REINFORCEMENT OF MILITARY SECURITY IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF AFRICOM

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Dedication

I dedicate this work to my parents whose hard work, support, love and encouragement carried me through.

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Abstract

The current military security situation in Africa is shaped by a number of factors which include the fight against terrorism, coups and intrastate conflicts. Terrorism is a security threat to Africa and is growing at an alarming rate mainly in the Sahel region, the horn of Africa and in West Africa. In 2013 Kenya, Somalia, Algeria, Mali and Nigeria were countries which experienced scenes of terrorist attacks in Africa. African governments are also being faced with another security problem in maritime security along African coastlines. Pirates have turned East African seas into the world's most dangerous seas. African militaries have been actively involved in the politics of African countries, mostly culminating in coups that oust elected civilian governments. This prerogative of keeping the peace comes from an entrenched perspective of military security as being the apex of other form of security. It should be noted, however, that in most cases the military intervention in politics has brought about more harm than good and has severely threatened human security in Africa. These difficulties result not only from the magnitude of these challenges, but also from the lack of capacity of some African states and organizations to respond quickly and effectively to them. After an assessment of Africa's security challenges the U.S created AFRICOM which seems to offer only militaristic assistance to African security challenges which cover a wide range of security issues i.e. social, economic and human security. Though AFRICOM was purported as being a tool to secure Africa, since its inception it has overseen the steady increase in conflict and armed interventions on the continent. This is because AFRICOM has increased the military presence of the U.S in Africa and enhanced the capacity of NATO for forward deployment in Africa. This was seen in the Libyan intervention when AFRICOM took charge of coordinating and leading the attack. The focus of the study is to analyse the command's objective and to assess whether the military security assistance being offered by AFRICOM jeopardises or enforces AFRICA's military security. The study mostly relied on qualitative research design; the information used in this study was drawn from interviews, case studies and documentary search. The main aim of this research is to add to the body of knowledge and to raise awareness on the help being offered by U.S and its possible effects on Africa's military security and also to analyse the change from military diplomacy to defence diplomacy by the U.S ; AFRICOM being the tool.

Abbreviations

AU   : African Union

USA   : United States of America

AFRICOM   : Africa Command

ECOWAS   : Economic Community of Western African States

UN   : United Nations

GWOT   : Global War On Terror

PSI   : Pan-Sahel Initiative

ACOTA   : African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance

ACRI   : African Contingency Response Initiative

DRC   : Democratic Republic of Congo

IMF   : International Monetary Fund

PMC   : Private Military Company

EPA   : Economic Partnership Agreement

List of Figures

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The strategic interest of the United States of America (USA) in Africa and the rising Chinese trade relations with Africa states led to the creation of the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in 2008. The Bush administration created AFRICOM with the main objective of enhancing Africa's military capacity and to provide training and support to African countries failing to deal with their own security challenges. Such a foreign policy towards Africa calls for an academic enquiry. The study therefore seeks to critically analyse the command and its objectives vis a vis the military security challenges facing Africa and its supposed benefits to the continent. President Sirleaf Johnson in Woods , Pajibo (2007:1) states that, "AFRICOM Can Help Governments Willing To Help Themselves," touting AFRICOM's potential to "help" Africa "develop a stable environment in which civil society can flourish and the quality of life for Africans can be improved." This chapter highlights the background to the problem, statement of the problem, research objectives and question. The chapter gives the general overview of the study.

1.2 Background to the study

According to Bahan (2010:43) "the Middle East has been known in the past years as the hub of terrorism but recently concern has arisen over Africa becoming another hub of terrorism". Over the last decade, a number of terrorist groups have emerged in Africa and these include Al- Shabab and Boko Haram .Hano (2003:67) states that "African nations with their poor law enforcement unintentionally allow transnational terrorist groups to operate within their borders". Terrorism is a security threat to Africa and is growing at an alarming rate mainly in the Sahel region, the horn of Africa and in West Africa. In 2013 Kenya, Somalia, Algeria, Mali and Nigeria were countries which experienced scenes of terrorist attacks in Africa. The African Union (AU) as a regional organisation has to a larger extent failed to stop terrorism years after it adopted the Organization of African Union (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in 1999. Bahan (2010:45) states that "because it is a global phenomenon, terrorism requires a universal approach." In light of this Africa therefore

needs external assistance and United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) offers a good opportunity to eradicate terrorism.

A few African states are not alert to security threats and are not able to contain them before they become full blown conflicts. The AU has been slow in solving conflicts in their infancy and more often than not these have turned out to be deadly conflicts. Most joint African operations are ad hoc affairs which in most cases are met with failures rather than success (Hano 2003). According to Leatherwood (2002:67) "a 1990 intervention in Liberia by Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) was dominated by Nigeria and perceived as partisan and marred by widespread corruption and sustained criminal activities". There is need to reinforce African military armies to become more technically proficient and increase their professionalism in times of conflict.

African governments are being faced with another security problem in maritime security along African coastlines. Pirates have turned East African seas into the world's most dangerous seas. According to the World Bank (2013) report, during 2005-2012, the pirates took over $400 billion in ransom when they captured over 40 large vessels in the Gulf of Aden which is crucial for the global economy. The ordinary Somalis suffer most from this because the pirates attack food ships sent by the United Nations and sell the food at high prices. This leads to starvation and more deaths since Somalia still depends on aid from the international community.

 Africa Command (AFRICOM)is a new United States (U.S) military branch devoted only to Africa. It is the ninth unified and the U.S military command to be established after the Second World War. According to Brown (2013:06)"AFRICOM was formed with the supposed intention of: bringing peace, and security to the people of Africa and promoting U.S and Africa's common goals of development, health, education, democracy, economic growth to Africa." The U.S government agencies in partnership with AFRICOM conduct security engagement through military to military partnerships, training, support and exchange programs to promote a stable and secure continent which is also conducive to U.S foreign policy.

Many African governments distrust US involvement in African affairs. Taking a closer look at the problems that Africa is facing right now such as poverty, hunger diseases, bad governance, corruption and religious indifferences; these do not only require military to

military partnerships or the militarization of the continent but they should be addressed through other means.

1.3Statement of the Problem

The purported objective of AFRICOM is to reinforce Africa's military security. The extent to which the command guarantees the security of African states is debatable because it was not created in consultation with African states; this is also confirmed by the critiques of AFRICOM which outweigh its supporters. AFRICOM emphasises military security and is reinforcing military security rather than human security. The point to note is not that the US wants to advance its interests but that these interests do not coincide with those of Africa and, more importantly, that the US has the means and power to pursue its interests. Problems that are being faced by Africa right now are not only military security issues but also include draughts, spread of diseases like HIV and AIDS, Malaria and political issues, these require financial assistance and human security rather than military reinforcement which is being emphasised by AFRICOM.The U.S interests are being accomplished mainly through military-to-military partnerships between the US and African states which the command has with fifty-one of Africa's fifty-five states. In many instances, these partnerships involve African militaries giving operational command where African armies are trained by military personnel from AFRICOM. In addition, National Guard partnerships have been set up between African states and individual US states through the state partnership programme. According to Brown (2011:14)

> 'Few people doubt that America is motivated principally by its own interests, who are believed to encompass the following: ensuring a stable supply of oilfrom the continent; maintaining access to Africa's natural resources; countering if notrebuffing China's growing economic and political engagement in Africa; and eliminating Islamic terrorist groups that take root in weak and failed states'.

Chinese trade with Africa has surpassed that of the USA, an aspect that the US wants to address. Linked to the competition with China is the control over the vast resources in Africa especially oil. As early as 2001, Africa's oil resources were presumed as being a potential solution to America's energy problem. The Cheney Report predicted that by 2015 Africa's Gulf of Guinea would account for over twenty-five per cent of US oil imports, prompting

George Bush to declare Africa's oil a national strategic interest of the USA. This situation has been brought into sharp focus by the fact that China currently receives around a third of its oil requirements from Africa; Sudan and Angola being the states from which the country imports most of its oil (Brown 2011). This has further entrenched the Cold War-like competition between the USA and China over Africa.

The 'war on terror' doctrine is another key reason for AFRICOM's establishment and its reinforcement of military security in Africa. Ebrahim (2013:14)states that:

> 'It is noteworthy that AFRICOM is not the first US initiative to use counterterrorism as a cover to infiltrate African states. Under the Pan-Sahel and Trans-Sahel counter-terrorism initiatives, the USA pursued its 'war on terror' agenda by coordinating counterterrorism activities with African states including Mali, Mauritania, Algeria and Niger, providing the weaponry and equipment and, at times, funding fuel costs'.

AFRICOM's main aim in this regard is to intensify and coordinate activities dealing with the 'war on terror' in Africa by cooperating and managing the initiatives stated above and furthering the military security issue by incorporating counterterrorism into the various military partnerships and training programmes it undertakes with partner states. North Africa being the important region in this regard

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1. To examine the extent to which AFRICOM can reinforce military security in Africa.

2. To investigate the current military security in Africa

3. To analyse whether the assistance being offered by AFRICOM is welcome and is addressing the problems in Africa.

4. To propose recommendations that can help to reinforce Africa's military security.

1.5 Research questions

1. Why is there reinforcement of military security in Africa?

2. What is the current military security situation in Africa?

3. Do the security problems in Africa require external assistance?

1.6Hypothesis

AFRICOM (jeopardises/enforces) Africa's military security.

1.7 Justification of the Study

This study sought to analyse Africa's security challenges, its capacity to deal with the challenges. The study also sought to assess the relevance of AFRICOM's military intervention in Africa and to analyse whether it is addressing the challenges being faced or it is reinforcing military security at the expense of other forms of security. This is necessary in that it will add to the body of knowledge an analysis as to whether Africa is benefiting from the reinforcement of military security or Africa's security threats is an issue that African states can deal with on their own, this study will also highlight other security challenges being faced by Africa except military security.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

Realism

Donnelly (2008:15) notes that:

> 'Realism is a tradition of international theory centred upon four propositions which are, the international system is anarchic, states are the most important actors, all states within the system are unitary, rational actors and that the primary concern of all states is survival. States thus build up militaries to survive, which may lead to a security dilemma'.

Realists think that humanity is self-centred and competitive. This perspective, which is shared by theorists such asThomas Hobbes, views human nature as egocentric and conflicting unless there are conditions under which humans may coexist (Donnelly 2009). Realism is also closely linked to the school of thought that posits that an individual is self seeking and it is motivated by this anarchic nature, hence always attempting to acquire more power.

