

**DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)'s NUCLEAR
STRATEGY AND ITS IMPACT ON DISARMAMENT**

By

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DECLARATION

I, Raymond Mharapara, declare that I am the sole author of this dissertation, that during the period of registered study, I have not been registered for another for another academic award or qualification, nor has any of the material been submitted wholly or partly for any other award. This dissertation is a result of my own research work, and where other people's research was used, they have been duly acknowledged.

Date_____

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CANDIDATE

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SUPERVISOR

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SUPERVISOR

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my wife Constance and to my two sons, Takudzwa and Mukudzeishe and last but not least my daughter, Kudzanai.

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ABSTRACT

The topic is about Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s Nuclear Strategy and its impact on Disarmament. Although DPRK has been branded the "axis of evil" by George W Bush junior, it however remained friendly to Zimbabwe. Firstly, it remains necessary to understand its nuclear strategy in depth given the on going good relations between DPRK and Zimbabwe. We are in a global world and Zimbabwe needs the participation of the western world in its weak economy and of necessity the relationship between DPRK and Zimbabwe require proper balancing if the two relationships are to be maintained without the risk antagonism. Secondly, to technologically emerging African defence forces the study will provide some of the pitfalls to be avoided when pursuing defence programmes. The research is a survey research which relied heavily on the use of questionnaires. Qualitative research method was used more than quantitative research method. Chapter four especially relied on quantitative research method. The major problem confronted relates to encouraging respondents to fulfil the promise of returning the filled questionnaires. However, that was more than compensated by easy access to research material. The result of this study show that 50% of respondents adjudge DPRK's international relations to be poor. The relationship with neighbouring South Korea and Japan is disastrous and hostile to say the least. DPRK's greatest motivations comes from the need to create deterrence and seek credibility. As part of the recommendations, DPRK should not fool itself that nuclear proliferation can stabilise tense relationships. Liberalisation looks to the degree of interdependence at the system level and that measures the economic connections between states; those economic institutions and entire economic establishment will collapse- because no support will be rendered to the economy. Surely DPRK ought to desist from settling matters/ problems violently- diplomacy should be given a chance and the assistance of Russia and China should be taken advantage of in settling this somehow mammoth problem between DPRK and USA.

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1 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is what it is today as a result of the split of the peninsula into DPRK and South Korea after the war of 1950- 1953. Although Korea existed as a unified country since the 7th century, the occasion of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894- 95, certain parts of Korea were occupied by Japan. As a result of the conquer of Korea in 1910 by Japan, it did remain a Japanese colony until the onset of the Second World War (WW II). The end of the WW II did not bring any joy to the Koreans either due to the absence of any elections. Although the United Nations (UN) had made a proposal of holding elections, the idea was stifled and vehemently rejected by communists (aligned to the Soviet Union) on either side of the 38th parallel. This effectively consolidated the enmity between the North and South with the north led by Kim Il- Sung establishing a Stalinist regime backed by a military equipped with Russian artillery and tanks. South Korea on its part was inclined to the USA and of necessity towed a capitalist agenda.

The dissertation is presented in an outline of headings and subsections to give a clear picture of the study. It starts with a background to the study which is a brief historical account of how the Korean peninsula broke up into two. The emergence of the hostility between the two since the end of the Korean war is highlighted. The Cold War period worsened the confrontation between the two Koreas and helped to widen the differences in socio-economic issues, military issues, cultural and otherwise. Further in

the research paper, a statement of the problem is given. Following the statement of the problem are clear objectives, research questions, limitations of the research and the research proposition to the study. On research limitations, the researcher identified issues that affected quality of the research results.

1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

When conflict broke up in Korea, the USA intervened on the side of South Korea after securing UN's support in branding DPRK as the aggressor. The USA was supported by Britain and Australia and less by other member states of the Security Council. Besides Soviet Union, China was brought in on the side of DPRK with an interest to protect its Manchurian border which was being threatened by the UN army's proximity. While the forces held sway by pushing the DPRK's forces north of the 38th parallel, peace talks proceeded on until 1953 resulting into an Armistice in 1953.

Since then, the wave of enmity between DPRK and South Korea has never receded and occasionally has been punctuated by diplomatic uproars. DPRK embarked on a nuclear programme which it has held on to hitherto.

It is now debatable to conclude whether DPRK's nuclear policy does have positive implications on security and peace or negative implications on the same in the region and the world at large.

Attempts and efforts have been made to produce positive outcome out of the long drawn and stalled Six- Party Talks involving Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and USA but to no avail. DPRK is demanding bilateral and direct talks or

negotiations with the USA. DPRK is ambitious and intent of subtly demanding integration (as a nuclear state) into the international community, as represented by integration into Asia and the world at large. This demand is obnoxious to USA and its allies in particular and USA is acutely aware of the inherent dangers that are likely to ensue from such a prospect. Kaarbo and Ray (2011) suggest that USA may have the last option of bombing DPRK to oblivion but that implies risks and consequences that are too ghastly to contemplate and ultimately would serve no meaningful political or strategic purpose.

1.2.1 The subject of DPRK Nuclear Programme

The subject of DPRK nuclear programme and the obvious standoff between DPRK and USA is topical in international relations. To the extent that all media houses in the North frequently touch on the issue is a forgone conclusion. To start with, DPRK is an isolated state whose interaction with the world over is limited to countries it has old and well established relationships with or to countries whose ideological underpinnings share some commonalities. The subject conjures up a lot of interest and controversy especially in view of the fact that the UN entrusted with the world's peace, security and stability considers the programme illegal; in the sense that is adjudged to be against both international law and the world body's efforts to achieve arms control, nuclear reduction and disarmament. The evaluation of DPRK's nuclear programme is problematic and full of intrigues given that states have a power-seeking tendency owing to the competition for security especially in an anarchic system (Ho-Wong Jeong: 2010).

A research on DPRK's motivations for nuclear capability should therefore be seen in the light of security investment, symbolic functions of image and status building, and/or the drive to fulfil an international norm. Notwithstanding the foregoing if power is to serve as a means to have determined effects in limiting an enemy's action, it has to pervade allies and enemies alike. In line with Ho-Wong Jong's (2010) argument DPRK has to be recognized internationally as enjoying state supremacy due to its nuclear weapons capability. DPRK supposedly is cleverly manipulating deterrence and fear. Thus whilst the UN is clamoring for disarmament and nuclear arms reduction, its desire is in stark contrast with the argument of (Kelman 2004: 59) that control of violence would be easily managed under a hegemonic world state (such as the Roman empire). What is being witnessed today seems to defy the odds because the unipolar or hegemonic international system epitomized by the USA is highly unstable or violent. That probably explains the emergence of DPRK's military power scenario as a competing power likely to provoke war or conflict. So, it can be explained that DPRK is pursuing deterrence with the knowledge that states fear the horror of mutual destruction hence the building of a deterrent system through ownership of nuclear weapons.

President Obama describes USA actions and efforts against terrorism and in particular the hunting down of Osama bin Laden as legal and especially on the strength of 9/11 attacks. It is doubtful whether the same Administration takes North Korea's nuclear programme in the same breath and considers it legal because DPRK is constantly reminded of the catastrophe of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and as such is intent on safeguarding her territorial integrity and sovereignty. DPRK is considered a dangerous

adversary by the USA for having gone ahead in developing nuclear arsenal. But this is by USA definition, description and labeling. According to DPRK's thinking, she is not doing anything untoward or no more than what Israeli did or is doing. Israeli nuclear weapons possession is based on her own threat assessment posed, supposedly by the neighbouring Arab States. The wars that Israeli has gone through up to this day confirms the instability and probably the hostility surrounding Israeli's relationship with Arab neighbours. Constant deadly conflicts with the Palestinians are another drawback to stability. It is difficult however to determine who the aggressor is. DPRK does not experience these occasional conflicts except for occasional military exercises carried by either DPRK or the assumed enemies, USA and South Korea. The reminder of the Korean war of 1950- 1953 is chilling for DPRK.

