

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF SADC IN
MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN MADAGASCAR
(2009-2013):**

BY

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Abstract

SADC evolved from the loose community of post independent Southern African countries that formed the frontline states. The FLS then later changed into the Southern African Development Coordination Committee. The core thrust of this organisation was mainly that of a regional economic community. However, this changed as time went on and the member states become more intertwined and interdependent to include political stability and military security of the region. The result was the promulgation of the Mutual Defence Pact and the organ on Politics, Security and Defence Cooperation. The institutions were designed to be conflict resolution mechanisms that would strengthen the role of SADC in maintaining peace and stability in the region. This role has been tested in various cases such as the DRC, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. This study focused on the case of Madagascar. This is because Madagascar was a unique case as it was not physically and geographically attached to the rest of SADC. The study was guided by the realism theory and the theory of complex interdependency. These theories helped to unpack the complexities of interstate regional relations within the context of a regional economic community. Complex interdependency helped to explain why it would be in the best interests of SADC member states to stop and contain conflict and instability in a member state. Realism made sense of the various self-serving motivations that may fuel states to actively participate in some interventions and refrain from doing so in other areas. The coup that ousted Ravalomanana by Rajoelina in Madagascar presented a prime opportunity for the utilisation of SADC conflict resolution mechanisms. SADC took over the mediation of the crisis after the African Union and the United Nations gave it the lead role as the REC body responsible for the region. The study was largely a qualitative study and used qualitative research methods in data collection and analysis. Data was gathered from documentary search and key informant interviews. Respondents were sampled using purposive sampling and were picked from the ministry of foreign Affairs, the Zimbabwe military, academia and experts in regional integration and security studies. The study found that though SADC had played an integral role in bringing peace and legitimacy back to Madagascar, there were many flaws in its conflict resolution mechanisms that affected its efficacy in promoting peace and stability in Madagascar. These were largely the division between the doves and hawks, nationalism and the self-interests of member states. SADC also lacks permanent mediation and conflict resolution machinery that makes conflict resolution an ad hoc process. This especially showed itself during the Madagascar crisis where SADC was on the back foot to international and continental bodies such as the U.N and the A.U. also SADC suffers from the overemphasis on the principles of state sovereignty and regime solidarity which leave little room for SADC to take proactive intervention measures. The study encountered difficulties in accessing vital information because some of the respondents did not have a firm grasp of the subject matter while others were uncooperative. Also the political situation in Madagascar is still unfolding, despite there having been elected a new government.

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Dedications

This work is dedicated to my family.

Acronyms

ANC	: African National Congress
AU	: African Union
AUPSC	: African Union Peace and Security Council
COMESA	: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
ESAP	: Economic and Structural Adjustment Program
FDI	: Foreign Direct Investment
FLS	: Frontline States
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GNU	: Government of National Unity
GPA	: Global Political Agreement
HTA	: High Transitional Authority
ICG	: International Crisis Group
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
ISDC	: Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
MDC	: Movement for Democratic Change
MDP	: Mutual Defence pact
MFA	: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
OIF	: Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie
OPDS	: Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
PMCRO	: Permanent Mediation and Conflict Resolution Organ
REC	: Regional Economic Community
RENAMO	: Mozambican National Resistance
REWS	: Regional Early Warning System
SADC	: Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG	: SADC Standby Brigade
SADCC	: Southern African Development Coordinating Committee
TGA	: Transitional Government Authority
TIM	: Tiako I Madagasikara (I love Madagascar Party)

UCG	: Unconstitutional Change of Government
UN	: United Nations
UNITA	: United Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USAID	: United States Agency for International Development
WB	: World Bank
WFP	: World Food Programme
ZANU PF	: Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZNA	: Zimbabwe National Army
ZNDC	: Zimbabwe National Defence College

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the most peaceful region in Africa with fewer ongoing conflicts, despite being the last portion of Africa to be decolonized (International Crisis Group ICG 2012). This could be attributed to the strength of resolve of the SADC community and the close cooperation of the countries in the management of potential conflict situations. It could also be said that the SADC region is the most organised in terms of intra-regional conflict management, leaving little room for external interference. While this may be, there still remain challenges and ongoing threats to the prevailing peace and stability within the SADC region. The SADC region also has some of the most intensely nationalistic liberation struggle parties which are still in power. More importantly, there remains a strong culture of political solidarity among the former liberation movements (now governments in power) who have committed to non-interference in the internal affairs of members states with attendant negative effects on governance in general within the region (International Crisis Group - ICG, 2012: 1). These former liberation movements exert their nationalistic ideologies couched in sovereignty mantras. The International Crisis Group considers this to be amongst the toughest challenges which the region faces and it argues that “as long as national sovereignty prevails over regional interests, the success of SADC conflict resolution mechanisms will remain limited” (ICG 2012:2). This is against the backdrop of SADCs failure to resolve conflicts within the region and demonstrable limited capacity to enforce agreements it would have brokered.

Now constituting 15 countries, the membership of SADC includes Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Kingdom of Lesotho, Madagascar, the Republic of Malawi, Mauritius, People’s Republic of Mozambique, Namibian Republic, the Seychelles Republic, the Republic of South Africa, the Kingdom of Swaziland, the United Republic of United Republic of Tanzania, Zambian Republic and the Republic of Zimbabwe. The organisation succeeded the original Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) which was formed in 1980, with the change being made in Windhoek, Namibia in 1996 (ibid). The initial thrust of SADC was to foster regional economic development, specifically through lessening over reliance on the then apartheid South Africa (ibid). However, the organisation has evolved and grown to encompass the overall security and

stability of the region. According to SADC (2014), “The Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) ratified in 2003 a framework for mutual defense and security cooperation among member states in the face of external aggression.” The MDP envisages the SADC countries commitment and desire to build upon mutual cooperation within the regional military alliance or security community. The region has however continuously faced security challenges emanating from internal political conflicts within member states, such as Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, and more recently in Zimbabwe and Madagascar (ICG 2012). SADCs capacity and resolve to foster and sustain peace and stability in the region has been continuously tested through the persistent political and economic crises’ in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Madagascar. These crises have constantly had to be referred to the SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS, the Organ).

The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation of 2001 (the Protocol) outlines the overall objective of the OPDS as the promotion of peace and security within the SADC region (SADC). The OPDS is further guided by several specific objectives within the Protocol, which outline its mandate as to: protect the people; promote security, political and defense cooperation; develop compatible foreign policy goals and build collective security capacity to respond to external threats; conduct peacekeeping and resolve intra- and inter-state conflicts; promote the development of democratic institutions in member states; implement international conventions (United Nations/African Union and others); uphold principles of international law; develop cooperation between police and security services to combat domestic and cross-border crime; and enhance regional capacity for disaster management and humanitarian assistance.

These objectives emphasise SADC’s recognition of the symbiotic relationship which subsists between development and security and further the need to balance the demands of both state and human security. According to Cawthra (2010), “Madagascar has a history of fragile democratic transition. The country became a member of SADC in August 2005, in what was seen by some as then-President Ravalomanana’s intention to broaden bilateral and multilateral relations beyond the post-colonial influence of the French.” As a member of SADC, Madagascar comes under the ambit of the bloc’s conflict resolution mechanisms. Therefore SADC has an obligation and the political mandate to ensure peace, security and stability in that country and all other member countries by virtue of this membership. The political crisis in Madagascar began when in March 2009 Andry Rajoelina, successfully staged a coup against the incumbent President, Marc Ravalomanana, thereby deposing of the

former regime. The coup plotters then formed a transitional government which was supposed to guide the country to elections. Prior to these events, the conflict within Madagascar had been simmering for over a decade, culminating in the political turbulence which subsequently led to the coup. These problems had emanated from the intransigence of Didier Ratsiraka, who after losing elections to Ravalomanana in the 2001 plebiscite, had refused to vacate from the office of President. After this, Ravalomanana struggled for legitimacy. The escalation of this standoff resulted in the African Union (AU) imposing a suspension of Madagascar's membership of the continental body and spearheading initial efforts to end the crisis. The crisis came to an end when Ratsiraka went into exile in June of 2002.

The political crisis in Madagascar has roots in a personal rivalry between Andre Rajoelina and Marc Ravalomanana (Ploch and Cook 2012:13). The incumbent President had unfairly withheld financial resources for local government infrastructural projects in the capital city, diverted investment away from the city, and refusing to facilitate cooperation between central and municipal governments; efforts perceived to be targeted at Andre Rajoelina the strongest contender for the state Presidency (Ploch and Cook 2012:12). The coup thwarted the incumbent President Ravalomanana's attempts to stymie and stall a possible political challenge from Rajoelina during the next presidential elections. Rajoelina, as mayor of Antananarivo, had constantly locked horns with the president over the city's substantial debt and the State's harassment of his radio and television broadcasting stations.

This culminated in Rajoelina organizing mass protests, which ended in violence and the death of protesters at the hands of the military and police. This induced weeks of mass protests and national strikes, eventually bringing the collapse of Ravalomanana's government after the military entered into the fray, supporting Rajoelina's cause (Ploch and Cook 2012: 14). After the constitutional referendum of 2010 under the leadership of Rajoelina, there were several reported attempted coup plots by the military which however did not materialize (ibid: 16). It is pertinent to note that since its colonization by the French in 1946, Madagascar has always had an unstable history of political violence, coups and assassinations. More recently, the country has been in persistent political turmoil since the 2009 coup by Rajoelina and SADC has been inadvertently superintending over the anarchy. Though a roadmap was brokered in 2011 by SADC for an eventual election, this roadmap was constantly broken and disregarded by Rajoelina. According to Iloniana (2014), "a humanitarian crisis ensued as donor fatigue set in and foreign aid from the United States of America and the European Union reduced, leaving over 40 percent of the budget unfunded. This was to worsen with the removal of

preferential treatment for Madagascar's textiles in the American market, as exports were in decline (Plock and Cook 2012: 18). The African Union had also isolated the country by suspending it from the continental body and the international community imposing sanctions on the country. This led to the near collapse of the country's economy as funding sources dried up particularly from the United States of America, which according to Reuters (2012) had hitherto ran a US\$140 million humanitarian assistance program under USAID between 1999 and 2009. There has also been a military mutiny over unpaid salaries and attempts on Rajoelina's life. These events represent a country in persistent turmoil and may point to the inadequacy of SADCs conflict resolution and mediation role. It also points to a grimmer scenario, that SADC cannot effectively enforce its own rules over unconstitutional seizures of power and the maintenance of peace, security and stability for the regions citizens.

Despite these challenges, Dabire and Bi (2014:1) argue that, "Madagascar's economy grew albeit slowly, largely due to mining, by 1.9 percent in 2012 and 2.6 percent in 2013, with projections of 3.7 percent for 2014 and 5.4 percent for 2015, as the political climate in the country improves." Madagascar further took another step towards recovery from its five-year political crisis by successfully holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the last quarter of 2013. This opened the way for renewed international acceptance and revival of economic and social development. This pointed to an eventual success of the SADC intervention however slow. This study therefore sought to examine the effectiveness of SADCs intervention in the Madagascar political crisis of 2009

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Despite the existence of robust conflict management strategies, mechanisms and protocols on security cooperation within the SADC, some countries in the regional block have persistently encountered insecurity emerging from deep seated in-country political conflicts. There is a disproportionately large amount of research on the role which regional organisations and security communities can play in peace keeping missions, as compared to the study of the efficacy of conflict resolution mechanisms of and within the SADC region. Thus no study has yet been done to analyse the efficacy of the SADC's strategies in resolving internal political conflicts with finality. Therefore it is not fully understood why these strategies have failed where they have been used and the reasons why the targeted beneficiary countries continually revert back into political turmoil. This study seeks to analyse the role played by regional security cooperation organisations and security communities in the finalization and resolution of conflicts within the SADC security community and among the member states. Specifically

focusing on the case of the Madagascan political crisis of 2009, the study seeks to investigate the role which SADC played in the crisis in that country and the various concerted efforts at its resolution. Further, it is the study's express intention to assess the impact which the SADC conflict resolution mechanisms have had in resolving an ongoing conflict situation in the region with finality.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

- To examine the conflict resolution mechanisms within the SADC security community
- To assess the role played by SADC in the resolution of the Madagascan political crisis of 2009
- To analyse the efficacy of SADC's conflict resolution mechanisms in the Madagascan case
- To investigate the challenges encountered by SADC in brokering peace in Madagascar.
- To recommend strategies to improve the efficacy of SADC mediation efforts in conflict resolution

1.4 Research Questions

- What conflict resolution mechanisms are at the disposal of SADC?
- What role did SADC play in the resolution of the crisis in Madagascar?
- How effective were SADC interventions in restoring peace and security in Madagascar?
- What challenges did the SADC face as it sought to resolve the Madagascan crisis?
- How best can SADC adapt its conflict resolution strategies and mechanisms of conflict resolution to suit the contextual circumstances?

1.5 Proposition

Regional conflict resolution mechanisms for political crises in sovereign countries are fundamental aspects of regional security communities' peace-making and peacekeeping efforts. Failure to institute these conflict resolution mechanisms in instances of crises generates instability which can spread to other members of the security community.

1.6 Justification of the Study

While the principal purpose of research is to fully interrogate phenomena and add to the existing body of literature, it is also useful for informing problem solving strategies in times

of crisis. This study seeks not only to fully understand the impact of SADC mediation efforts in crises situations, as well as provide practical advice on the best way to resolve problems should they arise. The crisis in Madagascar was formed from decades-long grievances which had periodically recurred since they were never resolved with finality. By interrogating the efficacy of the strategies and mechanisms used to resolve these conflicts, it is envisaged that more comprehensive country specific strategies may be adopted in efforts to bring peace and security to Madagascar. It is this study's express intention to identify such alternative resolution mechanisms and to present these as applied research oriented conflict resolution.

If this study is not done, SADC will continue to use inappropriate conflict resolution strategies without being able to adjust its strategies and methods of intervention with dire consequences for the citizens of countries in the region. Further, the very legitimacy and utility of the SADC as a viable security community which can achieve the objectives which it sets for itself may further be compromised. Political insecurity and instability are anathema to development, while political turmoil also delays achievement of social transformation agendas of development oriented states. The purpose of this study is therefore to analyse the role of SADC in conflict resolution whilst in pursuit of its mandate as the guarantor of peace and security in the region.

Regional organisations such as SADC can and do play an important role in non-military peace-making and peace building efforts, which remain the subject of fewer academic inquiries and intergovernmental strategies. This study is relevant because the sincerity of SADC's response to the crisis is questionable. Subsequent coups in Madagascar have gone on to show that SADC has a very big role to play in the maintenance of peace, security, stability and legitimacy in the region, however how and when SADC is supposed to stamp its authority remains an area of contention. This study seeks to explore ways in which SADC can better be prepared to handle internal political conflict arising from coups and how its intervention can help build lasting peace and security.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

1.7.1 Realism

This study also utilizes the realist theory to analyse SADC conflict resolution and its utility in the Madagascar political crisis. Keohane (2001:16) posits that international politics is characterised by organised violence in its quest for power.

