

**THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR TACKLING A
‘WICKED PROBLEM’: THE ZIMBABWE ANTICORRUPTION
COMMISSION’S FIGHT AGAINST
CORRUPTION, 2005-2017**

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to my parents, Abisha Kamuna and Memory Nyakudanga.

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ABSTRACT

Corruption is a very serious issue in the world and has had negative repercussions on a country's economy. While some developed countries have managed to prevent and combat it, African

countries including Zimbabwe have continued to encounter the wickedness of corruption. This is despite the presence of institutions that have been created by the Government of Zimbabwe to combat it. The institutions responsible for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe include ZACC, NPA, TI-Z and ZRP. ZACC is responsible for investigating and combating cases of corruption whereas the NPA is responsible for undertaking prosecutions. TI-Z influences or capacitates citizens with the software to demand for accountability and transparency and the ZRP detects, investigates and prevents crime. The study therefore seeks to analyse the hypothesis that weak institutional frameworks perpetuate corruption and that corruption is a wicked problem in Zimbabwe. It will also analyse the institutional framework for tackling corruption as a wicked problem using ZACC as a case study. It relies on a qualitative approach of enquiry, making use of documentary search and key informant interviews using an interview guide with open-ended questions. Additionally, a review of literature was done on the following concepts: institutional framework, wicked problems and corruption in order to interrogate issues in the study. The major findings from the study indicate that corruption is a wicked problem and the institutional framework for combating it is weak. ZACC, as an institution constitutionally created to tackle corruption, has various weaknesses which include lack of political will, political interference, lack of arresting and prosecutorial powers, financial constraints, negative public perception, disgruntled and low staff morale institutional corruption, inadequate human resources personnel, absence of public recognition among others. This implies that this institution needs to be strengthened and capacitated for it to effectively tackle the vice. The study recommends that there be political will, coordination amongst the institutions responsible for tackling corruption, strengthening of the institutional framework through injection of adequate finances, political will, witness protection and training of staff. Moreover, ZACC needs to be given arresting and prosecutorial powers, improvement of the staff working conditions at the Commission and education of the public on the existence and role of ZACC among others. However, the strengths of ZACC include the fact that it is constitutionally enshrined, has qualified, skilled and experienced human capital, has twenty-four hour reporting systems and has seven specialized departments with a common thrust of eradicating corruption in Zimbabwe. The study hypothesizes that weak institutional frameworks perpetuate corruption and this was tested at the end of the study.

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ACRONYMS

CPI:	Corruption Perceptions Index
DPG:	Deputy Prosecutor General
MPOI:	Mass Public Opinion Institute

NDPP:	National Director for Public Prosecutions
NGOs:	Non Governmental Organisations
NPA:	National Prosecution Authority
OECD:	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
TI CPI:	Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
TI-Z:	Transparency International Zimbabwe
UK Aid:	United Kingdom Aid
ZACC:	Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission
ZRP:	Zimbabwe Republic Police

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This Chapter introduces the study which is an analysis of the institutional framework for dealing with wicked problems with specific reference to corruption in Zimbabwe. The main case study is the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) in tackling corruption as a wicked problem, the strengths, weaknesses as well as solutions to combat it. This chapter presents the background to the study, statement of the problem, significance of the study, research objectives, research questions, hypothesis, limitations and the scope of the study. Finally the structure of the study is presented for readers to know the layout of the dissertation.

1.2 Background to the problem

Corruption is now an epidemic worldwide and has been termed as a “wicked” problem because of its intractability as well as for its negative repercussions on a nation at large. For instance, corruption leads to a decrease in foreign direct investment, low economic growth, a shift in government spending from more productive to less productive activities, inequality and poverty,

decrease in the efficiency of aid, currency crises among others (Marshall 2011:72). This makes corruption a “wicked problem,” a term which was coined by Rittel and Webber in their landmark article “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning” in 1973 (Ritchey 2013:1). Rittel and Webber (1973:160) define wicked problems as government planning and policy dilemmas which are persistent in nature as they argue that “wicked problems are never solved, but only re-solved over and over again.” Morrison (2013:1) also characterises wicked problems as “complex, persistent and resistant problems in public policy.” Therefore, corruption is a wicked problem globally since it has been persistent despite various efforts by the governments to deal with it.

In the quest to curb corruption, various institutional frameworks have been created by various states. In Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Anti- Corruption Commission (ZACC) was created in 2005. This is in line with Chapter 13: Section 254 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 20 which establishes this institution, its objective being that of combating corruption and crime. Therefore, it is imperative to note that the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for the legislative framework for ZACC thereby establishing the rules and regulations governing its operations. Therefore, the institutional framework for tackling corruption rests in the Constitution and the ZACC Act of 2005. According to the ZACC Act (2004:3), ZACC is responsible for combating corruption, theft, misappropriation, abuse of power and other improprieties in the conduct of affairs in both the public and private sectors and making recommendations to the government and to organizations in the private sector on measures to enhance integrity and accountability and to prevent improprieties. However, it has not been able to effectively combat corruption due to challenges associated with political interference, the commission itself being institutionally corrupt, lack of political will, lack of independence, the commission being a toothless bulldog, financial constraints which reduce institutional independence, skills shortages, lack of resources like vehicles among others. ZACC works hand in hand with Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI-Z) which is another non-state institution responsible for fighting crime and corruption.

According to Wasow (2011), Transparency International (TI) began in the late 1990s to systematically monitor corruption throughout the world. TI has created the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which ranks countries by their perceived levels of corruption (TI 2014:1). Every year since the late 1990s, it issued a report that gives each country a score, from „0“ highly corrupt to „100“ very clean. While no country has a perfect score, two thirds of the countries score below 50,

indicating a serious corruption problem (TI 2012:1). For Zimbabwe, the scores were as follows: in 2012 it scored number 20/100, in 2013, 2014 and 2015 it scored number 21/100 and in 2016 it scored number 22/100. All these scores are below the average score of 50, indicating that Zimbabwe is highly corrupt. In addition, when compared with other countries, the statistics are as follows. According to the TI-Z (2012:1), Zimbabwe was ranked number 163/176 countries in 2012, in 2013 it scored number 157/177, the score in 2014 was number 156/175, in 2015 it scored number 150/168 and in 2016 it scored number 154/176 (TI CPI 2016:1). From the above statistics, it is clear that corruption is a wicked problem in Zimbabwe and this may be because no action was taken back then when corruption emerged in the 1990s following the Willowgate scandal. According to Laiton (2014) in the *Newsday* of February 8 2014, “since no action was taken against victims of the Willowgate scandal, this created an opportunity for other top officials to follow suit believing they would get the same protection their colleagues had enjoyed.” Recent corruption scandals also indicate no action taken by the government hence rendering ZACC a toothless bulldog. Therefore, Afro-barometer (2015:1) reveals that despite the feeling that the level of corruption has increased over the past year, Zimbabweans think there is nothing they can do to combat the vice.

1.3 Statement of the problem

Corruption is a wicked problem in Zimbabwe and this research speculates that this is largely due to poor institutional frameworks. In Zimbabwe, the institutions responsible for tackling corruption include ZACC, the Police, the Judiciary and NGOs like TI-Z, among others. However, these have not been effective in dealing with the problem due to issues associated with lack of political will, lack of autonomy, the Commission itself being corrupt, ZACC being a toothless bulldog, financial constraints which reduce institutional independence, skills shortages, lack of resources like vehicles among others. These challenges have made corruption an epidemic that is difficult to cure hence it is the major thrust of the essay to unravel the challenges of and the wickedness of corruption in Zimbabwe. In simpler terms, it is essential to note that weak institutional frameworks tend to perpetuate corruption rather than curb it.

1.4 Objectives

1. To understand corruption as a wicked problem in Zimbabwe.
2. To survey the institutional framework for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe.

3. To investigate the strengths and weaknesses of ZACC in fighting this wicked problem.
4. To proffer recommendations on overcoming or at least mitigating corruption.

1.5 Research Questions

1. What is corruption and how is it a wicked problem in Zimbabwe?
2. What is the institutional framework for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe?
3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of ZACC in fighting corruption?
4. What measures can be taken to overcome or at least mitigate corruption?

1.6 Hypothesis

Weak institutional frameworks perpetuate corruption.

1.7 Justification of the study

The study will contribute to extant literature on corruption as a wicked problem globally and in individual states like Zimbabwe. The research aimed to unveil the challenges encountered by ZACC in terms of its institutional framework. Recommendations to tackle the challenges encountered will also be proffered. This makes the research useful to policy analysts, government officials and the citizens at large as it explains why it is difficult to curb corruption and the various ways institutions can contribute to fighting corruption as a wicked problem.

1.8 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

This section will briefly review the relevant literature as well as presenting the conceptual framework. For this study, the focal concepts are institutional framework, wicked problems and corruption as an instance of a wicked problem.

Institutional Framework: According to the Hodgson (2006:2), the term institution refers to systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions. North (1990:3) cited in Hodgson (2003:9) defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. On the other hand, the term framework refers to a basic structure of something or a basic supporting structure of something (Merriam-Webster's Learner's Dictionary 2016). From the above definitions, it can be concluded that an institutional framework is a system of established rules purported to perform certain roles and

functions. In this research, the institutional framework for tackling corruption under study is the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC). As set out in Section 255(1b) of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, this institution responsible for “combating corruption, theft, misappropriation, abuse of power and other improper conduct in the public and private sectors.” Therefore, it is the thrust of this dissertation to analyse the effectiveness of ZACC as an institutional framework for curbing corruption as a wicked problem and to unravel any challenges encountered.

Wicked problems: In this research study, corruption is termed as a “wicked problem” due to its persistent or pervasiveness. The concept of wicked problems was coined by Rittel and Webber in 1973 and they define wicked problems as “those problems which are persistent in nature, are never solved, but only re-solved over and over again and have no stopping rule” (Rittel and Webber 1973:160). Ritchey (2013:1) argues that wicked problems “are those complex and ever changing societal problems that are difficult to treat with much success, because they won’t keep still.” This is typical of corruption in many countries which has tended to be persistent despite various attempts by governments to mitigate it. Corruption in states has never reached a stopping point hence termed wicked since it is insolvable. Ritchey (2013:4) also highlights that “many internal aspects of wicked problems can be considered to be symptoms of other problems.” Implied is that wicked problems are interrelated such that none can stand on its own. In relation to corruption, it can be noted that corruption is a symptom of other problems like poverty. It can be therefore assumed that high poverty levels trigger corruption since bureaucrats will be trying to make ends meet. Therefore, Rittel and Webber (1973:165) argue that “one should not try to cure symptoms, but should try to settle the problem at its highest level as possible.” Efforts to ameliorate a symptom will reveal that the originally perceived problem is actually a symptom (Rittel and Webber 1973:165). Therefore, efforts by ZACC as an institutional framework to curb corruption are futile since corruption is a symptom of other problems like poverty.

Corruption: According to UK Aid (2015:12), corruption refers to the misuse of public resources or power for private gain. The World Bank (2011) (cited in UK Aid 2015:12), postulates that there are various forms of corruption which include bribery, embezzlement, facilitation payment, fraud, collusion, extortion, patronage, clientism and nepotism. Camerer (2009:11) argues that corruption can be in various forms: it can be petty or grand, incidental, systematic or systemic and it can also be judicial, administrative, legislative or political in nature. A useful approach to describing corruption divides it into grand and petty or bureaucratic corruption (Camerer 2009:11).

Political and grand corruption is the abuse of office by those who decide on laws and regulations and basic resource allocation and it takes place at the highest levels of political authority involving politicians, government ministers, senior civil servants and others (Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001) cited in UK aid 2015:12). Bureaucratic or petty corruption entails corrupt acts by policy implementers as they may demand extra payment for the provision of government services, make speed money payments to expedite bureaucratic procedures, or pay bribes to allow actions that violate rules and regulations (Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001), cited in UK aid 2015:12). It is argued that political corruption and bureaucratic corruption are related since there is evidence that corruption at the top of a bureaucracy increases corruption at lower levels (Chand and Moene (1999) cited in UK aid 2015:12). In Zimbabwe, there is both petty and grand corruption with grand corruption having a huge negative impact on society at large.

In this regard, the research will analyze ZACC as an institutional framework responsible for tackling corruption as a wicked problem. The research will investigate the strengths and weaknesses of ZACC in fighting this wicked problem and solutions to mitigating the problem.

1.9 Research Methodology 2 Overview of the Methods

This research employed qualitative methods of data collection. The methods used included structured interviews, documentary search among others. Snowball and purposive sampling methods were also be used. The target informants included members of parliament, commissioners from ZACC, the staff from Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI-Z) among others. The reason for selecting these as target informants is because they are the ones who are involved in issues to do with investigating and combating crime and corruption and have primary data relating to corruption.

2.1 Sampling Procedures

According to Babbie (1959:159), “sampling is the process of selecting a subset of observations from among many possible observations for the purpose of drawing conclusions about that larger set of observation.” Sampling is cost saving, quick, specific, and convenient (Babbie 1959:159). In this case, snowball sampling and purposive sampling were used as they enabled the researcher to obtain relevant data from the targeted population.

2.2 Data Collection Methods

2.3 Interviews

According to Polit and Hungler (1991), “an interview is a data collection method through interaction involving an interviewer (person interviewing or asking questions) and an interviewee (person being interviewed or questioned) in order to obtain valid and reliable information.” Interviews are flexible, allow the use of body language and allow probing among others (Polit and Hungler 1991). Citizens and staff members from ZACC, TI-Z and NPA were interviewed in order to understand the wickedness of corruption and crime in Zimbabwe.

3. Documentary Research

Documentary research refers to “the analysis of documents that contain information of the phenomenon under study,” (Bailey 1994). Books, journals, articles and the internet were used in this dissertation so as to obtain as much information as possible.

3.1 Delimitations

The research aimed at focusing on ZACC as an institution responsible for tackling corruption as a wicked problem in Zimbabwe. Other institutions like the National Prosecuting Authority, the Police, the Judiciary and NGOs like TI-Z were not major areas of focus. In addition, the study mainly focused on the period when ZACC was first established until present, 2005- 2016.

3.2 Limitations

Since corruption is a sensitive area of inquiry, the research faced constraints associated with lack of cooperation by the targeted informants due to fear of victimization since the area of study is politically sensitive. In addition, the commissioners refused to provide data since some of the officers are the culprits and had busy schedules investigating some corrupt cases. Moreover, some data was not availed due to information confidentiality and lack of care for the research. However, these constraints were mitigated by assuring the interviewees that the data gathered was confidential and that they will get copies of the study after the research.

3.3 Conclusion

Chapter 1 introduced the research study and presented the background to the study, statement of the problem, significance of the study, research objectives, research questions, hypothesis, limitations and the scope of the study. Chapter 2 will give an in-depth discussion of the literature review and presents the conceptual framework.

3.4 The Organization of Study

The dissertation is organized into 5 chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the study and will be followed by chapter 2 where the relevant literature will be reviewed. Chapter 3 will present the various methods to be used by the researcher in collecting data. Chapter 4 presents and analyses the major findings and chapter 5 will give conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the literature review and conceptual framework for tackling corruption as a wicked problem. The concepts of institutional framework, corruption and wicked problems are key to this research and will be discussed as part of the conceptual framework. In addition, case studies from Nigeria and Kenya will be used to analyse their institutional frameworks for tackling a wicked problem.

1.1 Literature review and conceptual framework

Below, this section discusses the literature review and conceptual framework in relation to the institutional framework for tackling corruption as a wicked problem. The concepts: institutional framework, corruption and wicked problems will be discussed in this section. Various authors will be used in order to discuss the various literature that has been written in relation to these concepts.