Discussions and negotiations have been previously held over DPRK's nuclear programmes. No meaningful positions have been agreed before. The USA- DPRK contest has been explosive with attacks on each other's positions. Due to explosive environment both have been unable to use the opening process as a constructive step toward discussion about disagreement, and aim at establishing a common ground. According to Jeong (2010), negotiations of this nature are difficult because negotiators tempted to manipulate the facts of their states case with a view to steal the discussion to their advantage.

There is need for research to understand, succinctly, the motivation and reasons behind DPRK's nuclear weapons development. Listening to a presentation by South Korea's Zimbabwe Ambassador, His Excellency Mr LEW Kwang – Chul at University of Zimbabwe

on 13 June, 2013; he emphasised the desirability of change as an important factor in the South Korea's industrial transformation, let alone for any other desired process or transformation. The question is whether DPRK's nuclear programme is inspired by change? We cannot be so certain unless the issue is interrogated fully. Admittedly the end of the bipolar world is a great change. So is the end of the World War II and the Korean War of 1950/1953. Could this help to explain the genesis of DPRK's nuclear programme? Or worse still does DPRK not have a legitimate claim of self-defence just as Israeli have?

Meanwhile the world and in particular the great powers are still battling with the two concepts/ theories of nuclear reduction and disarmament. The two concepts cause vexation when applied to a country like DPRK. Does UN have to choose to demand disarmament or nuclear reduction from DPRK? Can the line be drawn succinctly between the two? What should be the nature of discussions/ negotiations that the UN ought to initiate in order to persuade DPRK to discontinue the nuclear programme or let alone consider disarmaments. A lot of questions require some answers. Roehring (2013) suggests that most analysts harbour some hope that DPRK may yet be willing to abandon its nuclear weapons for a suitable package of incentives, Roehring's assertion can be traced back to emotional outbursts or statements that DPRK sometimes issues to the media. On 23/04/13 in the National Post DPRK was reported to be vowing to bolster its nuclear programme in response to USA report accusing Pyongyang of human rights abuses. Pyongyang labels USA attempts as hostile and aimed at toppling DPRK's leadership.

There are several options open to DPRK given by Roehring. The one drawing much support is that DPRK is determined to advance its nuclear process and use it as a carrot for incentives or use it as a deterrent whilst improving its demands in the likelihood of discussions and negotiations. On the part of USA, judging by its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, one is persuaded to think that the option of a pre-emptive attack on Pyongyang's nuclear assets is most likely. Advice to President Obama will caution against any pre-emptive attack. Besides losing the much needed support, Russia and China is likely to advise USA to give negotiations a chance. Internally the congress is unlikely to support such a move, let alone the United Nations (UN). The variables to do with such a decision are too taxing. The position of South Korea with such a decision will be unpredictable.

1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Understanding of defence policy and strategy of a country enriches a broad understanding of international relations. From an academic point of view it adds value to the bottom line of the international relations curricula. In turn this is critical to the formulation of advice to practitioners of foreign policy crafting in government but particularly Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It shapes the philosophy of other countries towards the country in question –DPRK. Important as these philosophies would guide other important activities or considerations in defence, trade and diplomatic relations or ties. A better understanding of DPRK's stand will or should inform any other relationship with it as a State. As a state Zimbabwe needs to reflect on DPRK's nuclear programme and be able to determine whether it accelerates dangerous weapons proliferation or

whether it has a negative effect on disarmament, or better still if a nuclear DPRK will contribute to stability in the region.

The DPRK will be given a rare opportunity to determine if it is a genuine effort and strategy for survival in the face of USA military threat. The research will enable interested states, particularly personnel entrusted with defence programmes to appreciate the forces at play regarding DPRK nuclear programme and gain a deeper understanding. Diplomatic efforts and avenues may be explored to avoid or end similar crises peacefully. Policies regarding disarmament and nuclear reduction might be made more amenable in order to rid the world of the potential for increase of nuclear arsenal and /weapons of mass destruction.

1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

DPRK views USA as the primary threat to its sovereignty, territorial integrity and survival. It has since been a subject of labelling to the effect that it is a rogue state and “axis of evil”. This has not helped the situation and DPRK on its part did embark on a nuclear programme evidenced by inception / conduct of testing on 06 October, 2006. This new chapter of increasing hostility characterises the relationship between DPRK and USA and its surrogate South Korea. Besides this antagonism, DPRK’s actions and behavior did create and continue to cause instability in the region; instability which seemingly draws China and Russia on the side of DPRK and USA obviously on the side of South Korea. An instability having the potential to spill into a nuclear retribution and conflict. This has also scuttled genuine efforts to reach disarmament agreement or policies. DPRK's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has meant that

even efforts on arms control have been derailed from progress. Ultimately it will be purposeful to find the best option and/or initiatives to bring DPRK to the talks and avert the prospect of nuclear conflict.

1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1. To find a reasonable explanation to DPRK's nuclear behaviour.
2. To assess whether DPRK nuclear programme is an effort to identify the state with prevailing shared norms in the international community.
3. To evaluate the implications of nuclear weapons/ military capabilities on enhancing a state's status.
4. Identify the linkage between economic and technological advancement and a well-equipped and stable military power.
5. To ascertain if possession of nuclear power capability leverages DPRK's prospects during negotiations with the USA.
6. To evaluate if the collapse of the bipolar world, integration of China and Russia in the global economy took away the guaranteed security commitment of the two countries from DPRK.
7. To find out if globalisation is linked to the search for nuclear capability.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. How can DPRK's nuclear behaviour be explained?
2. Is the nuclear programme an effort to identify the state with prevailing shared norms in the international community?
3. Do nuclear weapons / capabilities enhance a state's status?

4. Is there a linkage between economic and technological advancement and a well-equipped and stable military power?
5. Will possession of nuclear capability leverage DPRK's position during peace discussions and negotiations with the USA?
6. Did the collapse of the bipolar world, integration of China and Russia into the global economy take away the guaranteed security commitment of the two countries from DPRK?
7. Is globalisation linked to the search of nuclear capability?

1.7 RESEARCH PROPOSITION OR HYPOTHESIS

DPRK's nuclear weapons programme is driven by political interests than the need to serve national security interests of the state.

1.8 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

This study has the potential to arouse more interest and expand knowledge in defence/nuclear programmes, which inter alia incorporates disarmament studies. Undoubtedly this study is on a topical subject area hence is bound to add on more information to current debates. To technologically emerging African defence forces the study will provide some of the pitfalls to be avoided when pursuing defence programmes. This research could also provide information to researchers at national defence colleges in Africa and elsewhere, who may gather interest in the area.

1.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK /CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The dominant framework, will rely on deterrence and disarmament as permanent theories. Indeed the two terms are dichotomous with disarmament as a precursor to denuclearisation and deterrence as a theory referring to arming or building arsenal for purposes of discouraging enemy attack. Disarmament is the reduction of levels of specified weapon categories to zero; removal of the weapons category from military doctrine; and essentially requires international corporation, although unilateral disarmament is possible. As the world continues to clamour for a more nuclear free environment, emerging nuclear countries seem to be going opposite. Yoshihara and Holmes (2011:7) report that India and Pakistan continue to refine their forces, doctrines and strategies. DPRK rejects the call for disarmament and appears to have settled in as the newest member of the unofficial nuclear club.

