

**GLOBAL INSECURITY? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE  
UTILITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NORTH KOREAN  
NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY**

**BY**

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## **Dedication**

This dissertation is dedicated to my dear parents who sacrificed their financial resources to fund my education.

## **Acknowledgements**

I owe a debt of gratitude to numerous people for helping in completing this dissertation. I gratefully acknowledge my supervisor for giving me a considerable insight into this topic. Most of all I want to thank my family and friends for the emotional support they gave me throughout this research.

Responsibility for the views expressed and any remaining errors and omissions is of course, entirely mine.

## Abstract

Chapter 1 sets the stage for the investigation of the global insecurity problem brought about by the development of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate defense of the nation, a deterrent against any and all potential adversaries. The chapter though it is just an introduction to the study, it however attempted to profer the research proposal whose hypothesis credits nuclear weapons as being a necessary tool for deterrence despite their unprecedented destructiveness as exemplified by North Korea.

Chapter 2 traces back to the origins of the separation of South and North Korea which stems from the 1945 Allied victory in World War 11. After World War 11 the United States and its allies competed with the USSR and its allies for political and economic dominance around the world known as the Cold War. The Cold War influence also extended to Korea with the United States occupying the South and USSR the North. The chapter therefore attempted to investigate the debate on the Cold War rivalry particularly the tensions between North and South Korea and how the superpowers are involved in the conflict.

Chapter 3 dealt with the origins and objectives of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty which was opened for signature in July 1968 and signed on that date by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and 59 other countries. The chapter investigated the successes and challenges faced by the non proliferation regime and the impact of the Non Proliferation Treaty in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

Chapter 4 scrutinized the external environment or rather the reaction of the international community towards North Korea's nuclear weapon development program. North Korea's nuclear program has been a source of great concern for the international community. There have been multiple rounds of international negotiations, sanctions and diplomatic efforts from different nations all in a bid to resolve the North Korean situation as elaborated in the rest of the chapter.

Chapter 5 concluded the study. It summarized the discussions made in Chapters 1 to 4. Since it is now a known fact that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons openly and this has however dealt a fatal blow to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and for some scholars they argue that this has brought an end to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime because most states like Iran are following North Korea's example. Most states in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are now embracing nuclear

weapons for their own security. For years the United States and the international community have however tried to negotiate an end to North Korea's nuclear and missile developments and its export of ballistic missile technology. Those efforts have been replete with periods of crisis, stalemate and tentative progress towards denuclearization. Nuclear weapons, for all their horror brought to an end 50 years of worldwide wars. Even after the end of the Cold War nuclear weapons are still a necessary tool for deterrence as exemplified by North Korea in the study.

## Acronyms

DPRK	: Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DMZ	: Demilitarized Zone
ENR	: Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium Reprocessing
FCNL	: Friends Committee on National Legislation
IAEA	: International Atomic Energy Agency
ICJ	: International Court of Justice
JNCC	: Joint Nuclear Control Committee
LWRS	: Light Water Reactors
MAD	: Mutually Assured Destruction
MWe	: Megawatt electric
NNSC	: Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
NNWS	: Non Nuclear Weapon States
NWS	: Nuclear Weapon States
NPT	: Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
NPTREC	: Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty Reviews and Extension Conference
UN	: United Nations
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	: United Nations Security Council Resolution
USA	: United States of America
USSR	: United Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	: Weapons of Mass Destruction

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the Study

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) commonly referred to as North Korea is located in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula whose capital is Pyongyang. According to Olsen (2005;55) in his book Korea; The Divided Nation, North Korea has been a divided country since 1945 when it was liberated from the defeated Japan after World War II<sup>1</sup>. Korea was divided in accordance with a United Nations arrangement, to be administered by the Soviet Union in the north and the United States in the south. Tensions between North and South have run high on numerous occasions since 1953. The deployment of the U.S Army's Second Infantry Division on the Korean Peninsula and the American military presence at the Korean Demilitarized Zone are publicly regarded by North Korea as an occupying army. In several areas, North Korean and American/South Korean forces operate in extreme proximity to the border, adding to tension as postulated by Kreger (2005;28) in his book Korea Divided. In the early 1960s security concerns in the region and an apparent Soviet dismissal of these concerns hastened the DPRK's efforts to acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons<sup>2</sup>.

According to Carpenter and Bandow (2004;38) in their book The Korean Conundrum, North Korea's nuclear program was therefore born with assistance from the Soviet Union<sup>3</sup>. The two countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1959 and, over the next 30 years Moscow provided Pyongyang with training and technology useful in the development of basic nuclear technology. The type of aid granted to North Korea was typical of that on offer during the Cold War, when both the Soviet Union and the U.S supplied some of their allies and client states with basic nuclear technology and training. The 1959 agreement enabled a variety of technical and scientific exchanges and projects including construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre, training of North Korean scientific and technical personnel, and geological surveys for nuclear applications. Soviet assistance was not specifically intended to assist the development of nuclear weapons, but it allowed Pyongyang to master the basic technologies needed to produce and separate plutonium, which North Korea later employed in its nuclear-weapons program.

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<sup>1</sup> Olsen E, Korea; The Divided Nation, Greenwood Publishing Group, USA, 2005, p, 55.

<sup>2</sup> Kreger C, Korea Divided, Wheeling Jesuit University, 2005, p,28.

<sup>3</sup> Carpenter and Bandow, The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, Palgrave Macmillan, USA, 2005, p, 38.

North Korea also signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) in 1985. But even at that early date there were questions about the sincerity of Pyongyang's commitment. As Mohamed ElBaradei, the director of the I.A.E.A (the enforcement arm of the NPT) notes, North Korea took 7 years to sign the obligatory verification agreement with the I.A.E.A, a process that takes most signatories about 18 months. The ink was barely dry on the inspection agreement, ElBaradei recalls, before the I.A.E.A inspectors in May 1992 "discovered plutonium discrepancies in North Korea's nuclear waste streams indicating nuclear activity that had not been reported" according to Peter Goodman in his article, "South Korea Seeks Mediation Role To End Stand Off"<sup>4</sup>. When North Korean officials blocked a more intrusive inspection the following year, the I.A.E.A declared the DPRK to be in noncompliance with its obligations under the NPT and alerted the United Nations Security Council. Thus officially began the first North Korean crisis.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1989-90 North Korean leaders recognized the need for a new security relationship with a major power since Pyongyang could not afford to maintain its military posture. North Korean leaders therefore sought to forge a new relationship with the United States, the only power strong enough to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the early 1990s, throughout the first nuclear crisis, North Korea sought a non-aggression pact with the United States. The U.S rejected North Korean calls for bilateral talks concerning a non-aggression pact and stated that only six-party talks that also include the People's Republic of China, Russia, Japan and South Korea are acceptable. The American stance was that North Korea had violated prior bilateral agreements, thus such forums lacked accountability as stated by Wade (2007;465)<sup>5</sup>. Conversely, North Korea refused to speak in the context of six-party talks, stating that it would only accept bilateral talks with the United States. This led to a diplomatic stalemate.

On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time. Both the United States Geological Survey and Japanese seismological authorities detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.3 in North Korea, corroborating some aspects of the North Korean claims, according to a 2006 October United States Geological Survey Report<sup>6</sup>. On the other hand the United States kept tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea for decades. At times South Korean governments have contemplated and even begun their own nuclear weapons program which U.S pressure ended. South Korea is pursuing a major civilian nuclear energy program but unlike North Korea has placed it under comprehensive international safeguards

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<sup>4</sup> Goodman P, "South Korea Seeks Mediation Role To End Stand Off", Washington Post January 4 2005, PA 10.

<sup>5</sup> Wade H, US Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath's Fate, Asian Survey, Vol 47. No.3, (May/ June 2007) p, 455.

<sup>6</sup> Magnitude 4.3- North Korea (2002 October 09.01.35; 28 UTC Report) United States Geological Survey, (USGS, Oct 9, 2006)

and foresworn using it to manufacture nuclear weapons. On November 19, 2006, North Korea's Minju Joson newspaper accused South Korea of building up arms in order to attack the country claiming that "the South Korean military is openly clamoring that the development and introduction of new weapons are to target the North". North Korea accused South Korea of conspiring with the United States to attack it, an accusation made frequently by the North and routinely denied by the United States.

On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted a second test of a nuclear weapon. North Korea declared in that same year that it had developed a nuclear weapon, and is widely believed to possess a small stockpile of relatively simple nuclear weapons violating both Security Council Resolution 1718 and past undertakings to halt its nuclear weapons program as stated in *The American Journal of International Law* (2009;597). Following North Korea's second nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council tightened its sanctions according to Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland's journal, "Sanctioning North Korea; The Political Economy Of Denuclearization and Proliferation". North Korea was a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but withdrew in January 10, 2003, on the ground that it was "most seriously threatened" by the United States. North Korea stated that the United States had threatened it with preemptive nuclear attack and other belligerent actions such as blockages. According to Yoichi Funabashi (2008;135) in his book *The Korean Peninsula Question; A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, North Korea further stated that the United States had breached the 1994 Agreed Framework by failing to provide light water reactors and suspending its promised heavy oil shipments<sup>7</sup>. North Korea also alleged that the United States had instigated even the IAEA to internationalize its moves to stifle the DPRK, thus putting into practice its declaration of a war against the DPRK. Now that the DPRK is no longer bound to the safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency after its withdrawal from the NPT the DPRK has the same legal status as the United States and other countries possessing nuclear weapons not bound to international law, as far as the issue of nuclear deterrent force is concerned.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Since the end of the Cold War, it has been argued that there are some nuclear actors on the world stage to worry about. A number of states defined as "rogue" states are said to have entered the scene with a propensity for violence and the disruption of peace. The instability of Russia and other Soviet successor states have only fed fears that nuclear weapons, materials or scientific knowledge would fall into criminal or terrorist hands. The threat of rogue states and terrorism has emerged. North Korea is regarded as one of these states by some scholars. They are said to be threats to their neighbors, the world and the United States.

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<sup>7</sup> Funabashi Y, *The Korean Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, Brookings Institution Press, 2008, p, 135.

James Chisem(2011) in his article “Why are nuclear weapons so appealing to nation states in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” states that, Nation states like North Korea and Iran whose leaders have persistently violated international norms, are seen by the White House to be less predictable and inestimably more irrational than present nuclear powers<sup>8</sup>.These regimes, the argument goes, are theologically motivated, place diminutive value on human life, and “would be willing to use nuclear weapons despite the threat of nuclear retaliation”. The 21<sup>st</sup> Century is now characterized with global insecurity due to these so called rogue states.

Pyongyang is perceived from the outside as unpredictable. David Khang (2003;301) in a journal “International Relations Theory and the Second Korean Crisis”, stipulate that, Ever since the first Korean war in 1950, scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one, yet for 50years North Korea has not come close to starting a war<sup>9</sup>. Why were so many scholars so consistently wrong about North Korea’s intentions. In 2002 to2003 Pyongyang dismissed inspectors from the International Atomic Agency (I.A.E.A) and quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(N.P.T).Months after publicly declaring that it had nuclear weapons in early 2005, North Korea rejoined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and said it would get rid of existing nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities. However in 2006, the country detonated a nuclear device and launched seven missiles as part of the two tests. Andrew Kim in his journal, “South Korea in 2006;Nuclear Standoff, Trade Talks, and Population Trends”, states that the nuclear test conducted by North Korea in October 2006 placed the Koreas at the center of the world<sup>10</sup>.North Korea then later announced it was withdrawing from the Non Proliferation Treaty as postulated by Joseph F. Pilat in his journal “The End of the NPT Regime”<sup>11</sup>.The initial response of the Clinton Administration was to prepare for a war which would ultimately destroy North Korea. This plan, which would have likely been successful despite an enormous loss of life, was opposed by South Korea but it was abandoned until former U.S President James Carter (accompanied by CNN) flew to North Korea and engaged in unofficial efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the crisis. North Korea however justifies its nuclear weapon program on the grounds of self defense. Carpenter and Bandow (2004;60) in their book The Korean Conundrum state that accusing the U.S of planning to attack their country, the North Koreans say, “We have realized that as long as the U.S does not abandon its hostile policy against the North, efforts to keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear free is nothing more than an illusion”<sup>12</sup>.Stephen M.Younger(2000)

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<sup>8</sup>Chisem J, Why Are Nuclear Weapons So Appealing to Nation States in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century? July 20 2009.

<sup>9</sup>Khang D, International Relations Theory and the Second Korean Crisis, International Studies Quarterly, Vol 47, No. 3, (September 2003)p301-302

<sup>10</sup> Kim A, Nuclear Standoff, Trade Talks and Population Trends; Asian Survey, Vol 47, No. 1,(Jan/Feb 2009) p, 52-57.

<sup>11</sup>Pilat J, The End Of The NPT Regime; International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), Vol 83, No. 3, Thinking About Enlightenment in Nuclear Policies, (May 2007), p, 469-482.

<sup>12</sup>Carpenter and Bandow, op.cit; p, 60.

also argues that nuclear weapons represent the ultimate defense of the nation, a deterrent against any and all potential adversaries<sup>13</sup>.

Proponents of nuclear disarmament on the other hand argue that disarmament would lessen the probability of nuclear war occurring, especially accidentally. Matthew Kroenig in his journal, "Exporting the Bomb; Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons", states that nuclear proliferation poses a grave threat to international peace and security, for this reason, politicians, policymakers and academics worry that nuclear capable states will provide sensitive nuclear assistance to other states or terrorist networks, further fueling the spread of nuclear weapons<sup>14</sup>. These proponents also say that North Korea has acted in a manner that threatens regional stability and international security, North Korea systematically violates international law, engages in extensive proliferation and criminal activities and brutalizes its own population. Also as postulated by Nathan Hughes(2009) in his article "North Korean Nuclear Test and Geopolitical Reality" that North Korea has one of the highest concentrations of deployed artillery, artillery rockets and short range-ballistic missiles on the planet<sup>15</sup>. Joseph Cirincione and John Wolfsthal in a journal, "North Korea and Iran; Test Cases for an improved Non Proliferation Regime" stipulate that North Korea's nuclear arsenals and nuclear weapons present obvious and direct dangers to the United States, its troops, its allies and regional and global stability. North Korea will however remain a pariah state, isolated from the international community<sup>16</sup>.

North Korea the pariah state has mounted the global stage according to Robert Haskavy in his journal "Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation", which has led to international insecurity<sup>17</sup>. This has however attracted the attention of numerous nations of the region. While none of the parties require a North Korea with nuclear weapons. Japan and South Korea are especially concerned about North Korean counter-strikes following possible military action against North Korea. The People's Republic Of China and South Korea are also very worried about the economic and social consequences should this situation cause the North Korean government to collapse. Nuclear posturing has also been seen as a threat that could force the re-unification of the Korean peninsula. The Grand National Party currently the ruling party in South Korea, have stated that they will not return to the Sunshine Policy before North Korea gives up their nuclear weapons. The threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea has also fed South Korea's perceived need for a larger standing army and defense

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<sup>13</sup> Younger S, Nuclear Weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century; Associate Laboratory, Los Alamos, June 27, 2009.

<sup>14</sup> Kroenig M, Exporting the Bomb; Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Cornell University Press, March 2010.

<sup>15</sup> Hughes N, The North Korean Nuclear Test and Geopolitical Reality; May 26, 2009.

<sup>16</sup> Cirincione J and Wolfsthal J, North Korea and Iran: Test Cases for an Improved Non Proliferation Regime, June 2012.

<sup>17</sup> Haskavy R, Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation, International Organisation, Vol 35 No. 1, (Winter 1981), p, 135.

force. North Korea's nuclear weapon development program has angered the entire international community as described by Ralph Hassig in a journal, "North Korea in 2009: The Song Remains the Same"<sup>18</sup>.

According to The Christian Science Monitor (2012) by Daryl Kimball, North Korea's recent acts, including its July 2006 missile tests, October 2006 and May 2009 nuclear tests and April 2009 "satellite launch" coupled with its insistence that it would never return to the Six Party Talks clearly demonstrate that circumstances have now devolved into a crisis<sup>19</sup>. The current North Korea nuclear crisis is significantly more serious than that which occurred in 1994. Not only is North Korea's nuclear program now far more advanced, its two nuclear tests represent clear violation of its past commitments to denuclearize. The international community's failure to stop its nuclear program would also deal a significant blow to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and potentially encourage other states to follow North Korea's example. Five states are recognized by the Non Proliferation Treaty as Nuclear Weapons States. While pushing other countries to reject the acquisition of nuclear weapons for their defense, the United States seems to be relying even more heavily on nuclear weapons for its own defense. Jayaprakash N (2008;44) in a journal "Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: The Greatest Con Game", also argue that, Another vital fact that came to light in 1999 is that the US, which has been making the loudest noises against proliferation of nuclear weapons, had stored nuclear weapons in 27 countries and territories around the globe with or without the knowledge of local governments<sup>20</sup>. However if nations like the U.S.A, Russia, UK, France, Germany, China have a right to produce nuclear weapons, wouldn't this right be entitled to any nation willing to do so. As long as one state possesses nuclear weapons, other states will desire their own nuclear arsenals. What is security to one state will mean insecurity to others. As James Chisem (2011; 34) states that "nuclear weapons remain fundamental to the long-term security strategy of the nuclear weapon states which currently possess them and an attractive proposition to those which do not"<sup>21</sup>.