The state emphasizes an interest in accumulating power to ensure security in an anarchic international system. Power is primarily is mainly evidenced in terms of material resources necessary to induce harm on other states. Use of power provides for the use of force and other coercive means as acceptable in order to attain an intended goal towards the realisation of national interests. Goodin (2010:123) goes on to add that, "realism also propounds that in the

anarchic system the state is the most dominant and important actor which acts in a single voice and the power of such a state is defined by its military capabilities." Power politics in international relations are thus expressed in terms of the size, scope and effectiveness of a particular state military

Shehan (1999) notes that, "States are viewed as essentially hard-shelled entities with clear decision-making centres responsible for producing and implementing foreign policy." This view therefore clearly states the reason for the formation of AFRICOM by the U.S as means to protect its foreign policy in Africa. 'Weak' states are by definition seen as being inadequate vehicles for producing domestic security and in addition are viewed as a source of general insecurity in the international system (Donnelly 2008). This realist perspective places the emphasis of state security strengthened by military security over other aspects of security such as social security. This to a larger extent leaves out the inclusion of human and social security in any foreign policy grand strategy that involves the use of the military such as AFRICOM. As such realism explains this move towards military security as the dominant form of security because of the supremacy of the state as the unrestrained actor in the international system which is mainly characterised by anarchy. The international realm is deemed to be a dangerous environment characterized by the operation of the security dilemma, where the increase of the military security of one actor is a cause of insecurity in another actor in the international system (Brown 2013).

Liberalism

According to Shehan (1999:67), "Liberalism, in contrast to realism, believes in the measurement of power through state economies, the possibility of peace and cooperation, as well as the concepts of political freedoms and rights." Furthermore, liberals argue for the progress and perfectibility of the human condition as well as a degree of confidence in the removal of the stain of war from human experience (Doyle 1997). According to Duffield (2001:15) "liberalism has two major strands on military intervention i.e. cosmopolitan interventionists and liberal internationalists".Cosmopolitan interventionists base their argument on Kant's moral theory, but they follow his political thought. They assert that everyone who has the ability to intervene militarily in light of human rights violations also has a moral duty to do so, subject to criteria of effectiveness and/or proportionality (Burr 2007). In this regard the activities of AFRICOM in Libya under the guise of NATO in implementing the resolution 1703 which mandated the creation of a no-fly zone stopped the

advance Libyan army on defenceless civilians in Benghazi was justified and hence protected the human rights of general Libyans.Burr (2007:56) states that "liberal internationalists, on the other hand, have tended to place greater value on state sovereigntyand the attendant international duty ofnonintervention." Kant favoured absolute non intervention as a matter of principle: He thought it necessary to stabilize international relations and to ensure that each political community could freely determine its own way of life (Doyle 2010). It is important to note that liberalists put forward a view that African states should use their own means to deal with their own military security challenges to ensure a peaceful world.

Complex Interdependence

Complex interdependence as a theoretical framework can help explain U.S's concern for Africa's security. Complex interdependence advocate that a security threat in another continent is a threat to security for another continent, thus a security threat in Africa is a threat to security in America. The agenda of interstate relationships in complex interdependence consists of a number of issues that are not arranged in a specific or consistent hierarchy; however these issues are equally important. Military security does not dominate other issues in complex interdependence, the cooperation between states increases that it becomes difficult to make a distinction between domestic policy and foreign policy as policies become uniform amongst states that cooperate together. Military action against each other becomes less important between states in the same region in conflict resolution or in other issues, when complex interdependence prevails. Military force may, however, be important in these governments' relations with governments outside that region, or on other issues. Military force could, for example, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues among members of an alliance like the ECOWAS or SADC, yet at the same time be very important for that alliance's political and military relations with a rival bloc or group like the SADC intervention in DRC against the rebels which were alleged to have been supported by neighbouring Rwanda . Thus in this case the reason for AFRICOM's presence is justified only on the basis that it seeks to help African states deal with terrorism which has become a matter of concern not only in Africa's military security but globally as states cooperate together in a global village. The researcher will use realism, liberalism and complex interdependence as theories to analyze AFRICOM and its effects on the African continent and also the relevance of state military security vis-avis human security

 1.9Literature Review

Africa is struggling with several difficult security challenges. These difficulties result not only from the nature of these challenges, but also from the lack of capacity of African states and organizations to respond quickly and effectively to these security challenges. After an assessment of Africa's security challenges the U.S created AFRICOM which seems to offer only militaristic assistance to African security challenges which cover a wide range of security issues i.e. social, economic and human security. Various authors have written about AFRICOM citing reasons for its formation, its activities and analyzing whether it is welcome or not. The gap that has been left by these authors that this research seeks to fill is to assess the military security in Africa, analyze the need to have such an organization and to establish whether the command is also helping African states and governments to strengthen human security or it is going back to the reinforcement of military security over other forms of security.

AFRICOM became an independent, fully autonomous and operational military command on 1 October, 2008 (Busch, 2011). It was created without informing the UN or the AU which indicates that it does not want to operate multi-laterally and this makes its presence less legitimate suggesting a possible neo-colonial role (Kaldor, 2007:188). By not collaborating with international institutions, regional and sub-regional organizations within Africa it goes against requirements of good governance. This then shows a rejection of the Human Security paradigm as the possibility of AFRICOM in helping to create a peaceful environment required multi-literalism but rather an extension of US foreign policy into African military security issues. Combating terrorism continued to be a major driving force and one of the major goals from Washington, however, the role of AFRICOM was further complicated by the different messages coming from key internal members. The first commander, General Kip Ward, a military general (which in itself indicates AFRICOMs direction) made no reference to development, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping or conflict resolution (Africa Action, 2008).

 The organization was criticized for having a 'narrow military agenda' (Volman et al, 2009:1). African states have been reluctant to embrace AFRICOM, due mainly to distrust arising from communications from the US. Though AFRICOMs work is to intervene only if invited by African states, Africans insist they did not ask for an organization like AFRICOM for fear of the bases it may seek to establish on African soil and disaster capitalism in intrastate conflicts such as in Nigeria and Libya. Most African governments and many regional bodies have condemned the presence of an American military force in their countries. Only Ethiopia openly voiced support. Okumu (2007:8) claims that "the mere

presence of foreign troops disrespect Africa's historical 'Non-Aggression Pact', its common position on African security and defense." This is the direct opposite to the African view of military security, which they see as separate from development and sovereignty.

The Keenan (2008:18) approach considers the 'development' aspect of the security-development nexus as a 'guise' for what is essentially a narrow militaristic agenda. The 'development' aspect then, covers U.S. domestic strategic concerns that go beyond just focusing on servicing the GlobalWar onTerror (GWOT). Keenan thereby scrutinizes the concept that AFRICOM will deliver security (to the African country it engages with) and thereby be able to deliver it. Drawing on the U.S. involvement pre-2008, Keenan assesses that this organization has a tripartite agenda: to exploit Africa's resources; to limit Chinese engagement in Africa, and to secure African countries as a counter balance in the GWOT (ibid:16). Keenan's ideas are based on his research in the Sahel and the Maghreb regions of Africa, where after the GWOT was announced, an intelligence deception was created that spread the idea of terrorism. This was designed to create, the ideological conditions for U.S. 'invasion' of Africa to secure U.S. strategic, natural resources (ibid). This particular project came under the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which has been taken over by the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which now comes under the umbrella of AFRICOM.Keenan agrees with Abrahamson that the USA, like the UK in Blair's 'Commission for Africa' (2005), are aiming at 'securitizing' Africa. These change the security-development nexus, with the discourse shifting from one of 'development/humanitarian' to that of 'security' with Africa increasingly being mentioned in relation to the GWOT and the potential danger that it poses internationally (Keenan, 2008:18). By interpreting underdeveloped states as dangerous, the role of aid and development has changed to containing the 'threat' thereby merging the security and development agendas so that they become indistinguishable (ibid). Keenan goes so far as to claim that the 'overly militaristic' role of EUCOM, which is AFRICOM.

Authors who have written on this topic have not written on the current military situation in Africa especially after 2008 when the Bush administration established AFRICOM as a measure to help African states to contain its military challenges, whether the security situation is one that needs military reinforcement or other solutions which were highlighted in this research as well and whether the U.S military branch is addressing the current problems in Africa besides military security as stated in its mission statement. Africa's position in addressing the security problems which it is facing or perceived to be facing was also analysed

1.10Methodology

Research design

In gathering data, the researcher used both qualitative techniques. Key informant interviews and documentary search were used under qualitative techniques. It is important to note that each and every data collection technique has its own advantages and disadvantages.

Sampling Procedure

 Judgemental Sampling

Under purposive sampling the elements are chosen basing on the judgement of the researcher that is the researcher believes that some subjects are more suitable for the research as compared to other individuals. Gerges (2008:15) states that judgmental sampling "is a non probability sampling technique where the researcher selects units to be sampled based on their knowledge and professional judgment." It is used to select key informants who possess unique military security information. In this case, the military operations and planning officer in the ministry of Defence were interviewed. A number of International Relations officers were also randomly selected and requested to answer in-depth interviews. The interview guide was composed of questions about the military security in Africa. The researcher also conducted face to face interviews with three lecturers from the National Defence College. An interview guide was used for the purposes of guiding the interview.

Documentary Search

The researcher also used published work by other authors on the subject under study. The researcher used the USAFRICOM website to get much of the information as to the structure of the department, reasons for its formation, its activities and operations in Africa and other relevant information. The genesis of military security and Africa's current security information was obtained from e-books, articles, journals and published books by various authors.

1.11Data Analysis Techniques

Thematic Analysis

Data gathered from key informant interviews was analysed thematically using thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is a research for themes that emerge as being important to the

description of the subject under study. Rice and Ezzy (1999:258) postulated that thematic analysis involves the identification of themes through careful reading and re-reading of data. Qualitative data may be analysed thematically using thematic analysis in which narrations are grouped into themes focusing on a particular issue which have been constantly refered to by respondents or authors. Thematic analysis was used to analyze data obtained from in-depth and face to face interviews that were conducted.

Content Analysis

This method was used to analyse data drawn from documents such as books, articles, journals. Babbie (1989:106) argued that content analysis is any technique for making inference by systematic and objective identifying special characteristics of messages. Special characteristics of messages in this instance were deducted from the various speeches by the US president, the speeches from the command's internal members and directors.

1.12 Limitations

Due to the lack of resources the researcher was not able to visit the countries that were used as case studies in this research that is Liberia, Somalia, Nigeria, Uganda, Djibouti. The researcher relied on information found on the AFRICOM website since there was lack of resources to conduct interviews with the US department of security. Constrains that were also faced in undertaking the study is that many of the published information about AFRICOM is by European scholars who might have biased information in favour of the organization. On the other hand due to the fact that the organization was openly criticized upon its formation most African governments are not at liberty to disclose their engagements with AFRICOM. In order to deal with such challenges confidentiality was guaranteed through authentication letters from the University of Zimbabwe and also the researcher provided copies of the dissertation to the organisations which were visited during the field.

1.13 Delimitation

The study only focused on reinforcement of military security in African countries by Africom that is from 2008 when it became operational to date. The study took Liberia, Somalia, Nigeria, Djibouti Uganda as case studies only. This is so because the researcher will not be able to study the organization's activities and operations in the whole continent hence the countries stated above were taken as case studies and in some cases other countries in Africa were also referred to.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1Introduction

Human security is a relatively new doctrine that seeks to challenge the dominance of state centric security which is buttressed by military security. Human security emphasizes the need to ensure the security of the individual, in the first instance, before focusing on the security of the state as an entity. This is because even though the state may be secure, it does not always mean the individuals that make up the state are secure. Thus this chapter seeks to examine the effects of AFRICOM on the entrenchment of military security over human security. AFRICOM has sought to foster the military capabilities of the partner countries with the aim of strengthening the military capabilities of African states to bolster their ability to keep the continent safe. AFRICOM's main objective is to ensure that weak states can no longer be breeding grounds for terrorist activities and Islamic radicalization. As such there is a deliberate leaning by AFRICOM to strengthen states and their militaries in order to remove elements that may grow to become threats to American interests. AFRICOM represents a backward slide into the days of state security resting solely on military security which in turn supersedes everything else. This chapter seeks to examine the extent to which the formation of AFRICOM has affected this change.

