

**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JAPAN INTERNATIONAL  
COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA) IN ADVANCING  
TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN ZIMBABWE AND  
JAPAN (1980 – 2012)**

**BY**

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## **Dedication**

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## Abbreviations

AAKCP	African Asia Knowledge Core Creation Project
AfDB	African Development Bank
AREX	Agricultural Research and Extension
AU	African Union
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CFA	Commission for Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CAPs	Country Assistance Programme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
EAC	East African Community
EOJ	Embassy of Japan
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GPA	Global Political Agreement
GNU	Government of National Unit
GNI	Gross National Income
GOJ	Government of Japan
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HIPCs	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HDI	Human Development Index

IDGs	International Development Goals
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JOCV	Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
LEP	Look East Policy
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOHCW	Ministry of Health and Child Welfare
MOFAJ	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
MOFAZ	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe
MOSMED	Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises Development
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MTP	Medium Term Plan
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for African Development
NERICA	New Rice for Africa
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NSC	North South Corridor
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSBP	One Stop Border Post
OVOP	One Village One Product
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSC	South-South Cooperation
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
STERP	Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme

SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
TCTP	Third Country Training Programme
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZIDERA	Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZIMJFA	Zimbabwe Japan Friendship Association
ZIMSTAT	Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency

## **Abstract**

This study examines the effectiveness of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), as an implementing agency of the government of Japan in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan (1980-2012) to normalize relations. The study employs the qualitative methodology to discover the underlying motives using context specific settings and the perspective of the social actors themselves on Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation. During the decade of socio-economic and political challenges (1998-2008), Zimbabwe was isolated from mainstream international development by the international community. Zimbabwe-Japan relations slumped in 2000 when Japan suspended technical cooperation except for humanitarian aid as the West had imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe following the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). Zimbabwe adopted the Look East Policy as China willingly stepped in to fill the foreign aid gap left by the West. Japan's policies have always been made within the framework of US hegemony. Indeed, JICA's technical cooperation has been constrained by the Zimbabwe-Japan diplomatic tiff. Zimbabwe's prospects of developing are shaped by a range of issues from domestic governance and politics to externally driven issues such as foreign aid. Therefore technical assistance is an indispensable tool for Japan to co-exist and prosper with the rest of the world including Zimbabwe. Unique to Japan among the industrialized powers, Official Development Assistance (ODA) constitutes its chief foreign policy instrument given her constitutional constraints on military engagement. Japan's technical assistance is founded on the core principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. JICA as a bilateral aid agency mediates between Japan and Zimbabwe's for preference alignment since all technical cooperation programmes require some agreement for them to be implemented. Thus JICA's technical cooperation has significant power to encourage economic growth in Zimbabwe and Japan as well as deepening mutual relations. Japan employs the carrot and stick policy on its technical assistance to Zimbabwe by encouraging the inclusive government's efforts towards democratization. The analysis suggest that Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation is heavily influenced by the two countries own historical background, development trajectories, international events in the increasingly crowded and ever changing international system, amongst others. Japan seeks to establish a more significant presence in Zimbabwe as reinforced by JICA's focus on infrastructure, agriculture and basic social services. Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation is a mixed bag of win-win approach and the metropolis and satellite relations which can be viewed broadly as a function of the interplay between economic power and asymmetric interdependence on the one hand and culture and diplomacy on the other.



## **Chapter One**

### **1.1 Introduction**

This chapter introduces the background to the study, the basis for Japan's technical cooperation through its executing agency, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Zimbabwe from 1980-2012. The background to the problem detailing the relations between Japan and Zimbabwe will be explicitly narrated in this chapter. The statement of the problem and justification of the study on JICA's technical cooperation in Zimbabwe will be stated in this chapter. The overall objective, the objectives of the study, research questions, limitations, methodology and delimitation are also outlined in this chapter.

### **1.2 Background to the Problem**

Diplomatic relations between Japan and Zimbabwe were established in April, 1980 following a pledge by Japan to assist in postwar reconstruction (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe (MOFAZ), 2010:1). On the international stage, Zimbabwe became a darling of the international community as Western states such Britain, United States of America (US) including the European Union lined up with aid to enhance Zimbabwe's policy of national reconciliation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFAJ) coordinates Official Development Assistance (ODA), heading the Council of Overseas Economic-Related Ministries (MOFAJ, 2008a). Therefore, MOFAJ sets much of Japan's aid policy in Zimbabwe. Japan's ODA is founded on the core principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state and as such JICA, the principal agency of Japan's ODA refrains from engaging in political issues that characterize European donors (Trinidad, 2007: 96). Similarly, Chinese aid is unconditional except for the recognition of the 'One-China policy' making it attractive to African countries including Zimbabwe. Chinese aid comes with no strings attached to the recipient country. JICA Zimbabwe Office was set up in 1989 to coordinate Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) activities and in 1996 it became a fully-fledged technical cooperation office (JICA Zimbabwe, 2001: 1).

Zimbabwe inherited a dual economy characterised by a relatively well developed and diversified formal economy juxtaposed to a neglected and underdeveloped subsistence economy (UNDP, 2008:3; LEDRIZ, 2012:2-3). The dualism and enclave structure is the basis of historical grievances and explains the redistributive social welfare approaches of the 1980s

which however, could not be sustained without robust growth. Upon the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) Zimbabwe adopted the pro-globalisation austerity measures under the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991. This marked a complete departure from state-led to market driven economic development. ESAP's failure and related hardships such as increasing unemployment as well as pressure for full emancipation sparked the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000 (UNDP, 2009:1; Kocha and Joffe, 2011:3). The West strongly criticized the FTLRP for not upholding the principles of good governance (Chigora and Dewa, 2009: 92-98). Given the centrality of agriculture, this had negative ripple effects on food security, manufacturing sector's output, foreign currency earnings and employment. However, many African states, with a few exceptions, continued to show their support for Zimbabwe. Against this background, the relationship between Zimbabwe and its development partners including Japan deteriorated as its domestic policies were perceived to be in contradiction with Western interests.

As part of the West's grand scheme to mount political and economic pressure on Zimbabwe, the US promulgated the punitive Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in December 2001, to curtail development aid and impose sanctions against the country. Since Japan's policies are made within the framework of US hegemony and as a member of the West, Japan-Zimbabwe relations followed suit. Similarly, in February 2002 the EU imposed 'restrictive measures' on Zimbabwe through targeted sanctions, travel bans and arms embargo under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. The effect of the deepening post-2000 crisis was that both bilateral and multilateral aid to Zimbabwe decreased sharply. Confronted with these numerous challenges, Zimbabwe adopted the Look East Policy (LEP) focusing on China, indigenization and black empowerment policies. China guided by pragmatic realism embraced the LEP, stepping in to fill the gap left by the West.

The economic meltdown calmed in 2009 after the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008 and the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009 (Kochan and Joffe 2011: x). This fundamentally shaped the balance of power and strategic options available to Zimbabwe. The donor community including Japan hailed the GPA as a major breakthrough that paves way for a prosperous and democratic Zimbabwe (World Bank, 2009:3). However, the transition has proved to be a contested terrain, bereft of progress and uncertainty largely due to philosophical and political differences threatening Zimbabwe's inclusive growth.

### **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

This study examines the effectiveness of JICA as an instrument capable of restoring normalcy in the Zimbabwe-Japan relations. During the decade of socio-economic and political challenges (1998-2008), Zimbabwe was isolated from mainstream international development by the international community. Evidently, Zimbabwe has been isolated by key development partners such as the EU, US, Australia, IMF and WB. The incessant denigration, withdrawal of development aid and sudden dearth in foreign direct investment from the West is indeed testimony to this isolation. The souring of the Zimbabwe-West relations also affected the former's relations with states that are aligned to the latter including Japan. Zimbabwe-Japan relations slumped in 2000 when Japan suspended technical cooperation except for humanitarian aid as the West had imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe following the FTLRP. That Zimbabwe was isolated is acknowledged in Article IV (4.6.c) by the three political parties to the GPA which commits to re-engaging the international community to end the country's isolation.

Interdependence demands that countries work together to address issues that transcend national boundaries such as food security, infectious diseases, and conflict as they pose a threat to global stability. However, where there is a dent in diplomatic relations states tend to informally cooperate. In such scenarios, states resort to strategies that are less formal to promote cordial relations. Since Zimbabwe-Japan relations are largely influenced by the West, Japan's technical assistance constitutes its chief foreign policy instrument (Sunshine 2002:74). Thus Japan's major instrument of technical cooperation with Zimbabwe has been JICA, which fulfills Japan's commitments. However, JICA's technical cooperation has been constrained by the Zimbabwe-Japan diplomatic tiff. Indeed, analysis of Japan's technical assistance to Zimbabwe needs to be situated within the wider donor landscape with a growing plurality of actors. JICA's technical cooperation has significant power to encourage economic growth in Zimbabwe and Japan as well as deepen mutual relations. Japan employs the carrot and stick policy on its technical assistance to Zimbabwe by encouraging the inclusive government's efforts towards democratization. It is clear from the foregoing that JICA's technical cooperation with Zimbabwe is clearly defined but its impact on contributing to the normalization of Zimbabwe-Japan diplomatic relations is yet to be established. Thus, it is important for this study to examine the effectiveness of JICA's technical cooperation in this regard.

## **1.4 Objectives of Study**

### **1.4.0 Main Objective**

To evaluate the effectiveness of JICA in advancing Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation.

### **1.4.1 Specific Objectives**

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- a) assess the underlying factors on what motivates JICA's technical cooperation, grant aid and loans to Zimbabwe.
- b) identify JICA's technical cooperation, grant aid and loans to Zimbabwe
- c) evaluate Zimbabwe and Japan's relations based on JICA's technical cooperation, grant aid and concessionary loan programmes.
- d) make recommendations on JICA's technical cooperation programmes, grant aid and loan programmes in Zimbabwe.

## **1.5 Research Questions**

- a) How effective is JICA in advancing Japan's national interests in Zimbabwe?
- b) How does JICA add value to the contemporary development efforts in developing countries like Zimbabwe?
- c) Are there any subtle conditionalities for Japan's technical cooperation in Zimbabwe?
- d) Is Japan's technical cooperation harmonious to Zimbabwe's domestic policies?

## **1.6 Hypothesis**

Japan's reliance on US foreign policy limits its opportunities to strategically enhance her own national interests in Zimbabwe. JICA as the implementing agency of Japan's technical cooperation is effective in advancing her foreign policy to Zimbabwe.

## **1.7 Justification of the Study**

Prospects for developing countries like Zimbabwe are shaped by a range of issues from domestic governance and politics to externally driven issues such as foreign aid. For Japan, technical assistance constitutes its chief foreign policy instrument, and the study will therefore contribute to the aid debate by tracing how the Zimbabwe-Japan relationship which mirrors that of a developing and developed nation has evolved from 1980 to 2012. Zimbabwe-Japan relations hit an all time low in mid-2000 and the current period of re-engagement in support

of Zimbabwe's democratization progress provides an opportunity for relations to move to a new dimension (Herald 25 August 2012).

As global interdependence deepens, it is in Japan's national interest to strengthen its relations with Zimbabwe due to its geopolitical importance and as a source of natural resources. The study will assess the potential threats posed by new foreign aid players like China against traditional donors like Japan. The demand for infrastructure in emerging countries like Zimbabwe brings great opportunities for the revival of the Japanese economy.

In general research that investigates the role, incentives and biases of donor agencies is rather scarce (Quarles, 1998; Carr 1998). There are very few studies on the Zimbabwe-Japan relations. The study might contribute to the body of knowledge on Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation as well as trigger further inquiry in the discipline for policymakers, business, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), ODA specialists, civil society, academics and government officials from both Japan and Zimbabwe.

### **1.8 Research Design**

Lapin (1994:36) refers to research design as "a plan which indicates research set up, what happens to the subjects, and what methods of data collection are used". Data collection is the process of gathering relevant data about the subject (Dooley, 1995). The research design will use observation of phenomenon, field investigations through structured and unstructured interviews, documentary search, records and charts, amongst others, for data collection. Documentation is good because it is stable, can be reviewed repeatedly and can accumulate a broad coverage (Maxwell, 1998: 231). Interviewing is effective due to its targeted nature and the insightfulness of the end result (ibid: 231). Interviews provide in-depth accounts of different opinions and ideologies that support the documentary research. This will enable gathering of extensive data that are reliable, suitable, and adequate for the study. Babbie (2010) views document analysis as unobtrusive research that studies social behaviour without affecting it. Denzin and Lincoln (1998: 47) states that document analysis can be everything from a thorough text analysis to a cursory study of documents. Multiple selves are individually and socio-culturally constructed by constantly changing relationships (Becvar and Becvar, 2006). In this study it is asserted that human beings inhabit different realities that are socially and culturally constituted and which may, therefore, vary quite dramatically across cultures, time and context.

### ***1.8.1 The Sampling Frame***

Sampling deals with the method of selecting part of the elements to represent the entire population for a given study (Kothari, 2004:31). A representative sample adequately exhibits the features of the population from where it is chosen (Burns and Grove 2003). Purposive sampling would be used to deliberately select a data rich representative sample of interviewees from the population because each person adds their own unique and specific piece to the research puzzle. Key informants of the study are the Embassy of Japan to Zimbabwe, JICA Zimbabwe, Japanese experts and consultants, MOFAZ, Ministry of Finance, project beneficiaries, business, diplomats and government officials, civic society organizations, donor agencies, ex-participants, Japanese volunteers, media and relevant departments of line Ministries. These are targeted because of the extensive knowledge and experiences on Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation.

### ***1.8.2 Research Methodology***

Kothari (2004:1) defines research as an art of scientific investigation to gain new knowledge. Research methodologies are grouped into paradigms based on the school of thought as either quantitative (deductive) or qualitative (inductive) paradigms (Lincoln & Guba 2000). Paradigms shape how people perceive the world thus create the overarching framework within which a study is to be carried out (Hussey and Hussey 1997). Research methodology focuses on the research process and the procedures and tools and to be used (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:75). Methodology is the overall guiding strategy for research. The nature of the problem dictates the research methodology which in turn influences the credibility of any research findings. Therefore the study shall employ the qualitative methodology on Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation.

