<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
  <title>DSpace Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10646/39" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10646/39</id>
  <updated>2026-04-15T19:08:30Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-15T19:08:30Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>The social impact and responses to the economic crisis in Africa: A case for Zimbabwe</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10646/717" />
    <author>
      <name>Kaliyati, Jacob W.G.</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10646/717</id>
    <updated>2025-12-14T01:15:09Z</updated>
    <published>1992-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The social impact and responses to the economic crisis in Africa: A case for Zimbabwe
Authors: Kaliyati, Jacob W.G.
Abstract: A lot of research on the economic crisis and its impact on the African countries has so&#xD;
far focused on the economic performances of the countries concerned. The emphasis&#xD;
has been on variables such as production levels relative to population sizes, trade&#xD;
balances, world commodity prices, unemployment, budget deficits and so on. The social impact, let alone the responses to it, are merely touched upon in passing if not ignored altogether. The objective of this paper is to focus attention on the social aspects of the economic crisis and to try and use Zimbabwean data to quantify their social impact where possible. For the purposes of this paper, the responses by the various social and economic classes to the crisis would be taken as a measure of its social impact.&#xD;
There is no clear-cut definition of a crisis situation. It may be argued that analysing a&#xD;
"crisis situation" by focusing on the trends in economic indicators merely indicates&#xD;
whether a crisis situation is being approached or, if already reached, whether it is worsening. Such an analysis therefore does not actually tell us whether a crisis situation has been reached or not. Paul Procter defines a crisis situation as "....a turning point in the course of anything; uncertain times or state of affairs, moments of great danger or difficulty". In this paper, the last meaning will be adopted.&#xD;
This paper is not concerned with establishing whether a crisis situation has been reached or not, but rather with indications of movements towards a crisis or if a crisis situation has been reached, whether it is worsening. The development of a crisis is evidenced by falling output in both agriculture and industry in a situation of increasing population and falling world prices; increases in unemployment, growing government deficit, worsening terms of trade, high inflation rates and dwindling foreign currency reserves. As the crisis&#xD;
gets deeper, economic agents are assumed to adapt to the new situation until they can&#xD;
no longer do so, at which point a revolution might be necessary. At the household level,&#xD;
the adjustment process takes various forms ranging from changing consumption&#xD;
patterns, social habits, etc., to illegal practices like prostitution, pickpocketing,&#xD;
housebreaking, poaching, smuggling and the like.&#xD;
On the firm level, adjustment takes the form of using alternative raw materials in&#xD;
production, modifying and/or renovating the production processes with the aim of&#xD;
reducing costs. If the worst comes to the worst, the firm would inevitably close down,&#xD;
thereby worsening the crisis situation.
Description: This paper was originally prepared for presentation to the seminar on "The Social Impact and Responses &#xD;
to the Crisis in Africa" organised by the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in &#xD;
Africa (CODESRIA), in Dakar, Senegal, from 21st-23rd July, 1986.</summary>
    <dc:date>1992-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Beyond the house of hunger: the struggle for democratic development in Zimbabwe</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10646/716" />
    <author>
      <name>Raftopolous, Brian</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10646/716</id>
    <updated>2025-10-02T01:13:47Z</updated>
    <published>1991-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Beyond the house of hunger: the struggle for democratic development in Zimbabwe
Authors: Raftopolous, Brian
Abstract: As the first decade of independence drew to a close in Zimbabwe, there were increasing&#xD;
indications, particularly in the urban areas, of growing disillusionment with the&#xD;
operations of the Zimbabwean State. In September 1988, University students took to&#xD;
the streets in protest against what they saw as the growing tide of corruption within the&#xD;
State and Party machinery. In the following months, a major expose' in a national&#xD;
newspaper, The Chronicle, catalogued high-level corruption in the State involving the&#xD;
illegal sales of motor vehicles. Also in 1988, Parliamentarians, usually noted for their&#xD;
sycophancy, apathy and empty cant, spoke out in a brief but vigorous flurry of criticism&#xD;