1.2 Institutional framework

Hodgson (2006:2) says that the term “institution” refers to systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions. North (1990:3), cited in Hodgson (2003:9), defines institutions as the rules of the game in society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. Leftwich (2006:2) also argues that institutions are “durable social rules and procedures, formal or informal, which structure the social, economic and political relations and interactions of those affected by them.” Therefore, one can note that institutions are governed by specific rules and regulations which guide behavior in a society. On the other hand, the term “framework” refers to a basic structure of something or a basic supporting structure of something (Merriam-Webster's Learner's Dictionary 2016). From the above definitions, it can be

concluded that an institutional framework is a system of established rules purported to perform certain roles and functions.

Donnellan et al's (2012:1) definition of institutional framework is almost similar to Hodgson's definition of institutions as he argues that the term "institutional framework" refers to "the systems of formal laws, regulations, and procedures, and informal conventions, customs and norms that broaden, mould and restrain socio-economic activity and behaviour." The institutional framework for tackling corruption outlines the rules or regulations and functions of an institution responsible for tackling corruption. According to OECD (2008:34) the rationale behind the establishment of any anti-corruption institution is to address a specific problem involving corruption and to contribute to the reduction of corruption through a specialised institution.

Furthermore, the OECD (2008:31) argues that there are various models of specialised anticorruption institutions. These include multi-purpose agencies with law enforcement powers, law enforcement type institutions, preventive, policy development and co-ordination institutional models among others. According to the OECD (2008:31), the multi-purpose agencies with law enforcement powers model is where there is a single-agency approach where prosecution remains a separate function to preserve the checks and balances within the system. This is evident in the Hong Kong's Independent Commission against Corruption and Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau. In addition, the law enforcement type institution takes different forms of specialisation, and can be implemented in detection and investigation bodies. This model combines specialised anti-corruption detection, investigation and prosecution, prevention, co-ordination and research functions as evident in Norway, Belgium and Spain (OECD 2008:32). Lastly, the preventive, policy development and co-ordination institution includes institutions that have one or more corruption prevention functions responsible for research in the phenomena of corruption, assessing the risk of corruption, monitoring and co-ordination of the implementation of the national and local anti-corruption strategies and action plans as evident in France and Albania (OECD 2008:32).

In Zimbabwe, the institutions responsible for tackling corruption include the Zimbabwe AntiCorruption Commission (ZACC), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), NGOs like Transparency International-Zimbabwe (TI-Z), among others. It is vital to note that ZACC and NPA are constitutional creations as indicated by Chapter 13 of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe

which outlines their functions, roles and responsibilities in dealing with corruption. Therefore, it is essential to note that the purpose behind the creation of these frameworks is to try and reduce corruption as a cancer which has greatly affected Zimbabwe. However, the research will focus more on ZACC as an institution to tackle corruption as a wicked problem in Zimbabwe.

1.3 Wicked problems

According to Ritchey (2013:1), the notion of wicked problems was coined by Rittel and Webber in their landmark article “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning” in 1973. Rittel and Webber (1973:160) define wicked problems as government planning and policy dilemmas which are “ill-defined” and where there is a contest on the solutions to ameliorate the problem. To Ritchey (2013:1) wicked problems “are those complex and ever changing societal problems that are difficult to treat with much success, because they won’t keep still.” These definitions make corruption a wicked problem due to its persistent nature despite various attempts by the government to curb it.

The first characteristic of wicked problems, according to Rittel and Webber is that they are illdefined. Rittel and Webber (1973:161) aptly state that “the formulation of a wicked problem is the problem” hence “there is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.” Implied here is that there is always lack of consensus in formulating and defining wicked problems. According to Ritchey (2013:2), wicked problems “are strongly stakeholder dependent, such that there is often little consensus about what the problem is, let alone how to deal with it.” For Morrison (2013:2), “wicked problems cannot be defined until a solution has been proposed” and this is mainly because different stakeholders may have diverse interpretations and perspectives on what the problem really is. Morrison (2013:2) further argues that in the policy making arena, the definition of wicked problems is “often exacerbated by the fact that different stakeholders will have vastly different ways of defining the problem.” Therefore, each stakeholder has its own version of the definition and solution such that the definition and resolution of wicked problems become tenuous. This is in contrast to a tame problem where there is a well-defined and stable problem statement.

The second characteristic of wicked problems, according to Rittel and Webber (1973: 162), is that wicked problems have no stopping rule. This implies that wicked problems are insolvable to the extent that there is no precise stopping point for when a wicked is solved. This implies that wicked problems are perennial, arduous, persistent and consistent in nature such that they do not succumb to any attempt to ameliorate them. With wicked problems, a policy maker usually “stops for

considerations that are external to the problem that is when he runs out of time, money or patience” (Rittel and Webber 1973:162). Therefore, it can be noted that wicked problems are persistent and insolvable such that the problem is continually evolving and mutating.

The third characteristic feature of wicked problems is that “solutions to wicked problems are not true or false but good or bad” (Rittel and Webber 1973:162). This implies that a solution to a wicked problem is only right to the one who is implementing it. Morrison (2013:2) also argues that with wicked problems, “there are no right or wrong solutions, only better or worse ones.” Therefore, Rittel and Webber (1973:163) go on to argue that “interested parties are entitled to judge the solutions... and their judgments are likely to differ widely to accord with their group or personal interests, their special value-sets, and their ideological predilections.” Grint (2008:6) also argues that “the criteria for judging the validity of a solution to wicked problem are strongly stakeholder dependent.” Thus different stakeholders see different solutions as simply better or worse.

Another characteristic of wicked problems is that adopted solutions to wicked problems always have perverse effects (Rittel and Webber 1973:163). Rittel and Webber (1973:163) further argue that “consequences of the solution may yield utterly undesirable repercussions which outweigh the intended advantages or the advantages accomplished hitherto and in such cases, one would have been better off if the plan had never been carried out.” This implies that attempts to address wicked problems often leads to unforeseen consequences. Morrison (2013:2) argues that “each attempt to resolve a wicked problem may affect an infinite set of related problems.” One can thus argue that with wicked problems, a solution to tackle the problem can trigger unforeseen consequences or perverse effects.

In addition, wicked problems do not have an enumerable set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan (Rittel and

Webber 1973:164). This implies that “there are no criteria which enable one to prove that all solutions to a wicked problem have been identified and considered” (Rittel and Webber

1973:164). It is “a matter of judgment to pursue and implement a solution to a wicked problem” (Rittel and Webber 1973:164). Implied here is that, wicked problems are resistant to policy solutions. To Grint (2008:8), alternative solutions to wicked problems are not assessed using scientific models such as the Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA). In most cases, “with wicked problems

it may happen that no solution is found, owing to logical inconsistencies in the formulation of the problem” (Rittel and Webber, 1973:164). Ritchey (2011:65) notes that there is bound to be “chronic policy failure” of the adopted solutions to wicked problems

The sixth characteristic of wicked problems, according to Rittel and Webber, is the fact that every wicked problem is essentially unique (Rittel and Webber, 1973:164). This implies that wicked problems are context-specific hence a solution applied in one context may not be equally applicable in another context of the same problem. According to TI-Z (2012), the New South Wales Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) has been described as a good illustration of an efficient and effective anti-corruption body. This is evident by the public perception that the ICAC has succeeded in exposing corruption in NSW (80% in 1993 and 74% in 2003) (Pritchard 2005:207). Unlike in Zimbabwe, ICAC is independent and has special powers, which in some respects, exceed those given to the police, to perform its investigative functions. However, giving the same special powers which may exceed those of the police to the ZACC in Zimbabwe may trigger more corruption. This is because ZACC will not be reliant on any institution and will not be influenced or monitored by other parties hence with too much power, it can end up abusing such powers for private gain thereby perpetuating corruption. This can be supported by Martin (1998:1) who quotes Lord Acton’s saying “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” This implies that if ZACC is given special and more powers than the police like in the case of the New South Wales ICAC, it can become more corrupt.

Moreover, Rittel and Webber (1973:163) note that “every implemented solution to a wicked problem is consequential and leaves traces that cannot be undone.” They argue that “attempts to reverse a decision or to correct the undesired consequences brought about by an adopted solution to a wicked problem will pose another set of wicked problems, which are in turn subject to the same dilemmas.” It is therefore worth noting that a proposed solution to a wicked problem will always leave irreversible impacts.

Furthermore, Rittel and Webber (1973:165) argue that every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another wicked problem. They argue that “one should not try to cure symptoms, but should try to settle the problem at its highest level as possible.” Efforts to ameliorate a symptom will reveal that the originally perceived problem is actually a symptom (Rittel and Webber 1973:165). In Zimbabwe, whereas the government identified corruption as a wicked problem, a

closer analysis using Rittel and Webber's model may reveal that this was actually a symptom of other social problems such as poverty. Due to poverty and the need to satisfy physical needs according to Maslow's hierarchy of needs bureaucrats end up accepting bribery money. This is because most civil servants in Zimbabwe are earning below the poverty datum line hence poverty will influence them to accept bribes and perform all other corrupt practices. From this backdrop, it can be argued that the problem of corruption qualifies to be a symptom of the problem of poverty in Zimbabwe hence a wicked problem.

The ninth characteristic of wicked problems according to Rittel and Webber, is that "the causes of wicked problems can be explained in numerous ways and choice of explanation will determine the nature of the problems" resolution" (1973:166). With wicked problems, "people choose those explanations which are most plausible to them that is everybody explains the problem in a manner that best fits his/her intentions" (Rittel and Webber 1973:166). As a result of diverse explanations to the problem and its causes, "the analyst's world view is the strongest determining factor" in both explaining a problem and in devising measures for resolving a wicked problem as argued by (Rittel and Webber 1973:166). According to Ritchey (2013:5), due to diverse interested groups in a policy field, there is high possibility that one group's explanation of the wicked problem is bound to be refuted by the other group.

The tenth and last characteristic of wicked problems, according to Rittel and Webber, is that "with wicked problems, the planner has no right to be wrong" (1973:166). With wicked problems, immunity for failure of a policy alternative is not tolerated. The failure of an adopted policy action is never condoned. Planners are liable for the consequences generated by the policy action they adopt for implementation (Rittel and Webber 1973:166). Therefore, with wicked problems, there is no room for exoneration after policy failure.

1.4 Corruption

To Tanzi (1998:564), corruption has been defined in many different ways, each lacking in some aspect. However, like an elephant, even though it may be difficult to describe, it is generally not difficult to recognize when observed. The most popular definition states that "corruption is the abuse of public power for private gain" (World Bank 1998 cited in Tanzi:1998:564). This definition assumes that corruption does not exist in the private sector. However, it is essential to note that corruption is also prevalent in the private sector in procurement practices, in hiring and in many other respects. Corruption is a wicked problem nationwide as it leads to a decrease in

foreign direct investment, low economic growth, a shift in government spending from more productive to less productive activities, inequality and poverty, decrease in the efficiency of aid, currency crises among others (Marshall 2011:72). From this backdrop, it can be noted that corruption is a disease, a cancer that eats into the cultural, political and economic fabric of society, and destroys the functioning of vital organs (Amundsen 1999:1).

1.4.1 Categories of Corruption

According to the World Bank (2011) cited in UK Aid (2015:12), there are various categories of corruption which include bribery, embezzlement, fraud, facilitation payment, collusion, extortion and patronage, clientelism and nepotism. The World Bank (2011) cited in UK Aid (2015:12) notes that bribery is the act of dishonestly persuading someone to act in one's favour by a payment or other inducements like gifts, loans, fees and rewards. Embezzlement means to steal, misdirect or misappropriate funds or assets placed in one's trust or control. On the other hand, facilitation payment involves a small payment, also called a "speed" or "grease" payment, made to secure or expedite the performance of a routine or necessary action to which the payer has legal or other entitlement.

In addition, Vasiu et al (2003:975) argues that fraud is a generic category of criminal conduct that involves the use of dishonest or deceitful means in order to obtain some unjust advantage or gain over another. Collusion also entails an arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve an improper purpose, including influencing improperly the actions of another party. Furthermore, extortion is the act of or threatening to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improperly the actions of a party. Lastly, patronage, clientelism and nepotism basically involve the support given by a patron or the practice of appointing people directly. Therefore, it should be noted that all these categories of corruption have been prevalent in the public sector which has made corruption a wicked problem in Zimbabwe.

1.4.2 Types of Corruption

According to Bhargava (2005:1), there are various types of corruption which can be grand, political, corporate, administrative, petty and systemic corruption. Myint (2000:45) notes that corruption on a grand scale can involve embezzlement of huge sums of public funds, and the mismanagement, wastage, inequity, and social decay that come along with it. In addition, Bhargava (2005:1) says that grand corruption involves heads of state, ministers, or other senior government officials and serves the interests of a narrow group of business people and politicians, or criminal

elements. Political corruption involves lawmakers, such as monarchs, dictators, and legislators, acting in their role as creators of the rules and standards by which a polity operates. These engage in corruption when they seek bribes or other rewards for their own political or personal benefit and in return provide political favours to their supporters at the expense of the public interest. In addition, to Bhargava (2005:2) corporate corruption occurs in the relationships between private a business corporation and their suppliers or clients when corporate officials use the corporation's resources for private gain, at the expense of the shareholders.

Bhargava (2005:2) goes on to argue that administrative corruption includes the use of bribery and favouritism to allow certain individuals or businesses to lower their taxes, escape regulations, or win low-level procurement contracts. Systemic corruption is corruption that is prevalent throughout all levels of society. Lastly, petty corruption involves the payment of comparatively small amounts of money to "facilitate" routine official transactions, such as customs clearance or the issuing of building permits.

According to the UK Aid (2015:12), it is essential to take note of the commonly used distinction between political corruption and bureaucratic corruption. According to Andvig and Fjeldstad, (2001) (cited in UK Aid 2015:12), political corruption is the abuse of office by those who decide on laws and regulations and the basic allocation of resources in a society. On the other hand, bureaucratic corruption entails corrupt acts among those who implement the rules designed or introduced by top officials and may involve huge sums of money. It occurs during the implementation of public policies and involves appointed bureaucrats and public administration staff at the central or local level.

1.4.3 Causes of corruption

According to Marshall (2011:73), corruption is caused by a variety of factors which include poverty, low salaries, high risks of all kinds (illness, accidents and unemployment) and lack of insurance. In addition, Tanzi (1998:10) notes that the existence of rules and regulations in getting licenses and authorizations for opening a shop, buying and owning a car among others also leads to corruption. This is because the existence of these regulations gives a monopoly power or discretion to the officials who must authorize and inspect the activities as they may delay authorizations for months hence can use their public power to extract bribes for those who need authorization permits. Marshall (2011:73) also notes that weak legislative and judicial systems,

poorly developed laws for unclear tax based laws as noted by (Tanzi 1998:10), political instability and lack of political will also cause corruption.

In addition, Booth (2012) (cited in UK Aid 2015:15) argues that information asymmetry in relation to the principal agent theory also leads to corruption. A principal-agent problem exists when one party to a relationship (the principal) requires a service of another party (the agent) but the principal lacks the necessary information to monitor the agent's performance in an effective way. Therefore, the "information asymmetry" that arises because the agent has more or better information than the principal creates a power imbalance between the two and makes it difficult for the principal to ensure the agent's compliance. Person et al (cited in UK Aid 2015:15) note that corruption thus occurs when a principal is unable to monitor an agent effectively and the agent betrays the principal's interest in the pursuit of his or her own self-interest. This implies that corruption is more prevalent where there is limited supervision and monitoring in both the public and private sectors.