### ***1.8.3 Qualitative Methodology***

The study uses phenomenology as a way to develop an understanding of Japan's technical cooperation with Zimbabwe. According to Denscombe (1998) phenomenology is a social research on how life is experienced that places emphasis on subjectivity since reality is socially constructed. Phenomenological inquiry which underpins the qualitative research design uses the naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena in context specific settings (Creswell, 2003). There is the objective world and the subjective world that exists in the minds of policy makers (Webber & Smith, 2002: 59). Qualitative research is important to discovering the underlying motives of human behaviour (Kothari, 2004:3). As such

Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation through JICA would be interpreted using context specific settings and the perspective of the social actors themselves.

#### ***1.8.4 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis***

The study will make use of triangulated methods to collect data in order to capitalize on the strengths of both the qualitative and quantitative research methods (Kanbur, 2003; White 2002). Emphasis is placed on the analysis of a limited number of events and their interrelationships (Kothari 2004:113). The choice is premised on observing as well as establishing patterns to understand the state of affairs as it exists (Babbie, 2009) answering the why, what, where, how and who questions (Denscombe, 1998). The methodology is split into three broad areas namely primary and secondary data collection and direct observations so as to take advantage of the respective strengths of each methodology thus address their inherent weaknesses.

The information obtained from the survey through in depth interviews would be analysed for the purpose of drawing conclusions in line with the objective of the study. The data gathering instruments are interview guides, focus group discussion guides, observations, and content analysis. Thematic analysis was also carried out on issues that were recurring on the subject matter. Qualitative information will be summarised accordingly (Bryman 2001: 501). Miles and Hubbermann (1994: 177) refer to data presentation as the "data display stage" where data gathered are organized, compressed and assembled. The researcher took note of ethical considerations throughout the study.

#### **1.9 Delimitations**

The study is limited to Zimbabwe and Japan's technical cooperation during the period 1980-2012, the case of JICA based on the reviewed four agreed priority areas between Japan and Zimbabwe in 1998. These are the improvement of conditions for promotion of industry for income generation, improvement of health and medical services, promotion of agriculture in communal and resettlement areas and environmental conservation (including water supply). In order to achieve these goals, several schemes are combined together to derive maximum benefit.

#### **1.10 Limitations**

The accuracy of information could be compromised due to the subjective nature of foreign policy strategies whose hidden agendas are not always disclosed to the public. To address

these limitations, the research will compliment primary data with the extensive use of secondary data. Secondary data is economic as it has already been collected so the researcher does not have to devote money, time, energy (Boslaugh, 2007: 3). The other advantage of secondary data is the breadth of data available (ibid).

### **1.11 Conclusion**

International debate on global issues has transcended national boundaries as countries have become intertwined. Consequently, the division between home and abroad, domestic and foreign as bridged by interdependence and globalization impacts on the competence of national governments. Both Zimbabwe and Japan's foreign policies are an extension of domestic policies driven by national interest.

### **Chapter Outlines**

This section lays the format of the chapters in this report and gives a brief summary of the contents of each chapter.

The next Chapter examines the literature review and theoretical framework based on the concept of national interest which is central to foreign policy. Theoretical controversies on whether foreign aid eliminates poverty, promotes economic growth and good governance or vice versa are explored in a balanced manner. As globalisation advances, its pros and cons will also be discussed as the world has increasingly become a global village. Significant benchmarks and trends around technical assistance are cited to establish the pattern through time. Many theorists are used to support and explain the claims of specific discourses. All the discourses discussed in this chapter are reinforced in later chapters.

### **Chapter 3: An Overview of Zimbabwe-Japan Relations**

This chapter examines how the Zimbabwe-Japan relations have evolved from 1980-2012 and how this has impacted on JICA the implementing agency of Japan's technical cooperation. Major historical events or turning points in Zimbabwe and Japan as well as the international community will be cited and linked to their effect on JICA's technical cooperation. Instruments used by JICA when executing technical cooperation are linked to relevant projects which will prove critical in the next chapter when examining the findings.

#### **Chapter 4: An assessment of JICA's effectiveness in advancing Zimbabwe-Japan Technical Cooperation**

This chapter focuses on the state as the centre of analysis in a globalised world characterised with a multiplicity of actors in determining the effectiveness of JICA in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan from 1980-2012. The chapter links all the previous chapters by analyzing the Zimbabwe-Japan relations in an increasingly crowded and ever changing technical assistance environment. It evaluates JICA's technical cooperation in Zimbabwe by assessing its impact on the Zimbabwe-Japan relations.

#### **Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations**

This chapter draws conclusions of the study outlining why the research is important based on its findings. Recommendations are made on what might or should happen to improve the effectiveness of JICA in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

In this chapter the concept of national interest which is central to foreign aid delivery will be discussed. The chapter relies on the notion that all discussions on development assistance and international relations proceed upon theoretical assumptions which infer the underlying worldviews. Foreign aid is approached as competing between different perspectives in international relations with interconnections between the domestic and foreign policies as a continuum. Empirical evidence on the polarized opinion and controversies on foreign aid will also be explored in this chapter. Significant benchmarks and trends around ODA will be cited to establish the pattern through time as well as relational power's ability to influence specific actions of other states.

#### **2.2 Literature Review**

##### **2.2.1 Foreign Aid and its Rationale**

Foreign assistance is a vital component of international development and is an essential instrument of foreign policy. Hill (2003:3) defines foreign policy as the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations. Webber and Smith (2002:10) express foreign policy as constituting an attempt to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national societies. Therefore decision makers are faced with multiple responsibilities in their domestic and foreign relations. Aron (1966: 17) notes that foreign policy is at the hinge of domestic politics and international relations.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) - Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines ODA as financial flows, technical cooperation and commodities that are: (a) undertaken by the official sector of the country; (b) have as the main objective the promotion of economic development and welfare in recipient countries; and (c) are on concessional financial terms with a grant element equal to at least 25 percent of the total (Lancaster, 2008: 39). OECD countries report their aid on the basis of this definition. The definition however shows that foreign aid is not always a free resource transfer but is also characterized by economic and political conditions. Technical assistance or technical cooperation are forms of foreign aid where expertise is provided to developing countries in

the form of personnel, training, research and associated costs (ECDPM 2006:5).It encompasses all activities designed to develop human resources of a developing country.

The rationale for such assistance is posited on national security, commercial and humanitarian interests. When developing foreign aid policies, donor countries face incentives from special interest groups, bureaucrats and strategic interests (Easterly 2003). Recipients of aid face their own incentive structure. Aid promotes growth, reduces poverty, strengthen allies, among others. Even though aid remains a vital source of funding, its volume has largely been influenced by motives and perceptions of the recipient and donor countries.

Historically, most foreign aid has been given as bilateral assistance directly from one country to another. As for Japan, its conduit for technical cooperation is JICA. Easterly and Pfutze (2008) highlights tied aid, food aid and technical assistance as three ineffective bilateral aid channels due to special interest incentives. Donors also provide aid indirectly as multilateral assistance to the UN and its agencies, IMF, WB and AfDB. Given the many development goals that foreign aid seeks to promote, aid agencies prefer to focus on aid disbursements to justify their existence.

### ***2.2.2 Globalisation: Opportunities or Challenges***

Globalisation is an inevitable phenomenon. Gilpin (2001: 21) defines globalization as the integration of the world economy. Mazrui (1998:98) states that globalization results in global interdependence and increased rapidity of exchange across vast distances. Ohmae's (1990:24) views globalization as a borderless world. As a result of globalization, both Zimbabwe and Japan attaches importance to the achievement of food security, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), climate change, and infectious diseases as these cannot be solved without the cooperation of each and every country. Consequently, globalization reduces geographical distances as territorial boundaries become insignificant. Nye (1990: 177-192) conceptualizes globalization in terms of 'networks' of interdependence, with a series of connections in the system. Zimbabwe and Japan's national interests have become complexly intertwined as accelerated by diplomatic presence in each other's respective countries. Khor (2001:1) regards globalisation as the defining process of the present age often considered as internationalization, liberalization, modernization, Westernisation or Americanisation. Globalization is therefore the new face of an old process that we have to live with.

Amin (2001: 9) views globalization as another stage of imperialism so as to expand markets, loot the world's natural resources and exploit labour reserves from the periphery. Japan imports food, energy and natural resources like platinum and other precious metals for its manufacturing industries from Zimbabwe while it exports highly advanced finished products to Zimbabwe leading to international division of labour. Anghie (2004:245) notes that for the Third World, globalization signifies the dominance of forcefully advanced neo-liberal economic policies by global governance institutions. This intensifies inequalities between the West and Third World. Anghie (2004:249) argues that 'good governance' is intimately linked with the emergence of international human rights law so as to advance globalization. Good governance demands articulation of the needs and aspirations of people. However, concern is that global governance has been undemocratic, as the voice of developing countries has not been heard (JICA 2012: 4). In a JICA/JCER Joint Seminar Report (2007:40) Stiglitz suggests the need for reforms in the way globalization is managed to make it work.

### **2.2.3 The Aid-Growth Debate**

Aid distribution is based on the donor's close geographical, historical, cultural, political and economic affinities with recipients (Rix, 1993:178). Historically, Japan's aid started as post-war reparations and was later used to promote trade (Soderberg, 2010: 2011). Japan is a leading donor in Asia but the African context presents a more complex landscape, with minimal historical ties and a growing plurality of actors. Robinson and Tarp (2000:13) notes that a successful aid programme requires matching elements of the desirable development with an appropriate aid strategy. However, development can only be conceived only within an ideological framework (Roberts 1984: 7). Therefore for any technical cooperation project to succeed, an understanding of the wider context in which the project takes place is vital.

At the 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development, developed countries pledged to increase aid to 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) and poor countries committed to improve governance (Wild et al, 2011). The Washington Consensus manifested itself through bloated and ineffective blueprint SAPs towards developing countries (Rodrick 2002:10; Williamson, 2004). Consequently, Zimbabwe implemented ESAP from 1991-1996 based on what the Bretton Woods Institutions deemed appropriate. As a result, aid has been wasted on poorly conceived and executed interventions often fettered by debatable conditionalities (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007:1-2). This led to the strategic convergence as epitomized by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) initiated by the WB in 1999 and the UN

MDGs adopted in 2000 becoming the blue prints of ODA (Sunaga 2004: 20; Ohno 2007: 3). The MDGs roots can be traced to the International Development Goals (IDGs) adopted by the OECD-DAC in 1996. In the wake of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), PRSPs were intended to be nationally owned development strategies derived from participatory processes involving civil society and partners.

### ***2.2.3.1 Arguments for Foreign Aid***

In recent years, poverty has become the ultimate goal of development. Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz, Nicholas Stern and others charge that aid has supported poverty reduction and growth. The September 11 2001 tragedy, marked a growing momentum to increase aid to tackle poverty (Ohno 2007: 1). Sachs (2005) argues that by increasing foreign aid and debt relief Africa will be able to move out of the ‘poverty trap’. In 2005, the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair called for “a big, big push forward” in Africa to end poverty, financed by an increase in foreign aid. Consequently, the G8 agreed to forgive and double aid to Africa, from US\$25 billion to US\$50 billion a year (Easterly, 2005). As Calder (1988:517-41) puts it, Japan is a ‘reactive state’ responding to external pressures for change and reluctant to initiate independent foreign economic policies. Correspondingly, Japan increased its ODA to US\$10 billion and doubled its ODA to Africa despite her declining economic outlook (JIBC, 2008:5). At TICAD IV Japan made a commitment to doubling ODA without debt relief to Africa by 2012 from US\$0.9 billion to US\$1.8 billion (JICA 2009:19). As the executing agency, JICA plays an important role in fulfilling these commitments. Therefore technical assistance promotes economic growth and human development but its impact remains highly controversial.

Functionalist studies by Burnside and Dollar (2000: 847-868) conclude that aid raises growth in a good policy environment and in countries with bad policy environment, aid is dissipated in unproductive government consumption. The findings are confirmed by the Commission for Africa (CFA) 2005 report which diagnosed governance as the most important development challenge besetting the region. However, other studies cast doubt on the conditional linkage between aid and growth (Easterly, Roodman and Levine, 2004: 774-80; Roodman, 2007:3; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). Easterly, et al (2004) note that by applying the “new data test” Burnside and Dollar findings no longer hold. Clements, Radelet and Bhavani (2004: 34) observe some positive effects of aid on growth but Rajan and Subramanian (2008) fail to

confirm their finding. As a result, the nature of the relationship between good governance and growth is itself increasingly contested, inconclusive and context specific.

### ***2.2.3.2 Critics of Foreign Aid***

Foreign aid is the fundamental cause of poverty as it harms those it seeks to help and its elimination is critical for growth. Milton Friedman, Peter Bauer, William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo argue that aid has enlarged government bureaucracies, perpetuated bad governance, enriched the elite in poor countries or just been wasted. “No longer part of the potential solution, [aid is] part of the problem – in fact aid is the problem” (Moyo, 2009: 47). This is because aid creates a dependency syndrome. Critics of foreign aid implores donors to promote economic growth in developing countries through improving terms of trade, encouraging foreign business investment and access to international capital markets. Kurt Gerhardt as quoted in the *Southern Times* of November 11, 2012 notes that aid has failed due to the West which has assumed too much responsibility for solving African problems. This explains the renaissance of the euphoria of “*African solutions to African Problems*” mantra. Easterly (2006: 367) states that what matters is to get help to the poor. Consequently, instead of promoting growth foreign aid is undercutting Zimbabwe’s development potential, creating a dependence syndrome.

Infrastructure development is a critical enabler for economic growth, contributing to human development, poverty reduction, and attainment of the MDGs. Kremer and Miguel, (2003) perceives Africa’s poverty as a result of low human capital and chronic underinvestment in infrastructure. Japanese ODA in Africa has focused heavily on infrastructure, trade and agriculture as engines of growth (Lehman 2010b:28). Japan’s view is premised on the notion that that aid will not be sustainable in the long term in the absence of private capital formation and appropriate infrastructure (Lehman 2007:4). This has been given a new impetus by China and South Korea who have inherited the focus on infrastructure in their ODA. In Zimbabwe, infrastructure has faced persistent underinvestment resulting in a massive collapse of the once celebrated social services creating avenues for JICA’s technical cooperation in the same.