DPRK pursuit of nuclear programme is motivated to some extent by realist theory whereby according to Morgenthau (1973), states are the most important actors in global politics. It is the maximisation of power that is in the states interests and that explains DPRK's committed drive for nuclear programme. Whilst DPRK's case occupy centre stage, it is by no means the only state pursuing nuclear programme. In short, numerous non- Western governments are painstakingly searching for doctrines and strategies that fortify nuclear deterrence.

Yet against all these efforts, there is more than an opposing force to implement disarmament advocated by those states already nuclearized.

Disarmament as a theory is progressed to a disarmament treaty as a security regime capable of creating a framework for international corporation in the field of military security. That security regime enables states to develop patterns of expectations and behaviour resulting into behaviour and intentions becoming more transparent and predictable. Diplomacy and consultations are expected at greater frequency to resolve compliance concerns.

1.10 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

The study is divided into five chapters as follows: Chapter 1 is the introduction to the study, Chapter 2- Literature review, Chapter 3- the research methodology, Chapter 4- Research findings and Discussion of Results and Chapter 5 which gives conclusion and recommendations.

2. CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains the literature review and assesses some important issues that have been published on areas related to the research topic by accredited scholars and researchers. The literature review carried some statements quoted by print media considered authoritative. The literature helps in designing the data collection tools as well as the discussion of the results. The chapter discussed the theoretical framework of the topic under study which focuses on deterrence and disarmament.

2.2 DPRK's NUCLEAR PROGRAMME MOTIVATION

DPRK's nuclear programme is an attempt by a sovereign state to try to adjust to the environment. This environment can either be considered stable and friendly or unstable and threatening; depending on which side one may be commenting from. For DPRK, there is hostility and continuous threat from USA and this is based on previous events: the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by USA using nuclear weapons and the Korean War (1950-1953) which ended with a further ideological division of the peninsula into Communist North and Capitalist South Korea. According to DPRK, the war was dastardly let alone the destruction of innocent lives. Kim II Jong was greatly disappointed that neither China nor USSR did not support DPRK with ground troops in spite of the defence pact and assurance of protection that were agreed on previously. It dawned on the DPRK leader that DPRK's reliance on China and Russia for protection

was untenable hence the decision to develop its own nuclear capability. Kaarbo and Ray (2011) assert that the classical realist universe of Morgenthau considers states as the main and powerful actors and nuclear capability would undoubtedly signify acquisition of power and control. Following this assertion it stands to reason why DPRK developed nuclear capability.

Globalization has its own backlash. One is persuaded to think that the stampede to develop nuclear weapons is partly as a result of globalization in the security and defence landscape. The dictates of realism are such that the pursuit of power and political interest is paramount and cannot be dwarfed by considerations of economic spheres, moral spheres and other spheres of human activity. The 21st century is dominated by the stampede or urge to acquire nuclear capability. If it were not for restrictions from treaties and UN decisions, many countries could possibly be possessing nuclear capability. Acquisition of nuclear power is crucial in order to regulate loss of sovereignty due to pressure from exogenous events. Notwithstanding, Woods (2001) argues that globalisation has not resulted in complete loss of autonomy but that the loss of autonomy that goes with, globalisation can vary according to how powerful a state is, resulting in powerful states better able to insulate themselves. Nevertheless, above all, military security has also achieved developing global dimensions as a consequence of technological advances.

2.2.1 Models Explaining Nuclear Programme

In an attempt to explore deep the reasons behind DPRK's nuclear programme, Sagan (1996-1997) meticulously came up with three models. He noted that DPRK went ahead

with the programme in the face of likely condemnation from the international community. Obviously the voice of the international community would be represented by the UN and sanctions would be meted out as deemed necessary. This he explained using the security model, closely buttressed by the need for regime survival. To the DPRK leader it was a forgone conclusion that their country had been exposed to USA nuclear threat since the end of Korean War. In principle we see the theory of deterrence coming into play and propelling DPRK nuclear capability. The Japanese experience was instructive in this instance and remains so hitherto. In explaining the security model, one is tempted to follow the realist argument that national actions are molded and directed entirely by calculation of interest. Events continued to favor DPRK's development of nuclear programme based on the security model. The collapse of the Soviet Union due to perestroika and glasnost, the integration of China and later Russia into the global economy meant that both countries could no longer guarantee security commitments to DPRK. The USA wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect US commitment to protect its vital interest, and to a greater extent vindicates DPRK's fears of US threat. Looking at the ever rising or increasing tensions in the Korean peninsula, its persuasive to accept the security model's prediction that countries will pursue military capabilities to counter a threat.

Sagan's second model is the domestic politics model. This model dwells on the main state actors who control the decision-making apparatus. The fact that foreign policy is informed by domestic policy is not coincidental and the inclusion of domestic politics as a relevant variable provides for an acceptable explanation for the motivation to develop nuclear programme. Individual leaders are capable of sacrificing the lives of citizens of

their countries for personal reasons; history is replete with examples-Adolf Hitler and Mobutu Sesekeeso. This is a proposition put forward by philosopher, John Stuart Mill. In the domestic politics model, Sagan argues that DPRK's effort is underpinned by an enduring deep seated resolve by the ruling elites to serve parochial, bureaucratic interests as opposed to serving national security interests of the State. The structure of DPRK institutions of power is such that the supreme leader has control and supremacy over State apparatus, let alone the military. Because the military succumbs to his whims and instructions, it leaves no stumbling block/s in his instructions being taken as final. Sagan goes further to point out that unanimity is shared especially by domestic actors, such as officials in nuclear-related facilities, influential units in the military, or politburo members with constituents that are strongly behind nuclear weapons development. These domestic actors call the shots and contribute to the bottom line. As a way of defeating international isolation these dictators have a negative disposition towards economic integration and invariably seek glory from possession of nuclear weapons to consolidate their political goals to ensure regime survival. However the down side of the domestic politics model is that leaders and ruling coalition's favouring global economic integration embrace internationalization which does not promote acquisition of nuclear weapons. Dictators have the propensity to isolate their regimes from the international community with intent to retrogress towards economic integration and instead seek possession of nuclear arsenal to advance their political machinations. From an evaluation point of view the bigger voice suggests that the predictions of the domestic model are correct in that the ultimate goal of nuclear weapons possession is to safeguard Kim Jong-II's manifestation of the politics of the military. There is no fine line

dividing the Korea worker's Party (KWP) and the Korean People's Army (KPA). In both institutions bureaucratic actors dominated the decision making process.

The Norms model is the third and constitutes a significant plane in contemporary international relations. Many suggest that norms can be a very powerful source of political behaviour. By and large it is a negation of the realist proposition that national actions are governed by national perspectives or interests. A German historian Heinrich Von Treitschke quoted in Kaarbo and Ray (2011) argued, "Honest and legal policies are also ordinarily, the most effective and profitable. They inspire the confidence of other states". State craft is a result of state practice and adherence to norms. Indeed Sagan (1996-1997) argues that the model takes into cognizance the identity of the state, symbolic functions of nuclear weapons, and the dictates of international law with regards to shared norms in the international community. These are projected at the units of analysis in developing a nuclear picture and understanding DPRK motivations to develop nuclear weapons. Many authors, notably Joseph Nye point out that norms can be a powerful source of political behaviour. This is in concert with Sagan's assertion that, "The norms model maintains that states are motivated to acquire nuclear capabilities when they perceive it as a symbol of prestige and modernity, enhancing a state's status". DPRK has not been able to economically advance as her Southern neighbour, South Korea mainly due to different economic principles and ideology. In order to offset the pressure and burden of economic backwardness it may have found it compensatory or as the norm to develop nuclear arsenal; given the obvious prestige, modernity and enhanced status that follow from such development. Following on from the above, it is fairly convincing to argue that nuclear weapons attach some symbolic

functionality and significance to DPRK. The issue of identity to the international community and legitimacy to the citizens comes into limelight. If this argument is accepted, it consolidates and contributes to shaping the positive perception of the regime's identity at a time the regime is suffering isolation in the international arena. The pursuit of nuclear capability is found as prestigious and capable of sprucing up the otherwise waning international approval and popularity.

