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NON-REVOLUTIONARY INTELLECTUALS AND NEO-
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Paper 4

NON-REVOLUTIONARY INTELLECTUALS
AND NEO-COLONIALISM

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with exploring the role of ideas and intellectuals in the maintenance and perpetuation of neo-colonialism. Before dealing with the substance of the issue I make without elaboration some preliminary observations and state certain underlying assumptions.

First, by concentrating on ideas and intellectuals, I do not wish to suggest that neo-colonialism is not fundamentally an economic phenomenon. I do not propose a Hegelian view of imperialism, where it is a reflection of ideas! But ideas play role in both its articulation and perpetuation.

Second, I use term non-revolutionary in the title in two senses. Firstly, there is the political sense of non-radical or conservative; I wish to be clear that I am not concerned with "progressive" intellectuals, although much of what I say may be applicable to them. Secondly, I use the term non-revolutionary in the Kuhnian sense. In his well-known analysis of the development of science, Thomas Kuhn distinguishes between revolutionary science - that which is concerned with paradigm shifts - and normal science - that which is concerned with working within the accepted conventions of the dominant paradigm (Kuhn, 1964). In this paper I wish to consider normal scientists. I am not really concerned about the ideologues of the right, whose role in perpetuating neo-colonialism is fairly overt and explicit. Rather, I want to concentrate on the everyday scientist, who is perhaps "apolitical" "just doing a job". Here the role is less explicit and less obvious. Thus, and I cannot emphasise it enough, when I speak of intellectuals I am always referring to non-revolutionary intellectuals.

Third, although I realise that there are different types of intellectuals, that we can make a distinction between intellectuals per se and the intelligentsia, I tend not to dwell on this distinction. It is thus important for me to emphasise at the outset that ideas are not the property of a small group of academically inclined people. Intellectual activity is
undertaken by all people in society, even if it may not be their main preoccupation. I am concerned with those people who are involved in intellectual production, but ultimately it is the ideas that pervade society which are important.

Fourth, most of what I have to say is coloured by my perceptions of the issues as an economist and relate to economists. But I hope not exclusively so: I think they have relevance to other social sciences, humanities and natural sciences. Ngugi has emphasised the role that language plays in perpetuation of neo-colonialism. In many ways, scientific activities can be seen as a form of discourse, as a form of language. How does the language of science perpetuate neo-colonialism?

Finally, it will be noticed in the paper that I tend to use neo-colonialism and imperialism interchangeably. This is mainly for linguistic variation: since I am solely concerned with the current period, in which imperialism manifests itself as neo-colonialism, it does not seem to me necessary to draw any fine distinctions between the two.

Having made these preliminary observations, let me proceed to the substance of the paper. In the next section I consider the role of ideas in a class society before looking explicitly at intellectuals and imperialism in Section 3.

2. IDEAS IN CLASS SOCIETIES

Before examining ideas and neo-colonialism, it is useful to reflect upon the role of ideas in class societies in general and capitalism in particular. Marx and Engels dealt with ideas and class societies in the Communist Manifesto:

"What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class." (Marx and Engels, 1973:85)
Two specific and related theses about ideas in class societies are contained in this passage. Firstly, ideas are posited as part of a superstructure built upon, and responding to changes in, the material base of society. Secondly, a particular set of ideas are posited as the ruling ideas of the age. We need to elaborate on these two these to provide a basis for our later understanding of ideas and imperialism.

**Ideas and the Material Conditions of Life.**

The first thesis - that there is a coherence between material production and intellectual production - was propounded by Marx elsewhere, as in his oft-quoted Preface:

"The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness....The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophical - in short, the ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out." (Marx, 1971: 21)

I am aware that the view put forward in this Preface, and particularly the base/superstructure picture it paints, has been the subject of intense debate. At the risk of walking into this hornets nest, I think it is important that we should not regard the "ideological forms" as mechanically derived from and related to the base, but as being in a dialectical relation with it.
Changes in the material base lead to changes in ideological forms which in turn impact upon the material conditions of life. For example, the shift from the conception of scientific investigation as clerical authority to that of critical discourse was a necessary component part of the shift from feudalism to capitalism. But this shift was a process rather than a decisive break; while the process of development of the forces of production, which underlay the material shift was going on, there was a similar shift taking place in the realm of ideas. This shift was necessary, to allow the conditions for the changing material base to develop. Thus the changing material base lead to changing consciousness, while the changing consciousness provided the basis for further changes in the material base. We tend to speak of shifts between modes of production as if they are decisive and quick processes - but historically they take many centuries.

