

An Assessment of the role of regional organizations in maintaining peace and security in Africa: A case study of the South African Development Community (SADC) on the full implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe 2008-2013.

By Sitabile Dewa

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of a Masters Degree in International Relations

Faculty of Social Studies

Department of Political and Administration Studies

University of Zimbabwe

Table of contents

<u>Contents</u>	<u>Page</u>
1.1 Abstract.....	4
1.2 Acknowledgements.....	5
1.3 List of Acronyms.....	6
<u>Chapter 1:</u>	
Introduction/Background to the problem.....	8
Introduction to the formation of the GPA in Zimbabwe.....	10
Statement of the problem.....	12
Objectives of the Research.....	13
Research questions.....	13
Hypothesis.....	14
Justification of study.....	14
Methodology.....	15
Methods of Data Collection.....	16
Delimitations.....	17
Limitations of the study.....	17
General Introduction to SADC: Structure and Operations of SADC.....	18
<u>Chapter 2</u>	
Theoretical/ Conceptual Framework.....	21
<u>Literature Review</u>	
SADC interventions in maintaining peace and security in Africa.....	24
<u>Chapter 3</u>	
AU- MEDIATION.....	35

Background to GNU Formation.....	36
Structure of the GNU.....	37
SADC's Role as the Guarantor of the GPA.....	38
Challenges faced by the GNU.....	42
Prospects for enforcing the full implementation before the next round of elections in 2013.....	45
<u>Chapter 4</u>	
Findings of the Research.....	47
<u>Chapter 5</u>	
Recommendations and Conclusion.....	51
Bibliography.....	54

Abstract

Conflicts have been on the increase on the African continent in recent years. These have varied in strength with some assuming severe consequences, while others have manifested themselves after a call for elections in a country where some political parties argue that the elections have been rigged resulting in eruptions of political violence. Regional Organisations have played a crucial role in attempting to maintain peace and security in their members states. Efforts by regional organisations in trying to maintain peace and security has also been affected by the internal politics underlying the concerned country. With the complexity that characterises efforts of maintaining peace and security, Africa is reporting a new dispensation of power sharing agreements as a conflict prevention strategy with the latest ones in Kenya 2007 and Zimbabwe in 2008 respectively. Power sharing agreements have been met with mixed reactions with some quarters that it is an insult to democracy where the loser becomes the winner and vice versa forcing the parties into what others call "marriage of conveniences". But with the political violence, the displacements and human suffering that follows the disputed elections and the complexities that comes with securocrats in the country of disputes, it can be noted that power sharing agreements provide diagnosis for peaceful resolution to conflicts although it can be argued that it can be a short term solution to a bigger problem that has prospects of exploding in the near future. This study deliberated on the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe and how SADC contributed to its formation and provides an analysis of the role it has played in the full implementation of the agreement as a peace and security measure. This study has used desktop type of research and structured and unstructured interviews to come up with this study. From the topic under study it has been deduced that SADC as a regional body has managed to a larger extent assisted in the maintenance of peace and security in Zimbabwe. But it has also been noted that the regional block has not done much in ensuring the full implementation of the Global Political Agreement which it is a guarantor. This has been mainly attributed to the complex composition of the GPA principals comprising of three divergent political leaders who want to take much and give less pertaining to the operations of the agreement. From the findings of the research, it can be recommended that SADC should come up with strict enforcement powers to ensure full implementation of agreements and that SADC should also engage civil society organisations that will help with checks and balances of GNUs.

Keywords: Peace and Security ; Government of National Unity; Zimbabwe; SADC

Acknowledgements

I would like to first of all give thanks to my Lord for granting me this special favor to study towards my Masters degree. I would like to extend a warm gratitude to the following people for assisting me in coming up with this unique study, Pedzisai Ruhanya, Francisca Midzi, Washington Katema, Otto Saki, Jabusile Shumba, Jacob Mafume thank you all for the insightful ideas. Also want to thank my supervisor, Dr Chimanikire for assisting me to come up with this master piece. Last but not least a big thanks to the most special man in my life, my husband, Farai Nhende thanks for the support and patience during my moments of sleepless nights, studying all night. To God be the Glory.....

List of Acronyms:

SADC-Southern African Development Community

AU- African Union

ZANU PF- Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

MDC T- Movement For Democratic Change Tsvangirai

MDC M- Movement For Democratic Change Mutambara

MDC N- Movement For Democratic Change Ncube

GPA-Global Political Agreement

GNU- Government of National Unity

IG- Inclusive Government

OPDSC-Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

IMF- International Monetary Fund

SADCC- Southern African Development Central Committee

NEPAD- New Partnership for Africa's Development

DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo

MONUC- United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

ICT- Information and Communication Technology

ZEC- Zimbabwe Electoral Commission

Chapter 1:

Background and Introduction to the study

Zimbabwe was forced into a Government of National Unity on 15 September 2008 after no particular political party managed to garner the 51% votes needed to take the Presidency. Cases of political violence increased soon after the March 2008 election results. Generally, the environment was peaceful before the results were released. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced on national radio and television that the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) then a opposition party had garnered the highest number of votes. The MDC T President Mr. Tsvangirai according to ZEC got 47,98% of the total vote against ZANU PF presidential candidate's 43,25% and two independent candidates Simba Makoni and Langton Towungana who had 8.25% and 0.05% respectively. The winner however could not get the 50% +1 vote as required by the constitution and spelt out in the Electoral Act to avoid a runoff.

The inconclusive presidential vote led to a bloody run-off in June of the same year. According to the Human Rights Watch (2011), during the run off campaigning, opposition supporters were murdered in cold blood by suspected state agents or ZANU PF sympathizers. This assertion of a violent campaign is also noted by Masunungure E (2009:80) who highlighted that unlike in the pre- March 2008 period, the presidential runoff campaign was a visibly militarized one, the securocrats, rather than ZANU PF itself, were in the forefront spearheading the campaign. Masunungure E (2009) further asserts that the run off contest was reduced by ZANU PF to a battle between the bullet and the ballot(ibid). There has been a general consensus from all political parties and even the police on the fact that there was politically motivated violence and people from both parties died in the process. However according to Solidarity Peace Trust, in its report entitled "Prospects of a new beginning in Zimbabwe", 82% of the violence was perpetrated by ZANU PF while other parties accounted for a mere 1%. The Zimbabwe Peace Project a civil society organization in its August 2008 report indicated that a total 197 political violence related deaths had been recorded from March to June 2008. The conflict left many communities torn apart with a high need for peace building. The political violence received International, Regional and national condemnation forcing SADC to intervene in trying to avert the dire situation. SADC's intervention led to talks between the three main political leaders in Zimbabwe which led to

the formation of the Government of National Unity in a niche to promote peace and security in the country. SADC was given the mandate by African Union to be the guarantor of the GPA and ensure its full implementation.

Four years after the formation of the Inclusive Government, the peace is still disfranchised, no general agreement amongst political parties, there are continued reports of cases of political violence, the Global Political Agreement has not been fully implemented. Budge I and Keman H (1999:49) asserts that a power sharing arrangement in most cases is reached when the ruling party's confidence and legitimacy are severely weakened, even though it remains strong enough to exercise control over the most important institutions like the military. Papagianni K (2008:63) states that power-sharing transitional governments are universal strategies used for peacemaking and peace building that require the participation of representatives of political parties and sectors involved in political decision making, and especially in the executive, but also in the legislature, judiciary, police and army. Meredith P (2008:48) highlights that when a stalemate is reached after a disputed election, a power-sharing agreement has an benefit of giving some sort of legitimacy to the ruling party without discrediting the other opponent political parties involved, while at the same time tumbling the ruling party's fear of losing everything and fear of future revenges. To the author, power sharing agreements tends to have a disadvantage to the opposition parties but creates some form of peace and stability in the country.

Regional Organisations for example African Union and SADC have been facilitating power sharing agreements in Africa as a conflict resolution strategy but one can argue that implications behind these constitutional prescriptions are rather short term and can lead to the degeneration of more political violence and chaos if not managed well. This paper took a close look at the role of South African Development Community (SADC) in the full implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe and assessed how its efforts contributed to peace and security in the country after the eruption of political violence in 2008.

Introduction to the Formation of the Global Political Agreement

Zimbabwe was sparked by a decade of political unrest as a result of disputes emanating from national elections. The formation of an opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 saw a new turn in the Zimbabwean politics. National elections were held in 2002, 2005 and 2008 and there have been allegations of political violence in these elections. Harmonized elections were held in March 2008 and were generally peaceful but the results of the elections failed to provide an outright winner with 51% votes leading to Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) the then ruling party calling for an election re run in June 2008. It is the election re- run which was marred by extreme violence and the then opposition party MDC Tsvangirai (MDC T) claimed its supporters were the target of the violence leading to its withdrawal from the Presidential race. Before the 2008 elections, it should be noted that MDC split in 2004 due to a dispute of whether to participate in the 2004 Senate elections or not leading to two groups emerging, MDC Tsvangirai and MDC Mutambara (MDC M). The MDC M further split in 2010 and two parties emerged MDC M and MDC Ncube (N) , the later being headed by Professor Welshman Ncube.

A report produced by a human rights organization, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) in 2008, stated that it is the political violence of 2008 after the harmonized elections that led to the intervention of SADC. The intervention came after an upsurge of political violence that left close to 240 people dead, thousands displaced both internally and externally, hundreds of homes were destroyed and many families were left with no sources of livelihood. Tarisayi E (2009:19) states that the June 2008 election rerun led to a political impasse in Zimbabwe, political violence continued even after the announcement of the results. Many of the targets were villagers from rural areas who were alleged to have voted for the opposition party. As a result of the violence prior to the 27 June 2008 presidential runoff, the other candidate Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change withdrew from contesting. The reason for withdrawal was what he termed unprecedented levels of violence against his supporters. ZANU PF continued with the Presidential elections and President Mugabe was declared the ultimate winner. This was followed by his sworn in within a short period of time. Sachikonye L (2011:51) alludes to the fact that there was a pattern to the manner in which violence was deployed. Locals would be used to spearhead violence on opposition activists and supporters (Ibid). This showed how grave the violence

was and determined the possible conflict prevention strategies that were needed to achieve peaceful coexistence and tolerance in the country.

More economic sanctions were imposed on Zimbabwe by Western countries among them United States of America, Britain, Australia, Canada. The economy continued to deteriorate, there were food shortages, fuel crisis, pandemic diseases such as cholera, devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar, thousands of people migrated to other neighboring SADC countries especially South Africa and Botswana and others left for overseas. The year 2008, Zimbabwe according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) formed the fastest shrinking economy in the world with four million people in desperate need of food. The violence that broke after the 2008 elections received both internal and external criticism from international organizations United Nations (UN) included and various regional organizations, African Union (AU) and SADC. The situation forced SADC to intervene in solving the political impasse.

There was a serious media objection from international, regional and independent national media houses on the political violence and the irregularities in the manner in which the elections were held leading to the intervention of the African Union which gave a mandate to SADC as a sub regional block to intervene in solving the impasse. The then South African President, Thabo Mbeki was chosen as the mediator on talks between the MDC and ZANU PF. Various SADC Summits were held to try and find a lasting solution to the Zimbabwean crisis. These various summits continued to pile pressure on the Zimbabwean President to find a lasting solution to the problems that bedevilled the country by taking the talks seriously. Chief negotiators were chosen from ZANU PF, MDC T and MDC M parties to map the way forward with the assistance of the then South African President, Thabo Mbeki as the mediator who would then report back to SADC on the progress. After a series of meetings, a deal was brokered in September 2008 leading to the formation of a Unity Government comprising of ZANU PF, MDC T and MDC M. The Unity Government led to an agreement known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA).