DPRK's rise to nuclear capability should not be regarded as threatening when one looks at the feminist definition of power. Hannah Arendt in Kaarbo and Ray (2011) defines power as, "the human ability to act in concert, or action which is taken in connection with others who share familiar concerns". Israeli shares the same security concerns as DPRK; so does Pakistan and India. Nuclear proliferation became an important issue on the global agenda in the 1990. Thus India and Pakistan joined the 'nuclear club' when they conducted tests in 1998. One will be quick to ponder whether it was grossly wrong for DPRK to conduct nuclear test in 2006? Is it not true that DPRK share similar concerns with Pakistan and India do? In this instance, according to the feminine definition of power DPRK is vindicated. It is proposed that DPRK simply wants to ensure that there are security guarantees from the USA. Supposedly these arrangements need to be incorporated in bilateral agreements rather than DPRK being coerced into six-party discussions and negotiations, involving Russia, China, Japan, south Korea, USA and DPRK.

2.3 CHINA'S HAND IN DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

According to Michael, K et al (2012:48) DPRK nuclear programme is suspected to receive covert and unparalleled support from China. This has led China being labelled as one country most reluctant to dislodge Kim Jong-il. There is evidence that points to China's strong desire to moderate DPRK's behavior for not so open but critical reasons. Christensen (2003) argues that China fails to demonstrate the need and urgency to stress its great power status and its unrivalled influence over DPRK nuclear policy in spite of its claim that it is a mediator. Undoubtedly DPRK has proven that it is a useful pawn in China's regional strategy, which ominously and ultimately, aims to denuclearise the Pacific and push USA military forces out of the region without a fight- thus confirming its peaceful diplomacy. Liping (2005: 241) asserts that Beijing is keen to use Pyongyang as a bargaining chip to secure the Korean peninsula to prevent its use, ostensibly by USA, as a launch pad for offensive operations against China.

Looking at the matrix of variables to do with DPRK's policy and in particular survival of its nuclear progress, it would not be immature and out of context to imply China's complicity and/or tacit encouragement for DPRK's nuclear continuation.

DPRK's security concerns have developed to be multi-faceted. UN Development Programme (UNDP), sees 'human security' in the context of freedom from fear and want. Equally well UNDP 1994 contends that, the concept of security for too long has been interpreted narrowly: as a security from external aggression or as a protection of national interests in foreign policy. DPRK faces the security of human collectives as echoed by Buzan, (1991). He explains that security is ostensibly affected by factors

manifesting in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. It may be inferred that one of DPRK's nuclear motivation is by no means the need to secure leverage for negotiating removal of sanctions and have access to economic benefits. Another source of motivation might well be connected from the traditional sense of security: security of territory from external aggression or global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust (Connors, et al 2012).

The overall picture of DPRK's nuclear debacle would show that DPRK is in a dilemma; given that all the major factors seem to affect its position. By far however, the military and economic factors present the most difficulty.

2.4 THE WEST AND ITS USE OF PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP

Permanent membership is used to extend the interests of the USA, Britain and France. The easiness with which these countries reach at a decision to intervene on a certain and particular armed conflict leaves a lot to be desired or admired. Iraq intervention in 2003 was backed by assertions or allegations that Iraq was possessing WMD (weapons of mass destruction). An evaluation during and after the war did not prove the existence of WMD. Currently from yesterday 28th August 2013 the UK was engaged in marathon Cabinet meetings to determine the mode and plans for intervention in Syrian conflict. Analysts said that UK was at pains trying to establish some legitimacy through seriously pushing a proposal at UNSC for a UN resolution for armed intervention in Syria. This time around the resolution would be backed by serious claims that Assad's regime used some chemical gas against the rebels resulting in the death of some estimated 100 people. The use of chemical weapons or gas is clearly against

international law of armed conflict. However already there are serious objections from Russia. Whether this resolution will come to pass remains to be seen.

An assessment of these events shows that DPRK's motives of developing a nuclear programme could somehow be vindicated. If Syria was at the stage where DPRK is now, of developing a nuclear programme, one would argue that such a hurried decision for armed intervention could not be made. Certainly the diplomatic option could have been given a chance. This is the stage where it would be firmly established that the deterrence theory does exist and works so perfectly to obviate the catastrophe of an armed intervention. It is clear that the West had other hidden motives and prime among them is destruction of dangerous weapons stockpiles and sophisticated command and control assets. This is intended to ward off any assistance that Assad might contemplate to give to terrorists groups and associated non-state actors now and in future. Top among these groups is Hezbollah, the new found ally of Assad's regime in the conflict with rebels. In its quest to force a denuclearisation of DPRK's assets the West and in particular the USA is banking on its strong permanent membership of the UNSC. Several authors have employed deterrence theory as an analytical framework to examine the avenues at the disposal of DPRK in its ever increasing political conflict with the USA. The most conspicuous avenue is one involving DPRK deterring South Korea and the USA from the likelihood of launching an attack against DPRK. This would mean DPRK increasing its nuclear arsenal ability to offset an attack in the event of one. DPRK's nuclear weapons strategy and doctrine might also include a certain element of brinkmanship, given that the status of nuclear weapons possession is unlikely to be reversed. This political game of deterrence connects perfectly to Woods (2001)

argument that the loss of autonomy to powerful states better able to insulate themselves is so minimal. DPRK seeks to advance its nuclear programme to become powerful and hence exercise deterrence against USA.

2.4.1 Deterrence Theory and its Relevance for DPRK

The deterrence theory holds out for far more greater advantages even to some poor nations. Patrick Morgan cited in Project Muse by Holmes (2012) argues that, states have the possibility of threatening to fight if attacked or seek revenge after winning a conflict as long as they possess nuclear weapons. With nuclear weapons the assessments or battle estimates are simplified as they do not call for deeper analysis of balance of forces or parity in air assets or artillery pieces. Hence stability and peace rest on easy calculations of what one country can do to another. Indeed it is true that states like India, Pakistan, Israel and DPRK have nuclear weapons for the purposes of deterrence. Why should DPRK be seen in a different light than the three countries? Evidence to support possession of nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence is abundant. Some time ago DPRK hit a South Korean ship with a missile and sunk it resulting in the death of innocent people. With the exception of the usual diplomatic furore, no punitive action was taken by the USA. Swift decisions and action saw conflict and mass killings in Iraq, Afganstan and Libya. Diplomacy was not given a chance to reach settlements yet evidently diplomacy and other peaceful initiatives are being exhausted regarding DPRK's nuclear programme. There is therefore sufficient practical evidence to support Yoshihara and Holmes (2012) that states with hegemonic

aspirations consider constructing their deterrence strategy by holding on to nuclear weapons as trump card for deterring great power intervention.