Critics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty state that recognized Nuclear Weapon States to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons especially in the post cold war era, has angered some non nuclear weapon Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories of the NPT. For instance as demonstrated by Kimball (2005;113) that the United States more than any other state, must also fulfill its disarmament and non proliferation responsibilities<sup>22</sup>. Such failure, these critics say it provides justification for the non-nuclear weapon signatories to quit the NPT and

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<sup>18</sup>Hassig R, North Korea in 2009; The Song Remains The Same, Asian Survey, Vol 50 No. 1, (Jan/Feb 2010) p, 89-96.

<sup>19</sup> Kimball D, The Christian Science Monitor, Arms Control Association, Washington DC, December 5 2012.

<sup>20</sup>Jayaprakash N, Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty: The Greatest Con Game, Economic and Political Weekly; Vol 43, No. 22 (August 9-15 2008) p, 43-45.

<sup>21</sup>Chisem J; *op cit*; p, 34.

<sup>22</sup> Kimball D, A Non Proliferation Reality Check, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 40, No. 35, (August 27- Sept 2, 2005) p, 113.

develop their own nuclear arsenals. No current nuclear weapon state would seriously consider eliminating its last nuclear weapons without high confidence that other countries would not acquire them. Some observers have even suggested that the very progress of disarmament by the superpowers which has led to elimination of thousands of weapons and delivery systems which could eventually make the possession of nuclear weapons more attractive by increasing the perceived strategic value of a small arsenal. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has become a metaphor for 21<sup>st</sup> century security concerns. The director general of the IAEA, recently noted that the “margin of security” under the world’s current regime “is becoming too slim for comfort”. Although nuclear weapons have not been used since the end of World War II, their influence on international security affairs is pervasive, and possession of WMD remains an important divide in international politics today.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The study attempted to critically analyze how the development of nuclear weapons has maintained stability and world peace. It also to a lesser extent assessed the threats and impacts posed by the North Korea’s nuclear weapon development program on international security system and also reviewed the diplomatic efforts and attempts aimed at resolving the North Korean situation. The study also showed that North Korea is using the nuclear weapon program as a political tool to achieve security and deter the United States. It also highlighted the different goals and interests of the nations or the external involvement in the North Korean situation.

### **1.4 Research Questions**

Firstly, it is noted that North Korea’s interest in nuclear weapons seems not to be a recent development. How and when did this nuclear weapon development program start and how has it influenced other smaller states in the 21<sup>st</sup> century?

Secondly, in the Cold War era only the super powers made use of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union. As the cold war ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, optimists assumed that a post-nuclear era had arrived in warfare. North Korea started developing nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union’s aid and it has received the United States’ opposition, however, can this be said to be a continuation of the cold war?

Moreover, North Korea received substantial concessions in the 1994 Agreed Framework for the mere promise to freeze its nuclear weapons program. The United States has negotiated with North Korea several times before, but each understanding or formal agreement merely seems to pave the way for a new round of cheating and a new crisis. Why is North Korea

continuing to pursue a nuclear weapons development program even despite the likelihood of subsequent sanctions and condemnation from the international community?

Meanwhile, there are a growing number of states that now possess or are developing nuclear- and missile-related technological capabilities and expertise in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Does the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty remain relevant to current and future efforts to deal with nuclear proliferation and terrorism threats or it was intended to serve its purpose during the cold war era?

Since the end of the cold war, the United States has been interested in the Korean Peninsula. The United States is said to be having a national security interest in the stability of North Korea. How are the current US-North Korea relations like?

According to Carpenter and Bandow (2004;69) in their book “The Korean Conundrum” state that, “North Korea could become within a few years not just a state with few nuclear weapons, but a significant nuclear power”<sup>23</sup>.What is the possibility of smaller states ever acquiring the use of nuclear weapons?

Finally, in January 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expelled United Nations weapons inspectors and indicated a possible commitment to undertake serial production of nuclear weapons either by uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocess. What has been the role of the United Nations in the North Korean situation and what other attempts has it employed in resolving the crisis?

## **1.5 Hypothesis**

Nuclear weapons, despite their unprecedented destructiveness, are a necessary evil for stabilizing power relations during the years of Cold War from 1945 until the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. Even after the end of the Cold War nuclear weapons are still a necessary tool for deterrence as exemplified by North Korea.

## **1.6 Justification of the Study**

Senator Pete V. Domenici (2005) states that “More than 50 years ago, on December 8, 1953 President Dwight D Eisenhower offered a prophetic vision to the United Nations that nuclear power could contribute to the betterment of mankind through its peaceful application”<sup>24</sup>.He

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<sup>23</sup>Carpenter and Bandow, *op cit*; p, 69.

<sup>24</sup> Senator P Domenici, The world will be a better place in the 21<sup>st</sup> century because of nuclear weapons, 2004/Jan 2005, Vol 2, No. 6 <http://www.rowmanlittlefield.com>.



further stated that, in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century nuclear power will be a major contributor to global peace and a better quality of life for both the developed and developing world. Many forecasts predicted a substantial increase in the number of weapon states, since more countries were using nuclear power. Kennedy estimated that over 20 states would have nuclear weapons by the 1970s. A London Times leader of 1983 also predicted that 40 countries would be capable of building weapons by 1990.<sup>25</sup> Currently 56 states have civil nuclear reactors but only Israel, India, Pakistan and the five permanent members of the Security Council possess nuclear weapons. South Africa possessed weapons in the apartheid era but allowed them to be dismantled afterwards. Iran terminated its weapon program in 2003. Israel and India, like South Africa already had advanced weapon programs in the early 1970s. Hence the number of states possessing nuclear arms has increased by just one in over thirty years. North Korea has tested a weapon and is continuing to pursue a nuclear weapon development program.

Baker and Gudgeon (2005) in their article “The role of nuclear weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, postulate that “during the Cold War, the role of nuclear weapons was shaped by the nature of the opponent, the Soviet Union a fellow nuclear superpower and reliance on the balance of terror<sup>26</sup>. In the post cold war world, Russia is no longer the enemy. Today’s threats are regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery mechanisms”. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century the United States is now the threat or the enemy. Smith (2006;1) in his book Deterring America also argue that faced with America’s military superiority, many countries are turning to weapons of mass destruction following North Korea’s example as a means to deter U.S intervention<sup>27</sup>. Nuclear weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century has proven to be a successful deterring tool to the aggressor. Nuclear weapons have however maintained international peace and security through deterrence this has been noted in North Korea. Michael Hanlon (2010;57) also argue that mankind can peacefully and safely co-exist indefinitely with the bomb<sup>28</sup>. Even during the cold war when both the U.S and USSR possessed mutual second strike retaliation capability, it eliminated the possibility of nuclear victory for either side. In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century North Korea is trying to follow precedence, it is however necessary to study about North Korea’s nuclear capability even in the post-cold war era even with the demise of communism.

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<sup>25</sup> London Times 1990, 17 January, 1983.

<sup>26</sup> Baker and Gudgeon, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, April 13, 2005, [http://heritage.org/Press/Events/ev\\_0314059.cfm](http://heritage.org/Press/Events/ev_0314059.cfm).

<sup>27</sup> Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, p, 1.

<sup>28</sup> Hanlon M, A Skeptic’s Case for Nuclear Disarmament, Brookings Institution Press, 2008, p, 57.

## 1.7 Theoretical Framework

North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993 and refused to allow the United Nations inspectors access to its nuclear sites. Also recently tensions resurfaced between North Korea and the United States due to disagreement over the Six-Party Talks disarmament process. Disarmament according to Kaarbo (2011;271) refers to the act of eliminating weapons. It refers to both the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a nuclear free world in which nuclear weapons are completely eliminated<sup>29</sup>. Critics of nuclear disarmament say that it would undermine deterrence and complete elimination would destroy the current nuclear peace the world is experiencing.

Deterrence according to Stephen Cimbala (2005;12) in his text “Nuclear Weapons and Strategy” refers to the use of the threat of military action to compel an adversary to do something or to prevent them from doing something, that another state desires<sup>30</sup>. Deterrence theory gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. And it took on a unique connotation during this time as an inferior nuclear force, by virtue of its extreme destructive power, could deter a more powerful adversary provided that this force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack. A credible nuclear deterrent, Brodie (1959; 264) wrote, must be always at the ready, yet never used<sup>31</sup>. In Thomas Schelling’s (1966) classic work on deterrence, the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory is presented<sup>32</sup>. Instead it is argued that military strategy was now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence. Thomas Schelling goes on to explain the foundations of deterrence theory based on diplomacy<sup>33</sup>. Diplomacy between states is defined as a form of bargaining that seeks outcomes for each state that though not ideal for either party, are better for both than other alternatives. In order for diplomacy to succeed, there must be some common interest, if only in the avoidance of mutual damage. Therese Delpech (2012; 6) argues that nuclear weapons will always be present even in small numbers but the safest way to deal with them is deterrence<sup>34</sup>.

According to Realism-the dominant school of international relations theory the defining feature of world politics, and the one which creates perpetual inter-state rivalry, is the absence of an over-arching central authority as postulated by Waltz (2001;159) in his text

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<sup>29</sup>Kaarbo, Global Politics, 10<sup>th</sup> Edition, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, USA.2011 p, 271.

<sup>30</sup>Cimbala S, Nuclear Weapons and Strategies: US Nuclear Policy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, London, 2005 p, 12.

<sup>31</sup>Brodie B, The Anatomy of Deterrence, Princeton, 1959 p, 264.

<sup>32</sup>Schelling T, The Diplomacy of Violence, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid, p, 109.

<sup>34</sup>Delpech T, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century- Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy, Rand Corporation, 2012 p, 6.

“Man, The State and War”<sup>35</sup>. In his 2001 monograph, *The Tragedy Of Great Power Politics*, John Mearsheimer expanded this concept of structural anarchy by arguing that the only certainty which exists in international politics is that of uncertainty<sup>36</sup>. The enormously destructive effects of nuclear weapons significantly add to this uncertainty and the impulsion to proliferate, both globally and regionally, by heightening the prospects and stakes of disadvantage vis-à-vis other powers. Seaborg and Loeb (1987; 117) state that, So just as Moscow and Beijing undertook the development of military nuclear programs as a direct response to America’s and just as India went nuclear in an effort to offset a perceived Chinese advantage, it can be inferred that current nuclear states maintain their armories in part for similar reasons<sup>37</sup>.

According to Paul (2000;15) in his book Power versus Prudence-Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons stipulates that realism make strong claims regarding state behavior<sup>38</sup>. For realists, states pursue their own interests in an effort to secure their existence in the international realm. Security is core, so states engage in competitive arms and alliances in an effort to balance power. The security dilemma is of concern for nuclear policy because states are involved in arms buildup in order to have an absolute gain over another nuclear state. John Mearsheimer a neo-realist, recognizes the danger of nuclear weapons but believes that there are effective in deterring war, and mutually assured destruction will prevent states from committing nuclear suicide<sup>39</sup>. Proliferation is therefore a good thing since it makes states cautious in their relations with one another. Thus ideal Post-Cold War nuclear policy is to employ deterrence.

## 1.8 Literature Review

James Chisem (2011; 36) in his article “Why are nuclear weapons so appealing to nation-states in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century argues that nuclear weapons have an inimitable capacity to deter conventional and nuclear aggression. The bomb gives states a near-guarantee of security, whilst on systemic-level imbuing relations between nuclear powers with relative stability<sup>40</sup>. Indeed there is widespread scholarly agreement as stipulated by Gaddis (1982; 88) that the nuclear revolution explains why the cold war did not turn hot, why Arab states have eschewed military action against Israel, why China and the United States treat the Taiwanese issue with caution and why antagonisms between India and Pakistan remain largely

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<sup>35</sup> Waltz K, Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001 p, 159.

<sup>36</sup> Mearsheimer J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Harper, New York, 2001.

<sup>37</sup> Seaborg G and Loeb B, Stemming the Trade; Arms Control in the Johnson Years, Lexington Books, Massachusetts, 1987 p, 117.

<sup>38</sup> Paul T, Power Versus Prudence; Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons, McGill Queen’s University Press, London, 2000 p,15.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p, 123.

<sup>40</sup> Chisem, op. cit; p, 135.

rhetorical- a compelling verity which continues to influence policymakers in nuclear nations<sup>41</sup>.

On the other hand Robert Jervis argue that nuclear weapons are not simply an additional material manifestation of the security dilemma. Rather they are symbolic objects, in both domestic and international political arenas<sup>42</sup>. According to Sagan (1996; 54) in his journal “Why do states build nuclear weapons? Models in search of a bomb”, a nuclear capability can serve a function similar to flags, airlines and Olympic teams, shaping a state’s perception of its own identity and reflecting how it wishes to be projected outside the world<sup>43</sup>.The French, Russian and Indian experiences are especially relevant in illustrating this. Russia’s retention of a large nuclear arsenal roughly equal in size to that of the U.S can be seen as an attempt to offset decline in other areas. For India as postulated by Perkovich (1999; 29) in his book India’s Nuclear Bomb, the technical complexity involved in the development of a nuclear force is representative of its modernity and equality with First World nations<sup>44</sup>.Furthermore there is a tendency to equate this symbolism with power.

Government sources as well as some analysts and scholars like Carpenter and Bandow (2004; 72) have argued that North Korea is using nuclear weapons primarily as a political tool to begin re-establishing normal relations with the United States, Japan and South Korea and to end the long-standing economic embargo against North Korea<sup>45</sup>.They point that the threat of nuclear weapons is the only thing that has brought US, Japan, South Korea into serious negotiations. Carpenter and Bandow (2004;73) further state that most countries are developing nuclear weapons to give their nations a sense of power or prestige in the world, enabling them to further their goals without fear or reprisal, North Korea is therefore not an exception<sup>46</sup>.Although few non nuclear powers, most notably Germany and Japan have significant prestige and influence in the international community, the possession of those weapons is a route into a rather exclusive club. It is no coincidence that China was treated with greater respect and caution by the United States and other countries after it acquired nukes than before it achieved that breakthrough. Similarly, Washington and other capitals now treat India as a serious player in marked contrast to the tendency to view that country as a Third World underachiever before its 1998 nuclear tests. Pakistan also went from being regarded as a problem state (and in some quarters a potential state failed state) before its tests

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<sup>41</sup> Gaddis J, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post-War American National Security Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982 p, 88.

<sup>42</sup> Jervis R, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, p, 176.

<sup>43</sup> Sagan S, Why do states build nuclear weapons? Models in search of a bomb, *International Security*, Vol 21, No. 3, Winter 1996-1997 p, 74.

<sup>44</sup>Perkovich G, India’s Nuclear Bomb, University of Carlifornia Press, Berkerly, 1999 p, 29.

<sup>45</sup>Carpenter and Bandow,op.cit; p, 72.

<sup>46</sup>ibid. p, 73.

in 1998 to being a significant factor in the war on terrorism and other important security issues.

## **1.9 Methodology**

According to Prior L(2003; 23) in his book, Using Documents in Social Research, documentary research involves the use of textbooks and documents as source materials, government publications, newspapers, visual and pictorial sources in paper, electronic or other hard copy form<sup>47</sup>. Because of the availability of these secondary sources, information regarding the controversies surrounding the North Korea's nuclear weapon development program in the 21<sup>st</sup> century was therefore gathered through documentary research. In this research I managed to use textbooks, journals from the University of Zimbabwe library and British Embassy library, newspapers, government publications and the internet. James P(2005) in his article, "The Internet and Clinical Trials" he identifies the internet or online research as another research technique<sup>48</sup>. He states that the internet can provide practically instant information on most topics and has a profound impact on the way ideas are formed and knowledge is created. The internet also contributed a great deal in this study because North Korea has not stopped pursuing its nuclear weapon development program, events are still unfolding even to date, the internet therefore provides that current information. Data collected was therefore analyzed qualitatively through coding and categorizing. The process involved the identification, examination and interpretation of patterns and themes in textual data which helped in answering the research questions at hand.

## **1.10 Delimitations**

This study will concentrate on international relations paying particular attention on the aspect of international peace and security. It will focus mainly on North Korea's nuclear weapon development program, how it started and how the situation has affected or influenced the external environment or the international arena. The study will also look into the various attempts and efforts by the international community to stop North Korea's nuclear program and unveil the benefits that the program is also posing on the international security system.

## **1.11 Limitations**

The study will be a bit challenging because North Korea is a country situated further away and will be impossible to go there and observe and witness the events as they unfold. Most of the information on North Korea remain classified also some of it is not easy to acquire so will have to rely on the internet and newspapers for recent information and updates.

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<sup>47</sup>Prior L, Using Documents in Social Science Research, Sage, London, 2003, p, 23.

<sup>48</sup>James P, The Internet and Clinical Trial, Background, Online Resources, Examples and Issues, (2005), <http://ww.jm.r.org/2005/1/e>.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE COLD WAR RIVALRY

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the separation and conflicts of the South and North Korea tracing its history from World War 2 and to Cold War. The chapter also highlights the involvement and role of superpowers that is the United States and USSR in the North and South Korea, leading to various conflicts and civil wars. Following various attempts to unify the two Koreas, though amid challenges.