The acknowledgement by politicians and various media houses that the country witnessed serious political violence during the 2008 election period prompted this research in a niche to assess efforts made by SADC in the crafting of the GPA and its subsequent role in ensuring its full implementation. The study also assessed the extent in which SADC as regional block through its intervention managed to promote peace and security in Zimbabwe. This study also

examined why the GPA has not as per the initial agreement been fully implemented to date four years after its inception.

Statement of the problem

SADC with the current South African President Jacob Zuma now the chief mediator was tasked with overseeing the full implementation of the Global Political Agreement. The Inclusive Government was given a lifespan of two years but the two years lapsed without any agreement from the three principals on fulfilling the outstanding issues. The research intended to find out the role SADC played in ensuring peace and security in Zimbabwe after the 2008 disputed runoff elections, a responsibility bestowed on it as a regional block. This study also attempted to find out the reasons why SADC as the sole enforcer of the GPA had failed to ensure that President Mugabe, Prime Minister Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister Mutambara have fully implemented the deal which has outstanding issues ranging from the issue of the appointment of provincial Governors, the appointment of the Reserve Bank Governor and five other issues. The outstanding issues are contentious issues that were left out during the negotiations spearheaded by SADC. The negotiators who represented the political parties concerned failed to agree on eight contentious issues which the parties agreed to solve soon after the official signing of the agreement, but four years after the signing of the agreement, the parties have failed to reach a consensus on the issues. The principals only agreed on one issue in February 2013 which is the constitution after four years of staggering too come up with a draft constitution. SADC as the guarantor of the GPA was suppose to monitor and ensure the GPA is fully implemented. It has been argued that the power sharing arrangement has been far less productive than it might have been in terms of the democratic transition it was expected to steer in, and thus the country has made far less advancement toward economic resuscitation that what was expected. From the period 2008 to February 2013, the Inclusive Government has been marked by one dispute after another mainly between the Movement for Democratic Change formation headed by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, opposition leader at the time of the GPA's signature, and the ZANU-PF party of President Robert Mugabe.

According to Makumbe J, 2011, between 2007 to 2008, the country went on a decline, the Zimbabwean dollar lost its value, there were shortages of basic stuffs, food shortages, shortage of cash, the economy of the country collapsed, there was shortage of medication

and unemployment levels rose among other challenges. But the formation of the Inclusive Government witnessed changes and developments in the country as there was some form of recovery, the economy stabilised, social amenities improved. But there has been little progress on the political side in terms of ensuring that the GPA is fully implemented. Many deadlines were put in place by SADC to ensure the outstanding issues are resolved but the timeframes lapsed and SADC as the guarantor of the agreement has not done much to ensure compliance. With the current call for a possibility of national elections in 2013, without the full implementation of the GPA it remains to be seen if SADC will ensure that the elections are free and fair with as minimum cases of political violence and election manipulation. One can argue that the ‘big brother’ mentality amongst SADC heads of states can be attributed as the major reasons why the regional block has not done much in enforcing the full implementation of the Global Political Agreement.

Objectives of the Research

- To ascertain the extent in which SADC as a regional block has influenced political processes in Zimbabwe.
- To find out why the GPA has not been fully implemented to date.
- To assess whether SADC has managed to assist in the maintenance of peace and stability in Zimbabwe after the formation of the GPA.
- To assess and evaluate the impact of SADC’s intervention in addressing similar challenges in other SADC member states such as in Madagascar, Lesotho and DRC.

Research Questions

- What has been the role of SADC in the formation and implementation of the GPA?
- What problems have the GPA principals faced in the implementation of the agreement?
- What measures/ actions has SADC taken to foster peace and stability in Zimbabwe after the formation of the GPA?

- What has been the impact and success of SADC's intervention in other political hotspots such as Madagascar, Lesotho and DRC?

Hypothesis

SADC has to a greater extent played a significance role in the formation of the GPA in Zimbabwe which stabilized the economy and reduced cases of political violence and has also to a greater extent managed to maintain peace and security in the country although the country continues to report sporadic cases of political violence. It can also be deduced from the research that although SADC has managed to maintain peace and security in Zimbabwe since the formation of the Inclusive Government, the sub regional block is failing to ensure that the Global Political Agreement is fully implemented thus providing a long lasting solution of peace, stability and security in the country.

Justification of the study

This research made an academic contribution by examining why SADC as the guarantor of the GPA is facing challenges in enforcing the full implementation of it more than four years after its formation. Deadlines have been put in place, extended and lapsed making the full implementation of the GPA an outstanding issue on its own. Various SADC summits and extra ordinary summits on Zimbabwe have taken place since 2008 but not much has been achieved in terms of compliance to the GPA by the three principals. With the Global Political Agreement which had a lifespan of two years having expired and no clear election road map being enforced by SADC, one clearly ponder the reasons why SADC as a guarantor of the agreement is failing to ensure that Zimbabwe comes up with a lasting solution to the political challenges. The study also sought to find out whether the temporary peace and security intervention by SADC is enough to achieve long term solutions to the Zimbabwean situation. The research also attempted to ascertain whether the general peaceful environment the country is experiencing will last beyond the SADC mediation process or that it is just a time bomb waiting to explode. There was also need to find out whether the Zimbabwean political challenges can only be solved by the intervention of SADC or there is need for internal political will from all the political players involved in the agreement.

This study also revealed that regional organizations like SADC have a responsibility to play as a regional block in safeguarding peace and stability in their areas of influence. SADC's intervention is also supported by Pius XI (1931), who highlighted that the interventions are in line with the principle of Subsidiarity which states that a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order as that would be tantamount to depriving the latter of its functions, but rather it should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society in a niche to promote peace and stability. Thus regional organizations such as SADC have been bestowed the responsibility to assist in the maintenance of peace and security in all its member states.

By carrying out this research, this study also contributed to existing literature on the role of regional organizations in providing peace and security in Africa. The academic and social contributions of this research make it an important and relevant piece of work in contemporary discourse of the emergence of Governments of National Unity as a conflict resolution mechanism in peace and security in Africa. There is also need to understand the dynamics in the formation and implementation of the GPA and appreciate the politics behind the challenges SADC is facing in ensuring compliance from an academic point of view. The study also drew examples from other countries where SADC has intervened and assessed the impact of the interventions in maintaining peace and security. In this regard, recommendations drawn from this research can also be used by stakeholders in the political arena in Zimbabwe and SADC member states to map a way forward on the challenges bedeviling the GPA in Zimbabwe.

Methodology

The research design used was mainly qualitative because its principal objective *inter alia*, is to “bring out data on people’s experiences, their feelings and emotions using flexible language” (Makore-Rukuni, 2001:100). The study attempted to bring out SADC and Political leaders' experiences in dealing with the Zimbabwean political crisis. McLeod (1994:78) views qualitative research as “a process of systematic inquiry into the meanings, which people employ to make sense of their experience and guide their actions”. What Rukuni and McLeod suggest is that the qualitative paradigm attempts to understand the situation in its original context. This researcher concurs with these propositions in that if the data is to be

interpreted, it should not be in isolation to its context. Qualitative research is often regarded as a precursor to quantitative research, in that it is often used to generate possible leads and ideas which can be used to formulate a realistic and testable hypothesis.

Two types of data were used, the primary and the secondary data. The primary data were derived from the answers respondents gave in the self-administered questionnaire prepared by the researcher. In addition, the information obtained from the interview also provided primary research data that supported the study. The secondary data on the other hand, were derived from the findings stated in published documents and literatures related to civil society and peace building. Desktop type of research was also implored through the use of the internet. The Global Political Agreement document was the main source of reference. Primary sources of data have also been used in the form of unstructured interviews. Ten people were interviewed, two from ZANU PF, two from MDC T, two from MDC M, two from civil society organizations, one from the South African Embassy and one ordinary citizen.

Methods of Data Collection

The research is a multiple case study research. This design was chosen specifically for its ability to explain a specific situation and giving superior answers to the research questions that SADC has managed to maintain peace and stability in Zimbabwe and reasons why it has failed to ensure that the GPA is fully implemented. The triangulation method was employed to collect data from different sources and exposed any different perceptions. The research also used judgmental/purposive sampling in selecting the organizations and individuals to interview in the Inclusive Government and civil society. The qualitative method in the form of interviews, reinforce and evaluate findings over a broader scale. An interview is a purposeful discussion between two or more people (Kahn and Cannell, 1957: 17). The use of interviews help to gather valid and reliable data that are relevant to research question(s) and objectives. This fact is significant to this study since the interviews were consistent with and guided by research questions and objectives highlighted above.

Interviews were the primary data collection method in this study with the difference being that some interviews were questionnaire based while others were semi structured in-depth interviews. Interviews focused on personal accounts of representative of MDC T, MDC N,

and ZANU PF who were interviewed. One person from the South African Embassy was also interviewed. The GPA was also extensively used, together with the electronic and print media and also the UZ library. Qualitative techniques are extremely useful when a subject is too complex to be answered by a simple yes or no hypothesis. This research was one such a complex issue. It was difficult to quantify peace and security and respondents could have found it difficult to say yes there is absolute peace in Zimbabwe after SADC's intervention or nothing has changed with respect to peaceful coexistence. These types of designs are much easier to plan and carry out. They are also useful when budgetary decisions have to be taken into account. This study had no budgetary support hence the choice of the qualitative design. The broader scope covered by these designs ensured that some useful data is always generated, whereas an unproved hypothesis in a quantitative experiment can mean that a lot of time has been wasted. Qualitative research methods are not as dependent upon sample sizes as quantitative methods; a case study, like this research, for example, can generate meaningful results with a small sample group.

Delimitations

This study only focused on assessing the role of SADC in ensuring that the GPA is fully implemented. SADC was chosen because it is the guarantor of the GPA, a responsibility bestowed on it by AU. The focus on SADC was also necessitated by the fact that one of the major objectives of SADC as a regional block is to maintain peace and security in Africa. The research explored the formation and implementation of the GPA in Zimbabwe from 2008-2013. It also examined why SADC as the guarantor of the GPA has not managed to ensure that the three principals to the GPA fully implement all the outstanding issues as per the initial agreement. It also looked at the internal reasons stalling the full implementation of the GPA. The study also assessed whether SADC has managed to assist in the maintenance of peace and security in Zimbabwe between the period 2008 - 2013.

Limitations

The Zimbabwe politics is one area which is very sensitive hence the researcher faced some resistance from some political leaders but nevertheless managed to work with those who were willing to assist in the study. It was also difficult to access President Zuma and his mediation team comprising of Lindiwe Zulu who were busy most of the time with political

developments in their own country. But managed to hold one skype interview with one member of the SADC secretariat. Challenges were also encountered in trying to meet the three principals to the GPA but managed to meet some of the political leaders who were involved in the negotiations.

General Introduction to the SADC:

Structure and Operations of SADC

In April 1980, a meeting was held in Lusaka Zambia dubbed the Lusaka Declaration which gave birth to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), It started off with 9 permanent members. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was then formed to replace SADCC on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. SADC now boast of a membership of 15 countries. The SADC website states that the SADC Treaty has the heads of state and government summit as the supreme policymaking body, supported by the Council of Ministers, and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The Council of Ministers comprises foreign ministers from member states who manage the functioning and development of the regional bloc. They also oversee the Integrated Committee of Ministers, a body of ministers appointed from member states who are responsible for monitoring and controlling trade, industry, finance, investments, infrastructure, food, agriculture, natural resources, and social and human development activities (www.sadc.int). The Council of Ministers also oversees the Standing Committee of Officials, which provides technical advisory services and comprises permanent secretaries from member states. These structures operate on a troika basis. The troika system is an association of three countries (comprising a rotational grouping of outgoing, incumbent and succeeding chairpersons) that constitute a decision-making unit on behalf of the broader SADC structures. Countries that assumed membership of the troika of the summit in August 2012 are: Mozambique (chairperson), Malawi (vice chairperson) and Angola (outgoing chairperson) (www.sadc.int).