According to political realists, there are three central tenets of realism which are that states are coherent units that are the dominant actors in the international system, as such there can be no higher authority over the state. This tenet is important in analysing how states in SADC have sometimes resisted conflict resolution overtures from SADC in an effort to assert their sovereignty. The second tenet according to Keohane (ibid) is the use of force as a means of attaining and consolidating power. This assumption makes the use of force legitimate in the conduct of international relations. Thus the use of force by South Africa to restore legitimacy in Lesotho in 1998 may be viewed through this lens. The employment of force by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the DRC is also an example of force being used as a legitimate tool of foreign policy and conflict resolution within the auspices of SADC.

Keohane (2001:17) observes that realists – partly because of their assumption – undertake the notion that issues of military security dominates the other sectors of politics such as social and economic issues. This assumption relegates economic and social affairs to second and third tiers of importance in international relations, with military security being the dominant and overbearing issue of importance. This is in effect seen in the importance of the MDP in the SADC security and conflict resolution architecture. The preeminence of this protocol highlights that even though there are other important matters that SADC seeks to address, military security remains the highest priority.

Realism therefore helps to explain the instances in which SADC has used military force to resolve intrastate conflict and those instances in which it has used other means. This first tenet also highlights the fact that though economic and social issues are important they are only important in so far as they threaten the military security and regime stability of member states in the region.

1.7.2 Theory of Complex Interdependence

Complex interdependence explains the behaviour of an organisation such as SADC and the member states that form its core. As such complex interdependence will be helpful in explaining the importance of keeping each and every member of SADC politically stable and militarily secure.

This study will utilize the theory of complex interdependence to analyse the role of SADC in maintaining peace and stability in the region and its mediation efforts in Madagascar. This theory posits that as states become more developed; they become intertwined in more ways that supersede military relations and security. This negates the use of force in the conduct of

their relations with each other. This is largely because of the way in which modern day economies and societies have become highly intertwined to the point of blurring physical borders. Information Communication Technologies mean commerce is conducted on a scale previously unimaginable and this locks the interests and destinies of countries together. This interdependence makes war redundant as a tool of conducting foreign policy as it hurts all the parties involved.

Complex interdependence also posits that events in one country have the capacity to influence and shape events in another country. As such instability in Madagascar has the possibility to spread and foster instability in other parts of the region. This explains why SADC has consistently refused to legitimize power grabs through military or unconstitutional means. According to Keohane and Nye (1997:49), “in the post-World War II era countries have become more and more intertwined economically. The explosive growth in the size and number of transnational corporations has blurred state boundaries, rendering traditional realist assumptions about the centrality of the state questionable.” As such economic and developmental issues take the lead in cooperation among states.

There are largely three assumptions that Keohane and Nye make in their theory of complex interdependence such as formal and informal ties between ruling elites and foreign governments and intergovernmental organisations such as SADC. These channels of communication allow for a more comprehensive approach to security, including the use of mediators to defuse explosive situations and not necessarily employ armed force. The use of mediators also creates opportunities for the utilization of backchannels in situations too tense and delicate for face to face negotiation. This has been the case in the political crisis in Madagascar where envoys from SADC have taken the lead in brokering negotiations. This is despite the fact that countries such as Lesotho had called for the consideration of a military option to restore legitimacy in Madagascar. In light of this, the theory of complex interdependence explains why states in regional blocs will not employ force to solve disputes or in conflict resolution largely because of their shared economic, political and social interests in maintaining peace.

The second assumption made by Keohane and Nye is that the absence of a structured hierarchy in intergovernmental relations means that the military is not always involved. Thus there is a blurring of lines on what is purely domestic policy and foreign policy in a regional grouping like SADC. As such political instability can be discussed and solutions offered

within the context of a multilateral organisation such as SADC. This has been the norm with various political crises in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Madagascar being tabled for discussion. This opens up the state to external intervention by the regional body in cases where the Organ deems the security situation in member state to be an imminent threat to regional security and stability. This in essence takes away the focus from a state centric military based notion of security to a holistic and all inclusive human security paradigm. This allows for the involvement of SADC in a broad spectrum of domestic disputes that may threaten security in the region. Chief among these are unconstitutional power grabs, disputed elections and political instability caused by civil strife. These are issues that through complex interdependence the regional body can now take a proactive stance in resolving. Thus this theory explains the behaviour of not only individual states within SADC but also the behaviour of SADC itself as a multilateral institution.

The third assumption is that regional governments rarely use military force against each other due to interdependence issues but are likely to employ the use of force against foreign states. As such the MDP is purely a non-aggression pact for the defence of the region and its individual countries. This implies that states, individual or in a regional grouping, will not resort to the use of force in their relations with one another. This particularly explains the reluctance of SADC to use force to intervene in the domestic politics of a member state or as a way of ensuring compliance. This has however occurred in the isolated case of Lesotho in which the goal was to reinstate legitimacy

1.8 Literature Review

1.8.1 Background to the SADC Regional Economic Community

According to Ancas (2011:3), regional economic communities (RECs) have come to play an increasingly important role in the assurance of peace and security in Africa. While originally RECs may have been formed with an economic integration, trade and economic development mandate, this has recently since expanded as they have logically evolved into a coherent regional security community seeking regional peace and security (ibid). Security demands became more pressing and unavoidable as there was an observation of the destabilising impact of regional insecurity and instability from experiences elsewhere. This was not only informed by the threat of war as a potentially destabilising force, but also of its effects as an obstacle to socioeconomic development. War is an anathema to economic development and it unnecessarily disrupts the livelihoods of the local population, as well as their socio-economic transformation agendas post-independence. Therefore, the original motive for the

establishment of SADC has evolved from a largely economic role to one of ensuring peace and security within the region. This role has been reinforced through its successful interventions in various conflicts such as the war in the DRC, the coup in Lesotho, political disharmony in Zimbabwe and more recently in the case of Madagascar.

1.8.2 SADC Conflict resolution mechanisms

According to Dzinesa and Zambara SADC has a toolkit which it could use in its conflict resolution efforts: a regional monitoring mechanism, mediation, conflict prevention, fact finding missions, special envoys, informal consultations, peace building and targeted development activities. Levitt (2001: 66) identifies conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution as other useful tools at the disposal of SADC for the resolution of conflict and maintenance of peace. According to Levitt (2001: 67) the SADC Organ on Politics, Security and Defence (the Organ) is a robust conflict management mechanism which exists in SADC region. However, despite this, there is “an over-arching non-interventionist tone in the SADC protocol establishing the organ, possibly this was infused into the protocol due to the geo-political tensions and rivalry between Zimbabwe and South Africa” (Levitt 2001:67). In terms of the protocol, SADC still requires consent from a country for it to activate enforcement mechanisms to avert conflict, a major weakness in this protocol.

However, despite this key challenge SADC is still considered to have the greatest capability, within the African Union body, to engage in long term conflict resolution mainly because of the technological and military assets at its disposal (Levitt 2001: 67). SADC has constantly relied on these mechanisms in its peace-making, peace building and peace keeping missions wherever it has deployed, especially within the region. This is possibly why SADC has remained the most peaceful region in Africa, despite the exceptional cases of Lesotho, DRC, Mozambique, Madagascar and Zimbabwe.

1.8.3 SADCs role in conflict resolutions

Zimbabwe – In the case of Zimbabwe where there was a potentially explosive situation and rumours of war abounded, the SADC Organ used mediation (Thabo Mbeki and “silent diplomacy”), special envoys (Rev. Frank Chikane), fact finding missions, election monitoring (SADC Observer Election Mission), informal consultations (Kariba, GPA negotiations), conflict prevention, management and resolution (the GNU/Transitional Government Authority) to diffuse the problem with excellent results (Adebajo 2008:131). The country which had been headed down a slippery slope towards internal war rhetoric had reached fever pitch levels during the period of intense economic hardships.

Somalia - Adebajo (2008:131) advances that African nations have since 1994 been forced to seek internal recourse after Western states countries distanced themselves from African conflicts. In light of this, SADC has taken on an increasingly active role not only in the maintenance of peace and security within the region, but also advancing the adoption of democratic practices within the region and further afield in Africa. The SADC countries have committed to ensuring peace and stability returns to Somalia by contributing troops to both the UN and AU missions to Somalia. This is further demonstrated by SADC's MDP which does not tolerate unconstitutional power grabs in the region. However these stances came to a test during the Madagascar political crisis which put to the test SADC's willingness to enforce its principles militarily or otherwise using other means.

Because of the increased role of SADC in maintaining peace and security across the region SADC has come up with water-tight security measures to prop up democracy while at the same time upholding absolute sovereignty and solidarity pillars (Hammerstad 2005 :269). The emphasis on absolute sovereignty has in instances such as the Madagascar crisis caused not only indecision among the member states but also derailed the regional bloc from taking proactive measures to stop unconstitutional power grabs as occurred in Madagascar. ICG (2011:14) notes that King Mswati III was a strong proponent of a military solution whilst other regional powerhouses such as South Africa were in favour of a diplomatic solution. It is safe to argue that a military solution would have been much more effective in restoring order and constitutionality in Madagascar in a relatively short period of time. Military action would also have had the effect of sending a clear message that unconstitutional takeovers of power would not be tolerated in SADC. However, the diplomatic institutional effects on the principle of sovereignty which remains sacred in the regional bloc and within the AU are paradigm shifts that member states are not willing to tamper with.

1.8.4 Challenges Encountered by SADC in Conflict Situations

DRC – SADC was immensely involved in the DRC conflict. At one point SADC members Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia had their troops actively executing a SADC sanction military intervention in the DRC. However, Van Nieuwkerk (2006:6) argues that the intergovernmental organisation is more focused on protecting member states interests as opposed to making authoritative political decisions. This is because of the vastly differentiated approaches that member states have advanced for in terms of regional political interventions. Williams (2005:7) adds that the regional grouping's shortcomings were exposed in the 1998 DRC war when disunity and selfish interest came to the fore. For

example, South Africa is more assertive and militant when it comes to political instability in Lesotho arising from incessant military coups because of its strategic business and water resource interests in Lesotho. This is however in stark contrast to its vehement resistance to military intervention in the DRC which was eventually executed by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Zimbabwe might be argued to have had vested interests in that country aside from simply keeping the peace and restoring a legitimate government. Adetula (2008:9) argues that differences in either employing military or diplomatic solutions in DRC created paralysing tension among SADC member states such as Zimbabwe and South Africa. The same divisions also characterized SADC mediation of the Zimbabwean political crisis, with countries such as Botswana advocating international involvement through the U.N, Ancas (2011:12). These issues have as such played a role in how SADC intervenes in times of crises and in way these fissures maybe argued to have fragmented SADCs overall approach in the political crisis in Madagascar.

1.8.5 Lessons and best practices for SADC to improve

According to Plock and Cook (2012) the deep seated culture of political solidarity amongst the leaderships of countries still being led by liberation struggle nationalists has been a constant hindrance to successful conflict mediation and resolution efforts. Most of these countries take the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of a country very seriously, even going to the extreme of non-compliance and threatening to exit any regional organisation which compels them to do so. Zimbabwe exemplified its behaviour with a pull-out from the Commonwealth countries platform and its resistance to the rulings of the SADC Tribunal to which it was signatory. Zimbabwe also almost left the regional grouping at the height of the 2013 after the expiration of the tenure of the Government of National Unity (GNU). This culture is deep seated as Botswana similarly threatened a pull out of SADC over its deviant position on the Zimbabwean election of 2013. More recently, South Africa's ruling African National Congress have resolved and threatened a pull-out from the International Criminal Court over its insistence on persecuting that country's leadership over its decision to allow Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir to leave South Africa freely, despite a court ruling. It would seem political solidarity takes precedence among African political leaderships to compliance to principles of international law. Furthermore the economic cost of military action is also a very important factor that proponents of such action should keep in mind.

Ancas (2011:12) however raises the crucial point that despite the shortcomings of SADC, the bloc has managed to keep the region relatively stable as compared to other regions on the

African continent. Ancas (2011:12) notes that the regional organisation is more interested in reducing violence among member states than in eliminating underlying problems as is the case in the regional efforts in Madagascar. In this argument, the core objective of SADC is the maintenance of peace and security within the region, the solution of social and other domestic political problems is a function of individual states themselves. This is because of the complexity and sheer impossibility of trying to deal with these problems one by one and also because it would violate the sovereignty of the regional blocs member states themselves. As such one can safely argue that SADC executed its role of mediator and guarantor of peace in the region during the Madagascar political crisis in the most appropriate manner. Factors that are important to weigh in this assertion are that the crisis did not degenerate into a full scale civil war; SADC mapped out a negotiated return to constitutionality and stuck to its principles by refusing to recognise the government of Rajoelina. This was a strong message that resonated that SADC would not tolerate any unconstitutional power grabs.

1.9 Methodology

1.9.1 Research Design

This study was structured as a descriptive qualitative case study. The researcher employed qualitative research methods in data gathering, sampling techniques and data analysis. It was descriptive in that it described and analysed past events and exploratory in that it sought new ways to suggest how SADC can improve its role of maintaining peace and security in the region. Its philosophy was informed by the interpretive approach to social science as explained by Neuman (2007: 43-4). The data gathering techniques utilised were key informant interviews and documentary search, while the sampling methods relied upon were purposive and snowball sampling. According to Neuman (2007:43), explaining the interpretive research approach, human social life is based less on objective, hard, factual reality. Rather people interact with each other, not basing on what is real, but rather basing on what they believe to be real. People continuously create ideas, relationships, symbols and roles, which they consider to be meaningful, or important.

Social reality is fluid and only qualitative data can capture these fluid processes of social reality. Interpretive researchers are thus skeptical of and reject attempts to produce quantitative measures of observable acts.

A case study involves observing a small set intensely over time (Neuman 2007: 18, 20). In case study research, the researcher examines, in depth, many features of a few cases over a

period of time, with very detailed, varied, and extensive data, often in qualitative form. These selected cases are chosen to illustrate an issue and study it in detail and considers the specific context of each case. Effectiveness in conflict resolution and the maintenance of peace is largely a value-laden issue and as such the results from the research could only be adequately interpreted if analysed and gathered through qualitative methods. As such the study was largely descriptive and exploratory in nature.

1.9.2 Data Collection Techniques

This study used the following data collection techniques: interviews and documentary search (Neuman 2007: 20-2). Babbie (2010: 274) describes the interview as a data collection instrument in which the interviewer asks questions of another (a respondent); it can be collected either face-face or by telephone.

1.9.2.1 Key Informant Interviews

According to USAID (1996:1) the term key informant refers to a person who can provide detailed information and opinions about a subject base on his/her knowledge of the subject. The key informant interview involves an in-depth and qualitative conversation with a respondent; the key strength is that it allows for a free flow of information, the interviewer can frame questions spontaneously, immediately probe for information and follow up on responses for further clarification (USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 1996:1). This type of interview is useful when: qualitative, descriptive information is sufficient for decision making; when there is a need to understand motivation, behaviour and perspectives of key players; when the main purpose of research is to generate recommendations. Key informant interviews helped to find out the how and why of what happened. However, challenges with key informant interviews are: difficulty in prove truthfulness of data, the threat of interviewer and informant bias, and their limitations when quantitative data are needed. There are also challenges in analysing the large amount of qualitative information collected through this method. These may be offset by the strengths of the method as: information is collected directly from people in the know, there is great flexibility to explore a wide range of issues through the interview, and they are relatively inexpensive to conduct. To mitigate the challenges, the data gathered was compared to that which is available from documents and other sources through triangulation of methods and sources.