Ideas and intellectuals are not somehow "optional extras", but are an integral part of the system. Gramsci makes this clear in his discussion of intellectuals:

"Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields." (Gramsci, 1971: 5) (1)

Thus the capitalist class does not exist simply as a naked group of exploiters, but is dressed in a swaddling cloth of ideas which provide it both with a self-consciousness and with a self-justification. And the intellectuals who weave this cloth are created along with the capitalists. They help to develop a false consciousness, a mystificatory web of ideas, which justify capitalism not only to capitalists but also mystify the real nature of capitalism for the working class.
What are the “ruling ideas”?  

This brings us to the second thesis on ideas contained in the passage from the Manifesto quoted above: that the ruling ideas are, the ideas of the ruling class. This is presented in a highly epigrammatic form. Furthermore, it is a statement at a high level of abstraction: it refers not specifically to capitalism but to all class societies. It provides only a starting point for our investigation, not its end. We need to unpack it a little before we can elaborate it to show how it manifests itself in the specific context of capitalism in the last quarter of the 20th century and in Zimbabwe in particular.

In order to understand this epigram more fully we have to consider what is meant by "ruling ideas"? There is in most societies - and certainly in capitalism - an apparent plurality of ideas. There are disagreements, even amongst the ideologues of the ruling class. In Britain, for example, there are fairly obvious differences between Tory and Labour parties in the realm of ideas. We would not want to deny that either of these parties "represents" the ruling class. But in what sense can the ideas of either one of them be said to be the "ruling ideas" of Britain?

The most straightforward answer to this question is that "ruling ideas" refer to the fundamental or paradigmatic ideas of the society. Thus it is the rule amongst intellectuals in Britain or the United States that dialectics is regarded as an aberrant form of logic. It is difficult to find a British or American intellectual who is in not some sense a positivist, regardless of the superstructure of theories, hypotheses or whatever that they construct upon these foundations. There is a fairly widely accepted notion of "anglo-saxon" philosophy, which is generally regarded as being "empiricist", "pragmatic", or whatever euphemism one wishes to use for positivism.

It would appear that Marx and Engels were concerned with ideas at this broad level. In the Manifesto, they refer to the ancient religions, Christianity, religious liberty and freedom of
conscience. "...the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms." (Marx and Engels, 1973: 86)

This construction of the realm of ideas parallels the base/superstructure conception of society. There exist the fundamental ideas - let us call it the paradigm - upon which less fundamental theories are constructed. The pluralism which is apparent amongst bourgeois intellectuals exists at the less fundamental level. Since the ruling class itself is composed of different interests, different fractions of capital, ideas representing each exist simultaneously. Which of these are hegemonic depends upon politics within the capitalist class. Thus we could argue that Keynesianism articulated the interests of a specific fraction of British Capitalism, but even while it was hegemonic, anti-Keynesian ideas continued to flourish and develop. Then in the late sixties and early seventies there were shifts within the British ruling class which brought the monetarist counter-revolution, so that Keynesianism was no longer hegemonic. But there was no paradigmatic shift between Keynesianism and Monetarism. Both are contingent explanations of capitalism which do not threaten capitalism. Both are based on "anglo-saxon" philosophy.

If we are to be able to use this construction, we need to consider how ideas at the superstructural level and those at the paradigmatic level interact. Superstructural ideas are the concrete and contingent manifestation of the paradigm; but there is a dialectical relationship between the two. The paradigm conditions the superstructural ideas. Nevertheless, the paradigm itself is neither clearly articulated nor static. Superstructural ideas are part of the process whereby both the paradigm shifts (evolves) and our knowledge of it is worked out. This is most noticeable at times of paradigm shifts, but is actually taking place continuously, in more or less concentrated forms. In any concrete situation, therefore, we have to deal with ideas at the superstructural, and not simply the
In many ways, the "ruling ideas" of an age are presented to us as common sense. The mystification of the workers, to which intellectuals contribute, arises not only because of that intellectual input, but also (mainly) because it accords with a non-scientific, commonsense perception of their reality. It is obvious that if it were not for my employer I would would not have a job and if it was not for me, he would not make a profit. Thus, common sense tells me that we have a common interest. His profits might be high and my wages low, but that is because he is greedy or better educated or what-have-you. But common-sense tells me that if I were to destroy him, I would be destroying my own job. In many ways, the history of scientific endeavour has always been the struggle against the common sense of the age. When the Church suppressed Galileo they were not simply protecting their narrow interests, but were giving expression to the common sense of the age.