When SADC moved to SADCC, it witnessed an important change towards deeper and higher levels of cooperation among countries of the region. SADC continuously attempts to create platforms for its member States to efficiently address global challenges affecting the world at large and specific issues affecting it as a regional block. SADC member states are bound by

its objectives found under article 5 of its treaty which aims to achieve the following; a) achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration; b) evolve common political values, systems and institutions; c) promote and defend peace and security; d) promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and the interdependence of Member States; e) achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and Programmes; f) promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of the region; g) achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment and; h) strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region (www.sadc.int). This paper assessed SADC's capacity in fulfilling objective C on the promotion and defending peace and security in the region.

SADCNGO forum, a civil society that monitors SADC activities highlighted during an interview with the researcher (25 October 2012) that although SADC is headed by Heads of States, it is the Secretariat that runs the day to day activities headed by an executive secretary, who is supported by directorates. The civil society organisation further stated that the Secretariat is not a decision-making body, but that its duties are to implement decisions taken by the policy making structures. Another organ of SADC is the Organ on Politics and defence which is mandated with the promotion of peace and security. In 2004, the heads of state and government summit adopted the strategic indicative plan of the organ (SIPO I) to provide policy directions for the organ and guidelines for its day-to-day activities, as well as to align SADC's peace and security operations with the African Union (AU) peace and security architecture.

The region faces various conflict and security challenges and its capacity to foster and sustain peace and security has been tested in recent years by prolonged political and economic crises in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) is guided by the following objectives: protecting the people; promoting political, security and defence cooperation; developing common foreign policy approaches and a collective security capacity to respond to external threats; peacekeeping and resolving intra- and inter-state conflicts; promoting the development of democratic institutions in member states; implementing UN, AU and other international conventions; upholding international

law; developing cooperation between police and security services in combating domestic, cross border crime and disaster management. They emphasise SADC's recognition of the correlation between development and security and the need to balance state and human security. O' Brien. D. (2000,68) stipulates that the gist of the norm of subsidiary is thus that regional and sub regional organisations should be the "first resort" for problems transcending national borders, leaving the "international community" and global organisations like the UN to deal only with those problems that cannot be solved at lower levels. A number of considerations do indeed speak in favour of such a division of labour. For instance, in the case of an intra-state conflicts, adjacent countries are often more inclined to get involved because they almost inevitably suffer from the consequences of the conflict, e.g. in the form of a flow of refugee. Hence, states may be more likely to honour their obligations as members of a region or sub region, that is as neighbours, than as members of the international community, as doing so corresponds to their national interest. SADC member states have been trying to link security and development, stating that security co-operation within a region could improve its stability, thereby attracting more international investment and trade. It identifies the early 1990s as a vital period in the history of the region, marked by the demise of one-party systems and autocratic rule in favour of multi-party democracies. SADC members are also expected to adhere to AU and NEPAD principles, norms and values in respect of democracy and peace and security.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

The research paper mainly used the realism theory and idealism theory but this study subscribed to realism to explain the relationships between states. The theory of realism as postulated by scholars such as Benjamin Frankel and Oona Hathaway assisted to unravel SADC's position on Zimbabwe. Realism scholars make critical assumptions about the world such as states are the primary and most powerful actors in the international sphere and that the world is anarchic since there is no power over states and no state may command another, there can be no order in international relations; states seek to maximize their security power. It further postulates that the world has limited resources that are unevenly distributed and so they see states as primarily focused on maximizing power and security and that states behave rationally in their pursuits of security or power. Based on these assumptions, realists tend to view the world as a series of prisoners' dilemmas. The classic prisoners' dilemma involves two suspects arrested for a crime. The suspects agree in advance not to say anything. The police interrogate them separately and offer each leniency in return for a confession. If neither suspect cooperates, they will only face a light sentence for a lesser included offence. If both suspects confess, they will both go to prison for the full crime though they will get some leniency for their cooperation. If only one suspect confesses that suspect will be left off while the other gets the maximum sentence for the full crime. The best overall outcome for both suspects is when both choose not to confess. For each individual the best outcome is to confess while the other sticks to their agreement not to say anything. If either suspect believes the other will cheat by confessing, it is in their interest to also cheat and confess. Unless the two suspects are incredibly committed to their agreement this prisoners' dilemma should tend to end in both suspects confessing to protect themselves against worst possible outcome and possibly obtain the best outcome. In this case, the prisoners represent members of SADC who due to the 'big brother' mentality premised on the liberation struggle history tend to treat each other with 'kids gloves' in a niche to protect each other when there are conflicts in a member state.

In the majority of cases, when states make their foreign policies or sign treaties with other states, they look at those realist assumptions with a view of getting the best deals from such relations. If one audits the position of SADC especially under the mediation of President Mbeki, one can see that the position was mainly based on SADC members' national interests

that is the need to protect their economies and citizens from the influx of Zimbabweans, making the region politically stable and therefore attract investment that could lead to expansion of their economies through foreign investments, thus creating opportunities and employment for citizens. Hence the efforts made by SADC in the formation of the GPA as a peace and security measure thus contributing to the region's stability.

Strict realists like Frankel B. 1966 states that States are the primary and most powerful actors in the international sphere and that states seek to maximize their security power. It is important to note that there is a major division within the Realist School regarding how states measure the maximization of power. Under classic realist theory, states seek to make absolute gains in their power. Under this view, a realist state does not care whether other states gain in the same transaction as long as the state that is acting makes a gain in power. Neo-realists argue that states seek relative gains. In this view states will want to know whether they will benefit more than other states based on the existing power structure. Although these realists theorist vary in their intensity of the involvement of States one can deduce from the assertion above that States in this case refers to SADC member states make efforts through their summits and other meetings to resolve conflicts in other member states as a conflict in another state can negatively affect the smooth functioning of operations in their own countries. An good example can be drawn from the xenophobic attacks in South Africa in 2008 where foreigners were attacked by South Africans as a protest that the foreigners were congesting the country, taking away all the jobs and congesting the service delivery system in the country. Here states would rather make efforts towards solving the impasse rather than receiving a backlash from its own citizens hence efforts by SADC countries to solve challenges in other member states. Another example can be drawn from the intervention of Zimbabwe in the 1997 DRC war. Zimbabwe intervened to protect its interests as DRC was supplying electricity to the country and the war would mean interruption in the transmission of electricity to Zimbabwe. SADC also later intervened in the DRC war. This explains well efforts by member states to try and solve conflicts within the region.

The basic idea from the prisoner's dilemma can be translated into the international relations sphere. For example, States will follow the SADC guidelines to free and fair elections as long as they believe other states will also comply. Yet if one state suspects or knows that another state is violating the guidelines, the other state would be motivated to break the guidelines.

The realism theory has been criticised that although it explains certain choices made by states in the international sphere and thereby illuminate conduct (particularly economic and military conduct), it has difficulty explaining the acceptance by states of international human rights in such as self-centered and power focused world as understood by the realist theory. The problems are twofold in that Realists must find some benefit for states in agreeing to and complying with international human rights norms and other norms of good governance and two that even if such a benefit could be found, realists would need to show why there would be a strong incentive to cheat under the prisoner's dilemma. Although the realist approach has been criticised, one can observe that it best explains the behavior of SADC when it comes to its conflict resolution strategies to member states.

Idealist thinkers have an optimistic view of the world. They believe in the pursuit of the common good and respect of moral values and norms. They see the world as what it ought to be. Heydon summaries the idealist theory as follows:

Most forms of idealism are underpinned by internationalism, that is the belief that human affairs should be organized according to universal and not merely national principles. Such internationalism is also reflected in a faith in collective security and international law(2007:130)

Kant, an idealist, stated that the task of establishing a universal and lasting peace is not just a part of theory of right within the limits of true reason but its entire ultimate purpose (Lawson 2003; 16). This theory is still relevant and can explain efforts by SADC to maintain peace security in the region thus also feeding to ensuring Africa at large and the whole world is peaceful. To them it is not optional for SADC not to make efforts towards achieving peace and stability in the region. Nye and Keohane (1977:112) recognize the various and complex transnational connections and interdependencies between states and societies. They argue that the issue of military force and power balancing are decreasing but remain important. Interdependence clearly explains what realism has ignored, the rise of non state actors such as International Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Transnational Companies (TNCs) and also the rise in prominence issues such as human rights. Idealist area criticized by realists for being dreamers because they focus on " what ought to be" SADC can also be criticised as an institution based on idealism and thus focusing in what ought to be, states ought to fully comply with resolutions of SADC summits and meeting but because SADC does not have an enforcement mechanism, states choose at their own volition to comply or not. It is

more than four years since the Inclusive Government was formed in Zimbabwe but the principals to the GPA have not fully implemented the agreement as tasked by SADC.

Literature Review

Introduction

In recent years the world has seen an increase in conflict across the world. Many literature work has developed to explain the conflicts both the internal and external and its effects on international relations across the globe Lund M (1996:5) came up with a Conflict Curve, which explains peace as consisting of stages of intensity. He states the stages as consisting of durable peace, stable peace and unstable peace "durable peace. The author uses these to describe the state of a relationship between nations or groups within nations (Lund M, 1996). Consequently, on the face of potential conflict, these terms have been used to describe different phases in a changing relationship. Diplomacy is also a term which has been used to portray endeavours at attaining or creating a peaceful environment. Lund M 1996, introduces the Curve of Conflict, a conceptual model that illustrates how conflicts can be both violent and nonviolent and how the use of force in violent conflict tends to rise and fall over time. The curve also helps to organize terms and concepts used by those intending to minimise violence, showing how different conflict's phases relate to one another and to various kinds of third-party interventions. Lund M 1996, alludes to inter-state and intrastate conflict and one can investigate the applicability of intrastate conflict resolution in Zimbabwe.

The rise of cases of disputed elections in Africa has led to the creation of a new concept coined the Government of National Unity which brings two or more conflicting political parties together in a niche to encourage them to forgo their differences and work together in a coalition Government. The implementation of the GNUs has been met with varied intensity and success depending with the country involved and most importantly the nature of the internal politics underlying the political set up. This study aimed to found the extent to which the GNU in Zimbabwe facilitated by SADC after the violence that characterised the post March harmonised elections managed to create a platform for engagement between the warring parties thus managing to promote peace and stability in the country. The question that hovers around now is did the conflict prevention mechanism through the formation of the GPA have the adequate propensity for the promotion of a solid democratic space for citizens

and a scope through which Zimbabweans can embark on the national healing process. The author also points out that the notion that a GNU is a way of short changing the electorate, who will not have voted for more than one person to lead them (ibid). This study focused mainly on peace and conflict and scrutinised the viability of GNUs as a conflict prevention strategy and paid particular attention on the role of Inter Governmental Organisations that is SADC in maintaining peace and security in Africa. The research also examined the role SADC played in the formation of the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe and reasons for the non fulfilment of the agreement to date.

The Concept of Government of National Unity (GNU)- power sharing

Jefferson O. (2011:55) states that rebuilding a country after a period of war or election contestation is not only about rebuilding visible infrastructure but it also entails rebuilding emotional and psychological healing and also addressing challenges that can give room to the relapse of the conflict. Saed M. (2010:11) states that peace building activities, practices and procedures demand a multi-faceted approach working to achieve “positive peace” in a country. Michael E (2009:87) states that the formation of unity governments (GNUs) can be seen as a deterrent and transitional measure to ensure short-term reprieve from conflict. The term Government of National Unity can be defined to describe a situation which all the major political parties in a country are part of the governing coalition. Mathuli M (2010:15) states that GNUs can be described as fragile, discordant and are mostly transitional pacts that have a high risk of disintegrating at the slightest opportunity and further degenerating into conflict (Ibid). Wriggins H (1992:77) states that GNUs are good at reducing tension and managing differences during conflicts. The author highlights that GNUs have also been implemented in United Kingdom, Israel and Canada during World Wars I and II. The concept has also been used in United States of America, during the American civil war when President Abraham Lincoln, a Republican, chose Andrew Jackson, a Democrat, as his Vice President. Recently the concept has also been implemented in Nigeria, Macedonia, Togo, Sudan, Iraq and South Africa. Most recently are the GNUs in Kenya and Zimbabwe with African Union and SADC facilitating the agreements respectively.