2.2 The Evolution of Human Security and Military Security

Gasper and Oscar (2013:2) note that, "The human security approach broadens the scope of security analysis and policy from territorial security to the security of people. The 2012 General Assembly Resolution stresses the role of "Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to survival, livelihood and dignity of their people". In other words, threat(s) to – and values under threat in – people's lives are the key starting point of a human security report." In other words human security focuses primarily on protecting people while promoting peace and assuring sustainable continuous development. It emphasizes aiding individuals by using a people centred approach for resolving inequalities that affect security. The security of the individual directly impacts the security of the state. As such it follows that under this paradigm, the state cannot be secure if the individuals in it are not secure first in terms of food security, economic security and environmental security. These are the factors that affect the day to day livelihood of citizens.

Human security is therefore equally important as military security in that the security of an individual directly impacts the security of a state, hence there is need to reinforce human security as well.

Gasper and Oscar (2013:2) go on to add that, "The 1994 Human Development Report was more specific, listing seven essential dimensions of human security which are: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security." Human security therefore has a strong emphasis on the importance of securing the vital aspects of people's lives. These are freedom from extreme poverty and the institutionalization of social security aspects of governance. This gives pre-eminence to looking after the environment in which the individual lives in and making sure there are adequate resources to sustain an individual's livelihood in this same environment. The hard power aspect of security that entails military security and the continuity of the states is given a secondary role as it is subjugated to human security and therefore dependent upon the existence of human security.

According to http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v16n3p09.htm, "Peace means much more than the absence of war. Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law." In this vein human security means much more than the purely militaristic security of the state. It involves looking at those aspects of life that focus on the individual and the negative effects that can occur in the event of drastic changes to these conditions. Human security looks at the level of economic well being of citizens in a country and the level of social justice as being the benchmarks of evaluating security. Thus military security or the safety of the state from attack or violent upheaval is a secondary issue to the security of the individual.

The peace magazine (ibid) further adds that, "Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment -- these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national – security." Human security posits that the only way to ensure adequate security for the state is to start by securing the most rudimentary unit within the state which is the individual. Cases

of extreme poverty and want even in the presence of the most well equipped army will inevitably lead to social and political unrest. This has been the case in places like Somalia, Haiti and other weak and failed states where the lack of human security has been an insurmountable stumbling block to effective nation and state building. The hard power aspect of security that entails military security and the continuity of the states is given a secondary role as it is subjugated to human security and therefore dependent upon the existence of human security. It therefore means that in order to ensure a properly equipped and enforced military there is need to first address the human security, an aspect that is not being addressed by AFRICOM which is solely devoted to the reinforcement of military security as seen in countries like Libya, Nigeria and Kenya which will be discussed in the next chapter.

This means that human security refers to the quality of life of citizens of a particular state. Anything that negatively affects such quality of life is a security threat by virtue of being a threat to their livelihoods and well being. The emphasis is on overall human safety and the sustained improvement of the quality of life free from war and want, especially extreme poverty. Strides in improving human security are measured by the annual U.N Human Development index, which looks at all the aspects that make up Human Security.

However Trobbianni (2013:1) argues that, "On the contrary, it should be considered the central security provider: its stability and legitimacy are the main sources of protection for its citizens, from any kind of threats. The strengthening of national authorities should be a central strategy to ensure the protection of the people." This line of thought propounds that the state is first port of call that needs to be strengthened first before any other aspects of security can be considered. The state is defined by Webber as a corporate body that achieves a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a given territory. As such it is only the state that has the sole mandate to provide protection and security to its citizens. This function can only be fulfilled if the state has enough military capability to ward off any threats to the state itself. This militaristic view of security is founded on the basis that everything else that goes within the state is only possible after the state has managed to provide security, albeit in a militaristic nature. It is imperative for the state to secure its borders, territory and citizenry and the only way it can achieve this is through force which is provided for by its military. This therefore gives a way to the creation of a command like AFRICOM which through its military training program enhances the military might of most African states which are relatively failing to secure its boarders and citizenry from attacks for example the Nigerian government against the Boko Haram militants.

Trobbioanni (2013:1) goes on to say that, "citizens of states with weak institutions are more affected by violent threats." This means that states with weak institutions that cannot adequately provide security for their citizens will invariably crumble under a barrage of a multitude of threats, both domestic and foreign. Weak institutions usually give rise for opportunistic forces that may seek to disintegrate the state violently. This was seen in Mali in 2012. The Tuareg Rebellion of 2012 lasted from January to April 2012, a war was waged against the Malian government by rebels with the goal of attaining independence for the northern region of Mali, known as Azawad. This rebellion however was hi jacked by extreme Muslim fundamentalists and Jihadists who wanted to establish a Muslim Caliphate in North Africa. These Jihadists also teamed up with the Al Qaeda terror network and managed to keep their war going because of weapons coming in from war torn and chaotic Libya. Various Muslim holy sites and relics were destroyed during the rebellion. Livelihoods were disrupted and whole communities displaced. This example demonstrates the catastrophic effects of the states institutional failure to provide security for its people. The Mali state had no functionally effective military to secure its borders against the infiltration of arms and fighters from Libya and worse still could not ward off the rebel advance once fighting broke out. It only survived because of the French intervention. As such this highlights the paramount importance of the need to establish firm and reinforced military security institutions. Cheeseman (2005:75) points out that, "a growing number of threats come from new kinds of wars that take shape within societies or across states and do not fit well in a conventional warfare framework." This buttresses the idea that state security inherently comes before human security and that human security exists as a compliment to the establishment of state security. There is therefore need to enhance the capacity of military security in countries like Mali first in order to realise human security. However an important point to note is that the enforcement of armies like that of Mali can be done without the intervention of AFRICOM which can jeopardise the security of African armies by unrestricted sell of arms.

Trobbianni (2013) further argues that, "state security is not only about inter-state wars, but has a domestic dimension that is most important in the provision of human security." Military security is not about securing the state from external threats alone but also from those within. This is because internal threats to military security have the same effect as those from outside. Also the provision of human security hinges on the ability of the state to adequately provide military security to secure the state in the first place. Food, economic, community

security or freedom from fear or want cannot possibly be achieved in a war zone. The absence of war is a fundamental prerequisite for the provision of human security and this peace can only be provided for through the establishment of strong institutions within the state, chief among them being a functional and effective military. Proponents of military security argue that human security cannot seriously be a concept that can survive outside of the overall military security paradigm. AFRICOM in its endeavour to create a secure and stable African continent should therefore add to its list of objectives the objective to enforce human security as it is closely intertwined to military security which it is promoting.

According to Chappuis, from this perspective, 'taking human security seriously would require nothing less than a total refit of world order that would do away with the state as the essential unit of analysis in world affairs' (2011:109). He argues that the state remains the most basic, and at the same time, the highest unit of measurement in the international system. Subverting this order and divorcing human security from military backe d state security is a fallacy that cannot be conceivably achieved. States are unitary actors who will do what they have to do to survive and this means reinforcing their military security over human security.

2.3 Military Security in Africa

Omar (2000:9) argues that, "African militaries challenge civilian authorities, the military uses a number of reasons to assume to power and to justify this action" African militaries have been actively involved in the politics of African countries, mostly culminating in coups that oust elected civilian governments. This is because of what Omar (2000:9) terms "guardian thesis." This is whereby African militaries see themselves as the guardians of the state and the peace that prevails in it. They perceive the maintenance of state security as giving them an overarching prerogative to determine the course the states politics will take. Onwumechili (1998:43) argues that, "most elections in Africa are met with electoral squabbles which translate into conflicts and most militaries step in to guarantee peace." This prerogative of keeping the peace comes from an entrenched perspective of military security as being the apex of other form of security. It should be noted however that in most cases the military intervention in politics has brought about more harm than good and has severely threatened human security in Africa. The main cause of this is that military coups often bring with them political upheaval and instability. Also military coups start an unending vicious cycle of the military meddling in politics. This action by militaries in Africa has jeopardised the military security in countries like Mali and this has acted to the advantage of AFRICOM which is now

stepping in to reinforce military security which has been negated by militaries assuming political authority.

According to the Armed Conflicts Report (1999:14), "the military's control of the state, or even its attempt, has serious implications for human security." The tragedies in Sierra Leone and the Republic of Congo clearly highlight the military security problems that arise when the military takes over government. In Sierra Leone, President Kabbah, who assumed power after a public election, was toppled by Major Johnny Paul Koroma a military commander in 1997. The Armed Conflicts Report (1999:14) adds that, "in 1998 alone, more than 1 000 people, were killed in the conflict. As part of their war strategy, the rebels resorted to many unlawful acts directed towards the innocent civilians." Military takeovers in the name of preserving the greater good hardly ever achieve their desired results but rather serve to worsen and perpetuate socio-political upheaval that invariably has a negative effect on human security. The method used by the rebels and in some cases the armed forces of the government concerned left indelible scars on the social fabric of the communities that were affected by the war. Even in instances where the peace is secured, the military is inherently incapable of governing without infringing on citizens basic human rights. This unquestioning pursuit of military security has characterized the political and security environment in Africa. In practice human security is given second priority status in Africa. This is also a case that AFRICOM is not addressing as its main objective is to create a peaceful and stable situation in which it can foothold resource rich areas of Africa hence it is only giving priority to military security alone.

The emphasis on military security in Africa has also been witnessed in state resisting the principle of self determination for minorities within their borders. African governments have often used their armies to repress minorities and force national unity. This was the case in Sudan during the Darfur Crisis where Omar Al Bashir, the president of Sudan, used the army and sponsored the Janjaweed militia to suppress the Darfur people who wanted independence and greater control of the countries natural resources from Northern Sudan. Slain Libyan leader Muamar Gaddaffi also used a vast intelligence network and a strong military to thwart any opposition to his rule. There was a strong sentiment of preserving national cohesion and security. The same can be said of the Rwandan genocide which was sparked by a minority Tutsi government that suppressed the majority Hutu's. In both instances state apparatus was used to perpetuate conditions of inequality and oppression. The military was used to brutally suppress and hints of dissent in the name of preserving the peace. This is despite the fact that

this peace would have been a "negative peace" lacking strong human security support structures.

2.4 The Creation of AFRICOM

Africa is struggling with several difficult security challenges. These difficulties result not only from the magnitude of these challenges, but also from the lack of capacity of some African states and organizations to respond quickly and effectively to them. After an assessment of Africa's security challenges the U.S created AFRICOM which seems to offer only militaristic assistance to African security challenges which cover a wide range of security issues i.e. social, economic and human security. Various authors like Brown, Woods, Pajibo and many others have written about AFRICOM citing reasons for its formation, its activities and analyzing whether it is welcome or not. The gap that has been left by these authors that this research seeks to fill is to assess the military security in Africa, analyze the need to have such an organization and to establish if it is also helping African states and governments to strengthen human security or it is going back to the reinforcement of military security over other forms of security.

