effect of negotiations at the national and international levels in solving the conflict. Methodologically, the study was qualitative in nature; data collection was done using key informant interviews, open ended questionnaires and documentary search. Data was analysed using content and thematic analysis and non-probability sampling techniques such as purposive sampling were used. Chapter 2 of the study concentrates on the historiological perspective of conflicts, the object of this being to contextualise the South Sudanese conflict. Conflicts were thus discussed from a global perspective and much attention was given to their evolution. Worth noting is the fact that prior to WWII, conflicts were mainly between states, however in the post WWII and post-Cold War period intrastate conflicts have dominated and these conflicts are defined by their brutality compared to interstate conflicts. Conflicts in Africa are linked to the historical period of colonisation which saw European powers dividing Africa without due consideration of African societal configurations that were in existence. The upsurge of conflicts in Africa necessitated an examination of the institutional set up and the approach employed by the AU in resolving its conflicts. Regional efforts in conflict resolution were also looked at with much emphasis being placed on IGAD. Chapter 3 interrogates the proposition of the study. The chapter analysed the dynamics and complexities of the South Sudanese conflict. It was noted that conflicts are problematic in Africa due to factors such as availability of loose weapons across the continent. It was also noted that involvement of external actors in intrastate conflicts also affects negatively the resolution of conflicts. Chapter 4 presents the major findings of the study from the collected data. Political discord, lack of accountability, longstanding misunderstanding amongst the leaders of the SPLM came out as the defining factors of the nature of the South Sudan conflict amongst other noted factors such as lack of democracy within SPLM and external involvement by regional actors. The AU's incapacities in dealing with conflicts emerged as a major cause of the prolongation of the South Sudan conflict together with inappropriate conflict resolution mechanisms. Externally engineered solutions, lack of a standing force and lack of stakeholder inclusivity emerged amongst factors that undermined the amicable resolution of the South Sudan conflict. Chapter 5 concludes that dynamic and complex conflicts have a causal relationship to the resolution of conflicts and it also recommends that conflicts can be minimised through tolerance of divergent views and acceptance of popular opinion of the society. A research gap was noted in the effectiveness of AU in dealing with conflicts in the continent.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction and Background to the Problem

Political conflicts have been part of society since time immemorial and in post independent Africa there was a sharp rise in political conflicts. The Sudanese conflict stands as one of the conflicts. Some scholars peg the Sudan conflict to the Berlin Conference of 1884 when African boundaries were arbitrarily drawn by the former colonisers. Barltrop (2011: 15) asserts that “Sudan’s first civil war is often taken to have begun in August 1955, when southern units of the national army mutinied and attacked northern officers and other northerners.” The year 1955 marked an end to the British-Egyptian condominium over the North and South Sudan territories which had begun in 1899. The conflict between North (Sudan) and South (South Sudan) has been there since 1955 and has become part of the newly independent South Sudan.

The conflict in South Sudan had its roots in the pre-independence South Sudan. In 2005, Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional body covering the Horn of Africa, part of East Africa and the Great Lakes region, brokered a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and Southern Sudan thereby ending a civil war that started in 1983. CPA was signed between Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudanese National Congress Party (NCP). The International Crisis Group Report of 2014 states that the CPA for example “excluded other political and military opposition groups in both the North and South.” The excluded groups which include amongst others South Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (SSLM/A) formed in 1999 and the ‘White Army’ an informal and militant Nuer dominated organisation have become potential sources of conflicts. The same report points out that in the years following, many southern groups which include Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-Nasir (SPLM/A-Nasir), South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) and SSLM/A were absorbed into the SPLM/A which however, never forged a joint platform representative of its diverse membership. After independence, frustration increased amongst the above mentioned groups, they blamed the leadership for failing to provide the much needed security and basic services. This set the stage for the later conflicts that began soon after independence in July 2011.

Tiitmamer and Awolich (2014: 4) state that “the internal crises within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) are as old as the institute itself.” This assertion is

based on the fact that during the North-South civil war (1983-2005), SPLM/A split into two, that is, SPLM/A led by John Garang and SPLM/A led by Riek Machar (SPLM/A-Nasir). Similarly, Barltrop (2011: 40) shows how Sudan worked hard to widen the rift of the SPLM/A prior to South Sudanese independence by stating that;

the government was persisting with its efforts to widen the divisions in the SPLM/A, by means of such tactics as pursuing separate negotiations – outside the framework of the proposed Abuja talks – with the SPLM/A faction led by Lam Akol and Riek Machar, known as SPLM/A Nasir. This culminated in the government and the SPLM/A-Nasir reaching an agreement in Frankfurt on 25 January 1992

The creation of fissures amongst the Southern groups by the North during 1983- 2005 made it impossible for one to look at South Sudan crisis without taking into consideration the historical background of the SPLM/A which was the governing authority in South Sudan. Since its inception in 1983 the SPLM/A was rocked by disagreements between the two factions (SPLM/A and SPLM/A-Nasir) which resulted in deadly clashes between the ethnic Nuer and the Dinka tribes. The December 2013 crisis could be a reflection of the old undercurrent conflict that caused the split of the movement in 1992. Although the two protagonists by then, Riek Machar and the late John Garang reached an agreement in 2002, the underlying issues that had caused the disharmony within the movement were not addressed. Idris (2005: 105) highlights that “the Nasir faction charged Dr John Garang with dictatorial rule and human rights violations.” These are the same accusations that Dr Riek Machar levelled against Salva Kiir in the December 2013 conflict outbreak that led to instability in the new state of South Sudan.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The civil war in South Sudan created a lot of problems related to the political, social and economic wellbeing of the newly independent South Sudan state. Politically, South Sudan had more violent armed groups than political parties, ultimately undermining issues related to governance. Some of the groups are; the SSDM/A, SSLM/A, White Army, South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) and Yau Yau militia. The exercise of authority by the central government in States such as Unity and Jonglei where Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) was dominating became a serious problem. Furthermore, following an ineffective Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) programme conducted between 2009 – 2011, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) statistics of 2015 reveals that only 12 525 ex-combatant underwent the programme against

the intended figure of 150 000. Consequently, most of armed combatants were unaccounted for. Hence, South Sudan has a lot of uncontrolled arms amongst the population. The weapons are used in the prosecution of armed violence against unarmed civilians. In January 2012, youths from Mayendit County in Unity State attacked a neighbouring County in Warab, the government failed to contain the clashes which later led to a spiral of renewed violence. There was also gross violation of international law especially war crimes; for instance the enlistment of child soldiers by various armed groups. According to UNICEF estimates of 2014, over 12 000 children were recruited as soldiers by armed groups such as SSDM/A in Pibor and Jonglei states.

Socially, the civil war undermined the education and health systems. The central government faced a challenge in improving on the above stated social services. World Bank statistics for March 2015 indicates that in South Sudan, amongst those aged 15 and above only 27% are literate. The right to education of children was undermined by the destruction of educational infrastructure and enlistment of children into the warring factions' ranks. The health delivery system was also not performing well. The same World Bank statistics indicates that immunisation programme covers 17% of children, maternal mortality rate is 2% and infant mortality rate stands at 10% of all live births. More funds were channelled towards containing rebellious groups and maintenance of government in power. The construction of road infrastructure was derailed, with the tarmac roads being restricted to the capital Juba. This negatively affected investment opportunities in South Sudan hence unemployment levels remained high.

Economically, World Bank statistics of June 2014 indicate that the conflict undermined oil production which contributed about 60% towards South Sudan's GDP. The same statistics indicate that those that were involved in non-wage employment constituted 85% of the population and were mostly in agriculture. The report submits that in 2014 due to the conflict, the country's GDP fell by 15%. As a result of increase in military expenditure, infrastructure development and service delivery was jeopardised (World Bank Report March 2015). The economic development of South Sudan was undermined by the conflict and human security has taken a second fiddle to state-oriented security.

In terms of the humanitarian crisis that was caused by the civil war, ECHO Factsheet of July 2015 summed it up as follows:

The situation in South Sudan since the outbreak of civil war in December 2013 remains one of the world's biggest humanitarian crises. Over 2 million people have fled their homes, of which more than half a million to neighbouring countries; a majority of the refugees (around 60%) are children.

This described the extent of the humanitarian crisis that the conflict in South Sudan created. People were forced to flee their homes and become alienated from their source of livelihood due to the war. Donor aid become their source of livelihood. Displacement of people also destroyed the social fabric of various families. It is from this background that the conflict in South Sudan created far reaching problems socially, economically and politically. It had the potential of destabilising the region as the flight of people to neighbouring countries created pressure on the resources of the receiving countries.

The efforts that the international community, that is, United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), IGAD and neighbouring states, was putting towards resolving the conflict was an indicator that the civil war in South Sudan was a problem amongst the people of South Sudan, the regional states, the continental body (AU) and a host of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs); for example UN and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

1.3 Proposition

Dynamics and complexities of conflicts inhibit efficacious fracas-tenacity seriously jeopardising existing conflict resolution strategies.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

- To analyse the nature of the conflict in South Sudan.
- To examine conflict resolution strategies used towards addressing South Sudan conflict.
- To investigate the dynamics and complexities of the South Sudanese conflict.
- To ascertain the nexus of the dynamics and complexities in the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan.
- To draw lessons from the South Sudanese experience and make recommendations on the way forward.

1.5 Research Questions

- What is the nature of the conflict in South Sudan?

- What conflict resolution strategies were used to resolve the conflict in South Sudan?
- What were the dynamics and complexities of the conflict?
- What was the nexus between dynamics and complexities and conflict resolution in South Sudan?
- What are the lessons that can be drawn and recommendations made from the South Sudan political crisis?

1.6 Justification of the Study

A number of studies in line with the conflict in South Sudan were conducted but no effort was made to research on the dynamics and complexities of the conflict and the consequences of these in the resolution of the conflict. For instance, Brown (2014)'s study "South Sudan's Slide into Conflict: Revisiting the Past and Reassessing Partnership" focused on the relapse of South Sudan into violence. On another note, Blanchard (2014) in the study the "The Crisis in South Sudan" was concerned with the causes of the conflict, the parties involved and their motives. The focal point of this study was on understanding the dynamics and complexities of the conflict, an area that has not been explored. As a result information gap that existed in that regard was reduced. Furthermore, the study added some information to the existing body of knowledge in the South Sudanese conflict. In general the study gave an insight on the dynamics and complexities of conflicts and their resolution.

The quest for knowledge is an ongoing process, hence the importance of knowledge acquisition needs no overemphasis. The study improved the researcher's understanding of the South Sudanese conflict. Further to this, the knowledge acquired through the study remain important to the researcher and also academicians, international relations scholars/practitioners, government officials especially those involved in foreign affairs, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) who are concerned with conflict resolution, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who might be involved directly or indirectly in conflicts. Politicians and political analysts stand to benefit from the study by understanding conflicts especially dynamics and complexities involved in conflicts. The study could be an important decision making tool to some of the above mentioned stakeholders who stand to benefit from it.

1.7 Literature Review

1.7.1 Conflicts and International Relations

The term conflict is derived from the Latin word *Confligere* which means to strike together. Consequently, Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman (2009: 4) interpret a conflict as referring “to overt and coercive behaviour initiated by one contending party against another.” On the same note, Coser (1956: 7) understands a conflict as meaning “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals.” Meanwhile, in Shale (2006: 109) a conflict is referred to as “a situation where two or more people or groups believe that their objectives are incompatible.” There is a concurrence amongst various scholars about the definition of conflict. Incongruous goals and values amongst people or groups of people is what define a conflict. A number of important elements of a conflict came out from the definitions and these are; conflict takes place between contending parties, conflicts can be caused by differences over values, power or resources. Every conflict seeks to neutralise, injure or to eliminate the opponent who might be a stumbling block to the realisation of certain aspirations of the contending parties. Conflict therefore refers to a situation where discordancy of goals exists between disputants. Therefore, conflicts world over have been due to contradictions and incompatibility of goals or infringement of other people’s values.

According to Hagg and Kagwanja (2007: 10) “the dual process of market liberalisation and democratisation in the 1990s substantially weakened the post-colonial state, ushering new forms of violence and disorder as the hallmark of the post-Cold War Africa.” However Ojajorotu and Uzodike (2006: 87) point out that “the sudden upsurge in the number of small arms and light weapons in the international system is basically a by-product of the Cold War during which the major powers blindly supported different belligerents in developing countries in Africa and elsewhere.” The two scholars disagree on the causes of the increase in conflicts especially in Third World countries. Some believe that an increase in conflict is a product of liberalisation and democratisation while the other school assert that it is a product of the end of the Cold War. The Cold War school alleges that in the proxy wars, super powers dumped a lot of small and light arms which are now used in the prosecution of civil wars. The two views about the upsurge of conflicts globally look at the causes from an external point of view, while the role played by internal factors/conditions were not considered.

However, the two scholars agree to the fact that there was an increase in armed conflict in the post-Cold War era.

1.7.2 Nature of Conflict in the Post-Cold War Epoch in Africa

Mason and Meernik (2006: 15) state that “the pattern of armed conflicts has changed dramatically since the end of World War II. Both the predominant form and primary locus of armed conflicts have shifted dramatically...” Meanwhile, Morgan (2004: 1) proclaims that “with the end of the Cold War, the world is experiencing an increase in intrastate bloodletting that has horrified many observers of world politics.” The concurrence of the two scholars on the fact that there has been a shift from the traditional and common interstate conflicts that were witnessed before World War II attest to the fact that there has been a paradigm shift in the nature of contemporary political conflicts. However, the above scholars have not highlighted what has motivated such a change hence this study covered some of the factors behind such a change.

Hagg and Kagwanja (2007: 14) are of the view that “wars are also linked to complex proxy wars involving regional powers” For instance, the war in Somalia was linked to longstanding conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The two protagonists (Ethiopia and Eritrea) were alleged to be underwriting and backing rival forces within Somalia. On the same note, US involvement in Somalia to fight and destroy the Union of Islamic Courts fighters illustrates that intrastate conflicts are also linked to ‘clash of civilisation’ which now defines the bounds of the ‘global war on terrorism’ (Ibid). However, Bercovitch and Wells (2009: 15) are of the view that “the end of the Cold War made a significant contribution towards ending some conflicts such as proxy wars fought by client states.” There was a disagreement amongst scholars about proxy wars, some believe that proxy wars still exist as highlighted in the Somalian case. However, others believed that proxy wars came to an end with the end of Cold War; for example the Vietnamese and Angolan civil wars. An effort was made to ascertain the influence of external actors in the South Sudan conflict.

1.7.3 Halting and Curbing the Security Conundrum: An analysis of conflict Resolution strategies in Africa

According to Bercovitch and Wells (2009: 19) the main goal of traditional conflict resolution strategies was “to resolve conflicts so as to protect order and security and reinforce the ability of state to pursue their own interest.” This approach was based on the Westphalia system

which gave greater importance to the sovereignty of state. The traditional methods of conflict resolution include peacekeeping, mediation and negotiation. Meanwhile, Murithi (2006: 13) states that UN in 'An Agenda for Peace', outlined four major areas of activity; preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping and post conflict peacebuilding. Conflict resolution falls under peace-making provided in Chapter VI of the UN Charter which emphasises the need for pacific settlement of disputes among conflicting parties (ibid). Many global conflicts have been solved through peaceful means such as negotiations, mediation, good office and peacekeeping. However, in some instances UN Chapter VII has been used; for instance peace enforcement missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The effectiveness of these peace-making strategies for example negotiations, mediations and peacekeeping were analysed in the context of the conflict in South Sudan.

1.7.4 The Dynamism and Complexities of Conflicts in the 21st Century

Bercovitch and Wells (2009: 16) state that "in recent decades major shifts in the nature of conflicts have been away from interstate conflict, leaving internal conflicts and the proliferation of ethnic, religious, cultural and resource-driven conflicts as the major threats to international peace and security." The scholars postulate a migration that took place from interstate conflict to intrastate conflict and the proliferation of the identity conflicts. The identity conflicts are based on ethnic, religious and cultural lines as well as need for resources. In an effort to highlight the changes that were taking place in conflicts, Ojatorotu and Uzodike (2006: 85) assert that "since 1990s major conflicts all over the world have been fought with small and light weapons." The proliferation of small arms and light weapons was a new phenomenon that came following an end to Cold War. The availability of such arms enhanced the prosecution of civil wars. Meanwhile, the involvement of various groups in intrastate war made some of the conflicts difficult to contain; for instance the Somalia civil war which started in 1992. The conflict ended up involving a number of countries such as Ethiopia and Eritrea; groups such as al Qaeda and al Shabaab and inter-governmental organisations such as IGAD and UN.

1.7.5 Nexus between Dynamics and Complexities of Conflicts vis-à-vis Conflict resolution

Not all conflict resolution mechanisms are successful. They are dependent on the way the conflict is unfolding and the appropriateness of the mechanism used to resolve the conflict. Conflict resolution has been understood by Mitchel and Banks (1996: 21) as referring to,

an outcome in which the issues in an existing conflict are satisfactorily dealt with through a solution that is mutually acceptable to the parties, self-sustaining in the long run and productive of a new, positive relationship between parties that were previously hostile adversaries.

On the same note, Best (2005) points out that, basically conflict resolution entails mutual satisfaction with the outcome of the negotiation among conflicting parties and a sense of finality in that agreement. From the definition, conflict resolution is about accepting a conflict, recognizing that there are ways out of it, and engaging in efforts meant to solve it. However, some conflicts take longer than anticipated to solve, suggesting that not all conflict resolution mechanisms are capable of being applied in a conflict situation successfully all the time.