As I have suggested above, the epigram quoted from the Manifesto is at a high level of abstraction, and one of our tasks is to concretise it. One of the issues we have to deal with in this process is that Marx and Engels' thesis abstracts from nations. If we wish to discuss imperialism, we have to see how this general abstraction is manifested within the context of the modern world which not only has nations but has centres and peripheries, East and West, and actually existing socialist countries. Since the exploration of this is the main task of this paper, I will return to it later. At this stage let me raise one problem, which relates to our understanding of what is meant by "ruling ideas". Once we accept that the imperialist centre consists of a number of countries, it makes it even more difficult to identify "the ruling ideas". It is my impression that there is much less antagonism to dialectics within Europe than in Britain or America. Thus if we argue that the ruling ideas means the ruling paradigm, we have a problem once we recognise that French intellectual life is different from British or American. We have to dig even deeper under the surface of ideas to find a common basis.
How do the Ideas of the Ruling Class become the Ruling Ideas?

In trying to understand and concretise Marx and Engels' epigram we also have to consider the process whereby the ideas of the ruling class become the ruling ideas? In discussing this I will use examples from capitalism, but they can be applied to other class societies. I am still not specifically concerned with imperialism.

Marx clearly implies an objective process whereby changes in the material base of society leads to changes in its consciousness. At its broadest level the process must be seen as part of the class struggle. The unfolding struggle between classes takes place not simply at the political and economic level but also at the level of ideas. Ideas and intellectuals are one weapon in the armoury of the rising class in its struggle against the old. As the new class gains power, so the ideas which support it become the ruling ideas. The rise of the new class removes the block on the further development of the productive forces which the old class constituted: the rise of the new ideas is the manifestation of this removal at the level of ideas.

There is a danger of seeing this process in mechanistic or comparative static terms, as though these changes are quick, clearcut, consciously planned. We have to see them rather as part of a long and continuous process. Thus, one of the important ideological contributions to the rise of capitalism was Adam Smith's critique of mercantilist policies and rationale of laissez faire. If we ask why the Wealth of Nations was written in the late eighteenth century and not, say, a century earlier by Petty, it is clear that the climate was not right for it. The development of productive forces, the stage of the struggle between the emerging bourgeoisie and the ancien regime, and the level of development in the realm of ideas, were not appropriate.

A seventeenth century Wealth of Nations would have been a work not of science but of science fiction. It was not as if the Wealth of Nations suddenly appeared out of the blue. At the level of economics, others before him had been articulating components of his arguments - Petty, Hume, the Physiocrats.
Their arguments in turn were influenced— as were Smith's—by
the practice of business, the talk in the coffee shops:
capitalism had been growing out of the womb of feudalism for
several centuries before Smith. Furthermore, the ability to put
forward these arguments was itself dependent on other changes
outside the realm of economic ideas that had been taking place.
For example, the diminution of clericism as a source of academic
authority and the rise of rationalism, which had been underway
from the earliest days of the Reformation, was necessary to
provide a climate in which critical debate of state power was
possible. Similarly, the critique of Aristotelianism and the rise
of experimentalism— which dated back to the thirteenth century—
was a necessary precursor to the empiricism of the Wealth of
Nations. These developments in the realm of ideas— which
themselves depended on precursors and previous material
developments— were the foundations upon which Smith built.
Smith was part of a long historical process.