DPRK is not alone in this kind of deterrent strategy. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) like chemical stock piles held in Syria are similarly being used as deterrence. Russia with the quick support and submission of Syria proposed an initiative on Syrian crisis, stimulating to secure the chemical stock piles of the Syrian government under international observation, an obvious suggestion or strategy to avert war. According to the Herald – World News: of Wednesday 11 September, 2013 Wael al- Halqi, the Syrian Prime Minister strongly supported the initiative. Conclusively it demonstrates that WMD are being used as trump card to avoid war – that is preventing the intervention of the USA and allies would deal a blow to the opposition fighters who wanted Assad to be weakened for their own favourable outcome. Military intervention and/or sanctions are used as carrot and stick by powerful states to drive disarmament initiatives. The USA has for long been impressing on DPRK to agree to Six party talks with a view to securing a decision on disarmament in exchange for lifting sanctions on DPRK. DPRK on the other hand is demanding bilateral agreements with the USA with an aim of securing security guarantees and lifting of sanctions. The Syrian scenario, whereby its chemical weapons are to be placed under international control as a precursor to disarmament to some extent mirror the DPRK scenario. The threat by USA to strike drove Russia, Syria's ally, to put forward the proposal for possible disarmament.

It will be concluded that military threat has a causal relationship with disarmament. According to the Herald of Sept 12, 2013 France and Britain are pushing for a UN

resolution authorising military action in the event that Syria fails to act on its disarmament promises. In the case of DPRK, a different scenario and different players (states) are involved. It is a more complicated case than the Syrian conflict. A foreign policy of trial and error dominated Washington's foreign policy in respect of DPRK in the first decade of the 21st century. Whilst Bush emphasised the need for regime change in DPRK, Obama administration contrasts that policy with a policy of 'smart power' having its strength firmly embedded in international diplomacy. If this policy enables USA to engage DPRK on bilateral negotiations, its chances of success are reasonably high. A policy akin to unilateralism and provocation displayed by Bush Administration is bound to fail (Connors et al, 2012).

3 CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This section provides the methodology which was used to collect data, analyse it and present the results. The population and sample selection for the study are also discussed in the section.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design can be thought of as the structure of research (Frankel and Wallen, 1996). This is often described as a design using a concise notation that enables us to summarise a complex design structure efficiently. The research design outlined below relates to the current study which is an analysis of DPRK nuclear policy and its impact on disarmament.

3.2.1 Research philosophy

Donald and Pamela (2003) write that there are different approaches to research based on the inquirer's values, assumptions and belief about the world. There are two major categories of research philosophy. These are positivism and phenomenology. Saunders et al (2003) make a distinction between the two and state the positivist approach is deductive while the phenomenologist approach is inductive. Frankel and Wallen (1996) argued that phenomenology implies that knowledge is of a softer, subjective and spiritual nature based on personal experience and insight, so that it has to be personally experienced.

In this study the researcher adopted a combination of the positivist approach and the phenomenologist approach. Positivist for the mere reason that bulk information was available from authoritative authors and had to be analysed deductively to arrive at specific meaning and conclusions. The researcher also used an induction approach to further explain some intricacies and trends in the results of this study which all were used to reach the conclusions of the study.

This approach, underpinned by large surveys and interviews, was adopted because the study sought to explain what was happening in the simmering tensions between DPRK and the USA and its allies – South Korea and Japan. Indeed large – scale surveys are a research approach strictly positivistic with some room for interpretation (Remenyi et. al 1998). Knowledge of what is happening is acquired from views from published books and articles, individuals and then make further analysis why the tensions, what is fuelling them and what motivates DPRK nuclear programme. This way the researcher also gave his opinions and arguments about the results, the phenomenologist approach.

3. 2.2 Research Strategies

Saunders et al (1997) defined a strategy as a plan of how you will go about answering the research question (s) you have set. It specifies the sources from which you intend to collect the data and consider the constraints that you will inevitably have. The researcher acknowledges that there are five major research strategies which are experiment, survey, case study, action research and grounded theory. The survey research strategy was chosen in this instance and was used by

carrying out a survey regarding the international relations perspective of the DPRK nuclear programme. Further, survey research was found to be the best because it is structured and maintains objectivity throughout the study by using questionnaires.

O' Leary, (2005) defines survey research as a systematic gathering of primary data through the use of structured questionnaires and communication in a reasonably large number and highly representative sample of respondents. In line with this definition, the researcher employed the use of questionnaires as structured forms of data collection and respondents were sampled using the sampling methods to be discussed in the later sections.

3.2.3 Research Purpose

Research purpose can be classified into exploratory, explanatory and descriptive research purpose (O'Leary, 2005). In this study, the researcher adopted the descriptive and explanatory approach which was found to be appropriate to portray a reflection of the situation obtaining. DPRK nuclear policy character was unravelled in this research and questionnaires were used to collect data from the respondents using survey research strategy. The study sought to give an understanding of DPRK's nuclear policy in the light of the ever condemning, vitriolic attacks from the USA and allies. This required an explanatory and descriptive approach which would then come up with an outline of DPRK nuclear programme and attempts to improve, effective range of missiles and otherwise. The descriptive approach also made it easy to make statistical data analysis where needed.

3.2.4 Multipurpose research methods/ research approaches

There are two types of research methods and these are quantitative and qualitative research methods. According to Keogh (1999), quantitative research involves the use of numbers such as official statistics. They include the entire process in which data is collected, assembled, turned into numbers (coded), analysed using mathematical or statistical means. On the other hand, qualitative methods utilises open - ended interviewing to explore and understand the attitudes, opinions, feeling and behaviours of individuals. Qualitative research can take many forms; typical are focus groups, in- depth interviews and mini – groups (Cohen and Marion, 1999).

The researcher largely adopted the qualitative research method so as to appreciate attitudes and behaviours of the conflicting camps – USA camp and DPRK camp through published data and response from in depth interviews. Quantitative research methods were also employed though at a lesser extent compared to qualitative. In- depth key informant interviews were done with selected lecturers covering and teaching programmes to do with Political Science and International Relations. The researcher used information collected from these interviews to validate the results of the study and get a general overview of the DPRK nuclear policy.

The use of questionnaires was employed and heavily relied on. The questions were open to allow for explanation and freedom of expression of individuals understanding.

3.2.5 Deductive/ Inductive research

Keogh (1999) makes a distinction between deductive and inductive approaches to research. The author explains that a deductive approach is an interpretative approach where one only interprets what is on the ground. However, an inductive approach goes beyond mere interpretation by explaining why the results are what they are and giving ones opinion towards the results. In this study the researcher adopted a combination of both approaches given the obvious synergies between the two. This was achievable by first interpreting the results and then linking the findings with the reviewed literature. The researcher further explained the findings and in some cases gave his own opinion, which is inductive.

3.3 POPULATION

Boyd and Smith (1995) defined population as a group upon which the researcher is interested in making inferences. This study focused on appropriately degreed officers selected and lecturers at selected universities to give us their individual perspective of DPRK nuclear policy and impact on disarmament.

3.4 DATA COLLECTION

3.4.1 Sampling Methods

The researcher acknowledges that there are two types of sampling techniques namely probabilistic and non-probabilistic sampling techniques. Under probabilistic there are four main methods of randomly selecting respondents; simple random sampling and cluster sampling.