1.5 The institutional framework for fighting corruption as a wicked problem: some case studies

1.5.1 Nigeria

Nigeria has been known as one of the top most corrupt countries in Africa. According to Ikpeze (2013:148), Nigeria is said to lose up to 40% of its oil revenue to corruption. Accusations of corruption are frequently made against government institutions and several individuals in positions of authority. In addition, Ikpeze (2013:148) notes that Nigeria's tolerance for corruption has led it to having very high rates of poverty, conflict, insecurity and disease. Citizens complain of poor wages, poor security, weak institutions and even weaker checks and balances mechanisms in government institutions. For Ikpeze (2013:151) common manifestations of corruption in Nigeria include bribery, abuse of discretion and abuse of office, stealing, fraud, and misappropriation, extortion only to mention a few. Corruption can be said to be wicked in

Nigeria due to its rankings on the TI CPI's index. According to the TI-Z (2012:1), Nigeria was ranked 139 out of 176 countries in 2012, in 2013 it was 144/177, in 2014 it scored number 136/175 and in 2015 it scored 136/168 (TI CPI 2015:1). From this backdrop, Nigeria has created institutional frameworks and statutory frameworks to curb corruption.

According to Ogbeidi (2012:12), many cases of corruption in Nigeria are perpetrated by the top echelons of the political leadership class. This is evident from the 1994 Okigbo Panel Report which

reports that General Ibrahim Babangida's regime conspired with top officials of the Central Bank of Nigeria to squander about \$12.4 billion oil. In addition, the National Identity Card scandal is another case of high profile corruption perpetrated by the top echelon of the nation's political leadership class. In 2001, a contract was awarded to the \$214 million National Identity Card project to SAGEM S.A., a French company. It was alleged that seven prominent public servants collaborated with SAGEM S.A. to scuttle the \$214million project that was not fully executed with the money being divided among the suspected culprits (Asaju, 2003 cited in Ogbeidi 2012:17).

Some of the institutions created include the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) of 2003, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) of 2000, the Public Complaints Commission (Ombudsman) of 1975 among others. The corresponding legislations created include the EFCC Act 2002, the ICPC Act 2000, the Public Complaints Commission Act 2004 among others. According to Ikpeze (2013:151), the EFCC is specifically dedicated to investigating and prosecuting economic and financial crimes. These offences relate to financial malpractices, terrorism, retention of proceeds of a criminal conduct, economic and financial crimes, seizure and forfeiture of property and passport, and foreign assets. In addition, the ICPC is established to investigate, recommend and facilitate prosecution against corrupt practices. Furthermore, the Public Complaints Commission was also established in 1975 to protect through investigations against corrupt oppressive exercise of power by public officers. The above legislative and institutional frameworks indicate the efforts of the government of Nigeria to curb corruption. However, this has been in vain since corruption is still at its peak in Nigeria. Therefore, it is vital to discuss the challenges encountered by these institutions in trying to curb corruption.

According to Ikpeze (2013:151), one of the challenges encountered in fighting corruption includes the issue of immunity given to executive office holders during their tenure against prosecution by anti-corruption agencies. In addition, another challenge is the abuse of office and lack of political will to tackle corruption. It can be noted that Nigeria has enough laws to tackle corruption effectively but lacks political will. Another problem militating against the war on corruption is abuse of office. Ikpeze (2013:151) argues that in 2013, the President exercised his powers under the Constitution to grant state pardon to an ex-governor who had been convicted for corruption. Moreover, conflicts of interest among anti-corruption laws and institutions are another challenge. An illustration is the conflict about dividing the roles, functions and powers of EFCC, ICPC, among others on investigation, handling and documentation of fraud or corruption. Ikpeze

(2013:151) argues that a former Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Chief Michael KaaseAondoakaa, courted many controversies in this regard. He engaged in a battle for superiority with the Chairman of the EFCC, over the limit of the independence of the EFCC, as provided in its establishment Act. When the former Attorney- General attempted to take over the prosecution of certain cases from the EFCC, a controversy arose as to who should be in control of the trial of the ex-governor.

1.5.2 Kenya

Kenya is also one of the most corrupt countries in Africa. This can be evidenced by the statistics given by the TI CPI's reports. According to the TI-Z (2012:1), Kenya was ranked 139 out of 176 countries in 2012, in 2013 it was 136/177, in 2014 it scored number 145/175 and in 2015 it scored 139/168 (TI CPI 2015:1). According to Martini (2012: 3), corruption in Kenya manifests itself through various forms, including petty, grand, political corruption among others. Martini (2012: 3) notes that corruption is a key feature of Kenyan politics, with political ethnocentrism, institutional weaknesses, lack of resources and patronage making political parties vulnerable to corruption. In the 2011 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), 63 % of the respondents perceived political parties as corrupt or extremely corrupt (Martini 2012: 3). Wrong (2014) cited in Hope (2014:493) noted from comments of Kenyans that "everyone is corrupt in Kenya, even grandmothers." This is because institutions which were designed for the regulation of the relationships between citizens and the state, are being used instead for the personal enrichment of public officials and other corrupt private agents.

In addition, when interacting with specific institutions such as the Police, land services, city and local councils and registry and licenses services, the probability of citizens being expected or asked to pay a bribe raises to over 40 % (Martini 2012: 3). The most corrupt Kenyan organisation is the Kenyan Police where on average, 60–93 % of respondents reported a likelihood of a bribe demand by the Police and 52 % reported that a failure or refusal to comply with such a bribe demand resulted in their failure to access the service or in their incurring punishment (TI-Kenya 2008) cited in (Hope 2014:497). Therefore, it can be concluded basing on the above information that corruption is a wicked problem in Kenya just like in Nigeria.

However, various institutions have been created by the Kenyan government in trying to curb corruption. These include the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) of 2011, the Public

Complaints Standing Committee (PCSC) of 2007, Public Procurement Oversight Authority (PPOA) of 2007 among others. NGOs like Transparency International-Kenya (TI-K) are also visible in Kenya in order to tackle corruption. According to Martini (2012:7), the fight against corruption was high on President Kibaki's political agenda where several reforms and laws were enacted. These include the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crime Act 2003, the Public Officer Ethics Act 2003, and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2005.

The Public Officers Ethics Act 2003 requires civil servants to declare their assets even though there are neither clear provisions on the auditing of these reports nor records of any action arising out of these declarations of wealth (Global Integrity 2011, cited in Martini 2012:7). In addition, the Public Service Commission Act 2012 requires merit-based recruitment and promotion of public servants but, bribery, nepotism and political patronage remains reportedly widespread. This clearly indicates the wickedness of corruption in Kenya. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act 2005 was created to provide procedures for efficient public procurement and assets disposal by public entities; and for connected purposes (Public Service Commission Act Chapter 185).

In trying to curb corruption in Kenya, various challenges have been encountered. These include expansion of the public sector bureaucracy which has fostered corruption. One audit report by Pricewaterhouse Cooper indicated that there were over 4000 ghost workers on the payroll – constituting around 35 per cent of the 12 000 strong workforce with an estimated monthly wage bill of around US\$800 000 and 46 employees had fake degree certificates (Hope 2014:49). Other challenges include high persistence of bribery and the neglecting and the undermining of basic institutions that support the rule of law hence they can no longer act in the best interests of the nation among others.

1.6 Conclusion

Chapter 2 presented the literature review and conceptual framework of the research study. The concepts like institutional framework, wicked problems and corruption have been discussed. In addition, the institutional frameworks for tackling corruption in Nigeria and Kenya have also been discussed as case studies. Chapter 3 will present the various methods to be used by the researcher in collecting data.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology used in collecting and analyzing the research data. Qualitative research methods were used and the data collection methods included documentary search and key informant interviews using a key informant guide. The data analysis techniques used are content analysis and thematic analysis. Below, the research design, sampling procedures, data collection methods and data analysis techniques will be discussed.

3.2 Research Approach

The research approach used in this study is the qualitative methodology. Creswell (2009:233) defines qualitative research as a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. It involves emerging questions and procedures, collecting data in the participants' setting, analyzing the data inductively, building from particulars

to general themes and making interpretations of the meaning of the data. This research approach was used as it enabled the research to explore the wickedness of corruption in Zimbabwe. This is because the research sought to understand the weaknesses of and challenges encountered by ZACC in tackling corruption as a wicked problem.

3.3 Research Design

Creswell (2009:3) notes that research designs are plans and procedures for research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis. A research design can take several forms which include a qualitative, quantitative and a mixed approach to research (Creswell 2009:3). In this case, the research study adopted a qualitative approach to research as this enabled the research to explore the reasons why corruption is a wicked problem in Zimbabwe.

3.4 Research Methodology

The research methodology entails the methods used to collect data for research. Creswell (2009:11) gives three categories of research methodology which include qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods. In this research, the qualitative method was used to gather and analyse the data.

3.5 Qualitative Research Method

For Creswell (2009:4), qualitative research is a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of research involves emerging questions and procedures with data being typically collected in the participant's setting.

3.6 Justification for using the Qualitative Approach

The qualitative approach enables the researcher to understand more about a phenomenon. Punch (2004:243) notes that qualitative methods are flexible and easily modified which makes them well suited for studying naturally occurring real life situations. They also accommodate the local groundedness of the things they study and specific cases embedded in their context. Through interviews, the researcher obtained more information since they give room for probing and obtaining information through body language.

3.7 Study Area and Target Population

The researcher obtained data from institutions like ZACC, NPA and TI-Z. In addition, citizens' views were also vital in this research hence a few citizens were interviewed in relation to the study. The targeted participants included the MPs, Ministers, ZACC commissioners and the members

belonging to the strategic apex of these institutions. The reason behind targeting these is that they have the key information needed in this research.

3.8 Sampling Methods and Sampling Procedure.

Babbie (1959:159) states that “sampling is the process of selecting a subset of observations from among many possible observations for the purpose of drawing conclusions about that larger set of observation.” Sampling can be grouped into probability and non-probability sampling. Probability sampling gives everyone in the population an equal and known chance of being selected. Non-probability sampling does not offer everyone the chance of being selected. The study made use of non-probability sampling methods to obtain the data needed for research which include purposive and snowball sampling.

3.8.1 Purposive Sampling

Purposive sampling entails using the judgment of an expert in selecting cases and selects cases with a specific purpose in mind (Neuman 2014:274). For Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003a:713, cited in Teddlie and Yu 2007:80), purposive sampling techniques involve selecting certain units or cases „,based on a specific purpose rather than randomly.“” They are used in exploratory research or in field research to select unique cases that are especially informative. Neuman (2014:274) adds that “purposive sampling is mainly used to select members of a difficult-to-reach, specialized population,” such as ministers. It also enables the research to select participants based on internal knowledge of the said characteristics. Therefore, this method is useful if a researcher wants to study “a small subset of a larger population in which many members of the subset are easily identified but the enumeration of all is nearly impossible.” Babbie (1990) (cited in Latham 2007:9)

3.8.2 Snowball Sampling

To Neuman (2014: 27), snowball sampling is also called network, chain referral, reputation and respondent-driven sampling. According to Kartz (2006:50), snowball sampling is a special non probability method for developing a research sample where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances. For Neuman (2014: 275), the method is used for selecting the cases in a network and uses an analogy to a snowball, which begins small but becomes larger as it is rolled on wet snow and picks up additional snow. Neuman (2014:275) notes that it begins with one or a few people or cases and spreads out based on links to the initial cases.

In addition, Kartz (2006:50) argues that this sampling technique is often used in hidden populations which are difficult for researchers to access (such as drug users or commercial sex workers), or in cases where a sampling frame is hard to establish and it is assumed that cases are affiliated through links that can be exploited to locate other respondents based on existing ones. However, snowball sampling is subject to bias where the respondents who have many links are more likely to be recruited into the sample as there is no sampling frame. Therefore, a minister or commissioner can be approached and he will link the researcher to the next person.

3.9 Data Collection Methods

The systematic way of collecting data which is relevant to the research objectives, purpose or questions is known as data collection. Data collection in this research was done using documentary search and key informant interviews using a key informant guide.

3.9.1 Interviews.

According to Polit and Hungler (1991), “an interview is a data collection method through interaction involving an interviewer (person interviewing or asking questions) and an interviewee (person being interviewed or questioned) in order to obtain valid and reliable information.” According Finn (2008), there are two types of interviews used in evaluation: structured interviews, in which a carefully worded questionnaire is administered; and in-depth interviews, in which the interviewer does not follow a rigid form. In the former, the emphasis is on obtaining answers to carefully phrased questions. In the latter, however, the interviewers seek to encourage free and open responses, and there may be a trade off between comprehensive coverage of topics and in-depth exploration of a more limited set of questions. The study used key informant interviews or in-depth interviews to obtain data. The researcher interviewed members from ZACC, NPA and TI-Z.

The targeted informants included a few academics, the chairperson, deputy chairperson and four ZACC commissioners; the Prosecutor General, the National Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director for Administration and any other member of the National Prosecuting Authority Board. Three officers from the Criminal Investigation Department at Harare Central Police Station will be interviewed, the Deputy Commissioner General and three Senior Police Officers from the Zimbabwe Republic Police were to be interviewed. The Director and five staff members from the

TI-Z were to be interviewed too. These key informants were selected as they possessed the key information needed for the study and work with the quest of tackling corruption in Zimbabwe.

3.9.2 Documentary search

Mogalakwe (2006:222) notes that a document is a written text. Therefore, documentary search refers to “the analysis of documents that contain information of the phenomenon under study” (Bailey 1994). Therefore, newspapers, books and journal articles which contain information concerning corruption and the institutional framework for tackling it were used in this study so as to obtain as much data as possible. The study made use of data from Afrobarometer which conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues. Mogalakwe (2006:222) argues that there are two types of documents used in documentary search. These include primary documents and secondary documents. Primary documents refer to eye-witness accounts produced by people who experienced the particular event or the behaviour we want to study. On the other hand, secondary documents are documents produced by people who were not present at the scene but who received eye-witness accounts to compile the documents, or have read eye-witness accounts (Bailey 1994: 194). Therefore, both of these were analysed in trying to understand the wickedness of corruption in Zimbabwe.

3.10 Data Analysis

Data analysis is the process of making sense of the data collected. In this case, the researcher will be trying to find meaning from the data collected. Content analysis and thematic analysis will be utilised in trying to obtain meaning from the data collected. Thematic analysis involves the identification of themes through careful reading and re-reading of data. Patton and Cockran (2002:23) note that thematic analysis is one that looks across all the data to identify the common issues that recur, and identify the main themes that summarise all the views you have collected. This is the most common method for descriptive qualitative projects. On the other hand, Neuman (2014:49) notes that content analysis is a technique for examining the content or information and symbols contained in written documents or other communication media (e.g., photographs, movies, song lyrics, advertisements). This implies that school textbooks, television programs, newspaper articles were analysed to create a system for recording specific aspects of their content. The system included counting how often certain words or themes appear, systematically record what was found and then analyze the data using graphs or charts.

3.10.1 Reliability and Validity

Reliability concerns the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials (Carmines and Zeller 1979:11). This implies that the tendency towards consistency found in repeated measurements of the same phenomenon is referred to as reliability. In addition to being reliable, an indicator needs to be valid if it is to provide a more accurate representation of some abstract concept. Carmines and Zeller (1979:12) note that validity is the extent to which any measuring instrument measures what it is intended to measure. Validity is one of the strengths of qualitative research since it is based on determining whether the findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant or the readers of an account. Checking for validity and reliability can be done through member checking, triangulation, peer debriefing, use of an external auditor to review and spending prolonged time in the field (Cresswell 2009:192).

