

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICACY OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT
IN NORTH EASTERN AFRICAN REGION PEACE
INITIATIVES: THE CASE STUDY OF SOUTH SUDAN**

BY

NKOSANA GRADUATE MOYO

(R118248C)

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS OF A MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS**

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

MAY 2016

DEDICATION

To the people of Africa- whose sufferings are currently depicted in the struggles of the people of South Sudan. Like W E B Dubois wrote, I believe these are *The Strivings of the Souls of Black Folk*.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge people who assisted me in my research. In particular, General E.A Rugeje who inspired me to work and to study. I want to also acknowledge South Sudan's Minister of Plenipotentiary, Amot Francis Wol; the Ambassador of South Sudan, His Excellency General Gabriel Gui Kiak M; Mr Mahgaib Fadlalah Abderadi Adam of the Republic of Sudan Embassy Consular; and Lt Col Barnabas Simbarashe Tera, who was once deployed in South Sudan as a Military Observer-for granting me exclusive interviews. The entire staff in the office of the Office of the Inspector General is hereby acknowledged in particular, Captain N.Bakasa and Seargent E. Dika in typing and proof reading. I would also want to thank Sergeant Nomatter Masuku of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Public Relations Department for helping me with the recording of the interviews. There are also other people I want to thank who gave comments and granted me interviews in Zimbabwe and South Africa and who for official, security and personal reasons would rather prefer to remain unnamed. Further recognition goes to my supervisor Mr L Mhandara who bore the brunt of a nagging during our consultations including on weekends. I remain very grateful to my family in particular my wife Nondlela Dlamini and the naughty boys, Alwande and Mzwandile, for their support throughout this academic endeavor. Special mention also goes to my masters class, the "Siginyamatshe Class" of the University of Zimbabwe Masters of Science in International Relations for the shared discussions and debates.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the efficacy of IGAD in East African peace initiatives zooming on the conflict in South Sudan. The research problematized IGAD's long involvement with peace resolution in South Sudan resulting in multiple peace agreements on one hand and a festering endemic conflict on the other hand. To examine the immunity of the conflict in South Sudan to IGAD's efforts, the following objectives guided the research: to trace the origins and evolution of the South Sudan conflict, highlighting underlying causes, issues and key actors involved; to analyze the dynamics that have affected the functioning of IGAD in South Sudan and to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the Compromise Peace Agreement. The methodology used included a literature survey and interviews with officials from South Sudan, and the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. IGAD's effort besides various impediments managed to insure that Sudan and SPLA sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The Somali debacle though not fully solved, the semblance of peace currently obtaining is as a result of efforts by IGAD. In South Sudan, though grudgingly the belligerents have finally signed a peace agreement brokered by IGAD giving birth to the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU). It is however on record that a series of peace initiatives were organized by IGAD member states under the IGAD mandate though weak in resolving the South Sudan conflict. These have served as a stepping stone for the TGoNU. However IGAD, has been plagued by internal and external forces its endeavor to marshal peace in South Sudan and the region at large. These include dictatorial tendencies by the donor countries as well as regional rivalries within IGAD member states. With all these challenges IGAD has stood the test of time and displayed its efficacy scoring success in the advent for peace in South Sudan and the region at large. The conclusions reached by the researcher were that the uniqueness of the regional conflicts in East Africa as exemplified in South Sudan from its genesis in colonialisms carelessness in amalgamating north and south were that there were ethnic wars which tended to defy border demarcations. This is why despite the current settlement that has brought in a Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan there remains a lot of pending political quarrels which threaten the peace. It is recommended that the real gist for conflict transformation by IGAD in South Sudan should embrace five key points: all negotiations must be grounded in realities in a conflict scenario; it is important to have clear processes and rules in a peace process; it is important to root all negotiations with the people in the conflict; there is need to establish substrata of negotiations for less empowered delegates; it is important to maintain unity in the governing authority. Other strategies for conflict transformation that IGAD needs in future include, but are not limited to, truth commissions, reparations, widespread information dissemination and even international tribunals and trials.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
ACRONYMS	vi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background to the Problem	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem	3
1.3 Objectives of the Study	3
1.4 Research Questions	3
1.5 Justification of the Study	4
1.6 Methodology	4
1.6.1 Research Design	4
1.6.2 Sampling Procedure	4
1.6.3 In-depth Interviews	5
1.6.4 Data Analysis	5
1.7 Delimitations	5
1.8 Limitations	5
1.9 Conclusion	6
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	7
2.1 Introduction	7
2.2 Colonial Legacies	7
2.3 Geostrategic Importance of the Region	8
2.3.1 Regional Power Games	9
2.4 Shared Natural Resources	10
2.5 Transformation from IGADD to IGAD	11
2.6 Theoretical Framework	11
2.6.1 Regional Security Complex Theory	11
2.6.2 Geographical Proximity	12
2.6.3 Linked National Securities	12
2.6.4 Interwoven Fabric	12

2.6.5 Four Types of Threats and Interactions	13
2.6.6 Multi-Stakeholder Theory.....	14
2.7 Conclusion.....	15
CHAPTER THREE: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT	16
3.1 Introduction	16
3.2 The History of the South Sudan Conflict	16
3.3 Enter Salva Kiir Mayardiit.....	17
3.4 The Abyei Hitch	17
3.5 Post-Independence Problems.....	18
3.6 Institutional Problems of the SPLA and the Birth of SPLA-IO	19
3.7 The “Mechanical Majority” Accusation	21
3.8 What really was the rift Between Kiir and Machar?	23
3.9 Failure of the SPLM/A-IO to create a National Opposition	23
3.10 Military Dynamics	24
3.11 State Based Assessment	25
3.11.1 Jonglei State.....	25
3.11.2 Unity State	26
3.11.3 Northern Bar el Ghazal.....	27
3.11.4 Warrap	27
3.11.5 Lakes.....	28
3.11.6 Western Bahr el Ghazal	29
3.11.7 Central Equatoria State (CES).....	29
3.11.8 Eastern Equatoria State	30
3.11.9 Western Equatoria State (WES).....	30
3.12 The Evolution of the Conflict to Present	31
3.13 Conclusion.....	31
CHAPTER FOUR: AN IGAD PLUS SOLUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY	33
4.1 Introduction	33
4.2 The Central IGAD Mediation.....	33
4.3 A Complicated IGAD-Plus Effort: The ARCISS	36
4.4 Transitional Government of National Unity	41

4.5 Threats to the Unity Government	46
4.5.1 Two Armies	46
4.5.2 SPLM Advance Actions to Control the Government	48
4.5.3 Outstanding Issues	49
4.5.4 Logistical Hurdles	49
4.5.5 The Vital Role of Two Masculinities	50
4.6 A Critical Reflection of IGAD’s Role	52
4.7 Conclusion	54
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	55
5.1 Introduction	55
5.2 Conclusions	55
5.3 Recommendations	58
5.4 Implications for further Research	61
5.5 Conclusion	61
Bibliography	62
Books	62
Journal Articles, Newspapers, Reports	62
Internet Sources	64
APPENDIX 1	I
The Transitional Government of National Unity Members	I
APPENDIX 2	XIV
List of Governors	XIV
APPENDIX 3	XVI
Interview Guide	XVI
APPENDIX 4	XXI
List of Deputy Ministers	XXI

ACRONYMS

ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPA	Compromise Peace Agreement
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GPA	Global Political Agreement
GRSS	Government of the Republic of South Sudan
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development
MVT	Monitoring and Verification Team
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	United Nations Mission to South Sudan
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Opposition
SPLA-IG	Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Government
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

It was not necessary for South Sudan to be at war with itself. (South Sudan's Ambassador to Zimbabwe, HE General Gabriel Gai Kiak, in interviews with the researcher May 2016)

1.1 Background to the Problem

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) evolved from the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in 1986 with the objective of addressing the environmental degradation of the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea), part of the Nile Valley (Sudan and South Sudan), and part of the Great lakes Region (Kenya and Uganda). IGAD was revitalized in 1996 with a broader mandate of resolving the conflicts in the region, including the Sudanese conflict. Its highest decision making body is the IGAD Heads of State and Government.

Figure 1.1. IGAD Heads of State and Government.



IGAD Heads of State, Source: Radio Tamuz

It is puzzling how a region with such an organization, can have endemic conflict. According to Heally (2009:1) the region faced many conflicts including the Darfur civil war, state fragility in Somalia, North and South Sudan bitter rivalry, Ethiopia and Eritrea's border dispute and ephemeral turbulence in Northern Uganda and the Ogaden Region. Nevertheless, the institutions mandate has grown from environmental concerns, to other issues including security and other economic spheres such as trade, banking and investments. The expansion of the mandate grew exponentially due various events in the horn of Africa chiefly among them was the rise of Islamic fundamentalism

thereby radicalizing the whole region. This saw the emergence of radical terrorist organizations like Al – Shabaab and others who instantly threatened peace and security of the region.

One's inquisitiveness is further aroused when they note that IGAD has been active on the issue of Sudan since the organizations inception in 1986 when South Sudan was still part of Sudan. The Republic of South Sudan is in the midst of a festering endemic conflict, with roots dating back to Sudan's colonial time in 1899 and inherited by the new state in 2011, whose resolution has been the pursuit of many including regional and international organizations. Following the end of Anglo-Egyptian War on 31 December 1955 the first civil war broke out in the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region between 1972 and 1983 instigated by the Anyanya Rebel Army. The second civil war in Southern Sudan Autonomous Region (2005-2011) had the Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M) fighting to secede from Sudan and achieving autonomy on 9 July 2005 and independence on 9 July 2011. War has nevertheless continued amongst South Sudan SPLM factions and also between the splinter groups, government troops and the Sudanese government. In July 2012 South Sudan joined the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

If anything, peace should have been the crowning achievement of anti-colonial struggle restoring dignity to the colonized subaltern. Instead South Sudan and its independence flunked in to the abyss as Fanon (1967:45) had warned in the *Wretched of the Earth* as the "pitfalls of national consciousness." Post-colonial South Sudan conflict shows a confluence of factors including a colonial legacy, regional instability, international intervention, clannism, and the intensification of armed opposition which contributed to the disintegration of Sudan leading to the subsequent creation of South Sudan in 2011 through a referendum (Mulungeta 2009:8). The anarchy, violence, and poverty forced many South Sudanese people to be displaced, become refugees, and thousands lost their lives. Furthermore, South Sudan is bordered by five highly fractitious and conflict ridden neighboring states which are: the Central Africa Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Republic Sudan, Uganda and Kenya. The effects of the general anarchy in South Sudan have not only affected the population of South Sudan, they have also had a spillover effect to the Horn of Africa as a region and the international community. The problem of refugees, the smuggling of small arms and light weapons, the spreading of terrorism, and radicalization are all threats emerging from South Sudan, mainly affecting the IGAD member states (Mulungeta

2009:76). Of late the effort has been to stabilize the infant nation of South Sudan making sure there is law and order and sustainable institutional frameworks. IGAD has, subsequently, thus been engaged with the South Sudan conflict for almost three decades- including that pre-independence era. Given, this background this study analyses IGAD's efficacy in making peace in the midst of war in the North- Eastern African region using the case study of South Sudan by 2016.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The study explains and assesses the efficacy of IGAD, addressing war and violent conflict in South Sudan and the general North-East Africa at a time the rest of Africa is moving towards stability. South Sudan offers a unique incision into the regions viral instability cancer. The study intends to analyse IGAD's interventions in Sudan to understand the problem of multiple agreements without the cessation of hostilities. The continued humanitarian crisis despite diplomatic successes makes it important to re-look at IGAD's work and the apparent failure to foster sustainable peace in South Sudan. People in South Sudan people have suffered from the conflict and so has the countries in the Horn of Africa.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are:

- To trace the origins and evolution of the South Sudan conflict, highlighting underlying causes, issues and key actors involved;
- To analyze the dynamics that has affected the functioning of IGAD in South Sudan;
- To assess the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the compromised peace agreement.

1.4 Research Questions

- What drives the conflict in South Sudan?
- What are the peace initiatives implemented by IGAD in South Sudan?
- How has regional politics affected political settlement in South Sudan?

- How can one explain the different successes and failures between IGAD and other regional organisations such as SADC?

1.5 Justification of the Study

This study contributes to the ongoing discussion on conflict and conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa by analyzing the peace initiatives taken by IGAD in the past two decades. It will also serve as a source of information and catalyst for further studies in understanding the role of regional organizations in the resolution of complex conflict in Africa and beyond.

1.6 Methodology

1.6.1 Research Design

South Sudan has been used as a case study in this research in order to spell out the efficacy of IGAD in the regional peace initiative. The fact that the study seeks to explain complex regional responses to a complex South Sudan conflict and its sort of immunity to regional and international peace efforts implies that the approach to adopt in this study had to be analytical. On the other hand, there was a necessity to consider the numerous peace efforts made by IGAD, the AU, and the UN to resolve the conflict. In this case, negotiations, conferences, and actions of IGAD, the AU, and the UN were briefly studied. Such an approach is basically descriptive. The study therefore used both analytical and descriptive approaches.

1.6.2 Sampling Procedure

The principal sources of data were documents and academic literature. These include books, articles, media publications, and different reports. In order to strengthen aspects of the data provided by these writings, the researcher interviewed five experts two from the Embassy of South Sudan in Zimbabwe and the Consular of the Embassy of Sudan to Zimbabwe, Colonel Tera of the Zimbabwe National Army who served on a peacekeeping mission to South Sudan. The researcher also interviewed four South Sudanese citizens in South Africa. The sample was selected using the non-probability sampling method called purposive or judgmental sampling of experts and citizens on South Sudan, IGAD and regional organizations. This is because the subject is a technical matter and concerns a particular region and experiences such that purposive sampling allows the researcher to select capable respondents.

1.6.3 In-depth Interviews

In-depth interviews were used in the research under the qualitative research paradigm. Hofstee (2006) notes that when conducting in depth interviews, background type of questions are crucial in the process in that they help the respondents to be refreshed on the topic. He further notes that when carefully executed, in depth interviews may produce more than what the researcher negotiated for or expected in the first place. The researcher used his literature to probe responses to avoid misleading results. Probing encouraged respondents to elaborate on these responses.

1.6.4 Data Analysis

Qualitative data from interviews was collected through interview guides, note taking and recording with the consent of the interviewee. Kothari (2004:10) points that in most cases research studies result in large volume of raw data which must be reduced into homogenous groups if meaningful relationships are to be produced. Analysis was done using thematic analysis placing data into categories as case research studies usually produce huge volumes of data. Analysis was done in the context of the reviewed literature. The multi-stakeholder diplomacy framework largely suits this thematic characterization.

1.7 Delimitations

The study was restricted to IGAD and the South Sudan conflict with a particular focus on the processes between 2011 and 2016. In order to understand the evolution of the conflict it was important to trace the conflict to colonial wars in 1899. Inferences and allusions were made to other regional organizations and situations such as IGAD's experience in Somalia; and the role of international actors in IGAD-Plus.

1.8 Limitations

The researcher faced language and cultural barriers in carrying out interviews. This is because mostly Arabic language was used and the people are of an Islamic culture. Nevertheless, the researcher resorted to translators and rechecking of recorded materials alongside English transcripts by another translator. The researcher overcame the cultural limitation by taking time to research and appreciate Islamic culture beforehand. The researchers strategic professional experience in the Zimbabwe National Army however offered sufficient remedial functions in terms

of access to key personnel and experts most of whom are well versed in English, Arabic and Islamic culture such that the interviews proceeded without glitch.

1.9 Conclusion

The chapter covered the back ground to the problem, the statement of the problem, the objectives of the study, the research questions, the justification of the study, the methodology that include the research design, the sampling procedure, in-depth interviews, data analysis, delimitations and limitations.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Fifty Shades of Grey (E. L James)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to illustrate a portrait of what has been said about the propensity for armed conflict in IGAD countries. It identifies a gap in the literature and offers a theoretical explanation for the niche. The Regional Security Complex Theory is advanced for easy comprehension and further elucidation, while the Multi-stakeholder diplomacy Theory is considered as a useful extension of the Regional Security Complex Theory ideally proffering a prognosis.

2.2 Colonial Legacies

From a mere perusal of literature on the Horn of Africa it is evident that the conflicts are multilayered in cause and their nature are such that it eludes one dimensional answers or explanations. It is argued by Ayyob (1995) that some of the causes are pre-colonial, for example resource conflicts especially over the Nile River. But many writers including Farer (1979) seem to confirm that colonialism exacerbated, distorted and even fixed conflict into the very fabric of states in the region. Healy (2006) believes that;

Historical patterns of amity and enmity are deeply etched in the region. Conflicts typically stem from factors indigenous to the region, the most enduring being center-periphery relations in Ethiopia and Sudan. There is also a tradition of outside powers making alignments with states within the regional security complex.

The lumping together of different peoples in the European partition of Africa brought together conflicting parties and triggered vendettas which the colonial master often fanned. Playing one African against the other, for example intentionally educating one tribe and depriving others created animosity among the tribes.

