

**THE IMPLICATIONS OF VERTICALLY DIVIDED
AUTHORITY ON THE PERFORMANCE OF URBAN
COUNCILS IN ZIMBABWE: THE CASE OF HARARE CITY
COUNCIL.**

BY

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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS OF A MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.**

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

JANUARY 2017

DEDICATION

To Tasha.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to HCC councillors, the Deputy Mayor, Directors and officials from Rowan Martins, Cleveland, Remembrance, Town House, the Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing, Combined Harare Residents Trust Association and Residents Forum for taking part in this research.

My appreciation goes to friends, colleagues and family for their support during the course of the research. I am most grateful to my supervisor Mr T Nyikadzino for his patience, inspiration, assistance and over whelming guidance. Special mention goes to Miss T Gweshe, Mr C Hlatswayo, Fortune Mpofu, Annah Kadungure and Engineer T Phillip for their support and love.

Lastly and most important I thank the Almighty for the gift of life, wisdom and intelligence.

DECLARATION

I, Odlenmoud Nyasha Munzvandi declare that this dissertation is my original work except where sources have been acknowledged and has never been submitted to any other institution for academic purposes. The work has been submitted and will never be submitted to any other University in the awarding of a degree.

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ABSTRACT

The issue of VDA is a topical and highly debated topic in Africa and the world over. In Zimbabwe it emerged from the early 2000s period as a result of a strong opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which dominated urban councils and threatened the ruling party Zimbabwe National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) stronghold. This triggered the researcher to adopt qualitative research methods on the implications of VDA on operations of HCC. The study discovered that VDA has negative implications on operations of local authorities. This has created a cat and mouse relationship where the central government is tightly controlling the HCC leaving no room for innovation. In some instances it was discovered the central government is recentralising some functions that were previously allocated to local authorities for example vehicle licensing. It follows that the parent ministry has been using various strategies of subversion that include fiscal controls, central directives, legislation, senior appointments and sabotage of HCC operations resulting in poor performance of the council. The study concluded that VDA has resulted in HCC enjoying a relatively low level of autonomy in its operations which has adversely affected its operations. Against this background the study recommends the alignment of the Constitution to the Urban Councils Act Chapter 29: 15 (UCA), effectively devolve powers to local authorities and create an institution that coordinates the parent ministry and local authorities in Zimbabwe to improve centre-local relations.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
DA	Democratic Alliance
HCC	Harare City Council
KCA	Kampala City Act
KCCA	Kampala Capital City Authority
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MLGPWNH	Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing
NRM	National Resistance Movement
SA	South Africa
UCA	Urban Councils Act
UZ	University of Zimbabwe
VDA	Vertically Divided Authority
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZINARA	Zimbabwe National Roads Administration

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The chapter presents an introduction to the study. It outlines the background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives, research questions, justification, delimitations and limitations of the study. It ends by providing the organisation of the study.

1.2 Background to the Problem

Vertically Divided Authority (VDA) has become a common trend on the global arena. Cameron (2014:81) notes it is a scenario in which opposition parties are dominating the urban councils. In Latin America, development of VDA is associated with the federalism. The defining criterion of federalism is vertical sharing of political authority to sub national entities which in turn has resulted in different political parties dominating separate levels of government in the same country (Erk and Swenden 2010: 2). They went further to note that from Iraq to the European Union there are federal experiments with VDA around the world. Thus vertical division of central government authority and power has led to the development of VDA. Treisman (2007:3) cited in Erk and Sweden (2012: 8) argues that local elections were introduced in non-federal states and strengthened in federal Argentina and Brazil resulting in VDA scenario for both environments. Without dismissing the differences between federalism and political decentralisation it is important to appreciate how both result in strengthening local orders of government. This entails the local authorities have significant power and control over their citizens. Studies by Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2008) observe that, regional authority has grown substantially in non-federal states due to economic need for decentralisation and absence of warfare leading to national development through empowering local governance in Latin America.

It is important to note VDA has spread across the African continent. For African countries one can argue that VDA has its roots in decentralisation reforms. For most countries, attainment of independence resulted adoption of reforms that included but not limited to decentralisation. The reform was aimed at improving livelihood, community development and upholding democracy by bringing government closer to the people. Decentralisation resulted in the creation of local authorities for better service delivery and development of previously alienated areas. Kagonye (2010: 96) argues that, the policy of decentralisation originated from the need after independence to create a monopoly by central government so as to provide the public with required infrastructure and social services.

Decentralisation of central government functions led to the creation of provincial, urban and rural authorities to act on behalf of the central government in service provision. Positions of officials (for example councillors) in these authorities are voted by the public through elections. Olowu and Wunsch (2004) notes that throughout Africa, when people are allowed to freely express their preferences in emerging democracies, they have often sided with opposition rather than the governing forces at central government level. Hence this has resulted in opposition parties dominating local authority management a situation of VDA.

Examples can be drawn from South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Senegal among other African countries where opposition parties have dominated the local authority management through democratic elections. Hence forth the history of VDA in Zimbabwe can be traced to 2002 2008 and 2013 when the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) won urban councils, cities and municipality councillor and mayoral positions. These included but are not limited to HCC, Chitungwiza Municipality, Bulawayo City Council, Kadoma, Gweru and Masvingo. Due to the aforementioned scenario central governments have become suspicious of local authority management therefore using strategies of subversion to undermine service delivery. Oviasuyi, Idada and Isiraojie (2010: 86) relate to the “strong-hold” and “firm grip” by the state governments and House of Assembly having a negative effect on local authorities hence inhibiting effective administration for the “much needed goods and services for the people”. However studies have not been conducted to assess the implications of VDA in Zimbabwe. It is against this background that the study analysed the concept of VDA and how it has affected service delivery in Zimbabwe urban councils focusing on Harare City Council (HCC) case study.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Since independence the government of Zimbabwe adopted a number of decentralisation measures to strengthen the role of local governments in local developmental processes. The initiatives included but were not limited to legislative and institutional provisions. For example the Rural and Urban Councils Act, Public Finance Management Act and establishment of the Provincial Councils and Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH) respectively. However widespread development of Vertically Divided Authority in Zimbabwe created a complex relationship between the

central government and urban councils particularly the HCC. The central government through the MLGPWNH is highly suspicious of the HCC administration and interests it serves. This resulted in the central government being heavily involved in the day to day activities of the HCC a situation which affected the level of autonomy exercised by the HCC. Consequently, the HCC enjoys limited decision making powers and fiscal autonomy which is essential for ensuring effective service delivery and responsiveness to the citizenry. This negatively affected operations of the HCC. The study therefore analysed the implications of VDA on service delivery in HCC.

1.4 Purpose Statement

The purpose of this study was to explore implications of VDA on service delivery in urban councils, focusing at HCC.

1.5 Objectives of the Study

- To conceptualise VDA.
- To examine the nature of the relationship between the MLGPWNH and the HCC.
- To outline various strategies being used by the central government to control the affairs of the HCC.
- To analyse the implications of VDA on operations of HCC.
- To proffer recommendations that can be adopted to improve the relationship between the central government and the HCC.

1.6 Research Questions

1. What is VDA?
2. What is the nature of the relationship between MLGPWNH and HCC?
3. Which strategies of subversion are being used by the central government?
4. What implications does VDA have on operations of HCC?
5. Which recommendations can be proffered to improve relations between the central government and HCC for sound service delivery?

1.9 Justification of the Study

The issue of VDA has become a topical and highly contested issue world over. In Zimbabwe VDA took shape in the early 2000s and has been highly debated. Not only is it an issue in Zimbabwe, scholars like Lambright (2012) researched on opposition politics and service delivery in Kampala the capital of Uganda. More so in South Africa, Cameron

(2014) researched on vertical decentralisation and urban service delivery for vertically divided contexts. Furthermore, in Zimbabwe studies have been conducted by Jonga (2014) on local government systems and its associated challenges. Madhekeni and Zhou (2012) also researched on centre local relations in Zimbabwe focusing on the institutional and legal frameworks. However it is important to note that these studies did not dwell much on centre local relations in a VDA context and its implications on service delivery in urban councils. In light of this background the study will add to the existing body of knowledge and fill the research gap by analysing the implications of VDA on operations of urban councils in Zimbabwe focusing on the HCC.

1.10 Delimitations

The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of VDA on operations of HCC. According to its website, the City of Harare has a total population of 2.1 million on a space of 872 square kilometres. The research focused on the period 2002 - 2016. This period was selected because MDC gained a majority of seats in HCC giving birth to VDA.

1.11 Limitations

Limitations of the study included but were not limited to challenge in access to data. Public enterprises are associated with bureaucratic pathology. As a result the letter of authorisation to start data collection was issued after four weeks. Furthermore the political instability in Zimbabwe resulted in delayed commencement of data collection. In addition some key informants were not available for scheduled interviews. To mitigate this, the researcher used electronic means (emails and telephones) to book appointments. The researcher also triangulated qualitative sources of data.

1.12 Organization of the Study

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter provided the introduction to the study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Chapter 2 focused on literature review and the theoretical framework that guided the study.

Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter focused on the methodology that was used in the study.

Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Analysis

The chapter consisted of field work data and analysis.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

The chapter proffered conclusions and recommendations of the study.

1.13 Conclusion

The chapter was a presentation on the introduction of the study. It consists of the background to the problem, the statement of the problem, purpose statement, research objectives, justification, delimitations and limitations. The next chapter will comprise of literature review and the theoretical framework.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The chapter presents an overview of existing literature on the concept of VDA; its meaning, manifestation and implications on service delivery. Furthermore, it analyses the centre-local relations and strategies of subversion being employed by central governments in vertically divided contexts. Experiences of VDA from other countries were also presented with three case studies, which are Uganda, South Africa and Senegal. It ends by providing the theoretical framework guiding the study.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 Local Government Management as a Field of Study

Local governance emerged as a good governance practice, an essential phenomena relevant for economic growth and development. Tocqueville (2000: 167) considered local governance as the foundation of all free republican government, protection of the rights of minorities from all great political combinations and service provision. Helmsing (1990: 44) defines local government as that part of the whole government of a nation or state which is administered by authorities subordinate to the state authority but elected independently of control by the state authority by qualified residents. Nsibambi (1998: 167) concurs to the above noting that local governments are given powers and authority to manage their own affairs within a framework of unitary or federal state. Furthermore local government is an institutional unit through which government authorities carry out their functions (Lienert 2009: 13). From the above definitions, one can argue that local governments are sub national governments acting on behalf of the central government to provide services and with the aim of bringing governance closer to the general populace.

More so, it is imperative to note that the central government entrusts the local authorities with powers and authority to act on its behalf in decision making, revenue raising and development programs. In this regard, local government is best understood from a decentralization perspective. According to Chhetri (2013: 64) decentralization refers to the restructuring or reorganization of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance. Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1984) postulate that decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource

utilization and allocation from the central government to fields of central government ministries, agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations. In a comprehensive definition, one can then argue that decentralization is the empowering of local authorities by increasing their authority, fiscal autonomy, responsibility, and political power in the management of local authorities. The powers and authority exercised by local governments vary depending on the type of decentralization.