Jarstad. A (2006:60) postulates that the concept of power sharing is a swift response to end war or impasse in a country as it offers both warring parties a portion in the GNU. Nonetheless most GNU are followed by endless misunderstandings, stalled agreements, accusations and counter accusations that may sometimes lead back to war (ibid). According to Gates T. et al (2007:09), the concept of power-sharing arrangements aim to reduce the risk of civil conflict by guaranteeing potentially warring parties a role in the country's government, thus lessening the stakes of political contestation. Power-sharing can ferment conflict, rather than resolve it. Mandaza I. (2012) postulates that recent upsurge of GNUs IN Africa might not be the perfect path to positive peace as it only provides short-term arrangement designed to end civil wars and conflict , without fully addressing the root causes of conflicts and as a result the power sharing agreement if it fails it has a high propensity of degenerating into chaos thereby stalling efforts of the African Union through SADC of promoting sustainable solutions to the promotion of peace and security.

The 1987 Unity Accord In Zimbabwe

The 2008 Inclusive Government in Zimbabwe cannot be said to be the first GNU in the country as in 1987 the country witnessed another GNU of some sort after Robert Mugabe's ZANU party, united with Joshua Nkomo PF-ZAPU, to form what is now known as ZANU PF after they came back from the liberation struggle. In many instances, Unity arrangements are mostly made after protracted wars or just before elections. Tow W. et al (1997:19), states after Zimbabwe gaining independence from white rule in 1980, the new President, Robert Mugabe went into a deal with the late Joshua Nkomo the leaders of the other wing PF ZAPU. Presidents Mugabe's ZANU boasted of a bigger following than the group led by Nkomo so the arrangement merged the two ethnically diverse groups to form a pact known as Unity Accord brokered in 1987(ibid). This pact dominated Zimbabwean politics until 1999 when the MDC led by Tsvangirai was formed to challenge the status core. One can argue that the signing of the GPA on 15 September 2008 is reflects the 1987 Unity Accord. The only difference is that the MDC is a somewhat new political party born 19 years after the country gained independence and this in a way is used by its opponents to decampaign it.

Challenges faced by SADC in maintaining peace and security in Africa

SADC as a sub regional block has been faced with a myriad of challenges in its efforts of trying to maintain peace and security in Africa. Some of the challenges have been witnessed

in its efforts of attempting to address governance crises in Zimbabwe, the DRC and Madagascar, persistent tensions in Swaziland and Lesotho. The SADC OPDSC has been preoccupied with these challenges but regrettably one can note that there has not been much done in providing long lasting peace and security solutions. Events in these countries demonstrate the complex nature of transitions to democracy, and the reality of democratic reversals. Lissom L. 2012 suggests that SADC is yet to transform itself into a fully fledged regional security actor evidenced by its failure in most of its interventions to provide long lasting solutions to problems bedevilling the target country, thereby reducing its interventions to short term. But Milan M and Cilliers J. 2010 differ by stating that although SADC prefers non confrontational, diplomatic approaches to conflict in Africa, its current efforts have assisted to a larger extent to promote peace and stability generally in the region. The SADC region generally is one of the peaceful regions in Africa. Thompson A. (2011:19) alludes that mediation is the most preferred method of intervention by SADC as it is incapacitated for more forceful intervention strategies evidenced by the absence of a SADC standby force.

Zulu M, (2012:98) argues that SADC is a stable but not very efficient institution where its members are usually acting in a disaggregated manner, driven by the overriding demands of national interest and sovereignty, a point that is cemented by the Realist theorists that States are the primary actors who capitalise more on what is best first for their own national interests. SADC's approach to recent conflicts in its member states for example in Zimbabwe and Madagascar show that the regional block is a state-driven project which has inherent in-built shortcomings as it is failing to pile pressure on ruling elites to implement reforms let alone openly criticise each other. Tsunga A. 2012, also argues that SADC in all its attempt in solving conflict in Africa it has been paying more lip-service than action and has been ignoring any engagement with civil society. It is further stated that for it to address poverty and underdevelopment and promote stability and democracy in the region, it ought to become people-driven rather than state-driven (ibid).

Johnson T. 2011, states that SADC is one of the last part of Africa to be decolonized and remains one of the most peaceful but despite all the protocols and agreements, SADC faces acute challenges characterized by tensions between member states, resource deficits, citizens' exclusion, social discontent and limited internal and external coordination. Regional security cooperation requires serious political commitment and political will on the part of the

member states. Anderson J. (2011:78) states that the SADC region faces a range of evolving peace and security threats, including maritime security and piracy, cyber and technology-driven security threats, and socio-economic unrest. Besides efforts by the regional block to respond to the challenges above there is need for policy implementation capacity and information and response mechanisms are urgently required. Hamill J (2008:09) highlights that SADC's intervention in Madagascar and Zimbabwe exposed the region's limited capacity to enforce agreements it has brokered. Ad hoc and under-resourced mediation processes imposes additional burdens and responsibilities on the mediators. SADC's mediation efforts reveal the complexities and challenges of dealing with unconstitutional changes in government, contested elections and violations of the region's electoral code.

Wrigging H (2007:16) states that in 2004, SADC adopted the "Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections", which was expected to motivate compliance to democratic norms in terms of election processes and the contexts in which they are carried out. The act also promote compliance and resonate with the AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, as well as the AU Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions. Powell K (2009: 13) argues that although the roadmap was endorsed by all member states, the guidelines have been applied selectively, and appear to have played little role in informing SADC's position on the credibility of contested elections, especially in Zimbabwe in 2005 and the DRC in 2011. Although the framework and operational methodology were approved in 2010, the organization is yet to implement it (ibid).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni S (2011:06) highlights that a culture of political solidarity among member states premised on liberation war credentials has hindered SADC's efforts towards peace building as most of these member states have a common agreement with each other of non-interference in the internal politics of others. This has inhibited effective preventive diplomacy and provided justification for non-engagement in cases of potential conflict and security threats. Despite SADC establishing an early warning system in 2010, it is not clear if and how the regional block utilizes the conflict signals arising in the region and how best this infrastructure could be enhanced. Peterson M. (2012:70), highlights that the SADC Standby Force has demonstrated its readiness for deployment, successfully conducting joint exercises, though it needs further strengthening to expand its humanitarian and disaster management roles. But it has not fully incorporated a civilian component, which is necessary to provide

for human security as specified by the AU. The inter-governmental status of SADC limits the enforcement and monitoring of member states' compliance to its peace and security framework. Although political solidarity exists, relations between some of the regional leaders are fragile, even fraught, which has negatively affected sustainable regional security cooperation.

Oluoch F.(2008:77) states that the in an effort to enforce compliance to agreements and resolutions, SADC made provisions for sanctions through the SADC Treaty article 33(1) outside military intervention but the sanctions have not yet been enforced. SADC is an inter-governmental rather than a supranational organisation. It is further criticised that decision-making within SADC is centralised with the heads of state and government summit, whose decisions the secretariat is expected to implement, though it has no enforcement or monitoring capacity (ibid). However, compared to other challenges on the continent, Southern Africa is regarded as relatively peaceful. This affords it an important opportunity to build and consolidate its peace and security capacity. The case studies below show SADC interventions in the region in its efforts of trying to promote peace and stability in the region. The results of the interventions have been rather mixed but generally although it could have done better has managed to promote peace and stability in the region through its varied conflict prevention strategies.

Case Studies of SADC Interventions:

Lesotho

In January 1994, fighting erupted between rival factions of the Lesotho army. Anderson J. 2010, states that due to Lesotho's history of political instability and military intervention in politics, the fighting worried neighbouring countries. The fear was that the problem might spill over into South Africa at a time when the latter was faced with the all race elections scheduled for April 1994. An emergency meeting of Southern African states was called to search for immediate ways to diffuse the tension. The meeting moved a motion to support the democratically elected Basuto Congress Party (BCP) and was unanimously supported. There was a proposal to send a combined military contingent if the situation did not quickly return to normal. On May 23 1998, a general election was held in Lesotho the result of which was rejected by the opposition which claimed that it was rigged in favour of the ruling party. The SADC set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the opposition allegation but found no

evidence of fraud. The opposition refused to accept the verdict and turned to the army for support. There was an attempted coup and the situation prompted the SADC again to intervene on September 22, 1998 with an SADC force led by South Africa and this restored order in the country. Moffat E. (2008:49) argues that a solution was quickly reached in Lesotho because the country is relatively small and falls in the armpits of South Africa and argues further that the same approach cannot be used on a bigger country like South Africa. Nevertheless SADC should be commended for the swift response it exhibited in solving the political impasse in Lesotho although the opposition party was left disgruntled. The intervention by SADC in Lesotho managed to promote peace and security in the country.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Mesfin B. (2008: 17) states that conflict were recorded in DRC during the 1996 war around the country and that at the start of the war in the DR Congo, attempts were made by African leaders to put an end to a conflict, which was seen as potentially damaging to the entire continent. Several conference and summits organized through 1998 and 1999 culminated in the signing of the Lusaka peace accord on July 10, 1999. Cook J.B (1999:65) argue that during the war, there was almost no effective national army or communication between the centre and the periphery. The country subsisted essentially on an informal economy. Kabila came to power as a result of a combination of two main factors: on the one hand was the extreme weakness of Mobutu's Forces Armees Zairoises (FAZ) which mirrored the collapsed state, on the other, was the formidable regional coalition which supported Kabila's rebellion (ibid). Although security arrangements were signed between the Kabila regime and Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, the Congo did not only remain a source of insecurity, its territory deteriorated into an even easier facility for attacks against these neighbours. Frustrated by what was perceived as "Tutsi hegemony" in the region, increasing numbers of local militia, such as the Mai-Mai and the Bembe, lent a helping hand to the Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian rebel groups. On a number of occasions, elements of Kabila's new Congolese army gave support to insurgents, e.g. by escorting them to the Rwandan border on commando raids.

Powell K. (2005: 103) states that the fight continued in DRC, those who were sponsoring Rwanda and Uganda increased their funding thereby exacerbating the war. Cook J.B. (1999:84) highlights that continued fight in the country worried some SADC member states

leading to the intervention of an Angolan force to assist Kabila. The intervention came after a SADC resolution in Harare in August in 1999, where other member states resolved to assist the administration of Kabila. The decision was reached after DRC which was not all along a member of SADC had joined the regional block as a member. Hathaway O. (2007:90) further states that the SADC resolution to assist in the DRC war was swiftly responded by Zimbabwe, Angola and Zimbabwe. The military response was in line with the SADC framework (ibid). Zimbabwe and Angola sent the largest number of troops and Namibia sent the least. The intervention of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola led to other countries intervening in support of Kabila and some of the countries are Chad, Libya and Sudan. Wriggins .H.(2007:17) alludes that the intervention of SADC member states in the DRC crisis led to the stabilisation of the DRC war. There was a ceasefire leading to the formation of a transitional government which held a constitutional referendum in 2005. In 2006, national elections were held and Joseph Kabila won the Presidency.