Conflict in the region is not just among states but within states as the South Sudan conflict shows. Disregard for ethnic group boundaries led to demands for autonomy from ethnic groups and territorial claims from newly independent states in the expectation of past redress. At independence this was the question for Sudan in 1956, Kenya 1963, and Djibouti 1977. British and Italian Somalia where joined together in 1960 regardless of their social makeup. This was largely the genesis of interstate and intrastate conflict. In an extreme and eventually bloody situation Ethiopia

and Eritrea where federated in 1952. Internecine fighting continued between the states until Eritrea unilaterally declared independence in 1993.

The resultant conflicts have been a feast for ethnicity studies. Ethno-centrism found its roots in colonial divide and rule, and became a distinct feature of the region. In post-colonial Africa leaders that took over from Europe, finding very weak states, easily militarized these states in the name of security. The nature of state power was a zero sum game of winner takes all and victors and the vanquished. In a way some writers such as Mesfin (2013) have described the resultant governments as “autocracies relying on ethnic loyalties.” The worst part is that these centralized systems became militarized to secure their selves. But what logic kept the militarization bursting forward and removing peace from the agenda.

The regional leaders held substantial powers to declare war. Some extreme critiques such as Mesfin (2013) have stated that,

....given the highly personalized milieu in which politics operates in the Horn of Africa, ‘strong-man benevolent leader[s]’ in the likes of Mengistu Haile Mariam, Jaafar Nimeiri or Siad Barre, who were all deeply insecure behind their ruthlessness and vindictive egomanias, were able to shape the political destiny of a state almost single- handedly and enter into either warm or conflictual relation’s with other states, inducing civilian populations to join in and converting them into military and paramilitary groups

This paints a very gloomy and tragic picture one that resulted in the death of many East Africans, the destruction of homes, towns and lives and the displacement of millions.

2.3 Geostrategic Importance of the Region

While this may appear true *prima facie*, one also has to take note of the environment most of these leaders operated in especially in the context of colonialism and the Cold War. Being some of the first decolonized countries in Africa one notes that colonialism remained very present and thriving through a system of indirect rule in Sudan. The Cold War made the region a primary conflict point for proxy war. This is mainly because of the strategic value of some of the resources including oil and water found in the Horn of Africa. A very important geo-strategic resource is its location. The Horn of Africa’s proximity to the Red Sea gives it access to Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. This means it is easy to launch military attacks into these places. It is also the shortest and therefore economical route for oil from the Persian Gulf. These apparent assets were noticed by

the Soviet Union, China, USA- in fact by all with capacity and they made efforts to strategically secure the territories. The historic fight over the Suez Canal is proverbial typified in the First World War. The Horn of Africa became a scene for which a lot of weapons and troops would move at times without the control of the state. In a way this militarized a whole region.

In fact these assets have become a bigger challenge in the war against terror which has also extended and mutated the conflict into the twenty first century (Sheehan 2005). USA interest in the region resulted in the setting up of the Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa. Mesfin (2013) believes that the war on terror is abhorred by regional leaders because it technologized conflict and brought changes to how the conflict was waged. Increased scrutiny of the conflict in the fear that terrorist networks may set up bases in some of the weak states such as Somalia resulted in the “institutionalized surveillance of entire populations and the blind, wholesale suppression of all political opponents...” (Mesfin 2013) This has been criticized by Healy (2007) noting that:

Outside actors need to respond judiciously to the allegations of terrorism levelled against various parties to conflict in the Horn. The underlying conflicts in the region are older than the contemporary war on terrorism and will probably outlast it. Outsiders need to recognize the tactical value of their support and the interests at stake in representing local adversaries as associates of terrorism. They also need to weigh the possible gains (in terms of international terrorism) from intervention against the risks of greater radicalization, alienation and conflict generation in the region.

An extreme case of this militarization which has again brought international actors into the fray is the problem of the Somali pirates. With the fall of the government of Siad Barre and the dissolving of Somalia into unrecognizable fragments of warlords, the Gulf of Eden was taken over by marauding gangs (United States Institute of Peace 2004). These have continued to pose a danger to governments in the region and increasing the reality of the terrorist threat. Terrorist attacks in Kenya have been directly linked to such tendencies with some of the groups at times publicly claiming responsibility.

2.3.1 Regional Power Games

Mesfin (2013) has also described what he has called “the logic of subversion,” which is basically a situation in which states fund and support rebel movements in other states in the region. For example, Sudan supported Ethiopian rebels and from 1974, Ethiopia supported Sudanese rebels

that have eventually founded South Sudan. The region has similar networks existing between most of these countries such that conflict is intertwined and easily regionalized. Egypt has been and remains opposed to the proposition of the state of South Sudan which is a *fait accompli* with the referendum in 2011. However, Sudan denies allegations that it is supporting rebels in South Sudan. During interviews conducted by the researcher, the Sudanese Consular at the Republic of Sudan Embassy in Harare, Mahgaib Fadlallah Abderadi Adam, denied that Sudan was backing some rebel groups. He said “The problem is now an ethnical problem and not a border problem. Other leaders from Equatoria and Upper Nile support Shilluk leaders. Sudan is not interested in the prolongation of the Sudanese conflict and therefore does not support any of the groups. We want peace. Oil is from Unity State that is Nuer linked to Riek Machar such that fighting there does not benefit us.

In a balance of power like politics, there is also “the logic of alliances,” (Mesfin 2013). This largely results from the high militarization in the region. Militarized states heighten the perception of mutual threat. In a way this results in huge military expenditures for the struggling economies of IGAD (Mengisteab 2011). Furthermore, it promotes allegiances for protection and assistance to ensure state survival which have destabilized regional peace and ensured that conflict spread very fast.

2.4 Shared Natural Resources

Shared resources have been listed as causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa (Markakis 1995). Shared resources include transboundary water resources, forests and pastures. The Darfur is one conflict in which there is the nexus of hydro-political conflict and conflict over pastures. Conflict over the Nile River on the other hand is endemic, as Egypt which is a downstream riparian state played upper-stream states together and is never amused by any upstream developments that may lead to changes downstream. Egypt has therefore supported Sudan as a buffer and ally in guarding the hydro-resource. Closely linked is the fact that the region remains essentially a primary commodity export economy. The Minister of Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of South Sudan, Amot Francis Wol during interviews noted that one of the reasons for the conflict spreading so fast was “the existence of resources. There was a lot of outside influence eyeing the resources.” Effectively, this entails in the context of war- a lack of jobs, poverty and hunger. It triggers refugee movement as people seek survival, fleeing war and lack. This creates a humanitarian crisis which

may as well be the worst in Africa both in terms of poverty and refugees displaced internally and externally.

2.5 Transformation from IGADD to IGAD

The growth of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996 from its narrow initial scope as an environmental concern the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in 1986 showed that it provided a meeting place that brought states in the same region of North- Eastern Africa together and could be leveraged for discussing other pertinent common regional issues. Mulungeta (2009: 22) notes that the need for engaging IGAD in the Somali and Sudanese peace processes was one of the major reasons that brought about the transformation of IGADD. IGAD (2001:42) placed great emphasis on the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts as a means for achieving sustainable development. IGAD member states agreed: to take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace, and stability; to establish effective mechanisms of consultation and cooperation for the peaceful settlement of differences and disputes; and to agree to deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organizations (IGAD 2001:41). It was therefore a three pronged approach including: conflict prevention, management and humanitarian affairs; infrastructure development and food security; and the environment.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

2.6.1 Regional Security Complex Theory

It has been said that the security complex theory fits the Horn of Africa like a glove (Mesfin 2013). Buzan (1988), and Buzan and Waever (2003) were the first to advance the ideas guiding the concept of regional security. It enables one to “talk about regional security in terms of the pattern of relations among members of the security complex” (Ayoob, 1995:58). The Minister of Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of South Sudan, Amot Francis Wol during interviews in interviews with the researcher observes that regional powers have interests in South Sudan and South Sudan has direct access to United States dollars from its oil sells. Factions are friends with regional powers and this creates confusion in the settlement. The big border, not demarcated in some places

with Khartoum people still fight and at times they close our refineries. Abyei is still under Khartoum. This following sub sections analyses some of the tenets of this theory.

2.6.2 Geographical Proximity

A region was defined by Buzan (1988) as “a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other. This best explains for example the role of Uganda, Yemen, Uganda, Yemen, Libya and Egypt which are not states in the Horn of Africa but who find due to proximity linked by several geopolitical factors extremely concerned in the processes of the Horn of Africa. Libya for example is linked to supporting some rebel groups in Sudan.

2.6.3 Linked National Securities

Security complex is a phrase used “to designate the group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 1991:188). It appears that historically the political fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of neighboring states. Indeed, no individual state in the Horn of Africa has been insulated from the other states’ problems, irrespective of their distance from the other states’ problems, irrespective of their distance and comparative strengths and weaknesses. In addition military and political threats are more significant, potentially imminent and strongly felt when states are at close range

2.6.4 Interwoven Fabric

Security is understood as interwoven fabric of military, political, economic, societal and environmental factors. All these states share social and cultural values emanating from a centuries-old tradition of interrelationships, common religious practices and economic linkages. The conflicts are variably over borders, identity politics, ethnicity, religion and resources. The region is made up of Muslims, Christians and Animist cultures. In Kenya for example there is fear that the 10% Muslim community there has been infiltrated by terrorist networks (Moller 2006). Poverty is also a characteristic feature of the region as it is probably the world’s poorest region. This has also been due to debilitating droughts which have compounded to create a huge humanitarian crisis necessitating relief aid. Some of the longest running intrastate conflicts in Africa have been in Eritrea and South Sudan being responsible for about two million deaths. In 2003 there were 700

000 refugees, the size of Djibouti. Subsequently, the region has weak social and poverty indicators, for example it has low per capita income, and the highest mortality rates (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2008). Apart from being a present menace, all these ingredients may contribute to future cycles of conflict. The interwoven nature of the region explains why conflict moves very fast and becomes embedded in the region.

2.6.5 Four Types of Threats and Interactions

Firstly, Buzan and Waever (2003) identified balance of power contests among great powers. These are the ones international actors and local or regional powers engage in. Secondly, the presence of history through lingering conflicts that emerge between neighboring states. Ethiopia and Eritrea or South Sudan and Egypt are good examples. Thirdly, interstate conflicts, which are usually spillovers of internal politics. The conflict over Somalia like most conflicts in the region emanates from the logic of subversion and the logic of alliances. Fourth, and not least conflicts that arise from transnational threats caused, for instance, by the rise of radical Islam and informal networks, state fragility, demographic explosion, environmental degradation and resource scarcity.

Since decolonization it seems regional security arrangements have really been an increasing part of international relations. Buzan and Waever (2003) mainly focus on the post-Cold War period. Through an assessment of various regional security complexes they seem to believe that one has to trace the history of each security complex to its genesis. This way regional security factors may be linked to the bigger discussion about the configuration of international power. This way according to Buzan and Waever were able to offer a distinctive interpretation of post-Cold war international security, avoiding both the extreme oversimplifications of the unipolar view, and the extreme de-territorializations of globalist visions of world disorder. No individual state in the Horn of Africa has been insulate from the other state's problems, irrespective of their distance and comparative strengths and weaknesses. The theory enables one to go beyond a monolithic understanding of conflict, in time and space, across different regions of the world. The anatomy of a regional conflict is a necessity to understand beyond the stereotype and uniformity that can easily result from scholars and practitioners of regional conflict. In other words it caters for diverse types of regional conflicts rendering it amenable to the understanding of South Sudan and IGAD.

2.6.6 Multi-Stakeholder Theory

The study uses the theory of multi-stakeholder diplomacy to understand how IGAD has tried to use the involvement of several states, the African Union, the United Nations and other international organizations to solve inter-ethnic conflict and international conflict. Multi-stakeholder diplomacy occurs in a setup of a multiplicity of actors and levels of analysis (Katrandjiev 2006:13). The South Sudan conflict has the marks of symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare. The Abyei mountains dispute is one symmetrical conflict that cannot be resolved by Sudan and South Sudan agreeing, as the agreement will also need to be agreed to by rebel groups. It would mean that various tracks of diplomacy would need to be followed- track 1 diplomacy as in the traditional state meetings, for example the IGAD Heads of State meeting on South Sudan (Fisher 2005:161). Track 2 ½ diplomacy involving both states and non-state actors leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 (Fisher 2005:160) for example the Sudanese Consular at the Republic of Sudan Embassy in Harare, Mahgaib Fadlallah Abderadi Adam, during interviews with the researcher congratulated IGAD for the 2005 CPA as a milestone never to be downplayed.

In a situation where the peace process has been marred by many accusations of impartiality, impunity, errors and tragedy a successful conflict resolution may in this case benefit from the legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness that is fostered by multi-stakeholder diplomacy (Backstrand 2006:6). The SPLA/M war with Sudan largely deescalated following the involvement of all parties at arriving towards some modicum of peace. It is that same method that ought to be applied to the ten plus rebel movements, splinter groups of SPLM now fighting each other in internecine South Sudan civil war. A key line in multi-stakeholder diplomacy is therefore representativeness. It can be used to assess the representativeness of stakeholder participation in regional multi-sectoral networks.

It has also the advantage of roping in diametrically opposed international voices. The troika of the USA, the UK and Norway may then meet its major antagonists in the form of South Africa and Tanzania who strongly believe that the only recourse in the conflict is the adoption of “African solutions to African problems,” (Sudan Tribune March 11 2015). Actually, IGAD has announced that in its new peace process these countries are supposed to be part of the peace talks and this has been labeled an IGAD ‘plus’ formula of multi-stakeholders mediation mechanism (Ateny Wek

Ateny, Sudan Tribune 19 January 2015). For one to understand the use of the regional security complex theory and the multi-stakeholder theory in South Sudan it is necessary to analyze the origin and evolution of this conflict. This is principally because there it involves multiple actors and levels of analysis.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter covered in detail the effect of the colonial legacy in Sudan, the geostrategic importance of the Region, the regional power dynamics of the region, the effect of the natural resources to the escalation of conflict especially oil, how IGADD transformed to IGAD and why. Under the theoretical framework, the Regional Security complex Theory was discussed including the geographical proximity of this region to Europe and the Middle East especially. Also covered is the linked National; Security, the four types of threats and interception, that is the balance of power contest, lingering historical conflicts, interstate conflict, the rise transformational threats led by the Islamic fundamentalism, environmental degradation, scarcity of resources etc. also covered is the Multi-Stake Holder Theory.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT

3.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to characterize the nature of the South Sudan conflict. It brings out the actors and issues at stake. The key to understanding the conflict, particularly its escalation of spreading from 2013 may be the establishment of a historical continuum and linkages of events, actors and locations. The major actors in the analysis are the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), and the Sudan People's Liberation Army –In Opposition (SPLA-IO). A relatively much more nuanced level of analysis of state assessments follows to underline the nature of the conflict.

3.2 The History of the South Sudan Conflict

Just as James Joyce decries “history is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake from,” it may indeed be impossible to grasp the nature of the South Sudanese conflict without contextualizing it in time and space. The researcher has put together a timeline as Appendix 5 that helps understand the conflict. Interviewing the Sudanese Consular to Zimbabwe at the Republic of Sudan Embassy in Harare, Mahgaib Fadlallah Abderadi Adam, he was of the view that “the problem of South Sudan is the problem of Sudan itself. It has many backgrounds, the British created this problem, not only for Sudan but all over Africa in which IGAD is located.” The colonial problematic of a revolting mass, bandied together by a reckless colonizer not taking care to ethnic differences but rejoicing in divide and rule tactics established itself between 1899 and 1955 as Sudan jointly ruled by Britain and Egypt. In 1956, Sudan acquired its independence. The separatist Anya Nya movement began in the north with the aim to secede from Sudan thereby beginning the First Civil War of 1962. In 1969 Col Jaafar Muhammad Numeiri led a grouping of socialist and communist military officers who announced a program for an autonomous south. In 1972 in a peace pact in 1972 this is given to some measure.

However, as fate or fortune had it, oil was discovered in Unity State to the south of Sudan in 1978. In 1983, the South and North resumed their fighting in a Second Civil War with Dr. John Garang de Mabior forming the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/SPLA) when Sudanese President Numeiri rescinds the agreement in Addis. Actually, according to Greenfield (1999) Kerubino Kuanyin fired the first shot of that civil war resisting the imposition of Sharia law in the south of Sudan. After five years of fighting in 1988 one of Sudan's governing coalition

parties the Democratic Unionist Party proposed a ceasefire agreement that was never implemented. In 1989, the Sudanese military seized power from civilian rule. The next time a hand of peace was to try was in 2001 when Hassan Al-Turabi of the Popular National Congress had a memorandum of understanding with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). He was a Sudanese Islamist leader and was arrested the next day. Hope flickered again with the signing of a six-month renewable deal in the Nuba Mountains between Sudan and the SPLA. Eventually, negotiations in Kenya between Sudan's government and rebels led to the Machakos Protocol allowing for the South's right to self-determination in six years' time.

In January 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. Its major provisions were for permanent ceasefire; an autonomous South; a government of national unity in Sudan involving rebels from the South; and a referendum in the South in 6 years. In July 2005, John Garang one of the rebel leaders from the south became vice-president of Sudan, as a new constitution increasing South Sudan's autonomy became law.