## **2.3 Japan’s ODA and Donor Coordination**

When the OECD-DAC was founded in 1961, Japan was one of the members (Hook et al 2005: 230). The OECD is a unique forum of 34 democratic governments namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the US that work together to address challenges of globalisation (OECD, 2010:2). The organisation provides a setting for member states to coordinate domestic and international policies. Reforms to improve the design, delivery and management of aid show that its architecture has been flawed. Key issues to aid modalities are project aid, budget support, pool funding, and sector wide approach (Ohno and Niiya, 2004:3). According to Ravishankar et al (2009: 2113) ODA was harmonised by the three consequent high level forums in Rome (2003), Paris (2005) and Accra (2008). Japan endorsed both the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005b); the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2008e) and the 2008 OECD Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development (OECD 2010: 14). The Paris Declaration has however, been criticised for overlooking the roles of women in development.

Aid effectiveness frameworks allows for both domestic and international policies to be coherent and mutually supportive of sustainable growth. ‘Emerging donors’ such as China, India, and Brazil have increased their presence both economically and politically raising both challenges and opportunities for Japan and Zimbabwe (Edstrom 2010:6). The economic power shift occurring across the globe, has shaken the dynamics of development assistance as the new donors have broadened the foreign aid scope by providing options to the West’s faltering aid schemes.

### ***2.3.1 Overarching Principles of Japan’s Technical Assistance***

Since joining the Colombo Plan in 1954, the overarching vision of Japan’s ODA is to contribute to peace and development of the international community, thus ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity (Trinidad 2007:106). The philosophy and principles of Japan’s current technical assistance policy are set forth in the revised ODA Charter of 2003 which explicitly acknowledges aid as a diplomatic tool and Asia as the priority region (GoJ, 2003:9). However, Japan is increasingly committed to growing its presence in Africa. The ODA Charter is based on three basic principles namely popular sovereignty, pacifism and respect for basic human rights as enshrined in Japan’s constitution.

The principle of national ownership holds that ODA should not determine but rather facilitate local development. Japan respects ownership of developing countries, and places priorities on their own development strategies (Trinidad, 2007: 96). Horiuchi (2005: 470) describes ownership as the attitude of taking charge of one’s affairs and assuming responsibility for the

consequences. These principles are central to Zimbabwe-Japan Technical cooperation. Helleiner et al (1995: 9) notes that national ownership requires the recipient government to have control of its development strategy and minimal resort to conditionalities by donors. Conditionalities are the costs incurred by the recipient to access transfers in the case of non-aligned preferences with the donor due to the principal-agent problem. The assumption is that the agent will do a better job for the principal if its objectives are well-aligned with those of the principal (Khan and Sharma, 2001). In order to optimize self interest, all decision require consensus among various players (Neuman, 1998:5). To uphold country ownership the 'request based assistance' has been applied by JICA in its 'country specific approaches' (Masahiro and Shinji, 2001). As a result, ownership will be partial and shared since Japan's technical assistance is offered in response to official requests from the GoZ.

Self-help emphasizes that "aid means helping those who help themselves" that is respecting self reliance and ultimately sustainable development as developing countries 'graduate' from aid (Akira and Yazutani 1999:53). Self-help runs through Japan's aid planning and implementation, a focus that derives from Japan's experience of post war economic development (Grant 1998:45). The principle of self-help is strengthened by the realist view that the state is a unitary actor (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993:32). However, history shows that economic growth is rarely initiated by self-help.

### ***2.3.2 Evolution of Japan's Aid to Africa***

Sato (2010:11) presents five stages that have shaped Japan's engagement with Africa. Initially, the primary aim was to strengthen domestic industry and seek out new export markets (Moss and Ravenhill 1985:66). From 1960-1973 Japan separated politics from the economy as witnessed by its relations with South Africa (Ochiai, 1995:133). With the 1970s oil crisis shock, the rationale expanded to resource security in Africa (Ampiah 1997: 5). The oil crisis forced Japan to build better relations with Africa. Due to pressure and criticism, Japan began to refine its aid policy to allow humanitarian and poverty reduction to assume centre stage (Morikawa1997:57-59). The 1997 Asian financial crisis gave impetus for adoption of 'human security' as a pillar of Japan's foreign policy (Fukushima, 2003:136). Japan abandoned its sole reliance on multilateralism in preference of regional and bilateral channels as additional means of economic policy (Ohno and Ohno 2002: 9). Japan's version of bilateralism has been characterised with pressures on her to conform to the OECD-DAC's interests in donor coordination, alignment and harmonization as outlined in Annexure 1 (50).

### ***2.3.3 Africa and Japan's ODA Policy***

Japan observes that there will be no stability and prosperity in the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century unless the problems of Africa are resolved and these are infrastructure development, improvement of health care systems and agricultural productivity (Hideo 2002:42). Japan's three policy objectives towards Africa: (i) making appropriate contributions towards the resolution of global challenges as a responsible member of the international community, (ii) strengthening diplomatic foundations with 30% of the UN member states, (iii) deepening economic relations with resource rich Africa a potential market for the future (MOFA, 2008:7). As such Zimbabwe-Japan relations have been guided by the same. The Africa Asia Confidential (2009: 22) notes that Japan has approached Africa as a newcomer to protect its whaling rights, seek a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the upcoming 2016 reform meeting, and securing natural resources. Under the current circumstances, Africa is increasingly important to Japan purely for geopolitical reasons (MOFA, 2011:16). As a result of territorial disputes and Japan's expansionist policy, China is opposed to Japan's UNSC permanent membership and has more influence in Africa.

### ***2.3.4 The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) Process***

Japan took the initiative to counter rising Afro-pessimism by launching Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993 as its vehicle for aid and diplomacy to Africa (Morikawa 2005:204). Prior to the first TICAD in 1993 the amount of Japanese aid allocated to all SSA was roughly equivalent to that directed at a single ASEAN nation (Sato 2010:17). With TICAD, Japan has likened itself as initiating a similar kind of development to the 'Asian Miracle' that emphasizes links between Asia and Africa through South-South Cooperation (SSC) (MOFA 2001a: 137-138). With TICAD Zimbabwe-Japan relations were further cemented by increased support as Japan sought to bolster its position with regards to foreign aid and diplomacy in Africa. SSC refers to cooperation between developing countries for development (MOFAJ, 2011:29). There is however, skepticism on the applicability of Japan's model to developing countries like Zimbabwe as efforts and conditions that were enjoyed by the East Asian countries no longer exist.

TICAD is based on the ownership of Africa and partnership of the international community as it is co-organised by Japan, the AU, UN, WB and UNDP. Japan has utilized TICAD as an alternative development path to the Washington consensus (JICA 2010: 66). TICAD shifted the attention of Japanese ODA to Africa (Sato, 2010: 17). Similarly, China launched a similar

vehicle for African cooperation equivalent to TICAD, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, arguably the game changer in foreign relations of African countries after the Cold War (Lagerkvist and Jonsson, 2011:5). Coincidentally, as from 2000 Japan increased its share of bilateral assistance to Africa, as a reaction to China's growing influence in the region. Unfortunately, Japan's technical assistance with Zimbabwe assumed a downward trend as relations between the two deteriorated. Subsequently, TICAD conferences were convened in 1998, 2003 and 2008 with "Japan as its centre". However, success of the 2006 and 2009 FOCAC meetings made Japan anxious from the viewpoint of resource security (Lengauer 2011:35-81). TICAD V will be held in Yokohama, Japan from June 1-3, 2013 under the theme: *Hand in Hand with more Dynamic Africa* to review what has been achieved and decide what needs to be done (TICAD IV, 2011: 2). Unfortunately, the TICAD process outcomes and discussions are not widely disseminated even though they provide an opportunity for Japan to consolidate trade and political ties with Africa including Zimbabwe.

## **2.4 Theoretical Framework**

The approach to foreign aid is institutional, evolving over time in response to changes in domestic and international circumstances (Kondoh, Sato, Shiga & Kobayashi 2010: 11). Morgenthau (1957:29) argues that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power" and self-interest is a basic fact of human conditions. The 'Traditional view' or 'Realists' such as Carr, 2000; Morgenthau, 1948; Niebuhr, 1953; Wight, 1946; Wolfers, 1962 emphasize the ubiquity of power and competitive nature of politics among nations (Dunne and Schmidt 2008: 92). From independence to date, Zimbabwe has tended to follow the realist world view as its relations have not been guided by fixed ideas but contingency and pragmatism underpinned by national interest (Chan and Patel, 2006). Realists believe that states are self-interest oriented and their behaviour is shaped by the anarchic structure of the international system (Mearsheimer, 1994:5). Foreign policy is 'state centric' with pursuit of sovereignty and independence espoused through 'national interest' (Webber and Smith, 2002: 12). Quest for power is the driving force of human motivation (Aron 1962:21; Morgenthau, 1960:3). Due to her assertive foreign policy, Zimbabwe appears to have had no permanent friends but permanent interests.

Political power is a psychological relation (Morgenthau et al 2006: 30). Both domestic and international politics seek either to keep, increase or demonstrate power generating three ideologies of foreign policies namely the status quo, imperialism and prestige (ibid: 50).

Inoguchi and Jain (1996: xv) characterize Japan's foreign policy as 'karaoke diplomacy' where the performers are changed, but the song is the same, as its choices are determined by the US. Miyashita and Sato (2001:156) argue that Japan's acquiescence to American policy initiatives is a matter of choice rather than necessity. Hook et al (2005: 230) have dubbed the approach as 'quiet diplomacy'. As such Japan protects its cardinal interests by focusing on low risk and low profile initiatives in its technical cooperation with Zimbabwe. Keohane (1986: 9) states that since 1945, discussions on "foreign policies have been carried out in the language of political realism". Foreign policy is often powerless in the face of a multiplicity of external influences (Devetak, 1996:179-209). Keohane and Nye (1977) conceive power in terms of control over outcomes. President Robert Mugabe noted that "In most recent times, as the West started being hostile to us, we deliberately declared the LEP. We have turned east where the sun rises, and given our backs to the west, where it sets" (Daily Mirror, 18 May 2005). Zimbabwe's foreign policy has created a rift between the North and South, hence supporting her is emblematic to rejecting Western imperialism. Ultimately, foreign policy is guided by national survival against expedient forms of cooperation with other states.

Collective security and international sanctions were seen as necessary elements of a new world order characterized by greater interdependence (Linklater, 2001:221). A specific political situation evokes the formulation and execution of a certain foreign policy (Morgethau et al 2006: 19). Each state will therefore be influenced by a different set of experiences and histories (Youdem, 2007: 4). The GoZ perceives economic sanctions as an illegal tool meant to destabilize her internal political affairs thus threatening her sovereignty (Chingono, 2010: 66). Jacobson and William (1969:7) assert that states act as they do because of the nature of the international system which they are part of or because of the role which they have been assigned or chosen to play within the system. Japan has a long history of providing ODA as she was a recipient of the Cold War diplomacy Marshall Plan from the US in the 1950s which stimulated growth and preserved postwar liberal economies.

Allison (1971: 144) asserts that foreign policy makers strive to promote their bureaucratic positions, "where you stand depends on where you sit". The evolution of Zimbabwe's foreign policy was shaped and influenced by countries that gave moral support to Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) during the liberation struggle as well as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Patel, 1985). Harold and Margret Sprout as cited in Volger (1989:136) states that what matters in the process of policy making are not conditions and events as they are but what the policy maker

imagines them to be. Meredith (2002:46) notes that despite Zimbabwe being accorded star status on the international stage, President Robert Mugabe noted that such status was symbolic to a honeymoon. As for the West, they were hopeful that a stable and prosperous Zimbabwe would send a clear message about prospects of lasting negotiated settlements (ibid: 47). Therefore, it is important to infer reality by interacting with those who perceive it from different angles by sharing their contexts.

The legitimacy of the state is what enables it to internally put into effect its authority (Dunne & Schmidt, 2001:143). The GPA was prompted by the political stalemate that occurred after the 2008 presidential run-off elections. Each of the three parties had run out of political and economic options. Internationally, the GNU was applauded hence its re-engagement process with donors, multilateral institutions and creditors.

Globalisation theorists such as (Spyby 1996; Freeman 1998; Shaw 2000) suggest that the national security state has weakened and are content on pursuing cooperative security (Ripsman and Paul, 2005: 199). Keohane and Nye (1977: 3) advocate for 'complex interdependence' characterised by multiple channels with minor role of military force. Interdependence affects world politics and the behaviour of states, but governmental actions also influence patterns of interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 5). After the solidarity shown to Japan across the world in the aftermath of the March 2011 earthquake, Japan believes that by fulfilling her commitments to the international community, she is serving her own national interests (MOFA 2011:14; JICA, 2011:11). Therefore, the 2011 earthquake-tsunami had a positive development impact on Japan's international cooperation with developing countries like Zimbabwe.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Globalisation has made countries more interdependent hence the need for collective action. Domestic and international politics are manifestations of the struggle for power. Both Zimbabwe and Japan's foreign policies are influenced by international events and the corresponding domestic climate, oscillating between what serves domestic concerns and what responds to the international community. Realism including development literature routinely notes that aid is driven by political as well as developmental goals and that these goals sometimes conflict.

## **Chapter Three**

### **An Overview of Zimbabwe-Japan Relations**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This Chapter uses the case study approach to trace the diplomatic relations between Japan and Zimbabwe since independence in 1980-2012. It focuses on how JICA, an executing agency of Japan's ODA to Zimbabwe is fulfilling this through technical cooperation, grant aid and concessionary loan schemes. Due to increased interdependence, trends in both domestic and international developments will be evaluated based on how they impact on the technical cooperation relations between Zimbabwe and Japan. Relevant examples will be drawn from JICA's development schemes such as training, dispatch of experts, project type technical cooperation, provision of equipment, development studies, JOCV and emergency disaster relief. Consistency of Japan's aid flows to Zimbabwe and its bias towards key priority areas will also be verified.

#### **3.2 Background to the Domestic and International Pressures on Zimbabwe**

Zimbabwe's economy can be divided into four structural breaks: the First Decade, 1980-1990, the ESAP Period: 1991-1996, the Economic and Political Crisis Period: 1997-2008, and the Transitional Period: 2009-2012. Each historical epoch is characterised by different postures and reactions by Zimbabwe to the international community including Japan and vice versa.