#### 2.2 Background

After World War 11 the United States and its allies competed with the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies for political and economic dominance around the world. Known as the Cold War, this rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union shaped almost every aspect of international politics, as well as many domestic concerns, until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the USSR in the early 1990s. The two powers began to compete each other through the conflicts of foreign countries, in order to spread their own power more globally, examples are Vietnamese War and Cuban Missile Crisis as postulated by Joseph McCathy in his article, “Korea and the Cold War”<sup>49</sup>. Likely, according to Lee Kenneth (1997; 184) the influence of Cold War tension on the Korean conflict cannot be ignored<sup>50</sup>. The US perceived Soviet support for the spread of communism as a strong threat and American foreign policy attempted to contain and thwart communism around the world.

#### 2.3 The Origins of the Separation of South and North Korea

The Korean Peninsula is a region located in Eastern Asia extending south from the Asian continent for about 683 miles (1,100km) as stated by Amanda Briney (2010)<sup>51</sup>. Today, it is politically divided into North Korea and South Korea. North Korea is located on the northern part of the peninsula and it extends from China south to the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel of latitude. South Korea then extends from that area and encompasses the rest of the Korean Peninsula.

The division of Korea into North Korea and South Korea stems from the 1945 Allied victory in World War 11, ending Japan’s 35 year colonial rule of Korea. As the Russo-Japanese war ended in 1905, Korea became a nominal protectorate, and was annexed in 1910 by Japan. When World War 11 ended, in November 1943 Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek met at the Cairo Conference to discuss what should happen to Japan’s colonies, and agreed that

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<sup>49</sup>McCathy J, McCathyism; Korea and the Cold War, Appleton Public Library, 1953.

<sup>50</sup> Kenneth L, *Korea and East Asia: The Story of a Phoenix*, (Prager Publishers London, 1997) p, 184.

<sup>51</sup>Briney B, Tensions and Conflict in the Korean Peninsula, US Department of State, 2 January, 2010.

Japan should lose all the territories it had conquered by force. In the declaration after this conference Korea was mentioned for the first time. According to Olsen (2005; 56) in his book, Korea, The Divided Nation, The three powers United States, China and Great Britain declared that they were “mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea and were determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent”<sup>52</sup>. With the war’s end in sight in August 1945, there was still no consensus on Korea’s fate among Allied leaders. Many Koreans on the peninsula had made their own plans for the future of Korea, and few of these plans included the re-occupation of Korea by foreign forces. Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 according to Walker (1997; 82), Soviet soldiers invaded Manchuria as per Stalin’s agreement with Harry Truman at the Postdam Conference of late July and early August 1945<sup>53</sup>.

However, American leaders were suspicious of the people’s committees forming all over the peninsula, and suspected that without American intervention, the whole peninsula would elect to come under Communist government and Soviet influence. Soviet forces arrived in Korea first, but occupied only the northern half, stopping at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, per the arrangement with the United States. In 1945 the United Nations developed plans for trusteeship administration of Korea as stated by Seth Michael (2010; 45) in the book, A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present<sup>54</sup>. Chris Kreger (2005) in his book Korea Divided stipulates that the original plan had been to withdraw all occupation forces from Korea as quickly as possible to allow the Koreans to get on with rebuilding their land and political identity<sup>55</sup>. On August 10, 1945 two young officers-Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel were assigned to define an American occupation zone. Working on extremely short notice and completely unprepared, they used a National Geographic map to decide on the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. They chose it because it divided the country approximately in half but would leave the capital Seoul under American control.

This division started the conflicts between the two areas of Korea because the northern region followed the USSR and became communist, while the south opposed this form of government and formed a strong anti-communist, capitalist government. As a result, in July of 1948, the anti-communist southern region drafted a constitution and began to hold national elections which were subjected to terrorism. However, on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was officially founded and Syngman Rhee was elected as president. Shortly thereafter the USSR established a Communist North Korea Government called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) with Kim 11-Sung as its leader. Once the two Koreas were formally established Rhee and 11-Sung worked to reunify Korea. This caused conflicts though because each wanted to unify the area under their own political system and rival governments were

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<sup>52</sup> Olsen E, Korea, The Divided Nation, (Greenwood Publishing Group, USA, 2005) p, 56.

<sup>53</sup> Walker J, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman And The Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan, (Chapel Hill, The University Of Carolina Press, 1997) p, 82.

<sup>54</sup> Seth M, A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present, (Rowman and Littlefield, 2010) p, 45.

<sup>55</sup> Kreger C, Korea Divided, (Center for Educations Technologies, Wheeling Jesuit University, 2005) p, 8.

established. In addition, North Korea was heavily supported by the USSR and China and fighting along the border of North and South Korea was not uncommon.

## 2.4 The Korean War

After Korea was divided the two Korean powers both tried to control the whole peninsula under their respective governments. This led to escalating border conflicts on the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and attempts to negotiate elections for the whole of Korea. These attempts ended when the military of North Korea invaded the South on June 25, 1950 leading to a full scale civil war. According to Devine Robert et al (2007; 819), with the endorsement from the United Nations, countries allied with the United States intervened on behalf of South Korea. The United States provided 88% of the 341,000 international soldiers which aided South Korean forces in repelling the invasion, with twenty other countries of the United Nations offering assistance. After rapid advances in a South Korean counterattack, North-allied Chinese forces intervened on behalf of North Korea, shifting the balance of the war<sup>56</sup>. North Korea was however, able to quickly advance south by September 1950. By October though the UN forces were able to again move the fighting north and October 19, North Korea's capital, Pyongyang was taken. While not directly committing forces to the conflict, the Soviet Union provided material aid to both the North Korean and Chinese armies. South Korea's capital, Seoul was then taken. In the months that followed, heavy fighting ensued but the center of the conflict was near the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel.

Although some have referred to the conflict as a civil war, other important factors were involved. The Korean War was also the first armed confrontation of the Cold War and set the standard for many later conflicts. It created the idea of a proxy war, where the two superpowers would fight in another country to suffer most of the destruction and death involved in a war between such large nations. On the surface, the Korean War seemed to be a war between South Korea and North Korea, but really the superpowers were just using it as a front to combat each other without actually going into a "hot war" which as both had the atomic bomb- would have been MAD (mutually assured destruction). According to Kimberly Kim (2011) in her article, "Remembering the Korean War to End the Korean War", the Korean War was inextricably linked to U.S's larger goal in destabilizing the Soviet Union<sup>57</sup>. To fulfill its Cold War narrative against communist ideology and to prevent it from gaining a foothold on Asia, the US intervened, instilling its own principles of democracy and providing military assistance to South Korea as it fought against its Soviet Union-backed counterpart North Korea.

Although peace negotiations began in July of 1951, fighting continued throughout 1951 and 1952. On July 27 1953, peace negotiations ended and the Demilitarized Zone was formed, which

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<sup>56</sup> Devine Robert et al, *America Past and Present 11: Since 1865*, 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, (Pearson Longman 2007) p, 819-821.

<sup>57</sup> Kimberly K, Remembering the Korean War To End The Korean War, NYU Journalism Dpt, May 8, 2011.



was a four-kilometer wide buffer zone between the states, where nobody would enter. According to Suk-Young Kim in his journal, “Staging the Cartography of Paradox” the DMZ may be a small strip of land, but it is one of the most dramatic spaces on earth, simultaneously standing for the devastating traumas of war and an activist movement for peace and environmentalism. Shortly thereafter, an Armistice Agreement was signed by the Korean People’s Army, the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the United Nations Command, which was led by the U.S, South Korea however, never signed the agreement. The war is considered to have ended at this point though there was no peace treaty and to this day an official peace treaty has never been signed between North and South Korea. As dictated by the terms of the Korean Armistice a Geneva Conference was held in 1954 on the Korean question. Despite efforts by many of the nations involved the conference ended without a declaration for a unified Korea. The Armistice established a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) which was tasked to monitor the Armistice. Since 1953, members of the Swiss and Swedish Armed Forces have been members of the NNSC stationed near the DMZ

Since the end of the Korean War, tensions between North and South Korea have remained. For example according to CNN, in 1968, North Korea unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate South Korea’s president. In 1983, a bombing in Myanmar that was linked to North Korea, killed 17 South Korean officials and in 1987, North Korea was accused of bombing a South Korean airplane. Hamm (2001) in his journal, “North-South Korean Reconciliation and Security on the Korean Peninsula” states that, fighting has also repeatedly occurred both land and sea borders because each nation is continually trying to unify the peninsula with its own system of government<sup>58</sup>. North and South Korea clearly perceive each other as threats to their national security. They also perceive each other as enemies and have defined their identities in contrast to one another as according to Bleiker (2001)<sup>59</sup>. In 2010 tensions were especially high after a South Korean warship was sunk on March 26. South Korean claims that North Korea sunk the Cheonan in the Yellow Sea off the South Korean island of Baengnyeong resulting in the deaths of 46 sailors according to the BBC NEWS OF 20 May 2010<sup>60</sup>. North Korea denied responsibility for the attack. According to the 5 January 2011 “Korea Herald”, Since 1953 North Korea has violated the armistice 221 times, including 26 military attacks<sup>61</sup>. In 1976 in a declassified meeting minute, US, Department Secretary of Defence William Clements told Henry Kissinger that there had been 200 raids into North Korea from the South though not by the United States military. Stephen (2008; 53) in his book, Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion in the United States, postulates that, since the Armistice in 1953, relations between the North Korean government and South Korea, the European Union, Canada, the United States and

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<sup>58</sup> Hamm T, North-South Korean Reconciliation and Security on the Korean Peninsula, Asian Perspective 25, 2001, No. 2, p, 123-151.

<sup>59</sup> Bleiker R, Identity and Security in Korea, The Pacific Review 14, No 1 p, 121-148.

<sup>60</sup> North Korean torpedo sank South’s navy ship, BBC News 20 May 2010.

<sup>61</sup> Korea Herald, “North Korea commits 221 provocations since 1953, 5 January 2011.

Japan have remained tense, and hostile incidents occur often<sup>62</sup>. The United States still keeps troops in South Korea, in case North Korea ever invades again.

Or perhaps the Korean War didn't end at all as suggested by the Shmoop Editorial Team in their article "War in the Korean War"<sup>63</sup>. The agreement that ended active combat in July 1953 was technically only a cease-fire, not an official peace treaty. Technically, a state of hostility continues to exist between the Korean War combatants to this very day. And that hostility does not exist only on paper. Thousands of American soldiers are still deployed to the DMZ, joining their South Korean allies in keeping a perpetual watch over the North Korean troops stationed on the far side of the border, guarding against the possibility of any new Communist offensive in a 50-year-old war. Today, nearly two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cold War still lingers on along the barren strip of demilitarized land dividing Communist North Korea from the anticommunist South. According to James Foley (2003; 5) in his book Korea's Divided Families, the division of the Korean peninsula is one of the last remaining relics of the Cold War. Along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel it's always 1950<sup>64</sup>. According to Nicholas Eberstadt (1992; 151) The Cold War has not ended on the Korean Peninsula therefore the all the members of the international community should be on their toes<sup>65</sup>.

## **2.5 Attempts to Reunite the two Koreas**

According to Pyeong Chang in his article "Korea at a Glance: Inter-Korean Relations", Even after signing the armistice in 1953, the Cold War confrontation persisted on the Korean Peninsula<sup>66</sup>. The Republic of Korea adopted a North Korea policy with the goal of achieving a unified Korea under a democratic system. On the other hand North Korea sought its ways to achieve its goal of communizing the entire peninsula. In the early 1970s, the animosity between the West and the East began to slowly thaw. By riding the wave of the surfacing peace-promoting spirit in the international community, South and North Korea took steps toward warmer relations. The two Koreas announced the South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972 and subsequently held inter-Korean dialogue and exchanges through the South-North Coordination Committee and the Red Cross Society. The two Koreas, as stated by Park (2001;

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<sup>62</sup> Stephen S, *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda; Politics and Public Opinion in the US: 1950- 1953*; (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), p53.

<sup>63</sup> Shmoop Editorial Team, *War in the Korean War*, Shmoop University Inc.

<sup>64</sup> Foley J, *Korea's Divided Families: 50 years of Separation*, (Routledge, London, 2003) p, 5.

<sup>65</sup> Eberstadt N, *Hastening Korean Reunification*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 76, No.2 (March- April 1997) p, 77-92.

<sup>66</sup> Chang P, *Korea at a Glance, Inter-Korean Relations*, (Dpt Global Communications Contents and Division, 1999)

73) however, could not easily overcome the mistrust that they had built up over the previous two decades<sup>67</sup>.

South and North Korea continued to experience turbulence, greatly affected by the rapidly shifting international environment. Amid uncertainty and confusion, the South-North Korean relationship entered a new phase in the mid- 1980s when the communist states began advocating reform and openness. Notwithstanding the rapidly changing world order, they overcame the unprecedented challenges by taking appropriate measures. On July 7, 1988 with the announcement of the Presidential Declaration for National Self-esteem Unification and Prosperity, South and North Korea officially promoted Inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. The South Korean government followed by adopting a new formula for achieving national unification officially known as the “Korean National Community Formula” in September 1989. The formula was established under a framework that principally promotes independence, democracy and peace. The South Korean government attempted to achieve national unification through exchanges and cooperation. Shortly after the adoption of the new formula, the South Korean government enacted the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act and forged the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.

According to James Martin (2011) in his article on “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”, the two Koreas also agreed that their peninsula should be “free of nuclear weapons”<sup>68</sup>. The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula calls for the establishment of a Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) to negotiate a credible and effective bilateral nuclear inspection regime as called for in the declaration. South Korea joined the United Nations in August of 1991 along with North Korea, entertaining high hopes for reconciliation in the early 1990s. The mood for reconciliation, however, soon came to an end when North Korea provoked the first nuclear crisis by withdrawing from the NPT in 1993. At the time, South and North Korea were pursuing an inter-Korean summit meant to take place in 1994. The heightened hopes for the summit, however crumbled to dust by the sudden death of Kim Il-sung. The South Korean government suspended all inter-Korean exchanges between the two Koreas. As soon as the investigation team revealed the Cheonan was also sunk by North Korea, President Lee implemented countermeasures’ called the May 24 Measures. The South Korean government suspended all inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation with the North except the business operation in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and the pure humanitarian aid for the underprivileged people in North Korea. Relations between South and North Korea rapidly deteriorated and remained in a deadlock over the next few years.

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<sup>67</sup> Park H, North Korean Perceptions of Self and Others: Implications for Policy Choices, *Pacific Affairs* 73, No 4:503-516.

<sup>68</sup> Martin J, Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, (Center for Non Proliferation Studies, Monterey International Studies, 2011).

## 2.6 Unification Scenarios and Challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> century

Because of the bitter experience of the Korean War in 1950-1953 the Korean people in the North and South want to achieve the reunification by peaceful means. The two Koreas have changed their approaches to the bilateral relations by increasing economic interactions as well as the reunion of separated families according to Prof. Ilpyong Kim's article, "The Impact of Division On Korea". There are ten million Korean people who are separated from each other due to the Korean War and many of them are aging and want to achieve the reunion of separated families during their lifetime<sup>69</sup>. Reunification would also be an essential solution to the current problems and unending conflicts. The two Korean leaders therefore agreed that the unification of two Koreas will be achieved independently without any foreign interference, it will be achieved by peaceful means without the war, and it will be achieved by means of the Grand National Unity.

As suggested by Olsen (2005; 164) that the Koreans in both Koreas will be better served if their leaders are able to truly take the lead in the quest for Korean reconciliation and reunification without the assistance and intervention of any external power<sup>70</sup>. It will be if the theories behind the negotiations process, the motivations behind the political, economic and strategic agendas and the locale for hosting the sequence of meeting leading to Korea's resolution of its divided nation problems can be all dealt with by Koreans in Korea. Non Koreans should support Koreans in pursuing that goal if they can arrange it for themselves, should avoid trying to influence their pursuit of that goal, and should welcome whatever results the Koreans may devise, even if it is not fully in accord with what might be on the other countries' wish list for how a united Korea should configure itself.

The peaceful reconciliation and dialogue began in the 1990s when the civilian government of Kim Young Sam was installed in 1992 and economic cooperation between the two Koreas increased. It was during the period of Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy. The Sunshine Policy was introduced in 1998 as part of a campaign pledge to "actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation" with North Korea. The Sunshine Policy was intended to create conditions of economic assistance and cooperation for reunification, rather than sanctions and military threats. The plan was divided into three parts: increased cooperation through inter-Korean organizations (while maintaining separate systems in the North and South), national unification with two autonomous regional governments, and finally the creation of a central national government, lifted limits on business deals between North Korean and South Korean firms, and even called for a stop to the American economic embargo against the North. In June 2000, the leaders of North and South Korea met in Pyongyang and shook hands for the first time since the division of Korea. According to Won Bae Kim (2001; 47) the Korea people believe that inter-Korean cooperation will expand and eventually lead to economic and territorial integration of the two

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<sup>69</sup> Prof Ilpyong K, *The Impact of Division On Korea and the Major Powers*, (University of Connecticut, 2003)

<sup>70</sup>Olsen,*op. cit*; p, 164.