According to Chhetri (2013: 65) devolution is the real form of decentralization which involves the process of transferring decision making and implementation powers, functions, responsibility and resources to legally constituted local governments. It is devolution the transfer of power and authority by central governments to legally established, locally elected political authorities. In a devolved system, local authorities have clear legally recognized geographic boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform public functions. Antwi-Boasiako (2010: 169) relates to it as political decentralization, which is manifested in the degree and types of political autonomy and accountability. Against this background devolution is a situation where local people in the districts and regions elect their own legislative and executive personnel so that those units will be able to hire, pay and dismiss administrative personnel without reference to central authority. It gives citizens and their electorate power and influence in decision-making. Examples include but are not limited to South Africa, Brazil and other federal states. In India, local authorities have been established in terms of the Constitutional Amendment (73rd and 74th) Acts with clear powers and authority of the local bodies.

Deconcentration refers to the process of administrative decentralization whereby the central government designs a structure that enables its agents to work close to the local people in agencies of central government (Chhetri 2013: 66). Rondinelli et al (1984:15) further support this definition as transfer of responsibility for planning, management, raising, and allocation of resources from central governments to subordinate units. It is also a type of administrative decentralization where the central government retains ultimate authority. In this scenario, local authorities operate as central government departments due to limited authority. However, Lienert (2009: 13) notes that decentralization that focuses on political and administrative dimensions without focusing

on fiscal processes is not sustainable. For instance, Zimbabwe decentralized administrative responsibilities without the necessary financial support a situation which strained local authorities.

Rondinelli et al (1984), Lienert (2009) among other scholars of fiscal decentralization generally agree that local accountability is enhanced when at least a share of central grants are unconditional or with “no strings attached.” Under such fiscal arrangements, local governments have greater ability to tailor expenditures to local preferences. Bevir (2009: 44) postulates that local authorities in federal states have entrenched constitutional protection in a way those in unitary states do not have. However, scholars like Miller (2002: 7) argue that granting local authorities much autonomy results in misuse of authority by local officials.

2.2.2 Rationale for Local Government

This section presents the rationale for local governments, which includes bringing governance closer to the people, resource mobilization, preserving of culture, history, and heritage of communities, foster development and act as convenient administrative tool.

2.2.2.1 Citizen Participation

Local government according to Chhetri (2013: 64) aims at enabling citizens, either directly or indirectly, to be more involved in the decision making process. Bish and Clemens (2008: 2) refer to this as politics and policy. For them “political decision making at local level involves more direct participation than provincial or national policymaking.” It brings governance to the doorstep through grass root democracy. The result is citizen participation in public policy hence a bottom up approach to policy formation, implementation, and evaluation. In this regard, Tocqueville (2000: 167) praises the American local government system for its democratic values, arguing that towns embodied “local-self-government.” Creation of sub-national governments promotes democracy. Kurebwa (2015: 94) also posits that local government is the level of government that engages the rural majority hence its ability to engage the general populace is critical for local democracy.

Crook and Manor (1998) cited in Chhetri (2013: 64) agree that it improves local participation and democratization. Creation of local authorities ensures that institutions became more participatory and inclusive in policy making and administration. Bish and

Clemens (2008: 1) concur with the role of local government as a training ground for democracy, enabling local citizens to participate in collective endeavors and to learn how to temper individual ambitions with concerns for others. In an example, Chhetri (2013: 67) points to the motive for local government in India after independence aiming at strengthening and enhancing local participation in decision-making. This was made possible by enabling local communities to determine their local leadership through democratic elections.

2.2.2.2 Administrative Convenience

World Bank (2000) note that creation of local authorities generally improves public administration. Chhetri (2013: 65) argues that decentralization strengthens the central government by consolidating central power in sharing risks and burdens with local authorities. As a result, there is political and administrative decentralization that enables local authorities to perform. Goldsmith (2005) and Manor (1999) concurs that political decentralization in Western and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 90s led to local governments being given powers by central government. This included Latin America, Asia and Africa. In this regard, existence of local authorities gives the central government administrative muscle to deliver services in an effective and efficient manner. Rondinelli and Cheema (1984: 9) note that this initiative reduces overload and congestion in channels of administration and communication. Furthermore, delays are reduced and administrators' indifference to satisfying the needs of their clientele is overcome. Hence, results in easy coordination between government agencies. According to Mubvami and Nhekairo (2006) cited in Kurebwa (2015: 97) centralized systems result in fragmented development as government agencies operate independently. Hence, establishment of local authorities is important for coordinating and implementing national policies resulting in administrative convenience.

2.2.2.3 Resource Mobilization

A state favoring decentralization will distribute power to local government and under such circumstances local authorities play an active role in the policy process and service delivery in general (Bevir 2009: 44). For effective service delivery local authorities have to mobilize resources. Thus, in developed countries local authorities are created by the Constitution and Acts of Parliament like in South Africa and Botswana respectively. According to Chhetri (2013: 65) creation of local authorities improves efficiency and

equity of local service delivery. Thus, the central government through local authorities can effectively mobilize and collect taxes which are in turn used for service delivery nationwide. Bish and Clemens (2008 :183) state that in British Columbia fuel and property taxes accounted for over 47% of the total revenue, 26% from transit fares and 22% of government transfers were from municipalities and this was used for capital projects. Thus, from the above one can note that local governments are an effective revenue mobilizing and collection facility if fully utilized.

2.2.2.4 Development Strategy

The public sector has remained the main actor in the development process of most countries either developed or developing. The sector was the main actor in production and distribution of goods and services in most economies; especially those that embraced centrally planned economic policies (Nkya, 2000). Rondinelli et al (1984: 10) argue that local government is a way of mobilizing support for national development policies making them known at local level. Scholars like Uphoff and Esman (1998) and Ribot (2002) believe that the establishment of local authorities is a driver of poverty alleviation and rural development. They concur that establishing local authorities is a tool for equitable development across a nation in turn reducing the incidence of marginalization of communities further from capital cities and towns.

Kurebwa (2015: 94) relates to the above by saying creation of local authorities in Zimbabwe after independence had the intention of making government democratic, more responsive to the needs of the people and to redress the imbalances of colonial neglect. The imbalances had created marginalization of rural areas with development in the city centers only, hence local government is a remedy for national development. Rondinelli et al (1984: 10) note that local government can be effective channels of communication between the national government and local communities promoting national unity in development planning and management. Moreover, Bish and Clemens (2008: 1) acknowledge the role of local government in providing goods and services such as streets, schools, policing, water supply and sewage disposal facilities. Thus, it is a tool for promoting development through service delivery and addresses the issue of social exclusion.

In the final analysis, one can note that local authorities are significant for effective, efficient, and timely running of central government plans, projects, and programs. The

central government best delivers services to its citizenry through local authorities. Hence, scholars of local government for example De Visser, Mushamba and Machingauta concur on the importance of the role played by local authorities in national government activities. Chhetri (2013: 46) relates to this by saying “many hope that establishment of local authorities will facilitate greater participation of communities in problem analysis, project identification, planning, implementation as well as oversight which in turn will increase ownership and the likelihood of sustainability of such initiatives”.

2.2.3 Conceptualizing Vertically Divided Authority

Resnick (2014) states that VDA is a result of political decentralization whereby an opposition party is elected to manage a major urban agglomeration such as a capital city. It has become a pertinent matter in most developing countries as the opposition parties have taken control of urban centers through local authority bi-elections. Cameron (2014: 82) refers to VDA as a scenario when different political parties control disparate levels of government. Resnick (2014: 3) argue that in African cities opposition parties first gain foothold on the political scene before national support resulting in intense political competition. Gailmard (2012: 8) notes that elections not only provide an instrument with which to sanction wayward politicians but also for selecting politicians with desirable traits or preferences. He goes further to say voters will chose agents from one pool of a specific political party who is a more desirable type and have the potential to generate favorable results. In this regard it is essential to note that at local authority level citizens can elect councilors from the opposition party that is not dominant in the central government. It subsequently leads to a vertically divided authority scenario.

2.2.4 Strategies of Subversion used by Central Governments in VDA Contexts

Decentralization has always been conceptualized as risky endeavor due to political instability in Africa. In return Olowu (2006) and Resnick (2012) cited in Cameron (2014: 90) argue that national elites fear losing power at local-level hence they put different measures to undermine opposition parties that have dominated capital cities. In a definition by Resnick (2014: 61) subversion involves tacit moves to undermine established rules, practices and or power structures and can be pursued by a broad range of actors, including national and local government authorities, civil society and external organizations. Resnick (2014: 61) goes further to say, these are tactics used by central

governments in the fiscal administrative and political domains. The evolution of provision of services is an integral part of local government systems hence strategies of subversion reduce autonomy of local authorities when voters judge competences with ability to provide services.

2.2.4.1 Backtracking on Agreed Commitments

Backtracking on decentralization agreements has been one of the major strategies used by central governments to undermine opposition dominating urban local authorities. Davey (1976: 38) in Rondinelli et al (1984: 33) notes that central government in Sudan increased taxes to levels far beyond the collection capacity of local authorities' constraining the executive council's ability to provide services. Actors and agencies (particularly the central government) possessing powers must willingly give them up for local government to operate in a flexible environment (Rondinelli et al 1984:74). The central government can deliberately give local authority opposition mayors responsibility for activities they cannot fulfill in relation to existing resources and capacity. Hence, there is low or lack of political will by the central government to run proposed projects in local authorities. More so, central government encroachment on local government domains has stifled the prospects of successful service delivery.

2.2.4.2 Legislation

Most governments have used legislation if not all, as a strategy of subversion especially in VDA contexts. According to Cameron (2014: 90) the current plethora of national and provincial laws may be guilty of strangulating local government. Central governments world over have issued various legislative frameworks to undermine opposition party ability to govern local authorities. According to Resnick (2014) the President of Uganda passed the Kampala City Act (KCA) in 2009 which led to appointment of local authority personnel. Whilst in South Africa, the central government issued a Crossing-the-floor Legislation in the early 2000 to control local authorities. According to Wilson and Game (2011: 157) legislations are commonly used in recent years with unprecedented frequency and impact. In addition Resnick (2014: 73) relates to the presidential decree in Dakar that rescinded trash removal as a responsibility of the local authority with the annul allocation remaining in the hands of the Ministry of Environment (Aprosen). Therefore, local authorities have become an appendage of central governments taking direct orders from the centre

2.2.4.3 Sabotage

Sabotage of local government projects and activities by central government has resulted in problems in the successful implementation of programs by local authorities in service delivery. According to Cameron (2014: 88) removal of N2 Gateway housing project prevented the DA from gaining visibility and support from constituents in Cape Town. For example, inter-governmental relations left cities with limited responsibility in service delivery resulting in political manipulation in housing, transit sectors among other human services. Resnick and Diallo concur that in Senegal sabotage in transfer of funds from the central bank negatively affected service delivery. They coin an instance in June 2011 when trash collectors began striking over backdated salary at the CADAK/CAR offices whilst the central government was not releasing funds. Accumulation of trash was used as an example that Dakarais was not equipped to handle service delivery weakening the local authority.

2.2.4.4 Central Appointments

Appointments of Resident Ministers, Mayors and top management of local authority personnel among other influential positions is being used to undermine ability of local authorities to provide services. According to Resnick (2014: 83) appointment of an Executive Director by the president, who reports to the Minister a cabinet member undermines the autonomy of the KCCA. In addition, mayors are ceremonially elected which makes them puppets of the ruling party overally having toil on service delivery. Cameron (2014: 82) relates to the same scenario in SA. In SA mayors of local authorities are appointed by the President in conjunction with the ANC working group which in turn undermines the ability of constituents to hold their representatives directly accountable. This has led to political centralisation of the local governments and poor service delivery.