Diplomatic engagements have been extensively used by regional and continental bodies such as Southern African Development Community (SADC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and African Union (AU) as well as inter-governmental organisations such as United Nations (UN) to solve conflicts with varying success. In the Kenyan political conflict of 2007, political violence erupted following an election stand-off between Raila Odinga of Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Mwai Kibaki, a leader of Party of National Unity (PNU). The conflict rapidly turned out to be an ethnic conflict between the Luo and Kikuyu. In response the International Community through East Africa Community (EAC) and AU, engaged former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan to mediate. Annan quoted in Mehta, Richmond and Barber (2008: 7) highlights the importance of mediation by noting, “And when you have ethnic violence, and if you don’t mediate quickly, you get a hopeless situation.” He went on to state, “when we talk of intervention, people think of the military, but under R2P, force is the last resort. Political and diplomatic intervention is the first mechanism.” In the Kenyan conflict mediation as a conflict resolution strategy fixed the hostilities. However the same could not be said of the Syrian crisis which began in 2011 and was still raging on at the time of this study. Mediation was used on several occasion but failed to stop the conflict. A lot of questions remained unanswered as to why conflict

resolution strategies work in some dynamic and complex conflicts while they fail to work in other similar situations.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

To understand the dynamics and complexities of South Sudanese conflict and its resolution, a number of theories were used. The theories include, The Ripeness theory, The Readiness Theory and The Two-Level Game Theory. A brief discussion of these theories in the context of the conflict in South Sudan highlights their applicability to the conflict. The study used the Ripeness and Readiness theories as the main theories and The Two-Level Game Theory was co-opted to support the two. The theories are fundamental in explaining the Dynamics and Complexities surrounding the South Sudanese Conflict.

1.8.1 Ripeness Theory

Ripeness theory was propounded by Professor I. William Zartman in the 1980s. The theory seeks to explain key factors in the successful resolution of conflicts. It gives conditions and explains factors that make some conflicts to take longer than others to be resolved. It also helps mediators to decide how to time their entry into conflicts. Zartman's theory assumes that antagonists to violent conflicts are not fully sensible due to the desires of war. The theory states that due to this, conflicting parties may not negotiate sincerely to allow common ground to be struck amongst the warring parties. Zartman points out that more often the antagonists will always seek victory through escalation especially when they perceive victory to be attainable. The theory states that negotiations will only be done for the purposes of impressing the international community or as a way of gaining time to enable mobilisation of resources for the resumption of hostilities. Through the use of the Ripeness theory the dynamics and complexities of the South Sudanese conflict could be understood and were significantly explored.

According to Lyons and Khadiagala (2008: 9) "The implicit assumption of Zartman's theory is that parties to violent conflict are not fully rational due to the passions of war." This explains why the warring factions in the South Sudanese conflict were not negotiating sincerely with each other so as to find a better negotiated outcome that could benefit the two sides. Since the outbreak of the conflict in December 2013 the warring parties were constantly seeking victory through escalation. According to Zartman (1989) cited in Pruitt (2005: 1) "so long as they perceive victory as attainable, any participant in the negotiation

will be insincere and only for instrumental reasons such as impressing international audiences or gaining time to mobilise resources for resumption of war.” This was seen in the South Sudan conflict, since the outbreak of the conflict serious fighting was witnessed between the government forces and the forces loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar. The fight could have been motivated by hopes of victory in the minds of the antagonists.

The ripeness theory points out that sincere negotiations will not begin until several conditions obtain. Zartman (1989) cited in Lyons and Khadiagala (2008: 9) states that contending parties must perceive that they are in a “mutually hurting stalemate”, that is, “the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them” This condition as propounded by Zartman was applicable to the South Sudanese conflict. Since December 2013 when violence started in South Sudan the two parties took time to reach a hurting stalemate. As from December 2013, it was evident that the two parties were hoping that they were going to overcome each other through violence. The two major conflicting groups, Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) that is the government forces and Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army in Opposition led by Riek Machar had enough forces to execute the war. This made it difficult for any effort towards the resolution of the conflict to yield any progressive outcome. Either of the parties wilfully violated ceasefire agreements that were signed.

The other requirement for a sustained peace or sincere negotiation to take place is that each contending party perceives a “sense of way out” that is, “an expectation that negotiations potentially could yield a deal that improves its situation” (ibid: 10). The continued existence of the political conflict and violence in South Sudan could be explained in terms of lack of a ‘sense of way out’ by contending parties. Using the Sudan conflict or civil war that began in 1983 to 2005, a “sense of way out” could be seen. In 2002, Riek Machar who was leading a splinter group of SPLM/A called SPLM/A-Nasir agreed to re-join SPLM/A that was led by the late John Garang. Riek Machar could have realised that he was going to lose out from the peace deal that was about to be signed by SPLM/A and the Khartoum government, and as such in 2002 SPLM/A-Nasir re-joined SPLM/A.

According to Zartman (2001: 8) “The concept of a ripe moment centres on the parties' perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe.” It is pointed out that if both parties to the conflict share the same sense of finding the solution to the conflict the situation will be ‘ripe’. The situation

in South Sudan does not suggest that the situation had ripened. This is based on the assertion by Lyons and Khadiagala (2008: 10) who state that once a 'ripe' condition is attained "sincere negotiations can commence if the parties themselves or a mediator seizes the moment." Sincerity of the parties could be deduced from the fact that starting from January 2014 several peace agreements were signed but they did not translate to the cessation of hostilities by the antagonists. Therefore it could be argued that in the case of South Sudan, the 'ripe' conditions did not exist.

Zartman (1989) cited in Amer (2007: 731) states "once sincere negotiations begin, they can reach fruition if there is a 'mutually enticing opportunity'; that is a proposed deal that all parties perceive would leave them better off than fighting." Taking the South Sudanese conflict into context, it was evident from a number of failed peace deal negotiations and mediation that the contending parties had not seen an enticing opportunity in the negotiations that were conducted. According to The Herald of 20 August 2015, President Salva Kiir refused to sign the peace deal that was brokered by the regional body IGAD stating that the peace deal was not going to save the people of South Sudan. The fighting between the South Sudanese troops and the rebels resumed two days after the refusal by the President to sign the peace deal. Such incidents validates Zartman's assertion that when there is no mutually enticing opportunity, it would be difficult for sincere negotiations to take place.

The ripeness theory according to Zartman (1989) also states that where the situation would not be ripe for sincere negotiations to take place the mediator can ripen it. Attempts to ripen the situation were seen when on 4 April 2014, President Obama issued an executive order paving way for sanctions against individuals who obstruct the peace process or were responsible for human rights violations. The US has not identified whom it might sanction, but given the fact that both the government and the rebels were being accused of obstructing peace initiatives, individuals on either side were likely to face sanctions. Further, when President Salva Kiir refused to sign the peace deal on 20 August 2015, the UN threatened him with sanctions, fearing the Sanctions Salva Kiir signed the peace agreement on 26 August 2015. However, the conflict was not fully addressed as the South Sudanese President seemingly signed under duress, he indicated that he had reservations to the peace agreement but these reservations were not taken on board.

The ripeness theory attempted to bring out the dynamics and complexities of the conflict in South Sudan, and highlighted how these affected the resolution of the conflict. However, a

clear understanding of the South Sudanese conflict situation required the use of The Readiness and The Two- Level Game theories as additional supporting theories to the Ripeness theory.

1.8.2 The Readiness Theory

The Readiness Theory also makes the understanding of the dynamics and complexities of South Sudan conflict easy. Readiness theory was developed by Pruitt in 1997, it is a modification of the ripeness theory by Zartman. According to Pruitt (2005: 7) “readiness theory – holds that two psychological variables encourage a party to be ready for negotiations: motivation to end conflict and optimism about the success of negotiation or simply ‘optimism’.” The theory was applicable to South Sudanese conflict especially when considering the first variable, that is, motivation to end the conflict. Motivation to end the conflict according to Pruitt results from a perception that the conflict is dysfunctional or from a third party pressure. Applying this condition to South Sudan conflict, mediators or power balancers such as IGAD, AU and UN enabled peace agreements to be signed in an effort to end the conflict. The various warring factions yielded to third party pressure. For example, on 26 August 2015 President Salva Kiir signed a peace agreement under duress from UN which threatened to impose sanctions on him. Similarly, former Vice President Riek Machar had earlier on signed the peace agreement due to the perception that the conflict was dysfunctional.

Another variable in the readiness theory is optimism. According to Pruitt (2005: 8) “optimism is a sense that it will be possible to locate a mutually acceptable agreement.” An element of optimism existed in South Sudan in the sense that the conflicting parties engaged in negotiations hoping that they were going to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. The requirement for this variable is that optimism should increase as negotiations go along. If it does not the parties to negotiation will drop. In South Sudan negotiations were done, however in most cases they failed to bring lasting peace, an indication that optimism was decreasing on the negotiating parties.

According to Pruitt (Ibid), “optimism also depends on a perception that the negotiator on the other side is a valid spokesperson, an individual who can actually commit the other side to an agreement that will be endorsed back home.” The importance of negotiator had been a big issue in South Sudan. Mediation processes was undermined by IGAD the lead mediator in the

conflict. IGAD was not the best negotiator in the conflict. For example, Uganda had intervened in support of President Salva Kiir while Sudan was alleged to be supporting other warring factions against SPLM/A government. The readiness theory was applicable to South Sudan conflict and it equally formed the theoretical basis of the understanding of the complexities and dynamics of the conflict.

1.8.3 The Two-Level Game Theory

The conflict in South Sudan could also be understood using the Two-Level Game Theory. According to Putnam (1988: 434) “the politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two level game.” Considering the fact that the negotiations in South Sudan were internationally done made it possible for the Two Level Game to be applicable. The Two-Level Game proposes that there are two levels, that is, the national level (Level II) where domestic groups pursue their interest and international level (Level I) where national governments seeks to maximise their abilities of satisfying domestic pressures, at the same time minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments. The conflict in South Sudan had the above mentioned levels. The conflicting parties appeared in the two level game boards. During negotiations leaders of the conflicting factions sought to satisfy their domestic constituencies while at the same time trying to appear to be doing something at the international level.

Putnam (1988: 434) further argues, “the unusual complexity of this two level game is that moves that are rational for a player at one board may be ... impolitic for that same player at the other board.” Taking this theory into the South Sudanese context it could be stated that the faltering of peace deals was a result of pressure from domestic constituencies. Leaders of the various conflicting factions agreed at international level; for example in negotiations organised by IGAD or AU to end the conflict. However, as they returned to South Sudan such decisions were not welcomed by the followers; hence the peace deals were broken. Further, a leader may refuse to sign a deal because he would be very much aware that it was unacceptable to his followers. The two-levels made the resolution of the conflict complex due to conflicting personal interests in the two levels. Putnam (1988) in the theory also points out that:

the complexities for the players in the two level game are staggering. Any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board, and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat.

The above view by Putnam was evident in the South Sudanese conflict. According to BBC News Africa of 26 August 2016 seven ceasefires agreements were signed since 15 December 2016 and shattered some of them within hours. From this it can be deduced that ceasefire agreements were upset due to the fact that leaders of various factions in South Sudan were not satisfied with the outcome of the agreements and / or they were afraid of being evicted by their followers who felt betrayed by the agreements signed. The theory became also relevant in the study of the dynamics and complexities of South Sudan conflict.

1.9 Methodology

1.9.1 Research Design

According to Singh (2007: 63) research design is "... the plan, structure and strategy of investigation conceived to obtain answers to research questions." The research design is the way in which the study was conducted; which includes the way the data was collected as well as data analysis. According to Vaus (2001: 170) "a cross sectional design has ... no time dimension... meaning data are collected at one point of time." Meanwhile, Payne and Payne (2003: 31) state that "A case study is a detailed study of a single social unit. The social unit is usually located in one physical place, the people making up the social unit being differentiated from others who are not part of it." The case study research design was the most appropriate research design that enabled the dynamics and complexities of South Sudan conflict to be studied in detail. It enabled South Sudan to be isolated from other similar conflict areas.

The study used a qualitative approach and qualitative data collection methods such as key informant interviews formed the basis of data collection. Key informants were used to collect data on the nature of the conflict, conflict resolutions strategies, dynamics and complexities and effect of the dynamics and complexities in the resolution of the conflict. Meanwhile, open ended questionnaires were used in some instances where key informant interviews were not possible due to commitments and distances. A major noted advantage of qualitative data collection methods was that since the study was exploratory and sought to answer the 'what' question, the respondents were in a position to express their views and opinions about the conflict to their best knowledge.

1.9.2 Key Informant Interviews

Considering the fact that major research questions were qualitative in nature, key informant interviews formed the basis of data collection on the nature of the conflict, mediation techniques used, dynamics and complexities of the conflict and the effects of the dynamics and complexities in the resolution of the conflict. Key informant interviews facilitated the collection of primary data from key informants. According to Keyton (2001: 301) the advantages of the interview is that, “during your conversation, you can probe more deeply, follow up on a response, or pursue a topic that you did not expect to address.” Key informant interviews enabled the researcher to acquire as much information as possible from the respondents. Key informants consisted of international relations experts, international relations consultants and academicians. These were both former and current teaching staff at the University of Zimbabwe, government officials in the Ministry of Defence, that is, Zimbabwe Defence Forces military analyst, political analysts and South Sudan embassy staff. It was noted that key informant interviews had shortcomings in getting what the respondents had perceived as sensitive information as respondents became evasive in the provision of such information. To deal with that shortcoming self-completion unstructured questionnaires were used. These were also designed to cater for instances where face to face interviews were not possible.

1.9.3 Questionnaires

Payne and Payne (2003: 186) define a questionnaire as, “printed sets of questions to be answered by respondents, either through face-to-face interviews or self-completion, as a tested, structured, clearly presented and systematic means of collecting data.” The researcher used unstructured questionnaires that were sent through emails to some AU staff members. Questionnaires became important in collecting data on the nature of conflicts, dynamics and complexity of conflicts and the effect of these in the resolution of conflicts. Furthermore questionnaires were adopted due to their advantages in certain circumstances which according to Keyton (2001) includes being economic and easy to administer and also the ability to be administered to a large population in a short space of time. Questionnaires enabled the respondents to complete the questions at their own time and afford more confidentiality and anonymity compared to interviews (Singh 2007). These advantages greatly enhanced the quality of data that was collected. Due to the anonymity and

confidentiality inherent in questionnaires, respondents answered sensitive questions which were avoided in interviews.

The researcher acknowledges that questionnaires, just like any other data collection technique have weaknesses. It was difficult to ascertain if the intended respondent was the one who completed the questionnaire. Further to this, some questionnaires not responded to. Where respondents faced challenges with some questions they left such questions unanswered. This was despite the fact that most of the questionnaires were electronically delivered to respondents and were pilot tested prior to delivery to intended respondents. A process that was meant to check for question vagueness and that they would provide the expected responses. The researcher however managed to mitigate these shortcoming through triangulation; that is the use of interviews and documentary search.

1.9.4 Documentary Search

Mogalakwe (2006: 222) citing Scott (1990) defines a document as, “an artefact which has as its central feature an inscribed text.” Documentary search considered reports on South Sudan, data on the internet concerning South Sudan, some publications by the government of South Sudan, newspaper articles and electronic news on South Sudan. Documentary search involved gathering data from both public and private publications. Documentary search was very important in getting data that might not have been acquired through key informant interviews and questionnaires. According to Bailey (1994: 194) cited in Mogalakwe (2006: 222),

There are two types of documents that are used in documentary study, namely primary documents and secondary documents. Primary documents refer to eye-witness accounts produced by people who experienced the particular event or the behaviour we want to study. On the other hand secondary documents are documents produced by people who were not present at the scene but who received eye-witness accounts to compile the documents, or have read eye-witness accounts.

In this study both primary and secondary data were useful in that they enhanced the understanding of the dynamics and complexities of the South Sudan conflict and the effects of these in resolving the conflict. Documentary search helped to answer questions on the nature of the conflict, conflict resolution strategy, dynamics and complexities and the effects of the dynamics and complexities on conflict resolution in South Sudan. The extensive use of primary and secondary documents assisted in filling the gap that was left by interviews and questionnaires. Considering that the documents / publications used were not meant for this

study great care was taken in selecting the relevant data for the study. The use of documentary search complemented the other two methods, that is, interviews and questionnaires.

1.9.5 Sampling Procedure

Given the fact that the study was qualitative, non-probability sampling techniques were used. The non-probability sampling techniques used was purposive sampling. This sampling technique was used to select key informants. Keyton (2001: 135) points out that, “Purposive sampling is often used when sensitive topics are of research interest or much specialised population are sought”. Considering specialised knowledge requirement of the study and to some extent its sensitivity, purposive sampling became the most appropriate technique in gathering data from key informants.

1.9.6 Data Analysis and Presentation

The nature of the data that was collected ensured that the research had to use mainly qualitative data analysis methods. The method used are, content analysis and thematic analysis. Payne and Payne (2003: 51) state that “content analysis seeks to demonstrate the meaning of written or visual sources (like newspapers and advertisement) by systematically allocating their content to pre-determined, detailed categories and then both quantifying and interpreting the outcomes.” Content analysis was used on data collected through documentary searches. Meanwhile, thematic analysis enabled the study to draw emerging themes from the data that was collected using key informant interviews and unstructured questionnaires. This approach enabled the researcher to adequately deal with respondents’ views, opinions and ideas. Qualitative data analysis methods have a disadvantage that researcher bias can creep in, and to deal with this, care was taken in addressing attitudes, values and personal motivations creeping in during data interpretation.