3.3 Enter Salva Kiir Mayardiit

In an unforeseeable twist of fate, John Garang died in a plane crash in August 2005 and was replaced by Salva Kiir Mayardiit. Intense fighting between the north and south erupted triggered by the death of Garang. In September 2005, another power sharing government was formed in Sudan. In line with the CPA, an autonomous South Sudanese government came into being and former rebels led it. In November 2006, hundreds of people died in Malakal in ethnic clashes and this region experienced one of the heaviest massacres since the CPA in January 2005. As hostilities continued the SPLM temporarily pulled out of the national unity government and returned in December. The Sudanese government was accused of not meeting its obligations under the 2005 peace deal.

3.4 The Abyei Hitch

Despite the modicum of progress under the CPA, in March 2008 clashes between the SPLM and Arab militias in the north-south divide raised tension over an issue that the CPA had not resolved: the oil rich Abyei. By May 2008, open intense fighting broke out between the north and the south. Sudan's President Omar Bashir later agreed with SPLM leader Salva Kiir for international arbitration in the matter- tacitly confirming the split between the north and the south. However, as

the matter awaited the International Court of Justice due processes in October 2008 panics over alleged Ukrainian tanks pirated in the Gulf of Eden for South Sudan triggered fears of an arms race between the north and south. Khartoum was accused of arming some ethnic groups and fanning ethnic divisions to destabilize the south. In June 2009 the Sudanese government denied this. In July 2009 the decision of the international arbitration to place the foremost Heglig oil field with the north was accepted by both Kiir and Bashir.

By December 2009 an agreement had been reached on the referendum scheduled in 2011 according to the CPA. In an act of good faith, in January 2010 President Omar Bashir confirmed his support of the referendum process. In January 2011, a referendum brought full independence to South Sudan. In February, 2011, security forces clashed with rebels in Jonglei State with over one hundred fatalities. Close to Abyei fighting also broke out. In March 2011 talks with Sudan were suspended as it was accused of plotting a coup. The border region of Abyei was subsequently occupied by Sudan in May 2011. In June 2011 an agreement for demilitarizing Abyei was reached on the basis of Ethiopian peacekeepers stepping in. On 9 July 2011, a new state, the Republic of South Sudan, was born and added to the international community and the day became South Sudan's Independence Day.

3.5 Post-Independence Problems

The Minister of Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of South Sudan, Amot Francis Wol during interviews opined that “there was need for reconciliation to address grievances during the struggle, but that was not done” such that people continued to point fingers at each other. She said:

People had those problems inside. And there were so many people with guns from the struggle and when combined to the tinder of feeling marginalized, the fire easily broke out, spread and keeps the conflict going.

In August 2011, 600 people were killed in Jonglei State in fighting. In a sign of improved bilateral relations, in 2011 President Salva Kiir made a maiden visit to Khartoum as President of the South and the two leaders of the north and south set up committees for outstanding issues. That same October rebels of the SPLM attacked a town in Mayom, in Unity State killing 75 people. There was an air raid of Yida refugee which was blamed on Sudan, although Sudan denies it. In January 2012 a disaster was declared when approximately 100,000 people fled ethnic clashes. A non-aggression pact between the two nations results in Sudan closing the South's oil export pipelines

over outstanding fees. In South Sudan austerity measures were put in place. Fighting erupted between the two governments and South Sudan's attempted to occupy Heglig oil fields but was repulsed and Sudan air force bombarded Bentiu in South Sudan. In May 2012, Sudan put in place plans to pull out of Abyei to allow for talks. In August 2012 over 20000 fled rebels and Sudanese military fighting in the border states of the south. Independence, for South Sudan had only meant more fighting, economic crisis, and tension with Sudan. After several days of negotiations in Ethiopia, in September 2012 the two countries agreed on trade, oil and security but failed to resolve the Abyei issue. In March 2013, another agreement resulted in the reuse of the export pipelines and the retreating of troops from the borders to create a demilitarized zone. The importance of this overall picture is that it captures the complexity in time of the South Sudan conflict both as an inter-state conflict and an intra-state conflict. However, it does little to inform us of the much more nuanced normative issues in the conflict which is what this chapter begins to do going forward.

3.6 Institutional Problems of the SPLA and the Birth of SPLA-IO

The SPLA was formed in 1986 and had a rigid chain of command. It was led by a grouping of five commanders known as the Politico Military High Command. As an irregular army it was not easy to meet although its ranks continued to swell. The five were the Chairman and Commander-in Chief, Dr. John Garang; Deputy Chairman and Deputy Commander-in Chief, Kerubino Kuankyin; Chief of General Staff of the SPLM, William Nyuon; Deputy Chief of Staff, Salva Kiir; and an appointed alternate Member of the Politico-Military High Command, Nyachigag Nyachiluk. In the 1990's, the military leadership became to be known as the Provisional Executive Committee emphasizing the preponderance of the military over the civilian functions of the SPLM. According to Ajak in Weber et al (2014) "early on, particularly towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, there was a lot of discussion among the leadership of the SPLA about moves towards implementing a consensus decision-making policy within the senior leadership."

It seems the irregularity of the SPLA is a real cause for concern. In interviews with the the Sudanese Consular at the Republic of Sudan Embassy in Harare, Mahgaib Fadlallah Abderadi Adam, he pointed out that the

SPLA is not really an organized army. It is composed of militia's, even now it is composed of tribes. They must work hard to turn this army from a militia into a national army. When they fought Sudan every youth used to fight so when they got their independence in 2001 this culture continued. This is the reason there are so many groups fighting in South Sudan.

At some point juniors tried to wrestle power from the superiors. The genesis of the conflict was when Kerubino, the Deputy Chairman conceived to overthrow the Chairman John Garang as he thought he could negotiate a better deal with Sudan- in-fact the SPLA accused Sudan of planning this problem (Human Rights Watch 1999). The plan was foiled and Kerubino arrested before the plan was executed. As a direct consequence, the Chief of General Staff William Nyuon was promoted to Deputy Chairman and Deputy Commander-in Chief. However, the biggest blow to the unity of the SPLA could have been the 1991 defection led by Dr.Riek Machar and Lam Akol who were influential leaders in the SPLA. In 1992, the recently promoted Nyuon also left the SPLA and Salva Kiir was promoted to Nyuon's position.

The dissonance was to manifest in questions of how to govern liberated areas which necessitated an expansion of institutions. The SPLA and SPLM were separated in the 1994 Convention of the SPLA/M, at least on paper. This was also because there was also the need to plan and set up the civilian government of South Sudan. Nevertheless, time lines were missed and the organization progressed as SPLA (military wing) and SPLM (political wing) abbreviated as SPLA/M to show the difficulty of distinguishing until the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Garang came to trust the young politicians who were educated resulting in the old guard feeling threatened. According to Weber (2014) Kiir felt marginalized by Garang in the SPLA/M. In an interview in Pietermaritzburg in South Africa with a South Sudanese citizen he pointed out that rumors in 2004 for Kiir's replacement nearly brought the CPA negotiations to a premature halt and encouraged a section of young officers to be rivals of Kiir.

Ajak (2014) contends that the guerrilla movement was to transform into three entities: the political party, government and the military, with the SPLM transitioning into a political party mandated with "implementing the country's vision of democracy and secularism in a united South Sudan." South Sudan's Minister of Plenipotentiary in the Embassy Amot Francis Wol during interviews confirmed that it was perceived to be the most important. The government would run the autonomous region and the third, the guerrilla military SPLA was to be transformed into a professional conventional army.

However, the plan did not materialize because of unforeseen political developments. First, the replacement of Garang with Kiir is important since Kiir had gathered around him separatists

skeptical of this latest vision for South Sudan (Ajak 2014). There was therefore little energy and effort towards transforming SPLM such that all focus and jostling for positions was towards the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and the SPLA. The independence and recognition of South Sudan would only happen with the constitution of a government according to international law and the SPLA would guarantee its establishment in a highly conflictual region.

Problems of transition also did happen with the SPLA and the government. The “Young Turks” that Garang had employed in the civil service of the liberated areas nicknamed the “Garang boys” began a feud with Kiir. The civil administration was not transforming into the core of the government but a base for waging this internal strife and supporting the movement. Malpractices were reported such as nepotism, corruption, failure of service delivery, and governance control deficiencies in its territories. In July 2013, Kiir dismissed his entire cabinet for corruption.

The same power struggles were reflected in the transformation of the SPLA. Garang had retired many senior officers such that Oyai Ajak was left as the only most senior commander, the Chief of Staff. Latent power struggles ensued until Ajak and three other officers were arrested for planning a coup. Despite the promulgation of the Juba Declaration of 8 January 2006 for the integration of the SPLA and South Sudan Defence Forces problems of “integration and the reintegration of militias” subsist. The effect is that it has given latitude to military strongmen and warlords.

3.7 The “Mechanical Majority” Accusation

Ajak (2014) believes that the failure of these transformations, divisive ambitions, and popular discontent led to an introspection which threw the nation into the 2013 war as the centre failed to hold. This was made more acute with the Presidents acting within the SPLM’s political bureau which was a party decision making body and ideally not supposed to interfere with the government. But in this case the SPLM was the government and distress within the party would easily translate into national problems. The situation became precarious when the President lost control of the political bureau. Kiir went on to ignore the political bureau basing on what has been called by Ajak (2014) as his mechanical majority which is a phrase referring to Kiir’s majority in the virtual one party state. Kiir used this leverage to pass the SPLM constitution effectively giving him space to dishonor the gentleman’s agreement with Riek Machar that he would be his running mate. Some

SPLM members protested against this as intimidation and entrenching leadership. On 6 December 2013, a press conference by some SPLM senior members became one of the internal voices to boldly dissent. In a confrontational approach, the President passed a constitution controversial for three aspects:

How the voting was to be done (a show of hands, which the president favoured, or a secret ballot, which the others favoured); whether the senior leadership of the political bureau would be elected or appointed (the president preferred appointment); and whether the deputies and the secretary-general would be appointed or elected (with Kiir again preferring appointment) (Ajak 2014:4)

Ajak (2014) notes that the Presidents use of the mechanical majority resulted in some SPLM members walking out of the meeting and later violence began in Juba and as the state was not yet that strong everything degenerated into an ethnic line- an easy mobilization tool. This was reiterated by the Minister of Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of South Sudan, Amot Francis Wol in interviews with the researcher that the “conflict spread so fast due to the lack of experience” to deal with insurgency in the newly independent state.

The “Former Detainees” or Group of 10 (G10) which is a moniker for five senior SPLM party officials arrested for a coup plot and whose trial began at the onset of violence in December 2013. They have since been acquitted and were in exile,, mostly in Kenya. As the next chapter will show, IGAD invited this group to the negotiating table. The SPLM/A-IO leadership comprises of: Chairperson and Commander in Chief of the SPLM/A- IO Dr. Riek Machar Teny (former South Sudan Vice President); former Deputy Chairperson and Deputy Commander in Chief of the SPLM/A-IO, Alfred Lado Gore (former Minister of Environment); SPLM/A-10 lead IGAD negotiator Taban Deng Gai (former Unity State Governor); Foreign Secretary Dhiu Mathok, from Northern Bar el Ghazal, a Dinka and intellectual; Ezekial Lol (former Ambassador of South Sudan Ambassador to the USA); Peter Adwok (an eminent intellectual and former Minister); Angelina Teny, the wife of Dr. Riek Machar; and Hussein Mar (former Deputy Governor of Jonglei State). The splinter group, SPLM/A-IO is sustained by the support of old senior SPLM leaders who emanate mostly from South Sudan’s pan-Nuer community although in 2014 and 2015 there were about defections from junior ranked Dinka and Shilluk figures.

3.8 What really was the rift Between Kiir and Machar?

It is argued by Dockins (2014) that the disagreement between President Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar dates back “before the creation of the nation in 2011,” suggesting that one has to go back five years before 2011. Madut (2014) points out that Machar had ambitions of ruling South Sudan as well and even undermined the president by not implementing agreed positions. However, he also points out that it was not only Machar who disagreed with President Kiir but other party members he dismissed in July 2013, as "President Kiir had been accused extensively by a number of people that he fired back in July, including the former vice president, that he had been heavy-handed and undemocratic and developing dictatorial tendencies." Despite having fought on the same side in SPLA, Machar formed a splinter Nuer ethnic group that is alleged to have massacred people in Bor, a Dinka town. Kumar (2014) argues that this is the genesis of the rift such that, "President Kiir has been drawing on those memories and referencing them, even in his public statements....So, we know that that is something that is certainly salient on his mind as well as the minds of many other South Sudanese." According to Dockins (2014) Machar is on record apologizing for his role in the massacre. Kumar (2014) further notes that originally Machar had been introduced as vice president to bring in his substantial constituency and power in the Nuer community for a much more coherent state. The attempt at unity failed then in 2015 and is being tried again in 2016. This whole scenario confirms the assertions of the Republic of Sudan's Consular to Zimbabwe that:

The main cause of the problem of Africa is an ethnic problem. Since the separation in 2011 the problem between Riek Machar from Nuer and Salva Kiir from Dinka. There are many tribes in Sudan. Three main tribes: Dinka biggest, followed by Nuer and then Shilluk.

He believes that this is confirmed by the fact that in December 2013 it was not only the armed groups fighting but also civilian populations.

3.9 Failure of the SPLM/A-IO to create a National Opposition

It is also clear that SPLM/A in Opposition also failed to create a truly national opposition or destabilizing force as it remained largely a Nuer ethnic organization. Its strategy of using political and military defectors failed in the Equatoria states. Inasmuch as the opposition's vision is popular in some instances, for example its advocacy for a federalist government, it has been faced by some political limitations in South Sudan which were confirmed by the Minister of Plenipotentiary. Most

of the SPLM/A-IO leadership is from Equatoria states but are not in control of the 10 constituencies or militia. New defections have not been of much traction to events in Equatoria states.

Also, the fact that some of the SPLA-IO was never part of the SPLM political party leads to lack of enthusiasm and skepticism about an organization which is at the core of the SPLM/A-IO identity. The mistrust between the SPLA-IO and SPLM/A emanated from failed past peace processes and a general feeling of neglect. There has therefore not been consensus as to how to approach the GRSS. A militarized youth demands the resignation of the President for the Nuer killings, while the senior members perceive this as unrealistic. This creates tension, although Dr. Riek Machar remains in charge. The management of these contradictory forces will have a bearing on the future path of the conflict and peace overtures. This may eventually affect the enforcement of agreements by the negotiating parties if the parties to the negotiations are not united. That is, the ability to have an organizations members follow the decisions of their leadership at the negotiating table. This it appears, as discussed in Chapter 4, has been the major challenge facing Dr. Riek Machar.

3.10 Military Dynamics

The breakdown in the peace process in March 2015 escalated the conflict. The GRSS/SPLA had campaigns towards the end of 2015 particularly in Unity State targeting civilians at times. The strategy was towards a military annihilation of the SPLM pushing the insurgency to the border of South Sudan and Ethiopia. The SPLA-IO also had complaints over military strategy, logistics and weapons supply. GRSS/SPLA seemed better until the May 2015 defection of the strong Shilluk leader, Johnson Olony, and his militia. Significant military reinforcement by the GRSS/SPLA starting in 2013 had seen the Shiluki increasingly being in charge of the Upper Nile capital and was used to attack Palaich. Palaich is the remaining oil rich area in the Upper Nile. Malakal was soon taken. Olony did not join Dr. Riek Machar, his forces known as the Agwelek Forces have remained a separate entities, although they have, at times, coordinated with the SPLA-IO. This makes the Upper Nile Military strength formidable and endangering the Paloich oil fields. The strategic importance of this region to the GRSS/SPLA makes the stakes in the conflict very high.

According to the South Sudan Humanitarian Project (2015) this shows the weakness in the “recently integrated militias (e.g., Olony’s forces) and the link between the formal

political/military conflict and local dynamics, ambitions and grievances.” It is linked to the historical hostilities of Olony’s Shilluk ethnic group in Fashoda County and the Dinka Padang in Akoka County despite their alliance with the GRSS. One of Olony’s key henchmen is suspected to have been killed during this fighting. It was from this fighting that Olony defected from the GRSS/SPLA. This brought to the fore an ethno-political cleavage to a region of usual stability. This could be easily reenacted in other counties in South Sudan especially exploiting inter-ethnic faulty lines and Community Defense Forces (CDF) or community protection militias. The major antagonists invariably use the CDF with cataclysmic effects. In the Bul-Nuer Community, armed youths, were mobilized by the GRSS/SPLA for use in the region against SPLA-IO sections. It points to the hazards of having armed militia actors roving within a country, more so acting in the name of ethnic grievances. Any peace process may need to address the looming spectra of inter-communal conflict.