2.2.4.5 Fiscal Controls

Central government is using grants to undermine service delivery by local authorities. In essence, local authorities entitled to allocation from the central bank but these grants have become conditional with strings attached. Rondinelli et al (1984: 74) note that in Sudan the Ministry of Finance would cut budgets requested by local governments by 50% yet the central government did not reimburse for minor public works expenditures. This arrangement has distorted local government's ability to tailor expenditures according to local preferences. Coutinho (2010: 33) echoes that poor service delivery due to lack of

funding such as poor or non-existent provision of portable water and poor refuse removal and sewer systems result in disease. Rondinelli et al (1984: 12) posit that local authorities are better at providing services like road maintenance, lighting, and water provision compared to central government only if they have adequate funds and technical assistance. Hence, the central government controls local authority financing using grants and taking away revenue collection powers.

2.2.5 Services Provided by Urban Councils

Local authorities provide many basic services on behalf of the government which include but are not limited to protective, engineering, human and emergency services Bish and Clemens (2008). According to Mushamba (2010) local government functions can be divided into two. Mandatory functions relate to compulsory duties the council needs to perform whilst permissive functions relate to provision of social services and community development. These functions are sub-divided into five categories which are development, forward planning, financial, governance and regulatory functions.

The mandatory functions of local authorities according to Mushamba (2010: 108) include health, education, water and sewerage. Other scholars concur with this for example; Bish and Clemens (2008: 145) note that education is a major provincial and local government activity in British Columbia. Rondinelli et al (1984:2) posit that local authorities are responsible for providing safe water and sanitary services to communities. More so, Stanger (1980: 24) acknowledges the primary function of local authorities as provision of public transport, road construction, and maintenance. Bish and Clemens (2008: 97) Police Protection is one of the major services provided by provincial government. Permissive functions also referred to as human services by Bish and Clemens (2008) include cultural, recreation and social welfare. Resnick (2014) alludes to the N2 Gateway Housing Scheme that aimed at providing shelter to the disadvantages in South Africa Cape Town province.

2.2.6 Implications of VDA on HCC Operations

VDA has had different implications on service delivery in most countries. In relation to donor aid, some local authorities are flourishing from funding on various projects. For example, Cameron (2014: 9) refers to the German KFW which works with Cape Town municipality and has had successful projects. This was based on the assumption that ANC run authorities failed to deliver and projects never saw the day of light. In Senegal, due to

VDA local authority decisions were approved by the central government resulting in sabotage of development initiative in partnerships. The central government would frustrate the donors and partners would end up backing out of agreements with local authorities resulting in mere development with the citizens blaming the opposition party responsible for their constituencies. The World Bank (2011: 1) evaluation on Senegal concluded that the government of Senegal took decisions to counter decentralization and weakened municipalities reducing their performance.

VDA results in re-centralization in political, administrative, and fiscal processes. Dickovick (2011) postulates that presidents do not like to decentralize power but maximize their own power and discretion over national resources. Furthermore Lambright (2012: 53) notes replacement of the Kampala City Council with Kampala Capital City Act changed the orientation of the council negatively affecting service delivery. In his conclusion, Resnick (2014: 74) notes that the battle between central and local government in contexts of VDA is not unique to Senegal or the African region. Resnick (2014: 74) further argue that continuous urban transformation puts pressures on the mayors to provide formidable demands in service delivery.

In addition VDA has resulted in overtaking of programs by the central government resulting in project failure. According to Cameron (2014: 10), the central government of SA took over the N2 Gateway Housing Scheme that aimed at providing housing facilities to the disadvantaged. The opportunity would make the DA popular and unmask patronage and political affiliation based allocation of houses to ruling party supporters. Hence, the project failed to meet its objectives.

2.3 Case Studies

This section presents country experiences on VDA and its implications on local operations.

2.3.1 VDA in Uganda

In Uganda, Lambright 2012 researched on opposition politics focusing on Kampala City Council (KCC) and Entebbe Municipal Council (EMC). According to Sekiziyivu (2009: xii) decentralization is central to Uganda's mode of governance and is enshrined in the 1995 Constitution and Local Governments Act of 1997. Decentralization increased local government autonomy by transferring real power to local governments giving odmunzvandi@hotmail.com 0779674965

administrative control of service delivery for accountability and release local management from central government claws, widening local participation in decision making and streamlining fiscal transfer modalities. National Resistance Movement (NRM), which is the ruling party, controls EMC. According to Lambright (2012: 1) political decentralization has been part of democratic process in Uganda which resulted in Kampala being under the control of NRM.

From his study, Lambright (2012) revealed that KCC has not been receiving adequate funding to provide services to the electorate. The central government is deliberately depriving the local authority resources needed for production and delivery of services. The legislation of Uganda bases allocation of grants on population, level of development and number of services a local authority is expected to provide. On this basis EMC is supposed to receive fewer funds but is receiving five times per capita funds compared to KCC. In 2009, the Parliament of Uganda passed the Kampala City Act that replaced the local authority with a corporate authority Kampala Capital City Act (Resnick 2014: 75). This means an Executive Director who is appointed by the President runs the KCCA taking away all the KCC autonomy. It also resulted in sub-division of administrative units into smaller entities appointing delegated officials.

Furthermore Resnick (2014: 63-77) and Lambright (2012: 50-56) agree that state of affairs in Kampala show that there has been poor service delivery. There is a complicated political dynamic relationship between KCC and the central government. Moreover, these scholars argue that, fewer funds are allocated with the motivation to strengthen the NRM necessarily to diminish the status of the opposition party. One can also argue that dependency on the central government has resulted in political manipulation.

2.3.2 VDA in South Africa

Cameron (2014) examined effects of inter-party politics on urban service delivery. The Constitution of South Africa 1996 stipulates the creation of quasi-federal systems in which each level of government is distinct, interdependent, and inter-related. Ababio and Asmah-Andok (2013: 45) argues that the constitutional provisions means there has been a re-conceptualization thus developmental local governmental. It gave right to self-government. Section 151(4) states that national or provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality's right or ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions. More so according to Ababio and Asmah-Andok (2013: 43) municipal

councils in South Africa enjoy flexibility in legislation and governance in their specific region. However according to Ababio and Asmah-Andok (2013: 49) municipalities in SA are expected to generate a greater percentage of their revenue, whilst the national government controls the reliable sources like income tax.

Cameron (2014) discovered that service delivery was worse off in Johannesburg, which was under the control of the central government whilst Cape Town that was under the control of opposition party had better service delivery initiatives. 2011 South Africa's elections resulted in the opposition party Democratic Alliance (DA) winning overall control of Cape Town. Previously the DA had governed Cape Town in 2001-2 then in a coalition in 2006-11. With this background in mind Cameron examined Cape Town comparing with Johannesburg which has been under the African National Congress (ANC) since 2001.

In the attempt to undermine the Cape Town council, the ANC appointed a city manager violating legislative provisions. Cameron (2014: 85) argues that the central government undermined the locally elected council yet it did not affect service delivery as the local authority had a well-managed department of finance. On the other hand, ANC run authority has lost votes yet though it gets a larger allocation but has failed to satisfy the populace. To note, Cape Town has been rated as the best-run municipality in South Africa by EMPOWERDEX and COGTA a government department seconded the result (Cameron, 2014: 83).

2.3.3 VDA in Senegal

Resnick (2014) researched on various strategies of subversion in VDA contexts and service delivery. Senegal's decentralization process provided opportunity for the central government to deliberately reduce the autonomy of local government under conditions in which the latter could be held accountable for good service delivery and increase autonomy (Resnick 2014: 61). In 2009, Benno Siggil Senegaal (BSS) an opposition coalition gained control in seven of the country fourteen regions. What followed was replacement of mayors with central-government appointees. The central government encouraged opposition mayors in small communes to change their party affiliation in a bid to undermine the electoral success. In addition, smaller communes were split under the presumption that smaller territories brings people closer to the government. Resnick (2014: 66) notes that the central government tried to sever mechanisms of accountability

between voters and local officials (elections) by postponing elections, removing mayors to thwart opposition parties from building strongholds. In Dakar, it led to sour centre local relations in urban flooding waste management and removing street hawkers.

According to Resnick (2014: 64) Senegal's local authorities have never possessed adequate resources to cover the functional responsibilities that have been transferred to them. The opaque nature of local responsibility has become exacerbated in the VDA context, as in Senegal the local governance structure is regarded as prime providers of services (Resnick 2014: 71). In June 2011, a decree was issued stipulating allocation for trash removal would remain in the hands of Ministry of Environment. As a result, most urban areas had a daily accumulation of trash in the city amounting to 1400 to 1500 tons due to lack of fund transfer for this service management (Diallo 2011). In addition, according to the World Bank cited in Resnick (2014: 74), in Dakar when the local authority came up with development projects for infrastructure, the central government would issue a statement that the piece of land was reserved for something else. Compared to other services provided by Dakar local authority, only water and sanitary services are managed effectively as they were never given to the local authority but were under the central government.

2.3.4 Lessons Drawn

After having discussed the above, one can draw a couple of lessons from the case studies. To note VDA has been seen to have negative effects on overall performance of local authorities, with the scenario even worse in urban centers. Resnick (2014: 61) alludes to urbanization putting pressure on local governments to provide adequate services. Thus, due to urbanization most African cities have become over populated resulting in a scramble for resources in which the local authorities are failing to control. VDA can potentially undermine the ability of cities to address service delivery concerns. Hence, in most African countries councils have been met with challenges in garbage collection, water provision, road maintenance only to mention a few.

In VDA contexts, it has been noted with concern that central governments are skeptical to fully decentralize powers to local authorities resulting in sour centre relations. Moreover, the central government implores strategies of subversion to retain control of local authority management. According to Resnick (2014: 62) central governments uses

different tactics to reduce autonomy of local government that include rescinding resources, appointing management and removing areas of responsibility.

In South Africa results showed that local governments can survive and successfully deliver services to the public even under a vertically divided context because of their well-managed department of finance. Thus depending with resource availability and proper management local authorities can survive in a VDA context. Gailmard (2012: 6) refers to voters as principles and politicians as agents under an electoral agency dimension. This makes local authorities accountable to the public as the public votes the councilors into office. Thus, VDA can have positive implications on local authority as they can improve in service delivery in instances where the opposition party wants to prove itself to the electorate.

The public entrusts the local authorities and the central government to deliver basic services that include but not limited to sanitation, education, health facilities, road system construction, and maintenance. The challenge comes in the event where voters have a significant agency loss to politicians as they put small value of effort and but politicians exert effort in a minimal amount necessary to be re-elected into office.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

2.4.1 A Sequential Theory of Decentralisation (STD)

STD views decentralisation as a process of state reform composed by a set of public policies that transfer responsibilities, resources or authority from higher to lower levels of government in the context of a specific type of state (Falleti 2005: 328). The theory assumes that the level of autonomy enjoyed by local governments is determined by the sequence adopted. This theory helps in understanding local government dynamics in Zimbabwe where decentralisation took an administrative stance. The central government downloaded responsibilities without the financial support.

Implied is that a sequence which starts with Political decentralisation followed by Fiscal decentralisation and lastly administrative decentralisation (P-F-A) results in a comprehensive level of autonomy for local authorities. Angerbrandt (2011:17) notes political decentralisation implies that power is transferred from higher to lower levels of government making local authorities accountable to their constituency. As a result local authorities have decision-making powers hence enjoy a high level of autonomy.