Koreas<sup>71</sup>. The Roh Moo-Hyun government also adopted the policy of prosperity and engagement toward North Korea and will continue to work toward the peaceful reunification of two Koreas in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

The process towards this reunification was then officially started by the June 15<sup>th</sup> North-South Joint Declaration in August 2000, where the two countries agreed to work towards a peaceful reunification in the future. However, there are a number of difficulties in the process due to the large political and economic differences between the two countries as stated by Douglas Turner (2011) in an article in “The Korean Times”, Now that South Korea is becoming an international powerhouse, many South Koreans fear that the economic burden that reunification would place on their shoulders<sup>72</sup>. As a result, the realistic possibility of a reunified Korea is becoming something of a dream. The longer the North and South are divided, the more comfortable southerners will be with the thought of never reunifying. Koreans in the South know too well that they stand to lose more than gain if there is reunification in the near future. The North Korean economy pales in comparison to the South, and reunification would require heavy investment in rebuilding infrastructure and agriculture in the North.

Peace and hopes for reconciliation between North and South Korea also stop short as they meet the presence of US troops in the homeland and the stubborn refusal of the North Korean government to give up its developing nuclear weapons program as stated by Kimberly (2011; 2) in her article “Remembering the Korean War To End The Korean War”<sup>73</sup>. According to Carpenter and Bandow (2004; 33) in their book, The Korean Conundrum, they state that, Seoul’s Ministry of Unification has argued that the North Koreans’ “true aim is not to continue the nuclear development program, but to seek a breakthrough in relations with the United States”<sup>74</sup>. Cheng Young-dal a member of President Roh’s ruling party contends that, at heart North Korea would like to have their regime guaranteed. North Korea’s actions that it took lately have come because they fear for their survival as noted by David Sands in the Washington Times of February 4, 2003<sup>75</sup>. “Once these things (from a conciliatory approach) are guaranteed, North Korea will abandon its nuclear ambitions” as stated by Howard French in the New York Times of January 17, 2003<sup>76</sup>. However, the lofty goals of reconciliation and reunification of the two Koreas could be achieved only when the North Korean leadership is willing to give up the development of the nuclear weapons by accepting the security guarantee and humanitarian aid of the major powers at the Six-Party Conference in Beijing.

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<sup>71</sup> Won Bae K, Planning Issues in the territorial integration of the Korean Peninsula, *Geo Journal*, Vol 53, No. 1, (Springer 2001) p, 47-56.

<sup>72</sup> Turner D, Division Of Korea, *The Korea Times*, 2011.

<sup>73</sup> Kimberly K, *op. cit*; p, 2.

<sup>74</sup> Carpenter and Bandow, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, (Palgrave Macmillan, USA, 2005), p, 33.

<sup>75</sup> Sands D, South Korean Officials Says Fear Motivates North, *Washington Times*, February 4, 2003.

<sup>76</sup> Howard F, South Korea’s President Elect Rejects Use of Force Against North Korea, *New York Times*, January 17, 2003 PA11.

Also the United States should withdraw its troops from South Korea because the Koreans are said by Carpenter and Bandow (2004; 18) to be blaming Washington for the peninsula's continuing as well as past division, "The United States wants us weak and divided, they are actually ruling South Korea with the excuse that they are protecting us"<sup>77</sup>. To ensure progress in reunification, Washington should consider making military and economic concession including the possible withdrawal of the US forces to formally end the Korean War. Then the reunification of two Koreas may be achieved peacefully with the consent and security guarantee of the four major powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula including China, Japan, Russia and the United States which are influencing the future direction of reconciliation and reunification of the two Koreas.

Marcus Noland (2000; 12) stipulates that when the South Korean President Kim Dae-jung first announced his "Sunshine Policy" which brought him the Nobel Peace Prize he made it clear that an easing of tensions and reconciliation between the two Koreas was a goal, a goal that would take many years to reach given the very real difference and problem that exist between South and North Korea<sup>78</sup>. As postulated by Dan Reiter (2009; 10) in his book How Wars End, war is launched, fought and ended in pursuit of political goals and this was also the fundamental insight of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century Prussian thinker Carl Von Clausewitz<sup>79</sup>. According to Stanley (2009; 45) in the journal "Ending the Korean War", bargaining models of war suggest that war ends after two sides develop an overlapping bargaining space. Domestic mechanisms – domestic governing coalitions, a state's elite foreign policy decision making group and their role in ending interstate war- are critical in explaining how, when and why that bargaining space develops. Through preference information and entrapment obstacles, wars can become "stuck" and require a change in expectations to produce a war- terminating bargaining space<sup>80</sup>. A major source of such change is a shift in belligerents' governing coalitions. Events in the US, China and the Soviet Union during the Korean War illustrate the dynamics of these obstacles and the need for domestic coalition shifts in overcoming them before the conflict could be brought to an end.

Paul Chamberlin (2004; 33) also argues that building a harmonious reunified Korean society will also be difficult because two quite different Korean cultures have developed since 1945<sup>81</sup>. William M. Drennan (1997) in his article "Prospects and Implications of Korean Unification", then suggests that, The South needs time for democracy's roots to sink deeper, for a civil society's political institutions to mature, and for the government and people to prepare for the historical task of consolidating the nation<sup>82</sup>. Nicholas Eberstadt also agrees with William, in his journal

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<sup>77</sup> ibid, p,18.

<sup>78</sup> Noland M, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas, (Peterson Institute, Washington DC, 2000), p, 12.

<sup>79</sup> Reiter D, How Wars End, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA, 2009), p, 10.

<sup>80</sup> Stanley E, Ending The Korean War; The Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace, International Security, Vol 34, No 1, 2009.

<sup>81</sup> Chamberlin P, Cultural Dimension of Korean Reunification: Building a Unified Society, International Journal on World Peace, Vol 21, No. 3 (September 2004) p, 3-47.

<sup>82</sup> Drennan W, Prospects and Implications of Korean Unification, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, 22 May 1997.

“Hastening Korean Unification”, he adds that the South should liberalize its economy and strengthen its civic institutions<sup>83</sup>. The North needs time to open up, reform, and accustom itself to life as a more normal member of the international community and address the obstacles of nuclear weapons and its obsolete inefficient economic system. Koreans on both sides of the DMZ need time to resolve the legacy of over half a century of bitter division.

During the Korean War the United States warplanes dropped more napalm and bombs on North Korea than they did during the whole Pacific campaign of World War II and almost every substantial building in North Korea was destroyed as noted by Walkom Thomas (2010)<sup>84</sup>. General MacArthur considered using nuclear weapons against the Chinese or North Korean interiors as stipulated by Cyber Sarge in an article, “Division of Korea”. The US had the intention that radioactive fallout zones would interrupt the Chinese supply chains<sup>85</sup>. North Korea still fears that the United States might still attempt to use nuclear weapons on them considering that the US still has its troops stationed in South Korea. According to Bruce Cummings’ journal on “The Origins of the Korean War”, this has dramatically shaped North Korean choices and remain a key factor in its national security strategy<sup>86</sup>.

The North Koreans however, developed a survival strategy that Stratfor identified in the 1990s. According to George Friedman’s article on “The United States in Korea”, The Koreans’ intention was to appear simultaneously weak, fearsome and crazy<sup>87</sup>. This was not an easy strategy to carry out, but they have carried it out well. First they made certain that they were perceived to be always on the verge of internal collapse and thus not a direct threat to anyone but themselves. They went out of their way to emphasize their economic problems, particularly the famines of the 1990s. They wanted no one to think that they were intent on being an aggressor unless provoked severely. Second, they wanted to appear to be fearsome. This would at first blush seem to contradict the impression of weakness, but they managed they managed it brilliantly by perpetually reminding the world that they were close to developing nuclear weapons and longer-range missiles. Recognizing that the Americans and the Japanese had a reflexive obsession with nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons, Pyongyang constantly made it appear that they were capable of developing nuclear weapons but were not yet there. Not being there yet meant that no one had to do something about the weapons. Being close to developing them meant that it was dangerous to provoke them. Even North Korea’s two nuclear tests have, intentionally or incidentally, appeared sub-par, leaving its neighbors able to doubt the technological prowess of the “Hermit Kingdom”.

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<sup>83</sup> Eberstadt N, *op. cit.*; p, 78.

<sup>84</sup> Thomas W, Walkom: North Korea’s Unending War Ravages On, 25 November 2010, Toronto Star.

<sup>85</sup> Sage C, Division of Korea, Vietnam Veterans Website, 1999.

<sup>86</sup> Cummings B, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol2, New York Times, Princeton University Press, December 13, 1990.

<sup>87</sup> Friedman G, The U.S In Korea; A Strategy of Inertia, March 27, 2012, Geopolitical Weekly.

The final piece was to appear crazy, or crazy enough that when pressed, they would choose the suicide option of striking with a nuclear weapon, if they had one. This was critical because a rational actor possessing one or few weapons would not think of striking its neighbors, since the U.S counterstrike would annihilate the North Korean regime. The threat wouldn't work if North Korea was considered rational, but if it was irrational, the North Korean deterrence strategy could work. It would force everyone to be ultra-cautious in dealing with North Korea, lest North Korea do something quite mad. South Korean propaganda did more for North Korea's image of unpredictability than the North Korea could have hoped.

North Korea, then, has spent more than two decades cultivating the image to the outside world of a nation on the verge of internal economic collapse (even while internally emphasizing its strength in the face of external threats). At the same time, the country has appeared to be on the verge of being a nuclear power, one ruled by potential lunatics. The net result was that the major powers, particularly South Korea, the United States and Japan, went out of their way to avoid provoking the North. In addition, these three powers were prepared to bribe North Korea to stop undertaking nuclear and missile development. Several times, they bribed the North with money or food to stop building weapons, and each time the North took the money and then resumed their program, quite ostentatiously, so as to cause maximum notice and restore the vision of the weak, fearsome lunatic. The North was good at playing this game that it maneuvered itself into a position in which it sat as an equal with the United States, Japan, Russia, China and South Korea. It has achieved stabilizing its regime by reinforcing its legitimacy internally and its power externally.

According to Smith (2006; 87) in the book Deterring America North Korea's nuclear asserts remain effectively immune from American air attacks<sup>88</sup>. Though the United States and South Korea have far superior air forces and well trained armies, the sheer numbers of North Korea can bring to bear in terms of both man power and artillery mean that any war would be incredibly costly. Victor Cha and David Kang (2005; 8) in their book Nuclear North Korea: A Debate On Engagement Strategies postulate that the debate of North Korea has emerged in the past decade as one of the most divisive foreign policy issues for the US and its allies in Asia<sup>89</sup>. The US looks for appropriate strategy that it should employ to deal with this mysterious country. Ever since the first Korean War in 1950, scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one. Yet for fifty years the Koreans have not come close to starting a war. David C. Kang (2003) in his journal, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War" however argues that the explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite

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<sup>88</sup> Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006), p, 87.

<sup>89</sup>Victor C and Kang D, Nuclear North Korea- A Debate on Engagement Strategies, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2005), p, 8.



simple: deterrence works<sup>90</sup>. Nuclear weapons are however still a necessary evil for stabilizing power relations and as exemplified by North Korea they are still a necessary tool for deterrence.

In conclusion, with the US still having troops stationed at South Korea the idea of unifying the two Koreas will remain a fallacy with North Korea fearing that the US might still attempt to use nuclear weapons on them. Also different cultures have developed in the two Koreas since 1945 building a harmonious reunified Korean society will be difficult.

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<sup>90</sup> Kang D, *International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War*, Vol 47, No. 3, (September 2003) pp, 301-324.

## CHAPTER 3

### IMPACT OF THE NON PROLIFERATION ARRANGEMENT

Ever since nuclear weapons were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the international community has sought ways to prevent any future use, or indeed, acquisition of these weapons, leading to the formation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. This chapter will focus in depth on the origins and objectives of the treaty, its impact, failures and successes.

#### 3.1 The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

##### Origins and Objectives

According to Major Ken Craig's article on "The Nuclear Proliferation Treaty", diplomatic efforts in this regard were accelerated in 1949, following the Soviet Union's test of its first nuclear weapon, and again in 1950, following a similar test by the United Kingdom<sup>91</sup>. Between 1956 and 1959, the United States concluded peaceful-use nuclear cooperation agreements with 40 allied countries, 26 of which accepted United States-mandated safeguards. In return, these 26 were provided with research reactors, nuclear training, and reactor fuel. The Soviet Union concluded similar agreements with nations within its sphere of influence. In 1957, the IAEA was established to provide the institutional foundation for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to administer safeguards designed to ensure that nuclear assistance was not being used for military purposes. In 1960, the IAEA assumed responsibility for inspections previously implemented by the United States and the Soviet Union on their peaceful-use nuclear exports. That same year, France tested its first nuclear device, which created additional concern that a treaty was needed to limit the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Then in 1962, the world was paralyzed with the spectre of looming potential nuclear war as the United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The conflict came to a point on October 27, 1962 when Soviet ships were running a blockade of US ships that was meant to halt the shipment of nuclear materials<sup>92</sup> as stipulated by Alexander (2011). The attack from either the Soviet Union or the United States would have meant nuclear war. The decision finally came for a mutual stand down after the US agreed to take missiles from Turkey if the Soviet would leave Cuba. This is believed to be the closest to nuclear war that the world has ever come to, according to Hershberg (1995)<sup>93</sup>. Moreover, in 1964, China conducted its first nuclear

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<sup>91</sup> Major Ken Craig, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Achieving International Security through diplomacy, Canadian Military Journal.

<sup>92</sup> J. Alexander, The Non Proliferation Treaty; Its Effect on US Foreign Relations towards Iran, August 9, 2011.

<sup>93</sup> J. Hershberg, Anatomy of a Controversy, Project, Project Bulletin, Issue 5, Spring 1995.

test. Clearly, the impetus was being generated with respect to the need to establish a treaty that would prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to lay the groundwork for eventual nuclear disarmaments.

Following intensive negotiations on collective security arrangements, safeguards, and balanced obligations, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a proposed non-proliferation treaty to the UN. After amendments to the joint proposal, the UN General Assembly on 12 June 1968, approved Resolution 2373, which endorsed the Non Proliferation Treaty<sup>94</sup>. It was opened for signature in 01 July 1968 and signed on that date by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and 59 other countries. The Treaty entered into force with the deposit of US ratification on 05 March 1970. On May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty according to Major Ken Craig<sup>95</sup>. Under the NPT terms, a country that detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967 is defined as a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). Ironically, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China are the only nuclear-weapon states as defined by the treaty. Four non parties to the treaty are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons are called Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS): India, Pakistan and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons, while Israel has had a policy of opacity regarding its own nuclear weapons program. North Korea acceded to the Treaty in 1985, but never came into compliance, and announced its withdrawal in 2003. According to Daryl Kimball (2012; 1) in his article, “The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty at a Glance”, Under the treaty, the five Nuclear Weapon State commit to pursue general and complete disarmament, while the Non-Nuclear Weapon States agree to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons<sup>96</sup>.

Daryl Kimball (2012; 2) adds that, with its near-universal membership, the NPT has the widest adherence of any arms control agreement, with only India, Israel and Pakistan remaining outside the treaty. In order to accede to the treaty, these states must do so as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), since the treaty restricts nuclear weapon states (NWS) status to nations that “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”<sup>97</sup>. For India, Israel and Pakistan, all known to possess or suspected of having nuclear weapons, joining the treaty as NNWS would require that they dismantle their nuclear weapons and place their nuclear materials under international safeguards. South Africa followed this path to accession in 1991. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the implementing body for the NPT, monitoring compliance with the treaty and assisting NNWS in developing civilian technology. According to Tariq Rauf (1999)’s article on the “Success of the NPT Regime”, The NPT had an initial term of 25 years. In accordance with Article X.2, the NPT was however made permanent in May 1995, when 174 (of the then 178) member states meeting

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<sup>94</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXI), Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1672<sup>nd</sup> Plenary Meeting, 12 June 1968, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/resins/htm>

<sup>95</sup> Major Ken Craig, p, 2A.

<sup>96</sup> D. Kimball, The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty at a Glance, Arms Control Association, Washington DC

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.* p, 2.

in New York at the Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) agreed without a vote to extend the duration of the Treaty indefinitely<sup>98</sup>.

The Non Proliferation Treaty consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Although the concept of “pillars” is not expressed anywhere in the NPT, the treaty is nevertheless sometimes interpreted as a three-pillar system, with an implicit balance among them: non-proliferation; disarmament; and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. The NPT is often seen to be based on a central bargain: “the NPT non-nuclear weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals” as stated by Graham Jr Thomas (2004)<sup>99</sup>.

The first pillar is non proliferation: the five NWS agree not to transfer “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” and “not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce” a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) to acquire nuclear weapons (Article 1). NNWS parties to the NPT agree not to “receive”, “manufacture” or “acquire” nuclear weapons or to “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons” (Article 11). NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Article 111). The five NWS parties have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-NWS party except in response to a nuclear attack in alliance with a Nuclear Weapons State. However, these undertakings have not been incorporated formally into the treaty, and the exact details have varied over time. The U.S also had warheads targeted at North Korea, a non-NWS, from 1959 until 1991. The previous United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense Geoff Hoon, has also explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of the country’s nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by “rogue states” according to the BBC Article of 20 March 2002<sup>100</sup>.