1.10 Limitations

The study had some limitations especially in accessing key informants for the purposes of conducting interviews; for example government officials in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, South Sudan Embassy Staff and some international relations experts and academics and political analysts. In instances where interviews were not possible the researcher resorted to the use of questionnaires especially to AU staff members. The questionnaires afforded

respondents opportunity to complete the questions at their own time. The research was also limited due to lack of trust that respondents had on the purpose of the data that the researcher was soliciting for, as well as the confidentiality of the data they were providing. Hence the study might have been affected by the respondents' bias. In cognisance of this, researcher assured the respondents that the data they were providing was purely for academic purposes and was in no way going to be divulged to any person.

1.11 Delimitation

The study focused on the conflict in South Sudan and concentrated on the nature, dynamics and complexities of the conflict and conflict resolution mechanism in that particular country. Reference was however made to other related study areas to enable the study to come out. The study considered the period as from 2011 to 2015 although references were made to earlier period so that the study could bring out a clear picture of the conflict.

1.12 Conclusion

The chapter covered the background to the study which also served as an introduction to the chapter. It stated the problem which gave impetus towards conducting the study. The proposition of the study was also stated and it acted as a guideline to the researcher as it became the cardinal point throughout the research process. Some literature was reviewed in an effort to have an insight in the dynamism and complexities of conflicts. The study used qualitative research design and qualitative data collection methods such as key informant interviews, documentary search and questionnaires were used. Non-probability sampling techniques such as purposive sampling technique were also used in selecting respondents. Limitations of the study were also highlighted together with delimitation. After introducing the study in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 covered the historical overview of conflict and conflict resolution.

CHAPTER 2: CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter gives a historical overview of conflicts from a global perspective. Theoretical explanations and causes of conflicts in general are given. An upsurge in intrastate conflicts and factors motivating such an increase are also discussed. The chapter also gives a historical view of conflicts in Africa and the factors that seek to explain their increase in post-independent Africa and post-Cold War era. An examination of conflict resolution strategies is covered from a global, continental and regional perspective. Challenges encountered in the resolution of conflicts are also discussed. A discussion of proxy wars covering the Cold War era and the contemporary dimension of proxy wars was done, a consideration of proxy war effects in the prolongation of African conflicts was made.

2.2 An Overview of Political Conflicts and Conflict Metamorphosis: A Global Perspective

Conflicts are constitutive to human life. As a result, the history of conflicts is as old as humankind itself. In the theoretical state of nature, Hobbes sought to highlight that conflicts are inherent to human nature. Accordingly, Baye (2010: 12) citing Ivorgba (2005) states that, “conflict is as old as the history of mankind and therefore normal, natural and unavoidable ...” Meanwhile, on a related observation Olaosebikan (2010: 550) states that, “perhaps, this widespread existence of conflicts across the continents of the world has prompted scholars to observe that conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction.” What is clear from the two scholars is that conflicts in a human society are omnipresent, very normal and unescapable. As long as people interact and have divergent interests, conflicts are bound to occur. It is therefore essential to understand the current conflicts in that context. However, besides the convergence of views about the nature of conflicts, it has to be noted that each and every conflict was unique; hence not all conflicts should be treated the same.

According to Human Security Brief (2006: 8) “intrastate conflicts have been the most prevalent form of armed conflict in the period 1950 to 2005.” Anheier and Isar (2007: 76) citing Wimmer (1997) explain the increase in conflicts by stating that, “the rise of the modern nation-state thus has been accompanied by increased competition over state institutions by groups frequently aligned along ethnic or national lines increasing the likelihood of violence

and civil wars in the years after nation-state creation.” The period referred to was the time of decolonisation and independence of former colonies. It also covers the period following the end of Cold War and intra-state conflicts were dominating in the contemporary global conflict landscape.

The global conflicts were over time encouraged by different motives. Anheier and Isar (2007: 74) highlight that “in the imperial world, balance of power struggles were often aimed at securing geo-political advantages through the acquisition of new territories. But in the emerging world of nation states, conquest for the purpose of territorial gain was less common.” Meanwhile, Wiewiorka (2009: 32) asserts that “one major feature of the second half of the twentieth century was the growing number of national liberation struggles ... many of them taking the form of guerrilla activity, that gave birth ... to new states or new regimes.” The two scholars indicate that conflicts have been changing from the time of colonisation to date. In the colonial period conflicts were over colonies and later were over independence of the former colonies and currently they are within independent nation-states. The researcher therefore asserts that contemporary conflicts are inspired by a new set of factors different from those in the ancient times.

In justifying the causes of international conflicts, Baye (2010: 10) asserts that, “territorial claims, ideology, colonialism, nationalism, religion and natural resources have typically been the main sources of conflict throughout the world.” Meanwhile, Holsti (1991: 12) opines that “... arms races lead to war, as do resource shortages, the uneven development of capabilities among the great powers, status inconsistency, and many other things.” Anheier and Isar (2007: 77) attribute the cause of conflicts to “politics of exclusion and discrimination along ethnic lines which may lead to ethnic political mobilisation and the spiralling up of conflicts.” The causes given by the scholars cited above are responsible for both inter-state and intra-state conflicts. For example territorial claims, ideology and colonialism have been at the centre of inter-state conflicts in the Cold War and post-Cold War period; while politics of exclusion, nationalism, natural resources and discrimination are the major causes of civil wars and other intra-state conflicts in the contemporary world.

In explaining the explosion of conflict world over, Ferguson (2003: 1) states that, “in the late 1980s and early 1990s ... strange and especially brutal conflicts erupted in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa and elsewhere.” This is the period in time when bipolar system broke up leading to a unipolar system. Resultantly, Bekker (1993: 81) cited in Cocodia (2008)

attributes the rise of conflicts during this period to “demands for human and cultural rights and for equity in access to resources.” The surge in conflict signposts major changes that were taking place in the global landscape. Scholars assert that this phenomenological change was inspired by the democratisation and liberalisation process that were witnessed in Eastern Europe. On this there is a convergence of views amongst various scholars in the interpretation of causes of global conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Most of the factors given above remain relevant in the understanding of the contemporary conflicts that are happening globally.

Theoretically, in an effort to demystify the upsurge of conflicts in post WWII and post-Cold War era, Cocodia (2008: 14) highlights that “the globalisation theory contends that the upsurge of ethnic conflicts in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s was a reaction to events in East Europe.” In support of the above scholar, Chan (2003) cited in Anheier and Isar (2007: 68) states that,

in many nations, global economic integration has enriched economically-dominant minorities while democratisation has empowered poorer ethnic majorities, providing demagogues the opportunity to blame ethnic minorities for the impoverishment that open markets have brought to the less fortunate and competitive.

There is acknowledgement and congruency in the views of the above scholars that globalisation has an effect in the upsurge of conflict across the world. When globalisation integrated global economies the few rich came to the mess of the majority poor across the world. Further to this, democratisation brought liberties to the people who had endured long periods of subjugation from authoritarian regimes that were synonymous with communism. However, Anheier and Isar (2007: 31) state that “many analysts critique the idea that economic globalisation fuels cultural conflicts, arguing that cultural conflicts are found in almost every society whether it experiences high levels of globalisation or not (Rothkopf 1997, Sadowski 1998, Telo 2001, Kuran 2001, Dutceac 2004). The divergent view brought by some scholars indicates that it is premature to conclusively associate an increase in conflicts to globalisation. According to these scholars, conflicts have been in existence well before globalisation came onto the radars of human beings. This divergent view therefore requires an interrogation of other theories that explains the increase of conflicts in the contemporary world.

In another theoretical explanation, Cocodia (2008: 14) uses the hegemonic theory of conflict which argues that “ethnic conflicts have been on the increase with the era of rapid

democratisation of African states. This position holds that one-party (hegemonic) states have better control of ethnic conflict.” In supporting this argument Rothchild cited in Nkwi (2001: 5) points out that,

In such hegemonic situations, the state uses its coercive power to freeze inter-ethnic conflicts.... Hegemonic strategies of conflict management include subjugation, avoidance, isolation, assimilation and displacement, all of which tend to display relatively low levels of political interaction and reciprocity.

The excerpt highlights that when colonial domination and the post-Cold War era came to an end, democratisation took effect in most African, Eastern Europe and Asian states. The hegemonic state which used to suppress inter-ethnic confrontation through subjugation and other means were replaced by democratic institutions. The concept of democracy and democratic institutions promoted various freedoms. This meant that long suppressed ethnic discontentment came to fore. In the process, the new democratic institutions could no longer contain the grievances of the various ethnic groups as the case was during the hegemonic state period hence the explosion of ethnic related conflicts across the globe.

On another explanation, the diversity argument as proffered by Nairn (1993) cited in Anheier and Isar (2007: 68) states that “the fact that most of the new states that have emerged after the end of Communism are extra-ordinarily heterogeneous in ethno-religious terms and thus will experience higher levels of conflicts than older, more homogeneous nation states.” Meanwhile, Barber (1992) and Kaplan (1992) cited in Anheier and Isar (2007: 71) in the defrosting hypothesis argue that, “ethnic or religious antagonisms may lead to friction and conflict both within countries and across them, especially once the centripetal power of authoritarian, communist states melts away in the thaw of the post-Cold War era.” These arguments explain the upsurge of conflicts in Africa, Middle East and even in Asia. Heterogeneity has led to conflicts for instance the conflict in DRC, South Sudan, Syria, and Iraq. Furthermore, the collapse of authoritarian regimes has led to the emergence of a number of conflicts for instance the demise of Siad Barre's rule in Somalia in 1992 and Mobutu in DRC in the 1990s. However, it should be noted that conflicts are not only limited to countries with multiple ethnic or religious groups as the Somalia case shows. Somalia is homogeneous in terms of ethnicity but has one of the most protracted conflicts in the post-Cold War period.

There has been an evolution in the types of global conflict over years. Anheier and Isar (2007: 67) state that, “while the number of inter-state wars did decline, from 106 interstate wars in the nineteenth century to 59 wars in the twentieth, there was no such emergence of

new peaceful order.” They argue that in the second half of the twentieth century, a slight surge in inter-state wars occurred during the 1970s and 1980s as the Cold War reached its height. Following the end of Cold War there was almost absence in interstate wars. The only noted ones includes the 1991 Gulf War, Eritrea-Ethiopian War of the late 1990s, Kosovo War of 1999, the Kashmir fight between India and Pakistan and the 2003 Iraq war. Dynamism in conflict is an indication that the contemporary global conflicts have migrated from international wars to internal wars.

2.3 Conflicts in Africa: A Historiographical Standpoint

According to Pumphrey and Barcott (2003: 1) “Armed and violent conflict has been part of the human scene since the beginning of written history-a statement as true of Africa as it is of other places on earth.” Political conflicts in Africa dates back to the pre-colonial period where various kingdoms and states arose against each other. Furthermore, internal conflicts within these kingdoms and or states led to violent political upheaval that at times affected the whole region. The time of Mfecane in Southern Africa is a case in point. Mfecane was a time in history when various kingdoms broke away from the Zulu state and migrated northwards to form their own kingdoms. This indicates that conflicts and humankind are inseparable. Consequently, Africa like any other place on earth has not been spared from conflicts, and accordingly, it is normal and inevitable for conflicts to occur.

Conflicts in Africa have been linked to the process of colonisation especially the Berlin Conference of 1884 where European powers divided Africa amongst themselves. According to Pumphrey and Barcott (ibid: 21) “... it must be recognised that the seed of the post-colonial wars themselves lie in the sociological and political mess that ‘White’ colonialism created in Africa.” Likewise, Cocodia (2008) citing Bailey (1994: 4) posits that,

the political map of Africa is a western colonial creation, drawn by western powers with little regard to the boundaries of historic ethnic homelands or the ethnic compositions of the subject population, and today these artificial or multi-ethnic nations lack the internal political cohesion necessary for survival as nations.

On an analogous view, Baye (2010: 10) asserts, “the colonial boundaries ...were not established according to the various indigenous groupings. Grouping nations together ...and dividing them in others was a common feature ...” It is argued that in the post-independent Africa, Africa became and is still troubled by the legacy of colonialism that took place in the 19th Century. Grouping together of different ethnic groups in a single country and expecting

them to live together peacefully as well as dividing them with international boundaries have been cited as a source of African conflicts. This phenomenological experience of colonisation which disregarded ethnic diversity of African peoples in the drawing of boundaries is attributed to ballooning conflicts in Africa in the post independent and post-Cold War era. In support of this viewpoint, the following case studies serve to confirm this. The Sudan conflict that started in 1956 to 2005 between the Christian southerners and Arab North, the ongoing conflict in Nigeria between the Muslim North and the Christian South, and the conflict in Mali between the Muslim North and the Christian South. Colonial legacy has thus contributed to conflictual situations in Africa as highlighted above in the above case studies.

Gates et al. (2010: 16) citing Collier et al. (2003) posit that “underdevelopment is both a cause and a consequence of conflict.” Similarly, Francis (2008: 31) amplifies this by stating that, “conflicts constitute a major threat to African development in terms of loss of human life, destruction of property, displacement of people ... and diversion of resources meant for promoting sustainable development into arms purchase ...” In line with the above views, it is the opinion of Bowd and Chikwanha (2010) that the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa that have been embroiled in violent conflict are characterised by abject poverty, inadequate service provision, political instability, retarded economic growth and other challenges to overall development that deter the enhancement of human security. The scholars are in agreement to the view that underdevelopment can be a cause and consequence of conflicts. The effects of conflicts in conflict prone countries are dire they cut across every aspect of human life with the consequence of undermining human security. Underdevelopment of Africa is therefore linked to persistent conflicts as from decolonisation to date.

2.4 Stratagems for Resolving Conflicts

Beardsley et al. (2006: 58) assert that “International crises pose serious challenges to the stability of individual states and to the entire international system.” In response to these crises, Baye (2010: 12) has this to say, “Conflict is an indication that somehow, there is misunderstanding that requires attention and proper action.” Accordingly, strategies have to be put in place at global, continental and regional levels to deal with emerging and existing conflict situations. The acknowledgement that political crises create serious problems in the international system provides the basis for finding solutions to these calamities.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) through the UN Charter is empowered to deal with international threats to peace and security. Such measures are contained in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. Similarly, the AU through the Peace and Security Council has the capacity to deal with continental conflicts. Furthermore, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU empowers the continental body to intervene in situations specified in Article 4(h). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter also empowers regional bodies to take measures aimed at solving emerging or existing conflicts. These international institutional and legal frameworks have capacitated international, continental and regional bodies to deal with conflicts. However, the effectiveness of the strategies employed in the resolution of various conflicts differs depending on the conflict it seeks to address.

2.4.1 UN and Global Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Epoch

The New World Order ushered in by the demise of the Soviet Union brought a shift in the nature of international conflicts. Pumphrey and Barcott (2003: 5) have this to say in line with intra-state conflicts, “far more typical in Africa are civil wars, which are defined as being armed and violent struggles between political groups within a state.” Traditionally, international peace and security were threatened by interstate or international wars. Puchala (1971: 142) in Olaosebikan (2010: 550) defines interstate or international conflict as a conflict that, “take place between two or more nations and involve forces of more than one state.” Looking at the two types of conflict, the post-Cold War period has witnessed more intrastate rather than interstate conflicts. This paradigm shift has presented a new and serious challenge to UNSC’s endeavours towards resolving global conflicts.

In line with effective conflict resolution, Vraalsen (1997: 22) in Francis (2008: 31) asserts that,

... any successful attempt to resolve conflicts and make peace in Africa must be a genuine recognition of, and respect for, the identity of the peoples of the continent, their traditions and their proud cultural heritage. To this should be added an intimate knowledge of the historical facts as well as an understanding of the prevailing social and economic conditions on the continent as fashioned by centuries of colonial domination and oppression.

The challenges that are faced in conflict resolution emanate from the ontological framework of conflicts experienced globally. Scholars are of the opinion that effective conflict resolution can only be done following an understanding of the nature of conflict, be it an intra-state or inter-state conflict. It is also prudent to understand the current socio-economic conditions and

their link to the historical foundation of the conflict especially on intra-state conflicts. UN has employed various conflict resolution strategies such as preventive means, coercive diplomacy and military interventions. These are contained in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter of the UN. Some of the commonly used conflict resolution strategies will be looked at in this section to ascertain their effectiveness in dealing with conflicts in Africa.

Diplomatic engagement is among the strategies that are open for use by UN, AU and other regional economic communities (RECs). It has been used extensively by UNSC to solve both internal and international conflicts. Pumphrey and Barcott (2003: 14) states “Diplomacy is perhaps the classic example of a method of conflict resolution and reduction that relies on communication.” Diplomacy has been defined as the management of international relations, or the art of negotiating with a view to finding terms of agreement (Ibid). On a related view, Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991: 8) cited in Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas and Wilkenfeld (2006) define mediation as,

a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organisation to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.

Similarly, Woolford and Ratner (2008: 39) point out that, “Mediation, at its most basic level, is a practice in which an impartial facilitator intervenes to assist parties in resolving a conflict.” The common denominator in the definitions is that mediation as a method of conflict resolution seeks to avoid physical confrontation of the disputants. Mediation involves the use of a third part who brings together the protagonist and make them agree on certain terms that seek to end the conflict. According to Chapter VI of the UN Charter mediation is part of the pacific methods of conflict resolution that UNSC can use to solve political crises that threaten peace and security. History is replete with case studies where mediation has been used by UN to solve conflicts. In Africa, mediation was successfully used in Kenya during the 2007 election conflict, it was been used in Zimbabwe following the 2008 election deadlock and was employed in South Sudan following the 2013 outbreak of violence.