Under non-probabilistic sampling techniques units are not selected randomly. This approach was selected where methods other than randomness was the basis for selecting observations from respondents. Cook and Campbell (1975), further buttress non-probabilistic sampling techniques by suggesting that, alternatively one might purposively sample individuals who vary on important dimensions that characterise members of the target population. Amongst the three main types of non-probabilistic sampling procedures, namely; convenience sampling, judgement sampling and quota sampling, the researcher chose purposive and judgement sampling techniques. The researcher selected only the respondents whom he perceived knowledgeable of the research topic based on his judgement while employing the aspect of convenience to him. These sampling techniques are explained below:

Purposive sampling, sometimes known as purposeful or criterion based sampling, is selected on the basis of its appropriateness to serve the real purpose and objectives of the researcher of discovering, gaining insight and understanding into a particularly chosen phenomenon (Burns, 2004). Therefore, the sample is selected because they are convenient (Saunders et al, 1997) a gross estimate of the results, without incurring the cost or time required to select a random sample. Purposive sampling was used in the research for the following reasons.

- It is cheap
- The method does not need a lot of time in selecting respondents
- Data collection is done at the convenience of the researcher

Judgement sampling is a common non-probability method in which the researcher selects the sample based on judgement. For example, a researcher may decide to draw the entire sample from one "representative" city, even though the population includes all cities, O'Leary (2005) warns that when using this method the researcher must be confident that the chosen sample is truly representative of the entire population. Judgement was mostly employed in the case of selecting Political Science/ International Relations degree officers who were deemed to be knowledgeable of the research topic than lower or non-commissioned officers in the ZDF.

Under probability sampling random methods of selection were made use of to select respondents. Simple random sampling, systematic sampling and stratified sampling techniques are the most common and they are explained below:

Systematic sampling is a method in which elements are selected from the population at a uniform interval that is measured in time, order or space. This method differs from simple random sampling in that each element does not have an equal chance of being selected, thus some randomness is sacrificed. Sampling begins by randomly selecting the first observation. Thereafter, subsequent observations are selected at a uniform interval relative to the first observation (Wegner, 1993).

Simple random sampling is a probability sampling method in which each sampling unit is assigned a number and then the numbers are randomly selected by random number generating and the corresponding member/unit selected accordingly to be part of the sample. Each member has an equal chance of being selected (Meriam,1998).

3.4.2 Data collection methods

3.4.2.1 Primary secondary data

The major source for this study was primary data. According to Ghauri et al (1995), primary data is one that is collected specifically for a project. Primary sources of data which became handy for this study are books, reports and newspapers. There are three main ways of collecting primary data and these are questionnaires, interviews and observation methods. In this study, the researcher used the questionnaire and interview methods. Thirty (30) questionnaires were administered on ZDF officers and officers from Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Employing the definition of Donald and Pamela (2003) that states that secondary data is the data collected by others for their own purpose and now used for other purpose the researcher did not use this data at any large extent. Secondary data was only used to build a concise background information before the study and this came from books, publications and reports.

3.4.2.2 Questionnaires

Questionnaires were administered by hand to participants to the study. The questionnaires were pre- tested before dispatch. The pre- tested results lead to the redesign of a simple questionnaire by taking into account various demands and expectations of the study. The questions were also coded for computer entry and verification. The researcher used to a large extent, open questions while closed

questions were used to a lesser extent to give respondents the latitude to exercise their choice of response, thus infuse some enthusiasm and interest.

The questionnaire was considered to be the best instrument for the study due to its simplicity and provision for a list of possible answers from which the respondents could choose. The study also recognized the fact that data obtained in non- disorganized studies are easier to tabulate and interpret. Therefore, the researcher used this technique to gather data from all officers appropriately suited for this special study.

3.4.2.3 Interviews

In conducting research, a researcher can directly collect data from the respondent by speaking to the respondent. The author adds that this can be done in a number of ways which include by telephone or face to face (O'Leary, 2005). In the case of this study, the researcher used face to face interviews to collect some critical background information from selected senior officers and lecturers. Some senior officers with Foreign Affairs had actually served in the Diplomatic mission and thus set the tone for the study and gave some brief highlights of how foreign policy of countries like DPRK is used as a weapon for survival.

Interviews are very tough and produce more useful information for the research while on the other hand they are time consuming albeit for good reasons (Donald and Pamela, 2003)

3.4.3 Sample selection

Saunders et al (1997) contend that the idea of a 'sample' is linked to that of a population. Population refers to all the cases while a sample is a selection from the population. A purposive sampling technique was employed in this study through identification ZDF officers with first degrees in Political Science and Administration, Security, Conflict Management and Resolution and those with MSc in International Relations. A total of one hundred and five (105) emerged as the population.

Sampling of respondents was done as follows:

Simple random sampling, a method of drawing a sample so that each member of the population has an equal chance of being selected; and the selection of one subject is independent of the any other, was applied. A list including each officer's name or force number was made. The list represented the sampling frame. The sample frame was drawn by writing each officer's force number onto a slip of paper then shuffle the slips in a container. The slips were drawn out at random until the sample size of 25 was obtained.

This procedure was preferred statistically and does obviously alter the chances of being selected as then sampling procedure.

3.5 DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

Data analysis and presentation was done through the use of a combination of various procedures, ranging from content analysis, thematic and authoritative discourse analysis, Analysis was buttressed by using a statistical package for Social Scientists (SPSS version 18) and Microsoft Office Excel 2007. The results were presented in the form of tables, graphs and charts for easy understanding and read through.

3.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Chapter three presented the research methodology that was used in the study. Data analysis techniques have also been discussed. The following chapter presents the researcher findings and the analysis of the results of the research.

4 CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the research findings and discusses them in comparison to the literature reviewed earlier in chapter two. All the discussions were done with a view to answer the research objectives and arguments were for a similar purpose.

4.2 RESPONSE RATE

Questionnaires were used to collect data for the study as was alluded to in chapter three, thirty questionnaires were administered to Zimbabwe Defence Forces officers (ZDF) and all of them were successfully completed. This gives a response rate of approximately 100%. This, by all measures, is a quite good response rate, therefore it suffice to proceed with the results of the study as they are a true representation of the study population.

4.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

4.3.1 How best can DPRK nuclear programme behaviour be explained?

Since the conclusion of the Korean war of 1950 – 53, how do you describe DPRK's international relations with the rest of the world, in particular with world body – UN?




Figure 4.3.1: Description of DPRK nuclear behavior (Source: Research Results 2014)

The first pie chart figure 4.3.1 shows that 50% of the respondents adjudge DPRK's international relations to be poor with the rest of the world, if results are anything to go by, DPRK is seen in bad light in this regards, with the implication that DPRK needs to improve its diplomatic relations if it is to have many countries as its friends.

4.3.2 Rate DPRK's relationship with neighbors South Korea and Japan




Figure 4.3.2: DPRK's relationship with neighbors South Korea and Japan (Source: Research Results 2014)

DPRK's relationship with its neighbors South Korea and Japan can best be described as disastrous given the reflection at figure 4.3.2 among the entire respondent no one ever suggested nor indicated the relationship to be very good, good or sound. That automatically paints a very bad picture of DPRK's image.

4.3.3 What motivates DPRK's nuclear programme




Figure 4.3.3: DPRK's nuclear motivations (Source: Research Results 2014)

It is clear from figure 4.3.3 that DPRK's motivation for nuclear programme is fuelled by the need to build deterrence against USA threat. Other reasons to do with creating leverage for negotiations and seeking credibility among own population are complimentary. If the results of the research are anything to go by, DPRK is vindicated by those who claim its behavior is aggressive and represents an axis of evil.