The second pillar is disarmament: Article VI of the NPT represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. The NPT’s preamble contains language affirming the desire of treaty signatories to ease international tension and strengthen international trust so as to create someday the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons, and treaty on general and complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from national arsenals. The wording of the NPT’s Article VI arguably imposes only a vague obligation on all NPT signatories to move in the general direction of nuclear and total disarmament, saying “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on

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<sup>98</sup> Tariq R, Successes of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime, (Monterey Institute of International Studies, October 1999).

<sup>99</sup> Graham T, Avoiding the Tipping Point, Arms Control Association, (November 2004).

<sup>100</sup> UK Prepared to use nuclear weapons; BBC Article 20 March 2002.

a treaty on general and complete disarmament”. Under this interpretation, Article VI does not strictly require all signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty. Rather, it only requires them “to negotiate in good faith”. On the other hand some governments, especially non-nuclear-weapon states belonging to the Non- Aligned Movement, have interpreted Article VI’s language as being anything but vague. In their view, Article VI constitutes a formal and specific obligation on the NPT- recognized nuclear- weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, and argue that these states have failed to meet their obligation.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued 8 July 1996, unanimously interprets the text of Article VI as implying that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”. The ICJ opinion notes that this obligation involves all NPT parties (not just the nuclear weapon states) and does not suggest a specific time frame for nuclear disarmament<sup>101</sup>.

The third pillar is peaceful use of nuclear energy: this pillar allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to NPT signatory countries for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs in those countries, as long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. Since very few of the states with nuclear energy programs are willing to abandon the use of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the NPT under Article VI provides other states with the possibility to do the same, but under the conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons. The treaty recognizes the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but restricts this right for NPT parties to be exercised “in conformity with Articles 1 and 11” (the basic nonproliferation obligations that constitute the “first pillar” of the treaty). As the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station use enriched uranium fuel, it follows that states must be able either to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market. Mohamed ElBaradei, then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has called the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities the “Achilles’ heel” of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As of 2007, 13 states have an enrichment capability as noted by Daniel Dumbey in the Financial Times of 19 February 2007<sup>102</sup>. Because of the availability of fissile material has long been considered the principal obstacle to and “pacing element” for, a country’s nuclear weapons development effort, it was declared a major emphasis of U.S policy in 2004 to prevent the further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing(also known as “ENR”) technology<sup>x</sup>. Countries possessing ENR capabilities, it is feared, have what is in effect the option of using this capability to produce fissile material for weapons use on demand, thus giving them what has been termed a “virtual” nuclear weapons program. The degree to which NPT members have a “right” to ENR technology notwithstanding its potentially

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<sup>101</sup> The ICJ (1996-07-08), Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

<sup>102</sup> Dumbey D, Director General’s Interview on Iran and DPRK, Financial Times, 19 February 2007.

grave proliferation implications, therefore, is at the cutting edge of policy and legal debates surrounding the meaning of Article VI in relation to Articles 1, 11, and 111 of the Treaty.

Article V11 allows for the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones. Article V111 requires a complex and lengthy process to amend the treaty, effectively blocking any changes absent clear consensus. Article X establishes the terms by which a state may withdraw from the treaty, requiring three months' advance notice should "extraordinary events" jeopardize its supreme national interests. The remainder of the treaty deals with its administration, providing for a review conference every five years and a decision after 25 years on whether the treaty should be extended. The 1995 review conference extended the treaty indefinitely and enhanced the review process by mandating that the five-year review conferences review past implementation and address ways to strengthen the treaty.

The treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) according to the United Nations it "is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The NPT represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the Nuclear Weapon States"<sup>103</sup>. According to the World Nuclear Association's article on "Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation", The NPT's main objectives are to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons, to provide security for non-nuclear weapon states which have given up the nuclear option, to encourage international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons<sup>104</sup>. The NPT was essentially an agreement among the five nuclear weapons states and the other countries interested in nuclear technology .The deal was that assistance and cooperation would be traded for pledges, backed by international scrutiny, that no plant or material would be diverted to weapons' use. Those who refused to be part of the deal would be excluded from international cooperation or trade involving nuclear technology.

### **3.2 Successes of the Non-Proliferation Treaty**

According to the World Nuclear Association (2012; 1), Over the past 35years the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a conspicuous international success in curbing the diversion of civil uranium into military uses<sup>105</sup>. It has involved cooperation in developing nuclear energy while ensuring that

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<sup>103</sup> <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml>.

<sup>104</sup> World Nuclear Association, Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation, London, 2012.

<sup>105</sup>World Nuclear Association; op. cit; p, 1.

civil uranium, plutonium and associated plants are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation of nuclear weapons program. In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely. Its scope is also being widened to include undeclared nuclear activities. Most countries have renounced nuclear weapons, recognizing that possession of them would threaten rather than enhance national security. They have therefore embraced the NPT as a public commitment to use nuclear materials and technology only for peaceful purposes. According to Daryl Kimball in NewsMax.com Wires of May 4, 2005, the treaty has been very successful, when you consider the fact that, in the 1960s before the treaty was negotiated and opened for signature, it was expected that there might be dozens of states with nuclear weapons<sup>106</sup>. And today we have 8 states clearly with nuclear weapons stockpiles: the US, Russia, China, the UK, France as well as India and Pakistan and Israel, those last three states not party to the treaty. And there is the question about North Korea, which claims that it has manufactured nuclear weapons. So today we have 9 states when that number could be much higher.

According to Adam Engelhart (2012)'s article on "Nuclear Disarmament Resource Collection" in terms of quantitative reductions, measurable steps have been undertaken by key Nuclear Weapon States both unilaterally and bilaterally. The Nuclear Weapon collectively reduced the size of their nuclear arsenals from over 70,000 warheads at the height of the Cold War to fewer than 19,000 by 2012. These reductions have been carried out unilaterally by at least four nuclear weapon states, as well as through bilateral legally binding arrangements between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. The United States has reduced its stockpile by 84% from a Cold War peak of 31,255 warheads in 1967, to the current stockpile of approximately 5,000 operational and reserved warheads<sup>107</sup>. While France has reduced its arsenal unilaterally, and the United Kingdom announced ambitious reductions to its arsenal in 2010. While perhaps South Africa has been the most notable country to have rolled back its nuclear weapon program, there are other examples of countries reversing themselves at various stages in their quest for a nuclear weapon capability<sup>108</sup> as stated by Tariq Rauf (1999; 8). Canada was the first state that had the capability to make nuclear arms to renounce such a capability. Others under different circumstances have include among others, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Kazakhstan, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine. This has however indicated the success of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in reducing the number of states with nuclear weapons. According to Frances Mautner-Markhof (2007) The NPT, through its mandatory requirement for international safeguards on nuclear materials and facilities in all non-nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty, has had success not only in preventing proliferation but also as an early warning mechanism and as a confidence- and security- building measure<sup>109</sup>.

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<sup>106</sup> Kimball D, NewsMax Wires, May 4, 2005

<sup>107</sup> A. Engelhart, Nuclear Disarmament Resource Collection, October 23, 2012. [www.flicker.com](http://www.flicker.com)

<sup>108</sup> T. Rauf, *op. cit*; p, 8.

<sup>109</sup> F. Mautner-Markhof, Nuclear Non Proliferation: A Case Study of the Law of Unintended Consequences, Vol.2No.2, Global Asia.

### 3.3 Challenges faced by the non-proliferation regime

Though the treaty has been largely successful in limiting the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, it is today at the crossroads and faces difficulties due to non-adherence of provisions by state parties.<sup>110</sup> According to Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman (2009;144), the “NPT has one giant loophole”: Article IV gives each non-nuclear weapon state the ‘inalienable right’ to pursue nuclear energy for the generation of power. A “number of high-ranking officials, even within the United Nations, have argued that they can do little to stop states using nuclear reactors to produce nuclear weapon”. A 2009 United Nations report said that: “The revival of interest in nuclear power could result in the worldwide dissemination of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies, which present obvious risks of proliferation as these technologies can produce fissile materials that are directly usable in nuclear weapons” according to Benjamin K Sovacool (2011; 187)<sup>111</sup>. Also as stipulated by Jean-Francois Rioux (1992; 28) in his book Limiting the Proliferation of Weapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies, recent revelations concerning Iraq’s nuclear weapons program demonstrate that a large and growing number of states can now export the material, equipment technology and services needed to develop nuclear weapons<sup>112</sup>.

According to an article by UK Essays (2003-2013), the treaty is an expression of imbalances of the international system and is an intrinsically unfair treaty. The treaty, in Article VI, contains the seed of its own self-correction. Fred Kaplan (2005) has noted that “Article VI is so loosely constructed” that it is “amazing that anyone ever took it seriously”. The best guarantee for non-proliferation is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Over the years the NPT has come to be seen by many Third World states as a “conspiracy of the nuclear ‘haves’ to keep the nuclear ‘have-nots’ in their place”<sup>113</sup>. This argument has its roots in Article VI of the treaty which “obligates the nuclear weapon states to liquidate their nuclear stockpiles and pursue complete disarmament. The non-nuclear states see no signs of this happening” as noted by Graham Jr Thomas (2004; 11)<sup>114</sup>. Some argue that the NWS have not fully complied with their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. There has been disappointment with the limited progress on nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have 22,000 warheads between them and have shown a reluctance to disarm further. According to Ramesh Thakur (2007) in a journal, “If You Want Non-Proliferation Prepare for Disarmament”,

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<sup>110</sup> T. Reed and D. Stillman, *The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation*, (Zenith Press, 2009) p, 144.

<sup>111</sup> Sovacool B, *Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power: A Critical Assessment of Atomic Energy*; World Scientific, 2011 p, 187.

<sup>112</sup> J. Rioux, Limiting the Proliferation of Weapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies, (McGill Queens University Press, 1992) p, 28.

<sup>113</sup> F. Kaplan, “The Real Nuclear Option: The Non Proliferation Treaty is a mess. We have to save it anyway”. *Slate*, 3 May, 2005.

<sup>114</sup> Graham Jr, op. cit; p, 11.



the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation cannot be addressed without a commitment to the process of disarmament by the major nuclear weapon states<sup>115</sup>. Critics of the NPT argue that the failure of the recognized nuclear weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons especially in the Post-Cold War era has angered some non-nuclear weapon states (NPT signatories). Such failure, these critics add, provides justification for the non-nuclear-weapon signatories to quit the NPT and develop their own nuclear arsenals.

According to Alexander (2011), the use nuclear weapons is a force that can cause mass destruction for the people of a nation. Nuclear weapons are the most terrifying weapons ever created by humankind<sup>116</sup> as noted by Cirincione (2007; 48) in the text Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons. The constant fear of this attack is always felt by the United States<sup>117</sup>. Ever since the Cold War there has been an ongoing search to raise the security of the nation of the United States. The United States is seen using the NPT to their self interests. This regime of trying to stop nuclear spread is however, the outreach from the fear of the major powers through the world in the 1970's trying to look out for the security of its people. Therefore the existence of the NPT was a measure set in place out of the need for the nations of the world to protect their borders from an impending attack of nuclear warfare. A rogue nation developing a weapon that could cause mass chaos is something the United States cannot have. The United States has a foothold of control on the NPT and can be seen influencing the treaty for its own uses in security means. According to George Bunn (2003)'s article on "The NPT: History and Current Problems" While pushing other countries to reject the acquisition of nuclear weapons for their defense, the United States seems to be relying more heavily on nuclear weapons for its own defense<sup>118</sup>. This double standard constitutes another threat to the NPT regime. Even the United States has not yet adopted legislation to implement its new safeguards agreement. Some non-nuclear-weapon states may be holding back, asking why they should take on more nonproliferation obligations when, as they perceive it, the United States reject an important one-the CTBT prohibition on nuclear testing-and then proposes new types of nuclear weapons for itself. It is clear that the NPT is a treaty that was proposed by the major powers has turned out to be a con game<sup>119</sup> argues Jayaprakash (2008) in his journal "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The 'Greatest Con Game'".

Other observers have suggested that the linkage between proliferation and disarmament may also work the other way, that is, that the failure to resolve proliferation threats in Iran and North Korea, for instance, will cripple the prospects for disarmament. No current nuclear weapon states, the argument goes, would seriously consider eliminating its last nuclear weapons without high confidence that other countries would not acquire them. Some observers have even

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<sup>115</sup>R.Thakur, If You Want Proliferation Prepare for Disarmament, Vol.42 No. 47, pp22-23

<sup>116</sup>Alexander, op. cit; p, 28.

<sup>117</sup>Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2007), p, 48.

<sup>118</sup>G. Bunn, The NPT: History and Current Problems, Arms Control Association, Washington DC, 2003.

<sup>119</sup>Jayaprakash D, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Greatest Con Game, 2008, Vol.43 No.32 p,43-45.

suggested that the very progress of disarmament by the super powers which has led to the elimination of thousands of weapons and delivery systems could eventually make the possession of nuclear weapons more attractive by increasing the perceived strategic value of a small arsenal. As one US official and NPT expert warned in 2007, “logic suggests that as the number of nuclear weapons decreases, the “marginal utility” of a nuclear weapon as an instrument of military power increases. At the extreme, which it is precisely disarmament’s hope to create, the strategic utility of even one or two nuclear weapons would be huge.

Despite the broad coverage of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a string of failures since the early 1990s have highlighted the ineffectiveness of existing nonproliferation instruments to deter would-be nuclear weapon states. According to an article by the Council On Foreign Relations (2012), In theory, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can refer countries that do not comply with the NPT to the UN Security Council (UNSC), which in turn can impose sanctions or other punitive measures<sup>120</sup>. In practice, however, political calculations have often caused deadlock at the UNSC, enabling nuclear rogues, such as Iran to defy successive, fairly weak UN sanctions with virtual impunity. Another problem is the lack of adequate verification and enforcement mechanisms available to the IAEA, whose budget, intelligence capabilities, and technological resources fall short of what would be needed to detect, prevent or punish NPT violations. In 2010, the IAEA’s inspections budget was approximately \$164 million. Not surprisingly, even discounting nuclear facilities the IAEA does not have access to such as those in Iran and North Korea, nuclear materials have reached the black market from installations under IAEA safeguards namely from several in Pakistan.

According to NewsMax.com Wires Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace (Washington D.C) at the Review Conference states that “and you do have an increased perception that nuclear weapons are both desirable and beneficial, and that is something, which could lead to the erosion of the (enforcement) regime”. Most states in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century now desire nuclear weapons. According to Frances Mautner- Markhof in his journal “NPT: A Case Study of the Law of Unintended Consequences”, The nuclear weapon states under the NPT have also contributed to its weakening, in that they have fulfilled their Treaty obligations. These states have either turned a blind eye or casually reacted to the secret and illegal development of nuclear weapons by non-NPT states<sup>121</sup>. In some cases they have clandestinely supported such programs through proscribed technology transfers. For instance the United States signed the Indo US nuclear deal with India. The huge boulder that was blocking India’s nuclear path has been lifted and the country has been incredibly included, albeit in a tacit manner, in the exclusive club of nuclear haves. The deal suggests trade in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes between the United States, which is a signatory of the NPT and India, which is not. India refuses to become a party to the NPT and this bilateral pact has been strongly criticized as a terrible precedent and a cynical use of nuclear cooperation to advance political aims, in this case containing China. Some

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<sup>120</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, The Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Issue Brief, 5 July 2012.

<sup>121</sup> Mautner- Markhof, *op. cit.*; p, 12.

argue that it is because India is a new ally of the US. India correctly claims that the agreement and its new nuclear alliance with the US represent a victory and an acknowledgement of its great power status. Critics of the deal propagate it is also a huge blow to the integrity and survival of the NPT regime and it goes against the core of the non-proliferation agreement. It is also feared that India's special would spur other nuclear weapon states, such as Russia and China, to make similar deal with nations such as Pakistan, Iran or North Korea, further undermining the NPT.

According to Henry Sokolski (2010) in his book, Reviewing the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty(NPT), In the practical world, the NPT hardly admits of modification and is far too easy for violating states to withdraw from<sup>122</sup>. Under Article X treaty members are free to leave the NPT with no more than three months notice merely by filing a statement of the “extraordinary events ‘relating to the subject matter of the treaty’ it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests”. The withdrawal becomes effective only after the elapse of 3 months, whereas North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003, stating then that its withdrawal “will come into force automatically and immediately” on the next day . As demonstrated by North Korea with its withdrawal from the NPT these slight requirements are too easy to meet. Noncompliance with the notice does not necessarily mean that the withdrawal from the NPT is invalid as stated by Frederic L Kirgis (2003) in his article “North Korea’s Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty”. For this reason, the NPT is not just seen as being weak against violators, but is seen effectively as a legal instrument that enables nations to acquire nuclear weapons technology<sup>123</sup>.