Peacekeeping forces have also been used extensively by UN, AU and RECs to resolve conflicts. The UNSC has at its disposal the ability to deploy a peacekeeping force in conflict areas so as to de-escalate the hostilities. The UN defines peacekeeping as “an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.” This

definition befits the traditional peacekeeping missions of the first generation that were mainly concerned with the separation of contending parties. Such peacekeeping missions were a characteristic feature of the period soon after WWII. In the Post-Cold War era peacekeeping missions have become complex and multidimensional, in line with the new definition that has been accorded to the concepts of peace and security. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (2012) Handbook asserts that “while missions with different characteristics have emerged, peacekeeping has most commonly been used in recent years to preserve and build the conditions necessary for sustainable peace ...” This implies that peacekeepers are no longer concerned with the separation of the fighting parties but their duties are going beyond that scope. They now ensure that sustainable peace is created. Several peacekeeping missions have been mandated by the UNSC for example UNMISS, United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) amongst others. The employment of peacekeepers in conflict areas has remained vital in both interstate and intrastate conflict; hence their expansive use in preventing the escalation of conflicts.

The UNSC has also resorted to the use of sanctions in the de-escalation of conflicts. This strategy has been used extensively in Africa and elsewhere in the world. In the Horn of Africa, Eritrea was slapped with sanctions in 2009 through UNSC resolution 1907 for its alleged support of al-Qaeda linked terrorist group Al-Shabaab of Somalia. The sanctions banned Eritrea from exporting any arms, ammunition and war materiel. In the Great Lakes region, similar sanctions were also given to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) through UNSC Resolution 1533 of 2004. The DRC sanctions were meant to suffocate the warring parties with the intention of ultimately decimating their war efforts. Elsewhere, Iran and North Korea were slapped with sanctions to prevent them from producing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). UNSC Resolution 1718 of 2006 and 1874 of 2009 imposed sanctions on North Korea which were meant to disable North Korea’s ability to enrich uranium. Meanwhile, UNSC Resolution 1737 of 2006, 1747 of 2007, 1803 of 2008 and 1929 of 2010 gave sanctions to Iran. The sanctions were meant to obliterate any chances of the two countries acquiring capabilities to produce WMD or nuclear weapons. The sanctions have ensured that there is no lateral production of WMD that might be used in conflict areas. Sanctions have been used on several occasions as a deterrent tool by the UNSC.

2.4.2 AU Conflict Resolution: Institutional Framework and Approach

Africa Union (AU) came into being in 2002 taking over from its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Padelford (1967: 533) commenting on the principles of the OAU points out that, “among the principles to which the members agree to adhere to are respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, peaceful settlement of disputes ...” Similarly, Kalu (2009: 16) asserts that, “much of the OAU’s failure was due to its policy of non-interference in states’ internal affairs which weakened its ability to prevent and manage conflicts, especially civil wars.” The major stumbling block to OAU’s conflict resolution effort was its adherence to the principle of non-interference. The principle prevented member states in the continental body from taking action in serious conflict situations for example Rwanda genocide of 1994.

The transformation of OAU to AU brought a change in the way conflicts in the continent are dealt with. The Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000 on Article 4 (h) of principles, empowers states to intervene where countries fail to protect their citizens from internal conflicts. In that regard, Article 4(h) of the Principles provides: “The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” The Article provides the basis on which members of the continental body can intervene in an internal conflict of a member state especially on the circumstances specified in Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act. In terms of legal framework, the Constitutive Act of the AU has addressed the shortcomings of the OAU’s principle of non-interference. However, Francis (2005: 30) cited in Kalu (2009: 17) warned against prematurely assuming this new organisation would “significantly enhance the project of uniting Africa or strengthen the capacity of states to respond to peace and security issues on the continent.” In as much as there is a lot of optimism and hope that Article 4(h) has capacitated the continental body’s resolve in conflict resolution, the unfolding situation on the ground suggests otherwise. The case in point is the 2011 Libyan conflict where Africa was divided on the way forward and it resultantly failed to intervene in accordance with Article 4(h).

The constitutional framework of the AU is supported by the institutional framework. In 2002 AU established the Peace and Security Council (PSC or AUPSC) as a standing decision making organ to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts on the continent. According to African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) document of 2010, PSC is meant to act as a

collective security and early warning instrument for timely and efficient response to both existing and emerging conflict and crisis situations in Africa. However, Kalu (2009: 18) argues that;

the question may be asked, however, given the hegemonic intent in establishing the PSC and its expressed powers, what significant and substantive instrument exists to carry out its functions without constraints. That is, what functional or institutional power does the PSC have over the sovereign leaders of states who may not wish close scrutiny within their 'sovereign territory'?

The effectiveness of PSC is queried in light of the constraints that exist which might affect the execution of PSC duties effectively. Interventions by PSC may be hampered by sovereign leaders who might be unwilling to allow AU to take initiatives towards resolving internal conflicts. Further, the above quote indicates that there might be resource constraints, hence the effectiveness of PSC in dealing with continental peace and security could be compromised.

Article 2 of the PSC Protocol defines the components of the APSA that support the works of the PSC. According to Article 2 of PSC protocol, APSA is composed of the AU Commission, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an Africa Standby Force (ASF) and a Special Fund. These components play an important role in dealing with continental conflicts. For instance, Batware (2011: 6) asserts that “the role or mandate of the ASF is closely linked to PSC’s tasks in areas of conflict management and resolution.” Article 13 of the PSC Protocol states: in order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to Articles 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be established. The underlying fact is that the success of PSC in carrying out its mandate is closely linked to the APSA concept. Each component of APSA dovetails to one and as a whole, continental peace can be attained. In this regard, ASF has been deployed in peacekeeping missions in Sudan’s Darfur region and in Somalia. The two missions are African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) respectively.

2.4.3 Regional Ingenuities in Conflict Resolution: IGAD in North Africa and the Horn of Africa

According to Calleya (2000: 25) “Regionalism had its origin in Western Europe at the beginning of 1950s. It is from here that the basic concept has been transposed into different

parts of the world, Africa, Middle East, East Asia, South Asia, North and South America.” Africa initially came up with OAU which later transformed to AU. AU has five sub-regional groups which are Southern Africa, West Africa, Maghreb North, East and Central Africa. The five sub-regions are tasked by AU to lead in matters that threaten peace and security in their respective regions and to take initiative towards solving conflicts. In view of this Gebrewold (2009: 180) states that, “the Horn region has been trying to address the regionalised conflicts through its Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mechanism.” IGAD has been instrumental in dealing with conflicts in the Horn of Africa, East Africa, the Great Lakes region and North Africa. This is from a backdrop highlighted by Francis (2008: 16) who states that, “externally driven international efforts to resolve conflict in Africa are often faced with the limitation that the local parties are sometimes unwilling, or unable, to relate to such initiatives.” Imposition of external solutions to African problems has more often failed to amicably solve Africa’s problems hence endogenous solutions are preferred.

In the Sudan Conflict which lasted from 1956 to 2005 when the CPA was signed, local initiatives were preferred compared to international efforts in the resolution of the conflict. Gebrewold (2009: 180) asserts that, “The IGAD member states (Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) are directly or indirectly involved in the Sudanese Conflict, and they constitute the regional conflict system.” Further to this, Pumphrey and Barcott (2003: 169) indicate the efforts of IGAD in dealing with the conflict in Sudan by stating that, “Because the northern Sudanese trusted these IGAD countries to be fair, they were somewhat more receptive to their effort at mediating. As of 2002, IGAD efforts have borne some fruit...” The scholars indicate the role that IGAD as a regional body played in the resolution of the Sudan conflict. However, just like any other body (regional or international) IGAD has its shortcomings. Gebrewold (2009: 180) for instance asserts that “Throughout 2000 and 2001 the IGAD achievements were insignificant for the Sudanese peace process. The progress was very slow and the conflict between the GoS and the SPLM/A were continuing – and at least partly the IGAD member states contributed to it.” This is an indication that in as much as IGAD was very much involved in resolving the Sudan conflict it had its own problems as a body which affected the proper solution to the conflict by the region.

In the Somalia conflict, IGAD has also been found wanting although it took the initiative to solve the conflict. It is argued that IGAD has been taking various initiatives to rebuild Somalia although at the same time IGAD member states have been playing double roles in

Somali politics (Gebrewold 2009). What is evident with IGAD is that it is not as united a regional body as it is supposed to be, as comes out in the excerpt by Pumphrey and Barcott (2003: 171) who state,

Just as IGAD seemed to be on the verge of a diplomatic breakthrough, deterioration in the relations between countries of the Horn tragically undercut its success. The outbreak in May 1998 of a savage war between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998-2000) reduced the unity enjoyed by IGAD countries at the beginning of the new round of negotiations. Prospects for a negotiated settlement dimmed since three of the members of IGAD on the negotiating team were no longer on speaking terms with each other.

IGAD has taken initiatives in the resolution of conflicts that are within its ambit however, there is crippling enmity amongst its members which greatly undermines its effectiveness as a regional body. Nevertheless IGAD has remained very active despite its crippling drawbacks in ensuring that the region is peaceful.

In the South Sudanese conflict IGAD has led in making peace initiatives. In the resolution of South Sudan conflict by IGAD, International Crisis Group (2014: 20) asserts “regional leaders were quick to launch IGAD-led mediation efforts, focusing on a cessation of hostilities and the release of the eleven political detainees.” Congruously, Blanchard (2014: 13) states that, “Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) ... has sought to mediate talks between key leaders in the crisis with the support of the UN and the AU.” When the conflict broke out in December 2013, IGAD took the responsibility to deal with the conflict just like any other regional body in the continent. The efforts of IGAD were underwritten by AU and UN who are guarantors of peace agreements in the continent in support of regional efforts. However, delays in reaching agreements in South Sudan suggest that there are glitches in the efforts of IGAD. An in depth discussion of IGAD and its efforts in South Sudan would be done in Chapter 3 of this study.

2.5 Challenges in Conflict Resolution: A Global, Continental and Regional Synopsis

The structural setting of the UNSC has greatly militated against the fulfilment of its mandate. Conflicts have been raging on with little or no action from the UNSC. Okhovat (2012: 11) states that, “Article 27 of the UN Charter allows the permanent members of the Security Council to quash any non-procedural draft resolution with their negative votes, irrespective of its level of international support and popularity.” This situation has been bemoaned by Robert Hill, former Australian ambassador to UN when he said, “the Security Council is a club and the P5 is a club within a club.” The structure of the UNSC and powers bestowed to the

permanent five (P5) makes the UNSC to be oligarchic that is, dominated by the P5 who do as they please in issues of peace and security. However, despite these gridlocks inherent in the UNSC, continental and regional bodies are empowered by the UN Charter Chapter VIII Article 53(1) to deal with threats to peace and security at their levels.

An observation has also been made that the formation of regional and sub-regional groups has diverted allegiance of states from UNSC to these groupings. Chipaike (2012: 46) in an observation to the Libyan conflict of 2011 points out that, “instead of rushing to help the people of Libya under R2P and Article 4 (h), the AU was busy defending values of sovereignty, independence and brotherhood.” Similarly, Kalu (2009: 20) asserts that “while the capacity for collective action in the international community, especially the UN, has always existed, it has not been deployed for the protection of individuals against their governments in Africa.” This highlights incapacities on the part of UN and AU in dealing with conflicts. AU has failed to uphold Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. Further to this, the above observation suggest that AU and UN failed to implement R2P doctrine that seeks to overcome the OAU’s principle of non-interference that made the AU predecessor OAU useless in the face of rising intra-state conflicts.

Conflict resolutions have also faced challenges related to resources. This has weakened the capacities, efficiency and effectiveness of the UN, AU and RECs in dealing with conflicts. Article 43(1) of the UN Charter states,

All members of the UN in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the SC on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities including right of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

It should be noted that most of the troop contributing countries (UN member states) are unenthusiastic in fulfilling this obligation. A majority of UN missions are under staffed and under resourced. This has become a serious challenge to the fulfilment of various missions under the UN and REC mandates. For instance, in South Sudan, International Crisis Group Report (2014) points out that the proposed deployment of the Protection and Deterrence Force (PDF) and Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) in South Sudan have been stalling due to constraints in the availability of human and other resources. Troop contributing countries are not availing their personnel to support such deployments.

Kalu (2009: 20) citing Jentleson (2007: 583-584) asserts that, the Responsibility to Protect international doctrine pledges “to take collective action if national authorities manifestly fail to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” In explaining this doctrine, Mehta (2009: 2) states that,

If a particular state is unwilling or unable to carry out its responsibility to prevent such abuses, that responsibility must be transferred to the international community, which will solve problems primarily via peaceful means (such as diplomatic pressure, dialogue, even sanctions), an expression of universal morality or, as a last resort, through the use of military force.

International legal frameworks exist to enable members of the international community to intervene in situations that involve threats to human security such as genocides and other serious human rights violations. However, the R2P doctrine has not been effectively used by the continental body AU. For it to be useful there is need for AU to embrace it in dealing with some of the conflicts. However, this will be possible in a situation where the ASF has been operationalised, at the moment it remains an unrealised doctrine. The regional standby brigades which are to constitute ASF are yet to be operationalised this therefore makes it difficult to talk about ASF.

2.6 The African Experience of Proxy Wars

There are differing views between scholars with regard to the term proxy war. Craig (2010: 4) states that the term “proxy war was used to refer to the super powers’ use of allied factions or states to pursue their global rivalry outside the structures of Northern Hemisphere nuclear deterrence.” Safire’s Political Dictionary (2008) states that “proxy war has also been taken to mean both ‘localised conflict’ with outside sponsors and ‘brush fire war’ (a war likely to spread quickly unless put out).” In the Cold War period it referred to wars between West and the East. The two (West and East) were sponsoring their allied factions in a third country. The second definition encompasses all conflict whereby there is an external sponsor to the protagonists. The two definitions however concur on the fact that there is need to have third hand in a conflict for it to qualify as a proxy war. A third player in a conflict seeks to extend interests in the parties involved and state concerned. The two definitions therefore open a room to explore whether contemporary civil wars are not proxy wars.

Proxy wars experienced in Africa in the Cold War era came in various forms besides the ideological confrontation of communism and capitalism. In highlighting the experiences and

activities of the Cold War “Kingstone and Spears (2004: 18) state that “during the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union provided large quantities of military aid to client regimes in the developing world.” In concurrence, Hironaka (2005: 23) states that, “In the bitter Cold War rivalry, superpowers supported “friendly” regimes and strove to undermine “hostile” ones as a matter of course — and the other superpower often countered.” However, proxy wars were not limited to superpowers, Craig (2010: 14) highlights this by stating that, “South Africa’s capacity for material support and occasional direct strikes against the enemies of its chosen faction, clearly served to constitute much of its power in the proxy relationship.” The conduct of proxy wars is/was not a preserve of the superpowers, they can be conducted by any country which has an interest in the developments of a neighbouring state or any other state. Propping up chosen factions directly or indirectly will ensure that the interest of the sponsoring state will be protected. Considering the fact that a number of civil wars in Africa involves factions chances are high that most of the factions have proxy relationships.

In the Cold War period Africa become a fighting ground between the East and the West. Commenting about the proxy war in Angola, Ferguson (2003: 246) asserts that “after independence, the superpowers channelled their support in the form of weapons and military training to their factions of choice.” Meanwhile, commenting about the DRC conflict, Alao (2007: 129) states that “the general assumption has been that many of the external actors in the conflict intervened for the sole purpose of profiting from the country’s mineral wealth.” There is divergence in the motive behind external actors’ involvement in intra-state conflict. In the Cold War period it was ideological drive while in the Post-Cold War era other motive such as economic motives became central for external hand in conflicts. It remains to be seen whether the motive for the current involvement of neighbouring countries in civil wars in Africa is related to proxy wars.

In the South Sudanese conflict there are a number of external players involved directly or indirectly for instance Uganda and Sudan. International Crisis Group (2014: 22) asserts that, “the current intervention of regional forces, including but not limited to the Ugandan and Sudanese armed groups, puts Kampala and Khartoum on a collision course in South Sudan. Indeed, broader regional intervention opens a Pandora’s Box of possible proxy conflict.” Similarly, commenting about the DRC conflict, Alao (2007: 123) states that,

the intransigence to peace moves has been both from the different warring factions and from the regional countries that were involved in the war ... one characteristic of the war is that the nature of regional interest was so complex that the extent of the local factions' capability to dictate developments was severely limited.

The involvement of external forces in the ensuing conflicts in the continent is ostensibly rife. Various nations are apparently pursuing their interest in these conflict areas. Further to this, it seems prolongation of conflicts is due to the fact that it involves a lot of interested groups which cannot easily reach an agreement. This is highlighted in the DRC case. However, it still remains to be ascertained whether the involvement of these external forces is related to proxy wars or is related to other factors such as protection of the involved country's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter gave an anatomy of political conflicts from a global perspective, their causes and theoretical explanation. It examined the evolution of conflicts from interstate to intrastate in the wake of the post-Cold War epoch. A discussion of the upsurge of intrastate conflict and the motivating factors behind such phenomenological development was given. An examination of conflicts in Africa from a historical perspective was made. The resolution of conflicts through various conflict resolution strategies was discussed. A consideration of the challenges encountered in the process of conflict resolution were also discussed. The chapter also examined proxy wars in the post WWII and the possibility of their existence in the contemporary intrastate conflicts. The historical overview of the study made in this chapter laid the foundation for the conceptual understanding of the study which was covered in the preceding Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3: DYNAMICS AND COMPLEXITIES OF THE SOUTH SUDANESE CONFLICT AND THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS: NEXUS

3.1 Introduction

The Chapter discusses the major concepts, delving much into the dynamism and complexity of South Sudan conflict and the effects of these to the resolution of the South Sudanese conflict. A discussion on conflict and conflict resolution was made initially with the intention of understanding the meaning of the two. A detailed discussion of conflict resolution strategies employed in the South Sudanese conflict and their effectiveness was made. Regional involvement which included Uganda's interests and intervention, Sudan, IGAD, AU and the international community was covered and also the extent to which they affected the resolution of the conflict. The chapter unravel the two variables of the study.