##### **i. The First Decade: 1980-1990**

Zimbabwe adopted a dual and enclave structure of the economy. On the international stage, Zimbabwe cultivated a closer relationship with the West such that by March 1981 the total aid pledged was 900 million pounds (Meredith, 2002:47). Japan also joined the bandwagon. This was because Zimbabwe deliberately pursued a policy of national reconciliation. The government retained the system of controls as emphasis was placed on social welfare (ANSA, 2011: 14). However, this social thrust could not be sustained without robust growth and under pressure from the IMF and WB, the government implemented ESAP in 1991.

##### **ii. The ESAP Period: 1991-1996**

ESAP took the economy on a market driven path. However, ESAP's failure led to hardships and a political crisis (UNDP 2009:1). The Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation was accenting to its peak as witnessed by the gradual increase in JICA's technical cooperation.

### **iii. The Economic and Political Crisis Period: 1997-2008**

The crisis began in 1997 and deepened in the post 2000 period as economic upheavals and political turmoil wrecked havoc (ANSA, 2011: 15). This undermined international confidence in the Zimbabwean economy and her isolation as bilateral and multilateral ODA decreased sharply (JICA Zimbabwe 2002:1). Coincidentally, Zimbabwe's food security situation deteriorated from being a bread basket for Africa to a net importer of food as well as increased unemployment, shortage of foreign currency and hyperinflation. However, humanitarian assistance continued to be channeled outside government systems, directly to beneficiaries (Svensson, 2010:7). The ensuing period was characterised by inconsistent and incoherent implementation of policies as Zimbabwe became reactionary. The economy descended into hyperinflation. In 1997, Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation reached its peak and started to decline as the West imposed sanction on Zimbabwe due to the FTLRP.

In prior to the presidential runoff elections, the GoJ unilaterally withdrew all the Japanese staff involved in the implementation of JICA's technical cooperation programmes in Zimbabwe due to security reasons. This metropolis-satellite relationship created a vacuum as all critical posts including the Resident Representative which are reserved for Japanese nationals were left vacant. As a result, JICA's effectiveness in implementing technical cooperation programmes was severely constrained. A situation further compounded by the down grading of the Zimbabwe office to a sub-office under the JICA South Africa Regional Office. However, plans are afoot to restore the office's status.

### **iv. The Transitional Period: 2009-2012**

The GNU was established following the endorsement of the GPA among the three main political parties on September 15, 2008. In 2009, the GNU launched the Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) to initiate a process of stabilization as well as lay the foundation for long term recovery (AfDB, 2009: 1). The Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2011-2015, a strategic comprehensive blue print seeks to consolidate STERP (2009) and STERP II (2010-2012) by making a commitment to maintain macroeconomic stability through sustained delivery of quality social services (GoZ 2011, iii). The GNU is in itself a transitional conflict resolution mechanism that requires a multifaceted approach to reducing tensions and managing differences to achieve political stability. With the formation of the GNU, Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation resumed on the condition that Zimbabwe's positive reforms are observed with respect to human rights, the rule of law and sound economic

management. The GNU marked the turning point as the JICA Zimbabwe office now has 3 Japanese staff even though the normalization of relations through technical cooperation has not been easy.

### **3.3 Domestic and International Pressures on Japan's Foreign Policy**

Circumstances surrounding technical assistance have been undergoing significant changes and for Japan, the gap between real needs of partner countries and actual resources has been widening. Given Japan's prolonged economic stagnation, its economy has slipped to the world's third largest after being overtaken by China, the ODA budget has been steadily reduced by almost 40% over the past decade in sharp contrast to massive increase by major donor countries (ODA Manifesto 2007:6). This has forced Japan to re-organise its technical assistance thus impact on the Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation. Economic stagnation has brought the need to protect Japanese interests (Hook and Zang 1998: 1066). Under tight fiscal conditions, Japan's ODA budget has been reduced by 50 percent in 2011 from a peak of Yen1.6 trillion in 1997 and has since declined for 13 consecutive years below the 2005 Gleneagles commitment and the UN target of 0.7 percent of GNI (Adem, 2008, Edstrom, 2012). In 2008, Japan increased the net volume of its ODA to US\$9.6 billion becoming the fifth largest amongst DAC donors (OECD, 2010). However, Japan's ODA to Africa remains low as a proportion of its overall technical assistance contributions, averaging 14 percent between 2005 and 2009. This contrasts with allocations averaging 35 percent amongst other DAC reporting donors (OECD-DAC, 2011). Japan therefore, remains a relatively small donor in Africa including Zimbabwe.

As a result, Japan's ODA is being questioned both domestically and internationally. Domestically, Japan's elderly ratio is rapidly increasing while the birthrate is declining. Due to uncertainty, Japanese are pushing for the revival of the domestic economy. Despite all this, Japan's economy remains closely intertwined with developing countries (JICA 2010:6). Therefore, Japan's technical assistance now stands at crossroads of this domestic and international agenda.

The end of the Cold War, led to a series of challenges concerning Japan's role in the international system and whether the Yoshida Doctrine remained sufficient to ensure Japan's vital interests. Japan's development cooperation system has started to change and continues to evolve as driven by "gaiatsu" (external pressures) (Lancaster, 2010). Kenneth (2006) reiterates that the 'old left-right axis of the Cold War period is irrelevant to the new

generation of politicians who believe that Japan must assert her own identity in international society'. The change in governments confirms changes in Japan's political landscape (Konishi 2012:iii). However, as Yonosuke (1985:63) proclaimed "the Yoshida Doctrine is eternal" as Japan's foreign policy remains under the security umbrella of the US (ibid: v). Due to the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan relinquished part of its foreign political independence to the US to focus on economic and national rebuilding. It meant that Japan had to relinquish part of its foreign political independence hence the use of foreign aid in securing alliances with developing countries like Zimbabwe. Given the Yoshida doctrine, Japan's relations with Zimbabwe mimics the US foreign policy to Zimbabwe. This has implicitly affected Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation as the US promulgated the punitive ZIDERA in 2001, to curtail development aid and impose sanctions against Zimbabwe.

As donor fatigue set in, due to the end of the Cold War, Japan introduced new aid guidelines where it pledged to impose sanctions on those aid recipient countries whose governments violated human rights or democratic principles (Orr, 1993a: 98). Japan's bilateral cooperation with Zimbabwe was suspended in 2000 following the FTLRP. The GoJ enforced positive reinforcement in 2009 by initiating resumption of full-fledged economic cooperation in support of Zimbabwe's democratization progress (MOFA, 2009: 3). However, this is in contradiction to Japan's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries (Edstrom 2010:32). For Zimbabwe, non-interference remains an important tool for defending its rights and national interests.

### **3.4 Japan's Technical Assistance and JICA's Role**

Japan's model of ODA is intimately linked to its own history as it is motivated by economic, political, and security interests (Menocal et al 2011:14). Technical assistance plays a vital role in advancing these interests as it targets recipients from developing countries. According to Article 3 of the JICA Act, JICA aims to contribute to the promotion of international cooperation by supporting socio-economic development or stability of developing regions (JICA, 2010:3). JICA was established in 1974 to act as a bridge linking Japan with developing countries in accordance with its vision of "inclusive and dynamic development" that ensures human dignity (JICA, 2010:24). Inclusive development delivers benefits to all people by paying attention to widening disparities that occur with economic growth. At the bedrock of JICA's vision are four missions namely addressing the global agenda, reducing poverty through equitable growth, improving governance and achieving human security

(JICA 2012:7). The missions are achieved through four main strategies: integrated assistance, seamless assistance, promoting development partnerships and knowledge sharing (ibid). This forms the basis of much of JICA's operations as one of the largest bilateral development agencies.

To address the diverse development issues affecting particular regions, JICA uses its network of over 100 overseas offices including Zimbabwe. JICA's mid-term objectives are set out by the MOFAJ in accordance with Article 29 of the Law on General Rules of Independent Administrative Institutions (MOFAJ, 2008a). In October 2008, JICA became an "Independent Administrative Institution" as well as the "one stop shop" as technical cooperation, concessionary loans and grant aid were unified as a means for Japan to co-exist with the world (JICA, 2008:2). The expanded autonomy and mandate is however, accompanied by increased responsibility and accountability to Japanese tax payers who want to know what their aid is used for and its results (JICA Kenya 2004:1). The re-alignment is mainly as a result of Japan's prolonged economic stagnation spanning over a decade.

### **3.5 Japan's Technical Cooperation with Zimbabwe**

Japan regards Zimbabwe as a developing country with so much influence within the Southern Africa region and beyond (JICA 1992: 115). As Japan became the largest provider of technical assistance this was also reflected by the volume of technical cooperation disbursements by JICA to Zimbabwe which increased from 991 million in 1995 to Yen1,401 million in 1996 reaching its peak of Yen1,432 million in 1997 before assuming a downward trend of Yen1,414 million in 1998 and then declining to Yen1,310 million in 1999 (JICA Zimbabwe, 2001:10). In 1997, Zimbabwe was Japan's largest bilateral aid donor ranking 40<sup>th</sup> (9<sup>th</sup> in Africa) on the list of recipients as it had surpassed the US as the number one donor in the world. However, since 2000 Japan suspended formulation of new technical cooperation projects for Zimbabwe except for humanitarian aid (JICA, KRI & TAC, 2012: vi). This is consistent with the Japan's policy towards African countries which has a solid foothold in the Western bloc as led by the US. Since Western countries imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, the behaviour of Japan has not been different from that of the West confirming its 'karaoke diplomacy'. China however, seized the opportunity to feel the void by strengthening its foothold on Zimbabwe in support of the LEP. While Japan's ODA to Zimbabwe has remained limited compared to other countries in Africa there are indications that this trend is changing.

All requests for Japan's ODA should be made through the diplomatic channel from the GoZ to Embassy of Japan (EoJ). MOFAZ is the entry point for Japan's ODA in Zimbabwe (EoJ, JICA 2000, 13). The requests from the representative Ministry are submitted to the MOFAZ for onward transmission to the EoJ. The submitted requests will be considered by the EoJ, JICA Zimbabwe office, MOFAJ and JICA headquarters in Tokyo as well as relevant Japanese Ministries and agencies (ibid). Once every year in June, the EoJ asks the GoZ to submit official requests for Japan's technical assistance for the next Japanese fiscal year. The deadline of requests is end-August for Japan's ODA programmes except for the JOCV.

In implementing technical cooperation several instruments such as training, dispatch of experts and development studies are used for the specific technical cooperation programme. However, these tools cut across all technical cooperation programmes hence are used in all the four agreed priority areas depending on the project in question. The grant aid programme is funded by the MOFAJ, implemented in-country by JICA (JICA 2003:1). In terms of grant aid, Japan has placed emphasis on health, food and agricultural development. Japan has also provided non project grant aid for the support of ESAP in 1991 and 1992 (JICA, 1993:115).

### **3.5.1 Community Empowerment Programme (CEP)**

Community Empowerment Programme (CEP) is meant to provide assistance to NGOs working closely with local communities for a three year period (JICA, 2000:13). As such JICA with the endorsement from the GoZ has collaborated with Save the Children Fund (UK), the Zimbabwe AIDS Prevention Support Organisation (ZAPSO) and Development Aid from People to People (DAPP) and the Masvingo Provincial Medical Directorate in prevention, care and mitigation of HIV. This indicates Japan's commitment to assisting Zimbabwe in tackling the challenges that it is confronted with hence the effectiveness of JICA in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan. It is however, important to note that by partnering these NGOs, Japan draws lessons on how to deal with the HIV/AIDS pandemic, given the low preference rates that prevail in Japan.

The GoJ has utilized its UN Trust Fund for Human Security to provide assistance to the GoZ through UNICEF for the *Project of Infectious Diseases Prevention for Children* from 2005 to 2012 contributing more than US\$16 million (UNICEF, 2010, 5). The grants supported Zimbabwe's Expanded Programme on Immunisation (ZEPI) through the procurement of essential vaccines to strengthen routine immunization services of children against vaccine

preventable diseases to prevent child mortality. These contributions help enhance Japan's influence within the UN and eventually Zimbabwe.

### **3.5.2 Project Type Technical Cooperation**

Project type technical cooperation provides integrated assistance that combines training programmes in Japan, dispatch of experts and provision of equipment (JICA 2000:11). The "*Infectious Diseases Control Project from 1996-2001*" was a joint effort by the GoZ and GoJ through JICA to improve the health and medical services in Zimbabwe by controlling major infectious diseases like malaria and schistosomiasis in eight model districts at an estimated cost of US\$5.8 million (JICA Zimbabwe 1996:1). Under the project 17 experts were dispatched, 12 Zimbabwean counterparts were trained in Japan and US\$1.4 million worth of equipment was donated to the MoHCW (JICA 2001:4). The project placed emphasis on community based Insecticide Treated Mosquito Nets (ITMn) programme for malaria control and on primary school based School, Screening, Treatment and Education (SSTE) programme for schistosomiasis. However, due to a misunderstanding between the MoHCW and JICA about the qualifications of an expert who was supposed to spearhead the second phase, it was never implemented. The MoHCW preferred a candidate with medical background while JICA insisted that the prospective candidate was experienced enough even though he did not possess the requisite qualifications as demanded by the MoHCW. As a result of the stalemate wherein no part was willing to compromise the project was moved to Kenya who saw nothing wrong with the expert's qualifications and since then Japan's technical cooperation to Zimbabwe in this sector has been minimal.

### **3.5.3 Development Studies**

JICA conducts basic design studies to compile optimum draft proposals necessary for the implementation of grant aid projects in Zimbabwe (JICA 2006:3). Japanese consultants worked with Zimbabwean counterparts to carry out such studies as the Water Pollution Control in the Upper Manyame River Basin (1995-1997), Photovoltaic (Solar) Rural Electrification (1995-1998), Agricultural Development plan on Lower Munyati Basin in (1999-2000), Promotion of Small and Medium Scale Industry (1997-1998), Management plan for Conservation of Indigenous Forest Survey in the Gwaai and Bembesi area (1999-2001). As relations deteriorated, there was a gap of development studies implementation in Zimbabwe by JICA. In 2012, JICA conducted data collection surveys on the status of basic education, health, water and sanitation in Zimbabwe to identify areas where Japan can extend

its technical cooperation to GoZ (JICA; MOHRI, 2012:1). Japan does not however, commit assistance for the implementation after completion of feasibility studies and master plans. By carrying out these surveys, Japan is developing country based analytical work to clarify JICA's aid direction and priority areas for its technical cooperation in Zimbabwe.