3.11 Ethical issues

In carrying out a research, there are certain ethical considerations that need to be followed. Ethics are norms for conduct that distinguish between acceptable and non-acceptable behavior (Resnik 2013:1). Some of the ethical concerns in carrying out a research include the issue of anonymity, informed consent, information confidentiality among others. These ethics were followed which enhanced the research to become a success. The researcher assured the targeted key informants that the information they were to provide would be confidential and that their names would not be exposed after the research hence promoting anonymity and information confidentiality. The researcher asked for permission first from the organization and the key informants before starting the research thereby ensuring the effective upholding of informed consent as a research ethic.

3.12 Conclusion

Chapter 3 presented the methodology of the study. In this study, the methodology is qualitative in nature such that documentary search and key informant interviews were used for data collection. It is essential to note that the organizations chosen for research were specially selected since they are the ones which mainly focus on tackling corruption. Purposive and snowball sampling were used since the study needs key informants with key knowledge hence the researcher used their personal judgment to select key informants who linked them to the next person. Thematic and content data analysis techniques were used in order to obtain meaning from the data collected.

Chapter 4 will present and analyze the major findings.

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses the findings. The findings were obtained after conducting key informant interviews using an interview guide with open-ended questions as well as documentary search. The thrust of the research is to understand the magnitude of corruption in Zimbabwe and the institutional framework for tackling it as a wicked problem. The research also seeks to understand the institutional framework's weaknesses and/strengths in tackling this wicked problem. The research hypothesizes that weak institutional frameworks perpetuate corruption. The targeted institutions included ZACC, NPA, ZRP and NGOs like TI-Z with ZACC being the main case study. The research also seeks to come up with measures that can be taken in order to curb corruption as a cancer that has infected Zimbabwe. Thematic analysis of the major findings revealed that the institutional framework for tackling a wicked problem in Zimbabwe is weak hence the need for the government to adopt measures that will improve it.

4.1 Research Experiences

This study was pleasurable as the researcher managed to conduct interviews at ZACC, NPA and TI-Z where the researcher was warmly welcomed to conduct interviews. However, at institutions like ZACC and TI-Z, it was difficult to get information since the researcher was not granted the permission to interview all the targeted key informants. The researcher had targeted to interview the Prosecutor General (PG), the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), the Director for Administration and any other member of the National Prosecuting Authority Board. Permission was granted to interview the Deputy Prosecutor General (DPG), the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), the Director for Administration and any other member from the NPA. At the end, the researcher interviewed the DPG, one Chief Prosecutor and one Chief Law Officer on the 10th and 16th of January 2017. However, the researcher was not granted permission to interview the DPG while the NDPP and the Director for Administration were not available in their offices hence the researcher did not manage to interview them. The researcher managed to get fruitful information on the topic and the key informants were welcoming and free for the

interviews. However, some of the interviewed participants could not really specify the weaknesses of ZACC as they did not have hands-on information about the institution.

In addition, the researcher interviewed the Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator of TI-Z on the 16th of January 2017, three weeks after the application to conduct interviews, where the targeted key informants included the Director of TI-Z and five staff members from the institution. Permission was only granted to interview the Senior Researcher in just 10 minutes which was inadequate for open-ended questions which need probing. Other staff members were said to be busy. Nevertheless, the information obtained was useful in addition to a document received entitled “Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in

Zimbabwe 2000-2015” from the institution. Furthermore, the researcher visited ZACC and was granted the permission to interview the Chief Research Officer of ZACC only on 14 January 2017, 10 days after applying to conduct interviews, after targeting the chairperson, deputy chairperson and four ZACC commissioners. The information obtained from that interview was not fruitful since the officer only gave one point on the weaknesses of ZACC in tackling corruption. However, the researcher managed to obtain the 2011 and 2016 Annual Reports of the institution which contributed significantly to the research.

Furthermore, the researcher also targeted a few academics for interviews; a University of Zimbabwe (UZ) Lecturer and a UZ Teaching Assistant were interviewed on the 6th of February 2017. The interviews were very fruitful as the lecturers managed to point out some of the weaknesses of ZACC and to give fruitful recommendations to tackle corruption in Zimbabwe. Documentary search was also done and newspapers like *The Herald*, *The Standard*, *The Newsday*, *The Independent*, *NewZimbabwe* among others were consulted. However, the researcher did not manage to get permission to conduct interviews at ZRP as one of its targeted institutions. Their response was that “I have not been granted the permission to research at the institution and any inconvenience caused is sincerely regretted.” Table 4.1 lists people who were interviewed and when.

Table 4.1: Schedule of Key Informants Interviewed

Key Targeted Informants	Date	Organization	Successful/Failed
Deputy Prosecutor General	10/01/2017	National Prosecution Authority	Successful
Chief Public Prosecutor	10/01/2017	National Prosecution Authority	Successful
Chief Law Officer	16/01/2017	National Prosecution Authority	Successful
Prosecutor General	10/01/2017	National Prosecution Authority	Failed
National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP)	06/02/2017	National Prosecution Authority	Failed
Director for Administration	06/02/2017	National Prosecution Authority	Failed
Three officers from the Criminal Investigation Department	02/01/17	Zimbabwe Republic Police	Failed
Deputy Commissioner General of Police	02/01/17	Zimbabwe Republic Police	Failed
Three Senior Police Officers	02/01/17	Zimbabwe Republic Police	Failed
University of Zimbabwe Lecturer (Department of Political and Administrative Studies)	06/02/2017	University of Zimbabwe	Successful
University of Zimbabwe Teaching Assistant (Department of Political and Administrative Studies)	06/02/2017	University of Zimbabwe	Successful
Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator	16/01/2017	Transparency International Zimbabwe	Successful
Director of Transparency International Zimbabwe	16/01/2017	Transparency International Zimbabwe	Failed
Five TI-Z staff members	16/01/2017	Transparency International Zimbabwe	Failed
ZACC Chairperson	14/01/2017	Zimbabwe Anti-corruption Commission	Failed
ZACC Deputy Chairperson	14/01/2017	Zimbabwe Anti-corruption Commission	Failed
Chief Research Officer	14/01/2017	Zimbabwe Anti-corruption Commission	Successful

4.2 Research Findings

This section will present the research findings obtained from field work. In this section, it is vital to revisit the concept of “wicked problems” coined by Rittel and Webber 1973. Rittel and Weber (1973:160) define wicked problems as government planning and policy dilemmas which are “illdefined” and where there is a contest on the solutions to ameliorate the problem. To Ritchey

(2013:1), wicked problems “are those complex and ever changing societal problems that are difficult to treat with much success, because they won’t keep still.” These definitions make rhetorical corruption a wicked problem since it has been complex and difficult to curb in Zimbabwe despite efforts by the Government to curb it. Therefore, this chapter will survey the institutions responsible for curbing this wicked problem as well as analyze the weaknesses and strengths of ZACC as one of the institutions responsible for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe.

4.3 Theme 1: Defining corruption

As there is no single definition of corruption, the research sought to understand the meanings of corruption from the perspectives of the different institutions so as to reach a common ground of what corruption basically entails. According to Amundsen (2000) cited in Mutondoro et al (2016:24), “corruption is generally understood as everything from the paying of bribes to civil servants and the simple theft of public purses, to a wide range of dubious economic and political practices in which business people, politicians and bureaucrats enrich themselves.” For TI-Z

(2016), “corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” It is essential to note that TI-Z (2012) cited in Mutondoro et al (2016: 14) notes that the definition of corruption as the abuse of power for private gain shows “the centrality of power to corruption transactions.”

The chief researcher from ZACC and the DPG from NPA raised the same sentiments in defining corruption as they noted that in Zimbabwe, the definition of corruption is in the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act Chapter (9:23) Section (170-174). This involves bribery, corruptly using a false document, corruptly concealing a transaction from a principal and criminal abuse of duty as a public officer among others. The TI-Z Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator defined corruption as the “abuse of office for private gain.” Corruption is therefore an outcome of power dynamics in the absence of effective mechanisms and institutions for transparency and accountability, and taking place where there are goods and services valued by a polity. This abuse of office for private gain seems to have become a culture in Zimbabwe despite the presence of various institutions of tackling graft. It is the thrust of this dissertation to unravel the institutional framework for tackling a wicked problem with much emphasis on its weaknesses and or strengths.

4.4 Theme 2: The extent of corruption in Zimbabwe

In assessing the institutional framework for tackling a wicked problem, it is essential to understand the extent or magnitude of corruption in Zimbabwe. Therefore, interviews were undertaken at the different institutions in order to have different perspectives from different stakeholders. In an interview, the TI-Z Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator argued that

“corruption has reached endemic levels in Zimbabwe and has been accepted as a way of life.” Mutondoro (2016:11) also notes that the everyday language used by most Zimbabweans confirms the Shona adages „Mbudzi inodya payakasungirirwa” (“a goat eats from where it is tied”), “kudhiza” or “kugura.” These adages show the extent to which corruption has become culturally accepted in Zimbabwe. In addition, the TI-Z Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator argued that this is explained by the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI) where Zimbabwe is ranked one of the top most corrupt countries with a low Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score which ranges from 21 to 22 (compared to an average of 44 in four other SADCC countries) where the score has not greatly changed for the past three years. In addition, TI (2016) argues that the CPI currently ranks 168 countries “on a scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).” Therefore, Zimbabwe’s score which ranges from 21 to 22 is very low and is below the average score which implies that it is highly corrupt. TI (2016) notes that “the lower-ranked countries in our index are plagued by untrustworthy and badly functioning public institutions like the police and judiciary.” This implies that corruption is at its peak and is a wicked problem in Zimbabwe since the country has failed to even reach the average TI CPI score.

The TI-Z Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator added that Zimbabwe is doing quite badly when compared with neighboring countries like South Africa and Botswana which are doing quite well. As indicated earlier on, TI (2016) notes that “the lower-ranked countries in our index are plagued by untrustworthy and badly functioning public institutions like the police and judiciary.” This implies that the highly ranked countries, or countries with a high CPI score are less corrupt and more transparent in their operations. Therefore, according to TI (2016), South Africa had a CPI score which ranges from 43 to 45 between 2014 and 2016 which were above the average CPI score of 44 which indicates that there is less corruption compared to Zimbabwe which had a CPI score which ranges from 21 to 22 between 2014 and 2016 indicating high corruption levels. Botswana also had a CPI score ranging from 63 to 64 between 2014 and 2016 which is well above the average score indicating less corruption in the country. According to

Mutondoro (2016:11), TI-Z and Afrobarometer did a National Corruption Barometer Survey in 2014 and the two surveys confirm that 68-74% of citizens feel that corruption is very endemic and is increasing in Zimbabwe. From these figures, it is very clear that corruption is a wicked problem and a parasite that has fed into the country's economy hence requires stern attention. Therefore, according to MPOI Public Seminar Report on Corruption October (2016:3), Obert

Gutu argued that "the cancer of corruption that is eating into Zimbabwe's public service delivery system, if not dealt with, will totally decimate the country's economy." He added on to say that 22 government ministries have been found wanting on account of poor corporate governance, abuse of fund accounts and flouting of procurement procedures and only 10 government ministries were given a thumb up by the Auditor General's office.

In addition, corruption can be termed as a wicked problem in Zimbabwe considering the fact that "the government of Zimbabwe could not account for US\$15 billion which had been generated by the sale of diamonds in Marange" (Mgaisa 2016). This was also noted by Obert Gutu who argued that President Mugabe, on his 92nd birthday, admitted that "we have not received much from the diamond industry at all. I don't think we have exceeded \$2 billion, yet we think more than \$15 billion has been earned ... Lots of smuggling and swindling has taken place and the companies that have been mining, I want to say, robbed us of our wealth" (MPOI Public Seminar Report on Corruption October (2016:4). This clearly depicts how cruel corruption can be, eating away state resources thereby putting development backwards and perpetuating poverty. From this backdrop, one can note that surely, corruption is a wicked problem in Zimbabwe to an extent of making US\$15 billion disappear. However, ZACC's Chief Education Officer argued that certain processes are in place right now concerning the missing the US\$15 billion (MPOI Public Seminar Report on Corruption Zimbabwe October (2016:7). It is essential to note that its 2 years now since the US\$15 billion has been said to be missing and nothing has been done yet to arrest the culprits which indicates that there is no seriousness in Zimbabwe to tackle the vice.

Moreover, Mutondoro et al (2016: 13) as cited by Chene (2015) argues that Zimbabwe also performed well below the regional average in the 2015 Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, especially in terms of Freedom from corruption (21 out of 100), and is placed at the bottom of the regional rankings. The country also performs extremely poor in all six governance areas assessed by the 2013 World Bank World Wide Governance Indicators scoring 2.87 (on a 0 to 100 scale) in terms of freedom from corruption; 2.37 in terms of rule of law; 2.39 in terms of regulatory quality; 12.92 in terms of government effectiveness; 9.95 in terms of voice and

accountability; and 24.17 in terms of political stability and absence of violence. Therefore, the TI-Z Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator argued that corruption is a problem in Zimbabwe which requires serious attention. Chiweshe (2015) cited in Mutondoro et al (2016:14) then concludes that, “corruption in Zimbabwe is therefore interwoven into all facets of daily life.” The extent of corruption in Zimbabwe has been reflected by the citizen uprising through citizen-led social movements like the #This Flag and #Tajamuka Campaign. In these uprisings, citizens were demanding an answer as to where the US\$15 Billion from the sale of diamonds disappeared to since it is alleged that it was lost in corruption (Chene2016) cited in Mutondoro et al (2016: 10). These and other campaigns are a sign of citizens rising up against corruption.

According to the Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) Public Seminar Report on Corruption October (2016:2), Silence Pondo, the Acting ZACC Secretary argued that,

corruption is now a cancer in Zimbabwe and is now systemic as evidenced by a situation in which the institutions and processes of the state are routinely dominated and used by corrupt individuals and groups, a situation where corruption is primarily integrated in the organization’s processes and procedures resulting in weakening the control systems that help to prevent the abuse of resources. He also spoke about the corruption value chain which takes the assumption that: it takes one or more people for corruption to happen; corrupt people live/work with all of us in society (environment); corruption weakens corporate governance in institutions if workers get compromised; the corrupt bribe their way out through the value chain; and the corrupt may not be punished.

Pondo’s sentiments clearly support the fact that corruption in Zimbabwe is at its highest levels and has been accepted as a way of doing things in Zimbabwe. People tend to earn a living through corrupt means, people have become richer and have tended to live a luxurious life through corrupt acts.

In addition, the Zimbabwe Mail Staff Reporter (2016) notes that TI in its latest report on corruption disclosed that the country is losing at least US\$1 billion every year because of corruption. This is a very shocking considering that Zimbabwe is being run at an annual budget of about US\$4 billion implying that a quarter of the budget is lost through the cancer of corruption. According to Gutu (2016), Zimbabwe has since gained a notorious reputation of being one of the most corrupt countries in the world. A University of Zimbabwe (UZ) lecturer also indicated that corruption is problematic in Zimbabwe and this has hindered effective development. He argued that “the funds to be used for development are being stolen by selfish and corrupt public servants hence we are

always lagged behind in terms of development.”From this backdrop, it can be safely concluded that corruption in Zimbabwe is at its highest levels in

Zimbabwe and requires serious attention. The United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Report of Zimbabwe (2012:4) reveals that “by being party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the African Union Convention on Combating and Preventing Corruption and the SADCC Protocol Against Corruption, Zimbabwe accepted that corruption is a serious problem that needs to be tackled and committed itself to fight corruption.” Therefore, corruption in Zimbabwe is a cancer in the bone marrow, is at its peak, persistent and difficult to resolve hence rendered a wicked problem and requires serious attention so that it can be eradicated.