3.11 State Based Assessment

3.11.1 Jonglei State

This state is mainly populated by the Dinka, Nuer, Murle and numerous smaller ethnic communities. It has been the scene of much fighting especially in the beginning stages of the on-going conflict. Former Minister of Defense, John Kong Nyuon a Nuer is the GRSS Governor of Jonglei state. Through an edict, SPLM/A-10 has defined Jonglei state in British colonial boundaries of Bor, Pibor, Akobo and Fangak. Bor town had the misfortune of being swapped between enemies at one time being under the GRSS/SPLA with Ugandan backing and the budding SPLA-IO under the military command of Peter Gadet, driving thousands of internally displaced peoples over the Nile into Minkaman in Lake States. Uror, Nyirol and Akobo which are Nuer areas support SPLM/A-10. It was the base of Dr. Riek Machar and he mobilized them himself. These three counties bring with them the White Army of Nuer youth. The GRSS/SPLA has failed to overrun these SPLA-IO areas. The wife of Dr. John Garang, a South Sudan icon, Rebecca Garang supported SPLM/A such that in Dinka counties like Twic and Duk facilitating support on Jonglei state’s capital, Bor.

Following a May 2014 peace deal between the GRSS and Murle movement led by David Yau Yau (the SSDA/ Cobra Faction) an antecedent conflict was resolved and made Pibor a vantage military

site. Ideally, the GRSS/SPLA potentially has access to the thousands of soldiers bordering SPLM/A-10. In reality the Cobra Faction has avoided being drawn into the current conflict. This has had the effect of the escalation of threats to other oil facilities in South Sudan. As a result, it has been argued that the GRSS/SPLA has taken a strategic decision to let be SPLM/A-10 strongholds in Jonglei. However, Fangak and Pigi counties to the north west of Jonglei has been sucked into the vortex of the conflict. The contest for Dolieb Hills 20 miles from Malakal Town and with the strategic advantage of being higher ground has been a scene for vicious fighting between the forces thereby displacing thousands from Malakal and Upper Nile State.

The Upper Nile State (UNS) is an oil state with a cosmopolitan ethnicity including Dinka, Mabanese, Nuer, and Shilluk. It has been a fierce battle ground in the civil war. Its Governor Simon Kun has been opposed for the decision to shift the state capital to Renk town from Malakal. The importance of this town is that it is the transport hub between Sudan and South Sudan holding a pipeline and an agricultural area. It has been described as one of the “main theatre[s] of the current war.” UNS has been partitioned by SPLM/A-10 in pursuit of its new South Sudan federalist vision. In the ensuing fracas Malakal has paid a heavy price of destruction of property and nature, child soldier recruitment and serious carnages. There are above 30,000 people at the UNMISS PoC site in Malakal and yet ethnic divisions and the violent politics continue to render the region a hot spot.

The south and eastern UNS hosts the SPLM/A-10 headquarters in Pagak, Nuer homelands including Nasir Town used by Riek Machar as a rear base in the 1990’s rebellion. Nasir Town is a garrison for the GRSS/SPLA although still controlled by SPLM/A-10. UNS has weak borders and this is used to train soldiers in Sudan. Maban County of the Mabanese has about 1300000 refugees from Blue Nile State in Sudan. It is caught in the civil wars of South Sudan and Sudan. Community Defence Forces militias affiliated to the GRSS/SPLA and the SPLA-IO have arisen.

3.11.2 Unity State

Unity State also has oil. Fighting has however damaged the Heiglig oil fields such that its capacity has been severely circumscribed. It is home to the Dinka and Nuer and has fighting between SPLA and SPLA-IO. JEM and foreign militaries have a central role in the conflict. The Bul Nuer are allied with the SPLA and in the past were allied to the SSLA now integrated with SPLA. The Bul Nuer have been accused of civilian atrocities. The capital of Unity State was been temporarily

moved from Bentiu to Mayom and has been returned confirming increased security levels with dominance of the SPLA. Despite the presence of SPLA-IO the RRA structures were in disarray. Panakuach was captured in a pattern repeated in Koch and Leer. It has been alleged that scorched earth policy is being employed against civilian populations as was the case in 2014.

3.11.3 Northern Bar el Ghazal

The Northern Bar el Ghazal (NBEG) is an exceptional case without interethnic conflict but has intra-ethnic conflict. It is 90% Dinka (Malual) and is riled by an inter-county conflict. Current SPLA Chief of Staff Paul Malong, who is its former Governor. Contrary to the SPLM constitution he has kept his military position and is also SPLM party NBEG state Chairman, this is despite now residing in Juba. His successor as Governor Kuel Aguer challenged Malong by attempts at state tax reform and party reform allegedly with the tacit approval of President Kiir. Malong's patronage fought back and Aguer was impeached and removed from power by the President. A Malong loyalist, former deputy governor Salva Chol Ayot` replaced him.

Another challenge to Malong came from a long standing rival General Dau Aturjong, SPLA-IO Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of SPLA-IO in NBEG. He was defeated in 2010 elections amidst protest of rigging and has struggled to man a strong opposition. It is perceived as a militia more concerned with this rivalry than the greater SPLM/A-10 vision. This force gained from the failure to pay soldiers by the GRSS/SPLA resulting in defections to the SPLM/A-10. Deadly fighting followed for example the massacre of SPLM/A-10 soldiers who were training.

The SPLA-IO led by Aturjong capitalized on the 2015 drought thereby reenergizing fighting in the NBEG. The GRSS/SPLA responded by cutting lines of supply thereby reducing this menace. The reported alliance with the Sudan Armed Forces for the SPLA-IO proxy fight with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) which is an armed Sudanese opposition based in NBEG and supported by the GRSS/SPLA. Another drought and economic misfortunes may lead to a deterioration of the situation in an area Malong will not be sidelined.

3.11.4 Warrap

This a dominantly Dinka area headed by the only South Sudan female Governor Nyandeng Malek Deliech. She has become increasingly unpopular as indicated by about one third of the state's

parliament voting against extending her term by three years. She has also been challenged by the newly formed People's Liberation Party (PLP) led by Peter Mayen Majongdit. It may be welcome as a democratic development moving away from the SPLM/A soliloquy but it has been noted by the South Sudan Humanitarian Project (2016) that it also indicates "tensions between the Dinka sub-clans of the Kuac Ayok and other groups." When Majongdit was arrested the Kuac Ayok protested. Some influential politicians like Bona Bhang Dhol complain at the inclusion of the G-10 in government structures as they call them traitors.

It is important here to mention the Jieng Council of Elders uniting the Dinka group of influential elders and politicians that has significant power on the President and affirms ethnical influence in the South Sudan conflict. A key member is the former Chief Justice from Warrap the Presidents home area. This a group that has to be accommodated in the President's decision making and in an interview with a South Sudanese citizen in Pietermaritzburg he pointed out an increase of government appointees from Warrap over other regions such as Equatoria and Nuer. Infact former Kenyan President, Daniel Arap Moi has met the Jieng Council of Elders to persuade them to a common national vision and peace drive.

3.11.5 Lakes

This is another Dinka ethnically dominated area except Wulu County that has a majority of Bongo and Jur-Bel. The sections and clans of the Dinka have spurred differences resulting in inter-clan violence in 2014 and 2015 which "has spiraled out of control into revenge style (tit for tat) killings; deliberate attacks against women and children (including widespread rape)..., and the destruction and looting of critical community livelihoods assets a means to exact maximum damage on rival communities," (South Sudan Humanitarian Project 2016). The assassination of Chief Apareer Chut relative to the Governor rekindled civilian attacks as the Gony and Thiyic clans incite "sexual violence and attacks on women and children." The cocktail of citizens, the SPLM, and the Governor Matur Chol Dhoul resulted in Chiefs being arrested, a highly mobilized youth violently repressed, and community reprisals. Violence has mainly taken place in the counties of Cueibet, Rumbek North, Rumbek Centre, Rumbek East and Yirol West. Rumbek the capital of Lakes has witnessed a lot of violence. Over 11 sub-clan conflicts exist in five of the eight Lakes counties leaving hundreds of fatalities with the South Sudan Humanitarian Project (2016) estimating that more people were "killed per month than in the conflict-affected states in early 2015."

3.11.6 Western Bahr el Ghazal

Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBeG) is a much more stable state but is a recruiting area for the two major protagonists, SPLA and SPLA-IO. SPLA-IO has been linked to attacks in Raja County. It has been linked to the civil war in Sudan and Darfur where it has been used for military purposes such as training by non-government militia fighting in Darfur. Tensions over resources and politics exist between the Dinka, Fertit and Jur. The state Governor Rizig Zachariah Hassan has opposed federalism for unequally profiting the Equatorial region. The Governor is highly disliked and it has been linked to the general distaste of overall Kiir's administration. In the Dinka community the political structures had fallen. The parliament of WBeG on 16 September 2014 petitioned the removal of Governor Hassan to the President.

3.11.7 Central Equatoria State (CES)

Central Equatoria State (CES) hosts Juba, the national capital. This is where the fire to the current conflict first became violent. The central government, SPLA and investors dominate the space. Juba contains several internally displaced people's UNMISS PoC sites to much protest from the GRSS. Most of these refugees don't want to return to their home states and even if they wanted most of their homes were occupied after their flight in 2013. Juba has also become highly insecure. Governor Clement Wani former Mundari militia leader has told the GRSS Council of states that this insecurity has been due to poorly remunerated SPLA soldiers and an irregular force the Mathiang Anyoor purportedly recruited "from NBEG for purposes particular to the president." Additionally, fights over cattle began to be noticed after 2013 conflict in a state such fighting was unknown. An armed and very small opposition exists under the leadership of Elias Lako Jada. In interviews with the Sudanese Consular he observes that the presence of rebel groups in Equatoria states for example the Lord Resistance Army from Uganda shows how the "regional conflicts are one of the constraints for South Sudan. Most of its neighboring countries have rebel groups." This gives credence to the regional security complex theory that there are various levels of analysis- a local situation can easily be a regional matter, especially considering that the LRA is involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda as well.

3.11.8 Eastern Equatoria State

This is the least developed Equatorian state mainly pastoralists including the Taposa. It experiences serious cattle raiding and small arms violence. Its Governor, Louis Labong a former Brigadier is an advocate of federalism against the policy of the Kiir government although this has not severed his alliance with GRSS/SPLM. In 2014 former SPLA general Martini Kenyi defected to SPLM/A-10 although he failed to attract many followers with him. The GRSS/SPLA has had operations to thwart any rebel formations.

It has been alleged that there is the active mobilization of community defense forces (CDF) without affiliation to SPLM/A-10 as a security contingent in the civil war. These CDF's were alleged targets of GRSS/SPLA operations. Another belief is that the CDF is linked to Martin Kenyi who wants to create a non-aligned Equatorian front. Tensions have arisen over pasture lands between the Madi of Nimule County and the internally displaced Dinka community who came during the Sudan war. Adding armed EES youth one explains tensions. The GRSS/SPLA strategy is to restrain inter-ethnic and tension specially to protect the Ugandan economic corridor, the Juba-Nimule Road.

3.11.9 Western Equatoria State (WES)

One of South Sudan's largest tribes, Azande ethnic group, is based in the WES. Here too like most of South Sudan has seen increased insecurity. Here a separate defection from SPLA in 2015 called itself the Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation (REMNAS). It is generally believed that the SPLA-IO has training sites in WES. Fighting has been minimal. The central government has alleged a rebellion in WES but the state Governor Bakosoro and other state authorities deny this. This discord is reflected in interpretations of causality to insecurity. WES official position is that Greater Bar el Gazhal Dinka pastoralists migrating are behind this and at times with support from the security forces particularly in pressuring Mundri West County farmers. All migrating cattle have been ordered to be removed from the state by the Governor. According to the South Sudan Humanitarian Project (2016) Mundri has become more insecure of which it is "a key town 200km from Juba on a transport route to greater Bar el Ghazal, and has resulted in the mobilization of a WES community defense force (the Arrow Boys), the killing of local government officials, violence between citizens of Mundri West County and the SPLA, and displacement of civilians."

3.12 The Evolution of the Conflict to Present

Clearly, the state level assessment despite the intrinsic and nuanced local problems the central government in Juba also had its own challenges. In June 2013 President Kiir dismissed the Finance Minister Kosti Manibe and Cabinet Affairs Minister Deng Alor in a multi-million dollar scandal and annulled their prosecution immunity. The entire cabinet is subsequently removed in July 2013 in power haggling within the SPLM. The sacking of Vice President Riek Machar over coup allegations result in rebels seizing several towns and the death of thousands. Uganda intervenes coming to the aid of the government. In January 2014, a ceasefire is reached although it is breached. More talks in February fail to secure a firmer ceasefire and over a million flee their homes. A treason charge is placed on Riek-Machar. In April 2014, hundreds are killed in the town of Bentiu by pro-Machar rebels. The UN announces that thousands have been killed and millions displaced such that 5million people needed humanitarian relief. In July 2014 the UN describes the food situation in South Sudan as the worst on earth.

The significance of this ethnic profile of South Sudan is used to by the Sudanese Consular in interviews to highlight a unique difference with other regional organization. He notes that “there are big problems in IGAD. ECOWAS has a problem of terrorism. SADC has no problems of ethnicity. IGAD has a completely separate set of problems. They are ethnical and border conflicts. You cannot make any comparison between the organisations.” The warring parties’ only capitulating to international pressure exerted by IGAD, the international community and the general strain of fighting the rebels and government were drawn to talks in August 2014 in Addis Ababa. The talks are on a snail pace for months and the hostilities continue. In February 2015, the elections due in June are cancelled due to the fighting. China also deploys a battalion to UNMISS. 250 child soldiers are released by rebels at the intervention of UNICEF which estimates that 12.000 child soldiers are fighting in the conflict. In August 2015, President Kiir and Riek Machar signed an agreement that would result in Riek-Machar returning as vice-president. This was accomplished in April of 2016, details will discussed in Chapter four.

3.13 Conclusion

This chapter covered in detail the origins and evolution of the South Sudan conflict. The discussion included the history of South Sudan conflict, key players that include President Silva Kirr and Dr

Rick Machar and others, the abyei conundrum, post-independence problems, institutional problem of the SPLA and the birth of the SPLA-IO, failure of both SPLA and SPLA-IO to foster inclusivity, the military dynamics, state based assessed that include the four main states in South Sudan, that is, Jonglei State, Unity State, Greater Upper Ba el Ghazel and the Greater Equatoria.

CHAPTER FOUR: AN IGAD PLUS SOLUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

Questions of self-rule and power are so deeply at the heart of the Compromise Peace Agreement and the conflict itself, some observers fear both Kiir and Machar might face internal revolt within their respective movements if they continue to support the terms of the deal. Kiir and Machar will face a considerable task to convince their forces and dissident factions not to take up arms against each other and most critically, against a deal some describe as South Sudan's last chance for peace (Marima 2015)

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the IGAD's peace efforts in the fuller picture of all the peace initiatives implemented in South Sudan with the view to highlighting its role leading up-to the 2011 two state solution and referendum; the collapse of IGAD's mediation in March of 2015; and the involvement of other actors in what became IGAD Plus. The chapter discusses the circumstances of a creation of government of National Unity marked by the return of Dr. Riek Machar to Juba and his assuming his former position of First Vice President to President Salva Kiir. The discussion is considered in the context of the regional complex security theory and multi-stakeholder diplomacy.

4.2 The Central IGAD Mediation

All negotiations for peace in South Sudan took place through IGAD. Simultaneously, the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) supported IGAD and urged peace. Throughout the conflict they continued to speak out against killings, human rights violations, humanitarian crises and threats to the security of the United Nations Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS) personnel. IGAD initiated dialogue between the conflicting parties. All international and regional organizations came behind IGAD confirming its positive role in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, is better trusted by the parties and knows the conflict better. On 27 December 2013 the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government setup a negotiating team for a ceasefire, the freeing of detainees and peaceful dialogue in South Sudan.

However, the role mandated to IGAD was not unanimously approved and had internal contradictions. In interviews conducted by the researcher, the South Sudanese Ambassador to

Zimbabwe, HE General Gabriel Gai Kiak, argued that “IGAD was not good at the beginning. Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda were not on the same thinking. IGAD played to Riek Machar’s demand for two armies in one country. Raila Odinga’s complaint in Kenya and Morgan Tsvangirai’s complaint in Zimbabwe was over votes. Machar’s was over a coup- He should have been tried.” In this regard the efficacy of IGAD in a central mediation role was gravely compromised and the implications to that may have a debilitating effect for the future of peace in South Sudan. The South Sudanese Ambassador to Zimbabwe was so dismayed that he proposed that instead of having IGAD another negotiating team of “Kofi Annan and General Lazarus who were mediator in our conflict with Sudan would have solved it in six months.” He accused the Troika and IGAD mediation for dragging their feet and dancing to the views of rebels.

The Minister of Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of South Sudan, Amot Francis Wol during interviews with the researcher however commended the efficacy of IGAD in handling the conflict but argued that its political will is affected by the interests of its Presidents as these overshadowed peace, she said, “Member states affect the quality of regional organizations. Uganda has a big brother mentality. It took less than a week to deploy into South Sudan after the outbreak of clashes in December 2013. Uganda’s was negative- its paying US\$300, 00 per soldier per day definitely became an incentive for war.” The parties would shift demands relative to their strength on the battle field. Four ceasefires were effectively violated as a result. She notes that IGAD is at times dominated by some member states and confused by different views from the international community. Due to aforesaid buttressed by the Minister of Plenipotentiary the problems bedeviling South Sudan are equally exacerbated on one hand by IGAD member states themselves, the likes of Uganda protecting their interests and on the other hand the dictatorial approach by western world in particular the Troika who are the funders of all activities conducted by IGAD, “he who pays the piper plays the tune.” In this regard IGAD has been extremely compromised and hopefully peace will hold in South Sudan.