#### **3.5.4 Dispatch of Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCVs)**

The JOCV was established in 1965 to provide grassroots cooperation, "aid with a human face" (JICA 2002:1). The JOCVs initiative was motivated by the success and influence of the US Peace Corps programme. The JOCV are recruited from qualified and talented young Japanese nationals aged between 20 and 40 years eager to make use of their skills and experience (JICA Volunteers, 2009: 3). JOCVs work with counterparts for sustainability and skills transfer. Dispatch of JOCV is based on requests by the host government, which takes care of their safety during the 2-year assignment period while the GoJ is responsible for their living and travel allowances to and from Zimbabwe (JICA Zimbabwe 1999:5). Currently, they are 15 JOCV attached to various Ministries. The cumulative number of JOCVs that have been to Zimbabwe since the programme was launched in 1989 to date is 497 as summarized in table 3.1 below. As such the JOCVs learn more about the Zimbabwean way of life while at the same time transferring their skills and knowledge to their respective counterparts.

#### **3.5.5 Training Programmes**

Human resources development constitutes the very foundation of economic growth. JICA's technical cooperation has made a significant impact in the development of human resources through knowledge and skills transfer to developing nations (JICA Zimbabwe, 2003:1). The GoJ accepts between 60-70 participants for on the job training from Zimbabwe under the framework of individual, group, counterpart and third country training as part of Japan's technical cooperation programmes implemented by JICA (EOJ, 2012:1). The Zimbabweans are drawn from government ministries, local authorities and quasi-government organizations depending on the course content (JICA Zimbabwe, 2003: 1). As part of SCC, JICA supports Third Country Training Programmes (TCTP) by meeting training costs and when requested, dispatching instructors from Japan (JICA 2003:25). The training period ranges from two weeks to 11 months depending on the nature of the programme. JICA also offers Masters and Doctorate Degrees at Japan's centres of excellence to outstanding young individuals who demonstrate potential to become future leaders and opinion formers. The total number of beneficiaries as at December 2012 stands at 895 with 13 Zimbabweans currently undergoing

training in Japan in various facets of government operations (JICA Zimbabwe 2012: 4). By targeting young participants, Japan aims to obtain political goodwill and influence the future politics of Zimbabwe by balancing its long term interests with near term imperatives.

As a way of following up on ex-participants JICA initiated the launch of Zimbabwe Japan Friendship Association (ZIMJFA) (JICA Zimbabwe 2004:2). ZIMJFA helps maintain and expand the effectiveness of JICA training programmes through implementing developmental, social, cultural projects that integrate Japan's best practices (ZIMJFA, 2012:4). The Association brings together JICA ex-participants to promote friendship and cultural exchange between the peoples of Japan and Zimbabwe.

### **3.5.6 Dispatch of Experts**

A total of 81 Japanese experts have been dispatched to Zimbabwe to provide advisory roles in various fields that include telecommunications, small scale enterprises, bridge and road construction, health, microfinance, environment, irrigation and agricultural development, energy conservation and rural electrification (JICA 2002:1). Experts work hand in hand with Zimbabwean counterparts in addressing development issues by facilitating technological transfer and providing practical guidance. Presently, they are two experts in the field of agriculture and health as an Irrigation Development and Management Advisor and Strengthening Integrated Maternal and Child Health Services in Masvingo Province respectively (JICA Zimbabwe 2012:2).

### **3.5.7 Emergency Disaster Relief**

Emergency disaster relief involves the provision of emergency relief when a major natural or manmade disaster occur, especially in developing countries where capacity to handle such incidences is usually very low and in most cases nonexistent (JICA, 2003:4) In 2000, the GoJ through JICA provided blankets and tents to victims of Cyclone Eline in Zimbabwe. Japan is at the forefront of global and regional efforts on disaster risk reduction and management, drawing greatly on its own knowledge and experience.

## **3.6 Environment Conservation (including water supply)**

In support of the GoZ Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program (1985-2005), JICA implemented four grants in rural water supply from 1983 to 1999 including the *Rural Water Supply Project in Binga District* in 1998 for US\$1.5 million which involved the sinking of 30 boreholes, provision of equipment and trucks to provide safe drinking water

(JICA Zimbabwe 2003:2). The project empowered women, provided profits for commercial water pump suppliers and consultants from Japan, increased JICA's visibility and political goodwill from the beneficiaries.

Zimbabwe's major cities and towns are faced with a myriad of challenges such as water supply, refuse collection, accommodation and unemployment. Lake Chivero a major source of raw water for Harare is located downstream of the Upper Manyame River Basin while residents and industries are upstream rendering it vulnerable to pollution from run off waste water (JICA; Nippon Koei 1998:1). To curtail the situation, the Zengeza Sewage Treatment plant was constructed courtesy of US\$ 20.4 million grant aid assistance from the GoJ through JICA in 2000 under the "*Project for the Improvement of Sewage Facilities in the Municipality of Chitungwiza*" (JICA; NJS 20012: 1).

Poverty is urbanizing and requires a different thinking on development so as to reduce its ills on society. According to the UNs Africa Human Development Report (HDR) (2012) accessed on December 28, 2012 despite signs of economic recovery, the share of poverty in Zimbabwe's urban areas has jumped from 27% to 58% in the past five years. In 2008/9 Chitungwiza was the epicentre of the cholera epidemic whose root cause was the decline in the provision of basic social services. The cholera outbreak ended in July 2009, killing 4,288 people out of 98,592 infections throughout the country (MoHCW, 2009:2). In response, the GoJ through JICA availed a US\$1.5 million grant to tackle the outbreak (JICA, 2008: 3). Cholera cases and fatal impacts were concentrated in deprived high density suburbs like Chitungwiza characterized by low incomes.

The improvement of water and sanitation is at the core of the MDGs. The GoZ requested for follow up support for Chitungwiza Municipality's ailing water and sanitation facilities after which the GoJ through JICA engaged consultants from NJS to carry out an investigation on the Yen354 million "*Project for Improvement of Water Supply and Solid Waste Management in Chitungwiza 2011-2014*" (JICA, 2011:2). The project is expected to bridge interventions between emergency and long term development assistance by preparing a master plan for Chitungwiza Municipality for the next 30 years (JICA; NJS 2011: 5). A parallel programme to capacitate the municipality's employees and residents would be carried out. This will enable JICA and other partners to make informed interventions from its technical cooperation.

### **3.7 Improvement of Conditions for Promotion of Industry for Income Generation**

Enhanced logistics contributes to economic development. JICA has been actively providing support for the development of both “soft” and “hard” regional infrastructure under the NEPAD Africa Action Plan: 2010-2015 and the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (SADC RIDMP) with particular focus on economic corridors (JICA; PADECO & NIPPON KOEI, 2012:1). The US\$25.5 million project for the “*Construction of the New Chirundu Bridge 1999-2002*” between Zambia and Zimbabwe implemented through JICA was guided by the SADC Protocol on economic and industrial development along economic corridors (JICA Zimbabwe 2003:1). This initiative by JICA’s technical cooperation to Zimbabwe, spearheads regional integration and coordination.

To create ownership, both recipients contributed towards the construction by agreeing to fund the upgrading of associated facilities at the border post. During construction, engineers from both Zambia and Zimbabwe received training in Japan (TradeMark 2010:1). The new bridge has dual lanes, spans 400 metres across the Zambezi River, is 10.3 metres wide and has a 120 tonnes maximum load compared to Otto Beit Bridge constructed in 1939 with only 5.5 metres carriageway and 55 tonnes maximum vehicle weight limitation (JICA Zimbabwe 2000: 1). This caused traffic congestion with heavier vehicles being forced to use the Kariba dam border post.

Consequently, the Chirundu One Stop Border Post (OSBP), the first of its kind in Africa was launched on December 5, 2009 to speed up border crossing procedures and increase competitiveness (AfDB 2012:1). OSBP enables departure, entry and customs clearance procedures to be completed at single border locations of the principal country. The OSBP is a pilot trade facilitation project under the North South Corridor (NSC) Pilot for Trade Programme initiated by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)-East African Community (EAC)-SADC (WTO 2011:3). The OSBP is being implemented through the Regional Trade Facilitation Programme, with financial and technical support from DFID, JICA and the WB (TradeMark 2010: 1).

Zimbabwe’s lack of an appropriate framework to support Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) has stifled growth in this sector. As such the GoZ has tapped Japanese experience on the development of SMEs through JICA’s technical cooperation which helped create the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MoSMED) in August 2002(MoSMED 2007:1). The Ministry is modeled along the Japanese system. SMEs can be

used as engines for growth crucial for poverty alleviation, generating employment opportunities and improving the status of women. In developing SMEs, the biggest challenge is on access to capital, utilization of local resources and enhancing competitiveness to confront intensifying international competition. For promoting local industries and economies, JICA supports Zimbabwe under the “One Village, One Product” (OVOP) movement which encourages exports from developing countries (JICA UK, 2011:13). With OVOP communities develop distinctive products unique to their region using their special skills to support their livelihoods.

### **3.8 Improvement of Health and Medical Services**

Consistent with Zimbabwe’s policy of separating children below 12 years of age with adult patients, the GoJ through JICA constructed and fully equipped Pediatric units at Harare (Yen 1,232 million) and Mpilo (US\$10.8 million) Central Hospitals that serve the most economically marginalized communities (MoHCW, 2004:5). This shows that Japan has mastered the regional political dynamics in Zimbabwe, hence the balance of JICA’s technical cooperation. JICA also supported the improvement of a Maternity wing at Mpilo Central Hospital in 1994. Harare Central Hospital Pediatric Unit was completed in 1998 under the joint Canadian and Japanese governments grant aid support (JICA Zimbabwe 2006: 2). This shows JICA has been effective in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan while at the same time enhancing its relations with the Canadian International Development Agency. The integration of the pediatric facilities and supplement medical equipment helped de-congest the hospital thus reduce child mortality in Zimbabwe (E&Y Associates 2003: 3).

Pirages (1995:11) asserts that infectious diseases are potentially the largest threat to human security in the post-cold war. In Zimbabwe, infectious diseases are among the top causes of deaths to people of all ages and control of these diseases is one of the most urgent issues hence JICA’s technical cooperation to tackling HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. In order to address these health challenges bedeviling Zimbabwe, JICA has used many of its various schemes as detailed in table 3.2 below to remain visible and reach out to Zimbabweans in need of such health services.

**Table 3.2: Japan's Cooperation with Zimbabwe in the Health Sector since 2000**

<b>Modality</b>	<b>Cooperation Period</b>	<b>Title</b>
Technical Cooperation Projects	2000-2002	Reproductive Health Care for Young People in the Zambezi Valley
	2003-2006	Project for the Prevention of HIV/AIDS Transmission in the Mabvuku/Tafara Area in the City of Harare
	2005-2008	Project for the Prevention of Parent To Child Transmission of HIV in Masvingo Province
Grant Aid	2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011	Project for Infectious Diseases Prevention for Children (through UNICEF)
	2008	Emergency Grant Aid to Tackle the Cholera Outbreak (US\$1.5 million)
	2012	Improving Child Health and Addressing Violence Against Children and Women (through UNICEF)
Grassroots Human Security Grant Aid	2010	The Project for Livelihoods Support for Orphaned and Vulnerable Children in Murehwa District
	2011	The Project for Improvement of Health Facilities in Bietbridge District
Grant Aid for Japanese NGOs	2010-2011	Water, sanitation and hygiene Project for the Prevention of Cholera

Source (MofaJ, 2012:1)

### **3.9 Promotion of Agriculture in Communal and Resettlement Areas**

Food security is a fundamental development issue in Zimbabwe. Soon after independence, the GoZ embarked on developing smallholder irrigation schemes to alleviate hunger and poverty among its peoples (JICA 1992: 6). The GoJ through JICA, heeded the call by assisting the GoZ with construction of six medium sized dams with gravity irrigation canals in Masvingo between 1989 and 1993 including plant and equipment for maintenance at a total cost of Yen 3,185 million (JICA Zimbabwe, 1998: 10). Irrigating 240 hectares of land, the six dams support 775 beneficiaries. The schemes are in natural region IV and V where rainfall is fairly

low and erratic. The Nyakomba irrigation scheme was constructed courtesy of a grant from the GoJ in 1997 at a total cost of Yen2,024 million covering 424 hectares with 526 beneficiaries (Irea 2006:1). JICA's technical cooperation has resulted in sustainable agricultural production that alleviates food shortages, an indispensable tool for rural development. Irrigated land has thus become the source of the recipients' livelihoods. However, the pump house for Block D was flooded during Cyclone Elnino in 2006 and has not been working since then rendering 236 famers and their families hopeless as the magnitude of the problem is beyond their capacity.

Under the influence of the GoJ, the GoZ declared rice as a strategic national crop. As such, JICA together with AREX carried out trails on the New Rice for Africa (NERICA) which can be grown upland as a means to enhance food security (JICA Zimbabwe 2005:5). However, rice is Japan's staple food and by encouraging its production through the Coalition for African Rice Development, Japan is broadening its alternative future sources for the supply of rice.

Japan's commitment to promote SSC resulted in JICA launching the Africa-Asia Knowledge Core Creation Project (AAKCP) in 2004 to provide a forum to share experiences and knowledge in development (JICA; Kaihatsu, 2006: vii). The GoJ through JICA and Kasetsart University of Thailand as the Asian counterpart under the AAKCP helped Zimbabwe develop a comprehensive operational manual for use by extension workers to promote rural community development and integrated farming systems in Masvingo Province (MOA, 2006:2). However, this builds and compliments JICA's previous technical cooperation support in the province. Table 3.1 below summarises the foregoing discussion on Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation from 2006-2011.

**Table 3.1: JICA's Technical Cooperation with Zimbabwe from 2006-2011**

Year	Amount (100 Million Yen)	Training Participants (No. of Persons)	Trained in Japan (No. Persons)	Experts (No. of Persons)	Study Team Member (No. of Persons)	Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (No. of Persons)
2006	4.65	83	(40)	5	2	21
2007	3.53	68	(42)	5	4	6
2008	1.60	54	(37)	0	0	0

2009	1.10	85	(57)	0	0	0
2010	1.50	75	(60)	1	2	3
2011	3.08	101	(69)	1	0	7
Cumulative Amount/Number	166.70	1,332	895	81	759	491

Source: MoFAJ 2012

From table 3.1 above, Japan's technical cooperation with Zimbabwe has been influenced by both the domestic and international conditions as it were on the decline from 2000 reaching its lowest levels in 2008/9 of Yen1.1 million. However, with the establishment of the GNU cooperation has gradually increased. Therefore the volume of Japanese aid to Zimbabwe is positively related to and thrives in times of peace and stability. This is in sharp contrast to other Western donors whose aid flourishes in volatile environments like United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department for International Development (DFID) now ranked top donors in Zimbabwe.