1.9.2.2 Documentary Search

This involves a content review of newspapers, private documents such as letters and diaries, minutes of meetings, conference reports, internet documents and texts written on the subject under review. The key strength is that usually this information (if carefully chosen) has been filtered and condensed before and is strictly focuses on the topic under review. However, the key limitation is that some documents are classified and not readily available for public access. To mitigate these challenges, the researcher resorted to as many documentary sources as necessary to get an understanding of the phenomena and dynamics at play in the case. The researcher also endeavored to apply for permission to gain access to other documents which are not typically available for public viewing, particularly government documents.

1.9.3 Sampling

The study utilised the non-probability sampling techniques of judgmental and snow ball sampling. Judgmental/purposive sampling allows the researcher to pick respondents at his discretion at the basis of his knowledge of the population and basing on the assumption that they hold key information needed by the study (Neuman 2007:372,Babbie 2010: 193). This sampling approach was chosen for its key utility of identifying respondents where complete enumeration of the entire population is not possible (Babbie 2010: 193). In this study, the researcher identified knowledgeable key informants from the Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Zimbabwe national Army and academia who could provide insights on the SADC's roles in conflict situations.

The study also employed snowball sampling which involved following up on informants identified by key respondents in the study. This entails getting referrals to other potential respondents from the initial respondents (Babbie 2010: 193). Snowballing is typically used to identify what Neuman (2007: 160, 367) refers to as the hidden population and Babbie (2010: 193) calls a "special population." These are difficult to reach respondents who are useful for the purposes of the study. Because of their "hidden" nature these respondents could not be identified at the outset but were engaged as the researcher got referrals and introductions. Snowball refers to the process of accumulation as each located subject suggests other subjects (Babbie 2010: 193). This is highly effective for this study for identifying experts on SADC, regional conflict and mediation procedures and the Madagascar political crisis.

1.9.4 Data Analysis

This study used thematic and content analysis in interpreting the research findings and data collected.

1.9.4.1 Content Analysis

Content analysis involves going through documentary search and identifying recurring themes, which may be classified and interpreted as research findings. Content analysis is a set of techniques used in qualitative research for analysing and understanding collections of text (Meyer: online; Neuman 2007: 227; Hsieh and Shanond.: online). It refers to a set of methods for coding, categorizing and analysing data which is typically in the form of text, pictures, symbols, ideas, themes, words, or any message that can be communicated (ibid). Content analysis lets a researcher reveal the content, messages and meanings in a source of communication, whether it be a book, magazine, movie (Neuman 2007: 227).

1.9.4.2 Thematic Analysis

On the other hand, Mayring (2014: 105) posits that thematic analysis occurs in content analytical literature. It is a selective analysis of subject matters or attributes of the text and formulates an inductive strategy with the aim of identifying themes as categories and to analyse frequencies and contingencies of the content categories. Thematic analysis required the researcher to go through the text of interview transcripts or notes in order to extract common themes and issues that were raised by the respondents. Thematic and content analysis will help in understanding the values and inherent attitudes towards SADC conflict resolution and its role as the guarantor of peace in region.

1.10 Delimitations

The study was focused on the Madagascar political crisis of 2009. The study will be limited to analysing and assessing the mediation and conflict resolution efforts of SADC. Attention was also given to the efforts of the A.U. and the U.N. to defuse the situation but only in drawing parallels between the efforts of SADC. The study paid special attention to the structures and institutions of SADC in relation to its role as the guarantor of peace and security within the region. Madagascar was the focal point of the study but other case studies of SADC conflict resolution was also analysed and discussed.

1.11 Limitations

The study was focused on Madagascar, which was geographically distant from the researcher. As such the researcher had to rely on information acquired from secondary sources. Also the information from the Malagasy embassy in Zimbabwe might be biased in favour of the prevailing political sentiment in that country. Another challenge the researcher experienced is the lack of an adequately high number of respondents that were knowledgeable in the

political events of Madagascar. These challenges were mitigated by the use of a varied selection of documentary search information in order to balance out biases.

1.12 Conclusion

This introductory chapter has highlighted the context and background to the study reviewing the role of SADC as a regional economic community as well as a regional security community and notions of security and economic development in the region.

The chapter also discussed the research objectives as well as the research questions which the study seeks to answer. A statement of the problem was also given so as to locate the problem under study and the rationale for this study was indicated under the justification for the study section. The chapter also has a brief literature review provide some further context and insight into the mechanisms of SADC's role and functioning in conflict resolution. A brief review of three theories was also given specifically highlighting how, together with the research design, provide a logic for the study and how they will guide this study to completion. Finally, the chapter has highlighted the potential limitations for the study as well as the delimitations and provides an overview of the entire study under chapter outlines. The next chapter discusses the literature review and theoretical framework in detail.

1.13 Structure of the Study

Chapter 1- In this chapter, an introduction and background to the study were discussed, highlighting the path which the study seeks to tread.

Chapter 2- In this chapter, a review of theories informing the study and critical but diverse scholarly literature around the topic are discussed with the purpose of providing the guiding framework for the study.

Chapter 3- This chapter outlines the methodology adopted for the study, highlighting the various data collection and analysis methods employed in the study.

Chapter 4- This chapter presents is about the presentation of findings and data analysis, incorporating data from both the field and secondary research (documentary search and content analysis).

Chapter 5- This chapter discusses and presents the major conclusions reached after analysis of the data and proffers policy recommendations for improvement of SADC's conflict management strategies.

CHAPTER TWO: SADC CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND ITS EFFICACY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the formation of SADC as a regional Economic Community and its evolution to a security establishment.

In summary, the chapter analyses and traces the morphology of the grouping from a purely economic and development centred organisation to a security oriented structure. This chapter focuses on the apparatus of conflict resolution within the SADC framework and juxtaposes these institutions with SADC efforts at conflict resolution within the region. This analysis therefore entails unpacking the successes and failures of SADC conflict resolution and its

role in the maintenance of peace in the region through case studies of conflict within the region. These case studies include but are not limited to the DRC conflict and the Zimbabwean political crisis in which SADC has been involved. Such an exercise is instrumental in broadening the understanding of the issues that have made SADC interventions successful and unsuccessful. The arguments forwarded will be buttressed by a theoretical framework which seeks to explain the action of various political actors within the regional grouping vis a vis the conflict resolution structures of SADC in relation to the Madagascar political crisis.

2.2 Background to the SADC Regional Economic Community

According to Ancas (2011:3), Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have come to play an increasingly important role in the assurance of peace and security in Africa. While originally RECs may have been formed with an economic integration, trade and economic development mandate, this has recently since expanded as they have logically evolved into a coherent regional security community seeking regional peace and security (ibid: 2011). Security demands became more pressing and unavoidable as there was an observation of the destabilising impact of regional insecurity and instability from experiences elsewhere. This was not only informed by the threat of war as a potentially destabilising force, but also of its effects as an obstacle to socioeconomic development. War is an anathema to economic development and it unnecessarily disrupts the livelihoods of the local population, as well as their socio-economic transformation agendas post-independence. This evolution aligns with this study's guiding theoretical framework which is complex interdependence. This advances that cooperation inherently increases between states as they become more intertwined economically. This point to the inevitable evolution of RECs into security communities. Also the notion of collective security that is embodied in the MDP should also be noted. Collective security came to the fore as a bulwark to guarantee the security of the members of SADC through an-attack-on-one-is-an-attack on all principle.

Therefore, the original motive for the establishment of SADC has evolved from a largely economic role to one of ensuring peace and security within the region. This role has been reinforced through its successful interventions in various conflicts such as the war in the DRC, the coup in Lesotho, political disharmony in Zimbabwe and more recently in the case of Madagascar.

2.3 SADC Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

SADC as a regional body has a number of conflict resolution tools at its disposal to utilize in times of political instability. According to Dzinesa and Zambara (2011:66) SADC has a toolkit which it could use in its conflict resolution efforts: a regional monitoring mechanism, mediation, conflict prevention, fact finding missions, special envoys, informal consultations, peace building and targeted development activities. These tools have been largely successful in resolving conflicts within the region.

Most notably fact finding missions were instrumental in eventually ushering in fully fledged SADC intervention through mediation in Zimbabwe. Fact finding missions have also been used in Lesotho during the military coup in that country in 2014. Thabo Mbeki was appointed the special envoy to mediate in the Zimbabwean political crisis with measured success. President Mugabe has also been a mediator and envoy of SADC during crises in Lesotho. Levitt (2001: 66) identifies conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution as other useful tools at the disposal of SADC for the resolution of conflict and maintenance of peace. According to Levitt (2001: 67) the SADC Organ on Politics, Security and Defence Cooperation (the Organ/OPSDC) is a robust conflict management mechanism which exists in SADC region. However, despite this, Levitt (2001:67) argues that there is “an over-arching non-interventionist tone in the SADC protocol establishing the organ, possibly this was infused into the protocol due to the geo-political tensions and rivalry between Zimbabwe and South Africa.” Thus this limits the power of SADC to intervene in any domestic political issues in a member country. This may be interpreted as a measure aimed at containing

South Africa. This was due to the mistrust that existed towards post-apartheid South Africa and its possession of a colossal and unmatched military machinery in the region that had been previously used to destabilise other countries. In terms of the protocol, SADC still requires consent from a country for it to activate enforcement mechanisms to avert conflict, a major weakness in this protocol. This means that there can be no unilateral SADC military or diplomatic intervention without the express invitation of the country concerned. As such this greatly limits the use of military force in any interventions that SADC may wish to pursue as a regional body tasked with maintaining peace and stability in the region.

However, despite this key challenge SADC is still considered to have the greatest capability, within the African Union body, to engage in long term conflict resolution mainly because of the technological and military assets at its disposal (ibid: 67). SADC has constantly relied on

these mechanisms in its peace-making, peace building and peace keeping missions wherever it has deployed, especially within the region. This is possibly why SADC has remained the most peaceful region in Africa, despite the exceptional cases of Lesotho, DRC, Mozambique and Madagascar .

2.3.1 The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security

This department is one of the key conflict management mechanisms in Southern Africa. According to Olonisakin and Levitt (1999:73), the organ's principal goals include the protection of people of Southern Africa and the safeguarding of developments in the region, against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intrastate conflict and external aggression. As such it is the principal organ charged with assessing the security situation within the region and member states in order to make decisions on what measures to take to address potential conflicts that may incubate instability in the region. The organ has jurisdiction over intra-state and inter-state conflict that may threaten peace and security in the region.

Olonisakin and Levitt (1999:73) note that the Protocol was adopted by SADC in June 1995. It empowers the Organ to employ peace-keeping forces in order to achieve sustainable peace and security. This assertion means that the Organ has authority to sanction the deployment of peacekeepers in situations where there is mass civil strife and unrest within a member state. The Organ can also call on member states to provide troops to take military action in circumstances where there has been an unconstitutional change of government. An example of this was witnessed in Lesotho in 1998. In essence, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security which establishes the Organ gives broad powers to the Organ to intervene in the internal political processes of a member state when it deems the political situation in a member state to constitute a threat to regional stability. However, this is a bit ambiguous as Levitt (2001:80) notes in internal conflict situations the OPDS only responds to invitations from member countries to intervene. This causes paralysis in that it is not clear whether the Organ is supposed to take the initiative or instead wait for a formal invitation by the member state in question to intervene.

One also curiously notes that even if the situation dictates that the organ has to wait for an invitation to become involved in the domestic politics of a member state, this invitation might not readily be extended. This is because states are naturally distrustful of other states and are not willing to surrender their sovereignty to external actors. This becomes especially difficult

when those external actors are a regional bloc made up of neighbours that may have competing interests to that of the state in question itself.

2.3.2 The SADC Standby Force

The SADC Standby Force (SSF) was established in line with an African Union Protocol to establish the African Standby Force made up of regional brigades from the five regions of Africa. According to SADC (2012), the function of the Brigade is to participate in missions as envisaged in Article 13 of the "mandate" of the Peace and Security. The mandate outlines the functions of the SSF as including observation and monitoring missions; peace support missions; interventions for peace and security restoration at the request of a Member State; and actions to prevent the spread of conflict to neighbouring states, or the resurgence of violence after agreements have been reached. Loosely interpreted this means that the SADC Brigade forms the tip of the spear in any envisaged SADC military action in pursuit of restoring order in a member country or in peacekeeping missions which require a military presence to create buffer zones between belligerents. The SADC Standby force operates as a tool of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. This argument advances the assertion that the SADC Brigade is a military interventionist tool at the disposal of the Organ to be used when diplomatic channels have failed or when military means are the only way to secure stability and legitimacy.

Military intervention may be argued to have been the only way to bring constitutional and political legitimacy back to Lesotho in 1998 and the DRC during the rebellion against Laurent Kabila. The logic inherent in this line of thought is that the Organ has authority to order and authorize military intervention in a member state using the SADC Standby Force as the tool to execute such a directive. Such authorization however can only be within the confines of restoring peace and security. Although the SADC Standby Force has never been deployed to any conflict zone within the region since its inception, it is arguable to put forward the proposition that the Madagascar political crisis was a ripe opportunity to use a military option in conflict resolution and the restoration of legitimacy. Nevertheless, the major impediment to the use of a military option in resolving conflict in SADC remains the emphasis on state sovereignty and the need for an invitation from the member state in question. Thus there are blurred lines concerning what the Organ can and cannot do when it comes to military interventions in order to resolve conflicts within the region. Nathan (2004:6) argues that member states will continue to place emphasis on their sovereignty and the rights of states to non-interference in their domestic affairs by external actors, including

the regional body itself. The use of military action is in itself a highly divisive topic within SADC. Baker and Maeresera (2008:107) assert that at one point SADC was a casualty of militarist and pacifist camps during the DRC war. This highlights the differences in conflict resolution approaches espoused by the different member states of SADC. These differences have the net effect of crippling rapid and decisive action by the regional body to solve conflicts. As such the SADC Brigade has never been deployed though there have been numerous opportunities to do so, such as the constant military coups in Lesotho and the RENAMO disturbances in Mozambique. Thus it is safe to question the possibility that SADC will be able to galvanise sufficient consensus to allow the rapid deployment of the standby brigade to any conflict situation, particularly one involving a SADC member state. This situation obtained during the Madagascar political crisis when there was no consensus on which conflict resolution approach to take, diplomatic or military.

2.4 SADCs Role in Conflict Resolution

2.4.1 The Zimbabwe Political Crisis

The challenges experienced by Zimbabwe can be traced back to its experience of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of the late 1980s to early 1990s, the unresolved independence issues of land reform and the issue of war veteran's welfare. The country had not only delayed the social transformation programme but also had fallen victim to the machinations of the two Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (WB/IMF) which had imposed stringent conditionalities for Zimbabwe to access critical funding for its development agenda without a thorough research. The demands made by these two institutions led to an intense socio-economic meltdown which was further exacerbated by an unforeseen drought situation which affected the region at the time.