Nevertheless, on 3 January 2014 IGAD constituted the beginning of proxy talks in Addis followed by formal talks on 6 January. Later the AU established a Commission of Inquiry into violations of human rights in South Sudan and the AU Commission Chairperson Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma also visited Juba in support of IGAD’s efforts. By 23 January 2014 IGAD had successfully brokered Cessation of Hostilities setting up a Joint Technical Committee to establish the

Monitoring and Verification Mechanism to enforce the agreement. The talks adjourned on 4 March supposedly to return on 20 March and only resume on 28 April as IGAD Phase II in Addis Ababa under the theme National Reconciliation. It may be important that this came on the heels of a stern international warning to the warring parties, especially by the US under President Barack Obama's Executive Order of 3 April. IGAD's 25th Extra-Ordinary Session, had also earlier on in March authorized an East African regional Protection and Deterrent Force (PDF) to be sent to South Sudan. IGAD eventually succeeded in setting up the Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVT's). As earlier alluded to in this Chapter, the Western world most terms that were in the peace process were dictated upon the belligerents by the west and this has seriously affected the efficacy of IGAD as a peace ambassador of the conflict in South Sudan.

Following the collapse of the talks in March, the subsequent period brought out to the fore some of the problems of the IGAD led process. Daley (2015:1) argued that there was a "disconnect between the Addis process and South Sudan's citizens." In interviews with South Sudanese citizen in Zimbabwe it was highlighted to the researcher that the process had feigned its relevance to the generality of the South Sudanese people. A small and familiar cast dominated the Addis talks, making the whole process an elite exercise.

Chama Cha Mapinduzi Tanzania's ruling party also had a parallel process for which it was not clear how it was related to the IGAD led initiative. Even the national NGOs in Juba such as Wau and Rumbek were also clueless on the statutes of the talks (Daley 2015). A member of civil society in Western Bahr el Ghazal State told Saferworld (2015) that people distrust South Sudan TV resorting to radio stations, such as UN -run Radio Miraya, and the internet for balanced news. It was argued by one interviewee that language barrier presents itself in many states, for instance in Lakes State were the majority neither speaks English or Arabic. He noted that other newspapers such as Juba Monitor, The Citizen and Catholic Radio station Bakhita Radio have limited independent space and most of South Sudan's rural population do not have access to these resources. Taking note of this and compounding a general dearth on access to information on happenings in the mediation, a discord was established between the Addis process and the South Sudan populace. The pertinent conclusion by Daley (2015:1) is here informative: "tacit support for secrecy by the IGAD-led mediation further entrenches the perception that this process will produce yet another exclusive, high level peace deal at the expense of inclusive, consultative, and

sustainable peace.” These are reasonable recommendations for IGAD to take seriously. The peace talks eventually collapsed in March of 2015 and in July an agreement that was later to be IGAD-Plus Compromise Agreement was presented for consideration to both parties by IGAD and was to be used as a basis for continuing dialogue.

4.3 A Complicated IGAD-Plus Effort: The ARCISS

With the hindsight of failed talks, IGAD decided to include in the peace efforts now labelled IGAD-Plus other actors in the mediation process. Seymou Mesfin was appointed by IGAD to lead mediation which includes Sudan and Kenya. In April 2015, the actors were much more widened to include representatives from southern, northern, western, eastern and central, African regions and these were South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Chad respectively. Other actors to play a significant role were the African Union, EU, UN Security Council and Troika countries. This was in recognition of how the conflict was intricately interwoven into the fabric of the national securities of the region. The result was the agreement signed in August of 2015 captured in the image in Fig. 4.1 below. But the drama leading to the signing warrants some attention for its revelations on the regional setting and the multiple stakeholders involved in the conflict.

The world’s powerful nations had to apply pressure for peace to be signed. General Kiak the South Sudanese Ambassador and Col Tera during interviews bemoaned the influence that the western exerted on IGAD during the peace process. They both highlighted that like the Angolan Civil War and the current war in Syria the Civil War in South Sudan has also turned to be a display of superpower rivalry with the Chinese alleged to be in the fray. Angola has oil and South Sudan has oil, therefore these world powers under the guise of humanitarian concerns are infact out to protect their interests. The American role in IGAD was too visible hence the effectiveness of IGAD as an independent autonomous institution has been severely compromised. It is reported by Gatluak (2015) in News Agency that thousands from South Sudan, fellow IGAD member states, and partners from the international community thronged Addis Ababa to witness the historic peace deal. In the words of Gatluak (2015:1)


Other Billions of the world community, ordinary South Sudanese in towns, villages, bushes, Refugee camps both at home in the United Nations’ concentration sites and neighbouring countries, in addition to those of them in diaspora; were highly alerted full with hope that the peace will finally be signed on Monday August 17, 2015. South Sudan president was dragging his feet to defy the worldwide call for peaceful compromise. In

regard of that hope for peace, many South Sudanese living abroad in various countries working under different capacities had either called in sick that day from their jobs or quit sleeping.

Friends connect themselves with phone conferences and social-media to discuss some contentious issues parties to the conflict are still disagreeing upon and other challenges laying ahead. Like other thousand South Sudanese-Americans, one stay up all night chatting on “Social-media” with friends who are present at the scene of the peace talk since the day coincided with one’s day off from work.

Fig. 4.1. Signing of IGAD-Plus Compromise Peace Agreement.

...



President Salva Kiir Left and Riek Machar Right at the Signing of IGAD-Plus Compromise Peace Agreement: Source- Reuters.

Both government and rebel leaders gathered for the big day. The Minister of Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of South Sudan, Amot Francis Wol during interviews with the researcher pointed out that other IGAD members came to see President Museveni’s stance on the proposal. He was intransigent and came up with a parallel proposal that removed provisions for a 53% for rebels in Greater Upper Nile region. The rebels wrote a curt response to IGAD mediators furious that this undermined the spirit of a July draft agreement shown to the rebels.

Other actors strove from Thursday and Friday 13 and 14 August to persuade President Kiir to attend the talks. President Kiir had indicated that his Vice President James Wani Igga would be his delegate and representative at the Addis talks. President Kiir, chose not to travel to Addis and instead convened a special Council of Ministers session on Friday, the 14 of August 2015 attended by South Sudan political parties he trusted, senior National Legislative Assembly members, ten (10) South Sudan state governors, Chief Administrators of Abyei and Pibor, heads of independent commissions, and the Council of States members. Their resolve was that the government negotiators should be recalled back to Juba, the President or his delegate James Wani not travel to Ethiopia. Furthermore, they wanted to know if Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's plan of setting aside IGAD-Plus had been accepted. The government noted that peace was impossible to sign as there was a split in the rebel ranks.

However, due to concerted regional heads of state efforts President Salva Kiir changed his mind on August 16. Of note was the persuasion from President Museveni a close associate of Kiir. President Kiir flew in to Addis in the hocus pocus of a peace making milieu supposed to end the two year conflict. Delegates convened in Sheraton Hotel in a euphoric Addis Ababa at 0900hrs on Monday 17 August 2015. It may be surmised that regional Heads of States not IGAD put pressure on President Kiir to comply. President Kiir prevaricated and addressed the gathering citing that no lasting peace could be achieved when some of the rebel groups were not represented. It is noted that IGAD's Chairperson, Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn insisted that President Museveni's relationship with Kiir complicated IGAD's initiative towards the peace deal. At this point President Yoweri Museveni walked out of the talks. With the retreat of Museveni, Kiir also attempted to walk out and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta intervened and stopped him in the hall ways. He convinced him to come back and sign the deal. Upon returning, Kiir later asked for a further 15 days to consult in Juba and only put his initials on the document. This suggestion was not well accepted by those gathered for the talks. The wife of Dr. John Garang, the founder of SPLM/A, Madam Rebecca Nyandeng bemoaned the intransigence of the belligerent leaders citing how the suffering of the South Sudanese had just been extended at a time when what was needed was peace and not more talks. The US envoy to South Sudan and Sudan described the decision as "unexpected." Riek Machar's comments were that:

he was surprised by Kiir's decision...I didn't know that he was not going to sign... I couldn't find any explanation for this because he had it all. There is no reason why he

requested for more time. We had already been given enough time to consult our entities, this is a good agreement-----he had a lion's share on many areas.

What had been the queries of President Kiir? The IGAD-Plus Compromise Peace Agreement Proposal required the president to consult his First Vice President on security issues. This displeased the South Sudan government amongst other issues including: the demilitarization of Juba, the systems of governance, the existence of separate armies until full demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and general power sharing issues. According General Kiak Ambassador of Sudan to Zimbabwe, President Kiir did not trust IGADS initiative in the whole process as it seemed to lean towards Riek Machars demands.

The document signed resembled, with minor changes the July 24 Compromise Peace Proposal IGAD-Plus prescribed for further study to the conflicting parties. In the talks, seven states described in Chapter 3 President Kiir controlled 85% while SPLM/A-IO 15%. In the other three states government controlled 46%, SPLM/A-IO 40% and 7% to other parties and former detainees. The national scale showed government controlling 53%, SPLM/A-IO 33% and former detainees and other political parties 7% each. The agreement maintained the 325 members of parliament with reinstatements to those who had defected to the rebels in a reincarnation of the position before December 15, 2013. The SPLM/A-IO would appoint further 50 members to parliament, and other political parties and former detainees appoint 17 other legislators. The position taken by IGAD-Plus officials was that the document signed by the two leaders was the final document and would not need to be changed when President Kiir finished his consultation. It will be signed without any renegotiation.

Eventually, President Kiir signed on 26 February 2015. It would appear that many factors contributed to President Kiir's signing. The involvement of world leaders made him sign the document. The decreased influence of President Museveni as regional leaders urged him to cooperate. The threat of sanctions and general from the international community pushed the negotiations. Later on, President Kiir on 26 August 2015 signed the peace deal with "serious reservations" and warned that the peace deal might not last. He drew threats of UN sanctions in a two weeks signing deadline. Addressing African leaders in Juba at a signing ceremony he said, "With all those reservations that we have, we will sign this document." It would appear without the aforementioned factors above the efficacy of IGAD would have been compromised or its peace

endeavours would have failed dismally. The Minister of Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of South Sudan, Amot Francis Wol during interviews with the researcher echoed the same grievances over undue interference of superpowers and how that affects the role of IGAD: “They also have a hand in fighting by supporting one of the parties.” “They influence through funding conditionality’s; at times even preparing an agreement. The major problem is that the funding is coming from them and this affects the role of IGAD.” However, the Sudanese Consular in interviews with the researcher explained undue influence from the international community in the South Sudan conflict, in a different way suggesting that “the Troika’s financial support to IGAD is critical. Despite their own interests and agendas their funding is useful. Machar was forced to leave Ethiopia by the international community. You cannot separate interest from support even in the UN where the US contributes most.” Regardless, of this qualm, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon (2015), urged that “Now is the time to ensure that this agreement translates into an end to the violence, hardship and horrific human rights violations witnessed throughout this conflict.”

This deal was achieved after Ethiopia hosted extensive on-off negotiations and four failed ceasefire agreements. Fighting, nevertheless continued. USA’s National Security Advisor Susan Rice (2015), described the deal as a “first step” to the end of the fighting although it would need “hard work” to implement it. Rice (2015:1) continued “we do not recognize any reservations or addendums to that agreement... We will work with our international partners to sideline those who stand in the way of peace, drawing upon the full range of our multilateral and bilateral tools.” US State Department spokesman John Kirby was clear that further UN sanctions would ensue if President Kiir acted on his reservations. The US had proposed an arms embargo and sanctions starting 6 September 2015 if the 15 day deadline was missed. Reuters (27 August 2015) quote President Kiir opining that he had been intimidated and that regional and world leaders had been careless during the negotiations. His reasoning was that a poor agreement could backfire. However, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta commented that the region was better with the peace agreement and that there was need for a futuristic orientation.

Clearly, with the unequivocal support of these regional and international actors the peace lasted with the approval of parliament on September 10 2015. Its priority function is the setting up of a transitional government and an effective permanent ceasefire. Fighting and other logistical

challenges posed challenges to its success. Marima (2015) is of the view that in as much as the deal “is a positive sign of regional and international collaboration to make Kiir and Machar lay down their guns, the mediation, led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and various Western partners (IGAD-Plus), did not extend to separatist militias, which might hinder attempts to definitively end the conflict.” this was to become apparent with attacks on rebel bases continuing in the southern Central Equatoria State, and as Chapter 3 described Malakal County in the oil-resourced northeastern Upper Nile State. IGAD, the AU, the US and the UN Security Council strongly condemned the subsisting fighting and urging the need to engage rebel and army generals. Marima (2015) observes that on both sides there have been breakaways vowing to continue fighting. An example, is Peter Gatdet led group previously aligned to Machar. They had rejected the CPA at its draft stage. Marima (2015) notes that “they felt excluded from the process and that IGAD, views dissident groups as internal problems to be resolved by either side, did not take them seriously.” One very critical factor that needs to be spelt out is that IGAD seemed bent on achieving peace without putting in place any peace enforcement mechanisms. Concentration of peace efforts and negotiations mainly focused on SPLA and SPLA-IO disregarding many various armed militias who have become potential spoilers after the signing of the peace accord.

4.4 Transitional Government of National Unity

Four previously warring sides joined to form the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) that will last two and a half years. The groups are the SPLM-IG, SPLM-IO, SPLM-FD and Other Political Parties (OPP). The leaders are President Salva Kiir, First Vice President Riek Machar, now Foreign Minister Deng Alor Kuol from Pagan Akum and former Secretary General of the SPLM; and Lam Akol who chairs the Democratic Change (DC) party and OPP respectively.

The government was formed two days after the return of Riek Machar. This is eight months from the Compromise Peace Agreement and initial Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS). The perspective is for the TGoNU to be the end of a civil war that raged for 21 months. On Tuesday 26 April 2016 Dr. Machar took the oath of office as South Sudan’s First Vice President for 30 months.

Fig 4.2. The Presidium of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU)



President Salva Kiir walks his First Deputy Riek Machar and Vice-President James Wani on 26 April (Photo Moses Lomayat)

The actual formation saw each faction forward officials for ministerial appointments in the designations of the power sharing deal. The cabinet of 30 has the distribution in Table 4.1 below:

Table 4.1. Cabinet Ministers Distribution by Parties to the TGoNU

Organization	Number of Ministers
SPLM-IG	16
SPLM-IO	10

Former Detainees	2
OPP's	2

The Table was designed by the researcher from interviews at the Embassy of South Sudan in Zimbabwe.

Below, in Table 4.2 is a list of those appointed to the ministerial positions and their portfolio's furnished to the researcher during field work by the South Sudanese Ambassador to Zimbabwe. Both table's is revealing to the extent of contestation and even tension within the newly created government. The key ministries such as Defence are controlled by President Salva Kiir's SPLM-IG and where at time the SPLM-IO controls an influential ministry like the Minister of Interior, there was created a counter ministry like the Minister in the Office of the President for National Security Service ran by the SPLM-IG. This trend is repeated in the Deputy Ministers as shown in Table 4.3 and their names in Appendix 4 in the Annexure.

Table 4.2 Names of Ministers Appointed

Ser	Name	Ministerial Portfolio	Organization
1	Martin Elia Lomoro	Minister of Cabinet Affairs,	OPPs
2	Deng Alor Kuol	Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation,	FDs
3	Kuol Manyang Juuk	Defense and Veterans Affairs	SPLM-IG
4	Alfred Ladu Gore	Minister of Interior	SPLM-IO

5	Paulino Wanawilla	Justice and Constitutional affairs	SPLM-IG
6	Obote Mamur Mete	Minister in the Office of the President for National Security Service	SPLM-IG
7	Peter Bashir Gbandi,	Parliamentary Affairs	SPLM-IG
8	Michael Makuei Lueth,	Information, Communication, Technology and Postal Service	SPLM-IG
9	Richard K. Mulla,	Federal Affairs	SPLM-IO
10	Mayik Ayii Deng,	Minister in the Office of the President,	SPLM-IG
11	David Deng Athorbei,	Finance and Economic Planning	
12	Dak Duop Bichiok,	Minister of Petroleum	
13	Taban Deng Gai,	Mining	
14	Lam Akol Ajawin	Agriculture and Food Security	SPLM-IG
15	James Duku	Livestock and Fisheries	SPLM-IO
16	Stephen Dhieu Dau,	Trade and Industry	SPLM-IO

17	Dhieu Mathok Diing,	Energy and Dams	SPLM-IO
18	John Luk Jok	Transport	FDs
19	Rebecca Joshua Okwaci	Roads and Bridges	SPLM-IG
20	Josephine Akoon,	Environment and Forestry	
21	Mary Alphone Lodira,	Land, Housing and Urban Development	SPLM-IO
22	Mabior Garang de Mabior	Water Resources and Irrigation	SPLM-IO
23	Jemma Nunu Kumba	Wildlife Conservation and Tourism,	SPLM-IG
24	Peter Adwok Nyaba,	Science and Technology Higher Education	SPLM-IO
25	Deng Deng Hoch,	General Education and Instruction	SPLM-IG
26	Riek Gai Kok	Health	SPLM-IG
27	Peter Marcello Nasir	Labour, Public service and Human Resource Development	SPLM-IO
28	Awut Deng Acuil,	Gender, Child and Social Welfare	SPLM-IG

29	Nadia Arop Dudi,	Culture, Youth and Sports	SPLM-IG
30	Hussein Mar Nyuot,	Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management	SPLM-IO

Tabulation by Researcher using Data Confirmed by the South Sudan Ambassador

A critical observation to note is that from the data above in the cabinet and the legislative assembly, President Salva Kiir controls the majority in the transitional government. On the other hand, Machar and his SPLM-IO control the majority in the opposition and in the local government. It maybe that the way the powers are set up on a markedly symmetrical line is dangerous and sets up parties for confrontation. But it seems that far from that, in this instance, it is actually a much more preferred state since the parties were already in violent confrontation. Assuming the two leaders avoid further violent confrontation, this may actually turn out into a very health situation for democratic checks and balances. The apparent negative function is that it confirms and entrenches into the constitution a two party horse race which makes it very difficult for third actors and alternative recourses for citizens.