MacLean S (2003:45) argues that although SADC intervened in the DRC crisis, the intervention came late when most of the damage had already been done. The author states that most SADC member states were negatively affected by the DRC war but the regional block was slow to intervene in addressing the crisis. McLean 2003, gave an example of Zimbabwe stating that the country's electricity supply system was disrupted because of the war as the country relied so much on the supply of electricity from DRC. Meredith, M. (2008:84) states that the reluctance of SADC to take action in the DRC conflict did not start during the Joseph Kabila era but also during the reign of Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila where only the then South African President, Nelson Mandela was the one intervening in trying to solve the political conflict in DRC then Zaire. Before Mobutu was defeated by Kabila, President Mandela made efforts although unsuccessful in negotiating for a ceasefire and all this while SADC was silent on the crisis.

Gyimah-Boadi E. (Ed) (2008:15) explains that when Laurent Kabila continued to be involved in civil and regional wars, President Mandela continued to push for peaceful solutions to the DRC crisis and SADC remained numb. Several peace negotiating meetings were initiated by Mandela although they did not result in ceasefire. Gyimah-Boadi highlights that South Africa was part of the peacekeeping mission sent by UN in DRC code named, UN Mission in DRC (MONUC). South Africa also hosted and played a major part in a series of meetings in

2002 which led to the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord. The peace accord managed to bring on the table all warring parties in the DRC conflict. The warring parties managed to sign a peace agreement but unfortunately it did not manage to end the war on the ground. Thousands of people continued to flee the country as the war continued to take root. The fighting comprised of government forces, rebel troops in the eastern DRC which led to over 100. 000 people migrating to nearby countries (Africa Research Bulletin: September 1 – 30, 2007). The war ended a few year later but the peace was short-lived as there was another outbreak of war in 2012.

Michael J, (2012:13) argues that the conflict resolutions SADC is offering to DRC are piecemeal evidenced by the eruption of another war in August 2012. Joseph Kabila, DRC President appealed to SADC for intervention but the regional block did not respond to the call for assistance. The war is being fought by rebels of the 23 March movement (M23) at the border between DRC and Rwanda. Michael J further states that there were plans for a joint intervention between SADC and the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) but the efforts were hindered by SADC's complex decision making process where member states continue to argue on the form and nature the joint command should take. It is further argued that lack of political will on the part of some SADC member state is contributing to the delay in action of the intervention (ibid). One can conclude that although SADC's intervention in DRC was full of inconsistencies, the regional block has assisted generally in the maintenance of peace and stability in the war infested country.

Madagascar

Makinda S. (1996:09) states that Madagascar has a history of fragile democratic transition. After independence from France in 1960, a military coup in 1975 brought Didier Ratsiraka to power. Albert Zafy became President in 1993 after pressure on Ratsiraka to hold elections. In 1996, Zafy was indicted and Ratsiraka was voted back into office. Marc Ravalomanana too claimed victory following a disputed election in December 2001, despite no official result. This led to a conflict between Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka that led to the former consolidating his power with the support of the military. His government was eventually recognised internationally and Ratsiraka went into exile in France. Jarstad A. (2006:11) argues that all this time Madagascar was not a member of SADC but in August 2006 the then Madagascar President Ravalomanana joined SADC. It is argued that his joining of SADC

was a strategy by President Ravalomanana broaden relations with other countries which had nothing to do with France its former coloniser.

Bratton M. (2011:46) states that in 2009, there was a coup in Madagascar that saw Ravalomanana substituted by Andry Rajoelina and this led the country into another war. The coup led the country into chaos, where thousands of people were forced to migrate to other countries, the economy was affected and a number of countries withdrew their airlines as a result of the instability in the country (ibid). SADC in an effort to assist sent two missions to Madagascar to assist the situation. Ayittey. G. (2009:23) explore further by alluding that the decision of SADC to send two missions was reached after endless SADC meetings where heads of states were failing to agree on the proper action to take in the country. The author further argues that after the missions, SADC was issued with the results of the fact finding missions but there were no further actions on the part of SADC. The war continued in Madagascar and SADC did not take any action. SADC by failing to intervene led to the escalating of the conflict. Ayittey 2009, further states that Ravalomanana was ousted in March 2009 but SADC refused to acknowledge any other Government that is not the legitimate one led by Ravalomanana but the new Government was adamant. This led to SADC resolving to throw sanctions on Madagascar but this did not change anything. This led to the country being suspended from both the AU and SADC.

Anthoni V. (2012:08), argues that SADC attempted to send another military intervention after it suspended Madagascar but the interventions still did not yield any positive results. Another result of the failure of the intervention on the part of SADC was the lack of proper coordination with the SADC itself. A SADC Summit was held in South Africa in June 2009 where a resolution was made to send a mediation team to Madagascar that would mediate between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina. One can note here that SADC's intervention therefore shifted to mediation. SADC created a International Contact Group (ICG), an all-inclusive dialogue platform which attempted to negotiate for the reinstatement of Ravalomanana.

Beetham D. (2010: 50) highlights that the mediation exercise failed to achieve much as it did not have sufficient resources and would spent long periods of time without resuming the mediation.

Buzan B and Ole W. (2012:67), highlights that all the SADC interventions were taking place as solid resolutions from SADC summit but when President Zuma took over the Presidency in South Africa in 2010, he became actively involved directly in the Madagascar crisis. President Zuma took over the mediation process and his efforts increased when South Africa became the chair of the Organ in 2011. It is argued that South Africa's interest in Madagascar led to it continuing to push for an election roadmap in Madagascar. It is further stated that when all these attempts were being made Ravalomanana had already gone into exile and efforts to negotiate for his come back were fruitless (ibid).

In October 2012, the crisis in Madagascar had still not be resolved. Several SADC summits have been held with the country being of the topic of discussions but no concrete strategies have been agreed upon by SADC. SADC election roadmap has since been abandoned as the two warring parties continue to fight each other. Beetham D (2012: 06) argues that the duplication of duties and responsibilities and competition between SADC and AU has also contributed to the delay in coming up with the solution. It is argued that there seems to be some form of competition between SADC and AU on who will first broker a peace pact leading to overlapping of peace building strategies (ibid). Beetham 2012, further states that the security system in Madagascar is in too much control and are not willing to cede power evidenced by continued revolts within the ranks and file of soldiers in the country. It is further explained that during the Maputo Agreement, an agreement was reached through Article 22 to provide for an all politically inclusive committee on the security sector but it was resisted by the army. Nathan .L. (2012:76) states that SADC as a regional block that thrives to promote peace and security in Africa should have done more in Madagascar besides just suspending the country. The author argues that other stringent measures could have forced the regime in that country to resolve the political impasse.

Knowledge Gaps this research sought to explore

The concept of Governments of National Unity as a conflict resolution mechanism is a fairly new phenomenon in International Relations. SADC as a regional block mandated to maintain peace and security in Southern Africa has been involved in settling internal disputes in member countries using the concept of negotiations which gives birth to GNUs hence the enthusiasm by the researcher to find out to what extent the GNUS have managed to maintain peace and security in the region. This study also managed to explore if SADC as a regional

block has enough capacity to enforce compliance for example the Zimbabwean case. It also examined why the outstanding issues to the GPA have not been fully implemented four years after the birth of the I.G, a responsibility bestowed on SADC to make sure the agreement is fully implemented. This study by interviewing the political leaders wanted to feed into current limited literature on why the political leaders have failed to reach an agreement on the outstanding issues and the internal politics behind the delays in fully implementing the agreement.

Chapter 3

African Union- MEDIATION

The 1999 Sirte Declaration, which replaced the OAU with the AU, highlighted the need to link security and stability to development. SADC's peace and security architecture is structurally aligned to the AU peace and security architecture through the provision of mechanisms that are responsible for early warning of emerging conflicts, peacemaking, peace building and building and consolidation of democracy. The peace and security architecture is made up of the following components: the Peace and Security Council which promotes a broad approach including preventive diplomacy, peace building, democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention, the Panel of the Wise, the African Peace Fund, the continental early warning system, and the Standby Force. It provides the instruments required to meet the peace and security objectives of the AU Constitutive Act (AU website. www.africanunion.au).

The AU preamble recognises the need for continental unity and collective action, agreeing that continued reports of cases of conflicts in Africa are affecting progress. The AU preamble also acknowledges that peace, security and stability are prerequisites for implementing the AU's development and integration agenda. According to the Constitutive Act, the peace and security objectives of the AU are to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its member states (Article 3b); promote peace, security and stability on the continent (Article 3f); and co-ordinate and harmonise policies among existing and future RECs (Article 3l). The supreme organ of the AU is its Assembly, which determines its policies, and provides directives to the Executive Council on the management of conflicts, and restoration of peace.(AU website. www.africaunion.au).

Vogt. M. (2008:296) highlights that in 2001, the AU assembly incorporated the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and, in 2002, it adopted an amended version of the AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (the Protocol). The document emphasizes the collective security and early warning arrangement that facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. AU's specific objectives include the promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa; anticipate and prevent conflicts, promotion of democratic governance, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction; prevention and combat international

terrorism; and promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and respect for the sanctity of human life (ibid). After the outbreak of political violence in Zimbabwe in 2008, AU in June 2008 tasked SADC to intervene in the Zimbabwe in a niche to restore peace and stability in the country and this led to mediation talks in Zimbabwe which subsequently led to the formation of the Inclusive Government on 15 September 2008.

Background to GNU Formation

In May 2007, a SADC Summit was held in Tanzania where the then South African President Thabo Mbeki was tasked to lead negotiations between the main political parties in Zimbabwe comprising of MDC T, MDC M and ZANU PF. Part of the task included ensuring that the political parties come up with a clear, transparent election roadmap. Tarisayi E (2009:14) underscored that the negotiating team was expected to ensure the talks result to the agreement of holding harmonised elections which comprised of the Presidential election, Parliamentary, Council and Senatorial elections. The roadmap was agreed upon which ensured elections would be held in a free, fair and peaceful manner. (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2010). The three political parties agreed to the mediation for different reasons. ZANU-PF was driven by a combination of the free fall in the country's economy, increasing international criticism and, perhaps most significantly, pressure from SADC to accede to the negotiations (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2010). MDC-T viewed a negotiated settlement as possibly the best route to power, while the smaller MDC-M saw it as an opportunity to retain its political relevance (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2010). Mbeki managed to break serious obstacles and painstakingly got the parties to agree to key electoral reforms, facilitating a political climate that reduced the levels of pre-election violence in the run-up to the March 2008 elections. However, the five-week delay in announcing the presidential election result fuelled serious suspicions about the manipulation of the outcome. When the results were finally released, Morgan Tsvangirai of MDC-T won 47.9 percent of the vote ahead of President Robert Mugabe with 43.2 percent (EISA, 2008a), a controversial outcome that entailed a run-off between the two candidates.

A series of politically-motivated violence erupted in several parts of the country, leaving hundreds of MDC supporters dead and many more injured, and prompted Tsvangirai to

withdraw from the June run-off which saw President Mugabe the ultimate winner. However, election observer teams from SADC and the Pan African Parliament all agreed that the run-off election was neither free nor fair (SADC, 2008; Pan African Parliament 2008; and EISA 2008). In less than 48 hours of the run-off, President Mugabe was declared the winner and was inaugurated, just after his inauguration he went to attend the AU Summit in Egypt. At the summit, the Zimbabwean situation did not escape the radar, the election results were dismissed as neither free nor fair and the AU was worried about the escalating cases of political violence and as a result tasked SADC to continue look at the crisis by continuing with the negotiation process. This led to a series of meetings between the three main political parties.