According to Falleti (2005: 327) this decentralisation sequence has left governors and mayors more accountable to their constituencies through large scale transfer of resources, responsibilities and authority to sub national governments. Most developed countries that adopted this sequence enjoy higher levels of local government autonomy compared to developing world. In essence this sequence results in devolution of local authorities with administrative powers to make decisions and resource mobilisation capacity for effective service delivery.

A sequence that follows A-F-P results in funded transfer of responsibility without the necessary powers consequently local authorities in such circumstances survive without the necessary finance. Falleti (2005:329) argues that unfunded administrative decentralisation decreases autonomy of sub national governments. Resnick (2014: 69) further notes that fiscal decentralization requires that local governments possess a high level of discretion over formulation and allocation of budgets. Falleti (2005: 331) further notes that, a sequence which follows A-F-P preferences results in little change in distribution of power. Rather it follows that central governments under this set up transfer responsibilities but retains fiscal and political decision making power. Subsequently this institutional design and decentralisation reform decrease power of sub national officials with regard to national executive. Thus in a vertically divided context the central government will implore various strategies of subversion to counter the incidence of opposition parties winning the vote bank through effective service delivery. In addition decreasing power of sub national governments stifles their prospects of administrative and service delivery success as they depend on the central government for decision approval and resources amongst other necessary aspects.

2.5 Conclusion

The chapter provided the literature review. It made reference to the theoretical framework in the discourse of VDA and its implications on operations of urban councils. Country experiences from Senegal, Uganda and South Africa were discussed. The next chapter presents methodology that was applied in the research.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The chapter focuses on the research methodology. This entails the research approach, paradigm, research design, and research type and data collection techniques. It also presents the data presentation and analysis techniques, sampling techniques, ways of ensuring validity as well as ethical issues which guided the study.

3.2 Research Approach

A qualitative research approach was adopted in this study. According to Walsham (1993: 77), the basic assumption is that knowledge of reality including domain of human action is a social construction by actors. Thus the approach helped in analysing the implications of VDA on service delivery in the HCC from the actors' point of view. The approach made a platform for the study to focus on behaviour of major institutions in this case HCC and MLGPWNH and how their affect service delivery. This approach was significant in that it attaches meaning of social phenomenon to behaviour of actors hence was utilised in answering questions such as "What is the nature of the relationship between MLGPWNH and HCC", "What implications does VDA has on service delivery" . This qualitative approach gives information that is richer and has deep insight into the phenomenon under study.

3.3 Research Paradigm

A paradigm is a basic orientation to theory and research that includes basic assumptions, questions to be answered and techniques to be employed in the inquiry (Neuman 2014: 65). The definition above shows that the paradigm has an influence on the research methodology and provides a basis for data collection, data analysis and presentation to be used in the study. There are four research paradigm namely constructivist, post positivist, transformative and pragmatic research. This research was based on constructivism also known as interpretive research. Constructivism was adopted in a bid to understand multiple participant meanings on the implications of VDA on service delivery. The paradigm justified use of semi-structured interviews to get key informant opinions on the topic under study. Moreover constructivist knowledge claims are useful in theory generation hence the study concluded that VDA has negative implications on service delivery in the HCC.

3.4 Research Design

The study adopted a single case study research design influencing the choice of data collection as discussed below. Cresswell (2009: 3) posits that research designs are plans and procedures for research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis.

3.4.1 Case Study

The research used a case study design. According to Hancock (2002: 7) the in-depth analysis of a single case or small number of units forms the greatest value of this research design and offer unparalleled richness and depth of information as various methods of data collection can be employed. In this regard the researcher took the case study design to get deep insight on the notion of VDA in Harare and its impact on service delivery. Selecting the HCC as a case was influenced by its location, circumstances on service delivery and election results of 2002 and 2008. Harare is the capital of Zimbabwe hence it provides a best sample of central location with high demand of services to be delivered. More so, Vision 2025 of transforming Harare City to a world class city is premised on the city fathers ability to provide services like road construction and maintenance, housing, recreation, water and sanitation, among other services. This justifies choice of HCC as a sample case with pressure to deliver service. In addition, HCC comprised of opposition party councillors from the 2002, 2008, 2013 elections thus, best represents the opposition dominating local authority management in Zimbabwe.

The major advantage of a single case study design is its particularistic approach in describing a specific case in detail. Hence, the researcher got detailed information of the implications of VDA on service delivery. The case study design influenced research instruments to be used thus interviews and documentary search. Yin (1994) notes that case study approach uses multiple sources of evidence subsequently triangulation of findings ensuring validity. Single case study design is applicable in complex analysis of social situations over a period. It is in-depth analysis of a single case in this scenario HCC as an institution that provides services in a (VDA) complex situation. This assisted the researcher in addressing the question, “What is the nature of the relationship between the MLGPWNH and HCC”. In addition, it offered in-depth understanding by capturing variables in the complex VDA setup leading to manifestation of poor service delivery. A shortcoming of the design is results cannot be generalised, as it is not a representative of

the whole population. However it was not the objective of the study to generalise findings but to understand the implications of VDA on HCC.

3.5 Research Type

The study took a descriptive and explanatory stance. According to Babbie (1994: 89) descriptive research answers questions of what, where and when. He went further to note that descriptive studies lead to explanatory analysis of phenomenon. Descriptive research makes observations about a phenomenon. It gave a general understating on the nature of the relationship between MLGPWNH and HCC and strategies of subversion being used by the central government. After description an explanatory approach was adopted to further explain the implications of VDA on service delivery. Babbie (1994: 96) alludes that explanatory studies aim to discover social dynamics hence it was adopted to explain the described relationship between the two institutions.

3.6 Data Collection Techniques

This section provides the data collection methods that were used in the study.

3.6.1 Key Informant Interviews (KII)

KII were used to collect data on the relationship between the HCC and MLGPWNH, strategies of subversion being used by the central government and their implications on operations of the HCC. The researcher used KII because as illustrated by Yin (1994: 107) they enable the researcher to ask respondents about facts of a matter as well as their views on the subject matter. Semi-structured interview guides were used as research instruments. The researcher had face to face KII interviews with personnel at the MLGPWNH, HCC and councillors to develop an in-depth understanding of the implications of VDA on service delivery. KII gave the researcher an opportunity to discuss topics in detail with respondents. Thus it was utilised to gain a comprehensive understanding of the major research questions.

However, the technique had its own weaknesses. Some of the targeted informants could not be accessed whilst others cancelled scheduled interviews abruptly. More so other informants were hesitant to comment on strategies of subversion being used by the central government and the relationship between the MLGPWNH and HCC. To circumvent these challenges the researcher triangulated KII with documentary search.

3.6.2 Documentary Search

Documentary search was used to gather data from HCC reports, offices memos and documents from other government departments. Jashim (2010: 2) documentary research is an analysis of documents that contains information about the phenomenon the researcher wish to study. Cresswell (2009: 180) concurs that documentary search involves gathering information from documents that include minutes of meetings or newspapers. It also includes access to private information contained in diaries or letters. However, documents may not be authentic or accurate. Documentary search was used as a complement to KII. According to In this regard the study reviewed available documents to get further understanding on the major research questions.

3.7 Sampling Techniques

This section focuses on the sampling techniques that were used in identifying research participants.

3.7.1 Judgemental Sampling

Judgmental sampling also referred to as purposive sampling was used to identify key respondents with expertise and unique information on VDA and its implications on service delivery. Berg (2001: 33) states that in the development of a purposive sample, care is taken in the determination of who gets selected to represent a population. Neuman (2014: 273) further notes that purposive sampling is used to identify specialized populations in explanatory research. The researcher used this technique to identifying relevant personnel from HCC, Combined Harare Residents Trust Association (CHRTA), Harare Residents Trust Association (HRTA) and MLGPWNH. Babbie (2010: 193) explains that it is selection of a sample basing on the knowledge of a population, its elements, and the purpose of the study. In the process conducting interviews the researcher was constantly referred to other participants with knowledge on VDA implications on service delivery. Neuman (2014: 273) notes snowball sampling also referred to as network chain referral were sample is selected through existing networks. Thus, informants used their networks to refer the researcher to other individuals whom they believed would assist in answering major research questions.

3.8 Data Presentation and Analysis Techniques

3.8.1 Thematic Analysis

This technique was used to analyse data gathered from KII. Data was recorded and later transcribed to facilitate presentation and analysis. Rice and Ezzy (1999: 258) note that thematic analysis involves identification of themes through careful reading and re-reading of data. The researcher immersed herself in the field notes to understand the opinions of respondents. Braun and Clarke (2006: 79) assert that thematic analysis interprets various aspects which are core to the study. As a result coding was used in identifying recurring themes presented and analysed with the emerging themes.

3.8.2 Content Analysis

Data from documentary search was analysed using content analysis. As defined by Singh (2006: 150) Content analysis is a systematic scrutiny of current documents as sources of data. Babbie (2010: 156) posits that content analysis is the study of recorded human communications, such as books, websites, paintings and laws.

3.9 Validity

Triangulation of techniques was used to ensure research validity. The researcher triangulated primary and secondary sources of data. The technique was used to ensure descriptive accuracy of events and circumstances. Descriptive accuracy assisted the researcher to assess whether recorded information was a true reflection of VDA implication on service delivery at HCC. Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 28) assert the logic of triangulation as emanating from the simple reason that each method reveals different aspects of empirical study. Hence, documentary search and interviews provided different data that informed the study.

Secondary sources were evaluated on the basis of authenticity (how the document is genuine), credibility (accuracy of the situation) and meaning (ability of researcher to understand the document). Internet sources were chosen on the basis of currency (up to date), authority of author, authority of site and authority of the material.

Qualitative research approach relates to the world as a construct of the mind hence, phenomena is understood from the actors' view point. As a result the researcher used member checking and peer debriefing to authenticate and verify data gathered avoiding researcher bias. Member checking was used to verify interpretive accuracy of data from

interviews, opinions, feelings, intentions and experience of subjects in understanding VDA implications on service delivery.

3.10 Ethical Considerations

3.10.1 Scientific Conduct

To avoid scientific misconduct the researcher used Harvard reference style to cite authoritative sources used in the study. Moreover, participants were not used as a means to an end but the study was conducted in a professional fashion for academic purposes only.

3.10.2 Confidentiality and Integrity

The researcher ensured confidentiality by not publishing names of informants. More so, all the informants' personal details were not recorded to protect their anonymity thus upholding the principle of confidentiality. The researcher ensured there was non-disclosure of information to individuals who were not involved in the research. Furthermore, interviews were conducted in the absence of onlookers to ensure integrity.

3.10.3 Informed Consent

Informants should understand aimed and objectives of a research so that they participate willingly. To uphold this, the researcher got an authorisation letter from UZ to get entry into HCC other relevant organisations. The researcher also got a signed approval letter to carry out research in the institutions before commencement of data collection. Moreover the concept of VDA is highly sensitive and politically expedient. As a result respondents were given a detailed account of the study ensuring they voluntarily agree to answer questions and participate in interviews.

3.10.4 Beneficence

The researcher upheld this principle of beneficence by submitting a copy of the finished study at the HCC.

3.11 Conclusion

The chapter gave an insight into the research methodology and methods used to conduct the study. It consists of the research paradigm, type, sampling techniques, data collection, presentation and analysis techniques. The next chapter presents major research findings and their analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provided major findings of the study. It analysed the relationship between HCC and MLGPWNH and the implications of VDA on operations of HCC. Data presentation was guided by the objectives listed below.