4.5 Threats to the Unity Government

4.5.1 Two Armies

Probably the biggest threat to the peace is the presence of two armies within the country. In interviews with the South Sudanese Ambassador to Zimbabwe, HE General Gabriel Gai Kiak, he complained that they were even demanding the army HQ to be 25km from the capital and now they are under trees. There were no structures put in place- no water, nothing, they are under trees as if they are again in the bush. That is why I am saying it has not been a fair agreement but for the sake of agreement. Even our President had serious reservations to sign that agreement. Now Riek Machar has come with 1410- officers, NCO's and men, with big artillery 20RPG's and 20PKM's. He even wanted to come with tanks he got from Khartoum but they could be put in the plane. They left them behind which is an indication that had he came with them at any zero hour he could make a coup. He could topple the government.

Effectively, there is a weak state defense system and a rugged jittery rebel force. This concern points to the observation made by the Sudanese Consular in interviews that the problem of the current peace process is of confidence. There are two armies, the SPLA and the White army from Nuer of Riek Machar. What is needed is to build confidence between the two leaders. Riek Machar feared to be assassinated in Juba. He brought own troops and this is one of the problems -security arrangements.

In interviews the Sudanese Consular concludes that IGAD's role now is really on monitoring the implementation of the agreement to ensure that these two armies do not fall right back into war. This really is like a trap and shows the importance of urgent demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of the fighting forces.

While, on paper it appears Machar shall have power to make independent decisions from Kiir, this is neither desirable nor practical. Having two decisions from one house is not good for ARCSS and the Kiir who is in effective control may not allow that. The transitional government in Zimbabwe is illustrative where despite the impeccable Global Political Agreement that did not translate into effective power for the opposition that had been drafted into a power sharing agreement. One may say this is an inherent weakness of governments of national unity. A huge body of literature exists on this and it is inconclusive save for that unity government's work as a truce to break the momentum of a conflict cycle and their subsequent leading into lasting peace depend on case by case dynamics. The effect of the Council of Ministers which some say is to control and direct the presidency is at best wishful in a time of conflict where power is not only militarized but centralized around two opposing figures. What is useful to note is the faith of the peace makers that such an organ will be effective at some point at least. IGAD-Plus negotiators were in a way cognizant of this and set up the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission led by former President of Botswana Festus G. Mogae. Supposedly, the President will have the last say in Presidential decisions. Clearly, this was a decision reached in order to mollify the antagonists in the heat of negotiations. One may think this to be too pessimistic, but one needs to reflect on the history of nations to perceive that nations are judges in their own courts and even when weak rarely happily accept outside pressure.

It would also appear that ARCSS removed unilateral tendencies by effectively silencing opposition as all parties were bunched into one corner. Supposedly, it's only civil society and the President and Vice Presidents autonomous powers that are the safeguard of the broader national interest. If there is anything in Lord Acton's, "power corrupts, and absolute corrupts absolutely" then the silencing of the political parties was a mistake. It is the full incarnation of Foucault's definition of politics as the continuation of war by other means and a parody of Leo Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. It might be that South Sudan is set up for Shakespeare's *Comedy of Errors*. The real guarantor of peace may really continue to be IGAD-Plus and its arm-twisting tactics and hard language.

4.5.2 SPLM Advance Actions to Control the Government

When one analyses the actions of the SPLM-IG it is clear that it has made plans to control the next government. It has operationalized 28 states against the diplomatic advice to wait for feasibility studies of a professional commission that is impartial and inclusive. The announcement by President Kiir for his candidature in the future has effectively nullified the Arusha Reunification Agreement of January 2015. SPLM-IO and SPLM-FD are left with no choice than to submit to Kiir or continue to exist on their own. If ever reunification happens it is clear that it may neither be free or safe. This is given the military nature of the protagonist's SPLM-Kiir and SPLM-Riek. The transference of the ARCSS into the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011) to lead to the Transitional Constitution (2016) had to be stopped over disagreements on Presidential powers, the defunctness of ten states, parliamentary vacancies and some other issues from moving over from war to peace. Okuk (2016) observes that "the other critical legislations for conducting government affairs during the transitional period are also still pending political quarrels." The transitional government may also have to ratify a number East African Community (EAC) documents including its Treaty of establishment. This maybe done immediately or delayed until the economy recovers and is able to position itself better for viable trade balances.

The advice of The Minister of Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of South Sudan, Amot Francis Wol during interviews with the researcher is poignant here, the agreement had left the states at 10 states but the President's proposal to make them 28 states was out of the agreement and potentially explosive with the allocation of Malakal a Nuer area to a Dinka for example. She notes that lessons can be learnt from the aftermath of the struggle in 2011 when there was no resettlement after the "and so people were staying as tribes. The fighting is in ethnic groups: Nuer, Dinka and Shilluk.

Reconciliation is needed across the country to teach people that no-matter what happens they are still South Sudan. These ethnic groups are influenced by politicians.

What she effectively means is that the argumentation of politics may not be undesirable in itself but it may be important if our parties to the conflict began to utilize civilian means as final arbiter to disputes rather than force and violence. There is need to build a nation from the debris.

4.5.3 Outstanding Issues

Other problems in the wings pertain to the unconcluded matters from the 2012 agreements with Sudan on assets, borders, freedoms, oil, banking, trade, debts, postal service benefits, Abyei and pension. The distrust between Sudan and South Sudan complicates the matter. However, both the SPLM-Juba and the NCP-Khartoum may be brought together in the matter of the International Criminal Court in the case of Sudan and the African Union Hybrid Court for South Sudan. The egregiously human death toll and crimes in war will need examination, prosecution, and forgiveness. Falling oil prices have negatively impacted the economy. It is noticeable that the huge flow of foreign currency to South Sudan a remarkable feature of the 2005- 2011 period when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was still being unveiled. Borrowing from international credit lines like the IMF will have its conditionality's such that commentators like Okuk (2016) perceive a change from the era when Dr. Riek was previously Vice President to President Kiir and government expenditure was unchecked.

4.5.4 Logistical Hurdles

The challenge is to create demilitarized zones, congenial army facilities, the quantity of troops to be posted in Juba and other areas. According to Marima (2016), Kiir considers the CPA as only a "roadmap for regime change," and demilitarization is considered as "an attempt to erode state sovereignty." Machar simply saw the agreement as a reinstatement of the status quo. The military and Dinka leaders had also criticized Kiir for giving too much to Machar and Nuer. In response, the President issued stern reprimands to his generals against unsanctioned attacks and met the Dinka Council of Elders (JCE) diametrically opposed to the SPLA-IO's agreed dominance in the Upper Nile State, Unity State and Jonglei State. The SPLA-IO is opposed on the basis of being a Nuer dominated movement. Okuk (2016) is of the view that:

ARCSS is itself an ambitious project the D-days of its implementation modalities shall remain suspicious, if not unrealistic, in many aspects. The peace deal was designed with a purpose of silencing the guns and continuing with politics as usual in a less bloody and non-disaster in humanitarian dignity of the people

4.5.5 The Vital Role of Two Masculinities

The two men ruling South Sudan have a heavy historical mandate to transform a conflict that they have been a face for a long time. It seems at the base of the conflict are forces they cannot control but to which they give impetus. The views of John Campbell in Dockins (2014) maybe relevant in this analysis "Very often, behind ethnic conflict, you will find various political figures that seek to exploit ethnic identities in order to advance their own particular political agenda. And, I think there is at least some of that underway now in South Sudan." Ahmed Soliman in Dockins (2014) also believes that most of the problems resonate around the Kiir-Machar rift. There is really need for a total change in character between the two man. In interviews the Sudanese Consular noted that the attitude of the two leaders to atrocities committed is that they "generally deny these bad things but there are massacres from both sides." South Sudan's Minister of Plenipotentiary in interviews stated that the attitude of the parties was at first of a cat and mouse game, a tit tat but eventually "the President apologized for the past and that was a change as all this while no one had apologized." She noted that Riek Machar was still to do the same, probably because he was still settling into Juba.

Analyzing the war, especially, the natural resource battles over oil, and Abyei one may recall Collier and Hoeffler's (2000) greed and grievance theory. The prevalence of issues that have to do with the wealth, status and power between the north and South at first, between the rebels and the government reflect elite competition for resources which is the core of the greed theory. The protracted nature of the conflict since 1899, in the colonial times has created a vicious cycle of many aggrieved people. President Kirr has grievances over Bor, for example and the massacres that have taken place in many areas have definitely left a feel of people that have been wronged. This is perpetuated by a weak economy trying to recover from war, a fragile state that has known war before its birth in 2011 and has continued in war. The greed and grievance theory is also confirmed in interviews with the South Sudanese Ambassador to Zimbabwe points out that "the peace is genuine if Riek is genuine. You cannot have one country with two armies. He was trying to behave the way we did with Sudan but we knew we had to break away after the interim period. But what is in Riek's mind is known only to IGAD and the Troika countries. Even the framing of

the agreement was done according to his wish. So they are not mediating well. If you are a referee you don't have to side with one team but IGAD and Troika were siding with Riek Machar. He argued that "there was no need for South Sudan to go to war with itself because we fought for 50 years to become an independent country from the Arabs. Even if you have other things at the back of your mind, they should not be about any other thing, even personal interest. We hope, we pray that the peace will last."

This is not helped by the many ethnic groups in South Sudan who control certain states within the government. The pervasive culture of the violations of human rights, killings and media repression create an atmosphere of more grievances furthering conflict. South Sudan is a ground for validating the greed and grievance theory for its the history of the conflict points to an existential maintenance of grievances and quest for power. In as much as the regional organisations is weak the combination of IGAD and international actors under IGAD Plus has acted against the greed and grievances of neighboring states ensuring that war does not continue.

The Minister of Plenipotentiary in the Embassy of South Sudan, Amot Francis Wol in interviews believes that a lasting solution to the South Sudan conflict comes from a political and economic settlement. She said "South Sudan has a lot of resources but the situation is bad on the ground. If political affiliation is put aside and development happens- if ordinary citizens have something to do I am sure they will forget about the gun. The key is to put development in place. A lot of child soldiers are used because there are no schools. This will be a final solution because political differences will always be there." But it is that culture of violence, that propensity to carrying out politics by military means which needs to be stemmed out. In the same interviews she also detailed that a federalist solution to the South Sudan conflict "has always been the demand of the people since 1972. In 2005 it was demanded. Even right now Riek Machar wanted to divide it into 21 states. This idea was taken by the government realizing its popularity. Government made it 28 states. Geographically you cannot divide them as compared to the 21 states. The demarcations that have been done have been on tribal lines. It's still under negotiations. Federalism is seen as the permanent solution to South Sudan. Both the Minister of Plenipotentiary and Sudan's Consular agreed for the need for reconciliation between the various ethnic groups as a key factor to lasting peace in Sudan and was the challenge before the presidency. The Sudanese Consular was of the view that IGAD had the capacity to solve the conflict and has a special "role and experience"

regardless of contradictions within the regional leadership. He emphasized the need for reconciliation within South Sudan before political resolution. IGAD's achievement was in bringing the belligerents together, and it is now important to move to reconciliation and solve the ethnic problem.

4.6 A Critical Reflection of IGAD's Role

The researcher uses his research material to discuss a question posed by Bagat Makuac Anguek (2014) in a Radio Tamuz article titled *Can IGAD mediators resolve the conflict of South Sudan?* IGAD prevailed to insure that Sudan and the SPLM sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). But, the largely complex symmetrical nature of that conflict resolution overrode much more sinister asymmetrical conflict conditions. Anguek (2014) raises the point that some of IGAD countries are implicated as part of the conflict. Contrary to the spirit and letter of the CPA Sudan is reportedly offering Machar rebels a coordination office. Uganda has forces fighting the rebels. Djibouti has another coordination office for the SPLM-IO rebels. It is subsequently difficult for the major protagonists in the South Sudan conflict to have trust in "some if not all the members of IGAD."

Secondly, it appears some of the IGAD member states are indirectly benefiting from the conflict. For example, Uganda has troops that are paid for fighting there. Sudan enjoys that as South Sudan grapples with its internal issues other outstanding issues from the CPA such as the Abyei Issue and border contestations. Thirdly, some of the IGAD countries are reeling from their own civil wars. Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda have ongoing fighting within them and would still be expected to achieve peace in other countries. Fourth, there exists serious tension amongst some of the IGAD members: Eritrea and Ethiopia; Uganda and South Sudan; and Sudan and South Sudan. How these tensions can be overcome for peace in South Sudan is subsequently problematic.

Anguek (2014) notes that the CPA was a remarkable feat "but also we cannot deny that IGAD role to make sure that CPA was implemented was very weak so most of the CPA was not implemented and the term comprehensive peace agreement lost its meaning." This directly resulted in war in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. The Abyei issue is just one of the many outstanding matters between North and South Sudan. The agreements to form the transitional governments and cessation of hostilities were not implemented and one may question their utility if they are not to

be implemented. IGAD was caught in a cul-de-sac, a treacherous web of conflict, history, incapacity and mistrust.

The theory also offers a better chance of understanding the critique against IGAD that it has poorly sequenced its peace process over South Sudan (Mulungeta 2009:4). It has instigated political negotiations and commitments before securing a cease fire and this has at times led to armed groups deliberately flouting certain agreements. Some, such as Mulungeta (ibid) feel that the order should be: ceasefire, political negotiations and transitional commitments. However, a perusal of the South Sudan conflict shows that building on agreed points and common concerns may eventually result in a cease fire. Peace talks collapsed on 6 March 2015 because zero sum objective of peace were on the table, yet multi-stakeholder diplomacy could lay out significant step by step efforts accommodating belligerents and probably negating the fear of annihilation and retaliation.

External intervention and meddling have also been identified as major pricks to the peace endeavors of IGAD. United States of America, United Kingdom, and Norway as a troika are accused of undermining the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 by countries pushing an “African solutions for African problems” approach (SADC Tribune 11 March 2015).

The view of the civil society as shown a comment from the Community Empowerment for Progress (CEPO) (Sudan Tribune 8 April 2015), is that “the majority of Sudan’s peoples liberation movement members are militarized political minded leaders who militarized politics and politicized the military at the same time. This is a key reform that we expect to be addressed by the agreement for reunification of Sudan’s people’s liberation movement.” These concerns show a general consensus that agreements reached in peace processes should be honored. There has also been an agreement to end the violence in the conflict through the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

The conflict is indeed multifaceted with multiple actors and levels of analysis. This is clearly spelt out in the 2014 agreement Protocol on Agreed Principles on Transitional Arrangements towards Resolution of the Crisis in South Sudan. Interstate conflict between the South Sudan government and the Sudanese government has also persisted because 75% of oil reserves in the former Sudan are now located in South Sudan (Sudan Tribune 11 March 2015). Therefore the resolution of the

conflict could also go a long way in mitigating against the growth of terrorism. Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda have serious terrorism related security problems.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter covered a detailed analysis of the South Sudan Conflict. It also looks at how the IGAD plus solution leading to the implementation of the peace accord was conducted. Topics covered include the central mediation role that IGAD played, the ARCISJ and finally the transformational government of national Unity (TGoNU).

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

5.1 Introduction

Running away from Juba to the rebellious bush is not going to be tolerated any more if a politician found himself defeated by transitional politics. The rebels who have remained in the bush shall be persuaded to respond to the call of peace and pursuit of resolution of their grievances through dialogue. Transitional Justice, reparation, reconciliation, mending of broken social fabrics and healing is supposed to kick off in earnest. Thanks to peace-lovers and farewell to war-mongers. The next move should be the inculcation of serious planning, research, development and prosperity for all South Sudanese. (James Okuk 2016)

5.2 Conclusions

IGAD was clearly at the center to the achievement of peace both as a broker, and some of its members as peace spoilers. Its achievements in the face of intractable adversaries are no small feat. The conclusion of the study is that the origins of the conflict date back to colonial times and this particular conflict in South Sudan manifested in December 2013 in struggle for power between the Nuer and Dinka as represented by Riek Machar and Salva Kiir. A historical construction of the evolution of the conflict shows that this set the conflict on an ethnic basis, escalating a volatility in the Horn of Africa. The South Sudan conflict is not an introduction of conflict but rather the continuation of the conflict. As such the conflict was deeply ingrained in decades of a Sudanese civil war between the North and the South that resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 that ushered in the referendum of 2011 and the new state of South Sudan. The major defect of the CPA, as it turned out, was its preoccupation with state actors, a tendency typical of Track 1 diplomacy. This was not probably wrong as some of the rebel groups had been coopted into government. However, it seems that some of the rebels felt they needed more and were not being treated fairly. Instead of resorting to peaceful politics they chose, probably out of habit accumulated over a protracted colonial struggle from the British and civil war in Sudan. This happened in December 2013 to a state just two years into its being. Even some of the world's greatest states today like the USA had to battle bloody civil wars in the construction of a national narrative.