AFRICOM became an independent, fully autonomous and operational military command on 1 October, 2008 (Busch, 2011). It was created without informing the UN or the AU which indicates that it does not want to operate multi-laterally and this makes its presence less legitimate suggesting a possible neo-colonial role (Kaldor, 2007:188). By not collaborating with international institutions, it goes against purported requirements of good governance, which then shows a rejection of the Human Security paradigm as the possibility of AFRICOM in helping to create a peaceful environment required multi-literalism. Combating terrorism continued to be the number one goal coming from Washington, however, the role of AFRICOM was further complicated by the different messages coming from key internal members. The first commander, General Kip Ward, a military general made no reference to development, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping or conflict resolution (Africa Action, 2008).

2.5 AFRICOM and Security in Africa

Though AFRICOM was purported as being a tool to secure Africa, since its inception it has overseen the steady increase in conflict and armed interventions on the continent. This is because AFRICOM has increased the military presence of the U.S in Africa and enhanced the

capacity of NATO for forward deployment in Africa. This was seen in the Libyan intervention when AFRICOM took charge of coordinating and leading the attack on Gaddaffi. The Libyan intervention which imposed a no fly zone under Security Council resolution 1973 was executed under the leadership of AFRICOM. Though the intervention was carried out for humanitarian reasons as Gaddaffi was threatening to attack civilians and had previously done so, the fall of the Gadaffi regime left the Sahel and Maghreb regions in a worse of position than it already was. This is because of the domino effect of instability which then spread to Mali, Chad and the Central African Republic. Stewart (2012:40) argues that,

> "…instability spread to neighboring countries as weapons and combatants flow outward from Libya. Thousands of armed Tuareg tribesmen who previously served in Gadhafi's military returned home to Mali. The influx of this large number of well-armed and well-trained fighters, led by a former Libyan army colonel, re-energized the long-simmering Tuareg insurgency against the Malian government."

The huge amounts of arms that filtered through the porous and chaotic borders of Libya into Mali and downwards to Chad and CAR fuelled the fires of instability. Lederer (2013:12) adds that, "regular transfers of significant quantities of arms are going to Egypt and the Sahel, with less regular transfers to Chad and Syria." After the fall of Gaddaffi, Western companies went on a feeding frenzy parcelling out Libyan oil for exploitation. This is in line with the stated aims of AFRICOM which is to ensure the free flow of resources from Africa to the global market, no matter the cost be it human or security.

The role of AFRICOM is purely a foreign policy tool to advance American interests and not to secure Africa. This has been done through militarization of the continent through military to military partnerships between the various National Guard troops of the individual states that make up the United States. These partnerships have been carried out with any willing government regardless of their human rights background or economic stability. As such the U.S had sought to prop up unpopular governments in Africa who are willing to be proxies in the war on terror and provide forward operating bases and partner with them in fighting Muslim fundamentalists that are sheltering in some of the continents ungoverned spaces. This cooperation has been at the expense of human security on the continent. The focus on military to military cooperation has meant that scarce resources in Africa which could have been used to better the socio economic situation of many ordinary citizens have been

redirected into strengthening the military. Thus the reinforcement of military security which is being promoted by AFRICOM is putting human security at stake in that resource which are being used for military training and support programs could be used for food, shelter and to reduce the spread of diseases.

The drive towards increased militarization has been necessitated by the perceived need to be prepared against infiltration by terror groups and other destabilizing and subversive elements. However one might argue that the result of AFRICOM has been to export terrorism to largely peaceful African countries who are now falling victim to terrorists who target them because they are seen as Western Allies. An example of this is the Westgate Mall attack that took place in Kenya last year by Al Shabab militants. Gottinger (2013:09) notes that, "Al Shabab's stated rational for the attack was to punish Kenya for its presence as part of the U.S. supported AU troops occupying Somalia." The attack was meant to deter the Kenyan military from intervening in Somalia under the behest and sponsorship of the U.S military. With this in mind a connection can be easily made between the appearance of AFRICOM on the African continent and the increase in instances of violent conflict in Africa. This has been detrimental to human security through diminishing the capacity of states to provide military security itself and also through the siphoning of resources to pursue militaristic goals.

AFRICOM was criticized for having a 'narrow military agenda' (Volman et al, 2009:1). African states have been reluctant to embrace AFRICOM, due mainly to distrust arising from communications from Washington, intentional or not. AFRICOMs work is to intervene only if invited by African states. This is ironic because the first intervention by AFRICOM in Libya was not solicited for either by the African Union or by the Arab League. Africans insist they did not ask for an organization like AFRICOM for fear of the bases it may seek to establish on African soil would be used to undermine their own sovereignty. In fact, most African civilians, governments, and many regional bodies have voiced a No to the presence of an American military force in their backyard. Only Ethiopia and Liberia openly voiced support. Okumu (2007:8) claims that the mere presence of foreign troops disrespects Africa's historical 'Non-Aggression Pact', its common position on African security and defence. This runs counter to the African view of military security, which they see as separate from development and sovereignty.

The Keenan (2008:18) approach considers the 'development' aspect of the security-development nexus as a 'guise' for what is essentially a narrow militaristic agenda. The

'development' aspect then, covers U.S. domestic strategic concerns that go beyond just focusing on servicing the Global War on Terror (GWOT). He thereby scrutinizes the concept that AFRICOM will deliver security (to the African country it engages with) and thereby be able to deliver it. Drawing on the U.S. involvement pre-2008, Keenan assesses that this organization has a tripartite agenda: to exploit Africa's resources; to limit Chinese engagement in Africa, and to secure African countries as a counter balance in the GWOT (ibid:16). Keenan's ideas are based on his research in the Sahel and the Maghreb regions of Africa, where after the GWOT was announced, an intelligence deception was created that spread the idea of terrorism. This was designed to create, he claims, the ideological conditions for U.S. 'invasion' of Africa to secure U.S. strategic, natural resources (ibid). This particular project came under the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which has been taken over by the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which now comes under the umbrella of AFRICOM. Keenan agrees with Abrahamson that the USA, like the UK in Blair's 'Commission for Africa' (2005), are aiming at 'securitizing' Africa. This change the security-development nexus, with the discourse shifting from one of 'development/humanitarian' to that of 'security' with Africa increasingly being mentioned in relation to the GWOT and the potential danger that it poses internationally (Keenan, 2008:18). By interpreting underdeveloped areas as dangerous, the role of aid and development has changed to containing the 'threat' thereby merging the security and development agendas so that they become indistinguishable (ibid). Keenan goes so far as to claim that the 'overly militaristic' role of AFRICOM.

Authors who have written on this topic have not written on the current military situation in Africa especially after 2008 when the Bush administration established AFRICOM as a measure to help African states to contain its military challenges, whether the security situation is one that needs military reinforcement or other solutions which will be highlighted in this research as well and whether the U.S military branch is addressing the current problems in Africa besides military security as stated in its mission statement. Africa's position in addressing the security problems which it is facing or perceived to be facing will be analyzed as well.

2.6 AFRICOM-A Realist Initiative or Compromise in an Era of Complex Interdependence

Fischer (2012:34) notes that, "Historically the purpose of the military has been to defend a nation's borders against invasion and external attack." The creation and evolution of armies was thus situated in the sole function of keeping the nation state safe from outside threat. The sole purpose of the military was to repel attack from foreign elements who would seek to alter or change the way of life of the polity through conquest. The development of armies was a realist reaction to the needs of the state to ensure its continuity. Donnelly (2008:16) notes that,

> "Realism is a tradition of international theory centred upon four propositions which are, the international system is anarchic, states are the most important actors, all states within the system are unitary, rational actors and that the primary concern of all states is survival. States thus build up militaries to survive, which may lead to a security dilemma."

In this scenario the state naturally crated a military to secure itself from external attack. Realism propounds that the international system is an arena of self help and that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must (Thucydides).

This makes it imperative for a state to develop the necessary tools in terms of hard power to perpetuate its survival. Through evolution of the international system and globalization, threats to the well being of a state have changed from being just those to the territorial integrity and independence of the state but rather now encompass threats to the vital interests of the state. In the present world these interests are mainly access to vital, finite and increasingly scarce resources like oil and minerals necessary to keep modern economies going. A threat to the free flow and access to these resources naturally becomes a threat to the well being of the state and under the realist assumption, a state will do and use all that it has to ensure its survival and protect its interests. Thus in this case U.S created AFRICOM to protect its resource interests in Africa and ensure its survival against the raising competition from China.

Shehan (1999:23) notes that, "States are viewed as essentially hard-shelled entities with clear decision-making centres responsible for producing and implementing foreign policy. The state is deemed the natural form of human polity and strong central government is the recipe for domestic security and international influence. 'Weak' states are by definition seen as being inadequate vehicles for producing domestic security and in addition are viewed as a

source of general insecurity in the international system." This realist perspective places a very high premium on the emphasis of state security bolstered by military security over all other aspects of security. This effectively shut out the inclusion of human security in any foreign policy grand strategy that involves the use of the military such as AFRICOM. As such realism explains this move towards military security as the dominant form of security because of the supremacy of the state as the unrestrained actor in the international system. The international realm is deemed to be a profoundly dangerous environment characterized by the operation of the security dilemma, where the increase of the military security of one actor is a cause of insecurity in another actor in the international system.

There other theories that may be used to explain the formation of AFRICOM. Complex Interdependence The term 'complex interdependence' was developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye and refers to the various, complex transnational connections between states and societies. Interdependence theorists noted that such relations, particularly economic ones, were increasing; while the use of military force was decreasing. This theory argues that the interdependence that develops between states through commerce and globalization inhibits the use of force between states in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. Complex interdependence also posits that events in one state will invariably have effects on the well being of another state. This is exemplified by the 1973 oil crisis in which the oil producing countries of the Middle East created an artificial oil shortage to influence global politics. This event had negative ripple effects on the Western economies and those of smaller countries too. As such the modern state cannot possibly survive without cooperating with other states in one way or another. In view of AFRICOM, this may be interpreted as being that the U.S increasingly depends on Africa for its raw materials to keep the American economy going in the near future. Africa on the other hand is highly insecure and unstable and thus needs American support to establish effective and functional militaries that can guarantee not only the security of African states but the extraction of resources which will not only benefit the U.S but also Africans themselves. In this matrix the end result is a secure and developing Africa. One can therefore argue that Complex interdependence theory can be used to explain the formation of AFRICOM as it as a mutually beneficial venture.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has traced the evolution of human security and analyzed it at par with military security and how this has affected the overall security situation in Africa. The impact of the

formation of AFRICOM and its inherent involvement in the politics of Africa has also been examined. The results of AFRICOMs interference have largely been seen as being of a destabilizing nature. Complex interdependence theory however explains and highlights the relationship of AFRICOM and Africa as being not one of exploitation but rather mutual benefit.