Therefore, in the midst of this economic malaise and increasing social hardships resistance to government emerged and was strengthened and spurred on by a strong protest movement against the ruling party, which started to lose the popular public sentiment. This milieu precipitated some of the most confrontational encounters between government, war veterans, trade unionists/labour movements and the general public. The same era saw war veterans demanding compensation for injuries sustained during the war, a demand for urgent land redistribution, food riots in response to a worsening economic crises and the midway discard of ESAP. In an effort to placate the public, government capitulated and engaged in a populist

war victim's compensation programme, and a fast tracked compulsory land acquisition, in the face of growing opposition political sentiment.

Dzinesa and Zambara (2011:66) observe that the then South African President Thabo Mbeki was in May 2007 mandated by SADC to find a solution to Zimbabwe's three warring political parties. Mbeki's goals were aimed at endorsing the staging of the first harmonized presidential, parliamentary and local government elections in 2008. The mediation also sought to agree on measures to ensure that the plebiscite would be acceptable to all the parties and representative of the will of the Zimbabwean people. Dzinesa and Zambara (2011:66) add that while ZANU-PF was pushed to the negotiation table due to declining economic conditions, the two MDC formations were driven by waning Western support for their regime change agenda and also pressure from SADC to negotiate with the ruling ZANU PF party. This observation shows SADC at the forefront of identifying potential regional security threats and taking decisive action in dealing with them. In this case the proactive conflict resolution mechanisms used by SADC was negotiation. However, this mediation did not succeed as the elections in Zimbabwe culminated in a one man race run-off election that was duly won by Robert Mugabe after an opposition boycott.

In terms of stabilizing the Zimbabwean economy the SADC intervention was successful because the country adopted the multi-currency regime and arrested the out of control hyperinflation. The political situation simmered down as tensions cooled and the economy begun to grow. The mediation led by SADC seemed to have had the desired effects of stabilizing the country till elections could be organized to elect a new government.

According to the Solidarity Peace Trust (2012), "On the 15th of September 2008 ZANU PF and the two MDC formations signed a political agreement brokered by Thabo Mbeki under the mandate of SADC. The agreement was the culmination of a process that had begun in March 2007, which was itself preceded by various other attempts by African leaders, as far back as 2004, to bring an end to the Zimbabwean political crisis." The Global Political Agreement, as it would come to be known, would guide Zimbabwean politics for the next five years if elections were to be held. The peaceful elections of 2013 which were won by ZANU PF and endorsed by SADC and the A.U point to the fact that SADC intervention was extremely effective in diffusing the explosive situation that obtained in Zimbabwe at the time of SADC mediating to resolve the conflict.

However, other scholars have argued that SADC mediation and conflict resolution was muddled and lacked direction because of a lack of clear structures and institutions that governed mediation and conflict resolution processes within the regional grouping. They argue that the lack of violence in the Zimbabwean election was not due to SADC's efforts but rather the efforts of the Zimbabwean leadership who took to the podium to denounce political violence. Other scholars such as Raftopolous have criticized the silent diplomacy employed by Thabo Mbeki as having worsened the political situation in Zimbabwe by not honestly telling the parties in public about the steps they needed to take to resolve the conflict.

SADC employed a plethora of tools in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis, Thabo Mbeki used "silent diplomacy" and special envoys such as Rev. Frank Chikane, led fact finding missions. SADC also utilised election monitoring (SADC Observer Election Mission), informal consultations (Kariba, GPA negotiations), conflict prevention, management and resolution (the GNU/Transitional Government Authority) to diffuse the problem with excellent results (Eppel and Raftopolous 2008:5). The country which had been headed down a slippery slope towards implosion and internal war rhetoric had reached fever pitch levels during the period of intense economic hardships, was stabilized through SADC initiated mediation and conflict resolution. However, it can be argued that SADC managed to delay the political transformation in Zimbabwe by refusing to recognise the presence of a political crisis in Zimbabwe. This is largely due to the fact that SADC would not speak out against the excesses of the Zimbabwean government, rather showing an unwavering and unquestioning solidarity. This can be argued to have been a misguided approach that led to the festering of the political problem in Zimbabwe to reaching a crescendo in the 2008 political crisis. SADC leadership which is typically composed of liberation struggle veterans, who have shared values, resorts to solidarity whenever the political power of each of their peers is challenged. This limited the actions which SADC could take in order to force agreement between the two parties in Zimbabwe as SADC could not be an impartial adjudicator.

2.4.2 The Lesotho Constitutional Crisis of 1998

SADC has been tested in conflict resolution through the incessant military coups that characterize the Lesotho political landscape. Relations between civilian leadership and the military has never been cordial since independence in 1966. Klasa (1998:1) points out that, "Lesotho has a history of military coups stretching back to independence in 1996." The military has sought to usurp power countless times leading to disastrous consequences on the regime security and human security of Lesotho as a nation. The failure of any civilian

government to assert outright authority over the military has also caused a sense of impunity within the military to the point of actively resisting any form of constitutional civilian control and autonomy. This has had repercussions on not only the security and stability of Lesotho but also that of South Africa as it is its only immediate neighbour. The bad civil military relations in Lesotho have resulted in it being the only country in SADC to experience successive coups, which has an impact on the stability of the region as well. SADC has taken on an increasingly active role in the maintenance of peace and security within the region. This is further demonstrated by SADC's Mutual Defence Pact which does not tolerate unconstitutional power grabs in the region. However, these stances came to a test during the Lesotho and Madagascar political crises which put to the test SADC's willingness to enforce its principles militarily or otherwise using other means.

Klassa (2015:1) points out that, "South Africa does have a strong interest in protecting a thriving expat business community that operates just across the border in Lesotho. What South Africa is really interested in here is their banks and their retail, and especially their factories Lesotho's water will become more important going forward...but the real interest is to have a stable neighbour from which their companies can operate." A lot of South African companies have operations in Lesotho due to the low industrial action risks in that country, this is in stark contrast to South Africa which has been beset by successive and escalating workers strikes, which are detrimental for commerce. A customs union allows companies to easily export their wares back into South Africa. Thus the eagerness of South Africa to use military force in 1998 and the current political situation in Lesotho shows a strong reality of national self-interest rather regional solidarity in the interests of mutual security. Klassa (2015:2) also adds that, "The water issue is also a salient one. Lesotho receives 60 percent more rainfall than its much larger neighbour, while South Africa struggles with ongoing water security issues. The country currently consumes 98 percent of the water it treats - leaving little margin to absorb increases in consumption. The Treasury predicts supply will be outstripped by demand between 2025 and 2030. The completion of the Highlands Water Project in Lesotho is a key pillar of its water security strategy. The project, first announced in 1986, already supplies 10 billion cubic meters of water to South Africa's Vaal River system. This is set to increase by 50 percent by 2022, once the second phase of the multipurpose damming and hydroelectric power generation project are in place." While at present the SADC would prefer a negotiated return to the status quo with Mr Thabane - as Lesotho's democratically elected leader - in power, those preferences can be mutable. This because of

the vested interests that South Africa has in bringing stability and security to Lesotho may as well override the wishes of the people of Lesotho. This may be through the forcible installation through covert or overt means by South Africa of a candidate or coalition more amenable to the protection of South Africa's economic interests in Lesotho. These suspicions are what causes inaction in SADC conflict resolution mechanisms as member countries are not certain of the motives and interests of other SADC member states.

The increased role of SADC in maintaining peace and security across the region has led the organisation to establish measures aimed at promoting security democracy and human rights albeit with a degree of absolute sovereignty and solidarity (Hammerstad 2005 :269). The emphasis on absolute sovereignty has in instances such as the Madagascar crisis caused not only indecision among the member states but also derailed the regional bloc from taking proactive measures to stop unconstitutional power grabs as occurred in Madagascar. ICG (2011:14) notes that King Mswati III was a strong proponent of a military solution whilst other regional powerhouses such as South Africa were in favour of a diplomatic solution. It is safe to argue that a military solution would have been much more effective in restoring order and constitutionality in Madagascar in a relatively short period of time. Military action would also have had the effect of sending a clear message that unconstitutional takeovers of power would not be tolerated in SADC. However, the diplomatic institutional effects on the

principle of sovereignty which remains sacred in the regional bloc and within the AU are paradigm shifts that member states are not willing to tamper with. SADC has been very successful in resolving the political crises in Lesotho. These have been largely effective in limiting the disintegration of Lesotho as a political entity. SADC instituted and mandated Operation Boleas led by South Africa and Botswana to restore order in Lesotho in 1998 after a military coup in that country. SADC also oversaw the peace negotiations to end the political instability in Lesotho stemming from the attempted coup in that country in 2014. These mediation efforts and their success prove that despite the shortcomings of SADC it has been very successful in mediating and resolving conflicts in Lesotho.

2.4.3 The DRC Civil War

Mpangala (2004:63) notes that 1996 marked the first phase of the DRC war. This phase ended with the toppling of Mobutu SeseSeko and Laurent Kabila ascending to the presidency. The second phase of the war began in 1998. Punungwe (1998:5) argues that the intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia into outlined intolerance to unconstitutional power grabs

in the region, which was aptly captured in the military intervention code named “Operation Sovereign Legitimacy.” This military action can be said to have been a decisive turning point in setting a precedent for the use of military force in the SADC region as a conflict resolution tool. However, it is also important to note that this intervention was only possible because it was carried out at the behest of the Kabila government.

It is however pertinent to note that SADC and other continental actors had tried to pursue other diplomatic channels to bring the conflict to a peaceful end without necessarily destabilising the whole Great Lakes region through a military intervention that would involve six different countries fighting on opposite sides.

The Lusaka Agreement of 1999 tried to address external and internal concerns that were fuelling the armed conflict in the DRC. This is largely due to the fact that the leading members of SADC were neither united in terms of the approach to use in conflict resolution nor were they unified in terms of their interests in seeing the conflict resolved. This is because of the vastly differentiated approaches that member states have advanced for in terms of regional political interventions.

2.5 The Efficacy of SADC Interventions: A Preliminary Investigation

The above case studies have served to highlight the effectiveness of SADC interventions in conflicts within the region. SADC has been mainly involved in the DRC and the Zimbabwean political crisis where it headed the conflict resolution at the behest of the African Union. The major challenges to the efficacy of SADC interventions have been the solidarity between the ruling parties of most SADC member states that have shared a history dating back to the liberation struggles for independence. This largely emanates from SADC impotent conflict resolution interventions that do little to promote the security of the region or the resolution of conflict. However there are cases where SADC has taken a proactive role in resolving conflict such as the mediation in Zimbabwe and the military intervention in Lesotho in 1998.

The lack of post conflict security sector reform frameworks has meant that the same security forces that instigate unrest and constitutional crises in countries such as Lesotho are not adequately reformed and subjugated to civilian authority in the aftermath of conflict. This leads to a situation where the armed forces of Lesotho are perpetually involved in the politics of that country and cause political instability by tagging coups to topple civilian government. The lack of trust between member states in light of geopolitical interests also paralyses

SADC conflict resolution mechanisms and initiatives. This was seen in South Africa's eagerness to use military force to restore constitutional legitimacy in Lesotho in 1998 because it had vital economic and water resource supply interests in that country. However, in countries where South Africa has had no clear and outright interests such as the DRC, it has been reluctant to support the use of military force as a conflict resolution measure.

Nathan (2006: 2004) argues that, "the very notion that the SADC is a security community is questionable. The SADC region has never been characterized by close social relations and contacts between its member states. To be a community, there needs to be a common sense of belonging, that is, common values, goals, objectives etc." this lack of a common sense of belonging or values can largely be attributed to a colonial heritage and the late gaining of independence by South Africa. Apartheid South Africa was extremely aggressive to its neighbours and its destabilizing operations have had lasting effects in countries such as Mozambique. There is also a lack of common values seemingly caused by the differences in colonial masters, with the Portuguese speaking countries such as Angola not relating well to playing second fiddle to English speaking countries such as Zimbabwe. This creates tension in the pursuit of regional dominance which is expressed in a paralysis of action when it comes to coordinating military interventions in times of conflict. These deep rooted fissures and feelings of mistrust have even culminated in Angola not ratifying the SADC Mutual Defence pact. However these divisions are not only limited to SADC but characterize the rest of the African continent, this has also seen the A.U playing second fiddle to RECs in terms of military interventions in conflict situations.

2.6 Hard Lessons for SADC in Conflict Resolution

According to Plock and Cook (2012) the deep seated culture of political solidarity amongst the leaderships of countries still being led by liberation struggle nationalists has been a constant hindrance to successful conflict mediation and resolution efforts. Most of these countries take the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of a country very seriously, even going to the extreme of non-compliance and threatening to exit any regional organisation which compels them to do so. Zimbabwe exemplified its behaviour with a pull-out from the Commonwealth countries platform and its resistance to the rulings of the SADC Tribunal to which it was signatory. Zimbabwe also almost left the regional grouping at the height of the 2013 after the expiration of the tenure of the Government of National Unity (GNU). This culture is deep seated as Botswana similarly threatened a pull out of SADC over its deviant position on the Zimbabwean election of 2013. More recently, South Africa's

ruling African National Congress (ANC) has resolved and threatened a pullout from the International Criminal Court over its insistence on persecuting that country's leadership over its decision to allow Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir to leave South Africa freely, despite a court ruling. It would seem political solidarity takes precedence among African political leaderships to compliance to principles of international law. Thus this political solidarity at times hinders mediation and intervention as the threat of pulling out of SADC has been sufficient to ensure the regional bloc does not interfere in a countries domestic affairs. Furthermore, the economic cost of military action is also a very important factor that proponents of such action should keep in mind. It should be noted though that this solidarity is an impediment to effective regional intervention, it strengthens the region and protects it from foreign domination.

Ancas (2011:12) however raises the crucial point that despite the shortcomings of SADC, the bloc has managed to keep the region relatively stable as compared to other regions on the African continent. This is premised on the fact that, barring the civil war in Angola, there has been no other outbreak of war that with the potential to destabilize the region. SADC interventions have been mostly targeted at ending hostilities. Operation Sovereign Legitimacy in the DRC is a good example of this, though the DRC is still not entirely stable, SADC managed to contain the spread of instability across the region. In this argument, the core objective of SADC is the maintenance of peace and security within the region, the solution of social and other domestic political problems is a function of individual states themselves. This is because of the complexity and sheer impossibility of trying to deal with these problems one by one and also because it would violate the sovereignty of the regional blocs member states themselves. As such one can safely argue that SADC executed its role of mediator and guarantor of peace in the region during the Madagascar political crisis in the most appropriate manner. Factors that are important to weigh in this assertion are that the crisis did not degenerate into a full scale civil war; SADC mapped out a negotiated return to constitutionality and stuck to its principles by refusing to recognise the government of Rajoelina. This was a strong message that resonated that SADC would not tolerate any unconstitutional power grabs.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the conflict resolution machinery of SADC and how these have been effective resolving conflicts within the region. The chapter discussed the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and explored its inherent weaknesses while at the same time

highlighting the options open to it in times of conflict. The SADC Brigade was pointed out as being the tip of the spear in the current security framework in terms of an envisaged military intervention by SADC in any member state or elsewhere in Africa. This means that SADC can indeed use a military intervention in cases where the security and stability of the region is threatened. The chapter also focused attention on the Mutual Defence Pact and its impact on security in the region. Much attention in the chapter was given to examples of SADC conflict resolution intervention in countries such as Zimbabwe, the DRC and Lesotho which experienced conflicts ranging from political crises, civil war and constitutional crises respectively. This shows SADC taking proactive roles in conflict resolution and maintaining peace and security in the region. However the effectiveness of SADC has been limited due to regional solidarity and the pre-eminence of the principle of state sovereignty. This has meant that member states have actively resisted any moves towards giving SADC more discretion in interfering in domestic situations that may have destabilising effects on the regions security. The next chapter discusses the interventions of SADC during and after the Madagascar crisis and analyses the success and failures of these interventions.