3.2 Dynamism and Complexities of South Sudan Conflict and the Effect of These in Conflict Resolution

According to Gebrewold (2009: 155) the "split within Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) began in 1983." The 15 December 2013 SPLM split took the form of the 1992 split which saw SPLM breaking into two ethnic groups the Nuer and the Dinka. The split of SPLM gave a new twist to the southern conflict in the 1990s, just like it did in 2013. Infighting amongst the protagonists in the 2013 conflict widened the scope of the conflict resolution strategies. Regional efforts took into consideration all the warring factions in the resolution of the conflict although the wide frontage that was created by the split made it difficult for the conflict to be resolved. In reference to the 2013 South Sudan conflict, The Herald of 31 October 2015, states that despite the commitment by the warring faction in South Sudan to end hostilities fighting on the ground still continued. The conflict de-escalated soon after the signing of the peace agreement on 27 August 2015. However, violations were being experienced as indicated by the 31 October Herald Newspaper.

According to NTV Special Report on South Sudan of 22 March 2015, by February 2015 SPLM/A led by Salva Kiir and SPLM/A-IO led by Riek Machar were both stockpiling weapons for the resumption of hostilities. On the same report David Pulkol, a regional Security Analyst states that the stockpiling of arms of war by both sides indicated prospects of conflict escalation. Stockpiling of arms of war by the two fighting parties were preparations for the resumption of the conflict following a period of lull. Resultantly,

numerous violations of ceasefire agreements were witnessed. For instance, according to the Report of the Office of the Special Envoys for South Sudan of 12 November 2015, as from 08 February 2014 to 12 November 2015, a total of 52 incidents which resulted in violations of Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) or The Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement (PCTSA) were recorded. The statistics highlights intermittent escalation episodes since the first ceasefire agreement was signed in February 2014.

An AU Special Report as given in NTV Special Report of 22 March 2015 substantiates this by stating that “The violence ethnically cleansed the city of Juba of its Nuer population. The motive of this violence was political: the violence, which originated as a schism in the governing elite of South Sudan, targeted one particular ethnicity, the Nuer.” The fact that the conflict migrated from a political discord to an ethnically charged one meant that the Nuer who were targeted when the conflict started also took revenge at an opportune time, thereby transforming the conflict from a struggle for power to an ethnic based conflict. The conflict became polarised on ethnic lines throughout the country.

According to the South Sudan Special Report on NTV of 22 March 2015 as the conflict escalated, the number of stakeholders to the conflict also increased. The report states that this meant that the conflict could no longer be solved by two parties that is, the GRSS and SPLM/A–IO. Every solution was to cater for all stakeholders involved for example according to CCTV Africa Live News published on 21 July 2015, in the Arusha Peace initiative three warring factions participated in the peace initiative that is Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and Deng Alor. The multiplicity of stakeholders as highlighted above and the multiplicity of conflict fronts as will be highlighted below have a role in the success or failure of the resolution of conflicts. Commenting on the Darfur crisis that began in 2003, Idris (2005: 77) states that, “the recent political violence in the Western region of Darfur demonstrates the complexity of the Sudan’s tragedy. While the GoS and the SPLM/A are negotiating to end the longest running civil war in the south, a new civil war erupted in the region of Darfur.” The eruption of new conflict in Sudan threatened to scuttle peace initiatives that were being pursued at that time. The mushrooming of other political conflicts during the north-south civil war was a litmus test for the abilities of the Sudan conflict stakeholders in conflict resolution. Sudan had challenges in containing multiple emerging conflicts, an indication that it had problems in conflict resolution and prevention. Furthermore, in the case of South Sudan the ballooning of stakeholders entailed a broad based approach to the resolution of the conflict, failure of which

had the effect of negatively impacting on the conflict resolution efforts that were being pursued. Hence the conflict raged on despite several peace agreements.

The degeneration of the political situation in South Sudan happened over a period of time. The United States Institute of Peace Report on South Sudan's Political Turmoil of 01 August 2013 points out that on 23 July 2013, President Salva Kiir relieved the Vice President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers of their positions. On the same day he suspended the Party's Secretary General Pagan Amum. Some analysts point out that due to these developments, tension started to mount within SPLM as uncertainty amongst the political future of the dismissed SPLM party/government officials increased. However, the conflict remained latent until 15 December 2013 when open violence erupted in Juba from the Presidential Guards Units. The 15 December 2013 open armed clashes marked the highest level of the conflict as each side sought to overcome the other through escalation. Efforts to bring the major two protagonists to the negotiating table became highly improbable hence the January 2014 talks failed to end the hostilities. The situation was not yet ripe in accordance with the assertion of Zartman in the ripeness theory.

The course taken by political conflicts are at times difficult to predict. In the December 2013 conflict within the SPLM party, contentious issues were struggles over power. Reports indicate that the dichotomisation of the political space within SPLM emerged when Riek Machar indicated that he was going to challenge Salva Kiir in the leadership of the party and that he was going to contest as the President in the national elections of 2015. Ambassador Princeton N Lyman (US) in his testimony prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee highlights that, the challenge by Riek Machar ignited the conflict within SPLM. However, the conflict as it escalated moved from the need for power to ethnicity. This is similar to the course that an earlier conflict within SPLM took. Idris (2005: 53) states that "The SPLM/A political discourse claimed that it was not a separatist movement but one that sought to unite the whole country along political lines that transcend regional, ethnic and racial interest." Many scholars indicate that this has been the motive of SPLM/A since 1983 (Kingston and Spears 2004, Gebrewold 2009). However, as the conflict escalated, SPLM/A clamoured for self-determination. When SPLM realised that its initial objectives were hard to realise, it changed focus. The resolution of the conflict took two decades as from 1983 to the CPA of 2005, similarly the 2013 conflict went on for some time although despite the fact that there was de-escalation at some point.

Reconciliation of the warring parties has been the missing link in many conflicts. According to end genocide report intercommunal violence in Jonglei State was worrying as local tribes carried out revenge attacks for cattle raids which in some instances involved the razing of entire villages. The report highlights that ethnic targeting and hate speech were underlying the clashes and these were disturbing dimensions. There existed a lot of resemblance to other conflicts experienced elsewhere. In the Niger Delta conflict for example, Porter et al (2005: 57) state that “the Niger-Delta crisis is a complex one; with each of the region’s ethnic groups fighting its neighbours. They are seemingly all enemies, with no two groups being able to unite in friendship.” The two scenarios can be summarised using the Hobbesian theoretical state of nature where everyone would be up against another. The fact that South Sudan conflict encompasses local ethnic clashes entail that conflict resolution strategies employed were to consider all the strata in the South Sudanese society. Indicators from various peace initiatives suggest that all conflict resolution efforts were centred on the warring SPLM/A factions, and local ethnic cattle raids conflicts were not taken seriously. In accordance with Putnam’s Two Level Game theory, consideration of one level in the resolution of the conflict could have dire consequences in the resolution of the whole conflict. The neglect of the other level (that is the local level) by the international community could explain prolongation and lack of amicability in the resolution of the South Sudan conflict.

In the South Sudanese conflict external influence has added some flavour in the locus of the conflict. According to Endgenocide Report of 2015, South Sudan was faced with militia groups many of which were being sponsored by Sudan. The report cites the Jonglei based Yau Yau militias as one of the groups being sponsored by Sudan. The report also highlights that despite a seemingly peaceful co-existence between Sudan and South Sudan there are multiple unresolved and contentious issues between the two. The issues include amongst others the status of the oil rich Abyei region, border delineation and sharing of the South’s oil wealth. The scenario depicts an uneasy relationship between the two countries. It is from this background that all effort to resolve the conflict came to naught, as possibilities of destabilisation by the externally sponsored militias exist. Tenacity of conflict in such scenarios could be challenging.

3.3 An Outline of the Nature of South Sudan Conflict and its Effect in the Resolution of the Conflict

A number of views have been given about the nature of conflicts, Stetter (2007: 8) asserts that “conflicts are, thus, ubiquitous phenomena ... while most social conflicts have a tendency for entropy and disappear quickly; some of them stabilise and develop into quite solid conflict patterns or conflict structures.” This same view is shared by Messmer 2003, Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006). It is further pointed out that once conflicts have stabilised and developed into a solid state, they tend to overarch rather than coexist alongside other social structures and, thereby, shape socio-political discourses and practices (Stetter 2007). Commenting on the South Sudanese conflict Koos and Gutschke (2014) substantiate the above views by stating that since the outbreak of the conflict in December 2013, an estimated 10 000 people have been killed and over 1 million displaced (UNHCR 2014), 400 000 fled to neighbouring countries and more than 800 000 internally displaced. They further state that economically the conflict has disrupted oil production which provides 98% of government income. Trade between Uganda and Kenya has since dropped drastically amongst other social and economic ills brought by the conflict. The conflict virtually transcended to other aspects of human life.

A number of schools of thought were put forward regarding conflicts developments. Some scholars view conflict from a contagion perspective, for example Lobell and Mauceri (2004: 3) state that, “diffusion (or contagion) entails igniting conflict in other states or the spill over processes by which conflicts in one country directly affect neighbouring countries (Gurr, 1993; Migdal, 1988; Lake and Rothchild, 1998).” In the context of South Sudan, Mesfin (2015) points out that Ethiopia was concerned that the South Sudan crisis could spill over to Gambella, a region in Ethiopia close to South Sudan. Furthermore, Ethiopia was worried that if the situation deteriorates in South Sudan to the extent of a collapse to the South Sudan government, Eritrea could use South Sudan to infiltrate Ethiopian rebels in order to destabilise Ethiopia. Conflicts could therefore spread across borders from one country to the other. In South Sudan a number of players were directly or indirectly involved. For example, Mesfin (2015) indicates that Eritrea was clandestinely involved in South Sudan in support of Riek Machar. Consequently, most of the countries forming IGAD and even beyond developed interests in the conflict in South Sudan. They wanted to stop the conflict as soon as

possible. It was not surprising that IGAD quickly intervened and tried to mediate in the conflict.

Another school of thought that seeks to explain the development of conflicts has been articulated by, Lobell and Mauceri (2004: 2) who postulate that, “conflict is viewed as the result of purely internal disputes and histories, only indirectly influenced by external dynamics.” This is a digression from the contagion school, it can also be contextualised in the South Sudanese situation. In South Sudan the fight has been over the democratic space within the party for instance, Koos and Gutschke (2014) states that the current crisis in South Sudan began in July 2013 when President Salva Kiir fired his entire Cabinet, including Vice President Riek Machar, without any explanations. It is also the analysts’ view that Kiir’s move uncovered a power struggle that had been smouldering within SPLM for quite some time. Besides being contagious, conflicts can also be purely internal developments with less external influence although in the maturation of the conflict external players might join in. The cause of political conflicts therefore remains a mystery to many scholars. They can be explained using both the contagion and internal development schools of thought.

3.4 Disentangling Conflict Resolution: Conceptual Definition

The term Conflict Resolution acquired much popularity in the aftermath of WWII although the concept of Conflict Resolution has been in existence and practised since ancient times. Wani (2011: 105) understands conflict resolution as a situation “where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all violent actions against each other.” Meanwhile, Miller (2005: 25) asserts that conflict resolution mean “a variety of approaches aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive solving of problems, distinct from management or transformation of conflicts.” According to Maill and Woodhouse (2001: 15) in conflict resolution “it is expected that the deep rooted sources of conflict are addressed and resolved, and behaviour is no longer violent, nor are attitudes hostile any longer, while structure of the conflict has been changed.” What is evident in the definitions is that conflict resolution encompasses all efforts or processes that seek to ameliorate the differences between the antagonists and efforts to extinguish all conflicts sources. Conflict resolution therefore entails a process of finding common ground between the contending parties in an effort to de-escalate or to contain potential conflicts. This can be done through negotiations, mediations, arbitration and peacekeeping amongst other conflict resolution strategies.

3.5 South Sudan Conflict vis-à-vis Conflict Resolution Strategies

The conflict in South Sudan had been viewed by many analysts as a conflict based on power struggles. In an interview on CCTV News Africa published on 16 December 2014, Ambassador Ezekiel Lol Gatkouth (one of the last four out of eleven detainees to be released from prison following the 15 December 2013 political disturbances in South Sudan) states that the conflict in South Sudan was not a tribal war but it was only an issue of misunderstanding with President Salva Kiir over political reforms which included the need for democracy within the party. This view was further substantiated by President Museveni's speech on CCTV News Africa on 23 January 2015 following the signing of the Peace deal in Arusha where he said that "The crisis started in the party and went in the country." The nature of the conflict suggest that the resolution of the conflict was to start from the party hence the mediation effort that was initiated sought to find a common understanding between the two conflicting parties of SPLM/A. However, according to the Arusha Agreement, the conditionalities contained in the agreement failed to bring closer the protagonists. Such clauses as the reformation and transformation of the political party became a hindrance in the resolution of the conflict.

When violent clashes broke out on 15 December 2013 it soon became an ethnic confrontation between the two major ethnic groups the Dinka and the Nuer. According to Blanchard (2014: 2) "tensions and mistrust among South Sudanese leaders and ethnic groups ... date back to Sudan's civil war (1983-2005) and before." However, in a Press Conference broadcast by Press TV on 14 May 2014, Riek Machar refuted the issue of mistrust between him and President Salva Kiir. He criticised the US Secretary of State John Kerry for stating that the ongoing conflict was a result of personal hostility between himself and President Salva Kiir. Machar stated that such impression was misleading. However, the ethnic dimension of the conflict remains. Ethnic differences emerged strong during the Sudan's internal strife (1983-2005). The Nuer led by Riek Machar committed atrocities against the Dinka led by John Garang and vice versa. In the new wave of violence that started on 15 December 2013 the situation replicated itself. This was also the same to other conflicts that were experienced as from 2011, ethnicity was at the centre of these conflict which led to the formation of militia groups such as the White Army and Yau Yau. However, the fact that peace agreements such as the Arusha Peace initiative of 23 January 2015 emphasised on the need to discontinue all forms of tribalism and sectarianism indicated that the conflict had strong ethnic identity

politics undertones. Hence, the polarisation of the conflict made the resolution of the conflict to take longer than expected.

Mediation has been the main conflict resolution strategy that has been used in most conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. Shaw (2005: 921) states that “mediation involves the use of a third party, whether an individual or individuals, a state or group of states or an international organisation, to encourage the contending parties to come to a settlement.” In this regard, the South Sudan Macro-Conflict Analysis (2015) states that the mediation effort by the regional body IGAD, led by three mediators (one each from Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan), to end the conflict did not succeed. It points out that the 5 March 2015 deadline that was agreed upon by President Salva Kiir and Dr Riek Machar to negotiate outstanding political and security issues and end the conflict elapsed and the conflict escalated. On the same note, on 27 August 2015, the protagonists signed a peace agreement that was to signal the end of the hostilities. However, the Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVT) that were formed in 2014 to monitor peace violations in South Sudan indicated that by 13 September 2015 the peace deal was being violated. Skirmishes were being experienced in states such as Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei. The developments on the ground indicate that mediation did not manage to fully deal with the conflict in South Sudan.

The slow pace in the achievement of the peace and loss of patience amongst the stakeholders to South Sudan conflict has seen the mediation process being expanded. According to International Crisis Group (2015: 3) “IGAD-PLUS was announced in March 2015 following fifteen months of unsuccessful mediation. IGAD-PLUS members include the African Union (AU), UN, European Union (EU), the Troika (US, UK and Norway), China and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF)” However, it is argued that the expanded mediation effort met resistance from the GRSS who opposed the inclusion of Troika in the mediation process preferring that its role be limited to an observer status. The involvement of other members outside the IGAD community in the resolution of the conflict was designed to bring credence to the mediation process, however, it faced the same fate of the earlier mediation initiative. Meanwhile, parallel mediation process was also initiated. According to the Joint Agency Briefing Note of 2014 the need to address SPLM party crisis made members of the ruling parties in Tanzania and South Africa to convene a separate mediation effort called the Arusha process. The mediation process was based on the basis that the re-unification of the SPLM party was a critical pre-condition to SPLM. It is however argued that the parallel mediation

effort detracted the one led by IGAD hence a number of factors were undermining the effort to deal with the conflict.

Use of sanctions to end the conflict was also contemplated and was used to ripen the conflict. This was in accordance with Zartman's Ripeness theory where a third party pressure can be used to bear pressure on the protagonists in an effort to ripen the conflict resulting in the cessation of hostilities. Koos and Gutschke (2014) indicate that in March 2014 the US, Norway, UK and EU threatened to impose sanctions on the GRSS and rebels if they continued to undermine peace efforts and ceasefire agreements. Meanwhile, the UNSC also considered the imposition of sanctions due to the scale of violence by both parties. The US authorised targeted sanctions such as Visa ban and the seizure of assets to both sides. These threats remained cosmetic and were not implemented. However, in the peace deal signed by Salva Kiir on 23 August 2015, the threat of sanctions greatly motivated Salva Kiir to sign the agreement. According to a Reuter's publication of 26 August 2015, US State Department Spokesman John Kirby said that if Kiir failed to sign the deal, the United States would support further UN sanctions. The US had proposed a United Nations arms embargo and more sanctions from 06 September 2015 unless Kiir signed the Pact. Salva Kiir was given a 15 day ultimatum to sign the deal which he complied with on 26 August 2015 well before the deadline. This conflict resolution mechanism greatly reduced the scale of hostilities between the belligerents although the conflict never stopped.

3.6 Regional Involvement in South Sudan and Conflict Resolution

The conflict in South Sudan attracted a number of countries both in the region and outside the region. Some of these countries were involved directly while others were indirectly involved. All the involved countries are purporting to be assisting in the resolution of the conflict which had claimed thousands of lives. Besides the involvement of individual countries the continental body AU and the international community also added weight towards the resolution of the conflict. The discussion of the role of these countries and continental body AU will be done in the subsequent discourse.