CHAPTER THREE

AFRICOM AND DISASTER CAPITALISM

3.1 Introduction

The formation of AFRICOM has mainly been to further American interests on the African continent. These objectives have sought to be achieved in various ways, some of which include military to military partnerships, the provision of military aid in the form of training and advanced equipment for surveillance and counterterrorism activities. The objective of these partnerships being to, neutralize threats to security and create a conducive environment for the free flow of resources from Africa to the Western Metropoles. As such AFRICOM operations have been largely concentrated in the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa and the vast expanses of the Sahara-Sahel region. This region highly strategic in nature in terms of American energy interests and the control of other minerals, it is also a region where the U.S has faced growing and stiff competition from the Chinese for control of. Thus the region has naturally attracted the attention of AFRICOM operations and a continuous attack of militaristic negotiations masked in the overtones of the Global War on Terror. This has seen various Task Forces and commands formed to operate in this region. This chapter looks at the individual operations that AFRICOM has undertaken in Libya, Nigeria, Guinea and Somalia to 'secure these countries from terrorists and other subversive elements.

3.2 Libya- Operation Odyssey Dawn

Operation Odyssey Dawn was the strategic bombing campaign carried out by the U.S to stop Libyan forces from attacking civilians in the Eastern city of Benghazi where the uprising against the 40 year rule of Muammar Ghaddafi was said to be centred. This operation officially heralded the arrival of AFRICOM not only to the security and military issues in Africa but also to the political and governance side of how Africa was ruled. Garamone (2011:87) points out that, "The command of Operation Odyssey Dawn was under the authority of General Ham, the Commander of AFRICOM." In effect this made the Libyan crisis the first operationalization of AFRICOM on the continent. The operations logistical and

operational functions were all initially under AFRICOM. The military action was taken out to enforce a no fly zone authorized under resolution 1973 of the United Nations Security Council. The resolution authorized the use of force to ensure compliance. Garamone (2011) adds that, "The goal of the military coalition is to prevent further attacks by regime forces on Libyan citizens, officials said, adding that the coalition also wants to degrade the ability of Muammar Gaddafi's regime to resist a no-fly zone being implemented." However it has been argued that the U.S unilaterally expanded this use of force to attack Ghaddafi forces that were neither in a position to attack civilians or the U.S military machine itself. This escalation of the parameters and rules of engagement culminated in the supply of material aid to the rebels in Libya and ultimately resulted in the toppling and murder of Muamar Ghaddafi. The U.S through AFRICOM actively sought to destroy the military capacity of Libya and to effect regime change.

This is largely because Gaddafi stood accused of aiding terrorists and possessing chemical and biological weapons. The West also blamed Gaddafi for being behind the Lockerbie bombing of 1984. As such the U.S had a vested interest in seeing the fall of Gaddafi from power. Libya also possesses vast natural resource wealth that is of strategic importance to the U.S. Obeel (2011) posits that, "Gaddafi's Libya, despite its relatively small population, was known to possess vast resources, particularly in the form of oil reserves and financial capital." Hargreaves (2012) further adds that, "Libya is a member of OPEC and one of the world's largest oil producers. It was producing roughly 1.6 million barrels a day before the war, nearly 70 percent of them through the state-owned National Oil Corporation." This mineral wealth in the form of oil is one of the cornerstones for the formation of AFRICOM, as alluded to in previous chapters AFRICOM was formed to secure the smooth flow of resources from Africa to the Western metropolis- chief among these resources being oil to guarantee the energy security of America in the face of dwindling supplies the world over.

Becker (2011) points out that, "The U.S. government was furious that Gaddafi was moving to rein in and limit the power and profits of the western-owned oil giants that he permitted to come back into the country after George W. Bush in 2004 lifted economic sanctions against Libya." The Libyan leader had threatened to expel Western companies from Libya and cut down on oil production in return for diplomatic concessions from the U.S, Gaddafi also wanted greater benefit from his country's wealth for his people. Mufson (2011) adds that, "The Libyan leader demanded tough contract terms. He sought big bonus payments up front. Moreover, upset that he was not getting more U.S. government respect and recognition for

his earlier concessions, he pressured the oil companies to influence U.S. policies." This was an apparent and clear threat to U.S interests in terms of energy security and force projection in terms of its foreign policy and reigning in rogue leaders like Gaddafi. As such the targeting of Gaddafi who was very vocal against the U.S and the construction of AFRICOM bases on African soil was a tactical move in the grand strategy to gain a foothold in Africa. Henceforth this clearly highlights the real agenda behind AFRICOM's reinforcement of security which is to safeguard Africa's resources which are raw materials for US industries.

Rozzof (2011) argues that, "The killing of unarmed civilian protesters in Yemen and Bahrain has not brought about much concern and any military intervention by Western military powers." Yemen and Bahrain are countries that have cooperated with the U.S in the Global War on Terror and despite their Human Rights abuse records have escaped censure from their Western ally. This is evidence of double standards and points to the fact that Gaddafi was targeted because he did not fall in line. This also brings out the fact that AFRICOM is a tool for the U.S to forcefully assert its foreign policy goals and objectives on the African continent through the use of brute force against any and all who would dare oppose it. As such AFRICOM is demonstratably a tool for the furtherance of the security in the militaristic sense alone. This is because though Libya was a relatively stable country with high human security before the NATO bombing, all of it was sacrificed on the altar of the militaristic security of the U.S of removing perceived rogue leaders like Gaddafi from power. Rozoff (2011) observes that, "an estimated 65 Libyan civilians were killed and 150 wounded on the first day of the bombing onslaught." The major losers of the conflict turned out to be Libyan civilians. AFRICOM has in this basic sense furthered the cause of military security over human security through its operations in Libya. This entrenchment of military security however has been at a very large human cost in Libyan lives.

Grimaldi and O'Harrow (2012) argue that, "Libya's wealth fund, the Libyan Investment Authority, was the largest in the world, controlling assets worth more than US$50 billion, and also had hundreds of tons of gold reserves in its Central Bank." By any standard Libya was a rich and stable country, however its leader was seen as volatile and unpredictable and as such a wild card that could not be adequately catered for in the American grand scheme of things. This points to an argument that Gaddafi was taken out not because of an American desire to save civilian lives but that it was a strategic move to entrench the U.S foothold in African military and security affairs. It also opened the doors for Western oil companies to move into Libya and secure America's vital interests in energy security. Removing Gaddafi

kept the oil flowing. The Libyan experience also announced the arrival of AFRICOM to the world and any Western competitors for dominance in Africa that Africa was under the protection and "sphere of influence' of the Americans. AFRICOM also silenced its most vocal critique on the continent.

3.3 Nigeria, Boko Haram and AFRICOM's Disaster Capitalism

According to Johnson and Sergie (2014), "Boko Haram was created in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno, by Islamist cleric Mohammed Yusuf. The group aims to establish a fully Islamic state in Nigeria, including the implementation of criminal sharia courts across the country." The group was borne out of frustration from the politics of seclusion and corruption that meant relegation to perpetual poverty for the vast majority of youths in Northern Nigeria. This culminated in Boko Haram taking on a militant aspect to challenge the authority of the Nigerian government head on. Johnson and Sergie (2014) observe that, "Boko Haram, an Islamist militant group, has attacked Nigeria's military, schools, religious buildings and public institutions, with increasing attack since 2009. Thousands people have been killed in Boko Haram-related violence, and more than two hundred thousand people have been displaced." Boko Haram as such represented a threat to the order and stability of the Nigerian state. This in effect meant it had the capacity to disrupt the extraction and flow of Nigeria's vast oil wealth which the U.S has come to depend on. Neethling (2012) notes that, "Nigeria is Africa's largest supplier of oil, and is the fifth largest global supplier of oil to the US. Instability in the Niger Delta region has reduced output by as much as 25 percent at some point which is clearly not in the US interest." However Boko Haram gained international infamy after kidnapping more than 200 schoolgirls in 2014. This attracted the attention of the international community and more importantly that of the U.S. The militant group has brought instability in Nigeria which is one of the highest oil importers to the U.S. The Boko Haram is also another group which the U.S is targeting in its global war on terror. This therefore means that Boko Haram gives two major reasons for the formation of AFRICOM that is to protect its geo-strategic interests and in its fight against terrorism.

Chothia (2014) notes that, "In 2010, the US designated Boko Haram a terrorist organisation, amid fears that it had developed links with other militant groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, to wage a global jihad." The kidnap of the Chibok girls highlighted the need to tackle Boko Haram head to secure U.S strategic resource interests and checking the spread of radical Islamic links of Al Qaeda to West Africa and the Sahel region.

Consequently this has meant the use of military means to tackle Boko Haram. The most obvious tool for this has been AFRICOM. Shaoul (2014), "The United States has sent military and security "advisers" to Nigeria to help President Goodluck Jonathan's government rescue more than 200 schoolgirls kidnapped by the Islamist group Boko Haram." Book Haram has provided a pretext for AFRICOM to get involved militarily in Nigeria, which was also another staunch oppose of the establishment of AFRICOM bases on the continent. As such the rise of Boko Haram has provided a priceless pretext for the U.S to offer military aid and assistance to Nigeria, albeit under the ambit of AFRICOM, to combat a terrorist threat that the Nigerian state cannot deal with effectively on its own.

Shaoul (2014) adds that, "The kidnapping presents Washington, whose requests to mount military and intelligence operations from Nigeria had repeatedly been rebuffed, with a golden opportunity to secure a foothold in the oil-rich country, now Africa's largest economy. This is part of its efforts to build up a string of military bases across the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and West Africa." In this view Boko Haram has proved to be the best thing to ever happen to the American plan of making AFRICOM the first and last line of military security capacity building and support for African nations. This has at the same time increased the political influence of Washington in Africa and has made AFRICOM indispensable in combating a pervasive terrorist threat in Africa. The use of the term terrorist to describe any form of violent outburst has also made African states such as Nigeria more inclined to ask and use military help from AFRICOM rather than focus on the root causes of the discontent within their populations. Shaoul (2014) argues that,

> The US has used the "war on terror" to justify its interventions in North Africa, the Sahel and now the West African state of Nigeria. But the reality is that the US-NATO war for regime change in Libya—carried out at least in part because Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had for decades blocked Washington's efforts to dominate Africa—served to destabilize the entire region. Islamist forces, this time Boko Haram—the very forces that the US and NATO backed and armed in Libya as a proxy ground force in the war to topple Gaddafi—are being used as the bogey man to justify the intervention of US military forces.

The Boko Haram problem that can be solved using military means alone. Rather it is a socio-political problem that needs to be addressed by the Nigerian political system. Boko Haram is largely made up of disgruntled unemployed and alienated youths who feel the central

government has relegated them to being passive observers of the political process in their own country. As such their resort to arms and violence cannot be ended by employing counter force but rather by addressing the core social and political problems that drove them to violence in the first place. However this does not tally with U.S interests which would rather see the utilization of military solutions that would in turn entrench the utility and normalcy of a gigantic foreign military presence on the African continent in the form of AFRICOM.