Finally an agreement was reached and a deal was brokered leading to the signing in of the GPA. President Thabo Mbeki was the one facilitating the talks hence South Africa was made the guarantor of the GPA thus ensuring that all the outstanding issues to the GPA are fully implemented. During the negotiations, the three political parties failed to agree on key fundamental issues termed outstanding issues which for the sake of progress were left behind with the hope of implementing them soon after the signing off of the GPA on 15 September 2008. When the GPA was put in place it was meant to bring, political, economic and social stability to the country but most important, the agreement was suppose to prepare a way for credible elections in the country. Tarisayi, E highlights that it is unfortunate that the GNU came into being without the creation of a clear roadmap on how the outstanding issues and credible elections would be attained. The continued bickering by the signatory to the GPA on how the issues should be implemented, their differing interpretations of terminologies in the GPA, their disagreement on who to appoint and not appoint has continued to slow progress in the Inclusive Government.

Structure of the Zimbabwean GNU

The GNU has three principals that is Robert Mugabe from ZANU Pf as the President, Morgan Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister from MDC T and Prof Arthur Mutambara as the Deputy Prime Minister from MDC M. An amendment was made to the constitution that is Constitutional Amendment Number 19 by the three political parties and was consequently collectively passed by both Houses of Parliament, that is the House of Assembly and the

Senate, to give legal effect to the Global Political Agreement. The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and Members of the Cabinet were sworn-in in February 2009. A 25 member non-partisan Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) was constituted to lead the Constitutional review exercise as enshrined in the Global Political Agreement. The Parliament's Committee on Standing Rules and Orders was tasked to start a process of receiving nominations for Commissioners to sit on four independent Commissions that are now provided for in the Constitution. These are: the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission; the Zimbabwe Media Commission; the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission; and the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission. But the GPA stipulated clearly that the appointments to these Commissions should be made by His Excellency, the President from nominations put forward by the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders (The Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs website). A committee titled Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) was set up to ensure there is full compliance to the GPA.

The GNU has so far managed reform partially the media sector, a move that has eased the flow of information in the country through online media outlets, social media and independent daily newspapers. The rapid expansion of ICT and social media has the potential to reach marginalized media users such as the youth and the population in high-density, peri-urban and rural areas. Notable achievements include the amendment of the Electoral Act, licensing of independent newspapers, licensed of two new independent radio stations and the constitutional referendum process.

SADC's role as the Guarantor of the GPA

Hettne. I and Sunkel P (1997:67) defines a region as a subset of the global international system which is however difficult to delimit. Garventa J. (2004:21), states that regional organisations represent instances of first resort as far as the peaceful resolution of conflicts is concerned, but it is also underlined that different rules apply to the use of non peaceful means with the stipulation that "No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council" (art. 53.1 of the UN Security Council). The UNSC thereby reserves for itself the right to either authorise military action by regional organisations, or withhold such authorisation, in which case the

use of forces constitutes a violation of art. 2.4 of the Charter, according to which “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (UN Charter).

After the formation of the GPA, SADC was further tasked by AU to be the guarantor of the agreement and ensure its full implementation. There has been accusations and counter accusations between the GPA principals regarding the full implementation of the agreement. The GPA was suppose to last for four years but the four years have since lapsed without the outstanding issues to the GPA being fully implemented. There are talks of another round of national elections in Zimbabwe without the GPA being fully implemented. Maunganidze .0 (2012:14), states that after the signing of the GPA, the two MDC formations repeatedly complained about ZANU-PF’s deliberate failure to agree on anything and its continuous reluctance in implementing key reforms which incorporates the security sector reform, media reforms, election reforms. The two MDCs also blamed ZANU PF for failing to genuinely call for the disband of all structures of political violence as the country continued to record incidents of political violence after the formation of the IG. ZANU PF in turn complained of the failure by MDC to enerstly call for the removal of sanctions which ZANU PF believed where called on the country by MDC T.

The GPA also called for the formation of JOMIC whose responsibility is overseeing compliance with and implementation of the agreement. JOMIC is consisted of representatives from all the three parties . As a result of the compromised nature of JOMIC, its lack of adequate resources and poor communication channels between JOMIC and SADC, the institution has not done much in terms of ensuring adherence to the GPA demands. Several SADC Summit meetings were held where it was emphasised that the GPA should be respected and adhered to and that the three principals should be sincere in fulfilling all outstanding issues, little progress was made. SADC to ensure full implementation issued out ultimatums to the Zimbabwean Government in November 2009 and August 2010 but unfortunately, this did not force the principals to comply. This lack of enforcement powers on the part of SADC exposed its inadequacy of ensuring compliance on a deal it brokered. Gates S. and Kaare S, (2012:400), attributes that to the vagueness of the role of “guarantors” to the agreement. It is further stated that ZANU-PF seems against the idea of too much

involvement of SADC in the Zimbabwean situation which it claims that too much involvement of SADC in solving the impasse is tantamount to external interference. In November 2009, the troika of the Organ gave the Zimbabwean signatories until 6 December to fully implement the agreement and in August 2010, the heads of state and government set out a 30-day ultimatum for the same purpose but nothing materialised. In November 2011, the MDC-T petitioned SADC with a document consisting of all the violations it thought ZANU PF was breaching. Some of the allegations included, the politicisation of the security sector, disruption of parliamentary business, arbitrary arrests of human rights defenders, monopoly of state media, selective application of the law (ZLHR report on political violence). ZANU PF in turn also reported that MDC T was running a parallel Government for regime change agenda from the funds it is receiving from Western Donors.

Maunganidze, O.A. (2012) highlighted that at the SADC meeting in Livingstone, Zambia, in March 2011, the troika of the organ was requested to dispatch three members to work with JOMIC to strengthen its oversight of the GPA. Despite endorsement by the heads of state summit in Sandton in June, it took a year before two officers were sent. This followed protracted resistance by ZANU-PF, which interpreted this measure as interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign member state. At the same meeting Maunganidze O. 2012 further states that at the meeting, Zuma castigated ZANU PF for slowing down progress in the Unity Government and this angered ZANU PF which threatened to reject Zuma as the mediator in Zimbabwe arguing that his mediation was biased towards the two MDCs. One can note that the mediation of President Zuma has been marred by delays, accusations and counter accusations and although the mediation process has prevented the country from degenerating into political violence. But the mediation process led by President Zuma can be blamed for failing to ensure the outstanding issues to the GPA are fully implemented. In an interview with Hon Jameson Timba (interview on 19 February 2013), he highlighted that during the Livingstone Summit, a communiqué was released which reiterated that President Zuma as the mediator should ensure that the GPA is fully implemented and that the GPA principles should be sincere in making sure all outstanding issues are dealt with. The GPA signatories were tasked with coming up with an election roadmap and were also tasked to come up with a document that highlights all areas of disagreement and through President Zuma should make sure the outstanding issues are ironed out.

Bwanya N (2012) explained that after the Livingstone Summit there was still little progress on the mediation and negotiations with the three GPA principals continuing to disagree on almost all the outstanding issues. It is stated that the political bickering continued until an extra ordinary SADC Summit was called in Luanda, Angola in June 2012. At the Summit it was reiterated further that Zimbabwe was suppose to implement reforms and come up with a clear election roadmap. After the Luanda Summit progress was recorded on the 16th of March 2013 when a constitutional referendum was carried and the draft constitution received a nod from the Zimbabwean populace. What is now left is for it to be endorsed as the supreme law of the country. The outstanding issues have been reduced to sanctions, media reform, electoral reform, rule of law, freedom of association and freedom of assembly and legislative agenda and commitments. Other outstanding issues have been stalled and security concerns are exacerbated by destabilising political statements from senior defence force members and widespread impunity for past and current violations.

Two other controversial outstanding issues has been the operationalisation of the National Security Council (NSC), a key GPA creation and the reform of the security sector. From a report released by Electoral Institute of Southern Africa,(EISA) 2012, it can be drawn that the continued absence of President Zuma from the GPA mediation table can be blamed for the stalled election roadmap process. It is argues that President Zuma between November 2010 to October 2012 he was not fully active in the Zimbabwean mediation process leading to delays in the principals agreeing on the election roadmap. President Zuma's absence was blamed on his preoccupation with domestic affairs in his own country. There are current calls by political party leaders for another round of elections in 2013 and efforts towards the full implementation of the GPA seem dwindled. What should have come first is a clear election roadmap facilitated by SADC but this to date has not taken place, making it difficult to guarantee peaceful elections. In the lead-up to the August 2011 SADC summit in Luanda, ZANU-PF attempted to push for the removal of Zuma as the facilitator arguing that he cannot be the organ chair at the same time being the mediator but the move was unsuccessful. In a report by Crisis In Zimbabwe Coalition on the Deadlock over the full implementation of the GPA in 2012 stated that SADC 's role in Zimbabwe has been that of facilitation with no enforcement powers leaving all the leverage to political parties to choose whether to comply or not.

Challenges faced by the GNU- impediments to the full implementation of the GPA

Pankhurst D. (2010:25) defines full implementation as the complete fulfillment of all the outstanding issues that were agreed upon by the signatories to the GPA at its inception in September 2009 where each party pledged its full commitment to the fulfillment by signing the agreement. The outstanding issues had earlier on stalled the signing of the agreement. There are endogenous and exogenous factors hindering the full implementation of the GPA. One of the objective of the GPA was to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation. Essential to this was the restoration of democracy and the garnering of international support to revive the country's collapsed economy.

There are seven sticking issues to the full implementation of the GPA (as of 18 February 2013: <http://www.sokwanele.com/zigwatch>). There is a general disagreement between ZANU PF and the two MDCs. The Prime Minister Mr. Tsvangirai in 2011 threatened to pull out of the Inclusive Government if ZANU PF continued to unilaterally appoint the Reserve Bank Governor and Provincial Governors. There are accusations and counter accusations between these political parties as they both take turns to castigate the unwillingness of each other to honor and fulfill the demands of the GPA. Reports from Sokwanele, a civil society organization that monitors the full implementation of the GPA reported that SADC called for the full implementation of the GNU but there were disagreements by the principals on the appointment of the Attorney General and other sticking issues and all this can destabilize peace. Maisiri T. (2012) postulates that MDC want the full implementation of the GPA, ZANU PF wants partial fulfillment of the GPA whilst SADC is more concerned about maintenance of peace and stability in Zimbabwe hence its "kids gloves" approach towards the implementation. To SADC, anything that is a threat to peace and security is handled with caution. The composition of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is also a contentious issue. MDC T wants the full overall of the ZEC secretariat but ZANU PF is adamant. With SADC failing to ensure full implementation of the GPA, four years after its inception, one can deduce that Principals to the Global Political Agreement and SADC managed to only come up with short term solutions to peace and security instead of imploring long term solutions to the challenges facing the country thus promoting temporary peace. It remains to be seen with these short term solutions if the country will not regenerate again into chaos at the impending national elections.

Civil Society Organizations in Zimbabwe have castigated the composition of JOMIC where political parties are both the players and the referees of the GPA and this has also contributed significantly to the unfulfilment of the outstanding issues and the unnecessary delays characterizing the agreement. Masungure E, blames lack of effective external supervision on the part of SADC as one of the challenges the Inclusive Government is facing. Pankhurst .D (2010) argues that lay back approach by SADC can be a strategy by the regional block to avoid interfering with Zimbabwe's sovereignty, an area President Mugabe protects and defends.

Another area that the Inclusive Government has struggled with is to bring justice to victims of political violence as stipulated by the GPA. The GPA in Article VII stipulates that the Government shall:

'...give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what measures might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre and post-independence political conflicts.'

Article V11 saw the Government creating the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration which is chaired by three representative of the three political parties who are signatories to the GPA. The failure by the Inclusive Government to spearhead the national healing process remains one of the greatest challenges facing the country. Cases of human rights abuses are yet to be brought before the court of justice. There seems to be some reluctance on the part of the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation to facilitate the national healing process because the organ is too compromised. JOMIC which has also been charged with monitoring the full implementation of the GPA and also to monitor any cases of violations with the agreement including noting any cases of political violence. One can note that JOMIC has been able to respond to cases of political violence but is incapacitated to take action against the offenders. The failure by the Inclusive Government to redress the concerns of victims of political violence leaves the victims in dejected and in fear of victimization especially now as political leaders begin to call for another round of national elections in 2013 (Essuman. J: 2012:419).