against nepotism and corruption. In April 1989, just over a year after the signing of the&#xD;
Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and PF-ZAPU, a new challenge to the Government&#xD;
emerged in the form of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) with the latter&#xD;
campaigning basically on an anti-corruption and anti-one-party state platform. As the&#xD;
country moved into the last quarter of 1989, students again demonstrated in early&#xD;
October following the detention of the president and secretary-general of the Students'&#xD;
Representative Council. Finally, between April and June 1990, the State had to confront&#xD;
a protracted series of strikes in the public sector. The reaction of the State to these&#xD;
developments was at one level to reveal an aggressive stance. In 1988, response to the&#xD;
students' demonstrations, students and lecturers were threatened with detention, hastily&#xD;
arraigned before the courts on charges that could not stand the tests of judicial demands,&#xD;
and a Kenyan lecturer was deported. The State's response to the 1989 student protests&#xD;
was even harsher, leading to student detention and the summary closure of the&#xD;
University of Zimbabwe on 4 October 1989. Two days before the closure, the president&#xD;
of the Students' Representative Council strongly attacked the State, noting that, "the&#xD;
institution of Government has thus been rendered completely disreputable and hence&#xD;
the incumbents have lost legitimacy" (Mutambara 1989). In an allied move, the&#xD;
Secretary-General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Morgan Tsvangirai, was&#xD;
also detained by the State authorities because of his criticism of the closure of the&#xD;
University as "a clear manifestation of rising State, repression, which has already been&#xD;
felt by various sections of society" (The Chronicle^ 7 October 1989). As regards the&#xD;
opposition party, ZUM, several of its members were detained, and the operations of the&#xD;
party made difficult.&#xD;
Yet there has been more to the State's response to criticisms than coercive interventions.&#xD;
As a result of struggles between sections of civil society and the State, as well as conflicts&#xD;
within the executive, legislature and judiciary wings of the State, and the highest organs of the ruling party, there have developed important arenas of democratic debate and participation in Zimbabwean society. There still exists a substantial degree of Press&#xD;
freedom in which regular debates and criticisms of the Government can be found,&#xD;
Alongside State-influenced papers, can be found an important array of privately&#xD;
sponsored monthly magazines, such as Moto, Parade and SAPEM, as well as a weekly&#xD;
newspaper, The Financial Gazette. Regular discussions and debates are held in fora&#xD;
organised by intellectuals and attended by enthusiastic audiences. When this is added&#xD;
to regular elections which have on the whole been "free and fair", it can be seen that&#xD;
there is a vibrant struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe. An important basis of this&#xD;
struggle has been the growth and expansion of the Black petty-bourgeoisie which has&#xD;
developed after a decade of experience in public sector management, the large formal&#xD;
business sector and the emerging business sub-sector. Emerging from the experiences&#xD;
has been an increasing desire to become established, private businessmen. The basis of the tendency has been the limits on capital accumulations in the State, continued White control of the economy, and the proclivity for macro-economic policy to favour the monopolistic sector of the business community. Moreover, as large sections of the Black petty-bourgeoisie have found themselves excluded from the benefits of the post-colonial policy of "Reconciliation", demands have grown for more active participation not only&#xD;
in the economy but in the political process. These demands have resonated both&#xD;
amongst the petty-bourgeoisie in opposition, and within the State and Party structures.&#xD;
Moreover, even as the State has lost legitimacy amongst sections of the urban&#xD;
population, it has retained a popular presence amongst the majority rural producers.&#xD;
Nevertheless, it is not a support base it can take for granted in the absence of a substantial&#xD;
land reform programme. In addition, in terms of an overall alternative within&#xD;
Zimbabwe, the rightist drift of ZUM brought little hope of confronting the existing&#xD;
inequalities in the society. Thus as the united ZANU (PF) party takes the country into&#xD;
a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) seeking, in the words of the Senior Minister&#xD;
of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, to "shift quite decisively away from&#xD;
a command economy to one which promotes free markets and private enterprises (The&#xD;
Financial Gazette, 28 March 1991), there do not appear to be easily identifiable&#xD;
alternatives in Zimbabwe.&#xD;
There has therefore been an ambivalence on the part of the State on the question of&#xD;