Neethling (2012) notes that, "current US security policy is driven in large part by the global war on terror, which the Bush administration has identified as a top security priority. From a US point of view, terrorist attacks on US embassies in Dar es Salaam in 1998, Nairobi in 2002 and, more recently, in Algiers in 2007, have highlighted the threat of terrorism." As such the U.S has used the Global War on Terror agenda to force the need for Nigeria to accept the reality and help of AFRICOM even though it is against the existence of AFRICOM on African soil. This is because the U.S has validated its legitimacy to help fight Boko Haram on the premise that the Islamist outfit has links to the greater Al Qaeda terrorist network and is already radicalized to the point of stopping at nothing but the total destabilization of the whole region. Guzman (2014) asserts that, "The commander of AFRICOM General Carter Ham said three violent extremist organizations are of particular concern in Africa: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, active in northern and western Africa; Boko Haram in Nigeria; and al-Shabaab in Somalia." This linkage therefore legitimizes the involvement of AFRICOM on the fight against these various terrorist groups. The use of these unfortunate events as political capital to further the agenda of AFRICOM and military security over human security is nothing short of what Scahill (2011) terms 'disaster capitalism'. AFRICOM's operations in Nigeria have only furthered the entrenchment of the emphasis of the militaristic notion of security over human security. In the same thought AFRICOM as a command is developing necessary tools in terms of hard power to perpetuate its survival from external attack like the 9/11 attack. Realism deems the international system as a dangerous environment characterised by the operation of the security dilemma, where the increase of the military security of one actor causes the insecurity of another actor.

3.4 AFRICOM Exporting Terror- Al Shabab and The Kenyan Experience

In September 2013 armed men from a terrorist group from Somalia called Al Shabab attacked a mall in Kenya and killed 65 civilians. This attack was claimed to be in retaliation for Kenya's involvement in Somalia's political affairs through a full scale invasion of Somalia. Al Shabab warned that more attacks would ensue if Kenya did not revisit its foreign policy in respect of Somalia.

Catarlucci (2013) notes that, "Kenya's invasion of Somalia, hailed by the West and the UN Security Council, was meant to deliver a knockout blow to the militant Islamist group al-Shabaab." Kenya embarked on this military adventure with the blessing and funding of the U.S, it also received military aid in the form of training and equipment. Because Al Shabab is a franchise of Al Qaeda, the motivation of the U.S in encouraging Kenya, Burundi and Uganda to have a forceful military presence can be reasonably viewed as being a strategic move to use these countries as proxies in the war on terror. However this has not gone so well for the African countries involved as it has effectively had the blowback effect of exporting the terrorism threat to these countries as they are seen as extensions of Western imperialism. Catarlucci (2013) argues that, "It was in fact this US-backed military invasion that served as the alleged motivation of the Al Shabaab terrorists who attacked Kenya's Westgate Mall in late September 2013." Al Shabab had also attacked Uganda in 2012 killing civilians. It argued that Uganda should withdraw its troops from Somalia. Uganda is given military aid and logistical support to carry out its operations in Somalia through AFRICOM.

Catarlucci (2013) further adds that,

> ...beginning in 2011, geopolitical analysts warned that US, British and French intervention in Libya would create a terror emirate that would unleash a tidal wave of militant destabilization across Northern Africa and beyond. From Mali to Kenya, and as far as Syria, violence directly linked to the militants and the aid and weapons they received from the West in Libya, have now been felt.

This argument is based on the fact that weapons that were given to the Libyan rebels to topple Gaddafi eventually found their way into the hands of Muslim Salafists in Mali, the Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabab in Somalia which eventually attacked Kenya. This effect was caused by the fact that AFRICOM during operation Odyssey Dawn had not anticipated that the Libyan rebels would have links with Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) which in turn has links with a conglomerate of terrorist groups across the continent. Catarlucci (2013) argues that,

The cooperation between AQIM, Boko Haram, and Al Shabaab has been clearly bolstered by the immense influx of NATO-provided cash and weapons flowing into Libya first to overthrow the Libyan government. NATO's assistance in expanding Al Qaeda's operational capacity in North Africa can only be helping terrorists like those behind the Kenya Westgate Mall siege to carry out cross-border operations of this scale.

This points to a disturbing trend where efforts by AFRICOM to secure the African continent have nothing but negative effects that grow exponentially as they further downstream as in the case given above were the command had a hand in operation in operation Odyssey Dawn which was one of its attempts against terrorism but the rebels in Libya has links with groups like the Al Qaeda and Al Shabab which attacked Kenya.

The most glaring of this blowback is the exportation and internationalization of the terrorist threat to the wider African sphere which had largely been immune from terror attacks as African countries were seen as neutral or non threats to the jihadists. Vandiver (2011) notes that, "sending small numbers of troops to train other militaries to target terrorist groups is in line with a U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Africa that puts a premium on maintaining a low profile." In essence this means that the U.S through its AFRICOM apparatus trains, funds and equips other armies to fight for it as proxies in the war on terror. The objective being to keep a minimal U.S military footprint in the event of things not going as planned because of the political costs that can be exacted by official military action such as the effects in Somalia after the events of 1993 in the Black Hawk Down debacle. This strengthening of military security of African states has had costly repercussions on social stability and human security of Kenya and other countries that are partnering with the U.S in its fight against these terrorist organizations. These effects have in reality exported terrorism from its original localities of the ungoverned spaces of Mali and Somalia to the territories of Kenya and Uganda.

The U.S through AFRICOM and its reinforcement of military security has managed to drag in countries like Kenya and Uganda into the war on terror and to fight as proxies. Regrettably these countries have paid with the lives of their citizens as the terrorists have taken the war to their doorsteps. Catarlucci (2013) sums it up by saying that, "the blood of Kenya's innocent are on the hands of those within the Kenyan government willfull serving as a proxy for US aggression across Africa, and those across the West using Al Qaeda as a geopolitical tool to

achieve their global objectives." These geopolitical objectives are the militarization of security on the African continent and establishing military dominance in Africa for the sole purpose of ensuring the uninterrupted extraction and flow of strategic resources, and AFRICOM is the manifestation of these objectives.

3.5 Conclusion

AFRICOM has exploited security situations in African states to further its agenda of establishing a military security centred regime in Africa to further the entrenchment of American interests on the African continent. This has been achieved through the execution of U.N resolution 1973 that ended up in the toppling of Gaddafi. This had an effect of increasing insecurity across North Africa, the Maghreb and parts of West and East Africa. This was through the proliferation of arms and funds that the West gave to Libyan rebels that invariably ended up in the hands of terrorist linked organizations. In turn these organizations created a security deficit that necessitated African states to call for help from AFRICOM. This has been seen in Nigeria that ended up accepting military assistance in order to counter Boko Haram. AFRICOM then co-opted African partners to act as proxies in its Global War on Terror through Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara Task Force. The effects of these strategically moves by AFRICOM was a backlash by terror groups on countries like Kenya and Uganda who paid for their cooperation with the U.S with their citizens blood. AFRICOM has exposed itself as limiting the human security element in building true security for African countries. The emphasis on military has resulted in the transfer of military skills and hardware but creating a corresponding deficit in human security in the long run. This is because African governments have adopted a military approach in solving any and all problems they encounter instead of focusing on the underlying issues at the root of social unrest on the continent. This has largely been the case in Nigeria. AFRICOM has served to reinforce military security over human security in all of the cases that have been under examination in this chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

AFRICOM AND THE REINFORCEMENT OF MILITARY SECURITY

4.1Introduction

This chapter details the effectiveness of USAFRICOM. Themes highlighted in this chapter include the forces which facilitated U.S strategy towards Africa. With a number of security challenges in Africa, U.S has found itself in reshaping its strategy towards Africa. In this regard this chapter assesses the military and security challenges in Africa and external factors leading to the US foreign policy on Africa. The chapter also highlights the use of both soft and hard power by US in furthering its interest in Africa through the use of defence diplomacy.

4.2Forces Facilitating the Formation of AFRICOM

In an interview, Dr Mapuranga highlighted that, the formation of AFRICOM is linked to a number of new and evolving geostrategic and security considerations that the U.S is facing in Africa, most notably humanitarian and development interests, energy, security, terrorism, failed states and the rising Chinese intentions and interests. From this list of possible factors behind the command's formation, it is vital to establish the claim that Africa has emerged as both a strong market for finished products and a resource base for raw materials. This means that most European countries will compete for partners in Africa. As a result the US is forced to explore other alternatives to lure African countries into partnerships for its own advantage. Ebrahim (2013:76) states that, "it is also an undeniable factor that US relies on resources from the Middle East and North Africa and oil is no exception in this case." Given that the region is experiencing political and security instabilities, US decided to move and diversify its resource base to the whole of Africa under the smokescreen of military security in Africa.

4.3 Internal Factors in Africa Facilitating the Formation of AFRICOM

a) Military Security Transformation

The current military security in Africa is shaped by the transformation of African armies because of colonialism. There is the redefinition of military forces to suite their own societal needs. In Zimbabwe there was the transformation of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force to the current Zimbabwe Air Force. This is done in order to create African armies that can protect their own society not as extensions of the former colonisers. The transformation of armies has thus created serious security challenges to Africa. Reforms in the militaries caused weakening of security forces especially by coups. In December 1999, Ivory Coast had a coup in which Henri Konan Bedie was overthrown by a group of soldiers on allegations of corruption political repression and abusing the rights of foreign nationals. The former army commander Robert Guei then came into power; the general populace welcomed the coup hoping that it would end the suffering. There were visible signs within a few months of the coup that the country was heading to a pattern of arbitrariness. The Ivorian Human Rights Leagues: issued a condemnation of human rights abuses, charging the security forces, among other things, with summary executions of alleged criminals without investigation and of harassment of commercial entities. Many cases of abuse were committed by the soldiers. Also, soldiers demanded increases in pay and allowances, causing many mutinies. The situation in Ivory Coast at the time led to the intervention by the U.N peacekeeping troops with the assistance of the French army. According to Wynfred(1969:13) , constitutionally the duty of the army is to look after the people and warding off aggressors. This however is not the case in most African states as cited in the example of Ivory Coast given above. There is lack of resources in most African armies. There is lack of funding sufficient to have a credible defence. This leads to lack of preparedness.

b) Intrastate Conflicts

Africa is also being faced with a rise in the number of intrastate conflicts. According to Goodin (2011:90), "intrastate conflicts are sustained political violence that takes place between armed groups representing the state and one or more non state groups." In such cases violence is confined within particular boarders of a single state but it has international dimensions and this has a risk of spilling over into bordering states. In January 2012 Mali had such a conflict. A number of groups started fighting against the government of Mali for independence of the Northern Taureg people. After three months of conflict the president was

ousted in a coup, this resulted in the instability in Mali's three largest northern cities Kidal, Gao and Timbktu. The cities were overrun by the rebels. In January 2013 the government of Mali asked for foreign military intervention this led to the French military intervention and began operations against the Islamist. Gasper (2013:59) states that, "When the OAU was formed in 1963 it adopted a policy of non alignment." This policy was as a result of the cold war in which there were two main rival sides that is the Eastern camp under the USSR and the Western camp under the USA. This policy was adopted in order for African states not to accept foreign based military security as this would further perpetuate the Cold war. The AU peace and Security Council now works five regional economic communities like the ECOWAS, SADC. Mali is a member of the ECOWAS, when the conflict in Mali broke out the AU mandated the ECOWAS to deal with the crisis in Mali. However, according to Forster (2004:54) ECOWAS like any other African Economic community failed to deal with the situation in Mali because of lack of funding and most importantly the group wanted to deal with the issue in a diplomatic manner rather than military intervention which was applied by the French military. In the case given above Deni (2013:4) notes that ".... AFRICOM has most recently been the focus of popular attention for its role in Libya and its support of French operations in Mali, the Command's most significant—and arguably most important—operations and activities attract far less attention...." this highlights the presence of AFRICOM in East Africa in which the regional community bloc and the continent had failed to step in time and hence the intervention by France with the aid of AFRICOM.