### 3.10 Japan's Concessionary Loans to Zimbabwe

Japan has provided concessionary loans to the GoZ mainly in the roads and telecommunications sectors as shown in table 3.3 below.

**Table 3.3: JICA's Concessionary Loans to Zimbabwe**

Year	Project Name	Amount (Mil. Yen)
1982	Equipment Supply For Rural Road Development Project	4,100
1984	International Telecommunication Expansion Project	2,536
1989	Telecommunication Expansion Project	5,246
1993	Matabeleland Telecommunications Network Development Project	9,523
1995	Telecommunications Network Development Project	5,209
1996	Mashonaland/Manicaland Digitalization Project (II)	11,451

Source: (MOFA, 2006: Annex vi)

The interest rate is 2.3% payable over a period of 30 years with a grace period of 10 years (JIBC 1996:4). As at December 31, 2011 the outstanding balance on the GoZ guaranteed loan agreement between the then Posts and Telecommunications and now TelOne and JICA was 11,203 million Yen (JICA 2012:175). However, due to Zimbabwe's non servicing of its

external debt, estimated at US\$6.1 billion as of September 2012, JICA is not proffering concessionary loans (GoZ, 2013: 227). Despite this, every year in March, JICA dispatches a team on debt collection and restructuring to validate and reconcile the loan with the GoZ. Japan places high priority on concessionary loans for economic development as they are easier to mobilize than grants and have the effect of enhancing ownership by project recipients (JIBC, 2005). This is partly attributed to Japan's unique Treasury Investment and Loan System that reinforces responsibility on the beneficiary and the East Asian experience. Since ODA loans require repayment they promote efficient use of the borrowed funds. An ex-post monitoring initiated by JICA in December, 2012 to assess the status of the Mashonaland, Manicaland and Matebeleland digitalization revealed that due to technological advancements TelOne was dependent on critically deficient and outdated equipment (JICA, Nakamoto & Associates 2012: 1). This makes it difficult for TelOne to service the loan.

### **3.11 Conclusion**

Since independence, Zimbabwe has enjoyed a cordial relationship with the GoJ, as the latter has generously availed grant aid, technical cooperation and concessionary loans to various sectors of the economy such as transport and communications, health and local authorities to help foster human resources, technology transfer and infrastructure development. Both Zimbabwe and Japan have mutually benefited from technical cooperation through genuine wealth transfer, profits to Japanese suppliers and consultants, visibility and political goodwill. Therefore Japan's technical assistance through JICA has assisted Zimbabwe's sustainable social-economic development. The move to clear diplomatic hurdles between Tokyo and Harare which have been limited over the period 1999-2009 carries with it risks and opportunities.

## **Chapter Four**

### **An Assessment of JICA's Effectiveness in Advancing Zimbabwe-Japan Technical Cooperation**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter assesses the effectiveness of JICA in advancing Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation from 1980-2012 using primary data collected as reinforced by secondary sources. The ensuing discussion in the chapter puts the state at the centre of analysis in a globalised world. The Chapter will also focus on the role of multiple actors, how they are affected by and influence the context and processes within which policies are made and implemented.

#### **4.2 Diplomatic Visits between Japan and Zimbabwe**

The failure by Japan's highest state leaders to visit any country on the African continent until 2001, points to heavily one sided traffic at top-level diplomacy (Hideo 2002:42). The Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai travelled to Tokyo during the period July 17-19, 2012 marking the first time a Zimbabwean leader has visited Japan since President Robert Mugabe's official visit in 1989 (MOFAJ, 2012: 1). There have been no official visits of senior Japanese officials to Zimbabwe since 1997 when former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was the Japanese Minister of Health and Welfare. This is so because Japan withdrew its support to Zimbabwe in 2000 except for humanitarian assistance further isolating the latter from meaningful participation on the international community. This mirrors the Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation during the same period as Zimbabwe was no longer a priority. During the working visit, Mr. Tsvangirai met Mr. Yoshihiko Noda the then Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Koichiro Gamba, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Akihiko Tanaka, JICA President, business officials amongst others (ibid). This shows that the trajectory of bilateral ties between Zimbabwe and Japan is improving due to JICA's technical cooperation.

Mr. Noda expressed gratitude for the support Japan had received from Zimbabwe after the devastating earthquake as well as Japan's intention to further bilateral relations. Japan promised to dispatch a public-private mission in August, 2012 to promote trade and investment. Mr. Tsvangirai urged Japan to re-engage Zimbabwe as both countries agreed to support the forthcoming TICAD V, scheduled for Yokohama in June 2013.

Japanese culture Nihonkyo (Japanism) does not lend itself to banging your own drum but rather goes with the flow (GRIPS 2008:21-22). A closer introspection shows that by warmly embracing Mr. Tsvangirai, Japan is countering China's influence in the GNU, strategically nurturing her position to gain some traction from the re-engagement process and possibility of ascendancy to presidency given the pending harmonized elections.

#### **4.3 Structural and Organisational Management of Japan's ODA**

Japan's ODA has traditionally been a bureaucratic domain, organized to facilitate Japan's economic rise and to advance its prestige (Arase, 1995). Although Japan's development cooperation set up involves over 13 ministries and agencies, the system is coordinated and has a central hub (OECD 2010: 18). Formal approval for all bilateral projects, irrespective of size can only be done by MOFAJ. Therefore, all JICA technical cooperation projects must go through Tokyo for approval to check on the uniformity with Japan's ODA Rolling Plan for Zimbabwe priority areas and avail the necessary budget for the project. In 2011, the then Ambassador, Mr. Koichi Morita broke down in tears telling invited guests that because of the recent devastating earthquake, Japan had suffered, they could not sign the US\$5.6 million grant to UNICEF his country had pledged as he had not "communicated" with the MOFAJ for the project to take off. The signing ceremony was rescheduled for a later date after Japan had confirmed its TICAD IV commitments despite the ensuing disaster (JICA 2011:9). Despite the year 2011 being a very trying year for Japan, it remained fully committed to JICA's technical cooperation pledges with Zimbabwe.

#### **4.4 The Structure of Aid Coordination in Zimbabwe**

Most of Zimbabwe's urgent humanitarian needs have been met by the international community. Donors have also started to move away from providing purely humanitarian assistance to supporting recovery and transition. Japan's approach to development is described as the 'ingredients approach' as it is case specific and long term than the West's 'framework approach' (Yanagihara, 1998). Even though AfDB coordinates the ZIMFUND, USAID and JICA are not part of it as they use the project approach which does not permit basket or pooled funding. In 2009, the GNU launched the aid coordination policy to promote dialogue, minimize duplication and align aid with national priorities (MOF, 2012:47). Mrs. M. Makuwaza, the Director of Domestic International Finance with the Ministry of Finance applauded JICA's bilateral approach of working within the GoZ structures. This was further reinforced by a Senior Officer in the MOFAZ, Asia and Pacific Region who said that in

consultation with relevant line Ministries and JICA, GoZ had submitted requests for a Technical Assistance Advisor, Nutrition Expert, support for 50 community based tourism projects in Victoria Falls and construction of Nyakomba Irrigation Scheme Block A for the 2013 fiscal year. JICA's technical support in community based tourism is expected to feed into the UN World Tourism Organisation preparations to which Zimbabwe will co-host with Zambia. The National Staff are used as conduits for linking Japan's ODA with Zimbabwe as well as a source of institutional memory so as to guarantee continuity. This is a reflection of the effectiveness of JICA in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan.

#### **4.5 Tied Aid through Subcontracting**

Tied aid weakens competition as procurement is limited only to suppliers from Japan. Technical assistance from Japan is often tied to the use of Japanese organizations and expertise (Wild et al 2011:19). The 2010 OECD-DAC Peer Review of Japan states that Japan sees international development cooperation as its long-term interests (OECD 2012:14). The 2003 OECD Peer Review of Japan concluded that Japan's grant aid is "defacto tied assistance" a system that goes against the promotion of ownership and reducing aid administration costs of recipient countries. Although Japan's untied aid ratio declined from 96% to 94% in 2010, it is well above the DAC average of 84% for 2010 (OECD 2012: 219). Effectively, JICA's technical cooperation budgets rarely leave Japan except that they change hands to Japanese primary contractors. Japanese primary contractors can act as agents and suppliers or even subcontractors to local or third country companies (JICA 2000:9). In Zimbabwe, all projects that JICA has implemented have been awarded to Japanese firms with local companies assuming auxiliary roles. Therefore, the impetus behind Japan's technical cooperation in Zimbabwe is supplementing her export-led strategy through the development of new markets.

#### **4.6 Innovative Leadership through TICAD**

Donor governments often use aid to gain influence with recipient country governments (Horta, 2006:5). TICAD has been instrumental in reframing Japan's foreign policy by combining bilateral with multilateral cooperation in Africa (Raposo 2012: 16). The TICAD follow up mechanism shows that Japan has moved away from reactive to positive engagement so as to improve Japan-Africa relations. Whatever, is agreed under TICAD is implemented in country by JICA through technical cooperation.

White (1992) argues that the political aspect of aid lies in the donor's motive. Japan's aid to Zimbabwe is driven by economic, political and ideological motives. A career diplomat and now Permanent Secretary for Regional Integration and International Cooperation, Mr. Tedious T. Chifamba bemoaned JICA's lack of appreciation on the role Zimbabwe's Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Comberbach has played on advancing Japan-Africa relations through TICAD and yet no tangible benefits have trickled to Zimbabwe for her efforts. Instead, Japan seems to have completely cut ties with Zimbabwe despite most donors having maintained their economic presence. Ambassador of Japan to Zimbabwe, Mr. Fukuda said Japan was ready to step up cooperation with Zimbabwe given the huge expectations but however appealed for patience as the actual procedure takes time. The Japanese bargaining approach is generally cautious and slow as it appraises the external situation, methodically weighing and sorting each and every option, deferring action on contentious issues (Blaker 1998:211). This was affirmed in an interview with Dr. C. Sandy, a former Provincial Medical Director for Masvingo Province, and now Deputy Director with the Aids and TB Unit of the MoHCW who lamented that the Japanese are slow in making decisions but when they finally make up their mind, it will be good. Bilateral aid and most importantly technical cooperation is therefore, characterised by several different motives of corresponding interest groups. As such JICA has been effective in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan.

#### **4.7 Taking Leadership in Tackling Global Issues**

Today, the world faces a variety of issues such as climate change, food insecurity, poverty, and infectious diseases that cannot be solved without the cooperation of each and every country due to interdependence (JICA, 2010:6). JICA's knowledge and networks can be utilized to support the establishment of the foundations for dynamic and sustainable growth by making international cooperation part of Japan's culture (JICA 2010: 21). Therefore JICA's technical cooperation to Zimbabwe reflects international concerns and changing needs in developing countries since international cooperation is dynamic and complex.

##### **4.7.1 Sustainable Agricultural Development**

Japan's continued commitment to agriculture addresses food security and the green revolution (Court, 2005:27). Agriculture is the mainstay of Zimbabwe's economy, employing more than 70% of the population and contributing about 60% of raw materials for the manufacturing sector (GoZ 2012: 1). Therefore, land is an integral feature of Zimbabwe's foreign policy as it

is central to economic development and stability (Patel & Chan, 2006: 175-190; Youdem 2007: 8). The Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Investment Programme Framework (1997-2020:16) welcomes donor assistance in capacity building, provision of capital equipment and setting up alternative funding mechanisms. Dr. C. Zawe, a Director in the Department of Irrigation in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development applauded Japan's vision of having the smallholder irrigation schemes in Masvingo powered by gravity given the energy challenges Zimbabwe is currently experiencing. As a result of Japanese cooperation, beneficiaries are gainfully employed all year round in their respective fields thus address basic human needs such as food security, employment opportunities, improvement of livelihoods, ease the labour burden of women and children in sourcing water and cascade effects to adjacent communities of the irrigation schemes. These interventions by JICA's technical cooperation also address the dual enclave by ensuring development in the previously marginalized rural areas prior to Zimbabwe's independence. Therefore, one can assert that JICA has been effective in advancing Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation relations in sustainable agricultural development. However the case for Nyakomba Irrigation scheme block D shows that in some instances JICA has failed to be effective in advancing Zimbabwe-Japan relations due to the long period it has taken for concrete action to be taken to redress the situation.

#### **4.7.2 International Co-operation in Health**

Although most of the health problems can be addressed at national level some depend on international cooperation as no state can, by itself, resolve such risks and problems (Merson, Black and Mills, 2001: 674). Developed countries have a direct stake in the health of people around the world deriving from enduring traditions of humanitarian concerns and enlightened of self-interest (Howson, Fineberg and Bloom, 1998: 586). Zimbabwe's health system has faced difficulties in the recent years due to limited fiscal space as budget allocations have remained less than 10% of annual budget against the agreed Abuja target of at least 15%. In 2011, the MoHCW was allocated per capita expenditure of US\$19.7 against a target of US\$34 (PWC, 2012: 19). Currently, the GoZ, and its partners like JICA are committed to implementing health and disease prevention programmes to bolster Zimbabwe's health system. As a result, Zimbabwe is making steady progress towards achieving health related MDGs thanks partly to the effectiveness of JICA's technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan.

At the 1997 G8 Summit in Denver, Colorado the then Prime Minister of Japan, Dr. R. Hashimoto, called for increased international cooperation to reduce the burdens of parasitic diseases in developing countries (JICA Zimbabwe, 2004:2). Since then Japan have supplemented the GoZ's efforts through the MoHCW to control, eliminate and eradicate vaccine preventable diseases. This has seen improvements in immunization coverage towards regional and global targets of at least 90% coverage at national level (UNICEF 2010:5). Dr. Peter Salama said the GoJ has remained one of the prominent and committed donors to children's health in Zimbabwe. Childhood immunization is a cost effective health intervention that saves more lives for money invested. Therefore JICA has been effective in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan in the provision of health services.