4.2 Objectives Revisited

- To examine the nature of the relationship between the MLGPWNH and the HCC.
- To outline the various strategies of subversion being used by the central government to control the affairs of the HCC.
- To analyze the implications of VDA on operations of HCC
- To proffer recommendations that can be adopted to improve the relationship the relationship between the central government and the HCC

Figure 4.1: Respondents Profile

Respondents	Number	Rationale
HCC Top Officials	9	Heads of HCC at the core of decision making
MLGPWNH	2	Oversight on HCC activities (Parent Ministry)
HCC Councillors	10	Save different political interests in HCC
Civil Society	4	Represents residents and acts as watchdog over HCC
Members of the Academia (UZ)	3	Experts in the field of local government management

4.3 Major Findings

4.3.1 The Relationship between MLGPWNH and HCC

The study discovered that there is a highly centralised relationship between the MLGPWNH and the HCC. Despite efforts to decentralise local governments in Zimbabwe, the central government has maintained a firm grip on HCC activities. Furthermore the study revealed that HCC is heavily dominated by councillors from the opposition a situation which has led to the central being threatened by the strong opposition party. An interview with one councillor revealed that crucial decision making in the HCC is the prerogative of the parent ministry. Madhekeni and Zhou (2010: 19) posit that, the parent ministry treats HCC as spectators in their own territory consequently the two institutions have traded blows on several instances. HCC enjoys limited autonomy from the parent ministry leading to sour centre-local relations. Jonga (2012: 127) relates to this as interference, autocracy, tyranny of the few democrats and recentralisation of functions. The study also revealed that, due to VDA the relationship between the two institutions has worsened. The MLGPWNH has increasingly played a controlling and directive role since the emergence of a formidable opposition (MDC) with a significant control over local government authorities in the urban areas.

More so, central government suspicion of MDC dominance at HCC led to control mechanisms to frustrate the council leading to poor service delivery. The mechanisms included appointment of a Metropolitan Governor later replaced by Resident Minister of State. According to Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 9), this was “designed to neutralise the unwanted presence of the opposition MDC party that controlled the Harare and Bulawayo cities having overwhelmingly won local council elections”. There is simply too much of the “Minister shall” concept in Zimbabwean local government and this has entrenched excessive central government executive intervention. The Daily Mirror of 30 August 2004 quotes the former Minister of Local Government, Ignatius Chombo saying “local councils enjoyed delegated authority and thus should follow government, and by extension, ZANU PF policies.” The findings of the study demonstrates that this was a clear move in which the parent ministry showed no interest to seed powers to HCC amongst other local authorities to manage their own affairs subsequently leading to poor service delivery. Thus the HCC has remained an implementation agent of the central government with no autonomy to make decisions.

4.3.2 Strategies of Subversion Employed by the Central Government

4.3.2.1 Legislative Controls

The study revealed that, the central government uses legislation to control HCC activities. The UCA Chapter 29:15 is a piece of legislation that puts the HCC at the mercy of the Minister. In an interview a CHRTA director acknowledged that over 50 instances can be quoted with “The Minister shall...” provision hence this piece of legislation overrides the autonomy of HCC and other local authorities in praxis. A council director revealed that the Minister approves all major decisions for example the council budget. The Minister also appoints the top officials in the council thus according to one councillor, “No child can bite the hand that feeds it”. The councillor acknowledged that councillors come and go but technocrats in the council have a fixed term of employment so does officials at the MLGPWNH. One can then conclude that the above situation has created friction between HCC councillors and parent ministry officials.

Mushamba (2010) alluded that the legal framework in Zimbabwe forces local authorities to operate according to a strict ultra vires doctrine and an omnipresent central government. A councillor went further to explain that due to the existing legislation the council has been working with an acting town clerk for the past two years. A director concurred with the above saying, “This affects service delivery in that the acting town clerk will be summoned to leave office any time hence she cannot make permanent decisions in an office that is not hers”. Reference can be made to the warning warrant on Appendix D which is an example of a piece of legislation used in HCC to monitor staff and their conduct. According to one personnel at the HCC, the warning warrant is used to scare officials. Consequently this legislative control stifles relations between councillors and the technocrats for instance section 16 which prohibit officials to communicate directly or indirectly to councillors without authority. More over the study revealed that the Local Government Laws Amendment Bill of 2016 maintained the status quo on powers of the Minister and stronghold of the parent ministry on HCC and other local authorities’ management.

Councillors interviewed concurred that due to existing pieces of legislation, technocrats within the council sabotage the Councillors concern in favour of the parent ministry. In response to the above view a council official pointed out that,

“We are here to serve the interests of the citizens and the central government. We take our orders from the institution that enacted our existence as provided for in the Constitution. To be precise the Constitution says we act on behalf of the central government”.

Implied is that council technocrats act intra vires to legislative provisions at the expense of councillors who are the voice of the citizens. This has resulted in a scenario where the council seems not to respond to residents pleas in time or is reluctant to act on society problems whilst they are waiting for orders from the central government. This also shows that the central government is using legislation to control the HCC's day-to-day activities. The study revealed a grey area created by legislation between technocrats and councilors in the HCC. In one incident, the Minister of LGPWHN suspended the Mayor of Harare using the UCA CHAPTER 29:15 when the Mayor appointed a Town Clerk without consulting the parent ministry. However in response, the Mayor used section 278 of the Constitution that puts suspension powers in the hands of an independent Tribunal. Zimbabwe Institute (2005: 4) noted that, the Ministry's excessive interference in HCC, finally led to the resignation of MDC Councillors in August 2004. According to the Constitution of Zimbabwe section 265 (1) (b) local authorities must within their spheres assume only those functions conferred on them by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Implied is that HCC officials are responsible for comprehensive decision-making and program implementation, however when the shots are called from above it leaves their hands tied. The findings of the study demonstrate that the UCA chapter 29:15 gives the parent ministry unrestricted access to all council records, minutes and any document which relate to council meetings, resolutions, affairs and activities. Thus in a VDA set up like HCC, the parent ministry has been using such provisions to keep tight control of council activities.

The UCA Chapter 29:15 section 114 (1) provides that the Minister can suspend council when he deems it necessary. Madhekeni and Zhou (2012: 20) posit that MLGPWNH has been using legal and institutional frameworks to control council activities and still remain intra-vires. In the same vein literature review, pointed to the same scenario in Uganda. According to Resnick (2014: 75), the central government used the Kampala City Act of 2009 to replace the KCC with a corporate KCCA. An executive Director appointed by the President runs the authority. The Director as an appointee of the President exists to rubber

stamp orders from the ruling party reducing the level of autonomy enjoyed by KCC before 2009.

4.3.2.2 Appointments, Suspension and Dismissal of Councillors

The central government is also using appointments, suspension and dismissal to control HCC affairs one opposition councillor explained in an interview. Another councillor concurred arguing that they represent their wards in fear of the central government, which can decide to dismiss them when the Minister deems necessary. Machingauta (2010: 150) note that the Minister's primary role should be limited to policy formulation and supervision. Another councillor acknowledged the role of the Minister in the HCC as oversight but due to political endeavours, the Minister uses powers enshrined in the UCA to meddle in the day-to-day operations of HCC. One member of the Residents Forum concurred with this claim, arguing that councillors from the opposition party are not at liberty to act in the HCC, as they fear suspension. However, this is not peculiar to Zimbabwe. In Botswana, the State President has powers to dissolve council if they deem it necessary (Dipholo and Gumede 2013: 7). An interview with one top official in the HCC referred to the "cat and mouse relationship" that exist between the Minister and Mayor. This has resulted in the Minister stripping the Mayor of his benefits and entitlements on the basis of cost cutting initiatives. Another councillor gave reference to Chitungwiza Town Council where opposition top officials were dismissed on allegations of corruption and incompetence whilst the real reason was settling political differences. The councillor went further to reveal that, it was not about which party one affiliated to, even councillors who are affiliated to the ruling party are threatened with dismissal if they do not comply with the Minister's orders. As a result one can argue that appointments of HCC top brass have resulted in their manipulation by the parent ministry.

The study found out the situation is not unique to Zimbabwe. Cameron (2014: 82) noted the same scenario in South Africa when the President appointed a city manager who is affiliated to ANC against legislative procedures. Furthermore, a similar case happened in Uganda when the President appointed an Executive Director to run the KCCA who is affiliated to NRM ruling party. More so, the President of Nigeria appointed interim local government councillors and gave a directive that no allocation was to be released to Lagos, Niger and Nasarawa (Usman and Erunke 2010: 171). Hence, it is expedient to note

central governments use appointments to undermine opposition ran urban councils across Africa.

4.3.2.3 Central Government Directives

Heads of departments interviewed in the study generally pointed to the use of directives by the MLGPWNH to control HCC affairs. An interview with one director revealed that the central government through the parent ministry imposes directives and petitions to local authorities. Hope (2000:519) cited by Dipholo and Gumede (2013: 5) notes that local governments merely derive their legal status and power to function from statutes or administrative directives. A councillor made specific reference to slashing of bills in 2013 as one directive where the central government imposed a decision on all local authorities without considering the implications. More so, an official in the HCC pointed out “this directive has left HCC paying tax on behalf of the residents as the government slashed debts without slashing off VAT for the HCC”. A member of residents’ representatives acknowledged this slashing of bills as a measure that was arrived at not for the benefit of the residents but a political decision to benefit the ruling party in the 2013 elections. An interview in the Herald of 16 August 2013, reveal the town clerk acknowledging write-off of debts accrued between February 2009 and June 2013 amounting to US \$330 million. In a statement, the then Minister of Local Government argued that debts had become a burden on citizens considering the economic hardship caused by sanctions. The Minister quoted residents associations complaining over arrears caused by “unjustified increase in rates and bills by MDC-T led councils in urban areas. The study revealed that abrupt untimely central government directives have negatively affected service delivery by HCC. Dipholo and Gumede (2013: 7) argue that such a scenario create a lot of anxiety and uncertainty since local governments may never know what to expect from the upper tiers because their functions are subject to reform and restructuring by the national government. The central government has used directives to make decisions for HCC without assessing the impact on the council’s operations.

More over a Councillor gave reference to the directive in 2004 which deferred all council elections until further notice in the HCC. The 13 councillors involved were relieved of their duties by the Minister after they contested the Ministers’ directive to suspend council elections. The matter ended up in court and the councillors lost the case, “This became an example to us that when a directive is given we have to follow because we have no

stronghold in the courts”. In light of this directive, one technocrat in the HCC pointed out the same scenario in the present day HCC hierarchy. The director added that

“HCC has been operating with an acting town clerk for the past two years and when deliberations were made, the then Minister of local government refused to appoint the winning candidate Mashakada as he is an MDC-T MP and his political affiliation would not serve HCC’s interest.”

Thus, the Minister of local government used his powers enshrined in the UCA Chapter 29:15 sections 313(3) and 314(4), which requests council to expeditiously comply with Ministerial directives.

In 2006 a directive which gave Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) water provision and sewer reticulation services was passed. One top official mentioned,

“It was a political move in which the government wanted to choke HCC revenues. In the end when ZINWA failed to deliver the service was given back to us and the situation has worsened since then.”