c) Terrorism

The "war on terror" doctrine is another key reason for AFRICOM's establishment. This follows the promotion of the argument that weak states pose as much danger to the USA as strong states and that there is a link between underdevelopment and terrorism. Brown (2013:10) notes that "many analysts have referred to this process as the security-development discourse and have argued that this connection is dangerous because of the ease with which a causal relationship can be drawn between underdevelopment and terrorism." Fischer (2012:13) notes that "Perhaps more importantly, failed or failing states also can ultimately threaten U.S. interests more directly and immediately by becoming incapable of fully or effectively governing their own territory." If this happens, criminals, traffickers, and terrorist organizations can fill the vacuum created by the lack of an effective government. An example of this was Afghanistan in the 1990s, the years of interstate war created conditions that enabled Al Qaeda to develop a safe hub, which then contributed to the 9/11 attacks in the

United States. In other countries like, Somalia, Mali, and Yemen they are places where there is also governance vacuum which some authors have referred to as "alternative governance" structures and this has resulted in safe hubs that terrorist organizations took advantage of, in some cases directly threatening the security of U.S. interests (Brown 2013). Thus eliminating these safe hubs reduces the likelihood of a major terrorist attack against the United States.

Ebrahim (2013:14) states that,

> it is noteworthy that AFRICOM is not the first US initiative to use counterterrorism as a cover to infiltrate African States Under the Pan-Sahelian and Trans-Sahel counter-terrorism initiatives, the USA pursued its war on terror agenda by coordinating counterterrorism activities with African states including Mali, Mauritania, Algeria and Niger providing weaponry and equipment and, at times, funding fuel costs.

AFRICOM's main aim in this regard is to intensify and coordinate activities dealing with the war on terror in Africa by coordinating and managing the above initiatives and furthering the security-development discourse in cooperating counterterrorism into the various military partnerships and training programmes oversees.

d)Oil

Another reason for the formation of AFRICOM is the control over oil. Emira (2007:1) states that, "this military-driven U.S. engagement with Africa reflects the desperation of the Bush administration to control the increasingly strategic natural resources on the African continent, especially oil, gas, and uranium." Feffer (2008:10) alludes that "with increased competition from China, among other countries, for those resources, the United States wants above all else to strengthen its foothold in resource-rich regions of Africa." As early as 2001, Africa's oil resources were posited as being potential solution to America's energy problem. The Cheney report (2011) predicted that by 2015 Africa's gulf of Guinea would account for over twenty-five percent of US oil imports, this prompted George Bush to declare Africa's oil a national strategic interest. Ebrahim (2013:15) argues that "the consequences of the American invasion of Iraq have meant that by 2006 the USA was already receiving twenty-two percent of its oil from Africa, and by 2007 US oil imports from Africa eclipsed its imports from the Persian Gulf." This situation has been brought into focus and accelerated by the fact that China currently receives approximately a third of its oil requirements from Africa i.e Sudan

and Angola being the states from which the country imports most of its oil. According to Ebrahim (2013:45) "China has therefore invested large amounts of capital extraction capacity in African states that possess oil resources and, in the case of Sudan, even utilised its position on the United Nations Security Council to dilute and block resolutions targeting the regime." This has further entrenched the Cold-War like competition between the US and China over Africa leading to many commentators to assert that we are currently witnessing the beginnings of a new scramble for Africa. Emira (2007:12) notes that, "the rise of AFRICOM underscores that the real interests of neoconservatives has less to do with al-Qaeda than with more access and control of extractive industries, particularly oil." The figure below shows the petroleum imports to U.S by three African countries in nine years.


Figure 1: U.S. Petroleum Imports, 1993-2012, in thousands of barrels. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

According to Deni (2013:6) "since the oil crises of the 1970s, the United States has sought to diversify its energy suppliers beyond the Middle East, resulting in an increasing emphasis on petroleum producers in Africa, among other regions." As shown in figure 1 above, U.S. petroleum imports from Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria; Africa largest petroleum producers grew from the early 1990s until the late 2000s. Hence America has strong interest in the African countries as they are a source to its petroleum needs. Thus AFRICOM is the ideal infrastructure of U.S statecraft to safeguard its oil interests.

4.4 External Factors Facilitating the Formation of AFRICOM

a) The Rise of China

Despite the internal conditions in Africa facilitating for the formation of AFRICOM another external reason is the rise of China. China's economy has grown by an average of nine percent per annum over the past thirty years and whose Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has

grown to around sixteen percent of the world's GDP from a figure of less than five percent in 1980. Asia is a lens through which this can best be viewed. Esterhuys (2008:2) notes that "Chinese trade with the continent has grown from around three billion dollars annually in 1995 to over 100 billion in 2008." China has thus provided large amounts in developmental loans to African states, including US$22 billion to Angola and US$13 billion to the Democratic Republic of Congo, and it has invested over US$13 billion in the continent in the past five years. Hofstedt (2009:17) notes that, "it is noteworthy that Chinese trade with Africa is skewed towards Africa, thus indicating that this trade might not be as predatory as many argue." These trade aid relations are made more appealing to African states by the fact that Chinese aid is broadly non- conditional and is a result of historical south-south solidarity.

As a result of the reasons stated above, Chinese trade with African states has surpassed that of US with the continent an aspect that the US seeks to address. US administration' s military support to Africa under the African Contingency Response Initiative (ACRI) and the African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA) initiative among others, has been partly aimed at reducing the dependence of African states on Chinese military assistance in training and equipment.

4.5 AFRICOM: Military or Defence Diplomacy?

Cottey (2004:2) states that "defense diplomacy, also known as military diplomacy is the nonviolent use of military forces through activities like officer exchanges and ship visits to further a country's international agenda." While there is no broadly accepted definition of defence diplomacy, it can be understood as the peaceful application of resources from across the spectrum of defence, to achieve positive outcomes in the development of a country's international relationships. "Military diplomacy" is a sub-set of defence diplomacy; it refers only to the role of military attachés and their associated activity. Defence diplomacy does not include military operations, but includes other defence activities as international personnel exchanges, ship and aircraft visits, high level engagement, bilateral meetings and staff talks, training and exercises, regional defence forums, confidence and security building measures, and non-proliferation activities. The objectives of AFRICOM which include military training, military exchange programs and National Guard partnerships are derived from defence diplomacy as its operations mainly include the non violent use of military forces to further the interests of U.S.

Despite existing in various forms for centuries, little attention has been paid to this practice or its use as a tool of statecraft. According Oakes (2012:43),"Typically used as an umbrella term, activities as diverse as officer exchanges, ship visits, training missions, and joint military exercises have all been denoted as practices of defense diplomacy." As such it is important to note that the formation of AFRICOM in 2008 by the Bush administration is also seen as defense diplomacy. Winger (2014:2) notes that,

> …..Gates stated that the trials faced by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq were evidence that military strength alone was insufficient to triumph in modern conflicts. Rather, in the Global War on Terror and the conflicts to come "success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between" (Gates). Gates, breaking with the lineage of his office, recognized that such objectives could not be achieved through military coercion alone. Instead, he championed the cause of not only strengthening America's capacity to use soft power, but the necessity of integrating soft power with the hard power mechanism that had come to dominate American foreign policy (Gates). For Secretary Gates, the capability of America's military to redress the trials of the modern age lay not in its capacity to drop bombs, but rather in its ability to look beyond the use of violence and embrace alternative means of defense diplomacy.

AFRICOM has managed to infuse itself into various African militaries with its different activities. This has been managed through military to military partnerships which the command has with more than forty African countries. These partnerships involve the ceding of operational command to AFRICOM by its African partners. National Guard partnerships have also been set up between African states and individual US states through the state partnership program. Brown (2011:10) notes that, "in 2009, the command held an air force training drill with eight Western African states." South Africa is currently part of with the New York Guard, some of the US naval vessels have been deployed at Simon's Town port. Simon' Town port in South Africa has also been used to undertake and coordinate what is termed "theater of security cooperation" that is counterterrorism training and activities. This has resulted in the infiltration of the command's activities into African militaries under the guise of military to military partnerships and National Guard partnerships. Cross (2011:12) states that;

Defense diplomacy is thus not cooperation for its own sake, but actually the method of bringing the strategic thinking of one country (the recipient) into harmony with another (the practitioner). This nonviolent use of military institutions to convince officials from the recipient government that they actually want what the practitioner wants is the essence of soft power promoting its interests."

Defense diplomacy therefore entails an interdependent relationship between two actors involved. This relationship involves the use of soft power by the practitioner that is the U.S and the recipient which are African states. Military strength alone could not translate into triumph but national interests such as oil and minerals needed the integration of hard and soft power.

4.6 Security Cooperation

According to various authors the command will go a long way in promoting both military and human security in Africa. Deni (2010) notes that;

"AFRICOM supports the ongoing State Department security assistance program through its efforts to build basic military capacity by educating key military institutional-level personnel and through small-scale civil action projects with the South Sudanese military. And in more stable African countries such as Botswana, AFRICOM builds partner country capability to participate in or lead peacekeeping operations, or assists partner countries in integrating women into their military services."

In a speech in 2013, the US president Obama spoke of the importance of enhancing the security capabilities of partner and allied countries. Howard (2013:9) states that, "We don't need to send tens of thousands of our sons and daughters abroad, or occupy other nations," he further stated that, "instead, we will need to help countries like Yemen, Libya, and Somalia provide for their own security, and help allies who take the fight to terrorists, as we have in Mali." Assisting these African countries' military capability promotes U.S. interests in stability and security, hence the establishment of AFRICOM to assist in the military capabilities of African states.

4.6.1 Military Security Subordinate to Policy

It is important to note that effective governance requires competent and responsible security forces, military and police. In this case U.S. security assistance under AFRICOM is welcome, however it is subordinate to policy in Africa. Menkhaus (2012:9) states that "There are no significant traditional military threats in or to Africa, and therefore little need for large-scale traditional military training or equipment assistance." In as much as security is a basic requirement for effective governance and economic development, it is a mistake to think that security is created by security forces, security is created by competent governments. This experience is highlighted in a comment on AFRICOM'S mission, given in a Department of Defence report paper: "In that context the command would help build the capacity of African countries to reduce conflict, improve security, deny terrorists sanctuary and support crisis response." In this instance therefore military security is a subordinate policy under the broader policy designed for Africa by the U.S.

General Ward, AFRICOM's former commander in a report stated that AFRICOM in coordination with other US agencies will help Africa confront transnational threats to security, counter threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, illegal arms and narcotics, mitigate violent conflict, promote stability, security and reconstruction efforts, turn the tide on diseases such as HIV&AIDS and malaria, strengthen democratic principles by fostering respect for the rule of law, civilian control of the military budget transparency an foster the conditions that lead to a peaceful, stable and economically strong Africa. AFRICOM therefore works in various ways mentioned by General Ward showing that it is not a strictly military project. Recently the command built a special needs school in Nigeria worth US$ 84 000 for disadvantaged disabled children.