A series of peace initiatives were organized by IGAD member states under the mandate of IGAD. Though weak, the peace processes organized under the auspices of IGAD may still serve as a stepping stone for further reconciliation. IGAD's conflict resolution effort in South Sudan has been, however, challenged by a number of internal and external factors. IGAD has been principally characterized by a lack of political will and grave constraints of resources—human, financial, and logistic—which have impeded it from living up to its expectations. IGAD is also weak due to the regions volatility stemming from prevalent poverty and inter- and intrastate conflicts.

Though having a treacherous history, it is clear from the research that Sudan has already been a financial casualty from instability in South Sudan and now prefers peace. After the conflict Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir travelled to Juba in search of conflict resolution. It would seem that Sudanese inclination for peace would always remain high as long as its economic stakes in South Sudan remain high. The role of external actors in undermining IGAD's peace initiatives in South Sudan is also not negligible. Uganda's hand may make or break the peace. It is necessary to stop the various rebel groups that operate in the region who take advantage of state fragility in South Sudan to use them as military bases. The recovery of South Sudan may be very key to addressing this very issue. Given this it is clear that the credible threat of UN and US sanctions maybe the only limitation for the rebel's resumption of full-scale conflict

South Sudan's relapse into internecine fighting after much vouched peace agreements from the 2005 peace process speaks volumes about the quality of the peace achieved so far. All the people interviewed still feel the talks have not addressed the unique ethnic dimension to South Sudan's conflict which has been manipulated by politicians and rebels alike. This is very important in the consideration of IGAD's security complex since most of the conflicts are ethnic in nature. The criticism leveled against previous South Sudan peace pacts is that they had left out stakeholders such as political parties and former detainees supposed to be part of the transitional government. In as much as these have been given positions in the new arrangement, the elite nature of the agreement ensures a discord with South Sudan's citizens. This is not helped by limited access to information which creates an information void which the corrosive rumor mill and ethnic propaganda may easily fill. One may argue that there is also a new generation that is tired of military-style governance and who are increasingly yearning for a democratic and stable dispensation.

It is important to observe that the IGAD region is distinguished from other regional organizations due to the nature of the conflict going on there. The conflict is ethnic and does not respond fully to Track 1 diplomacy. The drafting of rebel groups to the negotiating tables of Addis Ababa really gave authenticity to a genuinely ingrained peace initiative. This had been the failure from the CPA of 2005, subsequent ceasefires and peace agreements.

There is a disconcerted feeling with the involvement of international actors. The USA, UK and China among other international actors have invested money in the independence of South Sudan. Envoys from the USA and China mediated with Ethiopia. USA has been the biggest donor to the country. China has invested the most, above any other investor in the oil industry of South Sudan and lost significant business when oil production fell. It is for these reasons that it was justified in some quarters during the research that these countries would act beyond ordinary diplomatic assistance. Their interests brought them to push for a ceasefire, pushing it to the Transitional Government of National Unity. IGAD-Plus also worked because the international actors were willing to use tough language and the threat of UN sanctions to ensure compliance with agreements. This was used when President Salva Kiir was refusing to attend and sign the ARCISS; and when Machar was delaying in Ethiopia. The message was clear: form the transitional government or else trouble. This nexus of economic and political interests of various actors may force an enduring peace.

The intra-SPLM party dialogue cannot address military realities. This specifically, complicated because of the impossibility of an in-country containment of the conflict and the fragmented set of actors. These had repercussions for potential solutions and regional dynamics. Actors, acted based on their political interests in an outgrowth of customized regional dynamics to violence that were diametrically opposed to power-sharing agreements. In some cases, local ethnic military capacity is linked to regional lines of conflict such that effective demilitarization has to see that these communities are disarmed and at the same time protected. However, the existence of two armies in South Sudan is a cause for concern for the peace agreement, many a plethora of other potential challenges.

5.3 Recommendations

There is hope in the peace agreements for a variety of reasons. This is largely from the peculiarities of actors involved in the conflict which is thought would produce a mutual push factor for peace. In monitoring the peace IGAD has to take advantage of the interlacing multidimensional interests by making sure that peace and reconciliation happens at salient and nuanced levels. International recognizing them and their grievances, allowing space for them to be aired and where possible remedial action, being implemented in a way that justice must not only be done but must be seen to have been done. The overriding trump card however, maybe economic recovery and development. This may remove the economic incentive to war and offer alternatives for young people to expend their energies. This requires President Salva Kiir, and his former nemesis now First Vice President to put national interests ahead of narrow and partisan interests. It is important for South Sudan to assure investors their investments and trade will not be adversely affected by a resumption of conflict. It may also be prudent to respond to Sudan's gestures of trade intention in oil on a basis that is not fighting. Both countries can cooperate to police and agree on border disputes in the Abyei region for which rebel groups usually mobilize around. Reconstruction of the country also offers huge employment possibilities in infrastructure development amongst other matters thereby occupying citizens and removing a conflict driver. With a very difficult terrain to maneuver ahead IGAD still has a mammoth task to keep the fragile peace together, its efficacy despite a semblance of success may be put to test in the coming months.

The region as a whole needs to pay attention to the spectre and toleration of rebel forces and their handlers. Confronting, these on a regional basis is more effective than on an individual member state level. Roping in the international community in the fashion of IGAD-Plus may well even out some regional bullies especially when IGAD resolutions are backed by the United Nations Security Council. Conflict in the South Sudan mirrors as a specimen for the Horn of Africa and it is clear in the case of IGAD's mediation in South Sudan that international actions alone do not work and regional efforts alone do not work.

IGAD must display its agility by continuously monitoring, enhance and promote dialogue amongst the two parties and other militias and embrace the broader concept of inclusivity. The two parties, especially the leaders must try as soon as possible to move their governmental systems from a personality basis around the two leaders of SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO. It is important to build the

nation through inter-ethnic dialogue and interaction. This is possible when the leaders actively begin to show unity and brotherliness. It is also highly important, that apart from concentrating on the demilitarization of Juba which characterized discussions of the return of Machar and was in line with ARCISS it is important- demilitarization should happen in the entire country. The efforts begun with the Juba Declaration of 2006 to integrate rebel forces must be hastened. It seems speed and surprise are the elements needed to disarm the rebels by removing civilian agitation and complicity in violence. National healing and rehabilitation of fighters are at the forefront. In this delicate process, extreme and judicious care is expected of the two leaders. All the interviewees in this research concurred that in as much as the conflict is ethnic, the actions of the two leaders determine the tone of ethnic conflict or peace. The aspect of peace spoilers that have walked away from the peace process of both sides of the major warring parties may also soon lose momentum and come back to the peace.

However, the very premising of a peace on individuals brings some stubborn cautionary examples from history. The assassination of Mohandas K. Gandhi in the midst of a peace breakthrough threw the Indian nation into unspeakable bloodbaths between Pakistan and India. It is imperative, at least these leaders owe it to the many that have suffered in the many generations that have suffered prior to this 2013 conflict and those that continue to suffer as a direct result of conflict. This cements the proposal to hasten the institutionalization of democracy, rule of law apparatus and civilian functions that herald normalcy.

For the survival of the peace process IGAD must be proactive. There is need for timely and accurate access to information on the running of the government and the peace process to prevent the misinformation which leads to abuse of the public by being fed propaganda and suspicions by any of the parties. While this may not produce the desired gelling of the different ethnic groups, it may be a start to a common understanding. The public will have discussion points and will be able formulate its own mind in response to a situation. To do this it is important to deepen the process to include youth groups, faith-based organizations, traditional leaders and women.

As earlier discussed in the dissertation and buttressed by concerns from the various interviewees, IGADs role and its efficacy has been seriously eroded due its donor dependence. The level of dissatisfaction with the funding of donors may require a reformulation of that funding mechanism.

A probable mechanism maybe to avoid an exclusive focus on the talks but also move into funding mediation across ethnic groups. It is also important for the South Sudan government, citizens and all observers to note that IGAD will not and cannot do everything for South Sudan- the ball is now firmly in its court to ensure peace and to build a nation out of their rubbles.

The long drawn out conflict in South Sudan has many lessons for regional organizations seeking conflict resolution. Conflicts of interests have certainly erupted when certain regional leaders have been criticized for taking sides and that some regional leaders are friends to warring parties leaders. States being judges in their own courts have at times claimed positions that are uncompromising and intractable. The role Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has resulted at times in failed IGAD meetings. Members of regional organizations need to be clear that a regional organization is an institution that they give life and character to. IGAD mediation tactics going forward may need to guard against undue political interference from regional powers. This was the reason for having Seymou Mesfin of Ethiopia as autonomous IGAD negotiator in South Sudan. Some of these lessons from IGAD need to be itemized for application in other regional organizations.

The significance to knowledge that this study has contributed is an understanding of how regional organizations such as IGAD, that find themselves in murky waters demanding a strict adherence to multilateral principles of impartiality and consistence can balance between local and international forces. It is explicit in the Regional Complex Security theory that failure to grasp the uniqueness of a particular region may result in failed peace interventions. Imbued with such an understanding one may then take to the negotiating table where alas many negotiations have flopped. The study suggests that a multi-stakeholder approach captures all the players and speaks to flexibility in the peace brokers without a strait jacket kind of format in an environment where peace has to be made in the midst of war preferably by prioritizing the cessation of hostilities. A key lesson from IGAD's mediation process, particularly with the pull out of Ugandan military troops and the appointment of a negotiator in Mesfin acceptable to both the rebels and the government is that the negotiation process must be protected from being drawn into the complex of local, national, regional and international setting. The South Sudan conflict also shows that events are in a constant state of flux such that one needs to read into this context with an open mind.

Key recommendations from interviews and literature can be summed up into five points for IGAD. Firstly: all negotiations must be grounded in realities in a conflict scenario. Secondly, it is important to have clear processes and rules in a peace process. Thirdly, it is important to root all negotiations with the people in the conflict. Fourth, there is need to establish substratum's of meeting for less empowered delegates. Last, but not least, it is important to maintain unity in the governing authority, in this case the government of South Sudan. Interviewees concurred that a federalist solution was the only permanent solution to the South Sudan conflict. Transitional Government of National Unity has also made this its goal. IGAD must continue to monitor this process to ensure power devolves to citizens rather than elites. Towards true conflict transformation- strategies that can be used include, but are not limited to truth commissions, reparations, widespread information dissemination and even international tribunals and trials.

5.4 Implications for further Research

The crises in South Sudan is likely to recur if the issue of ethnicity and multiple armed militias is not addressed. The TGoNU has already felt the effect due to sporadic violence erupting in different states led by the uncontrollable. These if not controlled will become perennial spoilers of peace. How can the government deal with the problems of the numerous ethnic militias and the effect of external?

5.5 Conclusion

The chapter discussed the conclusions of the research where it emerged that IGAD was at the center in the achievement of peace both as a broker and as peace spoilers. IGAD's incapacitation is also linked to its heavy reliance on external support. The chapter also made some recommendations where amongst the recommendations made South Sudan and Sudan has to cooperate to police and agree on border disputes in the Abyei region for which rebel groups usually mobilize around. On the implications for further research the researcher found out that more is to be done on how the government can deal with the problems of the numerous ethnic militias and the effect of external?

Bibliography

Books

Buzan B. 1991. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era*. London: Harvester.

Buzan, B, Waever O. 2003. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, B, Waever O, De Wilde J. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Dubois W E B. 2008. *The Souls of Black Folk*. The Project Gutenberg Ebook.

Fanon F. 1967. *The Wretched of the Earth*.

Farer T. 1979. *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Fisher R J. 2005. *Paving the Way: Contributions of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking*. Chicago: Lexington Books

Hofstee, E. 2006. *Constructing a Good Dissertation: A Practical Guide to Finishing a Master or PhD on Schedule*. Sandton: EPE

Kothari, C.R. (2004) *Research Methodology. Methods and Techniques*. New Age International Publishers

Mulungeta K. 2009. *The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD*. Addis Ababa: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Sheehan M. 2005. *International Security: An Analytical Survey*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Journal Articles, Newspapers, Reports

Angueck B M. 2014. Can IGAD mediators resolve the conflict of South Sudan? *Radio Tamuz* (16 July)

- Debay T. 2008. *The Nile: Is it a Curse or Blessing?* Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 174
- Daley S. 2015. What's happening with the South Sudan peace process? Nobody seems to know. 5 June 2015. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk>. Accessed 12 April 2016.
- Healy, S. 2009. *Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's Contribution to Regional Security*, Working Paper no. 59, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.
- Gatluak L. G. 2015. Analysis and Observations about South Sudan Peace Talks and IGAD-Plus Compromise Peace Agreement. *News Agency*. Friday April 29th 2016.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development. 2001. *IGAD Institutional Assessment*.
- Moller B. 2006. *Religion and Conflict in Africa*, Danish Institute for International Studies Copenhagen
- Okuk J. 2016. *Return of Dr. Machar to Juba and Next Political Move*. Tuesday 26 April
- Lunn J. 2011. *In Brief: The Horn of Africa- Review of Events During 2010 and Prospects for 2011*. UK House of Commons Library Research Papers, House of Commons Library, London
- Markakis J. 1995. *Environmental Degradation and Social Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation
- Mengisteab K. 2011. *Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa's Raging Conflicts*, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala
- Mesfin B. 2015. The Regionalisation of the South Sudanese Crisis. *East Africa Report*. Issue 4, June
- Salih M. 2011. *Transnational Islamist (Jihadist) Movements and Inter- State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa*. Nordic Africa Institute 2011(2), Uppsala.
- South Sudan Forms Transitional Government of National Unity April 28, 2016 (Juba)
- South Sudan Humanitarian Project. 2016. *South Sudan Macro-Conflict Analysis: Informing Operating Assumptions of Humanitarian Action*. Workshop Outcome Paper: July 2015
- Weber A, Ajak B, Mosley J. 2014. *Division and Conflict in South Sudan: Domestic Politics and Key Actors*. Chatham House.
- Sudan Tribune. 19 January. 2015.

Sudan Tribune. 11 March. 2015.

Sudan Tribune. 8 April. 2015.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2008) *Horn of Africa Crisis Report December 2008*. A Report to the Regional Humanitarian Partnership Team.

United States Institute of Peace (2004) *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. United States Institute of Peace Special Reports Issue 113.

Internet Sources

Mesfin B (2013) The Horn of Africa Security Complex, Institute for Security Studies. www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=169057, Accessed 2 March 2016.

The Positive (2010) South Sudan and its Dimensions of Interests. <http://thepositive.com/south-sudan-and-its-dimensions-of-interests/#sthash.d3GIMfwE.dpuf>. Accessed on 24 March 2016.

Reuters in Juba Thursday 27 August 2015. South Sudan's President Salva Kiir signs peace deal despite 'serious reservations.' <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/27/south-sudan-president-salva-kiir-signs-peace-deal-despite-serious-reservations>. Accessed 12 April 2016.

Marima T (2015) Can South Sudan's Fragile Peace Agreement Endure? September 14. <https://theglobalobservatory.org>. Accessed 14 April 2016.

Kent (2016) What is a time line? <http://literacy.kent.edu/eureka/strategies/WhatisaTimeline.pdf>. Accessed 20 April 2016.

United Nation's Security Council Report, (2016) <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/south-sudan.php>.

Backstrand K. 2006. Multi-stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Rethinking Legitimacy, Accountability and Effectiveness. European Environment. John Wiley and Sons. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/eet. Accessed 9 April, 2015.

African Arguments, 2014, Addis Dispatches (Part Two): IGAD's credibility Seriously Damaged by South Sudan Summit Fiasco. africanarguments.org/2014/09/03. Accessed on 10 April 2015.

Katrandjiev V, 2012, Foreign Ministries: Managing Networks and Optimizing Value, www.diplomacy.edu. Accessed 10 April 2015.