Similarly, we would be wrong to think of the Wealth of Nations as
somehow constituting a decisive break with the past: suddenly all
was light. It took time for the Wealth of Nations to be
incorporated into the "ruling ideas". In some instances, such as
the arguments for free trade, Smith's arguments required both
further elaboration and further development of English Capitalism
before they could become "ruling ideas". This latter point is
important. Smith could see, from his observations of eighteenth
century capitalism, that the development of the market was
crucial for the further development of capitalism. In other words
his ideas arose out of the material conditions of eighteenth
century life. By logical extension he could put forward an
argument for extending access to the world market, for free
trade. But, for these ideas to become practice, further
developments in the productive forces (further technological
developments stimulating large scale production) and in class
forces (the shift in power between merchant and productive
capital and the rise of organised labour) were necessary. In
part, Smith's book contributed to these further developments. We
can see here the dialectical process whereby ideas arise from and
contribute to the material base of society.
But these changes in both ideas and material conditions meant also that further developments in ideas were necessary. Subsequent economists developed modified rejected Smith's ideas, both as their understanding improved and as material and political conditions developed. Thus Smith was part simply of a long historical process, as we suggested above, but of a long and continuing historical process. He arose out of a certain stage of development of productive and class forces, and he contributed to the further development of those forces.

We would of course be mistaken to present this process whereby ideas of the ruling class become ruling ideas as if it was an automatic and deterministic process. We have argued that it is part of the process of class struggle; in this process classes do not simply wait for favourable events to occur, they create them. They intervene overtly in the production of ideas. The past has witnessed ruling classes using naked power against ideas - and intellectuals - which threaten them. The Copernican Revolution and the suppression of Galileo is an obvious case. The Church-State used direct force to try to suppress the new heresy. This heresy was a threat to their power, not so much because of its substance, but because it challenged the authority of the Church. It was an important battle in the rise of the scientific outlook, in the dethronement of clerical authority and the raising up of reason as the legitimate method of scientific investigation.

The ruling class also uses its power to support ideas - and intellectuals - which support it. In modern society, this means funding research institutions and researchers, supporting universities. The process of education itself is a process whereby the ruling class ideas become dominant [3]. The media and communications industry also contribute crucially to the process. They are central in the modern world to the process whereby the ruling ideas become the common sense of the age.

Finally, intellectuals themselves contribute to the process. Intellectuals survive by the sale of their labour power; they can
only sell it if it has use-value for the purchasers; in general it is only the ruling classes who are able to purchase ideas or at least determine the exchange value of particular ideas. The market for ideas thus determines which ideas are will be dominant, will get most exposure, which intellectuals will be able to survive as intellectuals. By this process of market selection, it is not strange to find that most of our normal scientists actually believe the ruling class ideas they propound. There is no conflict. Should we expect the flea to criticise the dog for being warm blooded? Most of our intellectuals are themselves products of their society; their task is to dress up common sense in appropriately impressive language.

The professionalisation of the intellectual also contributes. The criteria for employment, for promotion, for belonging to the club of respected intellectuals become more and more explicit and require more and more conformity. In USA Universities, one seldom finds Marxist economists; those that one does find, paid their dues by demonstrating their competence in other fields, showing they can do "real" economics. If they are good enough at that, their aberrant interests might be indulged. This is not always because of explicit suppression of Marxism, but because of the professional consensus of what is and what is not "good economics".

3. INTELLECTUALS AND MODERN IMPERIALISM

I have been looking at the role of intellectuals and ideas in class societies, particularly capitalism. In summary, I have been concerned to show how these support the ruling class and how they are related to the material basis of society. But the discussion has been presented essentially within the framework of a single country and has not been explicitly concerned with either modern capitalism or imperialism. We need to take into account the existence of nation states, nationalism and imperialism. From our previous discussion we would expect the role of non-revolutionary intellectuals in such a world to be to mystify the existence and nature of imperialism. But at a less generalised level, how does this work?
The Nature of Modern Imperialism

To discuss this we need to have at least some rough understanding of neo-colonialism. My views on this are not standard and therefore need to be explained briefly, although I am not sure how far the arguments I later present on intellectuals and imperialism depend on this precise view of modern imperialism.

Although neo-colonies exist in a capitalist world system, in which the international capitalist class exists in a well-developed (but continually developing) form, within the neo-colony national class lines are much less clearly established: a process of class formation is in motion. Although this process has definite similarities with the processes of primitive accumulation in the now-developed countries so vividly described by Marx (Marx, 1976: Part B), there are of course important differences. For our purposes the most significant differences arise from the fact that this process of national class formation is taking place within a world of already developed capitalist classes.