4.3.4 Does DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non – Proliferation Treaty and its Nuclear Programme negatively affects disarmament




Figure 4.3.4 Percentages of respondents with different views on the withdrawal of DPRK from Nuclear Non – Proliferation Treaty

Figure 4.3.4 shows that 50% of respondents hold the view that DPRK's withdrawal and its Nuclear Programme negatively affects disarmament encourage or moves against the backdrop of DPRK's behavior. In fact most states, notably South Korea and Japan did voice their concern already.

4.3.5 Mistrust of security assurance from Russia and China by DPRK is serious




Figure 4.3.5: Levels of mistrust of security assurance from Russia and China by DPRK (Source: 4.3.5)

Figure 4.3.5 shows that 40% of respondents are of the view that DPRK's mistrust of security guarantees from Russia and China is serious. Obviously and logically the second biggest percentage of respondents strongly agrees that DPRK's mistrust is serious and real. Somehow this vindicates DPRK's pursuit of the nuclear programme as deterrence.

4.3.6 What impact does DPRK nuclear policy behavior have disarmament




Figure 4.3.6: Levels of the impact DPRK Nuclear behavior has on disarmament (Source: Research Result 2014)

Figure 4.3.6 indicates that 40% of respondents feel that if nuclear programme continues, disarmament calls are likely to be ignored by other states. Whereas if the nuclear programme process declines, other states are likely to head disarmament calls. Pressure on other states engaging on armament exercises will recede.

4.3.7 Underpinnings of international relations

Realism does not account for considerable cooperation among countries occurring in the international relations




Figure 4.3.7 Response rate to whether realism account for cooperation of states in international relations

Figure 4.3.7 reveals that the issue is highly debatable and therefore reflecting an equal percentage of respondents agreeing with the statement and those disagreeing with the statement. It was indicated that realism was not solely responsible for explaining non-cooperation in international relations but that other theories like liberalism, dependency and interdependency account for either cooperation or non-cooperation. It would purely depend on the other countries involved.

4.3.8 The USA uses military force to make a country accept its decision




Figure 4.3.8 Respondents saying yes, no, or yes and no to whether the USA uses its military for a decision to be taken (Source: Research Results 2014)

Figure 4.3.8 shows that the greater part uses its military force for its decision to be taken. In some cases military force has been effective in achieving disarmaments objectives. Heavy USA military presence in the Korea peninsula had acted as a deterrent against DPRK provocative intentions over South Korea and Japan. It had also restrained China's territorial expansion vis – a- vis Japan in the South East Asian region. Military efforts compliment diplomatic efforts on disarmament.

4.3.9 It is in the interest of DPRK to cooperate with the USA or the UN so as to solve the issue of its nuclear programme?




Figure 4.3.9 Percentage of people going a yes or no

Figure 4.3.9 shows that those going for yes are 66.2% and these for no are 30%. Those going for either yes or no are only one percentage. Those going for yes are saying so in order to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Provoking or lack of cooperation with powers like the USA and by the UN, could result in obliteration of DPRK as a state, could result in sanctions which will paralyse the livelihood of the nation and citizens.

5 CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study. The conclusions were made based on the discussion and analysis of results in chapter four while the recommendations were made according to the researcher's understanding of the problem issues and study elements. These were all done to answer the research objectives.

In the study it was revealed that the respondents were officers in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces who did Political Science or International Relations degrees. Interviews were carried with lectures at designated universities and officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The research benefited interviews with seasoned lecturers and officers who served at East-Asia desk. Therefore the results of this study are considered valid based on these characteristics of the respondents.

5.2 CONCLUSIONS

The study established that the behaviour of DPRK leaves a lot to be desired. The number of respondents stating the behaviour to be poor is overwhelming. In fact it is at 50%. See figure 4:3:1 of the research. Forty eight per cent says the behaviour of DPRK is sound with only one each opting for good and hostile. This clearly shows that it is a country in problems which it does not seem to have a fixed solution now.

Figure 4:3:2 shows DPRK relationship with South Korea and Japan at Poor =51%, Hostile =49%. There is no way DPRK can have a good relationship at the present moment. The relationship with neighbouring South Korea and Japan is at its lowest ebb. Maybe the relationship has to be poor or hostile given the on going acute problems. It is viewed that South Korea and Japan are the chief culprits in this on going stand-off. Even if an agreement is reached or a negotiated settlement is reached, the relationship between DPRK and South Korea and Japan will never see the light of the day.

DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty negatively affects disarmament. It is pretty difficult to urge disarmament when DPRK is not part of the team. Several countries will secretly envy DPRK moves in order to avoid disarmament. The Nuclear programme deal is secretly supported by some countries especially with the knowledge that it increases the prospect of survival deterrence. It is good that DPRK is making every effort to modernise its nuclear programme but only if it does so with anticipation of talking to the USA. The aim will be negotiating for every slight move to be known by USA to allay any fears. We are aware that the plan is to have a negotiated settlement and the USA are likely to budge in as long as the deal is succinctly clear and implementable. This is what DPRK is supposed to do. With the pushing of China and Russia something measurable is bound to materialise but without the action of the two there is likely to be nothing.

DPRK should be advised to remain a good ally to both Russia and China since the two are the ones guaranteeing and underwriting its existence. Any slight move that

does not show subservience to Russia and China might spell disaster. In the event of any overtures taking place, it is Russia and China to guarantee safety involving the overtures. Russia is particularly worried that the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, was authored by President Bush and President Vladimir Putin in July 2006, commits her to refocus international efforts in the efforts against nuclear terrorism. The USA on its part is constantly worried that there is no guarantee that all militaries and governments will be good stewards of their nuclear weapons. This aspect seems likely if you consider that DPRK kills its own people who are adjudged to have over stepped their authoritarian rules.

Figure 4.3.3: In trying to understand what motivates DPRK, it was interesting to get the following statistics. Thirty three per cent of respondents said DPRK had a genuine undertaking of building deterrence, whilst 10% felt that there was an enduring need to seek deterrence. Nine per cent opted for build deterrence, create leverage and seek credibility, with another 9% saying Morgenthau's (1973) realist theory and presumptions. Another notable figure said 9% for building deterrence and create leverage during negotiations. Conclusively the greatest number of respondents (33%) said DPRK is motivated by building deterrence in its nuclear programme. It is instructive for DPRK to improve its relationship with neighbouring countries and in particular South Korea and Japan. Looking around all circles of life it is evident that China and Russia's continued influence to DPRK is welcome and for USA to gain ground in solving this standoff, much have to be relied on China and Russia. Yes China may have other different reasons why it supports DPRK but that would not matter because every country has a reason why it takes a certain choice.

From an individual point of view DPRK is showing realist tendencies like Kaarbo and Ray (2001) said in the literature review. However, some caution is required in the interest of China and Russia. Notwithstanding, when the actions of DPRK are viewed in feminist definition, it is correct to go nuclear. Since the feminist definition encourages acquisition of power Buzan (1991) could have been right when he mentioned the need for security for human collectives. This therefore gives it the urge to proceed with nuclear programme contemplating possible economic benefits arising from negotiating.

It is incisive to realise that any progress on the nuclear programme of DPRK will incite armaments. DPRK nuclear programme, according to the research results is motivated by the need to survive and less by the need to show a deep seated resolve to fight. It comes as a no surprise that DPRK is making all the effort to have nuclear programme solid in order to satisfy hegemonic aspirations by constructing their deterrence strategy by holding onto nuclear weapons (Yoshihara and Holmes, 2012). It can be concluded therefore that the results have shown that;

Figure 4.3.1: DPRK is motivated to establish nuclear programme by the drive to build deterrence, seek credibility and create leverage which most important will influence the outcome of negotiations.

DPRK withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its continued efforts to nuclearize negatively affects disarmament. Figure 4.3.4.