According to Jean du Preez (2003) in the article, “North Korea’s Withdrawal from the NPT: A Reality Check”, This will be a first time a state has left the treaty. North Korea’s withdrawal could trigger further defections from the treaty and cause other states in the region to pursue nuclear weapons of their own<sup>124</sup>. According to Wade L Huntley (2005)’s article on “North Korea and the NPT”, If North Korea’s actions trigger a nuclear proliferation domino effect in East Asia, the viability of the NPT would be shaken at its foundation<sup>125</sup>. North Korea’s action will also set a precedent eroding current NPT compliance norms. Other NPT non-nuclear states in similar situations may calculate that the political costs of their own potential withdrawal have been reduced by North Korea’s precedent. Of equal concern is the potential for North Korea to sell weapons-grade fissile material or nuclear weapons themselves to other states and non-state actors, including terrorist groups. Sheena Chestnut (2007) notes it in a journal, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks”, that policymakers and academics have

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<sup>122</sup>Sokolski H, Reviewing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).

<sup>123</sup>Kirgis F, North Korea’s Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, American Society of International Law, January, 2003.

<sup>124</sup>Preez J, North Korea’s Withdrawal from the NPT: A Reality Check, (Monterey Institute of International Studies, Washington DC, 2003).

<sup>125</sup> Huntley W, North Korea and the NPT, Foreign Policy in Focus, Washington DC, 2005.

expressed concern that North Korea will one day export nuclear material or components<sup>126</sup>. North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT may reopen domestic debates in a number of other states outside the region that previously possessed or pursued but then renounced nuclear weapons, for instance South Africa, Egypt, Brazil, Argentina and Ukraine. It is likely that these states would harden their criticism that the nuclear weapons states, and the United States in particular, are contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons by not fully adhering to their own NPT obligations to undertake systematic and progressive efforts towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons arsenals.

### **3.4 Impact of the NPT in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

The discriminatory treaty has neither resulted in substantial disarmament nor has it helped curb nuclear proliferation especially in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. It is progressively becoming doubtful whether the NPT, in its current form, can remain a useful tool for constraining nuclear ambitions. Vast loopholes in the treaty, noticed long ago, are being exploited. Some scholars like Joseph F Pilat in his journal "The End of the NPT Regime" argue that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international non-proliferation regime were created in a different time to deal with different threats<sup>127</sup>. The post- Cold War era now has a growing number of states that now possess or are developing nuclear and missile related technological capabilities and expertise. Therefore the NPT is no longer relevant since a number of states are now embracing nuclear weapons for their national security.

According to Alexander (2011; 34), It can be argued that the idea behind nations seeking to build nuclear weapons is to provide their nations with protection against the nations that might have developed weapons already<sup>128</sup>. This idea is one of balance of power. A nation can see another building up its arsenal of weapons and feels the need to develop their own in order to protect their nation in a potential attack from another nation. This is a result of the anarchy that the international system find itself thrown into. The Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) (2004)'s article on "South Korea Violation Reveals NPT Strengths and Flaws" argue that, the possession of nuclear weapons by some states and not others creates an imbalanced security environment that the nuclear "have-nots" have historically attempted to level. North Korea has felt threatened by the US nuclear arsenal and has sought to acquire nuclear weapons<sup>129</sup>. In turn South Korea feels threatened by North Korea's potential nuclear arsenal and

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<sup>126</sup> Chestnut S, *Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks*, VOL 32 No.1, (Summer 2007) p80.

<sup>127</sup> Pilat J, *The End of the NPT Regime*, Vol. 83, No.3 (May 2007), p, 482.

<sup>128</sup> Alexander; *op.cit*; p, 34.

<sup>129</sup> Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL), *South Korea Violation Reveals NPT Strengths and Flaws*, Washington DC, 2004.

even while “protected” by US nuclear weapons, engaged in proliferation behavior. This phenomenon is not limited to the Korean peninsula, as India, Pakistan, Israel and Iran, among others all demonstrate. South Korea’s actions underscore an unfortunate reality. Until the nuclear power work in earnest toward complete and total elimination of their nuclear weapons, as described in Article VI of the NPT, other nations will seek to even out the nuclear imbalance. Possession of nuclear weapons by any nation will continue to fuel proliferation. “Proliferation begets Proliferation” as described by Scott Sagan in his article “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons”. If one state produces a nuclear weapon it creates almost a domino effect within the region. States in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons to balance or eliminate the security threat. For instance, when United States demonstrated that it had nuclear power capabilities after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Russians started to develop their program in preparation for the Cold War. With the Russian military buildup, France and Great Britain perceived this as a security threat and therefore they pursued nuclear weapons.

The Cold War is over but it has been replaced by new threats to our national security. Stephen Younger (2000) in his article “Nuclear Weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, The principal role of nuclear weapons is to deter potential adversaries from an attack on our allies, or our vital interests<sup>130</sup>. According to Daniel Barkley (2008) in a journal “Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Empirical Investigation”, the analysis finds that when faced with ballistic missile threats, nations respond rationally and acquire ballistic missiles as a deterrent. Russia maintains very large strategic and nuclear forces<sup>131</sup>. China is actively modernizing its nuclear arsenal .India and Pakistan have dramatically demonstrated the ability of midlevel technology states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq, Iran and North Korea are also developing nuclear weapons. The nuclear age is far from over. Abolition of nuclear weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century cannot be achieved as stipulated by Michael E O’ Hanlon (2010; 34) in the book,A Skeptic’s Case for Nuclear Disarmament<sup>132</sup>.

Muthiah Alagappa in his journal, “Nuclear Weapons Reinforce Security and Stability in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Asia”, argues that nuclear weapons strengthen weaker powers by canceling or mitigating the effects of imbalance in conventional and nuclear weapon capability and thereby reducing their strategic vulnerability<sup>133</sup>. By threatening nuclear retaliation and catastrophic damage in the event of large-scale conventional or nuclear attack, and exploiting the risk of escalation to nuclear war, weaker powers with nuclear weapons constrain the military options of a stronger adversary. This is most evident in the case of Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Pakistan is much weaker than India in several dimensions of national power. It suffered defeats in two of three conventional wars it fought with India in the pre-nuclear era, with the 1971 war resulting in humiliating defeat and dismemberment. In the nuclear era, which dates from the late

<sup>130</sup> Younger S, Nuclear Weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Los Alamss National Laboratory, June, 2000.

<sup>131</sup> Barkley D, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Empirical Investigation, Vol.52, No.3, (June 2008) p, 455.

<sup>132</sup>Hanlon M. E, A Skeptic’s Case for Nuclear Disarmament, (Brookings Institution Press, 2010) p, 34.

<sup>133</sup>Alagappa M, Nuclear Weapons Reinforce Security and Stability in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Asia, East Asia Foundation, Vol 4 No.1 (Spring 2009).

1980s, Islamabad has been able to deter India from crossing into Pakistan proper and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir even in the context of Pakistan military infiltration into Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1999. India did not follow through with the limited-war option in 2001-2002 because of the grave risk it entailed. India was also forced in part by the risk of nuclear war to engage in a comprehensive dialogue to explore settlement disputes between the two countries, including the Kashmir conflict. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal has blunted the potency of India's large conventional military force. Although it has not cancelled out all the consequences of the large power differential between the two countries, it has had significant constraining impact on India's military options and assuaged Pakistan's concern about the Indian threat. Paul Kapur (2010; 36) in his book India, Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia also argues that the logic of nuclear deterrence, which helped avoid major war among the great powers during the Cold War and had thereby contributed to the "long peace" in Europe, also holds in the South Asia context<sup>134</sup>.

It is also possible to argue that the Arab countries' tacit acceptance of Israel's nuclear deterrence posture has contributed to Israel's security and to regional stability by lowering the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in some instances even contributed to peace settlements, like that between Israel and Egypt. Israel perceives nuclear weapons are the ultimate security guarantee. They enhance Israel's self-confidence and demonstrate its resolve to survive.

The leveling and cautionary effects of nuclear weapons are also evident in the relationship of the weak and isolated North Korea with the vastly superior United States. Although North Korea does not have an operational nuclear arsenal and the United States can destroy that country many times over, the risk of quick and substantial damage to its forces and allies in the region induces caution and constrains US military options. If in the future North Korea develops nuclear weapons and marries them to its missile capability, the risks associated with preventive military action against that country would multiply. According to Park and Lee (2008), Instead of simply suffering the will of the mighty United States, North Korea's nascent capability has provided it with security and bargaining leverage in its negotiations with major powers in the region. Kyung-Ae Park (2001; 535) calls it the "power of the weak" in his journal "North Korea's Defensive Power and US-North Korea Relations"<sup>135</sup>.

Younger (2000) states that nuclear weapons, are the most destructive instruments ever invented, had a stabilizing effect on superpower relations by making any conflict unacceptably costly. Nuclear weapons still represent the ultimate defense of the nation, a deterrent against any and all potential adversaries as demonstrated by North Korea<sup>136</sup>. According to Peter Howard in a journal, "Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games and US Foreign Policy", Iraq

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<sup>134</sup>Kapur P, India, Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia, (Columbia University Press, 2010), p, 36.

<sup>135</sup>Park K, North Korea's Defensive Power and US-North Korea Relations, *Pacific Affairs* Vol73, No.4, (Winter 2000-2001) p, 535.

<sup>136</sup>Younger; *op. cit*; p, 53.

and North Korea have been identified as members of the “axis of evil” with weapons of mass destruction programs that threaten the US. Yet in late 2002, the US prepared to attack Iraq whereas it chose to negotiate with North Korea, even after North Korea admitted to a secret nuclear program in direct violation of its 1994 agreement with the US<sup>137</sup>. Moreover, a direct comparison with Iraq shows North Korea to possess the greater capability to threaten the US. Muthiah Alagappa (2008) in his book The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Asia concludes that nuclear weapons influence national security strategies in fundamental ways and that deterrence continues to be the dominant role and strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons<sup>138</sup>. Even in the post-Cold War environment, deterrence remains important and effective as argued by Baker Spring and Kathy Grudgel (2005) in their article, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”<sup>139</sup>.

Conclusively, the NPT was formed with the objective that it would prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and to lay the ground work for eventual nuclear disarmament. However the treaty has been largely successful in limiting the number of states possessing nuclear weapons today. Though it still faces difficulties due to non-adherence of provisions by state parties.

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<sup>137</sup> Howard P, Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games and US Foreign Policy, *International Studies Quarterly* Vol 48, No.4 (December 2004) p, 805.

<sup>138</sup> Alagappa M, The Long Shadow: Weapons and Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Asia, Stanford University Press, 2008.

<sup>139</sup> Spring B and K. Grudgel; *The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Heritage Foundation Institute for International Studies, 2005.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

#### 4.1 Background

North Korea's nuclear program has been a source of great concern for the international community for more than 20 years. The state is now believed to have conducted three underground nuclear tests. According to Sigfield S. Hecker an American delegate who was sent to observe the situation in North Korea, states that in his article, "Lessons learned From the North Korean Nuclear Crises", Kim Il-sung, the country's founding father, laid the foundation for nuclear technology development in the early 1950s<sup>140</sup>. The Soviet "Atoms for Peace" initiative, modeled after President Eisenhower's initiative of the same name, enabled several hundred North Korean students and researchers to be educated and trained in Soviet Universities and nuclear research centers. The Soviets built a research reactor, the IRT-2000 associated nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in the 1960s. North Korean specialists trained at these facilities and by the 1970s were prepared to launch a nuclear program without external assistance.

North Korea's decision to build gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors was a logical choice at the time for an indigenous North Korean energy program because gas-graphite reactors can operate with natural uranium fuel and, hence, do not require enrichment of uranium. Although North Korea may have experimented with enrichment technologies, commercial enrichment capabilities were beyond its reach and difficult to acquire. North Korea's ambitious program began with an experimental 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor which became operational in 1986. Construction of that reactor was followed by a scaled-up 50 MWe reactor and a 200 MWe power reactor, although neither was ever completed.

Sigfield S Hecker (2010; 44) further stipulates that North Korea quickly mastered all aspects of the gas-graphite reactor fuel cycle. It built fuel fabrication facilities and a large-scale reprocessing facility, which enabled extraction of plutonium from spent fuel. Unlike the Soviet-built research facilities, the new facilities were built and operated without being declared to or inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Pyongyang had no legal obligation to declare these facilities because it was not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)<sup>141</sup>. American reconnaissance satellites picked up signs of the reactor construction in the early 1980s. It was not until 1989, when South Korea leaked American satellite data of the reprocessing facility that the international community first became aware of and concerned about North Korea's indigenous nuclear program. The concern stems from the fact that gas-graphite reactors are capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium while

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<sup>140</sup>Hecker S, Lessons Learned From the North Korean Nuclear Crises, American Association for the Advancement of Science, (AAS), Winter, 2010.

<sup>141</sup>*ibid*; 44.



generating electrical power and heat. So, whereas Pyongyang's choice of gas-graphite reactors for its energy program was logical, it was also the best choice to develop a nuclear weapons option.

In parallel, North Korea asked the Soviets to build light water reactors (LWRS) to help meet North Korea's energy demands. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 because the Soviets made consideration of LWRS contingent upon joining the Treaty. These reactors, though, never materialized because of the demise of the Soviet Union. Pyongyang kept inspectors out of its new facilities until 1992, by which time it had all of the pieces in place for the plutonium fuel cycle. This move coincided with several diplomatic initiatives and President George H.W. Bush's decision to withdraw all American nuclear weapons from South Korea. By this time, the 5 MWe experimental reactor produced electricity and heat for the local town, as well as approximately 6 kilograms (roughly one bomb's worth) of weapons-grade plutonium per year. The fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities were operational, and the two bigger gas-graphite reactors were under construction. In 1992, Pyongyang opened the window on its nuclear program for diplomatic reasons, but closed it quickly when IAEA inspectors uncovered discrepancies between their own nuclear measurements at Yongbyon and Pyongyang's declaration. Pyongyang responded to IAEA accusations by announcing its intent to withdraw from the NPT. Pyongyang was apparently surprised by the sophistication of the IAEA's nuclear forensics and by the strictures of the NPT. Negotiations started in June 1993 but stalemated. In 1994, when North Korea unloaded the reactor's fuel containing an estimated 20 to 30 kilograms of plutonium, Washington and Pyongyang came close to war before former President Jimmy Carter intervened and brokered a freeze.

#### **4.2 Geneva Agreed Framework**

Intense negotiations in Geneva led to the Agreed Framework which changed North Korea's nuclear technical trajectory dramatically. Pyongyang agreed to give up its indigenous gas-graphite reactor program for the promise of two LWRS to be supplied by the United States, South Korea and Japan. The spent fuel rods unloaded from the 5 MWe reactor were repackaged by an American technical team and stored in the cooling pool for eventual removal from North Korea. Operation of the 5 MWe reactor, the fuel fabrication plant, and the reprocessing facility was halted and monitored by the IAEA inspectors per special arrangement under the Agreed Framework. Construction of the two larger reactors was stopped. Although Pyongyang halted its plutonium during the Agreed Framework, it continued to expand its missile program, including by conducting a long-range rocket launch over Japan in 1998. It also explored uranium enrichment. During its first formal encounter with Pyongyang in October 2002, the Bush

administration, which was adamantly opposed to the Agreed Framework, accused Pyongyang of covertly pursuing the alternative HEU path to the bomb. This altercation effectively ended the Agreed Framework and changed Pyongyang's technical and political trajectory again.

In 2003, North Korea became the first nation to withdraw from the NPT. It expelled international inspectors and announced that it would strengthen its nuclear deterrent. By the end of 2003, which also marked the invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein, Pyongyang was eager to have Washington believe it had the bomb. According to a CRS Report for Congress by Richard P. Cronin (1994; 94) many analysts see North Korea's apparent efforts to accelerate its nuclear program as a response to adverse changes in its external environment that have had serious international repercussions for the North Korean economy<sup>142</sup>. The collapse of the Soviet Union largely cut Pyongyang off from its major source of modern military hardware. The demise of the USSR and the Soviet bloc also eliminated the source of about 60 percent of North Korea's two-way trade, mostly bartered goods, and created a severe economic crisis that has made it difficult for the North to support its massive military forces.

Other developments include a significant loss of economic, military and international political support from China, Beijing's 1993 decision to establish diplomatic relations with Seoul, and rapidly growing trade and investment ties between China and South Korea. While North Korea's economic crisis has deepened, its arch-rival South Korea has carried out a successful transition to electoral democracy and emerged as a major regional economic and technological power. These developments appear to have led to two broad responses by the secretive, Stanlist government headed since 1948 by President Kim Il Sung. The first has been a cautious effort to imitate some aspects of China's economic reforms in order to shore up declining living standards, check any tendencies towards popular or elite discontent, and increase hard currency earnings. This effort has included the establishment of several special economic zones in which foreign investors are invited to set up factories for export production and take advantage of North Korea's cheap focus. The second response—the main focus of the current confrontation appears to be the continued or accelerated development of North Korea's nuclear option and its ballistic missile capability.

### **4.3 Utility of Nuclear capability by Pyongyang**

Siegfried S. Hecker writes, "Military might is the only source of Pyongyang's diplomatic power today. Nuclear weapons have become central to the projection of its military might, in spite of the fact that its nuclear arsenal has little war-fighting utility<sup>143</sup>. Pyongyang views nuclear weapons as diplomatic equalizers with its much more prosperous and powerful, but non-nuclear

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<sup>142</sup> Cronin R, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: US Policy Options, CRS Report for Congress, (June 1, 1994) p, 94.

<sup>143</sup> Hecker S; op. cit.; p, 45.

rivals, South Korea and Japan. Without nuclear weapons, North Korea would get scant attention from the international community.