Furthermore the central government gave a directive which transferred vehicle licensing to Zimbabwe National Aviation and Roads Authority (ZINARA). According to an official in the finance department this move constrained the revenue inflows and the major resource base of HCC. Thus the study revealed that directives have been used time and again by the central government causing poor service delivery. According to Machingauta (2010: 144) lack of shared perception between the parent ministry and council on what is national interest has led to many problems, especially in councils controlled by opposition parties to that of the Minister. Hence in VDA contexts directives are being used coerce local authorities to implement interests of the ruling party regardless of negative impacts they may have on local jurisdiction’s operations.

4.2.3.4 Financial Controls

An interview with one top official revealed that the MLGPWNH approves council budgets. In essence the legislation expects a 70% and 30% ratio in overall expenditure in the event the proportion is different the Minister does not approve. According to an official in the finance department, it is the prerogative of the Minister not to approve budgets if the budget does not meet the service-wage bill ratio. She went further to say the

ministry delays approving council budgets on allegations that the council is not compliant with regulations. An interview with a councillor concurred that approval of council budget by the parent ministry has resulted in the council starting a financial year without a substantive budget. In addition to the above, the study revealed that the parent ministry also controls borrowing powers and public private partnerships of HCC. According to one director, local authorities have an obligation to finance their own budgets whilst and get a 5% allocation from the national fiscus. The director went further to note that,

“The central government through the MLGPWNH, and the UCA Chapter 29:15 has taken over fiscal autonomy of the HCC in instances where the Minister sets limits on taxes, tariffs, spot fines among others. Point to note is in works department. We got a relatively reasonable revenue flow from vehicle licences which financed a large chunk of our budget and now we get peanuts from bills, rates and surcharges.”

The study revealed that according to the Constitution of Zimbabwe section 301(3) local governments are entitled to not less than 5% of the national fiscus. However the study found out that the central government has not been remitting the allocation. More over the HCC revenue base dwindled ever since it lost one of its major sources resulting in the council struggling to operate at full capacity.

4.4 Implications of VDA on HCC Operations

4.4.1 Negative Implications

4.4.2.1 Poor Service Delivery

Due to the presence of VDA the state of service delivery in Harare leaves a lot to be desired and examples can be drawn in waste management, water supply and road maintenance. The study revealed that there is erratic water shortage with some locations like Mabvuku having gone for 17years with no water supply and in areas where water is available it is not safe for drinking. The centre blames the local authorities for poor performance whilst the local authorities blame the centre for sabotage to achieve political scores. Machingauta (2010: 150) acknowledges that powers of the MLGPWNH takes the initiative away from local authorities and opens them up to manipulation. Resultantly service delivery for example social welfare (housing) is being used by both institutions to gain political mileage. The study further noted the HCC has failed to provide social services. The central government is not seeding land to HCC as enshrined

in the UCA chapter (29:15) to build child care facilities and old peoples' homes. As a result Harare City is flooded with street fathers, mothers and children with no shelter consequently open spaces are not safe to patrol in the evening as one can be robbed. The study focused on two mandatory services provided by the HCC that is waste management and road maintenance.

4.4.2.1.1 Waste Management

An interview with a CHRTA official revealed that HCC has not been managing waste in a satisfying manner. Councillors and technocrats in the council attributed this to shortage of finances in which one director pointed out that, "It has been a challenge for us to dispose waste, we do not have enough vehicles nor do we have enough staff to cater for all suburbs within our jurisdiction". In addition, an official in the finance department opined that, residents have not been paying their dues, which makes it difficult for the council to provide services as expected. However, according to Appendix E on page 59 Waste Management Account 1 for the HCC has a net expenditure of US \$24 871 000 against an income of US \$26 794 000 and a surplus of US \$1 923 000. Considering these figures the study revealed HCC has the capacity to dispose waste with the available limited resources.



Source: Fieldwork

Furthermore, the litter question in the HCC as the study discovered is affected by party politics. In a VDA context, rate payers choose to follow directives that benefit them. Council is at loggerheads with street vendors who are also residents of Harare in a bid to

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clean up the city. A councillor acknowledged that vendors in the street are the vote bank of the ruling party hence it is difficult for the council to clean up the city unless the central government decides to act. The researcher visited fourth street rank early in the morning it was clean. However, a second visit to the same site mid afternoon had different results by 6 pm on the same day the rank was in a sorry state. The question remains: who is at fault? On one end the city fathers want to clean the streets on the other end politicians use this opportunity to spread political interests for their own advantage.

More so, an interview with a councillor revealed that, rate payers in Harare have become negligent to keep their city clean. To add to this, the Public Relations Manager showed concern over citizens “who litter everywhere and expects the council to pick up after them”. Hence, the above shows that in spite of resources being used as a reason for poor waste management the residents are equally to blame in the manner they litter the city deliberately. Figure 4.2 above shows a site in which a bin was placed by HCC but the populace continue to throw litter on the ground instead of placing litter in the bin. An interview with a Public Relations official revealed that VDA has nothing to do with keeping the city clean. In his words “It is the attitude of the residents which is worrisome. Even when we make efforts to deliver services, our efforts are in vain.” Thus the study discovered efforts by HCC to perform are met with resistance by rate payers who affiliate to the ruling party. In turn the central government takes the opportunity to get political mileage and disburses funds when HCC is blamed for poor quality of services. An example is when the President of Zimbabwe and the Minister of Local Government Public Works and National Housing announced the state of Harare roads a national emergency. More so the Minister publicly ordered HCC to clean up the city despite his knowledge on resource shortage in response to rate payers complains on litter and congestion caused by vendors.

4.4.2.1.2 Road Maintenance

The figure below is an example of poor drainage systems within the Harare City and the extent of damage on the residents’ vehicles and health during the rainy season. One CHRTA top official mentioned that, “the state of service delivery especially roads in Harare leaves a lot to be desired”. According to Bish and Clemens (2000: 127), local authorities are responsible for road maintenance, planning, traffic signals and signs functioning, clearing of gutters and drainage among others. An interview with one official

from the Residents Forum also raised concern over streetlights that do not function and takes long to repair causing congestion during pick hours. Moreover, one CHRTA representative added that the council is reluctant to patch up potholes as result residents have a challenge to navigate the city avoiding vehicle damage.

In response to this, one council director blamed the central government for the state of roads in Harare. According to this official, the council could manage roads in the event they were collecting vehicle licences that were taken by ZINARA. According to the Director,

“The council was getting a fair chunk from the vehicle licensing and this could sustain many of the services we provide. As a council vehicle licensing was one of the major tax head (if I can put it that way). But due to politics the central government took it from us and gave ZINARA. ZINARA has an obligation to monitor, construct and rehabilitate major roads in Zimbabwe and the Harare City roads have to suffer when funds are not remitted back to us. There is nothing we can do about the situation”

The study revealed that VDA has resulted in the HCC failing to provide quality services due to resource shortage. ZINARA is reluctant to remit funds to HCC in stances when funds are disbursed they are way below expected inflows to make significant changes. The council has obsolete infrastructure with little capacity to purchase equipment required to construct, maintain and rehabilitate roads. Subsequently road networks are in a horrid state. More over the study revealed that HCC has embarked on a decentralisation scheme which is being implemented at a slow rate due to resource shortage. Of the 8 zones created under this initiative only a few have fully functional workshops due to central government sabotage of HCC projects.

4.4.3 Constrained Revenue Generation

The study revealed that in VDA contexts central governments use funds to control local authorities. It stifles development let alone basic service delivery, as local authorities do not have fiscal space to manage their affairs. This is in line with the sequential theory of decentralisation, which states that without fiscal autonomy local authorities remain as implementers of central government initiatives with no influence in decision-making. According to Falleti (2005: 329) fiscal decentralisation refers to a set of policies designed

to increase the revenues or fiscal autonomy of sub national governments. Without this local authorities have no power to finance their mandate which results in poor service delivery.

As a result of VDA the central government has been meddling in HCC operations. In an interview a director noted that,


“HCC has the ability and capability to operate on its own without the parent ministry, like public enterprises and parastatals if it is given enough decision making and fiscal space nothing can stop the council from providing services”.

This was supported by a number of HCC Councillors who raised arguments against MLGPWHN role in HCC activities. An interview with a top official in the finance department raised concerns on the parent ministry meddling in HCC affairs. In her words,

“The HCC is able to stand alone in service delivery. The presence of the central government has in fact negatively affected service delivery. The central government uses directives, legislation and resources to control our activities. An example is in roads department where the government took revenue collection powers through ZINARA. They expect the council to venture in street lighting, road maintenance and construction with a small amount given by ZINARA when in practice ZINARA neither gives us the allocation in full nor in time.”

The study revealed that the central government has done more harm than good in the running of local authorities especially HCC. Transfer of vehicle licensing constrained the major revenue base of HCC resulting in low income. More so rate payers have been reluctant to pay their dues and debts have accrued reducing capacity of HCC to generate enough income to finance operations. A member of Harare Residents Trust Association said, “It is difficult for us as residents associations to convince residents to pay their dues in this pre-election period. Residents believe the government will slash all debts so there is no point in paying.” Commenting on the same issue a top official acknowledged that, “Slashing of bills in 2013 was a disastrous political decision in the history of Zimbabwe”. The study revealed that local authorities suffered huge losses in slashing of debts yet they still had to provide services. Slashing of bills in 2013 was a fatal mistake to date HCC has not recovered from this directive and the state of service delivery bears testimony.

Figure 4.3: 2017 Annual HCC Estimates Summary



Source: Fieldwork

The pie chart above gives a summary of the 2017 annual estimates of the HCC. To note 38.21% of HCC expenditure for 2017 was allocated to pay salaries and allowances. 32.74% was channelled general expenses whilst 5.83% and 5.08% were channelled towards admin charges and repairs respectively. In addition, 4.60% and 4.60% was channels towards maintenance and capital charges. The remaining 9% was revenue contribution. Overall 70.95% council budget was channelled towards salaries, allowances and general expenses, which is unsustainable. Appendix B account 6 on revenue collection HCC used US \$7 694 300 against an income of 4 356 000 resulting in a deficit of -3 338 300. This is true for 16 out of 24 accounts where the council incurred a loss in service provision whilst in the remaining accounts the revenue is not enough to finance the deficits. Due to different political ideologies, HCC has not been receiving the central government budgetary allocation. Thus, there is sabotage in resource distribution; resulting in HCC operating at a loss and poor service delivery as discussed above.

Figure 4.4: Road Drainage Systems



Source: Fieldwork

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4.4.4 Lack of HCC Autonomy

Directives has resulted in most Councillors particularly those from the opposition party to perform their duties in fear of the parent ministry. To note technocrats in HCC operate as a department of the parent ministry as they are bound in decision making by the MLGPWNH with minimal autonomy. Dipholo and Gumede (2013:1) illustrated that in Botswana local authorities are simply an extension of the central government responsible for the implementation of central government policies at lower levels. Thus this scenario is not unique to Zimbabwe rather in most developing countries local authorities lack autonomy. HCC is operating in a tight environment where the City Fathers do not have enough fiscal space to make decisions that finance service delivery. Machingauta (2010) notes a balance should be struck between the need for central oversight and preserving the value of local discretion. The study revealed that, VDA has resulted in poor prioritisation of services as the ministry makes decisions on behalf of the HCC. One top official argued that, "Most if not all decisions made by the central government have political benefits on the ruling party in turn causing problems in the HCC." This has in turn affected innovation and creativity where views of Councillors are not taken into consideration yet they mirror residents concerns.