Figure 4.3.8: The USA employs military force to make a country accept its decisions. It is evident by maintaining a very large force and by affording two or more wars at the same time.

5.3 TESTING OF THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

The researcher initially proposed that the whole political establishment and most important the political nuclear behavior of DPRK is influenced by individual power rather than a genuine resolve to serve the people, a desire to survive and stand up to a demand for justice by the people. According to the results in this chapter and the preceding chapter, it has been amply shown that deterrence comes first, use deterrence to seek better negotiating platform/ create leverage, increase of legitimacy are the fundamental tenets of DPRK.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

5.4.1 Recommendations to our own government

- DPRK shares a long history with Zimbabwe; we should then be able to interrogate ourselves with the issue of their problems and see if our own relationship can be adjusted to suit present circumstances.
- Looking at the way we are isolated at the present time by big economic powers, we should try by all means that we don't worsen our position or tarnish our image by continuing to associate with countries at collision with big powers.

- The demand for security is by all means, a normative demand, it is pursuit of a particular value (Wolfers, 1962: 150). It should not be acquired at the expense of other compelling economic needs.

5.4.2 Recommendations to the DPRK government

- Solving problems through violence and disputes does not make sense. In addition a lot of time is wasted rather than agreeing on meaningful things.
- Meaningfully engage China and Russia to settle for economic benefits and lifting of sanctions and allow for an open economy free to do business with anyone including the western world.
- Despite good arguments for the nuclear programme (to create deterrence and survival), economic institutions and the entire economic establishment require the open support tendered to similar institutions in a free country.
- The military-Industrial complex in USA has a special budget arranged to take care of DPRK (including 28 870 troops stationed in south Korea, a host of other military moves involving USA and South Korea and Japan). DPRK should know that it is causing the USA to commit the entire nation to contain the standoff.
- DPRK should take advice that liberalisation looks to the degree of interdependence at the system level arguing that economic connections between states make war less likely.
- DPRK should not be part to those who argue that nuclear proliferation can stabilise tense relationships. Nuclear proliferation may increase the probability of accidents and un-intended escalation to nuclear conflict.

5.5 AREA OF FURTHER STUDY

The following are recommended as further studies to this study.

- i. What would happen if DPRK wake up tomorrow a nuclear state, given the tensions and hostilities between USA and DPRK?
- ii. Is it not conceivable that DPRK becomes the next new nuclear member and be accepted by the United Nations and other nuclear members?
- iii. Investigation of the likely reaction of South Korea and Japan should DPRK attain nuclear status?
- iv. What would be the relationship of USA to Russia and China should nuclearisation become a reality to DPRK; given that USA is vehemently against DPRK nuclearisation?

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
6 CHAPTER SIX

APPENDICES

6.1 Appendix I: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ZDF RESPONDENTS

From the National Defence College

Tel No: 263-4-850008



Reference: NDC/2/3

National Defence College
Private Bag 7769
Causeway, Harare
Zimbabwe

April 2014

To Whom It May Concern

Dear Sir/Madam

RE: RESEARCH STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE

My name is Raymond Mharapara. I am a final year MSc International Relations student at the University of Zimbabwe.

It is a requirement for the MIR programme that I undertake a research study for submission to the University. To that end, I am conducting a research study entitled: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear strategy and its impact on disarmament. The major objectives are to analyse DPRK's nuclear strategy and find

how it impacts on disarmament. How does its nuclear behavior impact on neighboring countries and likely consequences will form the brief to this research.

In order to fulfill the research objectives, I am kindly asking for your assistance in completing a questionnaire attached. The study is purely for academic purposes and the research participants and findings will be treated with strict confidentiality.

I look forward to your completion of the questionnaire and returning of the same.

Yours faithfully,

R.S Mharapara

SECTION A : DEMOGRAPHIC AND BACKGROUND INFORMANION

1. Sex (tick)

- a. Female []
- b. Male []

2. Time lapse since graduation.

- a. 0 – 3 yrs []
- b. 3 – 5 yrs []
- c. 5 -10 yrs []
- d. 10 yrs and beyond []

3. Please rate your interest in subject of International Relations or Conflict Resolution and Management.

- a. Very Strong []
- b. Strong []
- c. Above average []
- d. Low []
- e. Very low []

SECTION B : EVALUATION OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF DPRK IN RELATION TO PEACEFULL CO-EXISTENCE

4. Since the conclusion of the Korean war of 1950- 53, how do you describe DPRK's international relations with the rest of the world in particular with world body – UN? (tick)

- a. Very good []
- b. Good []
- c. Sound []
- d. Poor []
- e. Hostile []

5. Please rate DPRK's relationship with neighbors South Korea and Japan?

- a. Very good []
- b. Good []
- c. Sound []
- d. Poor []
- e. Hostile []

6. What do you think motivates DPRK's Nuclear Programme? (tick)

- a. Morgenthau's (1973) and Hobbesian realist theory and presumptions. []
- b. Tyrannical and leader- centered goals of Kim Jong-II. []
- c. The need to build deterrence against real US threat. []
- d. Create leverage for possible bilateral negotiations with USA. []
- e. Seek credibility among own population and consequently raise its profile and image to the world over, seek and gain legitimacy from the UN. []
- f. Combination of all or any of the above and proceed to name them. []

7. DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non – Proliferation Treaty and Nuclear Programme negatively affects disarmament. (tick)

- a. Strongly agree []
- b. Agree []
- c. Neutral []
- d. Disagree []
- e. Strongly disagree []

8. DPRK's mistrust of security assurance or cover/umbrella from Russia and China is serious.

- a. Strongly agree []
- b. Agree []
- c. Neutral []
- d. Disagree []
- e. Strongly disagree []

9. What impact does the DPRK nuclear policy manifestations have on disarmament?

- a. Very strong
- b. Strong
- c. Low
- d. Very low
- e. Nil

Explain your choice of answer

SECTION C: UNDERPINNINGS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS10. Critics of realism say that at best, realism does not account for the considerable cooperation that occurs in international relations; at worst, this cooperation violets realist expectations.

Yes []

No []

If yes, Explain

11. Like elsewhere the USA used military force, the outcome was unsuccessful. Does this confirm the ineffectiveness of military force for some issues, like the DPRK nuclear programme.

Yes []

No []

If no, Explain

12. According to liberalism, states cooperate because it is in their interests to do so. It is in the interests of DPRK to cooperate with USA or the UN in order to solve the issue of its nuclear programme?

Yes []

No []

SECTION D: RECOMMENDATIONS

13. What strategies do you recommend for DPRK to adopt in order to avert possible armed conflict over its nuclear programme?

14. Any comments

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE

Thank you for your time

6.2 Appendix II: INTERVIEW OFFICERS FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND LECTURERS

1. How do you feel about DPRK's nuclear programme continuation especially against the UN and USA?
2. Unification is a noble idea between the two Korea's –South Korea and Democratic Republic of Korea – Comment!
3. What do you think is DPRK's motivation in undertaking a nuclear programme agenda at the backdrop of ravaging famine?
4. Does DPRK have a moral Justification for its actions and was it correct to withdraw itself from the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty?
5. What will be South Korea and Japan's take should DPRK be declared as a nuclear state?
6. What do you think are the options open to USA if negotiations fail?
7. Does Russia and China provide a clue to solving this standoff between DPRK and USA?
8. What lessons are provided to African Countries by DPRK?
9. What strategies do you recommend in order to solve standoff between DPRK and USA without bloodshed?
10. Any comments.

END OF INTERVIEW

Thank you for your time