CHAPTER THREE: THE MADAGASCAR CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the evolution of the Madagascar political crisis. The chapter focuses on the history of the political crises tracing the root causes of the coup by Rajoelina. Attention is also given to the role of the military on the crises and the influence the military had in shaping events during the progression of the coup. The various attempts at mediation by the United Nations, African Union and SADC are also put under the spotlight in order to examine the efficacy of each of these organisations conflict resolution mechanisms. This is

useful in determining and identifying the intricacies and complexities inherent in SADC conflict resolution procedures as it is the primary regional organisation responsible for maintaining security and stability in the region.

3.2 Historiographical View of the Crisis

There are a myriad of causes of the political crisis in Madagascar. Madagascar has a relatively small population of 20 million people but also has one of the highest birth rates in the world. This poses social, political and economic pressures on the government of the day as expectations and demands of service delivery and the eradication of poverty increase the burden on the government. A mixture of poverty, high unemployment and fragile political institutions culminating from a history of military interference in the political process made a potent concoction that spelled instability for Madagascar. However, the most apparent is the political rivalry between Andre Rajoelina, the mayor of the capital city and Marc Ravalomanana. This rivalry ultimately led to a political showdown between the two rivals in a coup.

3.2.1 High Unemployment and Extreme Poverty: Incubating Political Instability

Ellis and Randrianja (2009:35) note that the country's instability emanates from the combination of extreme poverty and high birth rates. The arrival of large numbers of young people from rural Madagascar every year looking to join the job market has created a volatile atmosphere in Antananarivo." The island nation's population is estimated to have more than quadrupled from less than 3 million around 1900 to 20 million today . As such it should be noted that the high level of unemployment in Madagascar can be cited as a major contributing factor to the meteoric rise of Rajoelina. This is largely because Rajoelina seemed to provide an alternative to the perceived failure of the Ravalomanana government to better the lives of ordinary Madagascans. Ellis and Randrianja (2009:33) add that the continued accumulation of wealth by Ravalomanana, who was elected in 2006, and the ruling elites in Madagascar in the face of increasing poverty and misery of toil for the workers contributed to the loss of affection with the government and its ability or willingness to address the economic hardships that ordinary citizens were facing. Madagascar had a very small economy that largely depended on foreign aid and investment to keep it afloat. According to the U.N (2015), "foreign aid accounted for 70 percent of the national budget. Madagascar is one of the world's poorest countries and has had a negative growth of GDP in the last year; its external debt is now almost 3 billion US dollars." Thus these economic and social pressures found expression in the rising political profile of Antananarivo's young mayor who

openly challenged the government of Ravalomanana. The existence of these economic problems and high levels of poverty can be interpreted as catalysts that incubated political instability leading to the coup By Rajoelina. The unequal distribution of economic resources and power fuelled the rise of Rajoelina as he offered an alternative to the government of Ravalomanana. Ravalomanana's government had increasingly become elitist and divorced from the harsh economic realities that most citizens of the country were living through.

3.2.2 Corruption and Bad Governance

Another major cause of the political crisis in Madagascar was the rampant corruption and bad governance of the Ravalomanana government. Cawthra (2010:15) argues that the more immediate cause was widely perceived – including by some former Ravalomanana supporters – to be failures of governance by the Ravalomanana administration, perceptions that he had used his position as president to benefit his extensive business interests through control of regulations, contracts and by monopolization, and by an essentially authoritarian and capricious management style. The purchase of an expensive private presidential jet by Ravalomanana also drew the ire of his domestic constituents as well as the international donor community which suspected the diversion of donor aid. Thus it can be argued that the corrupt activities by the Ravalomanana government that led to the unequal distribution of the country's wealth and largely economically disenfranchising the vast majority of the population created a ready and willing support base for any opposition seeking to subvert authority and assume power. This accumulation of wealth was also accompanied by an increased disregard for democratic processes and the tolerance for debate and political dissent within the Madagascar. Ravalomanana owned the Tiko Group, Madagascar's largest indigenous conglomerate. His extensive business interests in the country led to increasing allegations of corruption and favouritism which in turn alienated him from the vast majority of poor citizens in the country. Cawthra (2010:15) highlights that, "little room was left for political dissent, with parliament marginalised and decisions increasingly taken in a centralised manner by the presidency." The Ravalomanana government thus increasingly became authoritarian. The effect of this was not only alienating the countries opposition but also elements of Ravalomanana's own support base within his own party.

However, the most important factor in this power matrix is the reaction of the military to the governance style of Ravalomanana. This is because the military played a very important role in the success of the unconstitutional power grab by Rajoelina. Cawthra (2010:15) further argues that the inaction by the military and the gendarmerie, which is a powerful paramilitary

force, was largely due to the fact that the military saw the Ravalomanana government as a threat to their own power base and status of privilege in the distribution of power in Madagascar. The military saw the security sector reforms advanced under the watch of Ravalomanana as significant threats to their own relevance in power broking in the body politic. The military was of the view that promotions were based on favouritism to Ravalomanana's supports and sympathizers and not on merit which resulted in a top heavy structure of the military in Madagascar. Ravalomanana's perceived disdain and disrespect for the military also contributed to the military not taking action to quell a relatively small mutiny by a unit of the army. Ravalomanana's abuse of power had also reached the levels of using the military as security forces to physically protect his business interests.

3.3 Evolving Neocolonial Vestiges: The Korean Land Deal

Despite the above economic factors, the straw that broke the camel's back can be argued to be the land deal brokered by Ravalomanana's governments and Korean company Daewoo. Zuckerman argues that, "The Korean corporation signed an unprecedented agreement to lease 3.2 million acres of arable land from Madagascar at \$12 an acre. Daewoo plans to put most of the land under corn for export to Korea and the remainder under oil palms, hoping to export the oil on the bio-fuels market. This is a very odd deal, given that Madagascar is a nation that faces food insecurity and has a population that, for the most part, is composed of subsistence farmers. Given the ecological sensitivity of the island, it seems like untouched land might be a resource the nation would want to conserve in the long term."

This planned rental of Madagascar's land to a foreign company in order to grow food for repatriation to Korea had a lot of discrepancies that led many to believe it was the result of corrupt and underhand dealings by the Ravalomanana government. This is because the lease charges in the contract effectively gave the land away for free. Also the fact that Madagascar was food insecure itself; it did not make sense to lease out over half of its arable land to grow food for a foreign country.

Walt (2008) notes that many European firms were leasing land in the sea-locked nation to grow crops for food. In addition, the leasing of land in Madagascar to a Korean company would be another point in the rise of tenant farming in Africa. Tenant farming has taken on a new dimension in Africa with Asian countries such as India leasing large tracts of land in countries such as Ethiopia. This is seen as a strategic move to maintain food security as these countries do not have enough land to grow enough food to meet their own demands. This is

also seen as beneficial to African countries as it bring in the much needed FDI and also creates employment for the local populations. This land formed nearly half of the countries arable land. As such many in Madagascar saw this not only as a threat to their countries national security but also as an example of the governments corruption in acceding to an unfair contract that compromised the interests of the state. As such this deal proved very unpopular with the citizens of Madagascar and further served to alienate Ravalomanana from the electorate.

However, the Ravalomanana government argued that the land deal was economically beneficial to Madagascar. This was because of the FDI capital flows that would accompany the influx of Korean development of the largely virgin land for farming purposes. Walt (2008) notes that, “although Daewoo planned to export the yield of the land it had leased in Madagascar, it had also planned to invest about \$6 billion over 20 years to build port facilities, roads, power-plants and irrigation systems necessary to support the agribusiness there, and that would have created thousands of jobs for Madagascar's unemployed.” However the prospects of creating employment still did not make the deal unpopular among the populace.

3.4 Political Rivalry: The Rajoelina-Ravalomanana Power Matrix

It should, however, be noted that although there were socio-economic and political pressures that led to the coup, the most glaring and important factor was simply the personal rivalry and political animosity between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana. This rivalry led the two to exploit the other aforementioned factors in order to advance their own political interests. Ploch and Cook (2012:9) assert that the Ravalomanana-led government diverted funds meant for various local government infrastructure projects in the capital as part of strategies to discredit and frustrate the young mayor of Antananarivo. In turn Rajoelina retaliated by actively resisting the expansion of Ravalomanana's business interests in Antananarivo. This sowed the seeds for a political rivalry that would change the course of Madagascar's history. Bearak (2009) notes that, “the animosity between the two politicians finally turned morbid when the authorities battled anti-Ravalomanana demonstrators.” This was after Ravalomanana had closed down a TV station owned by Rajoelina. This had elements of business rivalry spilling over into the political sphere as both men and rival business interests in Madagascar. Cawthra (2010:15) points out that, “the competition between the two men was fuelled by their competing business interests, and the advantage that they could gain by fusing political power with business.” Thus Rajoelina saw the seizure of power not only as the elimination of a

political rival but also the removal of a business rival as well. The political power to be gained from seizing power would also be useful in advancing Rajoelina's personal business interests in the country.

3.5 The Rise of Rajoelina

Rajoelina rose from relative political obscurity to become the mayor of Madagascar's capital city Antananarivo. Bearak (2009) observes that, "Mr. Rajoelina was elected mayor in December 2007 with 63 percent of the vote, a rare and major defeat for President Ravalomanana's I Love Madagascar Party." This marked the start of the political rivalry between the two that would eventually lead to the forceful and unconstitutional takeover of power by Rajoelina.

Bearak (2009) points out that, "the president was once the capital's mayor, and the two politicians have feuded over how to run the city. Contentious matters have included how Antananarivo will pay off monstrous municipal debts partly run up by Mr. Ravalomanana." It should be noted that this then made the position of mayor of Antananarivo a semi springboard to the presidency. As such this gave Rajoelina enough confidence to challenge the government of Ravalomanana and eventually take power by force. Rajoelina used the municipal debt as a rallying point to coalesce other opposition groups around him and galvanized public opinion against the land deal with the Korean company. Not only did this give Rajoelina increased political visibility and relevance but it also created a strong power base for himself which he would later on use to usurp legitimate power and authority from Ravalomanana.

In retrospect one can tentatively argue that Rajoelina rose on the back of the mistakes made by Ravalomanana in governing the country. The various issues such as rampant corruption, poverty, unemployment and a disillusioned military aided the rise of Rajoelina into a political force formidable enough to topple a sitting government. Rajoelina not only exploited the socio economic problems bedeviling Madagascar but also endeared himself to the military.

3.6 The Unconstitutional Takeover: Subverting Elected Authority

According to Ploch and Cook (2012:10) argue that Ravalomanana was forced to resign in 2009 due to a combination of mass protests and military mutiny. The mass protests were mobilised by Rajoelina over the way in which Ravalomanana was governing the country. These protests eventually led to the ouster of Ravalomanana but it has to be noted that these would not have succeeded had the military not taken the side of the opposition forces led by

Rajoelina. The military played a very important role in this unconstitutional takeover of power.

The December 2008 closure of a television station owned by Mayor Rajoelina was viewed by many as an example of the increasing heavy handedness and autocratic nature of the Ravalomanana government. Rajoelina gave the government an ultimatum to reopen his TV station and other stations that had been shut down. This was ignored and he called for mass protests to unseat Ravalomanana, whom he now labeled a dictator. Agyeman (2009) observes that the increase in size and intensity of the mass protests also led to an increase in violence and clashes with the security forces. This resulted in a number of civilian deaths at the hands of the military on orders from the Ravalomanana government which classified the mass protests as, “civil disturbance which is akin to an attempted coup.” The protests continued and seemed to lose steam till the military killed another 30 civilians who were marching on the presidential palace. What followed were increased protests by Rajoelina’s supporters. Ravalomanana’s own supporters also began their own mass protests in support of Ravalomanana and resisting what they termed a coup attempt by Rajoelina. However, the most important event during the crisis was the mutiny by the military against the government of Ravalomanana. The military had been relatively neutral from the onset of the crisis and had called on the political actors to negotiate a political settlement of the crisis. However, fissures within the military itself led to the military taking the side of Rajoelina and in effect sealing the fate of Ravalomanana’s government.

3.7 Silent Kingmakers: The Role of the Military in the Crisis

Rakotomalala notes that, “On March 17th, deposed president Marc Ravalomanana handed over power to a military committee so that a referendum on the state of the nation could be organized. The then-opposition rejected that arrangement and power was transferred to the opposition leader Rajoelina.” Citing this very rapid transfer of power, the Rajoelina government argued that they had not staged a coup but had rather carried out the will of the people of Madagascar, which Ravalomanana had attempted to subvert. However from an academic point of view this is merely politicking and posturing as the takeover had all the hallmarks of a coup. The Rajoelina movement eventually depended on the support of the military to legitimize and entrench their takeover of power in Madagascar. The Rajoelina government did not come into power through elections but rather through the use of force and unconstitutional means to wrestle power from a democratically elected government. This in effect qualifies Rajoelina’s takeover of power as a coup.

Ploch and Cook (2012:10) argue that although the military had sought to maintain neutrality during the political crisis, it was inevitably drawn into the chaos as a reluctant actor. The importance of the military is that it could be effectively used to quell and suppress any protests to the status quo. However, the increase in violence and civilian fatalities pushed the military into taking action and choosing a side in the political crisis. This is largely because the military refused to be used to slaughter the civilians that it is supposed to protect and also because the military had vested interests in seeing the downfall of the Ravalomanana government.

According to Bearak (2009) “on March 14, Rajoelina announced that the army had acceded to taking orders from him. The following day the Presidential Guard, the only unit seen as remaining loyal to Ravalomanana mutinied and took over the presidential palace and the central bank.” These actions were the last nail on the government of Ravalomanana who then resigned and attempted to hand-over power to a Navy Admiral who declined. In effect the military had taken sides and chosen Rajoelina. This was very important as it shaped the eventual outcome of the coup by Rajoelina. Had the military not taken decisive action that pointed to whom they sided with, fissures within the military itself might have degenerated and led to civil war as had been predicted by the U.S ambassador Niels Marquardt to Madagascar during the violent protests. The military played an integral role in the overall success of the coup as they refused to obey orders to quash the pro-Rajoelina demonstrations; this then had the effect of adding momentum to Rajoelina’s movement. The refusal to use force against civilians citing the deaths of protesters at early demonstrations also served to defuse rising tensions over the excessive use of force by the military on the orders of the Ravalomanana government. In this vein one could safely argue that the deciding factor in the success of the Madagascar coup was the military.