In September 2010, the GoJ launched its Global Health Policy 2011-2015 in order to achieve the health related MDGs with adherence to the principle of "human security" (JICA, 2010:6). The policy thrust is to "Ensure Mothers and Babies Regular Access to Care (EMBRACE), an effective package to save the lives of mothers and babies by adopting a broad approach, including better infrastructure, safe water and sanitation.

At the 65<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly in 2010 the then Prime Minister Naoto Kan of Japan announced the "Kan commitment" to provide US\$5 billion for health, US\$3.5 billion for education over the next five years from 2011, where progress toward the MDGs has been slow (White Paper, 2011:8). Japan's ODA continues to attach importance to achieving MDGs, investment and sustainable economic development as pronounced in the MOFAJ's International Cooperation Policy of 2010. The GoZ (2009:11) National Health Strategy 2009-2013 is focused on improving access to comprehensive quality primary health services through equity in service delivery.

Of the eight MDGs, the GoZ has prioritized Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, Goal 3: Promote Gender and Empower Women, and Goal 6: Combat HIV and AIDS, Malaria and other Diseases due to their strong linkage (GoZ, 2000). Zimbabwe is one of the countries that have been worst affected by the HIV epidemic with an estimated prevalence rate of 13.7% in 2009 (MoHCW, 2009:8). However, Zimbabwe is off the mark with most of its targets hence a unity of purpose and adequate support from development partners is required (UNDP, 2004:3). Japan's total contributions since 2002 to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was US\$850 million to which Zimbabwe has been a beneficiary (MOFAJ, 2008: 10). In Zimbabwe, Japan's interests in the Global Fund are represented by

JICA which reports to Tokyo thus advance Japan's interests through multilateral technical cooperation with Zimbabwe.

Japan's policy declarations such as the Hashimoto Initiative, Mori's Human security concept, the Kan commitment and more recently the Global Health Policy 2011-2015 as well as the new Education Cooperation Policy 2011-2015 have been duly implemented by JICA as technical cooperation in partnership with the GoZ in a bid to address such global issues as human security environment, terrorism and infectious diseases.

#### **4.8 Infrastructure: Key Enabler for Growth**

Physical infrastructure plays an important role in the process of economic development (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003; Lockshin and Yemtsov 2004). The MTP cites infrastructure development as vital for economic growth and development. The AfDB estimates Zimbabwe's medium term infrastructure rehabilitation needs at US\$14 billion while the WB's long term analysis is US\$33 billion (GoZ, 2012). The challenge of restoring Zimbabwe's infrastructure base is one of the most urgent reconstruction tasks as appropriate and adequate infrastructure is key to development. Japan's Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Yonezo Fukuda, remarked that Tokyo needs to accept hardships including 'the African typical problem' such as daily power cuts and the deficit of basic infrastructure. There is scope for Japan and Zimbabwe to meaningfully engage in this sector through JICA's technical cooperation for a win-win situation.

#### **4.9 Follow up Cooperation: Sprucing Japan's Image**

Follow up cooperation can either be used to solve problems with facilities and equipment or expand project facilities (JICA 2003:1). In line with Japan's ODA Rolling Plan for Zimbabwe, JICA has initiated follow up cooperation on the Rehabilitation of Medical Facilities at Mpilo and Harare Padeatric Facilities, Matebeleland, Mashonaland and Manicaland Network Development Project, Rural Water Supply and the Chirundu Bridge (JICA Zimbabwe 2012: 3). Dr. Mbuyeyesango a pedeutric surgeon at Harare Childrens' Hospital said they were still using and taking good care of the equipment that Japan donated more than 10 years ago. Provision of new equipment would go a long way in motivating as well as serving children's lives (Interview Dr. Mbuyeyesango in Harare, 2013).

Following problems with warps on the bearings for the Chirundu Bridge both Zimbabwe and Zambia jointly requested for follow up cooperation. As a result, JICA engaged Chodai the

constructors of the bridge from October 14-November 3, 2012, to investigate the reasons for the deterioration, draw up a work plan for rehabilitation and recommend adequate countermeasures (JICA; Chodai, 2012: 1). JICA carries out post project support because the projects are the flagship of Japan projecting her image in Zimbabwe. Therefore JICA has been effective in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan.

#### **4.10 Capacity and Human Resource Development**

Haq (1995:3) recognizes that people are both the means and end of economic development. Japan's experience of high economic growth can be explained largely by adapting foreign elements and selectively applying them to Japanese circumstances through the 'local spirit, foreign knowledge' concept (JICA 2006:21). Japan's primary means for supporting capacity development is technical cooperation mainly through dispatching experts, training, providing equipment and research thus enhance endogenous problem solving abilities. This ensures a solid base for Zimbabwe's future as no country can realize its full potential without fully harnessing its human resources.

Capacity development allows partner countries to become self reliant by utilizing Japanese experts (GoJ, 2003:20). Japanese experts are not deployed to 'fill a gap' but instead are expected to impart knowledge and good practice through hands on assistance (ibid: 22). However, in some cases Japanese experts have been criticized for being more concerned with developing capacity to implement specific projects than with tackling organizational and systemic issues.

Those selected for JICA's training programme are expected to possess some minimum qualifications and influential enough for their knowledge to have a broader reach. Mrs. F. Musuka, a Training Programme Officer with JICA pointed out that ex-participants are utilized for the JOCV home-stay programmes during orientation and as resource persons as they are already familiar with the Japanese way of doing things (Mrs. F. Musuka, Interview February 4, 2013). Mrs. Vimbai Pachavo, the ZIMJIFA chairperson said her organization was grateful to the invaluable support rendered to ex-participants by JICA to see through their action plans. Capacity and human resource development allows JICA through its technical cooperation to spread Japanese values and hence increase Japan's soft power. However, some ex-participants raised concerns over the frustrations they experience after the training given the fact that they are exposed to state of the art equipment which is not available at their respective organizations. This negatively impacts on the effectiveness of Japan's technical cooperation

in Zimbabwe. But on the positive, the ex-participants become highly marketable due to their newly acquired skills to the private sector. Despite these concerns, JICA has been effective in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan.

#### **4.11 Partnering for Regional Integration**

JICA promotes cooperation with other donors by making use of each other's comparative advantages (JICA, 2011:61). JICA concluded cooperation agreements with the Germany Agency for International Development (GIZ) in 2010 on sharing expertise and knowledge in the field of water supply (ibid:61). With USAID and DFID, JICA is cooperating in the improvement of regional infrastructure. Regional integration is critical to accelerating progress in Africa, where most economies and markets are relatively small, isolated, and landlocked (WB, 2011: 15). JICA's technical cooperation contributed to regional integration and improvement of intra-regional distribution by constructing the Chirundu Bridge and the first OSBP (JICA, 2010:12). Speaking at the commissioning of the bridge President Mugabe said the facility was an important link to all SADC countries and beyond as both Zimbabwe and Zambia were land linked (Herald 13 December 2002: 1-2). On the same occasion, the then Japanese Ambassador to Zimbabwe Tsuneshige Iiyama said the bridge was a living symbol of partnership with local ownership and hence an expression of friendship of Japan with both Zimbabwe and Zambia (EoJ 2002:1). Therefore, Japan's trade and aid relationship with Southern Africa have been influenced by political stability, regional integration and presence of strategic resources and metals. Given the above, JICA has been effective in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan, spreading its wings within the Southern Africa region with Zimbabwe as its hub.

#### **4.12 Connecting Diverse Stakeholders**

Japan's strong preference for bilateral aid reflects concerns about visibility for Japanese aid and its importance as a foreign policy instrument (OECD 2010: 16). In Africa, Japan has moved a significantly higher proportion of grant aid due to HIPC (Court 2005:21). However, grant aid must be implemented under the single year budget system that runs from April to March and unspent funds cannot be rolled over (JICA 2000: 9). Therefore, expenditures tend to be accelerated towards the end of the year. Japan has not moved towards more programmatic aid approaches, as set out in the Paris Declaration, its approach remains cautious to the use of bilateral channels (OECD 2010b:63). This preference reflects JICA's technical cooperation reliance on the project approach as opposed to basket funding. As such

JICA has been effective in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan based on the easily identifiable project approach.

JICA's development cooperation in Zimbabwe is featured on JICA's global interactive website to enhance public confidence, increase transparency and accountability. Japan's logos and publicity materials are normally affixed on facilities and equipment donated by JICA to act as reminders to the beneficiaries of the generosity of the people of Japan. The purpose of aid is altruistic, therefore Japan through JICA receives warm glows from giving to the people of Zimbabwe. Press releases and announcements in both local and international media are usually distributed to enhance the propaganda value of aid at both the domestic and international arena. Participants are able to interact with those from other countries thereby creating a platform for networking even after the training period is lapsed further enhancing the effectiveness of JICA's technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan.

#### **4.13 Japan's Multilateral Cooperation to Zimbabwe**

Multilateral aid is implemented through a global network of international organizations to maximize on economies of scale (MOFA, 1997: 163). From 2006 to 2012 the GoJ, has extended humanitarian grants to Zimbabwe disbursed through specialised UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNFPA, FAO and WFP to promote collective action in the presence of heterogenous preference among donors (EOJ Press Release March 23, 2012). Multilateral aid enables Japan to contribute indirectly to the development of developing countries through subscriptions and development aid institutions (JICS, 2011:12). JICA Zimbabwe office monitors how such disbursements are spend in Zimbabwe as a way of furthering Japan's own interests. By so doing JICA remains effective in advancing technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan.

#### **4.14 South-South Cooperation: Japan as a Bridge-builder**

Japan has used its co-prosperity zones ideology and prosper thy neighbour concept to propel SSC as a way to deepening cooperation, broadening economic integration and complementing North-South Cooperation (Oshima, 2009). Asia-Africa cooperation represents "horizontal relations" in cooperation characterised by knowledge creation as opposed to the traditional "vertical relations" of the North-South cooperation where there is knowledge transfer. Japan through JICA has cooperation partnership agreements for TCTP with most member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that include Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore (JICA, 2012: 1). The partnership helps Japan maintain

its structural power within the Asia Pacific region. Japan is not part of the LEP even though they are further east. Due to Japan's influence, Zimbabwe was not eligible for TCTP until after Japan lifted its embargo in 2009. This is despite Zimbabwe's closer ties through the LEP to countries like Malaysia. However, ties with Malaysia outside JICA influenced activities have remained vibrant as witnessed by Zimbabwe's regular participation at the Langkawi International Dialogue which is held every two years ever since it was launched in 1995.

Cheney and Warren (2010: 16) conclude that Sino-Japan relations have shaped Japan's internal aid politics. China has surpassed Germany as the number one exporting country and Japan as the second largest economy becoming the world's largest consumer of energy. Despite these achievements China is a beneficiary of Japan's technical assistance. The Sino-Japanese relations are downright frigid both politically and economically especially after the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in the wake of Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku Islands on September 29, 2012. As a result, the Sino-Japanese relations have greatly influenced the Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation in a positive manner. In the Herald of 17 October 2011, the EU admits that the LEP was effective in destabilising the effects of its sanctions. Targeted sanctions continue to haunt Zimbabwe as it seeks to rebuild its political and economic position.

#### **4.15 International Grounding Experience for the JOCV**

Japan utilizes the experience that JICA volunteers acquire at grass roots level for its international cooperation (JICA Volunteer, 2002:17). As a result of the interaction, JOCVs volunteers acquire international grounding experience including cross-cultural communication abilities. JOCVs compliment government efforts by creating enduring change through skills and knowledge transfer that maximizes impact.

In Zimbabwe many JOCV have reported learning more than they contributed during their assignment period. According to an interview with Mr. K. Norimatsu, a JOCV Coordinator (Interview Harare, 2013) JICA only recruits Japanese nationals based on the 'choose and concentrate' concept. JOCV activities have made a big difference in Zimbabwe's perception to practical subjects such as Physical Education (PE), Art, and Music which can bring people together regardless of religion and language differences. The Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education (MoHTE) has also introduced a Diploma in PE and Sport at identified teachers' training colleges, a realization that this discipline is important. Baseball and softball have gained in popularity in Zimbabwe due to the work of JOCVs. Mr. J. Dewah, the Director for

Manpower and Planning with the MoHTE said the JOCV programme had complemented government efforts given the current freeze on posts (Interview Mr. Dewah January 8, 2013).

A Principal at a Teachers College hosting three JOCVs noted that the college had learnt a lot on work ethics and time consciousness. A JOCV at the same institution said that his experience in Zimbabwe was unique as it has taught him to appreciate basics as electricity and water.

“When I return to Japan, all the good things I have learnt in Zimbabwe will be a part of my life.”

The volunteers also commented on the negative publicity Zimbabwe still receives

“You get a lot of negative things like the currency is destroyed and the people hate white people but when you are here you meet friendly people, people who are cheerful and educated”.

The JOCV programme is mainly driven by the motive of culture and value dissemination to enhance mutual understanding between Japanese and Zimbabweans. However, others interviewees felt that the JOCV programme was a way of creating jobs to youths who would otherwise be unemployed in Japan.

#### **4.16 Conclusion**

The chapter analysed the evolution of Japan’s technical assistance to Zimbabwe, explored the root it has taken in the increasingly crowded and ever changing aid environment. Japan’s development cooperation is deeply rooted in its history and transformation from an aid recipient to one of the leading economies of the world. Japan through JICA, has been a major development bilateral partner to Zimbabwe since 1980-2012. Japan believes that the requirement to repay encourages recipients to be fiscally more responsible and to allocate resources more efficiently. Foreign aid plays a vital role in improving the lives of poor households across the country. The world has been rapidly globalised, as people, goods, capital and information move massively and instantly across borders.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter draws conclusions and makes recommendations of the study on the technical cooperation between Zimbabwe and Japan as from 1980 to 2012. As stated at the outset, ODA is one of the instruments used by governments to achieve their foreign policy goals. Japan gives aid mainly as an international obligation and as a foreign policy mechanism to preserve Japan's peace and prosperity. Japan has a distinct model for its development assistance that is rooted in its own history, development trajectory of remarkable transformation and as a latecomer to the current debates on aid practices with commercial, political, economic, ideological and diplomatic motivations as the key drivers for its technical cooperation with Zimbabwe. Japan's technical assistance to Zimbabwe is based on interdependence and humanitarian considerations.

#### **Conclusions**

The study observed that JICA is the implementing agency of Japan's ODA in Zimbabwe. JICA's cooperation leverages on its own experience and Japan's strength while considering Zimbabwe's potential in such areas as agriculture, education, infrastructure, health and humanitarian provisions. Japan through JICA has therefore, demonstrated the political will to tackle Zimbabwe's problems thus normalize the Zimbabwe-Japan relations.