Watson (2012; 1) in her article <sup>144</sup>“Stemming the North Korean Nuclear Program” notes that the DPRK’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is partly on its desire to keep this despotic system afloat in an increasingly hostile world. The North’s enigmatic leadership is also drawn to nuclear weapons as a tool of economic leverage. Having undergone drastic economic collapse in the mid-1990s, North Korea has become a deeply impoverished country, with approximately two thirds of its population of 24 million relying on food aid to survive. The DPRK views the maintenance of its nuclear weapons capacity as a way of pressuring both allies and adversaries to provide it with financial assistance. It is the perceived enhancement of national security, however, that is the ultimate source of North Korea’s aspirations. For North Korea, which has at different junctures identified the US, Japan and South Korea as threats, nuclear weapons constitute a “silver bullet to assure...deterrence of external powers” as stated by Pritchard Charles and Tilelli John (2010; 16)<sup>145</sup>.

The debate on North Korea has emerged in the past decade as one of the most divisive foreign policy issues for the United States and its allies in Asia as noted by Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang (2005; 54) in their book Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies<sup>146</sup>. Both Democratic and Republican administrations in the US have sought to navigate a course toward peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, experiencing long periods of resounding failure punctuated by occasional fleeting successes. Policies have ranged from containment, isolation and coercive diplomacy, to appeasement, multilateral and bilateral engagement. Despite these diverse approaches, few policies have yielded valuable dividends and some interested parties have disagreed vehemently over the regime’s intentions and goals and over the appropriate strategy that the United States should employ to deal with this mysterious country. These policies have not only underachieved, but have even inadvertently exacerbated North Korea’s nuclear defiance.

#### **4.4 The Six Party Talks Regime**

Taking office in January 2001, George W. Bush sought to adopt a more assertive and aggressive policy toward North Korea than that of his predecessor, favoring coercion and confrontation. Kelly M. Greenhill (2010; 13) in a book Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy defines coercion as “the practice of inducing or preventing changes

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<sup>144</sup>Watson E, *Stemming the North Korean Nuclear Program*, (Australian Institute of International Affairs, Quarterly Access, 2012), p. 1.

<sup>145</sup> Pritchard C and Tilelli J, *US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula*, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, Report No. 46, p. 16.

<sup>146</sup> Victor D and Kang C, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies*, (Columbia University Press), 2005, p. 54.

in political behavior through the use of threats, intimidation or some other form of pressure, most commonly, military force”<sup>147</sup>. This new strategy, often described as “hawk engagement”, consisted of tailored containment, pressure for regime change, and a strategy of pre-emptive action as postulated by Eloise Watson (2012; 4)<sup>148</sup>. Rejection of direct bilateral engagement with North Korea constituted another distinguishing feature of the Bush strategy on North Korea. Vigorous opposition to bilateral negotiations was based on the administration’s firm conviction that “no amount of diplomatic inducements could convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons” according to Nolan Janne (2007; 12)<sup>149</sup>. Instead, a multilateral negotiating format was emphasized. This process, dubbed the Six Party Talks, involved a group of regional actors (the US, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia) and was designed to buttress international pressure on North Korea and facilitate “the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner” as noted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2005)<sup>150</sup>. Yet in spite of, and in some cases because of the administration’s coercive posture and multilateral engagement, the US was unable to prevent North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, its eviction of IAEA inspectors, resumption of work on a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor, the reprocessing of spent fuel into weapons-grade plutonium, its nuclear weapons testing, or its boycott of the six-party talks. As such policy-makers and analysts have excoriated the Bush approach. Evidently, the heightened threat of pre-emptive attack posed by the US administration did little to rein in Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.

Eloise Watson (2012; 5) notes that, taking office in 2009, Barack Obama vowed his administration would “not fall into the same pattern with North Korea” as previous administrations. Despite this declaration, Obama’s strategy for North Korea has failed to significantly break from that of his predecessor<sup>151</sup>. The minor alterations in North Korea’s policy made by the Obama administration have also been ineffective in changing the calculus of the North Korea nuclear miscreant. Drawing parallels with Bush’s policy during his second term. Obama’s administration is heavily weighted toward diplomatic bilateral engagement with North Korea. This is reflected in his support of “sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy” as the United States’ “first line offense” in dealing with Pyongyang. However, the Obama administration differs in its cognizance of the futility in conciliatory engagement with North Korea. Unlike the previous administration, which often sought to appease North Korea between 2005 and 2008, Obama’s approach stresses a “no reward for bad behavior” rule. Similar to Bush’s predominant strategy of coercion, the Obama administration has adopted an essentially hardline policy against North Korea by drawing no stringent sanctions. This policy, referred to as

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<sup>147</sup> Greenhill K, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy, (Cornell University Press, 2010), p, 13.

<sup>148</sup> Watson E; op.cit: p, 4.

<sup>149</sup> Janne N, US Strategy To Stem North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Assessing the Clinton and Bush Legacies; Institute for the study of Diplomacy Working Group, Report No. 1, p,12.

<sup>150</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2005), Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing.

<sup>151</sup> Watson E; op.cit: p, 5.

“strategic patience”, has relied on economic pressure and arms interdictions to generate sufficient weakness that the Kim regime is forced to return to the negotiating table. The current administration emulates another aspect of the Bush approach by enlisting Chinese help as a central theme to its strategy for dealing with the North. Obama’s emphasis on pressure and compellence has failed to move Pyongyang towards denuclearization.

Sanctions have become a critical part of US leverage under the Obama administration. To further demonstrate this sanctions-oriented approach, the US worked vigorously to gain international support for the UNSC Resolution 1874 in response to Pyongyang’s May 2009 test. The resolution was unanimously passed, enforcing sanctions on North Korea’s arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its nuclear weapons programs. Regrettably, this economic pressure was ineffective in constraining North Korean nuclear efforts. In response to Resolution 1874, which North Korea condemned as a “vile product of the US-led offensive international pressure”, North Korea proclaimed that it would “never return” to the Six-Party Talks and insisted that it had now become “impossible” for it to give up its nuclear weapons. Ogilvie Tanya (2010; 122) asserted that the US was indeed “pursuing the same reckless policies followed by the former Bush administration to stifle the DPRK”<sup>152</sup>. US attempts to stem the North Korea nuclear program, and eliminate nuclear weapon proliferation in the country has proved a difficult task with scant success for both the Bush and Obama administrations. Although the United States is far more powerful than North Korea, America’s superior military or economic power does not guarantee North Korea’s compliance with United States’ interests when North Korea is determined to exercise its defensive power, argues Kyung-Ae Park (2000; 535) in a journal, “North Korea’s Defensive Power and US-North Korea Relations”<sup>153</sup>.

Diplomatic efforts at resolving the North Korean situation are therefore complicated by the different goals and interests of the nations of the region. While none of the parties desire a North Korea with nuclear weapons. The Grand National Party currently the ruling party in South Korea, have stated that they will not return to the Sunshine Policy before North Korea gives up their nuclear weapons. According to Carpenter and Bandow (2004; 74) in their book The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, South Korea is not wary of putting pressure on Pyongyang<sup>154</sup>. At a June 2003 Summit meeting with Koizumi, President Roh pointedly declined to endorse his call for a tougher response if North Korea escalated tensions by continuing work on its nuclear-weapons program. Instead, Roh chose to emphasize the need for continuing dialogue with the North and Seoul has conveyed that same tone to Washington on numerous occasions according to Nakamoto M and Ward A in the

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<sup>152</sup>Ogilvie W T, *The Defiant States, The Nuclear Diplomacy of North Korea and Iran*, *The Non Proliferation Review* (2010) p,122.

<sup>153</sup>Park K, *North Korea’s Defensive Power and US-North Korea Relations*, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73 No.4, (Winter 2000-2001) p, 535-553.

<sup>154</sup> Carpenter and Bandow, *The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea*, (Palgrave MacMillan, USA, 2004), p, 74.

Financial Times of June 9, 2003<sup>155</sup>. And on several occasions Roh and other South Korean leaders have flatly ruled out the use of military force to resolve the crisis. South Korean newspapers have warned that North Korea's nuclear arsenal could destroy South Korea's conventional forces, and that the strategic military balance has irrevocably shifted in the aftermath of North Korea's nuclear test. Finally, the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea has fed South Korea's perceived need for a larger standing army and defense force.

Some politicians in Japan have expressed a desire to change Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits the use of force as a tool for resolving international disputes. This desire has become increasingly relevant given the ability of North Korea's Rodong-1 missile to strike Tokyo, and it has gained increasing support as a result. Some estimates have claimed that as many as 3 of the 200 Rodong-1 missiles currently deployed may be fitted with nuclear warheads<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand Richard Cronin (1994) states that the Japanese government fully shares American concerns about a nuclear armed North Korea, but has been very reluctant to go along with U.S threats to impose economic sanctions on the North<sup>156</sup>. Instead, while Japan seeks to maintain solidarity with the United States on the issue, it strongly prefers an approach emphasizing patient diplomacy. Japan's cautious stance, and similar reluctance about confrontation on the part of South Korea, have been major factors in Clinton Administration policy shifts on the issue of seeking UN sanctions.

#### **4.5 The Food and Oil supplies Debate**

China, North Korea's most important ally and trade partner, has joined the rest of the international community in responding to the North Korean actions. According to Hui Zhang's article, "Ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions: The Need For Stronger Chinese Action", The Chinese government reduced its economic assistance, especially food and oil supplies. In unusually harsh language the Chinese called North Korea's behavior "brazen" a term Beijing used the last time decades ago during the tensions with the US. Beijing made it clear to its erstwhile communist ally and friend that it would not tolerate a nuclear armed North Korea and played a classical policy of "carrots and sticks". As soon as North Korea signaled its preparedness to return to the six-party talks, China increased its economic assistance to North Korea. According to Scott Snyder (2009; 2) in his book China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security<sup>157</sup>, notes that China has continued to maintain ties with North Korea although Mohan Malik (2000; 445) contests the view that China has now completed the transition from a challenger to an upholder of the global nonproliferation regime<sup>158</sup>. Carpenter

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<sup>155</sup> Nakamoto M and Ward A, RohKoizimu Differ Over Stance on North Korea, Financial Times, June 9, 2003. P3.

<sup>156</sup> Cronin R; op.cit; p, 34.

<sup>157</sup> Snyder S, China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 2009) p, 2.

<sup>158</sup> Malik M, China and the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol 22, No. 3, (December 2000) pp,445-478.

and Bandow (2004; 82) stipulate that the most critical component of Washington's strategy to forge a united diplomatic and economic front that will pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program is the role of China<sup>159</sup>. Bush administration officials believe that China is by far the most crucial participant in that coalition. According to Yoichi Funabashi (2008; 24 in the book The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Nuclear Crisis, during the second Korean nuclear crisis, China insisted on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as it had done in the first<sup>160</sup>. Indeed, the administration apparently now expects China to exert whatever diplomatic and economic leverage is needed to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions because according to an article by the Indian Defense and Security Analysis, North Korea is still blinded to China only because of a hostile external environment it faces with South Korea, Japan and the US trying to restrain its nuclear ambitions. The international community experts China to exert leverage for reform, stability and denuclearization.

According to Leszek Buszynski (2009; 808) in his journal "Russia and North Korea: Dilemmas and Interests", Russia had two objectives in its relationship with North Korea. One was denuclearization and the other was to promote influence on the Korean Peninsula to balance the U.S and Japan. Denuclearization has failed and Russia will adjust to a nuclear North Korea to further its second aim<sup>161</sup>.

The NATO military alliance published a statement saying that it "condemns in the strongest terms possible the North Korean nuclear weapon test. This test poses an extremely serious threat to the peace and security in the pacific region and the world"<sup>162</sup>.The alliance wants North Korea to return to the six-party talks

Christopher Torchia (2006) in an article, "Iran and North Korea appear to learn from each other in nuclear disputes" stipulates that Iran has been a long time customer of North Korean missile technology. Iran learned key insights from North Korea's negotiating and bargaining tactics, including the importance of maintaining strategic ambivalence over its nuclear program" Lee Chung Min, a Korean expert on Asian security, wrote in an email to The Associated Press. It is clear that one of Iran's key motivations for pushing ahead with its nuclear program has been that North Korea has not been invaded because they have possible nuclear and missile capabilities<sup>163</sup>. According to Brett Daniel (2012) Iran shows signs of following North Korea's national security strategy of acquiring nuclear weapons<sup>164</sup>. India and Pakistan also expressed joy, in the late 1990s when North Korea went nuclear, as noted by Andrei Nikolaevich (2012; 11) in an Asian article

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<sup>159</sup>Carpenter and Bandow;op.cit; p, 82.

<sup>160</sup> Funabashi Y, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Nuclear Crisis, (Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p, 24.

<sup>161</sup>Buszynski L, Russia and North Korea; Dilemmas and Interests, Asian Survey, Vol.49 No.5, (September/October 2009), pp, 805-830.

<sup>162</sup> North Atlantic Council Statement on North Korea nuclear test, 2006-10-09.

<sup>163</sup>Torchia C, Iran and North Korea appear to learn from each other in nuclear disputes, The Associated Press, Singapore, 2006-06-30.

<sup>164</sup>Daniel B, Iran Taking Lessons From North Korea and Iraq, 2012.Eurasiareview, News and Analysis.

“North Korean Program: What can and what cannot be done about it”. Unfortunately perhaps, but many people seem to love it when their country has nuclear weapons Andrei Nikolaevich further notes<sup>165</sup>.

#### **4.6 The Will Sanctions Work Debate?**

The United Nations Security Council according to Joseph F. Pilat (1994; 472) in his journal “The End of the NPT Regime” is therefore seen as the last hope in addressing proliferation problems, including North Korean crisis although there is said to be lack of consensus within the Council on enforcement and none on the use of force<sup>166</sup>. According to Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland (2009) in their article, “What To Do About North Korea: Will Sanctions Work”, On June 12, 2009 in response to North Korea’s second nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed additional sanctions via UNSC Resolution 1874. UNSCR 1874 extends this to all arms-related trade, as well as to all training or assistance related to it<sup>167</sup>. Stephen Haggard and Marcus N (2009; 18) further argue that despite these steps forward, the sanctions effort is not likely to yield immediate results and could even appear to backfire in the short run<sup>168</sup>. The North Koreans have typically responded to pressure not by complying but by escalating. The most recent cycle of escalation, culminating in the nuclear test, was in fact triggered by the sequence of UN actions. Those countries most inclined to sanction North Korea no longer have much economic interaction with it anyway. Japan, once an important mainstay of the North Korean economy through transfers, has imposed an embargo (through circumvention via third countries is reputedly easy). Aid from South Korea has dropped to a trickle, and commercial relations through the collaborative Kaesong industrial park in North Korea have also been held hostage by the new North Korean demands to renegotiate contracts. US economic exchanges with North Korea are miniscule. Indeed, the North Koreans even rejected the last important economic link to the United States by declining to continue a generous food aid program negotiated last year. Thus an unintended consequence of the crisis has been to dramatically raise the share of North Korea’s trade with China, and with Iran, Syria and Egypt, countries with which it shares nuclear and/or missile interests. These latter partners show little interest in political quid-pro-quo, let alone sanctions as stipulated by Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland (2010; 539) in their journal “Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation”, that North Korea has tilted its relations towards partners uninterested in such measures. This geographical shift in trade makes traditional sanctions even less potent<sup>169</sup>.

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<sup>165</sup> Nikolaevich A, North Korean Program; What can and what cannot be done about it, *The Asian*, Russia, 2012.

<sup>166</sup> Pilat J, *The End of the NPT Regime*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol 83, No.3, (May 2007), p,469.

<sup>167</sup> Haggard S and M. Noland, *What to do About North Korea: Will Sanctions Work*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 2009, p, 17.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid*;p,18.

<sup>169</sup> Haggard S and M. Noland, *Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation*, *Asian Survey*, Vol.50, No. 3 (May/June, 2010).



Stephen & Marcus Noland (2009; 540) propound that those favoring engagement had hoped that expanded trade, investment and aid would encourage North Korea toward a more reformist path by demonstrating the gains from economic integration and by tilting the internal debate in favor of liberalizers. Economic inducements were probably never as powerful carrots as some believed. Sanctions have failed in the past, but so have inducements, including quite generous ones<sup>170</sup>. There is ample evidence that current North Korean behavior is not driven by the external environment. If it were not for the threat from the United States, Korea would not need the bomb. The more closely Americans focus on Pyongyang, the harder North Korea tries to develop nuclear weapons and the more energetically it tests them. According to Andrei Nikolaevich (2012; 13) an Arab colonel once demonstrated that no amount of economic concessions will be seen as a sufficient substitute for security<sup>171</sup>.