3.8 U.N and A.U Intervention

According to Souare (2009:1), “the African Union policy position on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) is very clear; these will not be tolerated or legitimised anywhere on the African continent.” Thus this was the guiding principle for A.U intervention in the Madagascar political crisis of 2009. The standard procedure of A.U intervention is the use of mediation, suspension of the country in all A.U activities and the imposition of sanctions. In the wake of the coup in Madagascar, Ploch and Cook (2012:12) highlight that the A.U implemented mediation efforts in order to stop the political chaos obtaining in Madagascar. The A.U established the International Contact Group through which it could

coordinate efforts between the A.U, the U.N and SADC as the REC. the first Maputo summit in 2009 aimed at mediating and negotiating a political solution to the crisis in Madagascar was held under the auspices of the A.U. the mediation was led by former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano and comprised a mediation team with elements from the U.N, A.U, SADC and the OIF. However the abrogation of the Maputo agreement and the follow up Addis Ababa Additional Act forced the A.U to impose sanctions on Madagascar. The AUPSC proceeded to impose targeted sanctions on the HTA de facto government, as stipulated in the AUPSC Communiqué (2010: 2), it noted that the AUPSC “decides, therefore, that the sanctions listed in the Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1 (CCXVI) enter into force as of 17 March 2010, namely travel ban, freezing of funds and other financial assets and economic resources, as well as diplomatic isolation, against Mr. Andry Nirina Rajoelina.” The motive of sanctions was to force Rajoelina to negotiate a political settlement that would bring an end to the political crisis in Madagascar.

However one can argue that the major impediment to the negotiations was the insistence by the A.U that it would not recognise the government of Rajoelina as legitimate and that Ravalomanana was still the constitutional president of Madagascar. Though this was the de jure reality, the de facto situation was that Rajoelina was now in charge of the new political dispensation in Madagascar. As such though the recognition and conferment of legitimacy is a matter of principle that the A.U would not want to tamper with and thus set a bad precedent. Acceding to Rajoelina’s demands for recognition and dropping the insistence on Ravalomanana still being president would have gone a long way in fast tracking the movement of the negotiations. Cawthra (2010:24) however argues that, “it is also not clear that SADC took a principled position, or whether its support for Ravalomanana was informed more by solidarity between heads of state, who form a kind of informal club at the core of SADC; in other words, ‘regime solidarity’. There was a widespread belief amongst informants, partly shared by the author, that what motivated SADC’s apparently principled stand was mostly a fear of contagion.”

3.9 The Role and Nature of SADC Intervention in the Madagascar Conflict

SADC intervention took varied forms during the progression of the political crisis in Madagascar. According to Cawthra (2010:16) “Zambia called for Madagascar’s suspension from the bloc, while the OPDS met on 19 March and took a position of refusing to recognise Rajoelina, indicating that it would consider imposing sanctions if the constitutional order was not restored.” SADCs intervention, though argued to have come later than that of the A.U

was more robust and imposing. SADC did not take the initiative as the responsible REC for the region but rather waited on the A.U to take the lead. This can be argued to be a result of SADC lacking a standing conflict mediation and resolution structure and framework to follow in the event of threats to peace and stability to the region or to any one member state. Cawthra (2010:22) notes that, “SADC’s rather ad hoc approach to mediation should be replaced by a more institutionalised approach. Certainly, the secretariat of SADC played relatively little role in the negotiations, which were left to political heads.” The initial intervention was by the U.N and A.U and SADC came on board a bit late sending the Swazi Prime Minister Dlamini to mediate. Dlamini realised that SADC’s position was both untenable in terms of realities on the ground, and out of phase with that of other international actors, and he returned to Swaziland on 29 May, apparently urging a rethink in strategy in mediation and intervention. SADC then took a backseat till June when the A.U led mediation collapsed and SADC effectively took over the lead. SADC had already taken a leading role to play given the chief mediator function of Chissano, even if the AU was officially the lead agency.

IRIN (2009) notes that, “Heads of State of the 15-nation regional body met in South Africa on 20 June to consider the political and security situation in the Indian Ocean Island after the last mediation attempt by the African Union (AU) collapsed on 16 June.” SADC then took over the lead in negotiating and mediating an end to the political crisis in Madagascar. The mediation efforts however were stalled by the fact that SADC, like the A.U, demanded the reinstatement of Ravalomanana. This was partly due to the fact that SADC did not want to legitimize the Rajoelina government by negotiating with it, which under international law would be a tacit recognition of it being a legitimate government. These mediation efforts resulted in the signing of an accord that would guarantee elections in 15 months and the appointment of an inclusive transitional government. However the cabinet announced by Rajoelina had only two pronounced critics of Rajoelina. This violated the terms of the Maputo agreement and Ravalomanana and three main opposition parties denounced and threatened to establish a parallel government. SADC also denounced the proposed cabinet.

The nature of SADC intervention was also tainted by the fact that initially there was no clear consensus on which option to follow. Countries such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe were in favour of a military solution to the crisis, while some in the region such as South Africa, the regional power house, were in favour of a diplomatic solution to the crisis. According to Cawthra (2010:8), “the option of a military intervention using SADCBRIG was mooted by

King Mswati, and logistics, such as the provision of transport aircraft by Angola were discussed.” The major impediment to the use of military force was however the fact who would finance the military expedition. The fact that most economies in SADC depend on South Africa would inevitably mean that South Africa would end up footing the bill. Also any other unforeseen economic effects of a drawn out military intervention would have a profound impact on the region as a whole.

Military intervention would also serve to alienate the Malagasy people from SADC. This is largely because joining SADC was seen as Ravalomanana’s project. This coupled with the fact that geographically Madagascar is not attached to SADC would serve to galvanise public opinion against SADC in a nationalistic fervor. Cawthra 92012:13) argues that, “the armed forces were actively preparing to fight back against any SADCBRIG intervention – certainly the consequences, both politically and militarily, would have been disastrous for SADC, although in reality SADCBRIG was never in a position to carry out such an operation and there was no political authorisation for it.” The Malagasy military was as such prepared to engage in a “nationalistic” war against the SADC invaders. This fact and that of SADCBRIGs general unpreparedness for combat meant the military option was effectively off the table.

After the collapse of the initial talks due to the abrogation of the Maputo and Addis Agreements by Rajoelina, there were further talks spearheaded by SADC. In October 2009 the parties agreed to an accord that would eventually lead to elections that would preclude both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana from participating as candidates. However the crisis continued as Rajoelina continued to act unilaterally even after the signing of the second accord. The ICG (2010) observes that the UN and the AU to take the lead in the negotiations and resolving the political crisis, Rajoelina did not take its intervention seriously enough as he viewed it as biased in favour of Ravalomanana. This perception was a result of the insistence by SADC for the reinstatement of Ravalomanana as president at the very beginning of the crisis and its mediation. This hard and fast rule of zero tolerance to UCG’s by the A.U and SADC, though an excellent policy deterrent, is all but counterproductive in the event that a coup has already been executed. There was need for a realistic assessment of the situation that would inform adequate negotiating positions of both SADC and the A.U.

The announcements by the military in April 2010 for the need to end political crisis continue to reflect the undue influence that the military continued to have in the political process in

Madagascar. However the signing of the Transitional Governance Roadmap by an overwhelming majority of the political parties involved shows that the SADC mediation was not only inclusive and successful but was aimed at building lasting institutions in Madagascar that would prevent future political turmoil.

3.10 Divisions within SADC: Diplomacy vs. Military Intervention

The resolution of the crisis in Madagascar could be argued to have been long drawn out due to the division within SADC itself. These divisions are largely based on power politics and the desire to dominate the region. The fissures manifested in different approaches to conflict resolution espoused by different members of the REC. SADC was largely divided between the hawks and the doves in the Madagascar crisis. The hawks favoured a military solution whilst the doves wanted a diplomatic solution. The hawks camp mainly consisted of Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Angola. These countries were in support of using military force to restore legitimacy in Madagascar. The doves were led by South Africa which favoured a diplomatic solution to the crisis. This division in terms of preferred conflict resolution was a telling sign of deeper division within SADC as a REC. It proved that there is no agreed upon policy aimed conflict resolution. As such there are no permanent conflict identification and resolution mechanisms within SADC that can act following set guidelines and standard operating procedures, therefore conflict resolution is dealt with on an ad hoc basis. It is this ad hoc nature that leaves fissures between the doves and the hawks to show up during conflict situations. In turn these fissures lead to measures that integral members of SADC do not give their full support or do not participate altogether. A case in point is the DRC intervention by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. Cawthra (2010) argues that, “the option of a military intervention using SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) was mooted by King Mswati, and logistics, such as the provision of transport aircraft by Angola were discussed.” However, other considerations such as economic and military strategy in the face of resistance from the Madagascar military meant that the doves eventually triumphed. It should also be noted that SADC military intervention had no set precedent to follow in a situation such as the Madagascar crisis. Thus there was reasonable timidity and reluctance in exploring the use of military force.

3.11 Resolution of the Conflict: SADC Roadmap to Elections

The conflict was eventually resolved through the signing and adoption of an electoral roadmap. This roadmap would exclude both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana from contesting as candidates in the elections to be held in early 2013. According to Fabricius (2013) “SADC

then resorted to the so-called ‘ni-ni’ option. Ni-ni meant that neither of the two bitter rivals would run for office. In December and January they both accepted the ni-ni deal and the problem, from SADC’s perspective, seemed to be solved.” The roadmap recognised Rajoelina as the interim president of Madagascar until elections. This was however a major climb down in principle on the part of SADC. The roadmap also had provisions for Ravalomanana to return to Madagascar, Rajoelina had previously refused this as Ravalomanana had been tried and found guilty of murder in absentia. Though there had been a myriad of hurdles and speed bumps in the negotiations to resolve the crisis, the staging of elections brought stability to Madagascar and the SADC region. ICG (2014) notes that, “Presidential elections in late 2013 were endorsed as credible following the victory of Hery Rajaonarimampianina. The return to democracy paved the way for renewed international support.”

3.12 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed in detail the causes of the political crisis in Madagascar. The acute poverty and unemployment in the country catalysed the coalescence of a critical mass of the electorate that was disillusioned by the rule of Ravalomanana. The accumulation of wealth by Ravalomanana and his increasing authoritarian nature and style of governance also added to his alienation from the electorate. Ravalomanana also managed to foment resentment in the military against his rule, which was to prove crucial in the mass protests that followed. This is because the military came out as the deciding factor in who won the struggle for power between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina. However, it has been noted that the intense political rivalry between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina was the biggest catalyst for the coup in Madagascar. This rivalry spiraled out of control resulting in mass protests by Rajoelina that resulted in the deaths of civilians at the hands of the security forces. This in turn led to the military siding with Rajoelina and in effect executing a coup by handing power to Rajoelina. The international community led by the A.U condemned this action and sought to resolve it through diplomatic means. This saw the formation of the ICG which eventually gave the lead negotiating role to SADC. Though SADC had its own divisions in terms of approach and unpreparedness to resolve the conflict, it managed to supervise and oversee the signing of a comprehensive election roadmap.

This roadmap saw the holding of elections in Madagascar in 2013.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

4.1Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses the research findings of the study. This analysis is done in terms of the following objectives,

- To examine the conflict resolution mechanisms within the SADC security community
- To assess the role played by SADC in the resolution of the Madagascan political crisis of 2009
- To analyse the efficacy of SADC's conflict resolution mechanisms in the Madagascan case
- To investigate the challenges by encountered SADC in brokering peace in Madagascar

- To recommend strategies to improve the efficacy of SADC mediation efforts in conflict resolution

The major findings of the study were that SADC is largely crippled by an acute shortage of funding. Other challenges include the primacy of state sovereignty which makes the implementation of forceful interventions difficult. The study also found that the lack of a permanent dispute resolution and mediation within SADC made it slow to respond to developing and evolving conflict scenarios.

4.2 SADC and Regional Economic Communities, security communities

The study found that the formation of RECs had evolved from simply being economic communities. RECs now included cooperation on a wide range of issues chief among them being security and stability. This evolution has meant that though the U.N remains with the sole authority to authorize the use of force, RECs have now assumed a primary responsibility to respond to crises within their regions.

Jackson (2000:41) notes that the UN came up with a strategy to promote regional peace through the use of regional groupings on one hand and the UN serving a coordinating role. This was seen in the Madagascar case which saw the U.N and A.U eventually let SADC take the lead role in negotiating a resolution of the political crisis. The same can also be said of previous crises in the SADC region that occurred in Zimbabwe and Lesotho. Thus the study found that RECs having primary responsibility over conflict resolution within their regions was a crystallizing international practice.

Ancas (2010:4) highlights that in the Madagascar crisis, SADC was supposed to the lead in coordinating the mediation and management of the political crisis that was unfolding. It should also be noted that this tacit delegation of responsibilities was a result of geopolitical considerations and historical lessons learnt from intervening in domestic political conflicts. However a respondent from the ZNA argued that this was ambiguous in the case of a military intervention. He argued that various military interventions in SADC including that in DRC and Lesotho had been carried out without UN authorisation. As such though they were morally justifiable and legitimate as they had been carried out at the invitation of the states in question, they remained illegal uses of force under the UN charter. The respondent argued that it is legal issues such as these that may cause timidity in SADC to use force to resolve political crises that may require immediate military action to solve them. He also argued that the process of getting UN Security Council authorization was a bit tedious and arduous and

would prove impractical in a rapidly evolving volatile conflict situation. The respondent however acknowledged that SADC did indeed have primary responsibility to mediate conflicts that occurred within the SADC region.

4.3 SADC Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

4.3.1 The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

This study sought to examine the conflict resolution mechanisms at the disposal of SADC and how these were operationalized during the Madagascar political crisis. In 1996 at the Gaborone summit, SADC agreed on the formation of the OPDSC. Its mandate includes the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. According to Ngoma (2005:23), “the OPDSC is mandated to solve conflicts through preventive diplomacy, conflict mediation, negotiations, conciliation, arbitration, adjudication by an international tribunal, and the development of various protocols.”

The OPDSC has a four layer operational and decision making structure. The apex is the SADC summit under the Chairperson. The position of chairperson whose rotates annually and on a troika basis provides leadership to the OPDSC. The troika is selected alphabetically and comprises the outgoing, the current and the incoming chairpersons. Under the summit is the ministerial level, comprising the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence. They assist the OPDSC through the Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence and Security Committee. The Defence Chiefs and Technical level constitute the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). The ISDSC is the operational component of OPDSC mandated to ensure stability, conflict prevention, management and resolution among other responsibilities. ISDSC is an initiative that was adopted from the Front Line States (FLS) and incorporated into SADC following the demise of the FLS. A member of the ZNA officer corps interviewed argued that this decision making structure of the OPDSC was balanced and ensured that the decision making process is scrupulous. The respondent added that the four layers of decision-making also ensured ample consideration of pertinent issues affecting the sub-region. The in-depth consideration of issues may prevent premature action by SADC region. However other respondents were of the view that this rendered the OPSDC crippled through a web of bureaucracy. A considerable number of respondents argued that conflict resolution mechanisms needed to be streamlined and efficient as time was a scarce resource in volatile and unstable conflicts such as the one that obtained in Madagascar.