In contrast, in an interview, the Chief Researcher from ZACC argued that,

corruption in Zimbabwe is not necessarily wicked and there are still vast opportunities at our disposal to solve the problem. Our view is that to perceive it from a wicked point of view might imply that we as an agency are surrendering or „throwing in the towel“ in as far as the fight is concerned. We acknowledge it is a problem but not impossible to combat.

The same sentiment was also expressed by the Deputy Prosecutor General (DPG) who argued that corruption cannot be termed as a “wicked problem” that is difficult or impossible to resolve. For her, it is not a wicked problem if there is political will. This is because corruption is occurring in the offices of those who are supposed to combat it hence seeming impossible to resolve. She noted that the lack of political will can be explained by the absence of action to combat it as one can argue that Zimbabwe has the political will to curb corruption as indicated by the President’s Ten Point Plan which aims at “Pursuing an Anti-Corruption Thrust.” Therefore, she safely concluded that “corruption is there in Zimbabwe, but cannot be termed a wicked problem since it is solvable given the presence of political will.” Doctor S. Bhatasara also indicated that “although corruption is analogous to cancer in many respects, there is one difference. Unlike cancer which may not be treatable when it reaches certain levels, corruption can be reduced over time to very minimal levels where it will no longer threaten the economic, political and social fabric of the country” (MPOI Public Seminar Report on Corruption October

(2016:5). This sentiment indicates that she does not agree to the fact that corruption is a wicked problem impossible to resolve. She has a positive mindset like that of the DPG which views corruption as solvable given political will.

According to Afro-barometer (2015:12), its Round 6 survey in 2014, respondents were asked if corruption had increased, decreased, or stayed the same over the previous year in Zimbabwe.

Table 4.2 presents the responses:

Table 4.2 Public Perceptions of the Level of Corruption, by Province

	Increased somewhat/Has Increased a lot	Stayed the same	Decreased somewhat/Decreased a lot	Don't Know	Total
Harare	81%	9%	8%	1%	100%
Bulawayo	76%	12%	11%	1%	100%
Manicaland	75%	7%	10%	8%	100%
Midlands	72%	11%	12%	5%	100%
Mashonaland Central	72%	8%	12%	7%	100%
Mashonaland East	65%	25%	3%	6%	100%
Matabeleland South	59%	23%	7%	11%	100%
Masvingo	60%	16%	20%	4%	100%
Mashonaland West	55%	21%	18%	6%	100%
Matabeleland North	33%	44%	9%	14%	100%
Total	68%	16%	11%	6%	100%

Source: Findings from Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey in Zimbabwe (2014:12)

From Table 4.2, it can be noted that a total of 68% of the population in different provinces of the country argued that corruption had increased a lot by 2014. In addition, a total of 16% of the population also noted that corruption had stayed the same in 2014, 11% said it had decreased somewhat and 6% did not know. This indicates that the public is aware that corruption is a wicked problem and has reached endemic levels in Zimbabwe. This is supported by Hanyani (2016) who argues that “corruption has reached a boiling point to the extent that those who were supposed to guard against it find themselves being the main culprits. Both top and junior members in government and even in the private sector have developed an art of making quick money through corrupt means.”

4.5 Theme 3: Types of corruption in Zimbabwe

Mutondoro et al (2016: 14) argues that Zimbabwe has both grand and petty levels of corruption which operate in a mutually re-enforcing way. For Mutondoro et al (2016: 14), grand corruption consists of acts committed at a high level of government that distort policies or the central

functioning of the state enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good. Grand corruption involving the political elites is indicative of the decay in national politics and governance systems and sets precedence for petty corruption involving low-level bureaucrats. The Chief Public Prosecutor from NPA also noted that grand corruption is most prevalent in Zimbabwe as it is being done by heads of ministries and politicians. Petty corruption, on the other hand, refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low and mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens trying to access basic goods and services from hospitals, schools, police departments, and other agencies (Mutondoro et al 2016: 14). The Chief Public Prosecutor from NPA also noted that petty corruption is also common especially at road blocks where one can pay a bribe of \$10 instead of a fine of \$20 for a defective vehicle and this has contributed to the occurrences of accidents. Afrobarometer's Round 4 survey of 2009 indicates that 32 people argued that most of the police officers are involved in corruption. In addition, according to Afrobarometer (2009:26), Afrobarometer did its Round 4 survey in 2009 which indicates that 67% of the people noted that they never had to pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favor to government officials in order to avoid a problem with the police, like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or an arrest. This figure reduced in the Round 5 survey in 2012 since 47% of the people indicated that this never happened in 2011 hence an increase in corruption in Zimbabwe (Afrobarometer 2012:35).

The Chairman of ZACC, Mr Denford Chirindo, in the ZACC Annual Report of (2011:10) noted that "in 2011, the year witnessed an increase in both petty and grand corruption cases in general in the following sectors: Police, Local Government Authorities, ZESA, Justice Service Delivery and Public Service in general." He argued that the low levels of formal employment and inadequate remuneration of those formally employed have created a spiral in the supply and demand chain. This implies that poverty and unemployment have perpetuated these types of corruption in Zimbabwe. There is therefore a direct relationship between corruption and poverty, the more poverty accumulates in Zimbabwe, the more corruption takes place. People are likely to engage in corruption if they are poor as corruption as they assume that this would enable them to make extra cash and make ends meet.

It is worth noting that the Chief Researcher from ZACC argued that ZACC differs with academic scholars in relation to the types of corruption. He noted that categorising corruption in terms of whether its grand or petty is wrong since these are not types of corruption but rather indicate the magnitude or extent of corruption. He argued that the most common types of corruption in

Zimbabwe include bribery, abuse of office and concealment of transactions in procurement and tendering. Moreover, the DPG, emphasized on the presence of nepotism in Zimbabwe where people without qualifications or the capacity are appointed into office based on patron client relationships. She argued that the result is maladministration and inefficiency in government departments. An example is the appointments of retired officers as CEOs of parastatals. The National Railways of Zimbabwe, for example, has been performing dismally since it was being headed by retired officers without any managerial knowledge.

In addition, political corruption was also mentioned by the DPG where the politicians seek bribes and in return provide favours due to their political power. An example is indicated by the AntiCorruption Trust of Southern Africa (2012:15) where there is the ZUPCO Scandal of August 2006, as the Deputy Minister of Information and Publicity, Minister Bright Matonga and Charles Nherera allegedly solicited a US\$85,000 bribe from a foreign bus supplier (Gift Investments) as an inducement for them to award a tender to supply buses to the public transporter. On the other hand, it was alleged that in the Minister of Local Government and National Housing, Ignatius Chombo, had authorised ZUPCO to buy buses without going to tender which is against the Tender Board regulations (Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa 2012:15). The prevalence of these types of corruption tends to indicate the wickedness of corruption as a parasite in Zimbabwe that has sucked blood into the country's economy.

4.6 Theme 5: Roles and functions of institutions for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe.

According to the DPG, the key institutions responsible for curbing corruption in Zimbabwe include ZACC, NPA, TI-Z and ZRP. The Chief Researcher from ZACC indicated that in addition to the mentioned institutions, the Judicial Service Commission and the Zimbabwe Prison Services are also responsible for curbing corruption. Moreover, a University of Zimbabwe (UZ) lecturer also noted that the Auditor General's Office is also responsible for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe. However, this dissertation will discuss the roles and functions of the major targeted institutions (NPA, ZRP, ZACC, TI-Z) responsible for tackling corruption as indicated below.

4.6.1 Role of NPA in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe

The role of NPA is established in Section 258 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that NPA is responsible for "instituting and undertaking criminal prosecutions on behalf of the state and discharging any functions that are necessary or incidental to such prosecutions." The same sentiment was raised by the DPG who noted that "our role is to prosecute matters when brought to

us. In addition, we can alert ZACC and the ZRP of certain occurrences of corruption.” This implies that NPA can inform other institutions to investigate any matters concerning corruption.

The DPG added that,

we review mechanisms put in place by UNODC (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) internationally. We also oversee the implementation of the UNCAC (the United Nations Convention Against Crime) provisions. UNCAC has set up an implementation review group to foster the implementation of its provisions. The provisions include the setting up of legislative frameworks, institutions, preventive mechanisms, prosecutions and ensuring that these mechanisms are effective in combating corruption. Therefore, NPA is a member of UNCAC in Vienna (Austria) where members go there for at least three times a year for conferences. It is also a member of (African Union) AU Advisory Board, SADCC (Southern African Development Committee) among others.

It can be therefore noted that NPA only waits for matters from ZACC and ZRP in order to prosecute a criminal. This implies that without the go ahead from these two institutions, it is not possible for it to prosecute a criminal even if it has the evidence. This may result in selective prosecution, as the ZRP and ZACC may not recommend the prosecution of certain criminals as they may view them as not “fit for prosecution.”

4.6.2 Role of TI-Z in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe

The TI-Z Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator argued that,

our role is to get citizen action to influence or to capacitate citizens with the software to demand for accountability and transparency, to strengthen the capacity of state institutions to deal with corruption, to offer free legal aid to corruption victims and witnesses, to provide empirical knowledge that becomes the basis of public policy advocacy using our anti-corruption research tools, providing sound research data which becomes the basis for policy advocacy, sensitization and awareness.

TI-Z does this in a variety of ways some of which include publishing statistics which reflect the magnitude of corruption like the TI CPI Index which reflects a country’s level of corruption in relation to other countries. Therefore, TI-Z is a very instrumental institution in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe.

4.6.3 Roles and functions of ZACC in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe

Since ZACC is the case study in the research, it is vital to understand its roles and functions in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe. The Chief Researcher from ZACC was interviewed to understand the institution’s roles and functions. He referred to section 254 and 255 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which sets out its roles and functions. Section 255 of the Constitution

of Zimbabwe states that ZACC is responsible for investigating and combating cases of corruption, theft, misappropriation, abuse of power and other improper conduct in the public and private sectors. In addition, the Standard Political Editor, Patrice Makova, interviewed the former ZACC Chairperson Denford Chirindo who argued that the mandate of ZACC is to combat corruption, theft, abuse of power, misappropriation and other improprieties in Zimbabwe, through public education, prevention and through investigations leading to prosecution (The Standard, 21 October 2012). However, the effectiveness of ZACC in carrying out the mandate of curbing corruption is questionable given the statistics by TI-Z which makes Zimbabwe one of the most corrupt countries in Africa.

4.6.4 Role of the ZRP in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe

The functions of the ZRP are set out in Section 219 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which states that the ZRP is responsible for detecting, investigating and preventing crime. This implies that the police is also responsible for curbing corruption as they conduct investigations and arrest those who would have committed crimes. However, according to the (Gumbo 2017), President

Robert Mugabe on his 93rd birthday indicated that,

the Police through the CID Serious Frauds, are the other institutions responsible for tackling corruption hence the Police would not want their competitors, in this case, ZACC, to bask in the glory of being an effective institution of combating corruption at their expense. Whether we like it or not, generally there would be conflict and competition between ZACC and the ZRP in combating corruption, so expecting the Police to willingly give a helping hand to the Commission in fighting corruption is expecting too much. Therefore, one should take note that this does not mean that the Police would not want to fight corruption but the element of competition is likely to affect the Commission's zeal to fight corruption.

In addition, Afrobarometer did a survey in 34 African countries in order to understand why people fail to report crimes to the police. Table 4.3 indicates the main reasons why many people do not report corruption to the police.

Table 4.3 Main reasons why Zimbabweans don't report incidents of corruption

	2012	2014
Police wouldn't do anything	16	20
Police is corrupt	1	9
Don't know how to report	0	4
Don't know	2	5

Source: Afrobarometer Round 5 (2012:34) and Round 6 (2014:13) surveys on corruption perceptions in Zimbabwe.

Table 4.3 shows that 16% of the people in 2012 reported that the police would not do anything and the figure rose to 20% in 2014. One percent said that the police is corrupt and the figure rose from 9% between 2012 and 2014. These figures clearly indicate that there are corruption cases which are not being reported by people because of the above stated reasons mainly associated with lack of trust on the ZRP. Other reasons were that there was no police station in the area, that victims fear reprisal from the attacker and that the crime was reported to another authority (Afrobarometer 2014:15). This then puts a gap on the effectiveness of the ZRP in tackling corruption as people are reluctant to report on crimes due to the above stated reasons. Wambua

(2015:1) argues that “such negative perceptions of police integrity are damaging the credibility and effectiveness of the agency charged with protecting the lives and property of citizens.”

4.7 Theme 6: Assessing the institutional framework for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe

The term “institutional framework” basically entails a system of established rules purported to perform certain roles and functions. An assessment of the institutional framework for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe is vital in this research. According to the Deputy Prosecutor General of NPA, “the institutional framework for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe is strong.” This is because Zimbabwe has all the provisions necessary to combat crime. Legislations and institutions are in place in order to curb corruption as indicated earlier. She argued that the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act is a mechanism that is being used by institutions like NPA in trying to curb corruption. The Act clearly stipulates the procedures to be followed in cases of money laundering or any other corrupt act. Therefore, in her view, the institutional framework for tackling corruption is strong but lacks implementation.

The Chief Researcher from ZACC was of the same view as he argued that the institutional framework for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe is strong. He argued that this is because the Constitution has provided two institutions mandated to fight corruption which includes ZACC and NPA. He argued that in Zimbabwe, the fight against corruption is backed by both the Constitution and an Act of Parliament, unlike in other Asian nations like Mongolia, Indonesia, Bhutan and Vietnam which do not have such backing.

Moreover, the DPG notes that the institutional framework for tackling corruption is strong in Zimbabwe since each institution has a code of conduct which outlines operating procedures that

stipulate what one ought to do or ought not to do. For example, the code of conduct of NPA clearly outlines that a bail should only be given to the one deserving and giving a bail to undeserving persons is going against the code of conduct and one can be punished for that. The arrest of an accused by the prosecutor without fear of favor also indicates that the institutional framework for tackling corruption in Zimbabwe is strong. A UZ lecturer also noted that the institutional framework is strong theoretically but weak in practice. This is because ZACC does not have adequate powers to combat graft, appointments of commissioners is not healthy, political interference among others. He argued that these issues should be addressed in order to strengthen the institutional framework for tackling corruption.

However, the TI-Z Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator argued that “the institutional framework for tackling corruption is weak since corruption has been on the agenda for quite a long time and quite clearly, they have not shown any positive change with regards to decrease in corruption.” He argued that the institutional framework is weak due to political interference as evident in the Moyo scandal¹ where the press revealed that the President, a political figure, said that ZACC cannot arrest Moyo and also where the Vice-President went and freed the ZINARA officials who were behind bars at Avondale police station after being alleged of corruption. The TI-Z Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator argued that if all these allegations are true, it shows the weakness on the part of the institutional framework for tackling corruption which is constantly facing political interference hence failing to effectively deliver on its mandate. He added on to say that we can compare our institutional framework with that of other states like China which are more serious in tackling corruption. In addition, he argued that “the very fact that it is under the Office of the President and Cabinet raises questions by other stakeholders on its independence as it might be compromised.”