Japan is an empathic partner in its engagement as it accommodates Zimbabwe's voice in developing appropriate social frameworks and systems to build a stable society. In order to have loyalty and control over uncertainty, JICA maintains strong presence of Japanese in the administration of technical cooperation. Japan's technical cooperation tends to follow the presence of Japanese nationals. Experts and JOCVs provide windows of opportunity to accessing JICA's technical cooperation in Zimbabwe.

Following the Great East Japan Earthquake of March, 2011, Japan received support and encouragement from all over the world. Japan viewed it as an expression of gratitude and approval of its ODA underscoring the value of its allies and friends like Zimbabwe. Therefore, Japan was buoyed to increase its technical cooperation with Zimbabwe.

Political motives largely guide the size and the form of aid. The Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation has largely been influenced by the international community and the corresponding domestic climate. Foreign aid is used by Japan as a means to poverty alleviation, cement alliances, bolster trade partnerships and diplomatic cooperation with Zimbabwe. Japan is also politically motivated by its ambition to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, hence harbours strategic interests in its technical cooperation with Zimbabwe. Since the inception of the GNU Japan has increasingly shifted its support from humanitarian aid towards transitional and longer term development assistance. Both Zimbabwe and Japan are in a positive stance to enter fresh, friendly and cooperative relations.

The strongest motivation behind Japan's foreign aid policy to Zimbabwe is long term rather than short term economic interests especially, securing the vast natural resources that the country is endowed with. Japan's foreign aid policy towards Zimbabwe has a solid foothold in the Western bloc as led by the US due to its 'hub-and-spoke' foreign policy model confirming its quite diplomacy in pursuance of Japan's national interests. Even though Japan purports not to interfere in internal politics its Rolling Plan for Zimbabwe is underpinned by conditionalities for re-engagement that are subject to progress made on implementing the GPA. Therefore Japan through JICA has employed the carrot and stick policy through positive and negative reinforcement.

The environment surrounding ODA has dramatically changed as the world is becoming increasingly multi-polar and diversified. The proliferation of new actors with an interest in Africa has broadened the choices available in the selection of partners and development strategies. Zimbabwe is a beneficiary as it has been able to tap foreign aid from both traditional and new actors in foreign aid.

Japan has been on the forefront of triangular cooperation through SSC as an innovative leader in international development by utilizing its soft power and humility to consolidate its foreign policy infrastructure. Zimbabwe recognizes the importance of SSC on capacity building as the shortage of skilled manpower often constraints the effective implementation of development programmes. As such Japan has strategically utilized JICA through SSC to pursuing her policy of neutralizing China's influence in Africa and the Asia Pacific region. However, the LEP has seen Zimbabwe foster even closer relations with China.

As a way of influencing behaviour and of providing an efficient institutional arrangement for bilateral aid delivery, Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation is based on preference

alignment of the diverging interests as leveraged by JICA through intermediation. The bottom up approach to foreign aid helps address the principal-agent problem due to the physical separation between original taxpayers and ultimate beneficiaries. Therefore, technical cooperation is a modality of pursuing common interests aimed at positive sum results where everyone wins. A unique and striking characteristic of foreign aid is that the people for whose benefit aid agencies work for are not the same as those from whom the revenues are obtained as they actually live in different countries and political constituencies.

Japan's aid is often tied to the use of Japanese organizations and expertise and more recently the private and civil organizations. For instance, consultants including primary or lead contractors for JICA implemented projects have their roots in Japan. However, the absence of historical ties between Japan and Zimbabwe means that Japan-Zimbabwe cooperation does not match that of the latter and its traditional partners in either scope or depth.

Southern Africa is characterised by close interdependence and historical identity and as such ODA is more effective on a regional as opposed to bilateral basis. Tackling regional problems will ultimately contribute to regional stability and isolating Zimbabwe through sanctions does not yield positive results to the region. Japan's quiet diplomacy and disengagement in its technical cooperation with Zimbabwe is synonymous to imposing sanctions.

Ideological aspects are also crucial to Japan as it seeks to spread Japanese culture, technology and values as part of its strategic approach to increase soft power. Other than simply transferring technology and expertise, Japan's technical cooperation allows for cultural exchange between Zimbabwe and Japan which deepens mutual understanding. The Japanese approach to implementing ODA differs from the practice of most traditional donors with preference on concessionary loans where the borrower has an obligation to repay the loan. Japan through JICA is not currently extending concessionary loans to Zimbabwe due to arrears accumulation.

All the major alliances in international public health have been created around a single disease and it seems donor initiatives and policy networks follow the same pattern. Cooperation in health is mainly through horizontal consensus, cross-learning and transfer of knowledge. The international system on health continues to function in a state-centric and issue specific manner, lurching from one health problem to the next such as polio, AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis areas Zimbabwe-Japan have focused on in their technical cooperation.

Poverty reduction has become the overarching goal for development and PRSPs, MDGs and aid effectiveness declarations are emblematic of the new aid environment. While Japan's overall aid volume has been decreasing, ODA to Africa has been increasing and TICAD IV marked an important momentum for Japan's relationship with Africa including Zimbabwe. TICAD activities are consistent and complementary to the overall international goals.

There is a common misconception that Japan's cooperation with Zimbabwe is a one way relationship based on aid. In reality, Japan gains an abundance of knowledge and insights as well as learnt new values through the collaborative process. More importantly, the Japanese society benefits from the experience of ex-volunteers and experts who share much of what they have learnt after returning to Japan. Given the above, JICA as an implementing agency of Japan's technical cooperation in Zimbabwe has been effective in advancing Japan's foreign policy based on a win-win scenario on one end and metropolis and satellite on the other.

### **Recommendations**

Based on the findings of the study, the researcher made the following recommendations which when adopted may help enhance Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation.

It is difficult to plan effectively if funding is not aligned with decision making and budgetary cycles of recipients. Development needs of developing countries are considerably large and diverse and as such technical cooperation alone is insufficient to respond to the needs. It is therefore necessary to harness the participation of other stakeholders especially the private sector through foreign direct investment. There is therefore need to identify key strategic alliances between Zimbabwe and Japan as technical cooperation plays an essential role of complementing other sources of finance.

The new international order demands flexibility of issues on both the recipient and donor. Zimbabwe-Japan's technical cooperation must build on what works for both countries based on their respective comparative advantages. In today's highly globalised world, both Japan and Zimbabwe must pursue foreign policies characterised by 'enlightened national interest' that aims for a positive-sum result where everyone wins as opposed to 'isolated national interest'.

Given Japan's relative size as a donor in Zimbabwe, more must be done to profile its activities in international development since very little is known or understood about Japan's approach

to ODA. This will build influence and help increase visibility of Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation at both domestic and international level.

The well-being of people should be at the centre of all development efforts. Technical cooperation should be given to strengthen economic cooperation and not to further political objectives. The West including Japan should engage Zimbabwe as an equal partner of the international community without conditionalities. More importantly, as the country aligns its preference with the West it must be rewarded for the political reforms it is implementing like the recently concluded draft constitution which paves way for a referendum.

The 1998 four agreed priority areas between Zimbabwe and Japan for technical cooperation now needs to be reviewed as they seem to have been overtaken by events so that they reflect the prevailing environment in Zimbabwe. The four priority areas are improvement of conditions for promotion of industry for income generation, improvement of health and medical services, promotion of agriculture in communal and resettlement areas and environmental conservation (including water supply).

Zimbabwe should look at its 'landlocked' geographical position as an economic opportunity by considering itself 'land-linked' since it is at the heart of the Southern Africa region. Therefore, Zimbabwe-Japan technical cooperation must target industrial and infrastructure development projects that increase competitiveness and facilitate trade.

In order to ensure sustainability, community based management systems for the maintenance reserve fund systems should be established in accordance with each respective project.

JICA must also expedite the processing of request for technical cooperation so as to provide meaningful and timely interventions.

The relevance of communication cannot be overemphasized hence JOCVs, experts and Japanese staff deployed to Zimbabwe must be very conversant with English so that they do not struggle to put across their messages and in carrying out their assigned duties. Official communication must also be in English to avoid translations in which the meaning is sometimes lost.

### Annexure 1: Evolution of Japan's Aid to Africa

Phases	Japan's Aid Policy	Aid Policy to Africa
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Phase:</b> 1954 (Participation in the Colombo Plan) – 1972	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Pursuit of short term economic interests</li> <li>➤ Establishment of request based approach</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Concentration of aid in Asia</li> <li>➤ Absence of aid policy to Africa</li> </ul>
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Phase</b> 1973 (1 <sup>st</sup> oil shock) -1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Expansion of aid linked to economic security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Growing interest in Africa to secure natural resources and increased aid to Africa</li> <li>➤ Aid to Africa linked to build support to Japan's role in UN</li> </ul>
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Phase</b> 1981 (5 year Doubling Plan of ODA) - 1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Using aid as a means to recycle Japan's economic surplus and increase its global contribution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Increased aid to Africa and co-financing of SAL</li> <li>➤ Supporting hunger relief and food security</li> </ul>
<b>4<sup>th</sup> Phase</b> 1989 (Top Donor) -2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Becoming top donor and using aid for broad policy initiatives as part of global contribution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Becoming a major donor in Africa</li> <li>➤ Engagement in political sphere, including the dispatch of SDF</li> <li>➤ Hosting TICAD I and II, (1993, 1998) and exploring new aid initiative in Africa</li> </ul>
<b>5<sup>th</sup> Phase</b> 2001 (US replacing Japan as to donor) –Present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ ODA budget cut and policy changes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Debt forgiveness to HIPC's</li> <li>➤ Linking aid to peace building</li> <li>➤ Development partnerships</li> <li>➤ Supporting NEPAD/AU</li> <li>➤ TICAD III 2003 and TICAD IV 2008, <i>TICAD V planned for 2013*</i></li> </ul>

Source: Sato M. (2004:245) Table 11-1; \*(Added by author)

## Annexure2: Grant Aid Cooperation

In recent years Japanese grant aid has been used for the following projects in Zimbabwe:

Year	Project Name	Amount (100 Mil. Yen)
2006	Project for Infectious Diseases Prevention for Children	(2.23)
	Food Aid through WFP	(1.50)
	Grassroots Human Security Grant Aid (2 nos.)	(0.20)
	<b>Total</b>	<b>3.93</b>
2007	Project for Infectious Diseases Prevention for Children	(2.27)
	Food Aid through WFP	(4.80)
	Grassroots Human Security Grant Aid (2 nos.)	(0.19)
	<b>Total</b>	<b>7.26</b>
2008	Project for Infectious Diseases Prevention for Children	(2.21)
	Emergency Grant Aid to Tackle the Cholera Outbreak	(1.70)
	Grassroots Cultural Grant Aid (1 no.)	(0.10)
	Grassroots Human Security Grant Aid (3 nos.)	(0.29)
	Grant Aid through International Organizations (3 nos.)	(7.35)
<b>Total</b>	<b>11.65</b>	
2009	Project for Infectious Diseases Prevention for Children	(1.25)
	Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Project (1 no.)	(0.03)
	Grassroots Human Security Grant Aid (4 nos.)	(0.30)
	Grant Aid through International Organizations (5 nos.)	(13.70)
<b>Total</b>	<b>15.28</b>	
2010	Project for Infectious Diseases Prevention for Children	(4.64)
	Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Project (1 no.)	(0.44)
	Grassroots Human Security Grant Aid (4 nos.)	(0.29)
	Grant Aid through International Organizations (3 nos.)	(7.90)
<b>Total</b>	<b>13.27</b>	

Source: MOFAJ (2011:239)

### Annexure 3: Interview Guide

#### Personal Information

No.	Date	Organization	Interviewee	Interviewer

1. What is your name?
2. What is your level of education?
3. What technical qualifications do you possess?

#### Training

1. When where you trained
2. What was the name of the training course
3. How long was it?
4. Where did it take place?
5. What is your experience in dealing with JICA technical cooperation projects?
6. Are you a member of ZIMJFA?
7. Have you ever participated in any social activities with Japanese nationals?

#### **JICA Zimbabwe / EoJapan / GoZ: MoF; MoHCW; MOFA, MoHTE etc**

1. What is the major thrust of Japan's technical cooperation with Zimbabwe
2. How does one access Japanese technical cooperation?
3. What are the distinctive elements of Japan's technical assistance to Zimbabwe?
4. Is Japan's perception aligned to major government initiatives?
5. Why do countries cooperate in international health, poverty, agriculture etc?
6. Why did JICA decide to focus on follow up cooperation?
7. Why is assistance to developing countries necessary?
8. How effective is JICA in advancing Japan's national interests in Zimbabwe?
9. How does JICA add value to the contemporary development efforts in developing countries like Zimbabwe?
10. Are there any subtle conditionalities for Japan's technical cooperation in Zimbabwe?
11. Is Japan's technical cooperation harmonious to Zimbabwe's domestic policies?

#### **Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV)**

1. Which institution are you attached to?
2. What is your profession?
3. What is the nature of your job?
4. What is your perception about your organization you are attached to?

5. Why did you choose to become a JOCV?

**Host Institution for the JOCV**

1. Why did your organisation request for a JOCV?
2. How long has the JOCV been at your institution?
3. What is the nature of the job of the JOCV
4. What is your perception about your organization you are attached to?

#### Annexure 4: Names of Key Respondents / Informants

Name	Organisation	Position
Mr. Tsunehiro Kawakita	JICA	Resident Representative
Mr. K. Norimatsu	JICA	JOCV Coordinator
Mr. Yonezo Fukuda	EOJ	Ambassador of Japan to Zimbabwe
Mr. Tedious. T. Chifamba	MORI	Permanent Secretary
Mrs. M. Makuwaza	MOF	Director, Domestic & International Finance
Mr. John T. Dewah	MOHTE	Director, Manpower and Planning
Dr. Peter Salama	UNICEF	Country Director
Dr. Charles Sandy	MOHCW	Deputy Director AIDS & TB Unit
Dr. C. Zawe	MOAMID	Director, Irrigation Development
Dr. Mbuyeyesango	MOHCW	Pediatric Surgeon-Harare Children's Hospital
Mrs. Vimbai Pachavo	ZIMJFA	Chairperson

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