4.3.2 Objectives of the OPSDC

The study found that the OPSDC had a comprehensive set of objectives that outlined its operational mandate. Malan and Cilliers (2005:33) placed the objectives under five categories, that is, “military, crime prevention, intelligence, foreign policy and human rights.” The Protocol of the OPSDC includes the following objectives:

- a. In line with the international law, and where peaceful means to end a crisis would have failed, then it would be proper to consider military action
- b. To coordinate the participation of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping through the incorporation of national armies.

This situates the OPSDC as a highly proactive militarily capable organ tasked with the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. The broad objectives noted above enunciate SADC’s options to use force to ensure compliance where peaceful means have failed. The emphasis on peacekeeping and that military force should be used as a last resort was argued to be an ambiguous concept by a respondent from the University of Zimbabwe. The respondent pointed out that it therefore presents an opportunity for SADC leaders to continue engaging in dialogue even where there seems to be no light at the end of the tunnel, as far as resolution of conflict is concerned.

4.4 SADC Role in Conflict Resolution

This study found that SADC was played a very important role in resolving the conflict in Madagascar. The major roles that SADC played can be divided into four main themes which are refusing legitimacy for UCG, deescalating the conflict, avoiding a military confrontation and negotiation a framework or roadmap for the return to democracy. According to a respondent interviewed, SADC was at the forefront of seeing to it that the military did not take matters into its own hands and worsen the political situation in Madagascar. This was done through statements that condemned the UCG that had taken place in Madagascar. This in turn had the effect of alerting the military than any further moves to undermine civilian rule would not be accepted by the regional body and the A.U. in this vein SADC is seen as being proactive in mitigating armed conflict in the SADC region.

Another respondent argued that SADC had played a pivotal role in resuscitating negotiations after the A.U and U.N led interventions had collapsed. SADC was able to bring the disputing parties back on the table. Also it should be noted that SADC’s lead negotiator Joaquim Chissano was a tenable mediator to both parties. The fact that the parties were willing to come to the table under the auspices of SADC, shows that SADC played an immense role in

brokering the electoral roadmap that would eventually see Rajoelina step down. The respondent also noted that it was important to note that SADC stood on principle and initially refused to recognise the government of Rajoelina as the legitimate government of Madagascar. This was not only a matter of principle but was a very important signal to coup prone Madagascar that military takeovers and UCGs would never be tolerated.

SADC was also instrumental in formulating the electoral roadmap that culminated in the 2014 elections in Madagascar. SADC went on to send an observer team to monitor the implementation of this roadmap and also to monitor the elections that were to be held. SADC brokered the “ni-ni” option which excluded both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana from contesting in the elections. This was a very important milestone as it precluded either of the highly divisive candidates from actively participating in the political future of Madagascar. This was an important role played by SADC because it ensured the political system had a clean slate from the two political rivals.

While SADC has been able to help resolve conflicts and reduce violence in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, the agreements in question have never really come to grips with the thorny societal, political, and governance issues underlying those conflicts, or the democratic deficits that lead to instability. Thus, SADC played a pivotal role in hammering out a roadmap that ultimately guided the country’s re-entry into the international community. While the regional body has been rightly praised for an impressive piece of dogged diplomacy, one respondent argued that the resolution of the crisis had not come with sufficient scrutiny of the remaining problems that could precipitate another crisis in the near future. The respondent argued that the core issues that had led to the coup in the first place had not been addressed. Another respondent argued that the one size fits all approach of either organizing elections or a power sharing deal could not always work as a solution for lasting peace and stability. The respondent argued that SADC often ignored issues of corruption, poverty and human insecurity as the underlying causes of political instability and civil strife. Rather most SADC interventions such as those in Zimbabwe and Lesotho focused more on restoring legitimacy and political stability rather than addressing the causes of such instability. This only window dressed the problem, incubating it to explode at a later date.

4.5 Efficacy of SADC Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

The study sought to evaluate the perceptions of respondents towards the efficacy of SADCs conflict resolution mechanisms. A majority of the respondents, 43 percent, as represented in

the chart below were of the view that SADC was very effective in resolving the conflict in Madagascar. 29 percent of respondents were of the view that SADC was effective in Madagascar. Respondents argued that SADC took on the lead role of mediator after the A.U and U.N led mediation efforts had collapsed. The fact that SADC was able to resuscitate the negotiation process and ultimately come up with an election roadmap acceptable to all parties was a demonstration of the strong institutional dispute resolution mechanisms within the SADC framework.

However a significant number of respondents 14 percent, were of the view that SADC was ineffective. Another 14 percent of respondents were also of the view that SADC was very ineffective in resolving the conflict in Madagascar. The respondents argued that SADC had initially taken a back seat as the conflict unfolded. The reactive nature of SADC meant that the A.U and U.N had taken lead on a crisis in SADC's backdoor. The fact that these interventions failed were because these organisations lacked the intimate knowledge that SADC would have of its own member state. The respondents also concurred that SADC had wasted time bickering over to use military force or to pursue diplomatic means, this in itself was a failure that deserved mention as it showed that there was no unity of policy approaches to conflict resolution in SADC. This gave Rajoelina ample time to stir up nationalist sentiment in the face of a possible military invasion by SADC. The respondents argued that if SADC is ever to use military force, the decision to do so should be made quickly and executed with haste.

Ngoma (2005:23) adds on to this argument by saying that, "given that a coup d'état is an undemocratic seizure of power, SADC could have swiftly deployed the SSF to prevent the Madagascar conflict from escalating. SADC's response to the Madagascar conflict may account for the over reliance on diplomacy even where dialogue may seem to be ineffective, thereby prolonging the resolution of conflict in Member States." Thus in this line of thinking SADC was largely ineffectual in dealing with the conflict in Madagascar.

However Solomon (2004:3) puts forward a counter argument against the hasty use of military force, "the four layers of decision-making in the OPSDC provide ample time for consideration of key issues affecting the sub-region. The in-depth consideration of issues avoids the unwarranted employment of SSF which may worsen the security situation instead of fostering peace." This argument posits that the proper debate and discussion of facts on the ground in Madagascar ruled out the need for using military force which would have had the

possible effect of escalating the crisis. This is because the Madagascar military was prepared to engage a SADC force. A respondent from the ZNA argues that this would have seen SADC get involved in a messy a drawn out military expedition that would inevitably end in disaster. Thus the respondent argued that the processes of the OPDSC had ensured that there was no unnecessary use of military force in Madagascar and that the diplomatic route had been the best possible option. He added that the fact that SADC had vigorously pursued this option and resolved the conflict amicably is proof enough that SADC had been very effective in dealing with the crisis in Madagascar.

In an interview with a respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the respondent said that the multilateral involvement of all SADC members in the mediation efforts in resolving a conflict in a member country created strong bonds of cooperation within SADC. The respondent argued that the collective security efforts towards resolving common threats breed interdependence among SADC Member States. However, a respondent from the Zimbabwe National Defence College (ZNDC) opposed this view saying that SADC interventions were marred by the competing self-interests of the member countries. The respondent pointed out that when conflict of interest becomes pronounced it would be difficult for SADC Member States to agree on the employment of SSF in conflict situations. This would make the OPSDC and SSF paralysed in instances where military force had to be used to resolve conflict.

4.6 Challenges Encountered by SADC in Brokering Peace in Conflict Situations

4.6.1 Overlapping Roles of RECs

The study found that one of the major impediments to SADC intervention was the overlapping roles of different RECs that many of its member states were also members of. This made it difficult to assess a situation of conflict and determine which regional body would respond to it and directly take the lead in any mediation efforts. A respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interviewed argued that, “SADC was not sure whether it was supposed to take the lead or wait for the A.U to delegate this duty to SADC as had been the case with the Zimbabwean political crisis where the A.U explicitly assigned SADC to deal with the situation and mediate.” As such though it would seem logical that SADC would always take the lead in conflict resolution within its region of responsibility, the respondent argued that it was not always so clear cut.

Zounmenou (2009:73) concurs by adding that a minimum of six different mediators were quickly sent to resolve the Madagascar political strife without a defined leader among them.

SADCs special envoy, Absalom Themba Dlamini, visited Madagascar in 2009 and found that AU and UN mediation efforts for a solution acceptable to both sides had already taken off, whereas regional efforts were still focused on Rajoelina's removal and Ravalomanana's reinstatement in line with the policy of "Regime solidarity," which is customary in the region. This created not only a disjointed negotiation thrust but also divergent policy standpoints on where to negotiate from. Another respondent from the University of Zimbabwe in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies was of the view that the presence of so many mediators from different organisations not only created confusion but fostered the rise of competing interests among the mediators themselves as they would seek to quickly resolve a conflict in order to gain political mileage. This has the potential of rushing the conflict resolution process and ignoring the underlying cause of conflict in the first place. The SADC communiqué issued in July 2009 outlined collaboration with the AU, UN and International Organisation of la Francophonie (IOF).

4.6.2 Lack of A Permanent Mediation Mechanism

Another major finding of the study was that SADC does not have permanent mediation mechanism in place to deal with crises when they arise. Though SADC has comprehensive conflict identification systems in place such as the Early Warning System, it does not have a mediation mechanism in place to deal with conflict. In an interview with an academic from the ZNDC, the respondent pointed out that SADC had an efficient EWS that was created to identify conflict that had the potential to incubate regional instability. He also argued that the OPDS and the SADC Troika were very important conflict resolution mechanisms but were flawed in that they dealt with conflict as it arose. As such these organs were mainly prescriptive in nature and incapable of initiating and following through a mediation process adequately. This left SADC mediation disjointed and incoherent. The respondent cited the Zimbabwe Political crisis as an example. He argued that no real progress would be made by the political parties themselves as they would wait for a SADC summit to resolve their issues, this effectively made the SADC mediation team that had been assigned to Zimbabwe by the OPDSC through South Africa largely ineffectual. Ancas (2011:20) posits that regional groupings generally respond to political crisis in an ad hoc manner. In most cases, this reveals deep-seated problems of lack of institutionalised structures and decision-making processes to

deal with non-military conflict management and resolution activities. Inadequate coordination frustrated initial SADC engagement in the Madagascar political crisis. ICG (2010:4) points out that “SADC has yet to establish a mediation unit to strengthen its peace-making capacity.” This in effect means that SADC is always caught on the back foot when conflict such as the one that arose in Madagascar arises. The result is uncoordinated efforts from not only SADC itself but also the international community through the A.U and the U.N as there is no consensus or protocol on who should take lead in not only coordinating the mediation of the conflict but also managing the political crisis. The vague principles outlining the relationships between the A.U, U.N and regional bodies like SADC cause ambiguity and a paralysis of action in times of conflict.

4.6.3 Shortage of Resources

In an interview with an economic analyst and development expert, the respondent put forward the argument that the major reason for SADC not having a permanent conflict resolution and mediation mechanism was because of a lack of funding. The respondent highlighted the fact that SADCs budget was almost over 60 percent donor funded, this naturally puts limits and caps over what SADC can and cannot do. Thus the creation of a permanent mediation mechanism would not only be costly but also wasteful as there are no permanent conflicts that need mediation. The economist argued that it was therefore prudent for SADC to be a cost effective organisation and live within its means.

However the study found that this shortage of resources permeated to more than just the lack of a permanent mediation team. A lack of financial resources has meant that SADC could not extend the stay of the monitoring team in Madagascar. As such the result is that though SADC might have successfully mediated the conflict in Madagascar, it has no capacity to adequately monitor the implementation of the political agreements it has brokered over the long term. This creates a situation where belligerents in a conflict may only execute the deals they would have agreed to the extent that SADC is able to monitor such compliance. The lecturer from the University of Zimbabwe added that this can be exemplified by Rajoelina’s disregard of the Maputo Agreement, which called for him to create an inclusive government, by appointing his proxies to cabinet. This was Rajoelina exploiting the limited monitoring capacity of SADC.

A respondent from the Zimbabwe National Army officer corps also concurred saying that the lack of funding greatly limited the efficacy of SADC intervention. The respondent argued

that in some instances SADC clearly needed to explore military solutions but because SADC did not have adequate funding, it settled for diplomatic options instead. The military officer gave the example of how “Operation Sovereign Legitimacy” in the DRC was a SADC mandated intervention but that the individual countries that took part in it had had to fund the military expedition on their own. The respondent also pointed out to “Operation Boleas” which was executed by South Africa and Botswana in 1998 to restore order in Lesotho as another SADC military intervention funded by the individual countries that carried it out. He outlined that had there been enough resources to fund military expeditions, SADC would have used military solutions to UCGs more frequently. As such the financial challenges that haunt SADC force it to perpetually utilize diplomatic options to conflicts that may otherwise be decisively dealt with by a military intervention.

4.6.4 Regime Solidarity

The study found that another major impediment to SADC conflict resolution is the principle of regime solidarity. A respondent from the diplomatic corps highlighted that SADC was largely immobilized by the unwritten principle of regime solidarity by its leaders. He defined this as an unwillingness to intervene in the domestic affairs of a member country to the point of potentially removing the incumbent in favour of other political forces in any member country. The respondent pointed out that in most SADC interventions, SADC always sided with the incumbent even when it was not prudent to do so. He cited the case of the Lesotho coup in 2014 where SADC still maintained that the ousted prime minister should be reinstated first. SADC also took the same stance in the Madagascar crisis. The respondent argued that this created a situation which divorced negotiators from the reality on the ground and as such put SADC mediation on the wrong footing. Another respondent agreed with this argument adding that though SADC eventually backed down on the point that it would not recognise the government of Rajoelina and that it recognised Ravalomanana as the legitimate president of Madagascar. Negotiations over who would be recognised as the president or not took up valuable time, resources and political capital that SADC could have used on the real issues that had caused the coup in Madagascar. As such the respondent argued that it was important for SADC to adopt flexible and realistic approaches to conflict resolution and mediation. Hardline stances such as regime stability are naturally inflexible and do not always fit with the obtaining situation on the ground, this prolongs the conflict resolution process unnecessarily.

However another respondent from the Zimbabwe intelligence services argued that regime solidarity was a necessary evil. The respondent pointed out that it was a well-documented policy within the A.U and SADC not to accept or recognise UCGs. The major reason for this policy being the destabilizing nature of military coups and other undemocratic seizures of power. The respondent argued that these practices had a very real potential of contagion and spreading to other countries. Thus SADC had to be steadfast and firm in reiterating that it would not recognise the Rajoelina government as legitimate during negotiations.

This not only served as a deterrent but set the minimum standards for negotiation. A respondent from the embassy of a European country actually applauded this policy adding that it was a smart negotiating tactic by the SADC mediation team. He outlined that not only was this matter of principle but it also put the illegitimate Rajoelina government on the back foot by isolating it internationally. The diplomat pointed out that the embarrassment caused by SADC and the A.U refusing Rajoelina an opportunity to speak at the U.N general assembly because he was not the legitimate president of Madagascar was a major victory for SADC. This demonstrated the political muscle that SADC could wield on the international arena and probably went a long way in forcing Rajoelina to make concessions on the negotiating table.