There are also reports from Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Zimbabwe of victimization and unwarranted arrests by state agents. On 20 January 2013, CSOs released a joint statement arguing that some sectors in the Government particularly ZANU PF

sympathizers were disturbing civil society operations by harassing civil society leaders. Part of the press statement highlighted that CSOs were increasingly being targeted by law enforcement agents leading to temporary closure of some and detention of their staff and directors. Examples of organizations that were affected were the Counseling Services Unit (CSU), the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (Zimrights) and the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) in 2012. In an in-depth interview with the Finance Minister Mr Tendai Biti (19 December 2012) who is also one of the negotiators for MDC T, the Minister highlighted that there were hardliners of the old establishments who were hindering the full implementation of the GPA thinking that their social and political positions were being threatened. He further argued that the ZANU-PF hardliners, accuse President Mugabe of letting them down by agreeing to join the GNU hence they try by all means to sabotage the smooth flow of business in the Inclusive Government. Some of the sabotaging tactics he implored are the arbitrary arrests of civil society organisations, a move he explained as a strategy to derail the IG.

Derek Matyszak from the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), a civil society organisation in Zimbabwe argues that it would also not be alarmist to express that the circumstances in which the Zimbabwean GNU was negotiated and the compromises that both parties have had to make is an indication that all is not settled. Indeed ideological differences between Mugabe (of Marxist orientation) and Tsvangirai (of the capitalist school) have seen them and other senior government officials often contradicting each other publicly. On 13 April, 2009, the Minister of Information and Communication in the Zimbabwean Inclusive Government, Hon. Nelson Chamisa, threatened to resign over the subjective action by President Mugabe to usurp some of his ministerial powers and transferring them to a fellow ZANU PF Minister, one Christopher Mushowe of the Ministry of Transport and Communication, this has also caused tension in the IG (Newsday newspaper, 18 November 2012) .

An interview with Hon Priscilla Misihairambwi Mushonga (on 05 November 2012) one of the negotiators for the other MDC faction highlighted that the other challenge facing the GPA was that President Mugabe and the former opposition leader Prime Minister Tsvangirai have both exhibit public enmity for each other hence a cordial relationship between the two is difficult if not impossible because those who have been supporting President Mugabe all along will not be comfortable to see the President exhibiting signs of working together well

with Prime Minister Tsvangirai, his long time rivalry. Hon Mushonga further stated that the overemphasis of ZANU PF on war credentials has created animosity between Army generals and any other political party where the generals are adamant that the country can only be led by a person with war credentials. This has worsened tensions within the IG. Hon Jameson Timba the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's office during an interview stated that President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsvangirai also seem to hold different and divergent foreign policy aspirations, with the MDC being pro-West, while ZANU-PF is anti-West a view that has further generated problems for the Government of National Unity.

Prospects for enforcing the full implementation before the next round of elections in 2013

Ndlovu. G (2011:33), states that with the continued political bickering that characterized Zimbabwean politics it is difficult for SADC and the Principals to the GPA to ensure that the GPA is fully implemented before the next round of the elections. An example was given of the constitution making process, it took the country three years to come up with the draft constitution which ideally was suppose to be done in 18 months. One can note that the principals to the GPA are already in the campaign mode and there is little or no efforts of ensuring the GPA is fully implemented. With the lifeline of the GPA ending in June 2013, it difficult if not possible for the ever disagreeing parties to sit down and map the way forward regarding the full implementation of the GPA. An interview with an official from the South African Embassy who requested anonymity indicated that there is little room under the current environment for negotiations for the full implementation of the GPA as the political leaders are already in a campaigning mood. He highlighted that what SADC can best do is to facilitate for clear election roadmap that will feed into peaceful, free and fair elections.

Chapter 4

Findings of the Research

This Chapter goes through the actual findings which this study arrived at after collecting information from the selected primary and secondary sources. In this chapter, the study answered the research questions and meets the objectives which the study aimed to achieve in the conceptualization of the research. The chapter goes through what key informants said during the in-depth interviews. In line with the data collection process which was highly qualitative in design, the data analysis that is in this chapter is also qualitative. Below are the findings of the research:

SADC On the formation of the GPA

This section answered the research objective on the extent in which SADC as regional block influenced political processes in Zimbabwe. From the findings of the research it was deduced that to a larger extent, SADC influenced political processes in Zimbabwe between the period 2008-2013 by spearheading the formation of the GPA which saw three political leaders in Zimbabwe coming together to form a groundbreaking GNU which managed to put an end to the political deadlock that had characterized the country after the disputed June 2008 election runoff. The greatest achievement by SADC was the timely intervention that rescued Zimbabwe from being a failed state. The formation of the GPA spearheaded by SADC helped the country to recover economically and there has been an improvement from the social decay that had characterized the 2008 period. Schools had closed, there was an outbreak of cholera, shortage of basic amenities but the situation improved when SADC facilitated the formation of the GPA. Hon Patrick Chinamasa one of the ZANU PF negotiators during the GPA negotiations highlighted during an interview (10 January 2013) that the general mistrust and tension that was there between ZANU PF and MDC T before the formation of the GPA was reduced through the mediation and subsequent formation of the IG.

Challenges to the full implementation of the GPA

This research noticed that there are various obstacles that have stalled the full implementation of the GPA. The challenges are both intrinsic and extrinsic. Lack of political will by the political parties involved has been noted as one challenges hindering progress in the GPA.

Wanting to give less and receive more by the GPA Principals has stalled progress in the full implementation. Inefficiency and under capacitated of SADC as an institution has contributed to its diplomatic approach that lacks enforcement on the principals to the GPA. It is from this research that one can deduce that SADC lacks enforcement powers to ensure that a deal that it brokers in a niche to promote peace and security is full implemented. It has issued two deadlines for the full implementation of the GPA but all the deadlines have lapsed with no implementation of the outstanding issues. The AU and SADC were both tasked with resolving the crises in Zimbabwe, this underscores the importance of ensuring clarity on respective mandates and interrelated responsibilities. Two SADC summits on Zimbabwe were held and problems bedevilling the GNU had for many times had to wait for heads of state and government and ministerial committees, both of which are invariably committed elsewhere in their political and domestic roles. SADC's lack of a permanent mediation unit, and an incapacitated SADC Secretariat has led to SADC failing to effectively and distinctively provide supportive role in preventive and effective diplomacy.

SADC on Peace and Security in Zimbabwe

This research revealed SADC's role as the guarantor of the GPA. The regional organization as per its mandate managed to bring together warring political party leaders in Zimbabwe to come together and map the way forward for the country. Numerous negotiations were held which gave birth to the GPA which brought peace and security in the country. According to Heal Zimbabwe Trust report on the nature of political violence in Zimbabwe released in 2011, cases of political violence declined by 72% after the formation of the GPA between the period September 2008- September 2010. The intervention of SADC managed to bring back some level of normalcy in the country after the 2008 political violence that left more than 200 people dead. The MDC information department highlighted that between the period September 2008 to January 2013, it only recorded four deaths related to political violence as compared to the 2008 period. This can all be credited to the invention by SADC. The question now is does the peace ushered by SADC through the formation of the GPA long term or it was a short term solution to curb the violence that had threatened to disintegrate the country. Mr. Okay Machisa the Director of ZIMRIGHTS one of those interviewed during this research on (16 December 2012) stated that SADC has to a larger extent managed to bring peace and security in Zimbabwe by facilitating the formation of the GPA but further

stated that this solution managed to reduce cases of political violence and brought economic stability. Mr. Machisa further reiterated that although SADC managed to foster peace and stability in the country, it could have done better if it was not for the leniency the regional block has exhibited by failing to enforce full compliance to the GPA. This he blamed on the "big brother mentality" by the majority of leaders in the SADC who protects other leaders on a relationship premised on the liberation war histories of their countries. This argument can also be cemented by the Realism theory which explains that states want to capitalize on what is best for them (Rendall T. 2000: 55). From this study it can also be deduced that although SADC has assisted to a greater extent to peace and security in Zimbabwe between the period 2008- 2013.

There were diverse and conflicting interpretations of SADC's role in resolving conflicts in the Zimbabwe, whereas some understand the regional bloc to be an inter-governmental organisation without a mandate to intervene in internal issues, SADC has in some cases been involved in such processes. SADC's mediation processes lacked resources and tend to rely on the means and actions of the mediators, rather than on a regional autonomous capacity. SADC had limited capacity to monitor, evaluate and ensure implementation of agreements that it helps to broker, and has no sanction mechanism for violation of the deals. For example during the 16 March 2013 constitutional referendum in Zimbabwe, SADC only deployed 90 observers to monitor the crucial process in a country that has 9910 polling stations (a report given by SADC during a press conference during the referendum). SADC has not significantly engaged in addressing concerns or risks posed by and/or within the security sector, despite the significant and evolving role the military and defence forces play in the crises. Civil society was absent from SADC mediation processes. SADC's response to conflict situations is slow and the coordination from early warning to approval for early action is also unclear and an example is that President Zuma spent close to two years between 2010 to 2012 without coming to redress the challenges the IG was facing in Zimbabwe.

Anthoni. V. (2012:11) states that SADC lacks an effective, permanent team that specialises on mediation alone and as a result of this has compromised peace and security in Africa. It is further alluded that the SADC secretariat has not been capacitated enough to make decisions and the diverse political views of the SADC member states has led to delays in decision

making. Van N 2012 concluded, “In short, the Organ is not more than the sum of its parts, and given its in-built shortcomings, the parts become key.” (Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, p.12).

During an interview with the spokesperson for the MDC led by Proff Welshman Ncube, Mr Mozilla Ndlovu on (08 December 2012) highlighted that the mediation process which is headed by South African President can be viewed as a two way relationship between ZANU PF and NCA as President Zuma's mediation team comprises of ANC members only. The interviewee stated that this compromises the mediation process as ZANU PF and ANC are close allies. Contrastly one can deduce that the GPA has managed to last close to 5 years which can be said to be a plus on SADC as somewhat the presence of an active IG even if there are disagreements is a sign that SADC has managed to maintain peace and security in the country. What remains to be seen is whether the peace is short term or long term as one can argue that the peace is short time with a higher probability of the situation degenerating into chaos.

Impact and Success of SADC's intervention in other Political Hotspots

SADC's interventions in hotspots such as Madagascar, DRC, Lesotho has had mixed results. Lack of a stand by force like the ECOWAS has also crippled SADC's interventions. The diplomatic maintenance of peace and security might not be enough. The absence of a swift response to outbreaks of violence has also further paralysed SADC to act in time. The protocol of SADC troika is new, prior to that SADC has been using haphazard interventions. The respect of the concept of sovereignty has also hindered the efficiency of SADC. Lack of punitive action by SADC to encourage full implementation is also lacking. The summit held in Tanzania could only go as far as encouraging countries to fully implement agreements no enforcement mechanisms. The issue of power ties has also affected the smooth operations of SADC. Each region has its own power ties, Zimbabwe is more closer to Angola than South Africa which leads the negotiating team. Lack of proper coordination also affects SADC for example during the Lesotho war, South Africa was the first to intervene and SADC joined in later. This can be attributed to economic interests that determine whether a country should show keen interest or not.

Chapter 5

Recommendations and Conclusion

This Chapter provides recommendations and conclusions for this research based on a reflection on the research objectives and research questions. The main objective of this study was to assess the role SADC played in ensuring peace and security in the Zimbabwean crisis of 2008.