Andrei Nikolaevich Lankov (2012; 14) argues that nuclear weapons are a powerful tool. It seems plausible that currently the leadership in Pyongyang see their nuclear weapons as the primary means by which to guarantee their security<sup>172</sup>. The Pyongyang decision-makers presume that no foreign power would dare to invade a country which is known to possess nuclear weapons. North Korean diplomats often say that had Saddam Hussein really had nuclear weapons, he would still be living in his luxurious palace as the unchallengeable master of his country. Recent events in Libya however further reinforced this perception. Back in 2005-6, many American diplomats (including for example, John Bolton, then US ambassador to the UN) went on record as saying that North Korea should learn from Libya and emulate Gaddafi's decision to surrender Libya's nuclear weapons in exchange for economic concessions. It seems that North Korea has indeed learnt Libya's lesson when they saw how this bargain worked out for Gaddafi, his family and loyal supporters as postulated by Andrei Nikolaevich (2012). Among other things events in Libya have demonstrated to North Korea leaders how nuclear weapons might be useful even when combating internal opposition. Even the most brutal government will be quite reluctant to use nuclear weapons against its own people, but the existence of nuclear weapons makes it less likely that outside forces will get involved in a revolutionary crisis (either with airstrikes or providing direct aid to the rebels).

#### **4.7 The Multiple rounds of international negotiations**

Multiple rounds of international negotiations amid a strict sanctions regime- a process, which has been described as a game of cat and mouse- appear to have done little to curb North Korea's nuclear ambitions because North Korea has gone ahead to conduct another nuclear test, the third recent one. In the early hours of 12 February 2013, unusual seismic activity was detected around the Punggye-ri underground nuclear test site. This was followed with confirmation by the state

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<sup>170</sup>Haggard and Noland, op.cit; p,540.

<sup>171</sup>Nikolaevich A;op.cit;p,13.

<sup>172</sup>NilolaevichA;op.cit; p,14.

news agency that North Korea had successfully tested a device. According to Jethro Mullen in the CNN news of 12 February 2013, it is the first nuclear test carried out under the North's young leader, Kim Jong Un, who appears to be sticking closely to his father's policy of building up the isolated state's military deterrent to keep its foes at bay, shrugging off the resulting international condemnation and sanctions<sup>173</sup>. The test was designed "to defend the country's security and sovereignty in the face of the ferocious hostile act of the US..." the North's state-run Korean Central News Agency said, referring to new US-led sanctions on Pyongyang after the recent launch of a long-range rocket. North Korea has warned it will follow up the nuclear test it carried out on Tuesday with "stronger" actions unless the US ends its hostility towards the regime. The test which took place in the north-east of the country just before noon local time, could bring North Korea closer to developing a nuclear warhead small enough to be mounted on a long-range missile and possibly bringing the west coast of the US within striking distance. According to Muthiah Alagappa (2013) in an article, "North Korean Nuclear Test: Implications for Asian Security", as expected, the international community has reacted to the test with calls for tighter sanctions and will try to induce North Korea to the long-stalled Six-Party Talks<sup>174</sup>. These are unlikely to succeed as before.

According to William Pesek Jr (2013) in The Straits Times of February 11 2013 on the article "Don't Ignore North Korea Effect", uncertainty in the external environment is increasing<sup>175</sup>. There is global insecurity as Pyongyang is regarded as unpredictable by the international community. Tony Burman (2012) in an article, "Burman; North Korea's nuclear threat", states that whenever the world surprises you by appearing safe and sane, just think of North Korea<sup>176</sup>. In dramatic and unpredictable ways, it is once again using the nuclear card to rattle its neighbors, defy international agreements and remind us that a world overflowing with loose and often insecure nuclear weapons is neither safe nor sane. There are deep fears that events once again are careening out of control on the Korean Peninsula. According to David E Sanger in The New York Times of 2013<sup>177</sup>, he states that what concerned the United States and the rest of the world was not just entry of another nation into the nuclear club, but also North Korea's habit of selling whatever weapons systems it develops to anyone willing to pay for them. So while the obvious fear is that North Korea might use nuclear weapons against its neighbors or other nations, the larger worry in this era is: Who else might end up with North Korean nuclear technology because North Korea bears all the hallmarks of a country most likely to enable horizontal proliferation: they are small, isolated from the international community, not allied with a nuclear weapon state or superpower, and have little to lose in international standing. Jean-Francois Rioux (1992; 40) in his book Limiting the Proliferation of Weapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies notes that

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<sup>173</sup> Mullen J, Tough UN action vowed after North Korean nuclear test, CNN February 12, 2013.

<sup>174</sup> Alagappa M, North Korean Nuclear Test: Implications for Asian Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 10 February 2013, p.1.

<sup>175</sup> Pesek W, Don't Ignore North Korea Effects, The Straits Times, 11 February, 2013.

<sup>176</sup> Burman T, Burman: North Korea's Nuclear Threat, Toronto Star Newspapers, April 14, 2012.

<sup>177</sup> Sanger D, North Korea Goes Nuclear, The New York Times, Washington, 2013.

the various items needed to manufacture nuclear weapons continue to find their way from a worldwide nuclear industry into the purportedly peaceful nuclear programs of a number of developing countries, despite the panoply of nuclear agreements, laws and regulations that comprise present US and international nuclear export controls<sup>178</sup>. Morgan F etal (2008; 84) argue that these developments signal the end of a positive trend in efforts to contain nuclear proliferation<sup>179</sup>. It is now therefore too late to worry about the spread of nuclear proliferation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

According to Muthiah Alagappa (2013; 14), North Korea is intent on developing a strategic nuclear deterrent against present and potential adversaries. The international community must recognize and attempt to integrate a nuclear North Korea into Asia and the world. This may be unpalatable to policymakers who have persisted with a sanction and roll back policy as well as for the bankrupt nonproliferation community. However, there is little else that the international community can do. It can bomb North Korea to oblivion but that carries risks and would serve no substantive political or strategic purpose. The international community (the US and its allies in Asia as well as China) failed to address the real concern of national security that has driven the North Korea nuclear weapon program. It is no longer possible for international security assurances to cap or roll back the North Korean nuclear weapon program. The world must now confront the reality of a nuclear North Korea. Muthiah Alagappa (2013; 14) further argues that nuclear weapons will give Pyongyang a greater sense of security and thus enhance stability in Northeast Asia and more broadly in Asia<sup>180</sup>. Instead of being frozen in the mindset, it is time for Asian and Western policy circles and scholars to unravel the fake security blanket, go past post-Cold War paralysis, and do some real work on the subject. Ironically we may have to thank the DPRK for this stimulus.

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<sup>178</sup>Rioux J, Limiting the Proliferation of Weapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies, (McGill Queens University Press 1992) p,40.

<sup>179</sup> Morgan F et'al, Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Rand Corporation, (2008) p,84.

<sup>180</sup> Alagappa M; op.cit; p,14.

## CHAPTER 5

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

#### **5.1 Tension between North Korea and the United States**

Since as early as the 1960s, North Korea has sought to become a nuclear state to protect itself from its adversaries, most notably the United States with which it remains in a state of war. According to official data, about 28 thousand American soldiers are stationed in South Korea. The actual number is higher and they have nuclear weapons. Tensions between North Korea and the United States go back more than 50 years. All of Korea had been occupied by Japan from 1910 until 1945. At the end of World War II, the Soviet Army occupied the northern half of the country and installed a Communist regime, while the United States assumed control over what became South Korea. This division caused numerous conflicts between the two Koreas which led to the Korean War. During the war North Korea was backed by Soviet Union whilst South Korea's received 90 percent of the troops and equipment from the United States. In 1953, the United Nations and North Korea signed an armistice which ended the fighting. However, North and South Korea never signed a peace treaty, which is why American troops remain on the peninsula (South Korea).

North Korea's founder was acutely aware that Douglas MacArthur had requested nuclear weapons to use against North Korea during the conflict, and declassified documents show that he pressed his cold war allies- first Russia, then China, for nuclear technology. But it took decades to put together the equipment and it appears that the North made a political decision to speed forward North Korea's nuclear program.

The North was an autocratic left-wing regime while the South was an equally autocratic right wing one. But as the South merged with the western world and became relatively liberal, the North became ever more isolated, insecure, authoritarian and militarized. North Korea's isolationism was a product of both modern and much earlier history. Whilst it had long considered developing a modern nuclear program, the fall of the Soviet Union meant that North Korea became increasingly isolated within international society leading it to further pursue nuclear development in order to ensure its own security. North Korea then adopted a new unique political ideology called Juche (self reliance).

Juche ideologically encouraged the state to develop its own "self reliant" homegrown nuclear weapon. Its main function was deterrence. States coexist in a condition of anarchy, self-help is therefore the principle of action in an anarchic order, and the most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security. Most states including North Korea saw nuclear weapons as a tool necessary to ensure security and international peace as noted in the Cold War era, a period of peace followed the war, which many believe was down to the

initial spread of nuclear weapons and the risk of mutually assured destruction. Other great powers of the time followed United States and the Soviet and also developed their own nuclear weapons. However it was soon realized that the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more states could potentially destabilize regional security dynamics and increase the risk of weapons getting into the wrong hands. Thus the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and came in to force in 1970. About 189 states have signed and ratified the treaty.

## **5.2 The Signing of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty**

The NPT is the world's most important diplomatic tool for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. The goal of the NPT was to stop proliferation by limiting the number of states with nuclear weapons. The NPT whilst prohibiting Non Nuclear Weapon States from acquiring nuclear weapons, permitted the five Nuclear Weapon States to retain their weapons for the time being, but obliged them to ultimately eliminate them. Though the treaty has been largely successful in limiting the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, it is today at the crossroads and faces difficulties due to non adherence of provisions by state parties. The treaty is however an expression of imbalances of the international system and it is really an unfair treaty.

North Korea also joined the NPT under Soviet pressure in 1985 but delayed and blocked International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections till early 1990s. The inspectors eventually found out violations of NPT, and after disputes, the country withdrew from the treaty being the ever first state to withdraw. It is now a known fact that the country is developing nuclear weapons openly. This has however dealt a fatal blow to the NPT treaty and for some scholars they argue that this has brought an end to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime because most states like Iran are following North Korea's example.

China has also proliferated nuclear technology and the beneficiary has been Pakistan. There are evidences, which suggest that China has continued providing training to Pakistani scientists over several years after transferring technology. Despite mounting evidence of a nuclear program and passing of the Pressler amendment, United States has turned a blind eye towards Pakistan's efforts to build a weapon complex and hence provided tacit support. It has also offered nuclear proliferation support to India. The United States recognizes that India is a de facto nuclear weapon country and does not object to India having a nuclear doctrine and an arsenal. It has signed the Indo-US deal which has been supported by major powers and even by the IAEA. The deal entails that United States provides assistance to India's civil nuclear energy program and expands US-Indian cooperation in energy and satellite. Iraq also had nearly developed a nuclear weapon, despite having allowed required IAEA inspections of its declared nuclear facilities. They had been successful to operate a nuclear weapons program in undeclared facilities, in violation of NPT. Also various non-state networks have immensely aided the Iranian nuclear

program. It is therefore surprising that the so called Nuclear Weapon States are now supporting and aiding nuclear proliferation even the IAEA itself.

Most states in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are now embracing nuclear weapons for their own security. Currently it estimated that there are approximately 40,000 nuclear weapons on the planet. Therefore instead of being frozen in the mindset, it is time for Asian and Western policy circles and scholars to unravel the fake security blanket and hence end the nuclear non proliferation regime. Ironically we may have to thank North Korea for this stimulus.

North Korea has indeed successfully increased its own security; it has been treated with a degree of respect by the United States. For years, the United States and the international community have however tried to negotiate an end to North Korea's nuclear and missile developments and its export of ballistic missile technology. Those efforts have been replete with periods of crisis, stalemate and tentative progress towards denuclearization. The United States has pursued a variety of policy responses to the proliferation challenges posed by North Korea including military cooperation with US allies in the region, wide-ranging sanctions, and non-proliferation mechanisms such as export controls. The United States also engaged in two major diplomatic initiatives (the Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks) in which they tried to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons efforts in return for aid.

Then it so happens that in the 1990s, disaster struck; Floods permanently destroyed 20 percent of the arable land, crucial gold mines and many coal mines. Droughts made the situation worse (up to a million died) and, with North Korea's former trading partners abandoning her after the fall of Communism, the economy virtually collapsed. It was at this stage that the bomb took on a new role. Using the threat of nuclear expansion and proliferation, North Korea sought to extract aid (mainly oil and nuclear power plants) from the west, so as to restart its economy and potentially give itself a future. It is the perceived enhancement of national security, however, that is the ultimate source of North Korea's nuclear aspirations.

### **5.3 Disablement of Nuclear Program**

Although Pyongyang indicated its willingness to give up its nuclear capabilities most recently in September 2005, when the North agreed to disable its nuclear program in return for energy assistance and political recognition, its position has hardened appreciably since the collapse of the multilateral six-party talks in December 2008. This is all because North Koreans are said to have developed a survival strategy. The Korean's intention was to appear simultaneously weak, fearsome and crazy. They went out of their way to emphasize their economic problems, particularly the famines of the 1990s. They wanted no one to think that they were intent on being

an aggressor unless provoked. Secondly they wanted to appear to be fearsome by continuing to pursue its nuclear weapon development program and conducting tests. They also wanted to appear crazy enough that when pressed, they could choose the suicide option of striking with a nuclear weapon. The threat wouldn't work if North Korea was considered rational, but if it is seen as irrational the North Korean deterrence strategy could work. It would force everyone to be ultra-cautious in dealing with North Korea, lest North Korea do something quite mad. Several times they bribed North Korea with money or food to stop building nuclear weapons, and each time the North took the money and then resumed their program so as to cause maximum notice and restore vision of the weak, fearsome lunatic.

North Korea's nuclear weapon development program is a response to the threat that it feels. Experts estimate that North Korea has enough material to make up to eight nuclear bombs right now. The lessons of Gadaffi's Libya which abandoned its fledging nuclear program only to be overthrown by local opposition supported by the United States and the international community, has impressed on the North's leaders the need to retain their ultimate security guarantee. Had Libya actually retained the weapons he was accused of hiding and holding in reserve, the Americans would likely have never attacked. North Korea is therefore continuing to pursue its nuclear weapon development program in order to tighten its security and recently this mid February 2013 it conducted the third nuclear test further threatening the United States and the international community.

Nuclear weapons still represent the ultimate defense of a nation, a deterrent against any potential adversaries as demonstrated by North Korea. Iraq and North Korea have been identified as members of the "axis of evil" with weapons of mass of destruction programs. In the late 2002, the United States prepared to attack Iraq whereas it chose to negotiate with North Korea even after North Korea admitted to a secret nuclear program in direct violation of its 1994 agreement with the United States, This however shows that North Korea possess greater nuclear arsenals that threaten the United States. It has achieved stabilizing its regime by reinforcing its legitimacy internally and its power externally.

During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were also used to deter the use of other Weapons of Mass Destruction and to deter an opponent with superior conventional forces. The classic NATO-Warsaw Pact stand-off was characterized by the US and NATO attempting to deter overwhelming conventional forces from the USSR and Warsaw Pact with nuclear weapons in the context of extended deterrence. No such Soviet attack on Western Europe took place so advocates of nuclear weapons argue that nuclear deterrence worked. Nuclear weapons as the most destructive instruments ever invented, had a stabilizing effect on superpower relations by making any conflict unacceptably costly. Nuclear weapons, for all their horror brought to an end 50 years of worldwide wars in which 60 million people died. Even after the end of the Cold War nuclear weapons are still a necessary tool for deterrence as exemplified by North Korea. Burma, Iran and Syria are following North Korea's footsteps. These countries are rejecting interaction with the rest of the world and perceive that nuclear weapons will allow their regimes to continue

on their present course. This has however become the most important function of nuclear weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, to secure regime survival among totalitarian governments. In this post-cold war era, North Korea remains a useful demon for it has been an eye opener in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

#### **5.4 Will North Korea use the Weapon?**

Nuclear weapons have been the second force working for peace in the post-war period. They make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons. Nuclear weapons have helped maintain peace. Their further spread, however, causes widespread fear and global insecurity. The International community is on its toes fearing that North Korea might take an irrational step or sell nuclear technology to other states. To limit this global insecurity caused by North Korea's nuclear weapon development program the large differences between the "have" and "have-not" nations should be addressed. The United States must take the first steps in demilitarizing Asia by canceling its missile defense plans, reducing its troop counts, formally ending the Korean War and preparing for eventual disengagement from Korea by withdrawing its troops which are still stationed in South Korea. The presence of troops in South Korea threatens North Korea and making it seem like the Korean War has not ended.

Some argue that North Korea is using nuclear weapons as a political tool to begin re-establishing normal relations with the United States, Japan and South Korea and to end the long-standing economic embargo against North Korea. The threat of nuclear weapons is the only thing that has brought the US, Japan and South Korea into serious negotiations. The United States must also focus on normalizing relations with North Korea and removing sanctions and this would form the centerpiece of a comprehensive package addressing North Korea's economic and security concerns. On the US end, normalizing relations would begin with a substantial amount of humanitarian aid to address North Korean famine and agricultural problems. The US must lift sanctions to honor a promise implicit in the Agreed Framework.

North Korea too has a part to play, it must agree to controls on the exporting and testing of its missiles. For North Korea to feel safe giving up its missile development program, the US must work with other countries in the region to reduce militaries and strengthen confidence-building measures. On the Korean peninsula demilitarization must begin with a treaty to bring a formal end to the Korean War. Four-party negotiations involving North Korea, South Korea, China and the US have been inching toward a peace treaty that can replace the current uneasy armistice. Reunification would be an essential solution to the current problems and unending conflicts.



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