Globally, the current period is witnessing a process of the internationalisation of capital. This does not simply mean that production, ownership and accumulation is expanding geographically - that is something which has been taking place since the early nineteenth century. Capital itself is losing its national character. "International finance capital" is increasingly coming to mean international capital, rather than American Banks owning assets abroad. The process of de-colonisation - the delinking of colonies from single imperial powers - was part of this process. More recent elements have been the rise of off-shore banking, the growing integration of money markets, capital markets and stock-exchanges and the increasing geographical dispersion of single, integrated production processes. All of these are elements of a growing process of internationalisation of capital. This is the historical logic of capitalism: capital increasingly reproduces itself in purer and purer forms.
But although this process is underway, it is taking place in a world of nation-states and therefore takes forms which reflect this. International capital has to articulate itself concretely with the neo-colonies. The concrete form this takes of course varies, as it did in earlier phases of imperialist expansion. In all cases, however, international capital impacts upon and influences the nature of the local ruling class. The local classes may grow out of the soil of the nation, but they are strongly watered, fertilised and, on occasion, pruned by international capital.

The emerging national ruling class is caught between international capital on the one hand and the popular demands of recently decolonised masses on the other. It has to serve the interests of international capital while at the same time retaining its local political power. As with all ruling classes it attempts to balance these two sets of demands in its own interests, but because it is not a fully developed ruling class these interests are not yet homogeneous or coherently articulated. The clear contradictions that are noticeable within the neocolonial state have been attributed to the petit bourgeois nature of that state, but I prefer to regard it as a reflection of the underdeveloped nature of classes within the neocolony acted in the modern world system.

As the national ruling class is being created (or, more properly, as the ruling class of international capital is establishing its neocolonial branches), the ideological apparatus to support it is similarly in the process of being created. But, just as the emerging national classes are conditioned by the already existing world capitalist system, so too are the emerging national intellectuals and ideas conditioned by the existence of already existing international intellectuals. With decolonisation and localisation, international capital requires not simply an adequate political and ideological apparatus, but also a technical and managerial intelligentsia to oversee its programme in the neocolony. This in part requires training and education as well as expatriate expertise. There is an immediate and
common sense rationale for penetration of external intellectuals into national intellectual development. We have therefore to look at the role both national and, more importantly, international or foreign intellectuals play in the intellectual and ideological apparatus which is created to support the developing national ruling class.

This brings us back to the question touched upon earlier: how do the ideas of the ruling class become the ruling ideas? How do the ideas which have developed amongst international intellectuals become the ruling ideas of the neo-colony? The concrete means are so many and so varied that it is not possible to be exhaustive. I therefore discuss briefly some of the more obvious mechanisms: the education system and particularly the University; media and communications; international agencies and foreign experts.

The University and the Reproduction of Ideas

Obviously the whole education network is an important mechanism for the propagation and penetration of international ideology. Although this clearly starts from primary schooling, I will speak solely about the University and tertiary level. It will be clear that I speak with our University in mind, but this is not because I think it is unique: my limited experience of other African universities suggests that what I have to say applies pari passu to them.

How far have our Universities made a decisive break with the conceptualisation, structures and organisation of standard western university we inherited? Have we seriously considered the question of whether such a University is an appropriate institution for dealing with our conditions? Is a centralised institution which withdraws students from real life at the age of 19 for three to six years an appropriate structure for treating national intellectuals in agrarian, underdeveloped societies? Are the disciplinary structures of British universities appropriate for understanding African realities? University academics are constantly urged to meet the needs of the people;
but is it likely that this will be done within the framework of a University designed precisely to divorce intellectuals from the people? There certainly are students from working class and peasant backgrounds; but the University is designed to ensure that they remain "from".

Of course, these questions are all rhetorical; they answer themselves. The University is itself an integral part of the process of class formation. As such it is not isolated from the conditioning of the international intellectual system. What are the concrete mechanisms by which University intellectual life (and through it, national intellectual life) is thus conditioned?

One of the most pervasive mechanisms is the appeal to international academic standards. Our courses must be of accepted international standards; our staff must meet acceptable international standards both for appointment and for promotion. In short, the more our Universities can reproduce acceptable international standards, the more successful they are judged to be. Most of the institutional changes implied in the series of questions in the last paragraph would be rejected on the grounds that they would lower standards. But, we must ask, what are these "acceptable international standards" our Universities are reproducing? They are acting as one of the conduits through which the ideological apparatus of international capitalism is incorporated into national ideology. They help to weave the cloak of mystifying ideas which support the system.