4.7 Possible Challenges of AFRICOM to Africa

AFRICOM is a fundamental instrument to further US foreign policy in Africa. Jones (2012:55) postulates that, "the command is a curse than a blessing to the African continent." It perpetuates neo-colonialism. Chomsky (2013:76) defines neo-colonialism in simple terms as "a policy of a strong state towards another weaker state in seeking to control the political and economic direction of a weaker independent state." Critiques of the command view it as a bold move to recolonize Africa and argue that it is actually a stealth operation to extend US military control across the continent. The U.S is also aware of the fact that Africa is rich in minerals especially oil. According to Malvin (2012:88) " U.S knows that the world supply of oil may fall short of global demand as early as 2025, by that same year Africa's production of

oil is expected to rise by 30% hence, America has begun to redefine its relationship with Africa." In the data gathered in the IMF report in 2011, DRC was rated as the fourth poorest country in the world, the UN Development Index also placed DRC as number 184 out of 188. DRC has an estimated wealth of over 24trillion in minerals. With such mineral wealth in Africa as in the case of DRC it's not a fallacy that AFRICOM seeks to perpetuate neo-colonialism so as to have access and control of Africa' resources.

The militarisation and proliferation of arms in Africa that the command seeks to do is in itself a security threat. Peters (2012:12) argues that "with the increase in militarism, better trained soldiers, armed forces, increase in the number of drones on the continent, deployment of navy seals only lead down the one road of insecurity and giving birth to security dilemmas." Effects of conflicts are deaths, displacement of people and breaking of family ties. AFRICOM can become a basis for the expansion of private military companies (PMCs). America has been known to train such companies as the Black Water which fought the war on its behalf in Iraq. Black Water was one of the most high profile in the invasion of Iraq. When these PMCs fight in a war on behalf of a certain state there is a lack of accountability, these companies are also known for attempting to overthrow unpopular leaders like the case that took place in Libya in 1972 when a PMC, Woodhouse tried to overthrow Gaddafi from power.

The command threatens the sovereignty, independence and stability of the continent. Brown (2012:75) notes that, "AFRICOM infringes the sovereignty of African states due to the particularity of African History and Africa's current economic and political relationship with the U.S." The command violates the right to self determination of African states. AFRICOM is likely to become a device for the foreign domination and exploitation of Africa's natural resources. Brown (2011:12) suggests that following the fruitless efforts of the US and EU from the 1990s to convince Africa to liberalise and open up its markets through the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), the command is yet another move to control Africa's resources under the guise of military to military partnerships. Thus from the above points an analysis of the command shows that it poses various security threats to Africa rather than reducing them.

4.8 Conclusion

In summary as highlighted by the chapter there are internal forces within Africa which facilitated the US strategy towards Africa. Most African states are still in a process of

transformation after the attainment of independence from colonial bondage. A closer analysis however revealed that the process of transformation in Africa is being hindered by lack of resources to adequately fund the armies and this has led to a shift of the primary role of armies which is to protect its citizens. Intrastate conflicts some of which have become perennial in some states as Somalia has also resulted in Africa's inability to contain its conflicts and ask for foreign assistance as in the case of Mali cited above. The rise of China on the global market and its increased trade with African states has been a situation which US seeks to address in a bid to maintain its dominance on the global market.US foreign policy to Africa has been redefined to defence diplomacy after the realisation that war alone cannot be a means to attain the desired goal but rather by peaceful means tilted in its favour. The research has also revealed that the creation of AFRICOM is a security threat rather than a solution to Africa's problems

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The chapter presents the conclusion and recommendations to the subject under study. The chapter draws conclusions from the research and the literature review. It highlights the major aspects which have been brought forward and it gives recommendations and possible areas of further study.

5.2 Conclusion

a) Formation of AFRICOM

The formation of AFRICOM has mainly been to further American interests on the African continent. These objectives have sought to be achieved in various ways, some of which include military to military partnerships, the provision of military aid in the form of training and advanced equipment for surveillance and counterterrorism activities. The main objective of this being to deal with threats to security and create a conducive environment for the free flow of resources from Africa to the US. As such AFRICOM operations have been largely concentrated in the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa and the vast expanses of the Sahara-Sahel region. This region highly strategic in nature in terms of American energy interests and the control of other minerals, it is also a region where the U.S has faced growing and stiff competition from the Chinese for control of. Thus the region has naturally attracted the attention of AFRICOM operations and a continuous attack of militaristic negotiations masked

in the overtones of the Global War on Terror. This has seen various Task Forces and commands formed to operate in this region. Formation of AFRICOM therefore can be explained by realism in that, the theory states that states build up militaries to survive and that all states are rational actors with the primary concern of survival. Threats to survival have now shifted from just being territorial integrity and independence due to globalisation and now these threats include threats to the interests of a state. AFRICOM is hence a tool to protect interest such as oil and minerals to ensure its survival in an anarchic world.

b) Military Security in Africa

African militaries have been actively involved in the politics of African countries, mostly culminating in coups that oust elected civilian governments. This is because of what Omar (2000:9) terms "guardian thesis." This is whereby African militaries see themselves as the guardians of the state and the peace that prevails in it. They perceive the maintenance of state security as giving them an overarching prerogative to determine the course the states politics will take. This prerogative of keeping the peace comes from an entrenched perspective of military security as being the apex of other form of security. It should be noted however that in most cases the military intervention in politics has brought about more harm than good and has severely threatened human security in Africa. The main cause of this is that military coups often bring with them political upheaval and instability. Also military coups start an unending vicious cycle of the military meddling in politics. Transformation of armies in the African societies has also often resulted in serious security challenges by weakening the armies and in states like Ivory Coast and Mali this has lifted the primary objective of military to protect its militaries to foreign armies.

AFRICOM has exploited security situations in African states to further its agenda of establishing a military security centred regime in Africa to further the entrenchment of American interests on the African continent. This has been achieved through the execution of U.N resolution 1973 that ended up in the toppling of Gaddafi. This had an effect of increasing insecurity across North Africa. This was through the proliferation of arms and funds that the West gave to Libyan rebels that invariably ended up in the hands of terrorist linked organizations. In turn these organizations created a security deficit that necessitated African states to call for help from AFRICOM. This has been seen in Nigeria that ended up accepting military assistance in order to counter Boko Haram. AFRICOM then co-opted African partners to act as proxies in its Global War on Terror through Operation Enduring Freedom

Trans Sahara Task Force. The effects of these moves by AFRICOM was the increase of activities by terror groups on countries like Kenya and Uganda who paid for their cooperation with the U.S with their citizens blood. AFRICOM has exposed itself as limiting the human security element in building true security for African countries. The emphasis on military has resulted in the transfer of military skills and hardware but creating a corresponding deficit in human security in the long run. This is because African governments have adopted a military approach in solving any and all problems they encounter instead of focusing on the underlying issues at the root of social unrest on the continent, this has largely been the case in Nigeria. AFRICOM has served to reinforce military security over human security in all of the cases that have been under examination in the study. The power theory states that the use of power by states places an emphasis on coercive tactics being acceptable to either accomplish an intended goal or to avoid something inimical to the national interest. Power is expressed in terms of the size, scope and reach and effectiveness of particular states military and in this instance it is the U.S. As such the activities of AFRICOM in Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda relate to the power theory in its global war on terror despite the increase of terrorist groups in African states which have cooperated with U.S in its fight against terrorism.

c) AFRICOM; A Defence Diplomacy Tool

The role of AFRICOM is purely as a foreign policy tool to advance American interests and not only to secure Africa. This has been done through militarization of the continent through military to military partnerships between the various National Guard troops of the individual states that make up the United States. These partnerships have been carried out with any willing government regardless of their human rights background or economic stability. As such the U.S had sought to prop up unpopular governments in Africa who are willing to be proxies in the war on terror and provide forward operating bases and partner with them in fighting Muslim fundamentalists that are sheltering in some of the continents ungoverned spaces. This cooperation has however been at the expense of human security on the continent. The focus on military to military cooperation has meant that scarce resources in Africa which could have been used to better the socio economic situation of many ordinary citizens have been redirected into strengthening the military. This is explained by complex interdependence, complex interdependent theorists argue that interdependence that develop between states through commerce and globalisation inhibits the use of force between states in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. Africa is important as America depends on it for raw

materials to keep its economy going on, on the other hand Africa is highly insecure and unstable thus it needs America's support to establish effective and functional militaries that can guarantee both the security of Africa and the extraction of minerals which benefit U.S and Africa as well. One can therefore argue that complex interdependence can be used to explain AFRICOM as a defence diplomacy tool as it is a mutually beneficial venture.

5.3 Recommendations

Africa is able to deal with the security challenges it is facing. In Southern Africa under the regional economic (SADC) bloc there is the stand by force. The stand by brigade is funded by the SADC member states. The force was exercised for example in 2008 in South Africa's Uhatla when there was a field training exercise with live ammunition. The AU assessment on this exercise also stated that it was a success. This training was meant to train the brigade on how to respond in times of a crisis. The intervention by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in the DRC conflict on behalf of SADC also highlights that Africa is able to deal with its own problems. Hence Africa should utilise its economic blocs and create stand by forces which are able to intervene in conflict situations.

The use of concurrence by African parliaments delays intervention of armies in times of conflicts. This part of the constitution should be ratified in order to ensure that military security interventions are pro-active rather than reactionary.

AU should have a stand by force and also the early warning system should be used in practice and not only on paper. There should also be security cooperation between African states. African countries have little in common; they have different views to the problems which the continent is facing. Security cooperation therefore provides a platform for exchange programs between armies and this enhances the capability of the stand by forces regionally and overall on the whole continent. African countries lack resources and do not voice out disapproval towards bilateral relations, they usually survive on their own. This has resulted in the infiltration of AFRICOM in Africa were it now has fifty three military to military partnerships with African states, who under AU had said no to the creation of the command and its location in Africa.

Taking a closer look at the problems that Africa is facing right now such as poverty, hunger, diseases, bad governance, corruption and religious indifferences it is not true to think that these problems need military to military partnership or militarisation of the continent but

rather they should be addressed through other means. The problems facing Africa should and can be solved politically and through economic back up.

If the command is to benefit Africa, its activities should be done in such a way that addresses the problems at hand. Another point to note is that African culture and beliefs are different from those of America. There is therefore need to take into consideration the beliefs and culture of each country before embarking on partnerships rather than imposing on Africa.

5.4 Areas for further study

America's foreign policy towards Africa is dynamic because of the strategic interests that it has. The US strategy towards Africa therefore can change and be redefined to suite its interests. The main objective of the command has not yet been met that is to counter Chinese trade, global war on terror as there still exist terrorist groups like the Boko Haram in Nigeria and to control the resources in Africa. It therefore remains to be seen whether this command will stand the test of time or will wither with time like the European Command, Pacific Command and Central Command. Scholars might therefore study on the future of AFRICOM against its set targets.

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