As a result the study revealed that approving of council budgets by the parent ministry has resulted in the HCC losing its fiscal autonomy. Delays in approving the budgets have resulted in a compromise of public sector ethics of accountability and transparency. Funds are used at the start of a financial year before they have been approved in the budget leading to increased cases of corruption. Moreover, the national economic crisis has worsened the situation leading to the HCC not meeting the stipulated 70% to 30% service-wage bill. According to Falleti (2005: 331) a sequential theory of decentralisation that starts with administrative decentralisation results in little autonomy for the local authority. The HCC has been given responsibilities with no political and fiscal transfer of power. Subsequently the central government has recentralised power and authority resulting in low standards in HCC operations.

4.4.5 Reluctance to Pay Council Bills

The study revealed that due to the above situation residents have lost trust in their council officials. In an interview one councillor noted that residents are aware of the importance of paying their rates but are reluctant due to anticipation of another directive in the pre 2018

election period. In addition one director noted that the central government is taking advantage of VDA. The director went further to note that the central government has not been paying rates on premises they use which has negatively affected HCC operations. However, residents blame councillors for not representing their interest; councillors blame HCC technocrats for sabotage whilst the technocrats blame residents for not paying their bills. In the end the study revealed that there is revenue leakage, poor revenue remittance and collection, political prioritisation of projects, slacking of council officials in conduct of their duties leading to poor service delivery.

Figure 4.5: Residents Demonstrating Against Poor Quality Services at Town House



Source: Fieldwork

4.5.1 Significance of Central Government Involvement in HCC Operations

4.5.1.1 Innovation, Competition and Checks

In other instances, VDA can have positive impacts on service delivery if handled in a professional manner. Like in South Africa, Cape Town council officials used the sabotage imposed by the central government to improve its revenue collection capacity thereby improving service delivery. Strict adherence to duty and mandate has improved Cape Town performance and positively influenced sound service delivery. VDA can result in checks and balances for central governments on their local authorities. A key informant interview with a member of the academia revealed that decentralisation is a platform that the central government through the local authorities provide services to the citizenry. Hence, the central government can use it, as a standard to measure performance of local authorities in a professional manner as there are no political squabbles when the Minister

is able to point out in competences of a local authority without fear of losing political influence at party level. More so in support of this one councilor noted that,

“It is easier to be accountable to someone you do not share the same political interest with as your relationship is strictly business. Unlike a situation when you have to ask a party member to account for misuse of council funds when you will share the same cup of drink at a party congress”.

In response to the economic situation on the budget of HCC, a member of the Combined Harare Residents Association posited that, “the HCC has a blotted cabinet, a low revenue collection capacity and has poor prioritisation strategies as revealed in the 2018 budget which was initially rejected.” According to Marumahoko (2011: 52) the MLGPWNH also enforces a wage-service bill ratio of 30% to 70% in the HCC budget to ensure consistence with the national best practice. Thus the parent ministry keeps the council in check through approving the budget. As a result the study revealed that the MLGPWNH is essential in operations of HCC. It is the mandate of the Minister to keep the council in check, play an oversight role and intervene when need arises.

4.5.1.2 Oversight Role

Interviewed residents representatives justified government presence in the running of local authorities. They were sceptical of HCC running on its own without the central government keeping it in check. Most of the Directors raised arguments that the constitution of Zimbabwe has a provision for local authorities’ existence with the MLGPWNH as the parent ministry. The Chief Committee Officer had the same view. According to him,

“The ministry watches over the HCC and assist us when need arise. No child can survive without a guardian watching them you need advice, a second opinion in decision making. The ministry of local government assisted us in planning the commuter omnibus holding bay and the Minister gave a statement on the vendor dilemma in support of the city fathers mission to clean up the city”

One member of the academia from the University of Zimbabwe acknowledged that in any given community politics is always there. She went on comment that “Poor service delivery should not be blamed on VDA instead councils are supposed to be professional in

such instances and there will be sound service delivery like in Cape Town. A high degree of autonomy from the central government should be an added advantage to service delivery” This was in the same view of some council officials who believed that there is no difference whether the ministry exists actively or not. Their argument was premised on what they term “pressing matters” in council for effective service delivery. For them, presence of the parent ministry in the day-to-day running of HCC in a stable economy will have positive impact on service delivery as it plays an oversight function. “In the current situation, advocating for minimal central government presence in HCC affairs will not make a difference but worsen the state of service delivery”

4.5.1.3 Monitoring Role

More so, a member of the Residents Forum who justified the presence of the central government in HCC affairs supported this. He was of the same view with residents who believed the HCC separate from the central government would not satisfy the residents. The respondents referred to Chitungwiza council, which was dissolved on grounds of corruption among other factors. Thus according to them, the central government is there to monitor activities of the HCC least it loses focus on its mandate. In addition one Director argued that,

“We all have different political interests but when we are at work we do our duties diligently to serve the public and politics has nothing to do with service provision”. He went further to note that, “VDA is politics at national level which has nothing to do with HCC or any other local authority management. VDA has always been there because we believe in different principles even if we belong to the same political party’s differences always exist in a normal society.”

In light of the above, the study also revealed that, the Minister was justified in 2012 when he gave a directive to stop the HCC from dividing playing fields and public open spaces into residential stands. In the same year, another directive was given on procurement of water chemicals after the council had bought poisoned chemicals from a contracted company.

From the above discussion it is imperative to note a majority of council officials are in favour of HCC being under the watchful eye of its parent ministry. A different scenario would erode the few services the residents are already getting. Therefore, one can note that

the parent ministry should not be sidelined in the activities of HCC but its role should be redefined and limited to not interference. Furthermore, it is the prerogative of the council to make efforts in delivering quality services regardless of the local government ministry presence. Reference can be made to services like recreational places maintenance i.e. Harare gardens, Africa unity square, Rufaro stadium, Elis brown swimming pool among others. The council does not need central government assistance in maintaining these places when it can hire the facilities and earn money to purchase resources needed in their maintenance.

4.5.1.4 Assistance

In the figure below, the council has made efforts to put bins in areas where residents where dumping litter. However, due to shortage of garbage trucks bins overflow. HCC has not been collecting bins in time hence during rainy seasons and windy weather conditions such areas have become health hazards. As a result, outbreaks of malaria, dysentery, cholera and typhoid due to plenty of breeding place for the diseases. Due to poor waste management and overpopulation HCC has had its own share of typhoid and cholera attacks. The study discovered that in emergency cases the central government engages other ministries and assist the City of Harare to control the situation.

Figure 4.6: Poor Refuse Collection



Source: Fieldwork

In light of the above analysis the Urban Councils Act 29:15 and the constitution of Zimbabwe both places HCC under the jurisdiction of the MLGPWNH. Establishment of local government is not unique to Zimbabwe nor is the constitutional provision. In countries like South Africa, local authorities exercise a relatively high level of autonomy

regardless of central government presence. In essence, information from literature revealed that central governments act through parent ministries to assist local authority operations.

4.6 Conclusion

The foregoing discussion summarised major conclusions of the study. It shows that the sorry state of service delivery can be attributed to VDA. More over the central government in Zimbabwe through the MLGPWNH has been using different strategies of subversion to frustrate the HCC in the quest to provide services. The following chapter focuses on conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The study analysed the relationship between HCC and MLGPWNH and implications of VDA on service delivery in the HCC. In line with objectives of the study, this chapter draws conclusions from the findings presented and analyzed in the previous chapter. It also presents recommendations of the study.

5.2 Conclusions

5.2.1 Relationship between the HCC and MLGPWNH

The study concluded that there is a master servant relationship between the HCC and MLGPWNH. Domination of opposition councillors the parent ministry is meddling in day to day operations of HCC and keeps a tight control of its activities resulting in sour relations politicisation of functions. These controls and excessive powers have frustrated the City Fathers and stifled effective service delivery. Furthermore it has created a rift between council officials and their councillors in a situation where technocrats and politicians clash over decision making and priority setting. The MLGPWNH has recentralised powers through delegation of authority and responsibilities without the necessary fiscal space for HCC to operate on its own. Consequently HCC is operating as an agent of the parent ministry, implementing decisions made from above in a top down environment. Thus HCC is at the mercy of the MLGPWNH.

5.2.2 Strategies of Subversion being used by the Central Government

The central government is using various strategies of subversion to maintain tight controls over the HCC and other local authorities in Zimbabwe. The study grouped these strategies into four main categories namely fiscal controls, legislative controls, central appointments and directives. The central government has been holding back resources and using central appointments, suspension and dismissal of councillors to sabotage development functions of the HCC. In addition the parent ministry is using legislative and political controls to frustrate and undermine HCC activities. The study concluded that appointment of top officials in HCC has led to manipulation of management by the MLGPWNH. Furthermore directives have disrupted smooth flow of operations in HCC as they are untimely and inconvenient in the economic environment the council is operating.

5.3.2 Implications of VDA on Service Delivery

The study concluded that VDA has negative and positive implications on service delivery. To a larger extent VDA has been the major drive for central governments to deploy strategies of subversion in a bid to protect their stronghold on the vote bank. As a result the central government has recentralised power through the MLGPWNH presence in the day to day operations of HCC. Consequently there is politicising of city council operations, top down approach in decision making, poor quality service delivery and HCC enjoying a relatively low level of autonomy. On the other hand the study concluded that VDA has positive implication on service delivery. VDA is an initiative that fosters checks and balances between central governments and local authorities. It encourages competition between the different levels of government as both institutions want to gain the masses support. The study noted that it leads to innovation for local authorities that strive to survive despite strategies of subversion central governments employ as in Cape Town South Africa.

5.3 Recommendations

5.3.1 Alignment of Legislation

The study recommends that the government of Zimbabwe should prioritise aligning of the Acts of Parliament with the constitution for smooth flow of functions. This alignment will also specify responsibilities of the HCC and MLGPWNH as a result this will improve relations between the two institutions. In light of the above the powers of the Minister and the role of the ministry should be reduced to intervention not interference which has strained HCC.

5.3.2 Implementing Devolution

There is need to revisit the decentralisation strategy that was adopted by the central government. For local authorities to exercise relative autonomy for effective and efficient service delivery, the central government should consider implementing devolution. As illustrated by Falleti (2005: 331) political decentralisation increases the degree of autonomy. The central government should demonstrate a high level of political commitment to seed powers to local authorities without recentralising its roles and functions. Thus central government must devolve powers to local authorities according to the Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013.

5.3.3 Improve Level of Professionalism and Political Will

There is need for comprehensive political will for the central government and the HCC in conduct of their functions. There should be apolitical exercise of duties which serve the interest of citizens. Thus there is need for mutual understanding between the two institutions in supporting each other for development of the Sunshine City. HCC acts on behalf of and represents the central government at a local level. Consequently political will ensure co-existence of the two institutions and the improve service delivery that will satisfy the citizenry.

5.3.3 Improving Institutional Capacity

The parent ministry has a mandate to capacity building initiatives like training programs, streamlining HCC structures and engagement with private sectors supported by fiscal autonomy will increase the councils' revenue base and decision making competences. Mushamba (2010) advocates for legislation that provides clarity on local government powers and funding sources. In addition training programs will train technocrats in both institutions to set aside political differences in the work environment.