Recommendations

SADC should have an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance. The lack of enforcement on the part of SADC has led the GPA principals to be reluctant to fully implement the agreement as they know there are no implications for non compliance. SADC should introduce enforcement mechanisms like sanctions as this forces compliance. SADC should also engage members of the Civil Society organizations of that particular country during the mediations as this helps it to get a more clearer and independent picture of events under scrutiny. During the Zimbabwean mediation, the process restricted the process to only three political parties thus excluding important players such as civil society, labour and smaller political parties. This resulted into the agreement neglecting other immediate important needs that needed special attention for example dealing with victims of political violence such as refugees and internally displaced people, women and other victims of politically motivated violence, elements which Civil Society and other stakeholders would have pushed for attention.

Another blunder that was also made during the formation of the GPA is that it was agreed that JOMIC which comprises of the same members of political parties was tasked to deal with issues of compliance and monitoring of the GPA, a move which can be criticised as one cannot expect the same Government to monitor and be the judge of compliance at the same time. Lessons can be borrowed from the Kenyan experience after the 2007 election violence, where the AU conferred the responsibility to monitor the agreement on civil society. A non-governmental organisation named Social Consulting, which majors in governance and social development, was contracted to independently monitor the implementation of the Kenya Peace Accord and provide regular reports to the High Level Panel of Prominent Persons on any achievements as well as any challenges or issues that needed to be addressed. It is

difficult for coalition partners to monitor or track their progress on their own because individual interests may influence how they see and interpret the progress. An external and independent assessment is important in showing progress or lack of it in implementation of each agenda item. This is also critical in identifying and providing feedback on progress, challenges and gaps in implementation.

During the research it was also noted that SADC's mediation capacity is still a work in progress as important institutional gaps were exposed during the Zimbabwean mediation process particularly the lack of an effective monitoring mechanism. SADC should improve its monitoring mechanism by coming up with a permanent monitoring team. Secondly, the Zimbabwe case has provided lessons that should inform future mediation exercises. It was also noted that SADC as an institution is ill funded. If properly instituted, well funded and sufficiently staffed, the unit will help to alter the dynamics of mediation in the region shifting it from an ad-hoc process based on current and former presidents towards a more effective, institutional architecture that will strengthen SADC's ability and bring peace in the region.

SADC should implore strict follow up strategies to resolutions of its summits. Of all the summits and extra ordinary summits that were made on Zimbabwe there was no clear follow strategy by the regional block on the resolutions made by the summit on Zimbabwe. After the summit, SADC did not do much to follow up on the principals on whether they were compiling with the resolution or not. As a recommendation, SADC should put up, clear follow up strategies which are adhered to as this reduces it from being a "toothless" institution that does more talking than action.

The lack of enforcement by the SADC troika in dispute resolution is one cause for the failure of SADC to ensure full implementation of the GPA. The competences of the Standby Force need to be reinforced, notably through the inclusion of a civilian component, in order to build its capacities in humanitarian and natural disasters crisis management.

Conclusion

In conclusion one can safely state that SADC as a regional block has to a larger managed to maintain peace and security in Zimbabwe after the disputed 2008 election runoff. The question that remains is whether peace is long term and will not degenerate into violence now as the country heads towards another round of elections. SADC played a major role in the formation of the GNU through mediation talks comprising of three political parties. The regional block through the assistance of South Africa which led the mediation process managed to bring warring political parties together thus rescuing the country from falling into a failed state. The economic, social status of the country had deteriorated prior to the talks and SADC's intervention to a larger extent assisted in helping Zimbabwe get back on its feet.

The role SADC has played in Zimbabwe can be clearly explained by the realist theory which stipulates that countries are more concerned about power struggles and mainly assist each other when there is benefit to her, this is evidenced by the influx of Zimbabweans to neighbouring SADC countries putting a strain on their amenities thus SADC had to intervene through solving the stalemate in Zimbabwe. Although SADC has contributed immensely to the formation and implementation of the GPA it is evident from the research that the regional block has failed to enforce compliance to the full implementation of the GPA by the principles evidenced by the seven outstanding issues that have been hovering around all the five years of the existence of the lifespan of the GPA.

Failure for SADC to ensure full implementation of the GPA can also be attributed to lack of political will on the part of the Principals who seem to fight and outwit each other at any opportunity they get and this has delayed progress. From the research, it can also be observed that SADC has also managed to maintain peace and stability in other political hot spots like Madagascar, Lesotho and DRC but with varying intensity. From the various interventions, one can conclude that SADC's interventions have assisted in calming political situations that had a high propensity of degenerating into wars. And SADC's interventions have assisted to a greater extent to generally maintain peace in the respective countries although its interventions sometimes came late. Southern Africa can boast of being one of the calmest region in Africa with few cases of outbreaks of wars and civil strife. SADC with more resources, capacity, and also more willingness on the part of member states, the regional organisation has a capacity of curbing unnecessary loss of life and destruction of

infrastructure through wars by timeously and effective interventions that promote peace and security in Africa.

Bibliography

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, "Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa", Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, January 2012, p. 15. 31 Ibid, p. 16.

African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR). (1986). Retrieved from <http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instreet/z1afchar.htm>.

Ake, C. (2000). *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa*. African Books Collective. Wiltshire: CODESRIA.

Ayittey, G.B.N. (2009). Time for an African Solution or Sanctions? In *The Zimbabwean Situation*, 03 March 2009.

Barnett, C. & Low, M. (Eds.). (2004). *Spaces of Democracy: Geographical Perspectives on Citizenship, Participation and Representation*. London: SAGE.

Barry, Bole Wavers & Jaap de Wilde: *The New Security Studies: A Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 9-20, 42-45 & *passim*;

Buzan, Barry & Ole Waver: *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Lake,

Beetham, D. (2012). *Democracy and Human Rights*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Besson, S. & Marti, J.L. (2006). *Deliberative Democracy and its Discontents*. Hampshire, Ashgate.

Benjamin Frankel, Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction, in REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL, 1966

Bratton, M. (2011). *Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Budge, I. & Keman, H. (1999). *Parties and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bwanya, N. (2012). Prospects dim for Zimbabwe peace deal. *Mail and Guardian*, July 25, 2012.

Constitution of Zimbabwe (1980). Retrieved from <http://www.parlzim.gov.zw>.

Cook, J.B. (1999). *Citizen Participation: A Concepts Battery*. Columbia: University of Missouri, Department of Regional and Community Affairs.

Crick, B. (2002). *Democracy: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dahl, R. (2006). *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

David A. & Patrick M. Morgan (eds.): *Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997);

Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. (EISA). (2003). Realizing Effective and Sustainable Democratic Governance in Southern Africa and beyond. IESA Occasional Paper, No.20.

Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). (2012). The impact of Democracy on Public Participation in the SADC Region.

Essuman-Johnson, "Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis of two African Security Complexes", *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, vol. 3 (2012), pp. 409-422.

Fawcett, Louise & Andrew Hurrell (eds.): *Regionalism in World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), *passim*; In Election Institute of Southern Africa [EISA], EISA Occasional Paper No.13, October 2003.

GATES, S. and KAARE STROM (2012): "Power-sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes," Oslo, Center for the Study of Civil War. GRIFFITHS, R. (1995): "South African Civil Relations in Transition: Issues and Influences," In *Armed Forces and Society*(21), pp. 395-410.

Gaventa, J. (2004). Towards participatory governance: assessing the transformative possibilities. In S. Hickey & G. Mohan (Eds.), *Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation?* London: Zed Books.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (Ed.). (2008). *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Hamill, J. (2008). National unity option is a dead end. In *The Guardian*, 3 July 2008.

Hyden, G. & Braton, M. (Eds.). (1993). *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder, Colorado:

K. D. Hwang, *The Remaking of SADC Politico-Security Regionalism in the Post-Cold War Era* (Pretoria, 2006), p. 171.

Kornprobst, Markus: "The Management of Border Disputes in African Regional Subsystems: Comparing West Africa and the Horn of Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 40, no. 3 (2002), pp. 369-393.

Lund M, *Preventing Violent Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p37

Lynne Rienner. Retrieved from: <http://nvs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/14/1/16>, on February 26, 2008.

Ile, I. & Mapuva, J. (2010). Citizen Participation and Democracy: Safeguarding Citizen Participation Through Government of National Unity (GNU) or democracy violated? *Journal of Public Administration*, 45(1), March 2010.

JARSTAD, A. (2006): “The logic of Power-Sharing After Civil War,” Norway, Uppsala University Press.

Lund, M.S. (1996). Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Mark Malan and Jackie Cilliers, “SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Development”, Institute of Security Studies, March 1997.

Makinda, S. (1996). Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34(4), 555–573.

Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, South Africa
Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 12, No.6, 2010) ISSN: 1520-5509
Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion, Pennsylvania

Mandela, N. (1995). Long Walk to Freedom. Randburg, South Africa: Macdonald Purnell (Pty) Ltd.

Masunungure, E. V. (ed) (2009) Defying the Winds of change, Konrad Adenauer Foundation

Maunganidze, O.A. (2012). Post-Election Power-Sharing Governments and the Future of Democracy in Africa. Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria.

Meredith, M. (2008). *The State of Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence*. London: The Free Press.

Mesfin, B. (2008). Democracy, elections & political parties: A conceptual overview with special emphasis on Africa. Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 166, July 2008.

Meyer J et. Al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 144 (1977)

Nathan, Laurie: "Mediation and AU's Panel of the Wise", in Shannon Field (ed.): *Peace in Africa. Towards a Collaborative Security Regime* (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2012), pp. 63-80

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S "Reconstructing the Implications of Liberation Struggle History on SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe", South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), September 2011.

O'Brien, David: "The Search for Subsidiary: The UN, African Regional Organizations and Humanitarian Action", *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 57-83;

Vogt, Margaret A.: "Regional Arrangements, the United Nations, and Security in Africa", in Alagappa & Inoguchi (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 3), pp. 295-322.

Pankhurst, D. (2010). Striving for "Real" Democracy in Africa: the Roles of International

Randall, L. Schweller, Neorealism's Status – Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?, in REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL 90 (Benjamin Frankel ed, 1966.

Tarisayi, E. Voting in Despair – The Economic & Social Context, p1 of 14, in Masunungure, E (ed) Defying the winds of Change, KAS, 2009.

Tow, William T.: *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Adler & Barnett (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 19); Keating, Michael & John Loughlin (eds.).

Wriggins, Howard (ed.): *Dynamics of Regional Politics. Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007);

Journals, Websites, Reports

African Union/OAU: Decisive Step" *Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series*, vol. 38, no. 2 (February 2001), p. 14289. Assembly of the African Union, First

Ordinary Session: “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union” (9 July 2002) at www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit_council/secprot.htm.

“African Union (AU): A Giant Step Towards Unity”, *Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series*, vol. 40, no. 2 (February 2003), p. 15183. The “Mechanism” has been formally incorporated into the AU. See “Decision on the Implementation of The Sirte Summit Decision on the African Union, art 8A at www.au2002.gov.za.

“African Peace And Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study”, African Union, November 2010

Crisis Group interview, researcher, University of Botswana, Gaborone, 8 February 2012.

“Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa”, Friedrich- Ebert Stiftung, January 2012, p. 11.

“Final Communiqué of the 32nd Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government”, Maputo, Mozambique, 18 August 2012.

HOROWITZ, J. (2009): “Power-sharing in Kenya,” a paper prepared for presentation at the Workshop on Political Inclusion in Africa, American University, April 24-25, 2009.

OLUOCH, F. (2008): “Power-sharing Bad for Continent,” *The Nairobi, East African*, September, 13, 2008.

Powell K, “The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on The Responsibility to Protect”, *The North-South Institute*, May 2005, p. 11.

Trevor Maisiri, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Southern Africa.

Zimbabwe Lawyers for human rights report; The aftermath of political tension 2008