Furthermore, according to Mutondoro (2016:18), the police are perceived by citizens as the most corrupt entity in Zimbabwe mainly because of their chronic habit of soliciting bribes from motorists as well as the documented disappearance of critical dockets and evidence in their custody

¹ Prof. J. Moyo, Higher and Tertiary Education Minister, and his deputy, Mr Godfrey Gandawa, were alleged to have siphoned more than half million dollars from the Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund allegedly to strengthen their social ties in their respective constituencies at the expense of beneficiaries (*The Chronicle* 21 October 2016).

in corruption cases. Table 4.4 shows statistics by Afrobarometer over the years which indicate a comparative analysis of the public perception of corruption among police officers.

Table 4.4 Public perceptions of corruption among Zimbabwe police officers

	2004	2005	2009	2012	2014
None	9	5	5	3	6
Some of them	38	31	38	32	31
Most of them	31	39	32	41	38
All of them	11	23	15	22	20
Don't know/haven't heard	11	2	10	2	4

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Police?

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005:36), Round 4 (2009:25), Round 5 (2012:34) and Round 6 (2014:13) surveys on corruption perceptions in Zimbabwe.

It can be noted from Table 4.4 that the perception that most of the police officers are involved in corruption from 2004 to 2014 fluctuated from 31% to 38%. This implies that the police as an institution, is not only weak, but has also been captured by the self-interests of the bureaucrats. The Afrobarometer (2016) indicates that 81% of Zimbabweans pay bribes to the police to avoid various problems.” Mutondoro et al (2016:16) therefore notes that “an analysis of bribery in Zimbabwe shows that corruption is not so much about the actors, but rather an indication of systemic institutional flaws and weaknesses.”

4.8 Theme 7: Weaknesses of ZACC in fighting corruption

4.8.1 Political interference

Political interference is one of the major weaknesses of ZACC in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe. This is confirmed by a staff member from ZACC who argued that political interference is making it hard for the institution to effectively combat corruption in the country. Mushava (2016) also supports this notion arguing that ZACC says it has been facing political interference which has been preventing it from effectively clamping down on the scourge of graft. Political interference results in the “big fish” being spared of corruption hence selective prosecution. According to MPOI Public Seminar Report on Corruption Zimbabwe October (2016:7), Pedzisai Ruhanya, in a question and answer session, argued that the current problem that Zimbabwe is facing is that of the current political leadership which wants to sustain power at all costs. This implies that the politicians will do everything they can in order to stay in power even if it means interfering in the

activities of a Commission which is supposed to be independent. A Chief Public Prosecutor from NPA argued that “we will not win this battle if people are prosecuted selectively. People should not be protected but should answer all allegations.” Various corruption cases have not been resolved due to the notion of political interference and selective prosecution hence corruption has remained a wicked problem in Zimbabwe. Zhangazha (2016) notes that in June 2016, President Robert Mugabe accused ZACC officials of behaving like rattlesnakes after investigators raided several government departments, parastatals and local authorities as part of a wide corruption investigation. ZACC had also demanded documents from several permanent secretaries as part of their probe. This accusation raises questions on the effectiveness of ZACC in tackling corruption since they are appointed by the president whom they may find it hard to go against thereby making it difficult for them to tackle corruption.

Furthermore, political interference can be seen where in August 2016, the Vice-President Phekezela Mphoko stormed Avondale Police Station in Harare to free Zimbabwe National Roads Administration (ZINARA) acting CEO, Engineer Moses Juma and Non-Executive Director Davison Rupiri, who had been arrested by ZACC investigators on allegations of defrauding the parastatal of US\$1,3 million (Zhangazha 2016). Moreover, the recent allegations against the Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, Professor Jonathan Moyo, also evidence political interference. Moyo is being accused of defrauding the Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund (Zimdef) funds close to US\$ 270 000 (Mambo 2016). Therefore, the acting Vice President, Phekezela Mpoko, slated ZACC for seeking to arrest Moyo as he described the move as “malicious.” Mphoko pointed out that “Presidential appointees could not be arrested as this would be undermining the Office of the President” (News24 and Staff Reporters 2016). This indicates political interference since the VP was trying to defend Moyo arguing that “His (Prof. Moyo) only crime is that he supports the President and those who want to have him arrested are people who do not support the President.....” From these words, one can question Mphoko’s confidence of the innocence of Moyo as he was blaming ZACC for plotting to arrest Moyo. His argument was that ZACC does not have the powers to arrest but should seek permission from the President which is a fact as it relies on arrests by the ZRP.

In addition, Mambo (2016) notes that the President blocked the arrest of Prof. Moyo at ZANU PF Headquarters by ZACC officials in October 2016 in connection with the fraud. ZACC’s Annual Report of 2016 (:21) also reflects that in 2016, there were incidences of political interference,

including threats by ministers against ZACC Officers which compromises investigations and puts life of officers in danger. Against this backdrop, one can note political interference is one of the main factors affecting the effective operations of ZACC in trying to rule out corruption as a vice in Zimbabwe.

4.8.2 ZACC lacks prosecutorial powers

Another weakness of ZACC in trying to curb corruption is the fact that it lacks prosecutorial powers. This is supported by Section 255 (1f) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which stipulates that another function of ZACC is to refer matters to NPA for prosecution. In addition, Mahleka (2013:10) notes that “ZACC has the mandate to investigate, but lacks powers of arrest and or prosecution.” Lack of prosecutorial powers implies that the NPA also has to be satisfied before prosecuting an individual meaning that if there is inadequate evidence and lack of satisfaction, a person may not be prosecuted even if ZACC is convinced that the individual is guilty. The NPA itself has its own challenges hence is institutionally incapacitated to carry out various prosecutions. This makes it a “toothless bulldog” as indicated by the TI-Z Senior Researcher and

Regional Coordinator. A participant, in a question and answer session organized by MPOI, argued that ZACC officials are only serving as record keepers and are toothless and the

Commissioners were appointed corruptly hence Zimbabweans can talk and talk but there won’t be a solution (MPOI Public Seminar Report on Corruption Zimbabwe October (2016:7). This clearly indicates that the government is aware that ZACC does not have enough powers and is not serious in tackling corruption since it knows that it is acting as a record keeper. However, an official from ZACC defended his organization saying that he is at least happy that a toothless bull dog still remains a dog (MPOI Public Seminar Report on Corruption Zimbabwe October 2016:7).

According to MPOI’s Public Seminar Report on Corruption in Zimbabwe (October 2016:3), Obert Gutu, at a seminar organized by MPOI on the cancer of corruption, raised the same concern as he argued that, “it seems that ZACC has been fighting a losing battle, or to better put it, is just a toothless bulldog.” The implication is that some individuals reported to be corrupt may not end up being prosecuted thereby hindering the effectiveness of its mandate of zero tolerance to corruption. The implication is that corruption remains a wicked problem in Zimbabwe as some cases of corruption remain unattended to due to lack of prosecutorial powers by ZACC. Obert Gutu also made reference to an interesting statement which was recently issued by Major General Douglas Nyikayaramba of the Zimbabwe National Army before the

Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence and Security in which he said, “corruption is a cancer which is taking the nation backwards, thereby causing insecurity to the nation... the ordinary citizens expect authorities to address these issues, but if nothing happens to the alleged criminals, they will end up being ungovernable and creating problems for the defence forces.” However, MPOI Public Seminar Report on Corruption Zimbabwe (2016:7) indicates that a ZACC official, in a question and answer session, pointed out that ZACC has done investigations but is now receiving unfair criticism given that prosecution is not under its ambit as ZACC only investigates and ends there. He asked participants if they can change the Constitution so that they can perform that function.

4.8.3 ZACC lacks arresting powers

Another weakness of ZACC in tackling corruption is that it does not have arresting powers. A staff member from ZACC argued that ZACC does not have arresting powers thereby rendering it a toothless bulldog hence unable to solve the scourge of corruption as a wicked problem. This is indicated by Section 255(e) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe which notes that “the Government must ensure, through legislative and other means, that ZACC has power to recommend the arrest and secure the prosecution of persons reasonably suspected of corruption, abuse of power and other improper conduct which falls within the Commission’s jurisdiction.” From this section, it is clear that ZACC does not have arresting powers but can just recommend the arrest of a suspect. This implies that if the arresting authority (ZRP), does not see it fit to arrest a suspect, the suspect may not be arrested even if ZACC is convinced that the suspect may be guilty.

The UNODC Report of Zimbabwe (2012:112) reveals that the ZRP lacks equipment to conduct special investigative techniques such as controlled deliveries and surveillance, including related training on the use of such equipment. This implies that if ZRP is incapacitated to investigate on reports then a criminal may get away with crime. Therefore, the question arises as to how ZACC can effectively combat corruption if it cannot arrest the culprits and if ZRP will only arrest when it sees fit. This is why Prof. Jonathan Moyo is refusing to be arrested by ZACC because ZACC only has investigatory powers and not arresting powers. Moreover, the ZRP which has the power to arrest criminals cannot just arrest a person based on the recommendation of ZACC but needs to investigate further and make sure they are satisfied before arrest or else there will be implications if they accuse and arrest someone of a crime they did not commit. This implies that some individuals found to be corrupt by ZACC may not be arrested if the ZRP is not satisfied. Therefore,

lack of arresting powers is one of the major weaknesses of ZACC in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe.

In addition, Section 255 (1e) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe notes that ZACC has the power to direct the Commissioner-General of Police to investigate cases of suspected corruption and to report to the Commission on the results of any such investigation. This clearly indicates that the state knows that ZACC at some point is incapacitated and may not be able to investigate and deal with some issues of corruption. This is because if it knew that ZACC is capacitated and able to deal with corruption, it would not recommend ZACC to direct the Commissioner-General of Police to investigate corruption. This shows that the state accepts that ZACC has a weakness and will need some assistance in combating crime. Moreover, Section 255(1g) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe notes that ZACC has the power to require assistance from members of the Police

Service and other investigative agencies of the state. This also indicates that the state accepts that ZACC at some point may not be able to tackle corruption on its own hence a weakness in tackling corruption as a wicked problem in Zimbabwe. In addition, President Robert Mugabe on his 93rd birthday noted that,

ideally ZACC is supposed to be an independent Commission, but there are provisions in the law which take away ZACC's independence where the Commission ends up appearing or operating as an extension of the ZRP. For instance, the Commission is not allowed to arrest anyone in the absence of police officers, which in essence means that neighbourhood watch officers have more powers to arrest than a whole independent Commission.

He added that ZACC does not have its own holding cells in the event that it has arrested someone as the culprits are detained in police cells (Gumbo 2017). From these sentiments, it is clear that lack of arresting powers by ZACC also affects its independence and effectiveness. However, Senator Obert Gutu, in a question and answer session organized by MPOI, argued that the fact that ZACC has no arresting powers is not fundamentally the problem, but the anti-graft body cannot move an inch because there are certain individuals who are „untouchables“ (MPOI Public Seminar Report on Corruption Zimbabwe October (2016:7).

4.8.4 Lack of political will

For Mutondoro et al (2016:16), political will is defined as the commitment of political actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives, in this instance, combatting corruption, and to sustain the costs of those actions overtime. The DPG from NPA argued that corruption is a problem in Zimbabwe due to lack of political will. For Mutondoro et al (2016:16), “political will is a missing element given that most of the perpetrators of grand corruption are the same individuals entrusted

with upholding the rights, policies, and laws which they violate for personal gain.” One Chief Public Prosecutor from NPA argued that ZACC’s provisions for tackling corruption are strong but there is need for an improvement in implementation. He argued that there might be improvements in the following years since it is now being administered from the President’s office. From this backdrop, Mutondoro et al (2016:16) argue that “the political system and political actors have, therefore, only paid lip service to the fight against corruption in this country, when in reality being the main perpetrators and drivers of corruption in society.” This implies that if there is no will, corruption will always remain a wicked problem in Zimbabwe eating into the nation’s economy. If corruption is to be eradicated, political will is vital as there is need for commitment from all facets of the government. The reason why there is no political will to tackle corruption in Zimbabwe is that grand corruption is most prevalent in political offices which are supposed to be supporting the fight. Nomatter how much ZACC may try to tackle corruption, as long as there is no political will, all efforts will be in vain.

4.8.5 Centralization of ZACC operations

A staff member from ZACC noted that another weakness of ZACC in tackling corruption is the fact that it is centralized in Harare. The CEO of ZACC, Mr Ngonidzashe Gumbo, in the ZACC Annual Report of (2011:15) also expresses this concern, pointing out that the Commission was unable to decentralize in 2011 due to budgetary constraints. Mr Denford Chirindo, the ZACC Chairperson also wrote in the 2011 Annual Report that ZACC failed to decentralize and this is exacerbated by a low staff complement of a mere 57 employees out of an establishment of 204 employees to implement ZACC’s national mandate in the nation’s 10 provinces. ZACC’s Annual Report of (2016:22) indicates that the centralization of the Commission in Harare has become a big constraint since other provinces are not covered, hence it will give an impression that corruption is only wicked and found in Harare. Corruption is a highly sophisticated and elusive phenomenon, hence relying on investigators who are based in Harare to investigate suspected corrupt practices, say in Beitbridge will always remain a tall order, since by the time people travel to that place, a number of variables would have been overtaken by events, for example, culprits may run away or may create and present new information and new evidence which may be in defense of the alleged fraud. This is also indicated by (Gumbo 2017) in The Herald of 24

February 2017 where President Mugabe on his 93rd birthday also noted that “surely, one cannot expect ZACC to combat corruption in Chiredzi, Lupane, or Plumtree from Harare.”

Mr Gumbo in the ZACC Annual Report of (2011:15) noted that any meaningful impact in combating corruption requires improved accessibility and visibility of the Commission across the country and this is only possible through decentralization of operations. Gumbo added that 76% of the 220 reports received in 2011 were from Harare and 79% of cases reported were made through walk-ins, that is, person physically coming to the Commission to make a report, which illustrates that with decentralization, there will be improved accessibility and visibility of the commission. A staff member from ZACC argued that ZACC only has two educational departments in the whole of Zimbabwe. This department is very essential in tackling corruption since one of the ZACC's functions as set out in section (12c) is to educate the public on the dangers of corruption in society. Education is needed so that people can refrain from corrupt acts. However, with only two departments in Zimbabwe, education is impossible considering that Zimbabwe has 54 provinces.

In addition, ZACC only owns one office at Betterment Close near Mt Pleasant Business Park for administration purposes where commissioners can meet for meetings. Its investigators are congested at an office at Livingstone House which ZACC is currently renting. The effectiveness of ZACC in tackling corruption as a wicked problem becomes questionable here where the officials will be stuck in their offices instead of reaching out to the public so that the public can identify them and easily report crimes. This is different from the ZRP, where one can easily identify traffic officers at roadblocks across the country to easily detect traffic crimes and arrest the culprits so as to effectively combat traffic crimes. People can also easily report crimes to the police offices because they are at the reach of the people and spread across the country.

For ZACC, it is difficult to even identify its staff in the streets nor are they even accessible since they are centralized in Harare only. This means that ZACC can tackle corruption cases in Harare only since it has been indicated earlier that 79% of the cases dealt with were reported in person. It is essential to take note of the fact that crimes do not occur in Harare only but across the country. Centralization of ZACC offices in Harare only makes it difficult to effectively rule out the wickedness of corruption since some people may not be aware of it nor be able to access its services. President Mugabe on his 93rd birthday noted that this is because resources have not been availed so that it can decentralize to other provinces (Gumbo 2017). Therefore, centralization is a major weakness of ZACC in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe which has made it remain a wicked problem that is difficult if not impossible to resolve.