It will be objected that many of the individual academics are aware of this and teach or carry out research in a critical way, and they are to be commended for it. But one has to recognise the weight of institutions in the reproduction of capital. Any discerning person can recognise individuals at, say, the World Bank, or at Western Universities, who are seriously concerned with ending exploitation; this does not make those institutions any less involved in the reproduction of capitalism. Furthermore, we have to go back to the earlier debate on the level of ideas which constitute the "ruling ideas".

How many of us who have attempted to teach our students a
critical understanding of the nature of capitalism and imperialism can point to a dozen of our students who, by their practice, can be identified as seriously anti-capitalist five years after graduating? Do we really teach a paradigmatic anti-imperialism, or do we simply participate in the critical debate which the bourgeois university allows?

The appeal to international standards distorts our intellectual life in many ways. Thus it often determines both what we teach and what we research on. We have to make sure our students are conversant with the discourses of the international community. We rely on foreign books and periodicals for teaching materials. If we wish to attend international conferences, if we wish to have some standing amongst our international peers (which is necessary if we wish to be accepted on the local scene), we have to work in the currently fashionable areas. Even if we adopt a critical stance towards those areas, the terrain for discourse is mapped out for us elsewhere.

We also bring to our view of international standards the prejudices of our former colonial masters: Oxbridge and Ivy League Universities are at the apex of our pyramid: non-English speaking European ones are slightly odd and not to be preferred (although at least the Scandinavian and Dutch ones can teach in English, which sets them above French, German, Greek...); socialist bloc universities are extremely suspect - they must have ulterior motives. As for other third world universities - well, if they are in Africa, we know something about them and may find at a push them acceptable, but elsewhere they are extremely dubious. This implicit hierarchy affects us from appointments, promotion and staff development through to choices for sabbaticals and invitees to conferences.

This domination by international standards is of course not restricted to University circles. The same attitudes pervade neocolonial society. It is difficult to get ministers or senior government officials to attend and participate in a local conference; such difficulties seem to disappear when the invitation is to a conference abroad or is attended by well known
delegates from abroad. The Public Service Commission finds it more difficult to release (let alone support) civil servants for local post-graduate courses than for foreign ones. The civil servants are themselves less willing to be released. And clearly this is right, because the foreign universities and experts must be better - even in their understanding of Zimbabwe. Similar attitudes exist in the private sector: witness the difference in costs for attending management courses addressed by foreign as opposed to local, experts.

The University is also incorporated into the international intellectual system through direct assistance. Because we recognise our lack of resources and our own intellectual underdevelopment, we use external resources to help us. We have staff development programmes and other forms of training abroad where the international incorporation is fairly overt. But is it not the case that such staff development programmes are influenced by our perception of what our intellectual underdevelopment consists of - we are underdeveloped in the skills required of a typical bourgeois western (British) university. If we did not appeal to these standards we would perhaps go differently about the task of building our intellectual capacities.

Media and Communications

I have tried to avoid suggesting that only academics are intellectuals, although this may have been obscured by my preoccupation with my immediate social reality. But for intellectuals to fulfil their mystificatory role their ideas have to permeate society, to become the commonsense of the age. Here the media and communications industry is crucial. It is obvious that their function is more broadly concerned with cultural penetration, and to that extent lies outside the scope of this paper. But consider briefly the extent to which our media reproduce foreign agency reports, generally without comment or criticism, often without real attribution. Sometimes this is directly ideological in intent: for example, the penchant that the Financial Gazette has for reproducing articles out of Finance
and Development published by the World Bank and the IMF. More often the ideological content is less overt: the reports put out by Gemini, which appear frequently in the Third World press. But we should nevertheless ask what the ideological role of and impact of such articles is.

International Agencies and Foreign Experts

International agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, UNIDO, UNDP etc. obviously have an important role to play in propagating the ideas of international capital, as do NGOs and other foreign assistance bodies. For some the role is fairly clear and explicit: one thinks particularly of national based agencies such as USAID, or christian organisations such as World Vision. For the more technical oriented organisations however, it may not be quite so obvious. A body which provides straightforward technical assistance in school building or well building is not performing an obvious ideological role. But essentially the "neutral" foreign technical expert is premised upon the idea that the political and social aspects of problems can be divorced from their technical aspect. There exists a technical solution which can be inserted into any social context. This separation reflects a philosophy which views the world as composed of separate entities rather than as a whole. I would argue that its perpetuation is important for a continued mystification of the masses; developing an awareness of the unity of their experience is a crucial step in the development of a self-conscious exploited class. Peasants must not be encouraged to see that the problem of a broken water pump is a class issue, not simply an engineering problem.