4.6.5 State Sovereignty

The study also found that a major challenge to SADCs conflict resolution and mediation efficacy is the primacy of state sovereignty. SADC is founded on mutual respect for the sovereignty of the individual countries that make up the regional bloc. As such there is a strong aversion to getting intricately involved in political matters of a member state as this is seen as an infringement of that country's sovereignty. Though the SADC OPDS is tasked with dealing with threats to the stability of the region, domestic threats to stability are especially difficult to deal with. There are no clear definitions and demarcations of when SADC can institute fully fledged interventions without the express invitation of a member country. A member state may invoke the principle of sovereignty in order to avoid intervention by SADC in its domestic political processes. Member states have been reluctant to announce the redundancy of such a principle for the apparent reason that they may one day wish to use it to block SADC intervention in their own affairs in future.

Cathal (2014) argues that, "The SADC Summit has never been an arena in which heads of state face criticism from their peers, at least not openly. Even behind the scenes, pressure

only builds in response to crises, coups, or calamities that pose imminent threats to stability. Three important factors shape this approach: a strong commitment to respect the sovereignty of member states, the solidarity between governments with roots in liberation movements in Southern Africa, and an apparent reluctance among SADC states to cede power to regional entities or legal frameworks.”

The respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined that this represented a lack of political will by members of SADC too fully integrate and become a regional community. He highlighted that as long there remained a pronounced emphasis on state sovereignty in SADC it would not only be difficult in carrying out SADC interventions but it would also make the overall process of integration arduous and lengthy. A lecturer from the University of Zimbabwe added on that state sovereignty made it difficult to navigate the landmines that fill the domestic political landscape of member countries. The lecturer outlined that at the onset of SADC negotiations in Madagascar, SADC had a crisis of legitimacy as it was seen as Ravalomanana’s project. In essence the people of Madagascar did not identify themselves as belonging to SADC. The fact that SADC openly supported Ravalomanana made matters worse in that Rajoelina exploited this as an attack on Madagascar’s sovereignty. The respondent went on to add that state sovereignty remained the bane of SADCs existence. He gave the example of how Zimbabwe had effectively killed the SADC tribunal citing irregularities in how it had been constituted, the major one being that Zimbabwe had not ratified the protocol that brought it into being. As such Zimbabwe invoked its sovereignty to stop the operations of the SADC tribunal. This supremacy of state sovereignty greatly limits the powers of SADC in conflict scenarios.

4.6.5 Nationalism

The study found that SADC was inherently divided on nationalistic lines. Thus there is no sense of community that unites the whole of SADC into one coherent body. This inevitably permeates into its conflict resolution mechanisms and efforts. The case of Madagascar presented an acid test for SADC as the island is geographically unattached to SADC. The people of Madagascar are also largely of French and Asian ancestry. As such there is no commonality of values or shared beliefs that bind Madagascar and SADC. This made it difficult for SADC mediation to be accepted as legitimate in Madagascar. The lecturer argued that this nationalist sentiment is not only peculiar to Madagascar alone but to a lot of countries that make up SADC. The respondent pointed out that Angola has not yet signed the MDP, the reason for this being that Angola feels aggrieved for not having received any

military support to suppress the UNITA rebellion in that country which lasted over 30 years. Thus nationalist sentiment in Angola is that the MDA would not be beneficial to Angola. This in effect leaves out one of the more capable African militaries outside of SADC security mechanisms. Such a limitation has adverse consequences on SADC's ability to present a united front in the face of mediating political crises in member states. Nationalism also brings the legitimacy of SADC intervention into question, making the mediation process highly complex and drawn out.

4.6.6 Competing Self Interests Among Members

A major finding of the research was that SADC members have competing interests that usually come into conflict. The self-interests of member countries create fissures in how the bloc deals with conflict in a member country. A diplomat interviewed said that SADC had many competing countries' interests. He pointed out that South Africa had naturally assumed the de facto leadership of the bloc as it was the regional economic and military powerhouse. This was a coup de grace of Zimbabwe's previous position as the leading country in the bloc. Angola also seeks to be a regional centre of power. The diplomat argued that these ever shifting power dynamics in the region meant that each country would want to advance its own foreign policy and visibility by pushing its own approach to conflict resolution. This not only increases the leadership profile of a state within SADC but also acceptance of a country's chosen approach to solving a crisis in another country also tacitly means tentative acceptance of such a country's leadership. Thus there is fierce competition for the adoption of largely two options to conflict resolution in SADC, the military option and the diplomatic option. During the Madagascar political crisis Angola, Swaziland and Zimbabwe were in favour of the military option whilst South Africa favoured diplomatic channels. Although diplomatic channels were eventually explored, the differences in approach are a reflection of the different ideologies and interests that the various members of SADC have. These interests are more often than not in conflict and in direct competition with each other. A mid-level official from the ministry of defence pointed out that Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia had pursued the military solution in the DRC despite fierce resistance from South Africa. He however argued that South Africa had been very quick in invading Lesotho in 1998 and providing military assistance again in 2014 because it has vested interests in that country through the Highlands Water Project. Thus the differences in approaches to conflict resolution in SADC are largely driven by the self interests of the individual countries in SADC.

Lt Col Ngoma N (Retd) postulated a three pronged classification of SADC States with regards intervention in the DRC. The militaristic States like Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe were viewed as hawkish, whilst those who proposed peaceful settlement like South Africa were viewed as resembling doves. The neutral States were viewed to be like penguins. Such labeling of SADC Member States may reflect the lack of homogeneity when it comes to policy pertaining to response to conflict situations. There is therefore reason to justify conclusions by Baker and Maresera (2009) that chances are slim for the SSF to be employed as an intervention force especially where there is no common policy position among Member States. The fact that SADC resolved to shelve the use of military force in Madagascar is largely a reflection of the will of South Africa which is the most dominant member of SADC and the regional power broker. Baker and Maeresera (2009) conclude that SADC states would only intervene militarily where their interests are at stake. The Lecturer from the University of Zimbabwe added that lack of consensus at the onset of the crisis on which approach to use aggravated the situation in that there was no immediate response to effectively handle the evolving crisis. This negatively impacted SADC's conflict resolution reaction time and readiness.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter discussed and analysed the findings of the research. The major findings were that SADC had indeed evolved from being merely an economic cooperation and development entity into a fully-fledged security community. This was through the signing of the MDP and the establishment of the SSF. The institutionalization of the OPDSC is also an integral part in this evolution. This is largely due to the functions of this organ that give the primary responsibility to identify conflict areas and map resolution procedures. However this study found that the major flaw in this was that SADC does not have a permanent mediation team. This drawback means that the OPDSC has to mediate crises on an ad hoc basis. Thus there is no institutional memory and experience build-up of how to adequately mediate complex political crises. This also impacts on the responses SADC has to developing crises. This study also found that though SADC had been phenomenally successful in resolving the conflict in Madagascar, there remained glaring fissures. These include divisions over when to use military force, leadership of SADC and nationalism with members unwilling to cede any more power to the regional body. The study also found that there remained principles such as regime solidarity and state sovereignty that stood as impediments to speedy and effective conflict resolution by SADC. On the overall though, the study found that SADC though

limited by resources constraints and sometimes a lack of political will by members to resolve conflicts that did not directly affect their national interests, SADC had been very successful in conflict resolution and mediation.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes the research study and gives an outline of the study's recommendations. The previous chapter discussed the security architecture within SADC and how this was operationalised to solve the Madagascar political crisis. The chapter also highlighted the role played by SADC in resolving the conflict. In the research findings, the most glaring were the short comings of the structural efficacy of SADC in conflict resolution. This was largely as a result of the lack of funding and a permanent mediation organ within SADC. As such mediation was initiated on an ad hoc basis. In light of these findings this chapter seeks to discuss worthy recommendations that SADC could institute in order to make its conflict resolution and mediation efforts more robust and responsive to evolving conflict situation within the region. This chapter also gives recommendations for Madagascar, as a political entity on its own, in order to ensure lasting peace and political stability. These

recommendations are mainly aimed at establishing a politically stable state in which the military has a limited role to play in the civilian politics of the country.

5.2 Study Summary

This study sought to analyse the efficacy of SADC's conflict resolution mechanisms using Madagascar as a case study. Madagascar was chosen as it had had a marked conflict of ideology and conflict resolution approaches by the member states in SADC. This was mainly between the hawks and the doves. Also the Madagascar case was peculiar in that it turned out to be a triumph for SADC diplomacy and entrenched SADC as the primary body responsible for security and stability in the region. This is because though SADC had been slow to respond to the crisis, it later took on the lead from the A.U and the U.N and saw the crisis resolved through agreement of an electoral roadmap. This study sought to analyse the unique characteristics that placed SADC in a position to resolve the conflict better than the A.U and the U.N. the study also took the thrust of unpacking the shortcomings of SADC that had the potential of scuttling the Madagascar intervention as well as future interventions. The research was focused on the organs of SADC that are responsible for maintaining peace and security in the region, primarily the OPSDC and the SSF and how these organs have been utilised. The study used documentary search and face to face interviews to collect data on the subject matter. Respondents were from the ministry of foreign affairs, the military, academia and other experts in security studies. The data was analysed using content and thematic analysis as outlined in the methodology section in chapter one.

The study also sought to unpack the various protocols and unwritten rules that seem to govern SADC's intervention. These were mainly discussed in the last chapter as being regime solidarity and an over emphasis on state sovereignty which saw member states unwilling to give the regional body more power and maneuverability in terms of instituting interventions. This study found that these principles hindered effective military or diplomatic intervention as the domestic politics of member states remained largely a domain inaccessible to the regional body. The study also found that fragmentation along nationalistic lines and the self-interests of state was the major driver for any interventions that might be agreed upon in the regional body.

5.3 Conclusion

The study found that SADC does indeed have robust conflict resolution and mediation mechanisms in place. These mechanisms have had varying success over the lifespan of the regional bloc. SADC successfully mediated in internal conflicts in Zimbabwe and Lesotho

and the main case study of this research Madagascar. However these mediation interventions were not without their faults. The study concludes that SADC is faced by an acute lack of political will to use military force as intervention tool to restore legitimate constitutional order in instances of UCG. This has been witnessed in Madagascar and the DRC. This unwillingness is both as a result of a fractured SADC along nationalistic lines and also the self-interest of the individual states that make up SADC. These divisions cause a lack of coherence in what measures are taken to intervene in politically destabilized countries.

The study also concludes that though SADC has gained a wealth of experience in diplomacy and defusing delicate political situation, the lack of a permanent mediation organ means that there is not institutional memory. The implication is that valuable expertise, knowledge and experience is lost and that mediation is seen as an ad hoc process without need for any continuity.

The study concludes that SADC's successes have largely addressed the imminent political threat to stability but never really the root cause of such instability in the first place. As such SADC's interventions amount to stop gap measures that do not build lasting institutions that have the capacity to ensure lasting peace and stability. This is the conclusion this study makes from the intervention in Madagascar. This is based on the logic that SADC simply mandated the holding of fresh election and the preclusion of Ravalomanana and Rajoelina from contesting in the elections. This study however found that though the political rivalry between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina played a significant role in the instability in Madagascar, there were more underlying causes such as debilitating poverty amidst a population explosion. Political corruption, economic marginalization, a politicized military and the mismanagement of government and the economy by Ravalomanana were catalysts for instability that were not adequately addressed by the SADC intervention. In essence this means that these issues have a possibility of resurfacing later on in the future on Madagascar and destabilising it, and potentially the region as well.

5.4 Recommendations

- Establish the SADC Permanent Mediation and Conflict Resolution Organ (PMCRO)
 - this is necessary in order to initiate mediation in the early stages of an evolving conflict. It is also necessary to build an institutional repository of gained knowledge and experience in the mediation of tense political situations. This is important because it makes mediation a process and not an ad hoc event.

- There is need to expand and strengthen SADC's existing security policy framework. SADC should promulgate a regional protocol on political, diplomatic and military interventions independent of the MDP. This protocol would be the legal instrument governing the PMCRO and would outline the responsibilities of states in cases of political instability in the region. The protocol would also outline the prerogative of SADC to use military force to restore constitutional legitimacy in instances of UCG. SADC would not need an express invitation to use military force.
- SADC member states need to cede some of their sovereignty to the regional body in order to allow for rapid interventions before political instability degenerates into civil war with the potential to destabilize the whole region.
- There is also an acute need to create national centres and to include the participation of the academia, NGOs and the civil societies as part of strategies to widen the regional early warning system. This makes it more sensitive to potential conflict and instability.
- There is need to capacitate the OPDSC early warning system in order to make it more responsive to not only military threats to security but also political threats to security. This makes it easier for SADC conflict resolution and mediation apparatus to identify and solve conflicts early on.
- Wean off dependency on aid- this study recommends that SADC build its own capacity to finance its own projects and interventions. The study noted that military intervention was ruled out in most interventions because of the lack of resources among other reasons. This severely limits the flexibility and muscle of SADC as a regional body, it becomes a dog without any sharp canines. The lack of funding also means that SADC cannot finance the operation of a permanent mediation organ. Thus SADC members should contribute more money to operationalise vital organs of SADC.
- There is also a serious need to build cohesion and competency of the SSF through acquiring enough resources and constant holding of combined exercises to make the army more effective in its mandate as a dispute resolution tool.
- SADC should develop and execute a common conflict resolution and mediation policy that clearly outlines the various stages of conflict escalation and the tools at SADCs disposal that can be used to contain such escalation.
- This study also recommends that SADC should come up with a conflict resolution mechanism that combines and coerces national defence commanders to remain

neutral. This was especially the case in Madagascar and Lesotho, where there was an urgent need for security sector reform.

- In light of the muddled and unclear interventions by the A.U and U.N, it becomes imperative for SADC to formulate and implement a joint foreign policy guideline to assist in the promotion of regional and international re-engagement efforts.
- There is also need to promote ownership of SADC by the citizens of SADC themselves. Citizens can play an integral party in the governing of member states if the Heads of State Summit and the Council of Ministers incorporate the Parliamentary Forum into their structures. This will allow the elected Parliamentarians to air views of their constituencies to SADC's top hierarchy.
- SADC should also take measures to align the MDP provisions on military intervention with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This would make the utilisation of the military option legal and in line with the UN Charter.
- There is also a need to develop a common foreign policy as regards to the anticipated increase of Asian presence and investments in the region. This would limit the occurrence of destabilising economic deals such as the land deal in Madagascar with the South Korean company.

5.5 Areas of Further Study

The current conflict resolution mechanisms of SADC have been demonstrated to be largely effective in defusing political conflicts within the region. However there remains a gap in literature over how military force can be used to expedite the conflict resolution process, especially in instances of UCG. As such there is need to explore the consequences of SADC using military force on one of its members and whether this would be a destabilizing action that may result in the collapse of the regional body or not. There is need to explore ways in which the SSF can be strengthened and reinforced as a conflict resolution and peacekeeping entity in SADCs arsenal.

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