democratic participation and development. On the one hand, the desire to remain&#xD;
accountable to the agenda of the liberation movement, however nebulous the precise&#xD;
content of that agenda, has not been a fiction. Moreover, there has been a certain&#xD;
sensitivity to debates and discussions going on within civil society about such issues. On&#xD;
the other hand, an aggressive, heavy-handedness has been shown against certain groups&#xD;
in the national body politic, attempting to assert their autonomy from a certain definition&#xD;
of the "national interest" in ways considered adventurist and without a viable&#xD;
programmatic alternative. At its worst, the latter reaction has been characterised by&#xD;
authoritarian prescriptions.</summary>
    <dc:date>1991-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Price control as a means of consumer protection in Zimbabwe: A review of the price formation system</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10646/715" />
    <author>
      <name>Mupindu, Shinga</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Masuko, Louis</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10646/715</id>
    <updated>2025-12-14T01:15:05Z</updated>
    <published>1991-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Price control as a means of consumer protection in Zimbabwe: A review of the price formation system
Authors: Mupindu, Shinga; Masuko, Louis
Abstract: This paper has been written as a response to a workshop on price control and consumer&#xD;
protection held at the Park Lane Hotel from 9th to 11th September, 1987. Several&#xD;
papers were presented at this workshop which was jointly organised by the ZCTU and&#xD;
the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe.&#xD;
The present paper therefore provides a synthesis of the insight of the position papers&#xD;
presented by the following parties with regard to price control and consumer protection:&#xD;
• Government - Ministry of Trade and Commerce&#xD;
• ZNCC - Private sector (CZI and EMCOZ were not represented).&#xD;
• ZCTU - Employees' umbrella organisation.&#xD;
While this paper provides a synthesis of the position papers presented at the workshop,&#xD;
it also gives an analysis of the three positions taken by the abovementioned parties and concludes by providing "our perspective" on price control and possible short as well as long-term solutions. Of all the consumer protection mechanisms, only price control will be dealt with in this paper. This stems from the central position of price control in the debate on the policy of Growth with Equity, i.e. planned economic growth and distribution of the national cake. It also follows that consumer protection from exploitation is conditioned by the degree of effectiveness of price control.</summary>
    <dc:date>1991-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Issues of agricultural employment development in Zimbabwe</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://hdl.handle.net/10646/714" />
    <author>
      <name>Moyo, Sam</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Ngobese, Peter</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://hdl.handle.net/10646/714</id>
    <updated>2025-12-14T01:15:03Z</updated>
    <published>1991-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Issues of agricultural employment development in Zimbabwe
Authors: Moyo, Sam; Ngobese, Peter
Abstract: Agriculture remains the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy, in spite of the atypical&#xD;
relatively developed manufacturing, mining and services sectors by African standards.&#xD;
Table 1.1. gives some salient features pertaining to the role of agriculture in Zimbabwe's economy. According to the First Five-Year National Development Plan, the sector's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) share hovers around 15% and overall GDP was&#xD;
expected to grow an average of 5% per annum (see Table I.I.). The share contribution&#xD;
to GDP has fallen over the last few years by approximately four percentage points.&#xD;
Fourteen percent of the Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF) is derived from&#xD;
agriculture. Agricultural exports constitute approximately 34% of total exports, whilst&#xD;
imports comprise 2-3% of the total.&#xD;
The sector has received around 20% of national public sector investment and is&#xD;
projected to receive the same until 1990. In average terms this represents annual&#xD;
Government allocations (capital investment) of $176 million.&#xD;
Meanwhile, overall formal employment in the agricultural sector represents&#xD;
approximately 25% of total formal employment and has declined from 327 000 in 1980&#xD;
to 277 800 in 1985. Employment in agriculture is expected to increase at an average rate of 2,2% up to 306 800 by 1990. Informal employment by the sector is relatively high, presumably engaging at least 600 000 Communal Area (peasant) households.</summary>
    <dc:date>1991-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
</feed>