5.3.4 Setting up an Independent Commission

The study suggests that an independent commission be institutionalised. This institution will monitor exercise of power by the Minister. Mushamba (2010: 121) posit that the commission will facilitate proper discharge of constitutional mandates. More so it will coordinate harmonised relations between the HCC and MLGPWNH to ensure quality of service delivery.

5.3.5 Community Engagement

The study recommends community engagement at ward level to facilitate smooth operations and program acceptance by the residents. As illustrated on appendix H on page 65 the researcher visited ward 31 (Glenview South) where Cllr Chakeredza is running projects with the community to mitigate service delivery challenges faced by HCC. The projects include cake making, breeding chickens, making detergents, training of block man, engaging the business community to train merchandisers (SPAR) and clean up campaigns. Other wards should adopt the same strategies which improves livelihood of residents.

5.4 Areas for Further Study

The study discovered that there are other crucial salient features that affect service delivery in the HCC. Against this background the study suggests the following areas for further studies, party politics implications on service delivery in the HCC, challenges being faced by HCC in service provision, role of the civil society and citizens in service delivery.

5.5 Conclusion

The chapter provided for the major conclusions and recommendations of the study. The above recommendations will foster good relations between the HCC and MLGPWNH. As a result the HCC will enjoy a higher level of autonomy in its operations which will improve quality of service delivery.

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APPENDICES

Odlenmoud nyasha

Appendix A

Key Informant Interview Guide for Harare City Technocrat

Date.....

My name is O. Nyasha Munzvandi, a post graduate student at the University of Zimbabwe. I am currently undertaking a Master of Science Degree in Public Administration. In accordance with the requirements of the degree program, I am undertaking a study on the Implications of vertically divided authority on service delivery in Urban Councils using HCC as my case study. All information you provide shall be solely used for academic purposes.

Vertically Divided Authority refers to a situation when different political parties control different levels of government that is local council and national government (Cameron, 2014: 82).

Questions

1. Which core responsibilities does your department provide to the residents?
2. How do you finance these responsibilities?
3. How autonomous is the HCC from the parent ministry?
 - Is the presence of MLGPWNH a hindrance or a benefit in service delivery?
 - Strategies of subversion being used by the central government to control local authorities.
4. In your own opinion comment on the relationship between the HCC and MLGPWNH.
 - How does this relationship affect service delivery?
5. Can you comment on your relationship as a technocrat with
 - Parent Ministry
 - Councillors
 - Citizens
 - Residents Associations
6. What challenges has the council faced in service delivery?
7. In your on view what can be done to improve service delivery in the HCC?
 - What can be done to improve relations between HCC and MLGPWNH?

Your participation is greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and cooperation.

Appendix B

Key Informant Interview Guide for Harare City Councillor

Date.....

My name is O. Nyasha Munzvandi, a post graduate student at the University of Zimbabwe. I am currently undertaking a Master of Science Degree in Public Administration. In accordance with the requirements of the degree program, I am undertaking a study on the Implications of vertically divided authority on service delivery in Urban Councils using HCC as my case study. All information you provide shall be solely used for academic purposes.

Vertically Divided Authority refers to a situation when different political parties control different levels of government that is local council and national government (Cameron, 2014: 82).

Questions

1. Which functions do you perform as a councillor?
2. Which Committee do you specialise in?
 - Performing which duties.
3. How do you finance service delivery as HCC?
 - Financing special services in your respective ward.
4. Which challenges has the council faced in its operations
5. How autonomous is the HCC from the MLGPWNH?
 - Is the presence of MLGPWNH a hindrance or a benefit in HCC operations?
6. In your own view what can be done to improve operations in the HCC?
 - What can be done to improve relations between HCC and MLGPWNH?

Your participation is greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and cooperation.

Appendix C

Key Informant Interview Guide for Harare City Residents Representative

Date.....

My name is O. Nyasha Munzvandi, a post graduate student at the University of Zimbabwe. I am currently undertaking a Master of Science Degree in Public Administration. In accordance with the requirements of the degree program, I am undertaking a study on the Implications of vertically divided authority on service delivery in Urban Councils using HCC as my case study. All information you provide shall be solely used for academic purposes.

Vertically Divided Authority refers to a situation when different political parties control different levels of government that is local council and national government (Cameron, 2014: 82).

Questions

1. What are your key responsibilities in the council?
2. What is your comment on the state of service provision?
 - In your own view what has been the root cause of the above scenario?
3. Can you comment on your relationship as the residents trust with
 - Councillors
 - Citizens
 - Technocrats
4. In your opinion how autonomous is the HCC from the MLGPWNH?
5. Is the presence of MLGPWNH a hindrance or a benefit in the operations of HCC?
6. In your on view what can be done to improve service delivery in the HCC?
 - What can be done to improve relations between HCC and MLGPWNH?

Your participation is greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and cooperation.



CITY OF HARARE

1417

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF WORKS

TO:

REFERENCE: STAFF 5/

DESIGNATION:

Date:

PAY NUMBER:

LETTER OF WARNING

I wish to warn you that your behaviour in respect of the following item (marked X) is considered reprehensible/misconduct and has been noted in your file. Whilst no further action may be taken in this case, any future recurrence of such behaviour may result in a recommendation for your dismissal from Council's service.

1. Absenteeism.
2. Absence without consent during working hours.
3. Poor time keeping.
4. Idleness.
5. Inefficiency/Carelessness.
6. Rudeness/Insubordination/Aggressiveness/Discourtesy.
7. Drunkenness/Drug Affliction/Bad Behaviour.
8. Incitement of other Staff/Persons to act contrary to Council's interests.
9. Failure to obey lawful instructions.
10. Misuse of Municipal Vehicle/Plant/Property.
11. Theft/Loss/Damage of Municipal Property.
12. Failure to report misuse/loss/or damage to Council Property.
13. Conviction for any Criminal offence.
14. Action likely to bring Employer's Service into disrepute.
15. Failure to comply with leave conditions.
16. Communication/Complaining directly or indirectly to Councillors or media without authority.
17. Any other reasons or brief details of items listed above e.g. date of Incident and property involved.

DIVISION/BRANCH/SECTION HEAD

c.c. Staff Office
Administrative Assistant Room 119 (Items 10 and 11 only).

Received by:
(Print Name)

.....
(Signature)

Date:

Appendix E

2017 ANNUAL ESTIMATES SUMMARY -

Account	Salaries & Allowances US\$	Admin charges US\$	General Expenses US\$	Repairs	Maintenance US\$	Capital Charges US\$	Revenue Contribution US\$	Gross Expenditure US\$	Recharges US\$	Net Expenditure US\$	INCOME US\$	Surplus/ (deficit) US\$
1 Waste Management	8 203 900	1 289 400	4 198 700	1 473 400	1 692 200	2 520 400	5 493 000	24 871 000		24 871 000	26 794 000	1 923 000
2 Distribution Account	7 634 000	750 696	5 963 500	426 300	994 700	3 599 973	2 352 300	21 721 469	2 060 000	19 661 469		- 19 661 469
3 Cleveland Dam Chalets& hillside	25 500	121 900	36 300	4 200	12 800		72 500	273 200		273 200	100 000	- 173 200
4 Parks & Cemeteries	4 038 200	282 600	961 800	51 800	155 500	395 400	514 900	6 400 200		6 400 200	551 000	- 5 849 200
5 Operations		435 700	874 600	8 951 000	5 219 000	1 522 200	3 805 000	20 807 500		20 807 500	7 344 500	- 13 463 000
6 Finance:Revenue Collection	3 034 900	1 126 400	3 356 300	14 800	35 300		126 600	7 694 300		7 694 300	4 356 000	- 3 338 300
7 Town Clerk's Office	1 642 200	598 200	1 816 200	49 500	39 400	360 600	800 600	5 416 700	1 440 600	3 976 100		- 3 976 100
8 Corporate Services	3 343 600	2 201 900	1 761 900	35 400	106 200	145 200	74 500	7 168 700	3 056 000	4 112 700		- 4 112 700
9 HCD central	1 923 100	410 400	6 033 100	10 000	22 700	74 800	278 000	8 752 100	8 752 100			
10 HCD Public safety	15 350 000	1 142 200	2 153 900	51 500	154 500	100 000	501 000	19 453 100	16 500 000	2 953 100	5 428 000	2 474 900
11 Finance- Cent Department	1 342 100	892 000	10 367 600	76 500	101 500	205 000	3 200 000	16 184 700	3 500 000	12 684 700	84 690 100	72 005 400
12 Supply Chain	599 400	237 000	632 300	34 200	79 800		382 600	1 965 300		1 965 300	25 000	- 1 940 300
13 City Health	22 308 700	1 244 000	8 257 500	86 000	200 700		1 937 600	34 034 500	722 700	33 311 800	4 836 200	- 28 475 600
14 DOW Administration	6 260 000	2 652 700	2 222 500	208 800	464 400	110 000	2 096 000	14 014 400	5 618 400	8 396 000	5 060 300	- 3 335 700
15 City Architect	2 847 700	1 076 800	596 000	20 700	48 400		406 700	4 996 300	597 200	4 399 100	3 593 100	- 806 000
16 Valuations and Estates	605 000	261 600	114 700	1 500	4 500		49 000	1 036 300		1 036 300	91 000	- 945 300
17 Estates			500 000					500 000		500 000	14 703 000	14 203 000
18 Traffic enforcement	2 419 100	90 000	341 600	16 800	50 200		55 300	2 973 000		2 973 000	3 370 000	397 000
19 Housing Head Office	644 600	723 800	363 800	10 600	25 100		158 000	1 931 900	347 800	1 584 100	533 200	- 1 050 900
20 Housing General	2 698 900	473 400	1 524 100	143 500	334 900		1 801 800	6 976 600	765 800	6 210 800	9 233 300	3 022 500
21 Stadia , Halls &swimming pools	1 935 400		1 312 300	34 000	109 700			3 391 400		3 391 400	953 000	- 2 438 400
22 Cre&VCTS	1 578 100	74 000	1 513 200	7 300	16 700		199 500	3 388 800		3 388 800	65 500	- 3 323 300
23 Primary Schls	932 900	38 600	398 000	11 000	32 900			1 413 400		1 413 400	271 700	- 1 141 700
24 Harare water	27 298 100	1 672 000	45 044 450	3 784 000	4 153 000	5 020 000	3 000 000	89 971 550		89 971 550	90 283 000	311 450
Grand Total	116 665 400	17 801 296	99 954 350	15 502 800	14 054 100	14 053 573	27 304 900	305 336 419	43 360 600	261 975 819	262 281 900	306 081
% of Gross Expenditure	38.21	5.83	32.74	5.08	4.60	4.60	9	100.00				

**DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES**

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UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

19 September 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam

**RE: APPLICATION FOR RESEARCH ASSISTANCE: MUNZVANDI ODLENMOUD NYASHA
(R124681Q)**

This letter serves to introduce Ms Odlenmoud Munzvandi a Postgraduate student in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies. She is doing field research in fulfillment of the requirements of a MSc. Public Administration.


The Department kindly requests you to assist the student to the best of your ability. Her research topic is: ***The Implications of Vertically Divided Authority on Service Delivery in Urban Councils. The Case of Harare City Council Road Maintenance.***

May I also assure you in advance that the information gathered during this exercise **will be used for academic purposes only.**

Should you have any queries, please contact the Department.

Yours faithfully

**DR D.P. CHIMANIKIRE
A/CHAIRPERSON**



Appendix G

Odlenmoud nyasha

Appendix H

Ward 31 (Glenview South)