Some external agencies are now learning that technical questions have to be located in their social and political environment. But even these seem to continue to believe that their foreign expert is better equipped to understand even these issues than local people.

In more direct ways these external agencies impoverish our national intellectual development, even when well intentioned.
To meet the charge of not relating to local conditions, there is a growing tendency to employ local experts or to incorporate them in consulting teams. But even this carries with it the danger that, because of the attractive conditions of work (and the status conferred on such jobs by our externalised standards) that manpower is drawn away from national intellectual development. These agencies come with their own programmes, views, priorities and home-country political concerns. They may strengthen those national tendencies with which they concur, but they weaken those with which they disagree. They heavily influence the allocation of intellectual resources, with international fashions determining the focus of national intellectuals, rather than indigenously generated concerns.

Finally, when speaking of international agencies, one should mention the free floating intellectual who adopts the neocolony as a research area: the PhD student mining the third world for data; the academic on safari for his next article. It may be unfair to caricature these people in this way, because often they are earnestly sincere about contributing to the solution of our problems. But we should be more concerned about their practice, than their intentions. The data mined generally is exported, and doesn't help build our research foundations. The trophies from the safari hang on the walls of journals which we never see or see late, and contribute to debates in which we do not participate, or participate late.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The discussion of the previous section might seem to suggest that the penetration of the ideas of international capital is permitted because of the action or inaction of a misguided or wilful group of people. This would be highly misleading. These instances are but examples of a more objective process related to the class development of the neocolony. This penetration is part of that process, and as such appears to be a natural phenomenon. Not only is the emerging ruling class served by the percolation of these ideas into the common sense of the neocolony, but our non-revolutionary intellectuals are served personally by
participating in the process. "The fault lies, dear Brutus, not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we are underlings." We should not expect an internal struggle against intellectual imperialism, because it is not in the self-interests of those whose responsibility it is to lead the struggle.

It may seem that this argument is a call for an extreme intellectual Pol Potism: autarchy coupled with liquidation of the intellectuals. I think that it does imply some intellectual delinking. But in my presentation of the argument I have tended to be non-dialectical. Once we adopt a dialectical view, we can see all of the issues raised in Section 3 are parts of more contradictory processes. These contradictions operate at several levels.

The question of international standards highlights one of the main contradictions of the struggle for intellectual decolonisation. For no one can deny that there does exist an international community of intellectuals to which we belong. If we completely reject those links, we cut ourselves off from the history of homo sapiens. Even Marx did not adopt an autarchic approach to ideas: he entered into critical discourse even with bourgeois and vulgar political economists. The contradiction exists: our links with the international intellectuals both develop and underdevelop us. It is not clear cut.

The same contradictions can be found in the other illustrations I have used. This is perhaps as we should expect, for we know that the development of capitalism itself is a contradictory process. Just as the spread of mission education in colonial Zimbabwe at one and the same time incorporated the masses into the colonial economy and provided them with the tools eventually to overthrow it, so we would expect international intellectual penetration both to incorporate us into the world capitalist system and to provide the tools for its eventual overthrow. But this contradiction is not resolved simply at the level of ideas. The tools provided only become revolutionary when the material conditions for revolution have developed; and for that we have to look to classes other than our intellectuals.
NOTES

1. It should be noted that "social group" in this context is Gramsci's prison term for class.

2. Of course, this is not an exclusively Marxist construction—witness, say, Kuhn and other philosophers of science.

3. For an interesting account of how this operated in colonial Africa, see Ngugi wa Thiong'o (Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1981).

4. Certainly there have been attempts to set up interdisciplinary approaches, but apart from the fact that even this concept derives from existing disciplinary approaches, such attempts are usually marginal and marginalised.

5. The irony is that, mainly because of increasingly restricted access to resources, even those standards are not being maintained; in view of my argument this might be regarded as a good thing, but it would seem to me that the trend is to reproduce those standards badly, rather than to question the standards themselves.

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