3.6.1 Involvement of Uganda and its Implications to Conflict Resolution Strategies

In an interview with NTV on a Special Report on South Sudan of 22 March 2015, UPDF Spokesperson Lt Col Paddy Ankunda, stated that Uganda has strategic interest in South

Sudan. He highlighted that South Sudan is the largest export market of Uganda and that Uganda hosts a huge refugee population from South Sudan, hence this had a security implications to Uganda as a nation. The interview highlighted that UPDF was going to remain in South Sudan to protect these interests and as long as the bilateral agreement between the two countries required them to do so. Hutton (2014: 44) highlights similar sentiments by UPDF Chief General Katumba Wamala who argued that Uganda has, “an obligation to see South Sudan stand as a nation”, adding that an ungovernable South Sudan was a threat to Ugandan security. Meanwhile, commenting about the UPDF deployment in South Sudan, Brown (2014: 7) points out that “The unilateral military intervention by the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) added to the regional complexity of the crisis. UPDF support for the GRSS’s fight against Riek Machar’s forces ... has threatened ... a sustained Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA).” It was the view of many analysts that the involvement of UPDF had negative effect in the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan. In line with this, in an interview with NTV published on 22 March 2015 David Pulkol ordered UPDF to move out of South Sudan indicating that the involvement of UPDF was a sticky issue that affected the resolution of the conflict.

In a view analogous to the above, Blanchard (2014: 13) points out that, “... the perception of bias toward President Kiir by Museveni may complicate IGAD’s mediation effort going forward.” Similarly, International Crisis Group (2014: 11) is of the view that “Uganda’s ongoing combat role has complicated IGAD’s task and been a stalling point for the SPLM-in Opposition, which demands that Kampala withdraw the troops prior to further dialogue.” There was a concurrency amongst scholars that despite being the most qualified regional institution to deal with the South Sudanese conflict, IGAD lacks credence due to the unilateral involvement of Uganda, a member of IGAD, in support of President Salva Kiir against Riek Machar. Neutrality and impartiality on the part of IGAD as a regional body responsible for the resolution of South Sudanese conflict had been compromised. However, in an interview with NTV on 22 March 2015 Professor Philip Kasaija, an International Law Expert, indicated otherwise, noting that in as much as he supports the call to withdraw UPDF he had ambivalence over the matter. His concern was on filling the gap that was going to be left by the withdrawal of UPDF. He felt that to some extent UPDF was very important in stabilising the situation and its withdrawal was going to affect the stability of South Sudan.

There is also debate amongst various scholars and analysts regarding the involvement of Uganda in South Sudan. Jok (2014: 4) highlights this by stating that,

Uganda's role in South Sudan's conflict continues to be the subject of much heated debate, with some suggesting that it is within the rights of a sovereign states to forge military alliances with other countries and the critics of this alliance saying that it is an alliance that is shrouded by lack of transparency and legislative oversight as would be required of an open democratic society.

There are divergent views of various schools of thought regarding the intervention of Uganda in the conflict. This divergence was evident in John Ndebesa, a Senior History Lecturer at Makerere University who regrets the deployment of UPDF. In an interview with IRIN on 14 October 2015 he states that, "We need dialogue and mediation rather than militarism to solve crises in this volatile region. Whenever a crisis happens in the region, we [Uganda] rush into military means and that has failed to work. Militarism compounds the problem." The above excerpts indicates that there was nothing wrong in getting assistance from other states in an effort to address internal problems. On the contrary, others are of the view that the alliance between GRSS and Uganda was questionable and unwarranted and had compounded the problem rather than solving it. The debate indicated the controversy that surrounds Ugandan intervention in South Sudan. The controversy was linked to the challenges that were faced dealing with the conflict.

3.6.2 Sudan Involvement in South Sudan Conflict

Arguments have arisen to the fact that intra-South Sudan division was successfully taken advantage of and worsened by Sudan government (Gebrewold, 2009; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012 and Blanchard, 2014). Several scholars' view was that the conflict continued due to activities of Sudan that was sponsoring various rebel factions thereby complicating the whole conflict. It is also believed that this made the conflict resolution strategies yield very little positive outcomes. Ultimately, South Sudan remained in a perpetual state of conflict despite several peace initiatives that were applied.

Ottaway and El-Sadany (2012: 3) state that, "Although the North appeared to accept the results of the referendum and to resign itself to its much diminished status as a country that had lost one-third of its territory and three quarters of its oil in reality it did not." It is argued that Sudan has remained very active in the political developments of the South and more often destabilised it. In testimony to this allegation, David Pulkol, a Regional Security Analyst in an interview with NTV on 22 March 2015, stated that Khartoum was to be ordered

to stop meddling in the affairs of South Sudan. It should also be noted that, historically, according to Gebrewold (2009: 154) “the Sudanese government maintained the violence system in South Sudan through direct military intervention and through re-division of the region into three sub regions with the aim of undermining the intra-south solidarity.” The indirect involvement of Sudan in the conflict in South Sudan may also provide the basis for the prolongation of the conflict. A third hand in the form of Sudan either directly or indirectly had a far reaching effects in attempting to find a solution to the conflict. Various sponsored militia/rebel groups have been the biggest peace spoilers in the South Sudanese conflict. An example is the Yau Yau militia in Jonglei State.

On the same note, according to Blanchard (2014: 12) “the Sudan government in Khartoum fuels SPLM splits by financing and arming breakaway factions.” Similarly, an NTV Special Report on South Sudan of 22 March 2015 implicate Sudan and Eritrea in the conflict by highlighting that they were sponsoring Riek Machar in an effort to counter UPDF support to Salva Kiir. The role of Sudan in the resolution of the South Sudan conflict therefore becomes conspicuous due to its double edged posture. However, it took the role of mediation together with Kenya and Ethiopia. Sudan remained very important due to the fact that as a member of IGAD and as a neighbour of South Sudan, it was expected to play an important role in the resolution of the conflict. However, allegations levelled against Sudan made it difficult for some protagonists in South Sudan to trust it. Further to this, frontier wars remained between Sudan and South Sudan. Some analysts such as Mesfin (2015: 4) highlights the fact that, the status quo in South Sudan is good for the GoS stating that a “civil war would present the extraordinary opportunity of preventing the emergence of a stronger and oil-rich state allied to Uganda and it would allow Sudan to re-establish its traditional influence over South Sudanese politics ...”

3.6.3 IGAD and the Resolution of South Sudan Conflict

IGAD took a lead in the resolution of South Sudan conflict. International Crisis Group (2014: 20) asserts that “regional leaders were quick to launch IGAD-led mediation efforts, focusing on a cessation of hostilities and the release of the eleven political detainees.” Congruously, Blanchard (2014: 13) states that, “Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) ... has sought to mediate talks between key leaders in the crisis with the support of the UN and the AU.” When the conflict broke out in December 2013, IGAD took the responsibility to deal with the conflict just like any other regional body in the continent. The IGAD efforts

were underwritten by AU and UN who are guarantors of peace agreements in the continent in support of regional efforts. However, delays in reaching the agreement suggested that IGAD faced some obstacles and the continuous violations of the peace deal could also be a testimony to that.

Brown (2014: 9) is of the view that “interventions of the regional leaders mask their narrow national interests, which in turn are undermining the credibility of the IGAD process led by chief mediator Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia.” Similarly, International Crisis Group (2014: 21) highlights that, “the involvement of IGAD and non-IGAD neighbours as well as the AU, UN, Troika, China, and others in resolving South Sudan’s civil war poses challenges to the international community’s ability to coordinate and reach consensus.” Other than IGAD there are other interested bodies and individuals who were involved in the resolution of the conflict. The involvement of these parties were seen as a hindrance to the resolution of the conflict due to their lack of coordination

It is the view of (Ibid) that, “despite divisions over how best to resolve the civil war, IGAD ... announced its intention to send a Protection and Deterrence Force (PDF) as part of the ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM).” The force was deployed in 2014 with several Monitoring and Verification Teams deployed in conflict hot spots. There is a view that MVM could be used as cover for national armies to pursue divergent national interests of the involved countries (Ibid). The initiative to deploy an intervention force indicates frustration with the slow progress in mediation and that national, regional and other international actors lost faith in United Nations Mission In South Sudan (UNMISS) which had a new redefined mandate of protecting the IDPs. Deployment of a peace monitoring force failed to arrest the fight between the warring factions. PDF was restricted to monitoring of peace violations rather than addressing the underlying causes of violence amongst the fighting factions.

3.6.4 AU’s Intervention in the South Sudanese Conflict

AU as a continental body is mandated to deal with conflicts in Africa. Shaw (2005: 930) highlights this by stating that, “Article XIX of its Charter referred to the principle of ‘the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.’” The excerpt is in reference to AU predecessor OAU. It is observed that a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established by the Protocol of 21 July 1964. This

formed the basis on which AU is currently dealing with conflicts. In reference to the 2013 outbreak of the South Sudan conflict, International Crisis Group (2015: 23) states that “following the war’s outbreak, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) established a Commission of Inquiry into alleged atrocities.” The AU took the initiative though in support of IGAD to de-escalate the conflict. The inquiry was designed to give the continental body the basis of de-escalating the conflict by threatening those alleged to be involved in committing atrocities with ICC indictment. This was designed to discourage those involved in genocides, crimes against humanity and war crimes to revise their behaviour. The NTV Special Report on South Sudan of 22 March 2015 highlighted that the leaders of the two major warring groups, that is, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar were recommended for indictment by the above stated AU Report. Besides the Commission of Inquiry and Report, AU remained docile in the South Sudanese conflict only opting to play a supportive role to IGAD.

3.6.5 International Community in South Sudan Conflict Resolution

The breakout of the South Sudanese conflict in 2011 epitomised the failure by the international community to prevent the conflict that was evidently building. This point of view was supported by Akol (2014: 13) who has made an observation that “Unlike the negotiations that ended the last protracted Sudan’s north-south conflict in 2005 with the signing of the CPA, the international community has taken a more layback approach when it comes to the current IGAD-led mediation process...” Similarly, International Crisis Group (2015: 19) opines that, “As IGAD struggled ... the UN, AU and bilateral partners largely watched from the side lines, rarely offering or being asked for greater political support.” It is argued that for Western countries it was of a lesser significance than winning IGAD member states’ support in fighting transnational terrorism. China was also concerned with the protection of oil infrastructure. Lack of commitment by the international community exacerbated the delays in finding a lasting solution to the conflict. The UN played a restricted political role since the outbreak of the conflict (Ibid: 21). UNMISS did not engage at any stage in the peace process. However, according to CCTV Africa Live of 21 July 2015, the international community intervened in the form of IGAD-Plus which was launched in South Africa in March 2015, the initiative involved regional and international players such as South Africa, Nigeria, China and the United States amongst other countries. However, the involvement of IGAD-Plus made no impact to the resolution of the conflict.

3.7 Conclusion

The chapter discussed concepts of interest to the study in an effort to make a deeper understanding of the involved variables. The dynamism and complexities of conflicts and the effects of these on the resolution of the South Sudanese conflict were discussed. Conflict resolution was discussed in an effort to simplify its understanding in relation to the South Sudan conflict. Conflict resolution strategies that were used to address the conflict were considered and their effectiveness in addressing the conflict analysed. The chapter also discussed involvement of the regional and international players in the conflict and also examined their influence in the resolution of the conflict. The chapter laid the foundation for Chapter 4 which sought to bring to fore the major findings of the study.

CHAPTER 4: DYNAMICS AND CONVOLUTIONS VIS-À-VIS EFFICACIOUS CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTH SUDAN

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the major findings of the study. On the nature of the conflict in South Sudan, political schism and lack of tolerance within SPLM/A became topical. It emerged that there is a link between the December 2013 conflict and the Second Sudan Civil War of 1983-2005. Matters to do with corruption, elitism, lack of democratic space within SPLM/A, external interference from Sudan and lack of accountability on the part of the government formed part of the findings on the nature of the conflict. On conflict resolution strategies it emerged that Africa was handicapped in terms of resources and finance. Solutions proffered to deal with the conflict were not suitable as a result they failed dismally. Exclusion of some stakeholders have seen a number of peace spoilers emerging. An analysis of the dynamics and complexities of the conflict and their effects in conflict resolution sums up the chapter.

4.2 The Political Schism and Lack of Tolerance within SPLM/A

According to a number of respondents, the civil war in South Sudan was centred on power politics by the ruling elites. They stated that, the conflict in South Sudan was a tug of war for political power between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar. Both parties were not interested in any peace treaty that did not assure them of absolute political power, thereby creating a challenge in the resolution of the conflict. Respondents pointed out that these traits were apparent for quite some time in the SPLM/A. In 1992 Riek Machar broke away from SPLM/A and led a splinter group that fought against SPLM/A as well as the Khartoum government. Meanwhile, at the dawn of the 2005 CPA, Salva Kiir was alleged to have been involved in a plot to depose John Garang from the chairman/leadership of SPLM/A. These political developments within SPLM mirror the volatility that was in the making within the party for quite some time. Some respondents pointed out that loss of patience by Riek Machar quickened the pace for the degeneration of the relations between the two warring camps. The respondents were of the view that the announcement by Riek Machar that he was intending to contest in both the leadership of the country and the party SPLM was enough to kick start the conflict. Two rival groups emerged in the process between those who were advocating for the leadership renewal within SPLM and the country and the reactionary elements who wanted to maintain the status quo.

On a related note that highlighted internal political discord within South Sudan and SPLM party, it was the view of some respondents that the number of rebel groups in South Sudan highlighted that the political situation in that country was capricious. Meanwhile, SPLM/A as a party was characterised by defections even in the newly independent South Sudan. In 2013 SPLM split into two SPLM/A and SPLM/A-IO. Further ruptures also took place within SPLM/A-IO. For instance, former Chairman of National Committee for Finance and Resource Mobilisation for the SPLM/A-IO Gabriel Changson Law Chang defected from SPLM/A-IO. Changson accused Riek Machar of dictatorship, the same accusation that former Vice President Machar levelled against Kiir in 2013. Internal instabilities within South Sudanese political parties defined the conflict in South Sudan. Some respondents linked this to the view by some analysts and scholars that SPLM/A had failed to transform itself into a political party, hence any disagreements within the party ended up as a violent armed confrontation with the conflicting parties seeking to solve their differences through violent clashes.

4.2.1 Relation of the December 2013 Conflict with the Second Sudan Civil War (1983-2005): Genealogy of the Current Conflict

It was the view of some of the respondents that the outbreak of the December 2013 skirmishes in South Sudan are nothing but a continuation of a long existing incompatible differences that existed between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar. According to some respondents Riek Machar never wanted to be part of SPLM but was only interested in taking over the reins of power. They pointed out that this was one of the main reason that led him to break away from SPLM/A in 1992 resulting in him making direct negotiations with the north. It is argued by some respondents that Riek Machar has for some time been trying to parachute himself to the top echelons of South Sudan. They stated that in his initial break away during the north-south civil war he hoped that his breakaway was going to greatly undermine SPLM/A's war effort and ultimately decimate it, leaving his SPLM/A-Nasir as the only competitor in taking over the control of the south. However, it dawned on him that his chances were very slim hence he re-joined John Garang in the SPLM/A. The need to take over power by Riek Machar has been evident in the SPLM/A's life history, it is as old as the party itself. It was therefore the view of some respondents that the prevailing conflict had its origins from the yester years.

4.2.2 Corruption and its Effect in the Functioning of the Government

The war in South Sudan has also been associated with the need to address corruption within the government. Some respondents accused President Salva Kiir of harbouring corrupt dealings, they argued that he does not walk the talk as his policy on corruption failed to match his actions. It was said that in 2013 the President suspended some of his Ministers accusing them of corruption, these were Kotsi Manimbe Ngai and Deng Alor Kuol. The two Ministers were to face prosecution for corruption. However, according to the South Sudan News Agency of 14 July 2013, the whole government ministers were corrupt, suggesting that the two were just sacrificial lambs. The paper highlighted that there were other dealings that were not above board which involved a number of transactions by other cabinet ministers. The selective application of the law by the President was said to have triggered a lot of grumbling within the government. It is argued that this set the stage for internal fighting within the government. One of the respondents corroborated this view by stating that President Salva Kiir was the most corrupt person in the government, alleging that he wired millions of dollars out of the country. Meanwhile, another respondent stated that, “South Sudan was a best example of a country in the world led by corrupt leaders.” Corruption forms part and parcel of other factors that define the South Sudanese conflict.

4.2.3 Understanding Democracy and its Role in the Conflict Initiation

Robert Ingersoll, an American civil war veteran and politician, once said; “give to every human being every right that you claim for yourself.” Ingersoll was speaking of democracy and liberties/rights that are inherent in a democratic society. Some respondents believed that lack of democratic space within SPLM/A was central in the breakup and crystallisation of hostilities in South Sudan. One of the respondents was of the view that SPLM in its war of liberation was fighting for freedom of expression, equality, justice, liberty and dignity for all South Sudanese. However, the mere fact that these liberties were said to be suppressed within SPLM/A formed the basis of causing hostilities within SPLM and South Sudan at large.

According to South Sudan Nation.com problems of democracy emerged in SPLM during the Sudan general elections of April 2010 when SPLM refused to support some candidates that were proposed from the grassroots by various constituencies. It is argued that it was from this time that SPLM developed a culture of undemocratic tendencies. One of the respondents said that failure by Salva Kiir to accept a challenge from other party members in the chairmanship

of the party was because he was perfecting the art of dictatorship. Lack of democracy within the ruling party SPLM was blamed for the fighting that broke out in December 2013. It was the view of some scholars and analysts that unless some reforms were instituted to deal with what has been described as autocratic behaviours within the SPLM/A party, all efforts to find solutions to the conflict would fail and conflicts were to continuously recur.