4.8.6 Financial constraints

Budgetary constraints are also one of the chief factors impeding ZACC's effectiveness in dealing with corruption. A staff member from ZACC argued that ZACC is facing financial constraints since it is only funded by the government. The economy in Zimbabwe is not performing very well hence funds are inadequate for operations in all sectors and ministries in the country which is also affecting ZACC to effectively carry out its mandate. Mutingwende (2016) notes that the

Chief Law Officer in the NPA, Chris Mutangadura, said that the seriousness of the state in combating corruption is reflected in the national budget. This is also indicated by Zhangazha (2017) who notes that "ZACC, which has a mandate to investigate corruption cases but has been complaining of being underfunded, was allocated US\$2,1 million in Chinamasa's 2016 US\$4,1 Billion budget."

Looking back in 2011, the former ZACC Chairperson, Mr Denford Chirindo, decried that ZACC requested an amount of US\$24,5 million but was allocated only US\$1,7 million for its operations (ZACC Annual Report of 2011:11). This amount was approximately 7% of its planned and requested budget and one can wonder how it actually coped with such an amount. Mr Chirindo noted that this adversely affected the functions and operational capacity of the commission to carry out its mandate effectively. An example is the ICT department which failed to train its workers on cybercrime and ICTs due to budgetary constraints as noted by Mr Chisango in the ZACC Annual Report (2011:19). In addition, Mr Chirindo, in an interview with the Standard Political Editor argued that "funding of the ZACC is a major challenge and I am more optimistic that with the necessary resources, delivery on our mandate is child's play as the Commission will be able to effectively deal with corruption,"(The Standard,21 October 2012). All these sentiments tend to support the point that ZACC's effectiveness in dealing with corruption as a wicked problem is being largely hindered by budgetary constraints. Funds are needed to purchase vehicles, fuel, computers, to hire adequate staff and training in order to effectively conduct investigations. Absence of these weakens ZACC to effectively conduct investigations and curb graft in Zimbabwe.

4.8.7 ZACC itself is institutionally corrupt

One of the weaknesses of ZACC in tackling corruption as a wicked problem is that ZACC itself is corrupt. Various allegations of corruption were reported against the commissioners which resulted in some of them serving some years in jail. Maodza (2016) notes that the former ZACC CEO (Ngonidzashe Gumbo) was jailed for two years for defrauding the commission of US \$435 000. It is argued that Gumbo bought offices to be used by the commission using government funds in

Mount Pleasant but registered the property in his name. He also instructed his subordinates Mubataripi, Chisango and Mangwiro to form a shelf company using ZACC money, called Property Mortgage where they became directors with equal shares.

In addition, the ZimSitRep (2014) reported that the ZACC commissioners in 2014, were accused of being corrupt themselves as it was exposed that they continued to receive salaries for 6 months after their terms of office had expired in August 2013. The ZimSitRep (2014) notes that \$457,000 was owed to the CMED for vehicles hired by commissioners as of mid-December, 2013. Amongst the nine commissioners, investigations revealed that only one of the nine commissioners, Chairperson Denford Chirindo, was still legally employed by the anti-graft body. This then poses a question on the effectiveness of the ZACC in tackling corruption when its commissioners are found to be corrupt.

Share (2016), argues that “ZACC suspended 19 investigating officers for alleged corruption, insubordination and divulging the organisation’s secrets in July 2016.” This clearly indicates institutional corruption at the Commission which makes one question the commitment of the institution in tackling corruption if its own members are corrupt. Moreover, ZACC’s effectiveness in tackling corruption is questionable after a close analysis of the history of some of the commissioners. An example is Goodson Nguni, allegedly a fugitive from the law in South

Africa. Nguni was convicted of “offenses of fraud and corruption” by the courts in Port Elizabeth in South Africa. In March 2008, the NPA of South Africa received an order from the High Court of South Africa to dispose of Nguni’s property and disburse an amount of R62 806.60 to the state after he had benefited from the offenses of fraud and corruption by his employer implying that he was also involved in corruption. Against this background, it should be noted that Section 9(e) of the ZACC Act (Chapter 9:22) notes that a person is disqualified from being appointed a commissioners if he or she has been has been convicted in Zimbabwe, in respect of an offence involving dishonesty outside Zimbabwe, in respect of conduct which, if committed in Zimbabwe, would have constituted an offence involving dishonesty. Therefore, selection of Nguni as a commissioner raises suspicion on the appointments done at ZACC as one can argue that they are political since he did not deserve given his corrupt background. Mawarire (2015) therefore notes that “...hope had been rife that if an anti-graft commission is set, corruption might be reduced but with dubious characters appointed, corruption can become worse.” From this backdrop, one can

strongly argue that institutional corruption and political appointments are a weakness of ZACC in trying to root out corruption in Zimbabwe.

4.8.8 Inadequate human resources personnel

Moreover, another weakness of ZACC in tackling corruption is inadequate human resources personnel. A staff member from ZACC argued that they are suffering from skills shortages as there are only 54 staff members in Zimbabwe against the full establishment of 204 members as indicated in the ZACC Annual Report of (2016:7). The General Manager of Prosecution and Legal Services, Mrs Sandra Nhau, in the 2011 Annual Report noted that in 2011, the division had a staff complement of three officers against the full establishment of 12 officers. In addition, a staff member from ZACC argued that ZACC only has 29 investigators in Zimbabwe, a country with 10 provinces hence inadequate to cover the whole of Zimbabwe. This figure is critically low since the investigators are required to carry out various investigations in the 10 provinces in the country. This implies that the Commission will actually take a lot of time investigating a case hence resulting in delays in investigations and prosecutions. Share (2016), notes that “ZACC suspended 19 investigating officers for alleged corruption, insubordination and divulging the organization’s secrets in July 2016.” One can wonder how the institution operated after suspending these officers since it was already short staffed. The assumption is that some of the corruption reports might have remained uninvestigated or delayed due to an inadequate number of investigators. ZACC’s Annual Report of (2016:6) reflects that in 2016, upon assumption of duty, the current Commission noted that staffing and manning levels were critically low due to the current government blanket freeze of vacant posts. This may mean work overload to the current staff which is often stressing and demotivating.

Moreover, a staff member from ZACC also mentioned that the prevention department only has two personnel in Zimbabwe against the full establishment of 20 staff members. This department is essential in tackling corruption as a wicked problem since prevention is always better than cure. It is then difficult to prevent the scourge of corruption if a nation of 10 provinces only has two people to help prevent the occurrence of corruption in Zimbabwe. This indicates that the government is not serious in terms of preventing corruption in Zimbabwe. In addition, Mahleka (2013:10) notes that the Chairman of the Commission personally stipulated that the Commission needs assistance in capacitating it as it is, inter alia, understaffed. Mahleka (2013:12) goes on to argue that “not only is this institution understaffed, but it is debatable whether those in the rank and file are abreast with

best practice in terms of investigation and general enforcement.” From this, it can be noted that it is difficult for ZACC to curb corruption if it is understaffed.

4.8.9 Lack of resources (financial, human, technical)

Another weakness of ZACC in trying to curb corruption is the absence of adequate resources. Resources can be financial, human and technical. According to Zhangazha (2016), the ZACC Principal Public Relations Officer, Phyllis Chikundura, noted that ZACC needs resources to use and maintain the vehicle fleet which ZACC currently has, computers, office furniture, fuel to conduct investigations around the country and to conduct awareness programmes like exhibitions baseline surveys and system audits among others. This was also confirmed by a staff member from ZACC who argued that there is a depleted fleet of motor vehicle and limited office space. In addition, the ZACC Annual Report of (2016:22) indicates that inadequate office accommodation has remained a major drawback that has seen the Commission housing more than three officers in one small office and in extreme cases managers are also sharing offices. This affects the effectiveness and efficiency of the commission as office space is needed so that the officers can carry out their work freely.

The ZACC Annual Report of (2016:11) reveals that “the current fleet of vehicles has depreciated and requires urgent replacement with a view to acquiring off road vehicles that suit various geographical terrains.” In addition, the CEO of ZACC, Ngonidzashe Gumbo, in the ZACC Annual Report of (2011:16) noted that “due to the complex nature of corruption cases, reports, investigations or interviews outside Harare were a challenge as they were unable to travel due to shortage of vehicles, fuel, subsistence or necessary operational and organizational support which would have been available had the matters been locally handled.” Inadequate resources also affect prosecution as reported by Gumbo in the ZACC Annual Report (2011:15) where he noted that due to resource constraints, there were challenges relating to the finalization of the matters expeditiously especially where reports emanated from outside Harare. Therefore, lack of adequate resources is also another weakness of ZACC in trying to tackle graft and its wickedness in Zimbabwe.

4.8. 10 Disgruntled and low staff morale

A staff member from ZACC argued that another weakness of ZACC is that it has disgruntled staff with low morale. She argued that “we are treated as civil servants yet the ZACC Act says that we are not.” This is also supported by the Constitution of Zimbabwe Section 14(2) which stipulates that the officers of the Commission shall not be members of the Public Service Commission. In addition, Section 7(3) indicates that the salaries, allowances and any pension benefits payable to

the members shall be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF), which is hereby appropriated for the purpose. However, this is not the case since they are paid by money allocated to the civil servants and not directly from the CRF. This implies that they are being paid low salaries as they are being treated as civil servants thereby resulting in disgruntled and low staff morale. The same sentiment was also raised by President Robert Mugabe, on His

93rd birthday noted that “while the Constitution says ZACC is an independent Commission, it cannot be regarded as one given that their salaries are paid through the Salary Service Bureau and treated the same as civil servants. Surely, one cannot expect investigators from ZACC to be professional when dealing with issues of fraud and corruption when their salaries are very low” (Gumbo 2017).

The CEO of ZACC, in the ZACC Annual Report of 2011:(18), noted that the Commission operated on one third of the approved establishment of staff mainly because ZACC was unable to offer attractive conditions of service given the risks associated with anti-corruption work. This indicates that ZACC has not been able to maintain the correct and required number of its workforce due to low staff morale. Inadequate number of staff members questions the effectiveness of the institution in tackling corruption.

Moreover, investigations require serious follow-ups and thorough investigation by someone who is committed hence if they are demotivated they can end up ignoring some of the cases to be investigated. It is also essential to note that ZACC was once sued by its investigators over poor employment conditions (Nemukuyu 2013). Nemukuyu (2013) notes that the contracts of employment for their investigators were varied from time to time and were treated as civil servants taking home US\$200 or US\$300 a month when the ZACC Act says they should not be treated as civil servants. This is why a member of staff from ZACC complained that the realignment of the Act with the Constitution is taking too long. Therefore, the arbitrator ordered ZACC to pay the investigators their outstanding salaries, the 13th cheque, offer vehicles to the outstanding five investigators who were left out when others received vehicles. If the investigators who are supposed to investigate corruption are demotivated, then it is difficult to tackle corruption. Thus, disgruntled and low staff morale is a weakness of ZACC in tackling corruption.

4.8.11 Negative public perception

Another weakness of ZACC in tackling corruption is that the institution is facing negative public perception. A staff member from ZACC noted that ZACC only has one department of Public Relations in Zimbabwe. According to the ZACC Annual Report (2011:21), this department is responsible for ensuring prevention, engagement of stakeholders and increasing awareness against the evils of corruption among others. This actually makes it difficult for ZACC to change the negative public perception as it has one department to handle public relations and will be loaded with so many responsibilities. The negative public perception actually implies that ZACC is not taken seriously hence people can end up not reporting any form of corruption since ZACC can effectively deal with corruption if corruption is reported by the public. Table 4.5 shows a survey done by Afrobarometer which indicates the ratings on government's fight against corruption in Zimbabwe by the public from 2004-2014.

Table 4.5 Ratings on government's fight against corruption in Zimbabwe

	2004	2005	2009	2012	2014
Very badly	19	60	20	52	39
Fairly badly	19	21	17	29	39
Fairly well	37	14	39	13	9
Very well	13	3	7	3	9
Don't know	13	3	17	3	4

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005:47), Round 4 (2009:34), Round 5 (2012:41) and Round 6 (2014:15) surveys ratings on the government's fight against corruption in Zimbabwe.

Table 4.5 indicates that the public's ratings on the government's fight against corruption in Zimbabwe. It is indicated that the perception that the government is handling the fight against corruption badly increased from 38% to 78% between 2004 and 2014. This figure increased by 40 percentage points to 78% which is way above 50% which is the average percentage, hence it is very clear that most people perceive the government, ZACC being the institution responsible, as not effectively tackling corruption in Zimbabwe. Therefore, if people perceive it as weak and a toothless bulldog, then they will not report and corruption will not be completely eradicated in Zimbabwe. This implies that corruption is a wicked problem in Zimbabwe since people are still seeing its impacts despite the existence of ZACC to combat it.

4.8.12 ZACC lacks public recognition/presence

The TI-Z Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator argued that another weakness of ZACC is that it does not have public recognition and is not reaching out to people. He said that “if you go to Murombedzi (Mashonaland West Province) right now and ask them if they have knowledge of the existence of ZACC and its major roles, they will argue that they do not have the knowledge hence it needs citizen buy in.” Lack of public recognition implies that people cannot report to ZACC if there is any case of corruption since they do not have the knowledge of its existence. Afrobarometer in its Round 6 survey indicates that 6% of the people argued that the main reason why people do not report on incidences of corruption is that people do not know where to report it (Afrobarometer 2014:19). Without the citizens contribution, it therefore becomes difficult for ZACC to effectively rule out graft in Zimbabwe.

4.9 Strengths of ZACC in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe

4.9.1 ZACC is established in the Constitution

The Chief Researcher from ZACC noted that ZACC has a number of strengths which include the fact that “it is constitutionally enshrined and also has qualified, skilled and experienced human capital.” The TI-Z Senior Researcher and Regional Coordinator also raised the same sentiment as he argued that “the major strength of ZACC is its legal recognition through an Act of Parliament.” The legal recognition gives it power to conduct investigations and refer matters to the NPA for prosecution. This has enabled it to carry out investigations in various government departments in trying to root out graft in Zimbabwe.

4.9.2 ZACC has skilled personnel and a 24 hour reporting system

In addition, another strength given by the DPG is that “ZACC has investigators from the Police, some of the members there are lawyers, prosecutors and magistrates. This makes it effective since these are needed to perform various roles in trying to root out corruption in Zimbabwe.” Moreover, the UNODC Report of Zimbabwe (2012:126) indicates that ZACC has 24hr reporting systems. The 24hr reporting systems enable people to make phone calls during the day or night and also physically report on any issues of corruption. This is a strength as this has enabled people in and near Harare, to access the office anytime and those from the other parts of the country are able to make phone calls anytime and be attended to. Individuals who are afraid to report during the day due to fear of victimization can report at night hence contributing against the fight against corruption.

4.9.3 ZACC has various specialized departments

Another strength of ZACC is reflected in its Annual Report (2016:2) which shows that ZACC has 7 departments. These departments are specialized on different tasks that aim at eradicating corruption. These include the Public Education and Publicity Department, the Prevention Department, the Legal Services Department, Human Resources (HR) and Administration Department, Investigations Department, Finance Department and the Audit and Risk Department. According to the ZACC Annual Report of (2016:3) the Public Education and Publicity Department is responsible for educating the public against the evils of corruption, designing and developing research programmes into corruption, undertaking community relations programmes and enlisting collective public support in combating corruption.