APPENDIX 1

The Transitional Government of National Unity Members

No.	Name	Position	State	Tribe
1.	Cde. Salva Kiir Mayardit	Chairman	Warrap	Dinka
2.	Dr. Riek Machar Teny	1 st Vice Chairman	Unity	Nuer
3.	Cde. James Wani Igga	2 nd Vice Chairman	Central Equatoria	Bari
4.	Cde. Malik Agar	3 rd Vice Chairman	Blue Nile	Funj
5.	Cde. Pagan Amum Ukec	Secretary General	Upper Nile	Shilluk
6.	Dr. Ann Itto	Deputy Secretary General for Southern Sector	Eastern Equatoria	Madi
7.	Cde. Yasir Saed Arman	Deputy Secretary General for Northern Sector	Northerner	Khartoum
8.	Cde. Daniel Awet Akot	Member	Lakes	Dinka
9.	Cde. Kuol Manyang Juuk	Member	Jonglei	Dinka
10.	Cde. Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior	Member	Jonglei	Dinka

11.	Cde. John Luk Jok	Member	Jonglei	Nuer
12.	Cde. Jamie Nunu Komba	Member	W. Equatoria	Zande
13.	Cde. Mark Nyipuoc Obong	Member	W. Bahr El Gazal	Jurchol
14.	Cde. Clement Wani Konga	Member	C. Equatoria	Mundari
15.	Cde. Alisio Emore Ojatuk	Member	E. Equatoria	Lotuka
16.	Cde. Taban Deng Gai	Member	Unity	Nuer
17.	Cde, Paul Mayom Akec	Member	Lakes	Dinka
18.	Cde. Awut Deng Acuil	Member	Warrap	Dinka
19.	Cde. Akol Paul	Member	Warrap	Dinka
20.	Cde. Deng Alor Kuol	Member	Abyei	Dinka
21.	Cde. Nhial Deng Nhial	Member	Warrap	Dinka
22.	Cde. (Late) Samson Kwaji	Member	C. Equatoria	Pajulu
23.	Cde. Paul Malong Awan	Member	N. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
24.	Cde. Lual Diing Wol	Member	N. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
25.	Cde. Abdul Aziz Adam El Allawe	Member	Nuba Mountains	Nuba

S/No.	Name	Position	State	Region	Tribe
1.	Fr. Pio Kuac	Religious Affairs	Upper Nile	G. Equatoria	Shilluk
2.	Mr. John Kong Nyuon	Security Affairs	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
3.	Dr. Joseph Nguen M.	Social Service	Unity	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
4.	Mr. Kennedy Kayin	Peace and Reconciliation	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Murle
5.	Mr. Kong Kong Bol	Border Conflicts Resolution	Unity	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
6.	Mr. Alfred Lado Gore	Diplomacy	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Bari
7.	Mr. Tor Deng Mawien	Decentralization & Inter-Governmental Linkage	Warrap	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
8.	Madam Rebecca Nyandeng de-Mabior	Gender& Human Rights	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
9.	Mr. Lual Diing Wol	Political Affairs	N. Bhar El-Ghazal	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
10.	Mr. Joseph Lagu Yanga	Special Advisor	E. Quatoria	G. Equatoria	Madi
11.	Mr. Telar Ring Deng	Legal Advisor	Lakes	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
12.	Lt. Gen. Salva Mathok Geng	Advisor on SPLA Affairs	Warrap	G. Bhar El-Gazal	Dinka

13.	Steven Madut Bak	Regional Cooperation Affairs	Warrap	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
14.	Cornillo Befo	Monitoring and Integrity in Governance	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Bari

GOSS Ministers

S/No.	Name	Ministry	State	Region	Tribe
1.	Mr. Kosti Manibi	Cabinet Affairs	Western Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Moru
2.	Dr. Cirino Hiteng	Presidential Affairs	Eastern Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Lotuka
3.	Mr. Nhial Deng Nhial	SPLA & Veteran Affairs	Warrap	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
4.	Mr. Gier Chuang Aluong	Internal Affairs	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
5.	Mr. David Deng Athorbei	Finance & Economic Planning	Lakes	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
6.	Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin	Information	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
7.	Mr. Michael Makuei Lueth	Parliamentary Affairs	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka

8.	Mr. Madut Biar Yiel	Telecommunication and Postal Services	N. Bahr El-Gazal	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
9.	Mrs. Nyanlok Tiong Garluak	Animal Recourses and Fishers	Unity	G. Equatoria	Nuer
10.	Mrs. Awut Deng Achuil	Labour, and Public Service.	Warrap	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
11.	Mr. Lino Makana	Transports and Road	W. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Zande
12.	Mrs Jamie Nunu Komba	Housing & Physical Planning	W. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Zande
13.	Dr. Ann Ito	Agriculture & Forestry	E. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Madi
14.	Mr. John Luk Jok	Legal Affairs & Constitutional Development	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
15.	Dr. Luka Manoja	Health	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Bari
16.	Ms. Agnes Losuba	Gender, Social Welfare& Religious Affairs	Central E. State	G. Equatoria	Kakwa
17.	Mr. Stephen Dhieu	Commerce & Industry	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
18.	Mr. Deng Alor Kuol	Regional Cooperation	Abyei	Abyei	Dinka
19.	Mr. Garang Diing Akuong	Energy & Mining	N. Bhar El Gazal	G. Bhar El Gazal	Dinka

20.	Jemmy Lemi Milla (late)	Cooperatives & Rural Develop.	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Pajulu
21.	Dr. Michael Mille Hussien	Education	W. Bahr El-Gazal	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Fertit
22.	Mr. Gabriel Changson Chang	Culture & Heritage	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
23.	Lt. Gen. Oyay Deng Ajak	Investment	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Shilluk
24.	Mr. Abdallah Albert	Wildelife Conservation & Tourism	E. Equatoria	G; Equatoria	Abakaya
25.		Environment			
26.	Mr. Joseph Ukel	Higher Education, Science & Technology	W. Bahr El-Gazel	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Jurchol
27.	Mr. Makuach Teny Yok	Youth, Sports & Recreation	Unity	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
28.	Mr. James Kok Ruai	Humanitarian Affairs & Disaster Management	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
29.	Mr. Paul Mayom Akec	Water Resources & Irrigation	Lakes	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
30.	Mr. Pagan Amum Ukac	Peace & CPA Affairs	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Shilluk

31.	Mary Jervas Yak	Human Resource Development	Warrap	G. Bahr El-Ghazal	Dinka
-----	-----------------	----------------------------	--------	-------------------	-------

Plus two ministers without portfolios which totaled 33 ministries in all.

GOSS Independent Commissions and Chambers

Ser	Name	Commission	State	Region	Tribe
1.	Dr. Pauline Riak	Anti-corruption	Lakes	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
2.	Dr. Deng Dongring	Public Grievances Chamber	Warrap	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
3.	Mr. Steven Wondu	Auditor Chamber	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Kuku
4.	Rev. William Chan	Relief & Rehabilitation	Warrap	G. Bahr El Ghazal	Dinka
5.	Mr. Jarkuc Barac	De-mining Authority	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
6.	Mr. Peter Guang Akiech	Peace & Reconciliation	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Shilluk
7.	Mr. William Deng Deng	Demobilization, Disarmament Reintegration	Warrap	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
8.	Dr. Bellario Ahoy Ngong	HIV/AIDS	N. Bhar El-Ghazal	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka

10.	Mr. Isaiah Chol Aruai	Census, Statistic and Evaluation	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
11.	Mr Lawrence Korbandy	Human Rights	W. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Moru
12.	Alakaya Aligo Samson	Reconstruction and Development Fund	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Kakwa
13.	Mrs Philister Baya Lawiri	Civil service	E. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Lokoro
14.	Mr. Robert Lado Loki	Land Commission	Central Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Kakwa
15.	Mr. Dhiou Mathok	Employees Justice Chamber	N. Bahr El-Gazal	G. Bhar El - Gazal	Dinka
16.	Mr. Ben Robin Oduho	War disable, Widow & Orphans	E. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Lotuka
17.	Prof. Ajuoi Magot Chol	Southern Electricity Corporation	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
18.	Mr. Gabriel Mathiang Rok	Southern Sudan Fiscal, Financial Allocation & Monitoring	Lakes	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
19.	Mr. Kawach Makuei	War Veterans	N. Bahr El-Gazal	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka

20.	Mr. Daniel Deng Lual	Bureau for Community on Small Arms Control	Warrap	G. Bahr El- Gazal	Dinka
21.	Mr. Koak Guok	Local Government Board	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Nuer

GOSS Under-Secretaries

Ser	Name	Ministry	State	Tribe
1.	Selvatoria Garang Mabior	Finance and Economic Planning (Finance)	Warrap	Dinka
2.	Aggri Tesi Saboni	Finance and Economic Planning (Planning)	C. Equatoria	Kuku
3.	Elisabeth Manou Majok	Commerce & Industry	Jonglei	Dinka
4.	William Ater Machiek	Energy and Mining	Lakes	Dinka
5.	Juma Stephen Luga	Telecommunications & Postal Services	Central Equatoria	Bari
6.	Martin Mou Mou	Education , Science& Technology	Warrap	Dinka
7.	Dr.Olivia G. Lomoru	Health	C. Equatoria	Bari
8.	Eng. Reymond Pitya	Roads & Transport	Central Equatoria	Bari
9.	Ochan John Bongomin	Electricity Corporation	E. Equatoria	Acholi

10.	Dr. Daniel Wani	Wildlife Conservation & Tourism	Central Equatoria	Bari
11.	Crispin Abugo Paul	Urban Water Corporation	W. Bhar El-Ghazal	
12.	Eng. Isaac Liabwel C. Yol	Water Resource & Irrigation	Lakes	Dinka
13.	Jaden Emilio	Agriculture and Forestry(Forestry)	Central Equatoria	Pajulu
14.		Agriculture and Forestry (Agriculture)	Warrap	Dinka
15.	Dr. Mokuei Malual	Animal Resources and Fisheries	Warrap	Dinka
16.	Bortel Mori Nyomble	Co-operatives & Rural Development	W. Equatoria	Bari
17.	Mrs Salwa Jebril	President's Office	Warrap	Dinka
18.	Abdon Agaw	Cabinet Affairs	Jonglei	Dinka
19.	Mark Nyikang Yomon	Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly	Upper Nile	Shilluk
20.	Mrs Rebecca Jashua	Labour, Public service & HRD	Upper Nile	Shilluk
21.	Dr. Julia Aker Duany	Parliamentary Affairs	Jonglei	Nuer
22.	Mr. Majok Guandong	Regional Co-operation	Jonglei	Nuer

23.	Gordon Soro Yisaya	Local Government Board	Central Equatoria	Bari
28.	Justice. Reuben Madol	Judiciary of Southern Sudan	Warrap	Dinka
29.	Jeremiah Sawaka	Legal Affairs& Constitutional Development	C. Equatoria	Bari
30.	Mrs. Margret Matthew Mathiang	Gender, Social Welfare& Religious Affairs	Unity	Nuer
31.	Peter Baptist Abaker	Culture & Heritage	W. Bhar El-Ghazal	Balanda
32.	Justice John Wuol Makec	President, Judiciary S. Sudan	Warrap	Dinka
33.	Justice Chan Rech Madut	Vice President, Judiciary SS	Warrap	Dinka
34.	Mr. Elijah Malok Deng	President, Bank of S. Sudan	Jonglei	Dinka
35.	Mr. Cornelio Koryom	Vice President, BOSS	Warrap	Dinka
36.	Mr. Jok Madut Jok	Youth & Sport		Dinka
37.	Mr. Michael George Garang	Information	Jonglei	Dinka
38.	Mr. Ambassador Moh Ajang	Humanitarian Affairs	Upper Nile	Dinka
39.	Mrs Beatrice	Peace & CPA Implementation	C. Equatoria	Kakwa
40.	Mr. Akuei	Investment	Jonglei	Dinka

SPLA, Internal security and other security organs

No.	Name	Position	State	Tribe
1.	1 st Lt. Gen. James Hoth Mai	Chief of General Staff SPLA	Upper Nile	Nuer
2.	Lt. Gen. Ping Deng Majok	Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration & Finance	Abyei	Dinka
3.	Lt. General Deng Wek	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations	Jonglei	Dinka
4.	Lt. General Biar Atem	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics	Jonglei	Dinka
5.	Lt. General Mabuto Mamur	Deputy Chief of Staff for Moral & Political Orientations	Eastern Equatoria	Lotuka
6.	Lt. General Majak Agot	South Sudan National Security Service (Special Branch)	Jonglei	Dinka
7.	1st Lt. Gen. Achuil Tito	Inspector General Police	Warrap	Dinka
8.	1st Lt. Gen. Agasio A. Tong	Inspector Gen. Prison Service	Warrap	Dinka
9.	1st Lt. Gen. Aru Maan Chot	Inspector Gen. Fire Brigade	Jonglei	Dinka

10.	Major General John Lat	Military Intelligence	Lakes	Dinka
11.	Major General Marial Nuor	Public Security	Lakes	Dinka

APPENDIX 2

List of Governors

State	Name	Since
Amadi	Joseph Pachiko	24 December 2015
Aweil	Ronald Ruai Deng	24 December 2015
Aweil East	Deng Deng Akuei	24 December 2015
Boma	Baba Medan Konyi	24 December 2015
Eastern Bieh	Peter Bol Kong Nguoth	24 December 2015
Eastern Lakes	Ring Tueny Mabol	24 December 2015
Eastern Nile	Chol Thon Balok	24 December 2015
Gbudwe	Patrick Raphael Zamoi	24 December 2015
Gogrial	Abraham Gum Makuach	24 December 2015
Gok	Madang Majok Meen	24 December 2015
Imatong	Natisio Loluke Manir	24 December 2015
Jonglei	Philip Aguer Panyang	24 December 2015
Jubek	Augustino Jadalla Wani	24 December 2015
Latjoor	Peter Lam Buoth	24 December 2015

Lol	Rizik Zachariah Hassan	24 December 2015
Maridi	Africano Monday	24 December 2015
Namorunyang	Louise Lobong Lojore	24 December 2015
Northern Liech	Joseph Monytuul	24 December 2015
Ruweng	Mayol Kur	24 December 2015
Southern Liech	Teker Riek Dong	24 December 2015
Terekeka	Juma Ali Malou	24 December 2015
Tonj	Akech Tong Aleu	24 December 2015
Twic	Bona Pariek Biar	24 December 2015
Wau	Elias Waya Nyipouch	24 December 2015
Western Bieh	James Kok Ruai	24 December 2015
Western Lakes	Abraham Makoi Bol	24 December 2015
Western Nile	William Othon Awer	24 December 2015
Yei River	David Lokonga Moses	24 December 2015

APPENDIX 3

Interview Guide

This interview is being conducted by Nkosana Graduate Moyo (Major) a M.Sc. International Relations student at the University of Zimbabwe assisted by Nomatter Masuku(Sergeant, ZDF PRD) as part of his dissertation research on the topic: **The Efficacy of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in North-Eastern Africa Region Peace Initiatives: The Case of South Sudan**. Your responses will be used for academic purposes and the identity of interviewees protected. The following questions fall under three objectives of the research, which are: to trace the origin and evolution of the South Sudan conflict highlighting underlying causes, issues, and key actors involved; to analyze IGAD's peace and security mandate versus festering conflict in the Horn of Africa; and to examine the role of IGAD in resolving the South Sudan conflict.

Research Questions

Objective 1: To trace the origin and evolution of the South Sudan conflict highlighting underlying causes, issues, and key actors involved.

Start of Conflict

1. What in your view started the conflict? What were its causes?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

2. Why is there so many armed groups in South Sudan?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

3. The Republic of South Sudan has been accused of fomenting conflict in South Sudan, in particular by supporting Dr Riek Machar, what is your view on this assertion?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Course of the Conflict

4. How has the conflict unfolded? What keeps it going?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

5. What in your view made the conflict spread so fast?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

6. What has been the attitude of the President Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar to the atrocities resulting from their two forces fighting?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Ending the Conflict

Objective 2: To analyze IGAD's peace and security mandate versus festering conflict in the Horn of Africa

7. Does IGAD have the institutional capacity and the political will to deal with the complex and prolonged conflict in South Sudan?

.....
.....
.....

8. What will be the most appropriate way to solve the South Sudan conflict?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

9. How has regional politics affected political settlement in South Sudan?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

10. Observing the international pressure on Dr Machar in Ethiopia to go back to Juba one can even question the extent of IGAD's role in the peace process. Do you think and feel that at times international actors such as the USA and United Nations (UN) at times take a superior role to IGAD? What could be the implications for long lasting peace and regional dynamics?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

11. How in your view has the ethnic dimension contributed to the escalation of the conflict?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Objective 3: To examine the role of IGAD in resolving the South Sudan conflict.

12. What are the peace initiatives implemented by IGAD in South Sudan?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

13. In your view what has been the problem with current peace efforts?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

14. What role should IGAD play?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

15. With the return of Dr Riek Machar what are the next stages in the formation of a government of national unity and for a lasting settlement?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

16. What is your take on a federalist solution to South Sudan's conflict?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

17. How can one explain the different successes and failures between IGAD and other regional organisations such as SADC?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

APPENDIX 4

List of Deputy Ministers

1. Cirino Hiteng, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, (FDs)
2. David Yauyau, Deputy Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, (SPLM-IG)
3. Gabriel Duop Lam, Deputy Minister of Interior, (SPLM-IO)
4. Matison Otoromoi, Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, (SPLM-IG).
5. Akol Paul Kordit, Deputy Minister of Information, Communication, Technology and Postal Service, (SPLM-IG).
6. Mary Jarvas Yak, Deputy Minister of Finance and Planning (SPLM-IG).
7. Kornelio Kon Guk, Agriculture and Food Security (OPPs).
8. Elizabeth Achol Yol, Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development (SPLM-IO).