Some respondents pointed out that unilateral decisions were being taken by senior party officials without consultations. Such decisions were contrary to the 2011 South Sudan national constitution. They stated that in a democratic set up, people are the ones that make decisions through democratic institutions such as elections. It was their belief that decisions made through democratic channels were always in harmony with the opinion of the general population because they would have been made by the people. This view is strengthened by Abraham Lincoln's definition of democracy which states that democracy is the rule of the people, by the people and for the people. Unilateralism in decision making defeated the whole idea of democracy within SPLM. It was therefore not surprising that some respondents believed that the issue of democracy was part of the major causes of the South Sudan fracas. According to some respondents, South Sudan is lacking in democratic values and this has dragged it into a political abyss. One respondent argued that the democratic space was limited around personalities and the decision making process was favouring the top-down approach instead of consultations with the wider structures of the party. According to a 2012 article by Dr Luka Biong Dong "The Curse of Liberation," liberation movements in Africa and around the world slowly turn their backs to the ideals that they fought for once they attain their political freedom. In short the article states that, "new liberators quickly become new oppressors." This sums up one of the causes of the conflict situation in South Sudan as viewed by some respondents.

4.2.4 The Implications of Sudan's Relations with South Sudan

It has been pointed out that the war in South Sudan has strong links with the relations between Sudan and South Sudan. One of the respondents pointed out that the disagreement over oil resources was at the centre of the conflict in South Sudan. It was the opinion of some respondents that Sudan had no intention of letting a bigger oil stake go to South Sudan. It is argued that Sudan continuously engineered problems to its southern neighbour hoping that at one stage a favourable government in the South was going to take over reins of power. It was the view of these respondents that a win-win situation or more shares was what Sudan

expected in the contentious oil sharing issue. This viewpoint was corroborated by a number of analysts who pointed out that Sudan was supporting Riek Machar to upstage the GRSS. It was the opinion of some respondents that Sudan hoped that when Riek Machar takes over power he was going to definitely pay back to Sudan through favourable oil deals.

Some respondents pointed out that the conflict in South Sudan was due to the fact that Sudan was supporting a number of rebel groups in the common borders of the two countries. They argued that such a situation negatively affected Government of South Sudan's efforts in consolidating its political authority in the country. It was said that Sudan kept South Sudan in a perpetual conflict mode to ensure that its preoccupation was to find solutions to its internal problems instead of consolidating its political power. Some respondents argued that the conflict in South Sudan was a proxy wars. They argued that the GRSS got war support from Uganda and Riek Machar was supported by Sudan. The history of proxy wars in Africa indicates that they are difficult to burn out. Sponsors of the various fighting elements in a proxy war continue to support their elements in a bid to ensure that they win the war and in the process such wars end up protracted. The external hand in the South Sudan conflict made some respondents to conclude that the conflict was a proxy war.

4.2.5 The Few Elites versus Majority Population and Conflict Situations

There was a strong view from a number of respondents that another problem in South Sudan which also defined the conflict was the issue of elitism. It was the view of many respondents that the rulership of the country has been the preserve of the political elites who have been at the helm of the leadership of the ruling party since the Second Sudan civil war (1983-2005). It was argued that this created a rift in the South Sudanese society due to the fact that the young and energetic were not given the opportunity to enter into the politics of the country. The government was dominated by those who fought in the Second Sudan civil war. It was argued that such people have not provided South Sudan with the best solutions to the challenges faced by the country since independence other than resorting to war which they are used to. It was pointed out that this made the South Sudanese political situation to remain very unstable despite all the optimism the peoples of South Sudan had when they voted in favour of secession in the 2011 referendum.

It was also opined that since independence, South Sudan society was characterised by two groups of people the rich and the poor. It was stated that such a situation promoted

antagonism in society. According to Aristotle, one of the great ancient philosophers in one of his discourses about the best constitution, statesmen should neither come from the elites nor the poor due to the fact that the two classes were always at war. He argued that the rich would always want to oppress the poor while the poor would want to revenge their treatment by the rich. Aristotle therefore preferred a constitution made up of the middle class which he termed the 'golden mean'. He argued that this would serve as a cushion between the two antagonistic classes, the rich and the poor. This theoretical constitution of Aristotle had relevance in the South Sudan conflict as has been highlighted by some respondents. The respondents argued that, the rich and poor situation and the politically powerful and weak condition, has created perpetual conflict in South Sudan. It was therefore the view of many that the conflict in South Sudan was between the poor and the rich. They believed that unless the gap was narrowed, intermittent conflicts would continue to characterise South Sudan.

4.2.6 Government and other Actors' Accountability and its Effect in the Fracas

It was the view of some respondents that the conflict in South Sudan was also centred on issues of accountability. Despite the existence of a national constitution that defines the constitutional obligation of the arms of government, the executive was said not to be accountable to anyone. The executive remained very powerful compared to other arms of the state, that is, the judiciary and the legislature. It was argued that the superiority of the executive over other arms of the government undermined the smooth running of the government. It was stated that it was from that background that the President dissolved the parliament, fired the Cabinet ministers, and ordered the disarmament of the Presidential guards and also the re-arming of the Dinka ethnic group soldiers within the army, amongst other violations of the constitution and constitutional provisions. They stated that this showed that the President had vast power. Further, the deployment of the Ugandan army was said to have taken place outside the oversight of the parliament. Economically, it was stated that the government mismanaged funds meant for the development of the country and re-directed them into war efforts, an indication that there was no parliamentary oversight of government expenditure. It was therefore concluded that issues of accountability were at the core of the conflict in South Sudan.

One of the respondents had this to say; "One of the root causes of the South Sudan fight is an ill-fated culture of impunity and historical lack of accountability." Respondents pointed out that since the beginning of the conflict in 2013 and when considering the killings, turmoil and

rapes that took place, the government had done nothing to hold any of its officials and forces accountable for these war crimes and crimes against humanity. It was said that instead the government obstructed international efforts to monitor human rights abuses and other investigations related to probable war crimes. Based on the above, the conflict had elements of lack of accountability. It was believed that if some government or rebel officials and military personnel from both sides were held accountable to some of the human atrocities committed since the conflict broke out, wars of vengeance were going to subside. Currently, the political atmosphere remained highly charged as various aggrieved groups were waiting for an opportune time to wage wars of revenge.

4.3 AU Perspective in Conflict Resolution

Many respondents are of the view that AU was not up to task in resolving conflicts in Africa. It is pointed out that as long as Africa relies heavily on other regions such as European Union for the funding of its operations, conflicts were to continue to be problematic in the continent as the case has been with Somalia, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Darfur, South Sudan and other similar conflicts. It was pointed out that as long as Africa has no capacity to deal with its own problems, it remains a farfetched and illusory goal to expect peace in Africa. A belief that as long as Africa fail to hold accountable some of its leaders, conflict resolution cannot successfully be achieved. On this point, it was stated that most of the African Heads of States and or Government have dirty hands and the ones with dirty hands have been the weak points in conflict resolution. They are used as examples by those violating international law and they cannot be used anywhere to assist in conflict resolution because of their dirty hands tag. For instance, one of the respondents stated that it was difficult for Al Bashir to condemn South Sudanese political hierarchy for war crimes and crimes against humanity, due to the fact that he was indicted by ICC over the same crimes. The respondents pointed out that due to this Africa would always have challenges in conflict resolution.

4.3.1 Use of Imported Ideologies in the Resolution of African Conflicts

Many respondents were of the view that the resolution of conflicts in Africa was a challenge due to the fact that those who assist in solving the conflicts in most cases are foreign to Africa. The importation of foreign ideologies has not worked well for Africa. Most of these ideologies are difficult to implement in Africa particularly in South Sudan considering its political culture. Some respondents highlighted that most of the imported ideologies such as

democracy are alien to Africa or are understood differently in Africa hence they do not fit in the same way as they do to Western political systems. In trying to implement such ideas, problems and conflicts emerge just like the developments in South Sudan. In the case of South Sudan, ceasefire and peace agreements suggested a government of national unity, giving Riek Machar the position of the Vice President of the Republic, the position he held before he broke away in December 2013. Questions have arisen whether this was feasible considering the fact that the two had failed to work together before. Moreover, governments of national unity has some limitations suggesting that chances were high that it could fail to work in South Sudan.

Furthermore, some respondents argued that the involvement of countries such as China and the US left a lot to be desired. Instead of directly dealing with the existing conflict the two countries were concerned with strategic economic gains from oil exploitation. For example, it was stated that China deployed its troops as peacekeepers in order to secure its vast stake in the South Sudan oil industry. Meanwhile, the US's engagement in South Sudan was meant to pave way for its international organisations such as USAID. It was the view of many that once USAID establishes itself in South Sudan, the US would be guaranteed that its interests would be taken care of in the oil rich country. It was also stated that the US still harbours interest of gaining more ground in the exploitation of oil in South Sudan. It was opined that ulterior motives by the external forces overshadow the need to solve the South Sudanese conflict. Desire to protect and secure national interests by external actors constituted the preoccupation of these external actors at the expense of peace and security in South Sudan.

It was also the view of some respondents that, the use of a peacekeeping forces in an area where peace has not been secured shows lack of seriousness on the part of the international community. South Sudan had a UN mandated mission that is, the United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Its mandate was to take care of internally displaced persons and ensuring that humanitarian aid reaches the intended beneficiaries. It was argued by some respondents that the first thing the UNSC should have done was to ensure that all the hostilities had stopped before authorising a peacekeeping mission. They argued that the UNMISS was a US project which sought to spread the influence of US through the use of international non-governmental organisations such as USAID in South Sudan. It was therefore stated that as long as Africa does not have its own means of solving its problems, conflicts were to continue unabated. The belief was that no way could external players

proffer workable solutions to Africa, and the conflict in South Sudan was not an exception. Therefore home grown solutions tailor made for South Sudan were required.

4.3.2 Voluntarism in the Provision of Troops towards Peacekeeping

Some respondents were of the view that African Standby Force (ASF) was a long awaited phenomenon which if operationalised would greatly improve peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in Africa. The biggest challenge in solving the South Sudanese conflict was due to the reliance on troop contributing countries. It was revealed that it took time for PDF to be operational in South Sudan as most troop contributing countries were not forthcoming with their troops. It was revealed that the countries that eventually contributed troops that constituted PDF in South Sudan had national interests in that country. Otherwise troop contributing countries were known for not honouring their pledges. The list of the countries include amongst others Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya and Sudan. In general it could be concluded that most of the countries that were contributing troops towards peacekeeping missions have some interest in host countries.

4.3.3 Stakeholder Inclusivity in Fracas Tenacity

There was concurrence from most respondents that the resolution of the South Sudanese conflict has concentrated on the top echelons of the political hierarchy. It was stated that this left out most of the important players in the mediation process. So far peace initiatives were centred on the two warring factions, the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A-IO. One of the respondents was of the view that peace pacts fail because they involve the top echelons of the two warring factions. They pointed out that the lower echelons of the two fighting parties do not honour the peace initiatives, and as a result most of the peace deals have died prematurely. For example according to BBC News Africa of 26 August 2015, Salva Kiir supporters who include ethnic Dinka elders and powerful generals, had advised him not to sign the 27 August 2015 peace deal, saying it was a foreign-backed attempt to weaken President Kiir and the country. This scenario befits the two level game theory by Putnam (1988). Putnam proposes that most conflicts have two levels; the international level and the national level. At international level agreements are signed. However, these agreements need to be approved at national level. Any discord in the two levels will see an agreement failing. In the case of South Sudan most respondents were of the view that agreements failed due to

lack of inclusivity of all concerned parties hence conflict resolution has not been effective because peace agreements were signed by leaders but followers do not approve them.

Some respondents argued that problems in the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan were due to the fact that there are a number of peace spoilers in the form of various rebel factions. They pointed out that besides Salva Kiir and Riek Machar there were a number of other groups with a bigger role in the achievement of peace or frustrating it. Notable ones being the David Yau Yau led militia, another one led by General Peter Gadet operating in Jonglei state, as well as South Sudan Armed Forces in Eastern Equatoria State and the SPLM-IO splinter group led by Changson and the White Army. Many pointed out that by concentrating on the two main factions, the regional body IGAD lost the equation of solving the problem in South Sudan. All stakeholders or actors in the conflict in South Sudan were to be taken care of by any conflict resolution effort.

4.3.4 Multiplicity of Internal and External Actors in Conflict Resolutions

It was the view of a number of respondents that glitches in the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan was greatly affected by multiplicity of players who increase almost on daily basis. One of the respondents had this to say, “Continuous splitting in SPLM makes it difficult to address the source of the conflict.” The respondent highlighted that SPLM had splinted several times which saw a number of generals within the rank and file of SPLM forming their own rebel movements with the intention of disposing Kiir’s government. An example of such Generals was Peter Gadet. Some respondents also highlighted that due to availability of weapons, there are a number of rebel groups that were emerging in South Sudan, which makes the country very insecure. It was said that these groups have equal capabilities of committing atrocities against the civilians. In the same vein, the Sudan Tribune of 8 December 2015 highlights the fact that a group of armed men identified as South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) were alleged to be capturing SPLM bases in Eastern Equatoria State. In all peace initiatives that were made, this group was never involved. This was one amongst a number of similar groups which were the biggest peace spoilers in the South Sudanese peace initiatives.

Some respondents argued that the bigger the number of those involved in the conflict, the more difficult it will be to find a compromise amongst the stakeholders. Hence it was the view of these respondents that in the short to medium term period, the resolution of the

conflict in South Sudan was going to remain illusory unless a compromise was struck, and some efforts were made to accommodate all the groups that have been left out in all the previous peace initiatives. Respondents also felt that there was need to understand the conflict first especially those intending to assist before any solutions were proffered. They pointed out that the increase in the number of rebel groups on a daily basis was a sign that all peace efforts being made were cosmetic, they did not address the ‘why’ part of the conflict. They highlighted that so far efforts made in South Sudan towards resolving the conflict was like treatment of symptoms of the disease instead of addressing the root cause of the problem. They argued that this approach of treating symptoms best explains the continued increase and complication of the conflict instead of its solution.

There was also a view by some respondents that the South Sudanese conflict attracted a lot of other external actors. They pointed out that a number of external players were involved and their involvement was suspicious as some of the external players appeared not to be worried with the restoration of peace but with fortifying their own interests. Examples of such countries include China, US, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Eritrea amongst other such countries in the neighbourhood and across the globe. Respondents opined that external players were partaking in resolving the conflict due to two broad motives; that is; to make sure that their interest were taken care of and to guarantee that their interest were not thwarted by other actors. If this view is anything to go by, it could be stated that the involvement of external actors greatly undermined the efforts of mediators and the IGAD peace initiatives. The existence of external actors’ interest overshadowed any efforts of dealing with the problem in South Sudan.

4.3.5 Sincerity of Actors towards the Ending the Conflict

It emerged through discussions with a number of respondents that the major stumbling block to the realisation of peace in South Sudan was lack of sincerity on the part of protagonists. Incidences of accusations and counter accusations were common from the two main groups. It was argued by some respondents that accusations and counter-accusations were deliberate ploys by these groups to violate peace by giving pretexts that they were protecting themselves. It was pointed out that this was an indication of gross insincerity on the part of the adversaries. Based on the developments on the ground, this view could be true especially when considering the peace initiatives and cease fire agreements that were violated willingly by concerned parties. Some even argued that ceasefire agreements were made or entered into

by the parties to enable them to find a breather so as to prepare for the escalation of the hostilities or re-organisation of their forces. If one were to borrow from Zartman's Ripeness theory, it could be stated that the parties to the South Sudanese conflict lacked sincerity due to the fact that they hoped that they will at one stage overcome their adversaries through escalation. This became one of the challenges that stalled peace efforts in South Sudan.

According to some respondents, sincerity was not only expected from the protagonists but also from those who sought to solve the conflict. For instance, a number of respondents questioned the sincerity of the IGAD led mediation process. It was the view of some respondents that IGAD only tried to bridge the gap between the fighting factions but had no capacity as a regional body to solve the conflict. The argument was that all IGAD member states were involved directly or indirectly in the conflict in support of one of the groups involved in the conflict. It was pointed out that IGAD member states were trying to exert their influence in the determination of the outcome of the resolution. This view was supported by a number of analysts and scholars who have been examining the role of the regional body in the South Sudan conflict. It is argued that the countries making up IGAD; Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea have both declared and undeclared wars against each other. For example Ethiopia and Eritrea have an inconclusive border dispute war. Therefore the view of many respondents was that this polarisation on the part of IGAD members casts doubts on their sincerity towards solving the conflict. South Sudan is turning out to be a regional chess board where the protagonists are the pawns that the regional countries were using to outwit each other. The shaky situation of the regional countries made it questionable in the eyes of many respondents that the actions of these countries were genuinely seeking to solve the problem.

Respondents argued that the coming of the international community in solving the conflict in South Sudan was adding confusion to an already confused situation. Some were of the view that most of the international players involved in the conflict in South Sudan had dirty hands. It was revealed that countries such as US, China and Egypt who provided some assistance or pledged to assist in dealing with the conflict were not clean. It was stated that the US wanted to increase its stake in the oil resources while China wanted to protect its oil stake. Meanwhile, Egypt was worried with the coming in of another state that will complicate the Nile River riparian state conflict. Egypt wanted to see a friendly government in South Sudan that will not complicate the Nile River Agreement. It was from this background that Egypt

promised to deploy its troops as part of PDF which assisted in monitoring violations of peace treaties and cease fire agreements. Meanwhile, the US showed interest in assisting through what was called IGAD+. It was argued that beside the need to secure oil stakes the US wanted to see the establishment of a government that will toe the US line in anti-terrorism stance considering the mushrooming of terror groups in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. These issues made it very difficult for many respondents to accept that these countries were genuinely assisting in resolving the conflict.