In addition, the ZACC Annual Report (2016:2) also indicates that the Audit and Risk Department ensures that the internal audit systems, procedures and guidelines are produced for approval by the Commission. It also establishes checks and balances in all departments for the purposes of compliance. The Legal Services Department assists the Commission to exercise its statutory powers in a lawful, effective, ethical and accountable manner by providing high-quality, accurate and timely legal services. In addition, the Prevention Department carries out the corruption prevention functions aimed at promoting good governance in both the public and private sectors. It examines the laws, practices and procedures of public officials, while also reviewing systems and processes, advising and assisting public authorities and the community on ways in which corrupt conduct may be eliminated. The Human Resources (HR) and Administration department oversees recruitment, selection and promotion and termination of service, coordination of manpower development as well as superintending over staff discipline. It also facilitates improvement of conditions of service, spearheads and promotes talent management and implements all policies of the Commission.

Furthermore, the ZACC Annual Report (2016:4) reveals that the Investigations Department is responsible for planning and conducting intelligence-led investigations of serious cases of corruption and fraud including cyber-crime and abuse of power leading to prosecution. The

Finance Department is also responsible for providing support services to other departments and divisions of the Commission. It manages and account for all Commission transactions and resources while mobilizing resources for the Commission. The fact that ZACC has all these departments with the same quest of tackling corruption is a strength since specialization usually results in efficiency.

4.10 Hypothesis testing

It can be noted that corruption basically entails the abuse of office for private gain. It has reached endemic levels and has become difficult to resolve to such an extent that it can be termed a

“wicked problem.” The types of corruption in Zimbabwe include grand and petty corruption. Due to the persistent nature of corruption, the government of Zimbabwe created institutions responsible for tackling corruption which include ZACC, NPA, TI-Z, ZPS and the ZRP. The major role of NPA is to prosecute matters, the ZRP detects, investigates and prevents crime. The role of TI-Z is to capacitate citizens with the software to demand for accountability and transparency and the role of ZACC is to investigate and combat cases of corruption and abuse of power. This dissertation was guided by the hypothesis that “weak institutional frameworks perpetuate corruption.” This hypothesis has been confirmed by the research findings since it is very clear that the institutional framework for tackling corruption is weak and fragmented. ZACC has a variety of weaknesses which make it incapacitated to effectively tackle corruption in Zimbabwe hence corruption has remained a wicked problem in Zimbabwe since its establishment in 2005. Some of the weaknesses include lack of prosecutorial and arresting powers, centralization, lack of political will, political interference, inadequate resources among others. However, ZACC also has its strengths which include the fact that it was established in the constitution, has skilled personnel and a 24hour reporting system, has 7 specialized departments among others.

4.11 Conclusion

Evidence presented in this chapter reveals that corruption is indeed a wicked problem in Zimbabwe and institutions like ZACC have a lot of weaknesses hence the need to be capacitated so that they can be strengthened to fight against corruption. The weaknesses of ZACC in tackling corruption include lack of prosecutorial and arresting powers, centralization, lack of political will, political interference, inadequate resources, disgruntled and low staff morale, negative public perception, lack of public recognition among others. These have made ZACC not fully capacitated to tackle corruption hence corruption has remained a wicked problem in Zimbabwe despite efforts by the government to combat it. In contrast, ZACC has a number of strengths which include the fact that it is established in the constitution, has skilled personnel and a 24hour reporting system, has 7 specialized departments among others.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conclusions as well as recommendations from the findings obtained from the research study. This research was motivated by the persistent and pervasive nature of corruption in Zimbabwe and speculated that it now resembles the kind of problems Rittel and Webber characterize as „wicked problems.“

5.2 Conclusions

From the evidence presented, it can be concluded that corruption in the country is indeed a wicked problem as it has reached endemic levels despite various interventions (largely rhetorical) by the government to combat it. In Zimbabwe, the institutions responsible for tackling corruption include

ZACC, TI-Z, NPA, ZRP, JSC and the ZPS. For this research, ZACC, the constitutional body tasked with fighting corruption was used as the main case study.

5.2. 1 Conclusion 1: Corruption is ill defined in Zimbabwe

Rittel and Webber (1973:160) note that wicked problems, (corruption being one of them), are “government planning and policy dilemmas which are “ill-defined” and where there is a contest on the solutions to ameliorate the problem.” This implies that wicked problems are difficult to define hence difficult to solve. From this backdrop, it can be noted that corruption in Zimbabwe is ill-defined since various institutions have different perceptions when it comes to defining corruption. ZACC and NPA define corruption with reference to the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act Chapter (9:23) Section (170-174) which involves bribery, corruptly using a false document, corruptly concealing a transaction from a principal and criminal abuse of duty as a public officer among others. However, TI-Z simply defines corruption as the “abuse of office for private gain.” This clearly indicates that corruption is ill defined since the different institutions perceive it differently. The implication here is that these institutions are likely to tackle the problem differently basing on their own perceptions.

5.2.2 Conclusion 2: Corruption is an endemic problem in Zimbabwe

Evidence presented shows that for TI-Z, corruption has been persistent, has reached endemic levels in Zimbabwe hence can be termed a “wicked problem.” TI-Z argued that this can be explained by the TI CPI score where Zimbabwe is ranked one of the top most corrupt countries with a low CPI score ranging from 21 to 22 (below 44 which is the average score in SADCC) where the score has not changed for the past three years. Surveys done by the Afrobarometer on public perceptions also report that the majority of Zimbabweans view corruption as a wicked problem which needs serious attention. Corruption in Zimbabwe has reached a boiling point and those who are supposed to combat it are also involved in corruption and this has made it difficult to solve. In contrast, ZACC argues that corruption is a problem that is not impossible to combat and viewing it from a „wicked“ point of view might imply that the agency has surrendered the fight against corruption. The DPG from NPA also noted that corruption is prevalent in

Zimbabwe, but cannot be termed a „wicked problem“ since it is solvable given the presence of political will which is currently lacking in the country. From this backdrop, one can note that ZACC and NPA, as institutions constitutionally established to curb corruption, view corruption as a problem that is solvable and not as a wicked problem that is difficult to resolve. On the other

hand TI-Z has thrown in the towel as it views corruption as wicked and difficult if not impossible to resolve.

5.2.3 Conclusion 3: There are differing views on the types of corruption in Zimbabwe The evidence presented indicates that the NPA argues that corruption manifests itself in two types which include both grand and petty corruption levels. Grand corruption involves abuse of office by elites and involves embezzlement of huge sums of public funds whereas petty corruption involves payment of small amounts of money to “facilitate” routine official transactions. However, ZACC differs with academic scholars in relation to the types of corruption. ZACC argues that categorising corruption in terms of whether it is grand or petty is wrong since these are not types of corruption but rather terms which indicate the magnitude or extent of corruption in Zimbabwe. He argued that the most common types of corruption in Zimbabwe include bribery, abuse of office and concealment of transactions in procurement among others.

5.2.5 Conclusion 4: There is interdependency amongst institutions in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe

Due to the wickedness of corruption in Zimbabwe, various institutions have been created in order to combat it. The key institutions responsible for curbing corruption in Zimbabwe include ZACC, NPA, TI-Z and ZRP. ZACC is responsible for investigating and combating cases of corruption whereas the NPA is responsible for undertaking prosecutions. TI-Z influences or capacitates citizens with the software to demand for accountability and transparency and the ZRP detects, investigates and prevents crime. Therefore, these institutions are interdependent as they rely on one another since they all play an important role in the fight against corruption.

5.2.4 Conclusion 5: The institutional framework for tackling corruption is weak

Evidence presented reveals that the institutional framework for tackling corruption is weak. This is so since corruption has been on the agenda for quite a long time and there is no positive change with regards to decrease in corruption. The government has come up with various strategies to curb it to little effect. The institutions responsible for tackling corruption are also corrupt which has made it difficult for corruption to be completely eradicated in Zimbabwe.

5.2.5 Conclusion 6: Determining the weaknesses of ZACC in tackling corruption

The evidence presented reveals that the weaknesses of ZACC in tackling corruption include lack of political will, political interference, lack of arresting powers, lack of prosecutorial powers,

centralization, negative public perception, financial constraints, institutional corruption, inadequate human resources personnel, disgruntled and low staff morale, absence of public recognition among others. This implies that ZACC as a constitutional body specifically created to tackle corruption is weak hence has failed to curb corruption as a wicked problem in Zimbabwe.

5.2.6 Conclusion 7: Strengths of ZACC in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe

Despite the wickedness of corruption in Zimbabwe, ZACC as an important institution responsible for tackling corruption also has a number of strengths. These include the fact that it is constitutionally enshrined, has qualified, skilled and experienced human capital, has 24hr reporting systems and has seven specialized departments with a common thrust of eradicating corruption in Zimbabwe.

5.3 Recommendations

Below, the research proposes some recommendations that can be considered by the Government of Zimbabwe in order to strengthen the institutional framework for tackling corruption as a wicked problem in Zimbabwe.

5.3.1 Recommendation 1: Need for agreement amongst institutions on the definition of corruption

Due to the different perceptions of the institutions in defining corruption, it is very clear that the way they will tackle the problem is likely to differ. This calls for the need for the institutions like ZACC and NPA to sit down together and agree on one single, known definition of corruption.

5.3.2 Recommendation 2: Need for coordination amongst the institutions

Since TI-Z views corruption as wicked and impossible to resolve whilst NPA and ZACC view it as solvable, TI-Z needs to continuously interact with ZACC and NPA so that it does not give up the fight against corruption in Zimbabwe. It needs to interact with the two institutions so that they can share ideas in fighting corruption other than viewing it as difficult and impossible to resolve.

5.3.3 Recommendation 3: Need for political will

Dealing with the various types of corruption in Zimbabwe requires strong political will.

Masiyambiri (2016) argues that “political commitment and support from the highest levels for a coherent approach and its implementation is of crucial importance for ZACC to succeed in its public obligations.” The DPG noted that this could be done through the implementation of follow

up mechanism to check if rules are being followed and that no corruption is taking place and severely punishing the culprits. She also added that the supervisors or those responsible for curbing corruption and those employed in government should be morally upright without a corruption or criminal record.

5.3.4 Recommendation 4: Need for institutional independence at ZACC

The key institutions responsible for tackling corruption are interdependent. ZACC relies on the NPA for prosecutions and on ZRP for arrests. This results in delays in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe hence the need to ensure institutional independence of ZACC so that it can have both prosecutorial and arresting powers. This will enable ZACC to arrest and prosecute matters on its own without having to wait for ZRP and NPA to first investigate and take action hence corruption matters will be quickly dealt with.

5.3.5 Recommendation 5: Capacitating institutions responsible for tackling corruption In order to strengthen the weak institutional framework for tackling a wicked problem, the government of Zimbabwe needs to capacitate it with the right resources in order to strengthen it. This implies that the institutions should have adequate human resources personnel, adequate training, equipment and financial resources so that it can effectively carry out its mandate.

5.3.6 Recommendation 6: There is need for strong capacity building at the ZACC

In order to mitigate the weaknesses of ZACC, the government of Zimbabwe needs to inject heavy finances to the Commission. This will enable it to purchase equipment, recruit and train personnel as lack of these have weakened its capacity to tackle corruption in Zimbabwe. In order to curb institutional corruption, there is need for transparency in appointments and a background check before hiring anyone at the institution and those found to be corrupt need to be fired and severely punished. In addition, Zhangazha (2016) indicates that Mrs Chikundura, the Public Relations Officer of ZACC, argued that there is need for massive recruitment since the commission is understaffed. This will then ensure that there are adequate investigators to investigate corruption in various provinces of the country.

In addition, ZACC needs to be given arresting and prosecutorial powers for it to effectively tackle corruption in Zimbabwe. Delays associated with handling corruption issues will be mitigated as it will be able to arrest and prosecute culprits on its own without having to wait for the NPA and ZRP to first investigate and take action. Dr. S. Bhatasara also argued that ZACC needs to decentralise the fight like what Zimbabwe did it with HIV and AIDS (MPOI Public Seminar Report on

Corruption October 2016:6). This will mitigate the weakness associated with the centralization of ZACC offices in Harare.

Moreover, the Commission needs to improve the working conditions of its staff and should stop treating them as civil servants as they are not part of the Civil Service. Augusto (2014) also argues that Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) did some empirical work showing that in a sample of less developed countries, there is an inverse relationship between the level of public sector wages and the incidence of corruption. This implies that staff members at the Commission need to be paid well so that they are not tempted to be corrupt in order to supplement their incomes. In order to curb weaknesses associated with negative public perception by ZACC, the institution can conduct public seminars in which it informs the public on its existence and its success stories in tackling corruption.

Furthermore, there is need to educate the public on the existence and roles of ZACC in tackling corruption in Zimbabwe as the majority of Zimbabweans do not have knowledge of its existence. The Chief Researcher from ZACC noted that there is also need to institutionalise anti-corruption studies in education institutions like universities. This would then inform the youths, who are the future of Zimbabwe, on the existence of the Commission and inculcate a culture of anticorruption to those youths. According to MPOI Public Seminar Report on Corruption October (2016:7), Dr. S. Bhatasara argued that “if the country has managed to mainstream everything else in the curriculum (and even thought of having uniforms for teachers) then it is possible to mainstream anti-corruption education into the curriculum.”

5.4 Conclusion

The research concludes that corruption is indeed a wicked problem in Zimbabwe which has reached endemic levels hence the need for serious attention by the government. The key institutions responsible for combating corruption in Zimbabwe include ZACC, TI-Z, NPA AND ZRP. These institutions are interdependent as they play various roles which are vital in the fight against corruption. It can be concluded that the institutional framework for tackling corruption is weak since the problem of corruption is still prevalent in Zimbabwe despite the efforts put by the government (though rhetorical) to combat it. ZACC as a case study was analysed and was concluded to be weak due to its various weaknesses as an institution responsible for tackling corruption. The weaknesses include lack of political will, political interference, lack of arresting and prosecutorial powers, financial constraints, negative public perception, disgruntled and low

staff morale institutional corruption, inadequate human resources personnel, absence of public recognition among others. This implies that this institution needs to be strengthened and capacitated for it to effectively tackle the vice. However, the strengths of ZACC should also be acknowledged. These include the fact that it is constitutionally enshrined, has qualified, skilled and experienced human capital, has 24hr reporting systems and has seven specialized departments with a common thrust of eradicating corruption in Zimbabwe.

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APPENDICES

INTERVIEW GUIDE

“Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to talk with you on a matter that I see is dominating public discussions, that is, the issue of corruption. My choice of dissertation topic was motivated by this growing public concern. I have a few questions to ask you and I hope you will be able to assist me with some of the answers.”

1. The literature defines corruption variously or in different ways. How does ZACC define corruption?
2. Some people say corruption in Zimbabwe has now reached the scale of what some scholars call a 'wicked problem,' meaning a problem that is difficult if not impossible to resolve. What do you say to this?"
3. There are various types of corruption and in your view, what are the types of corruption that are prevalent in the country?
4. As you see it, what are the key institutions for tackling corruption in the country?
5. What is the role and function of ZACC in tackling this wicked problem?
6. How do you assess the institutional framework for fighting corruption? Do you see it as strong or weak?

You said it is weak.....In what way do you view the institutional framework as weak and if so what are the possible remedies.

You said it is strong.....In what way do you view the institutional framework as strong.

7. In your view, what are the weaknesses of ZACC in fighting corruption ?
8. What do you think are the strengths of ZACC in fighting corruption?
9. In your opinion, what measures can be taken to overcome or at least mitigate corruption in Zimbabwe?
10. Do you have anything to add that we have not discussed?

11. Do you have any documentation that you can share with me?

Thank you for allowing me to interview you for my dissertation. Good day Sir or Madam.