4.3.6 Resource Control and Conflict Settlement

Most conflicts in Africa and elsewhere have been motivated by the need to control resources and in some of the conflicts, resources have been used to perpetrate the conflict. It was the view of some respondents that the conflict in South Sudan cannot be separated from the need to control resources such as oil and to some extent land. It was also believed that oil proceeds have been used to fund the warring parties' war effort. These views were justified, considering the imposition of arms embargo on the GRSS by US and other threats of sanctions by UNSC. It was believed that the GRSS was using oil proceeds to finance its war endeavours, hence the need to suffocate it with sanctions. Similarly, some respondents highlighted that most of the states affected by fighting were rich in oil for example Unity state and Jonglei. It was stated that the major warring groups SPLM/A and SPLM/A-IO wanted to have full control of these states so that they can benefit from the proceeds generated from oil extraction. It was therefore not a far-fetched view that resources played a role in the conflict in South Sudan by either prolonging it or motivating it.

Some respondents are of the view that the need to control rich agricultural lands also motivated the South Sudanese conflict; especially the recurrent communal conflicts amongst various ethnic groups. Cattle raids are common amongst various ethnic groups especially the Nuer and the Murle. However, little efforts was made by the government of South Sudan to address this problem. It was believed that as long as communities have capacity to wage violent conflicts using arms of war, the conflict in South Sudan was going to rage on. They stated that such capabilities indicated that the government of South Sudan failed to provide security to its people, hence these communities took it upon themselves to protect their localities. It was said that these communal clashes over land and cattle remain a source of conflict unless the central government ensures that it was stopped. Most of the rebel groups

co-opt these communal armies into their rank and file and in the end they create chaos in the country.

4.4 An Analysis of the Dynamics and Complexities of the Conflict and Effects of these in Conflict Resolution

Dynamism and complexities of the conflict have an effect in perpetuating or ending the conflict. In the discussion of the dynamics and complexities of the conflict in South Sudan some respondents highlighted that the South Sudanese conflict was not unique from other conflicts experienced in Africa and elsewhere. They pointed out that just like any other conflict the conflict was responsive to various factors prevailing on the ground which can be internal or external to South Sudan or have a direct or indirect effect to the conflict itself. It was therefore the view of the respondents that dynamism and complexities in the conflict can be due to developmental issues, external interest, role of involved actors, the main beneficiaries to the conflict and the contagiousness of the conflict amongst other reasons. It was believed that an analysis of the dynamism of the conflict and its complexities are very wide concepts. However, efforts were made to extensively cover the concepts.

4.4.1 The Effect of Multiple Players/ Actors in Conflict Resolution

The multiplicity of actors has earlier on been noted to have an effect in the resolution of the conflict. Due to large numbers of actors involved it may become difficult to amicably bring all of them together and to agree on one thing. It was noted that such a situation was conducive to an increase in the number of peace spoilers. Similarly, it was the view of some respondents that too many actors or players in a conflict can complicate the whole conflict situation. Some respondents were of the view that when a conflict involves too many internal players or actors as the case has been in South Sudan, it widens the possibilities of complicating the conflict. They pointed out that this was common in situations where internal groups have external sponsors. They pointed out that in such situations the conflict could become immune to conflict resolution strategies due to spoiler problems. These views were not wild considering the views of some scholars who state that Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda were directly or indirectly involved in the South Sudan conflict. This meant that the increase of the actors in the conflict suggested that the conflict matrix also changed to an advanced level which required a correspondingly advanced approach.

The conflict in South Sudan had numerous groups with the potential of unleashing violence. Some respondents noted that the growth in the number of fighting groups was tantamount to escalation. They pointed out that escalation on its own was a negative development in the life cycle of a conflict. They argued that despite all the peace efforts that were made in South Sudan, the increase in the number of warring factions made the conflict complex and consequently delayed the establishment of lasting peace. The growth in the number of fighting groups signified the perpetuation of the conflict. It was therefore not surprising that as of 08 December 2015, four months after the signing of the cessation of hostilities on 27 August 2015, the Sudan Tribune of 08 December 2015 indicated that fighting was taking place in a number of areas in South Sudan involving the little known groups such as South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF). In reality, the locus of the South Sudanese conflict remained highly unpredictable even at a time when every concerned person had hopes that the signing of the 27 August 2015 peace deal would mark the end of hostilities.

There are however some views from some respondents that the conflict in South Sudan had entered entropy stage. They highlighted that the level of violence had greatly reduced since the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement in 2014. The sporadic clashes were just but some of the indicators that the conflict was manageable. This however called for an assessment of the effectiveness of the government in dealing with such sporadic attacks which were done by mainly little known groups such as SSDM/A, SSLM/A SSAF, Yau Yau and White Army. In that regard, concern was raised about the capacity of the government to deal with such problems. Many respondents stated that the government in Juba was still very fragile, as a result it had challenges in the provision of political goods and services and it lacked in the monopolisation of legitimate violence. Due to such developments, each and every group with the capacity to unleash armed violence continued to do so unabated. Some respondents said that South Sudan needed time to deal with its security institutions so that they could measure up to the security challenges beforehand.

4.4.2 Societal Inequalities and Conflict Development

Some respondents felt that it may be awkward to talk about the dynamics and complexities of the South Sudan conflict without making a mention of the effects of the social conditions to the overall conflict situation. This was based on the background that South Sudan was marginalised for quite a long period of time that dates back to the colonial period. That meant that its education, health and other social amenities remained at rudimentary stages. The

majority of South Sudanese were uneducated and had no access to health facilities. For instance according to World Bank figures of 2015, 27% of the ages from 15 and above are literate, infant mortality rate is 105 per 1 000 live births, maternal mortality rate is 2,054 per 100 000 live births, and only 17% of children are fully immunized. Meanwhile, only 55% of the population has access to improved sources of drinking water.

The effects of a defunct social system must not be under estimated. Some of the respondents pointed out that conflicts can easily flare up in instances where people have nothing to lose. They pointed out that in South Sudan most of the military age groups were unemployed hence they can be conscripted by any group involved in the conflict. Furthermore, lack of education made this possible, some pointed out that uneducated people can be easily brainwashed and indoctrinated by whoever wants to use them. This view point was reinforced by UNICEF's 2014 astounding figures of more than 12 000 child soldiers that were reportedly involved in the conflict. Poor social conditions could not be ignored in the quest of demystifying the dynamics and complexity of a conflict and the effect of these in the resolution of the conflict.

It was also argued by some respondents that the continued widening of the gap between the rich and the poor in South Sudan society was a conducive environment for conflicts. This view is borrowed from Karl Max and Lenin who point out that most revolutions are a results of class struggles between the rich and the poor. Since independence in July 2011, the South Sudan government failed to transform the lives of the population for the better, instead the conditions of the people worsened. It was from that background that some respondents have pointed out that the conflict in South Sudan has strong socio-economic connotations. It was their view that if these social disparities were not addressed the conflict in South Sudan will rage on or could be easily ignited by minor disagreements in future.

4.4.3 Effects of the Concept of Development in the South Sudan Conflict

It was the view of some respondents that lack of development had negative effects in the conflict in South Sudan. Levels of unemployment were high and the country's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2014 was \$1.111 according to World Bank (WB) statistics of 01 October 2015. Another report by World Bank in March 2015 estimated that the conflict cost 15% of the GDP in 2014. The WB October 2015 statistics further highlighted that outside the oil sector, livelihoods were concentrated in low productive, unpaid agriculture and

pastoralists work which account for around 15% of GDP. 85% of the working population was engaged in non-wage work, chiefly in agriculture which had a staggering 78%. The statistics indicated the gloomy state of affairs in the South Sudanese economy. Literally most of the respondents pointed out that there was absolutely nothing to talk about in terms of development in South Sudan. It was stated that such unrealised expectations from the population formed the basis for rising against the government. It was argued that the government had failed to transform the economic potential of South Sudan towards improving the lives of people. They stated that there was no difference between the conditions during the period of Sudan's hegemony and the period of self-rule. They pointed out that those factors that drove the Southerners into war in the Second Sudan Civil War (1983-2005) are the same factors that propelled the current skirmishes.

4.4.4 The Role of Elitism in the Conflict and Conflict Resolution

Respondents were of the opinion that as long as Salva Kiir and Riek Machar constituted part of the South Sudanese political equation it was unlikely that the situation would normalise. One respondent had this to say; "Until these two guys go, things are not looking great, however it is unlikely that they will go, because they represent very strong constituencies in South Sudan." An account of this nature highlighted the fact that the war in South Sudan was meant to preserve the interest of those in power and also those who sought to take over the reins of power. Through the use of politics of patronage the two leaders Salva Kiir and Riek Machar ensured that they remain in power (Salva Kiir) or they take over power (Riek Machar). It was from this view that some respondents pointed out that the South Sudanese civil war was an elitist civil war driven by those who sought to retain their political standing in the rulership of the country. Thus as long as the conflict had such a dimension, fighting was to remain as the most used tool to ensure that the elites remained in power.

4.4.5 Displacement of People and Communal Conflicts

The outbreak of the conflict saw millions of people being internally displaced and according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) statistics of December 2014 about 1.9 million people were displaced. The statistics are too high to be ignored when one considers the dynamism of the conflict and its complexity. It was therefore the view of some respondents that as long as the proper settlement of the IDPs was not done and a new lease of life given to them, the conflict was unlikely to end. It was pointed out that wars of

vengeance were likely to be the characteristic feature of the security situation in South Sudan. Furthermore, whenever wars of revenge were undertaken they were ethnically charged. The retaliatory attacks by the Nuer against the Dinka following the Dinka killings of the Nuer in Juba on 16 December 2013 is an example. It was the view of some respondents that South Sudan conflict had the potential of destabilising the region due to refugee flight to neighbouring countries. For example, Uganda pointed out that amongst its motive of intervening in South Sudan was the alarming levels of refugees that were flocking into Uganda from South Sudan. However, the Ugandan intervention irked a number of regional countries, making them contemplate intervening in the conflict directly to thwart the growing influence of Uganda in South Sudan. The IDPs and refugee problem has a potential of perpetuating the conflict.

4.4.6 Transformation of SPLA into a Professional Organisation

A number of respondents and analysts alike were of the view that dealing with the South Sudan conflict was a daunting task considering the fact that currently there was no national army to talk about. The security of the country from both internal and external aggression was entrusted to a partisan military formation whose allegiance was not to the state but to certain individuals. The respondents highlighted the fact that the so called national army was characterised by the Dinka while the Nuer tribe had their military units which were fighting against the government. It was argued that the setup in the armed forces was not healthy and did not promote peace in South Sudan. It was therefore suggested that there was need to address the anomaly if the conflict was to be contained. It was also pointed out that no meaningful disarmament programme could take place in a situation where various armed ethnic groups for example the Nuer, Dinka and Murle are fearing for their lives. These ethnic groups would cling to their arms with the aim of protecting themselves during times of attacks.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter brought out the major findings of the study based on the main research objectives that guided the study. It brought out the findings on the nature of the South Sudanese conflict as propounded by various respondents. It also analysed various conflict resolution strategies that were used with much emphasis on their effectiveness in dealing with the conflict in South Sudan. Dynamics and complexities of the conflict and the effect of these

in conflict resolution capped the findings of the study. The chapter formed the basis of drawing conclusions, coming up with recommendations and also enabled the realisation for the need for further studies. Chapter 4 set the stage for chapter 5 by making it possible through collected data to draw conclusions, make recommendations and to identify implications for further researches.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

5.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes the study by presenting conclusions of the study, it also proffers recommendations on noted areas that need improvements and outlines implications for further research. Conclusions of the study were based on the findings of the research which sought to understand the relationship that exists between dynamism and complexities of conflict and conflict resolution strategies in South Sudan. The chapter also made some recommendations that were drawn from findings which the researcher felt there was room for possible improvements in the South Sudanese conflict or in other similar conflicts elsewhere. During the research process the researcher found areas related to the study that had gaps that need to be filled hence implication for further study forms part of this concluding chapter.

5.2 Conclusions

The findings of the study suggested that the dynamics and complexities of a conflicts have a causal relationship to the resolution of a conflicts. Similarly, various conflict resolution mechanisms that would be put in place to deal with the conflict were affected. On the nature of the conflict the research found that internal discord within SPLM/A and amongst various groups within South Sudan and other external actors defined the conflict. It also came out that the conflict had its roots in the long standing political differences between the leadership of SPLM/A. It was also the view of many respondents that corruption within the government and lack of democratic space within SPLM were among the major factors that define the conflict. It emerged that Sudan could not be ignored in the analysis of the nature of the conflict due to the direct and indirect effect it has on the conflict. It has also been realised that lack of accountability by the political leadership over the atrocities committed and over some of the decisions the leadership made also described the conflict.

In conflict resolution it was found that the major stumbling block was lack of effective conflict resolution mechanism tailor made to deal with African conflicts. A major challenge to the resolution of the conflict came out to be the role of interested external players who did not only seek to assist in resolving the conflict but were seemingly concerned with their national interests. Furthermore, strategies used were not all encompassing, various groups were being left outside of peace initiatives yet their co-operation in preserving peace deal was

highly needed. It also emerged that peace efforts were undermined by a deliberate lack of sincerity on the part of the conflicting parties towards ending the conflict and also those who purported to be assisting in the resolution of the conflict. Control of resources such as oil and land was also noted to have caused and perpetuated the conflict.

It also emerged that peacekeeping efforts were greatly undermined by lack of a standing force designed to quickly intervene in conflict situations such as the one in South Sudan. Reliance on voluntarily provided troops jeopardised the South Sudanese conflict resolution efforts. Efforts to deal with the conflict were also scuttled by multiple actors either within or outside the conflict. It emerged that internal players had entrenched views of the desired end state of the conflict and could not bend such views easily while external actors sought to ensure that their interest were protected at all costs.

In dealing with the dynamics and complexities of the conflict, it emerged that multiple actors complicated the conflict. On the other hand societal inequalities undermined efforts to obliterate the conflict once and for all. Meanwhile, development issues escalated the conflict due to dissatisfaction amongst the various quarters of the society who felt the government was not doing enough on this issue. It also came out that the conflict was pushed by the needs of the few elites who are obsessed with the reins of power at the expense of the whole society. It also emerged that there was need to make reforms in the security system and the professionalisation of the armed forces.

5.3 Recommendations

The findings of the research indicated a number of factors that defined the nature of the conflict in South Sudan. Furthermore, they exposed a number of loopholes that undermined the efforts towards the resolution of the conflict. On the dynamics and complexities of the conflict and their effect on the conflict resolution some areas that need improvement were also noted. This section will therefore proffer recommendations based on noted areas that needs to be improved.

It was noted that the conflict in South Sudan was defined by issues related to the need to remain in power at all cost by the ruling elites, closing of the democratic space within the ruling party thereby undermining leadership renewals. Ultimately a violent conflict broke out challenging such behaviour. The researcher is of the view that such senseless conflicts can be

avoided through tolerance of divergent views and acceptance of popular opinion of the society.

Civil war in South Sudan created unnecessary human suffering and has claimed tens of thousands of lives, with other millions being displaced within and outside the borders of South Sudan while efforts in social and economic development have been temporarily halted. Such incidences could be avoided in a situation where people develop a culture of progressive negotiation or dialogue. The researcher is of the view that this could discourage various aggrieved groups from resorting to armed confrontation as the case has been in South Sudan.

Corruption has also been found to be part of the causes of conflicts and has greatly undermined the development of the society. The adoption of the international best practices in governance by the political leadership will greatly reduce incidents of corrupt practices by the leadership. Governments must be transparent in their operations and accountable to all their actions. This could reduce levels of suspicion amongst various groups within the state thereby reducing the chances of revolutions against the government by aggrieved groups as the case has been in South Sudan.

Conflict resolution in Africa has remained illusory due to use of conflict resolution methods imposed by external parties that have interests in the country with the conflict. Furthermore, it also emerged that settlement of conflicts was rushed without taking time to understanding the root causes of the conflict. To deal with this challenge, Africa should capacitate itself on issues of conflict resolution to avoid heavy reliance on imported non-working solutions. There is also need to have a deep understanding of the conflict before any attempts to address that conflict are made, lest resources, time and lives would be unnecessarily wasted and lost as has been seen in South Sudan.

5.4 Implications for Further Research

Africa and conflicts have been inseparable and some conflicts in the continent have spanned over half a century (for example the DRC conflict). Meanwhile, the conflict in Sudan was dubbed the longest civil war in Africa. On the same note the newly independent South Sudan has fallen prey to the scourge of a civil war that has been linked to the Second Sudan Civil War (1983-2005). To deal with conflict situations, Africa as a continent has put measures that seeks to deal with the neutralisation of emerging conflicts and their resolution. The question

that has arisen is, how effective is the continent in dealing with African conflicts? This is from the background that more often those who sought to assist in most cases exhibit double standards contrary to the expectations of Africa. This emerged in the South Sudanese conflict whereby when IGAD seems to be failing, more international actors came in although not welcome. Therefore a study on the capabilities of the continent in addressing its problems is necessary. Such an audit will help to come up with the shortcomings of the continent and measures of addressing them.

5.5 Conclusion

The chapter concluded the study by providing conclusions of the findings of the study. It also gave recommendations on areas that were noted to be in need of improvement if conflict occurrence and recurrence were to be reduced. The chapter ended by giving implications for further research.

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