

**AN ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AID TO  
ZIMBABWE FROM 1980 TO 2000**

**BY**

**HERBERT GARA**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS OF THE MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES**

**FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES**

**UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE**

**JULY 2009**

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Contents.....	1
Acknowledgements.....	4
Abbreviations and acronyms.....	5

## **CHAPTER 1**

Introduction.....	8
Statement of the Problem.....	9
Objectives.....	10
Justification of the Study.....	10
Hypothesis.....	11
Methodology.....	11
Limitations.....	11

## **CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review**

Introduction.....	12
Definitions and Types of Aid.....	12
Aid and the Realist-Idealist Perspectives.....	15
Aid and the Dependency Theory.....	19
Aid, Democratic Conditionalities and Imperialism.....	22
Conclusion.....	24

### **CHAPTER 3: Overview of EU-Zimbabwe Relations since 1980**

Introduction.....	25
A Brief History of the EU.....	25
EU-Zimbabwe Relations 1980-1990.....	28
EU-Zimbabwe Relations 1991-2000.....	32
EU-Zimbabwe Relations 2001-2008.....	36
Conclusion.....	38

### **CHAPTER 4: EU Aid Programmes in Zimbabwe: An Analysis of EU-Zimbabwe Cooperation**

Introduction.....	39
Food Sector.....	39
Figure 1.....	40
Health Sector.....	42
Table 1.....	43
Education Sector.....	44
Figure 2.....	45
Civil Society, Human Rights, Good Governance and Rule of Law.....	46
Economic War: EU Sanctions on Zimbabwe.....	48
EU Conditionalities on Zimbabwe.....	45
Zimbabwe's Contingency Plan: Look East Policy.....	53
Conclusion.....	56

## **CHAPTER 5**

Recommendations and Conclusion.....	57
Bibliography.....	60

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to express my special gratitude to my supervisor, Ms Petra Chinyere for her unwavering support throughout the writing of this dissertation. Her guidance and comments were instrumental in producing this piece of work. I am deeply indebted to my wife Patricia who allowed me to burn the midnight oil in order to finish this dissertation on time. Her typing skills also came in handy as it was impossible for me to research, type and go to work at the same time. My special appreciation also goes to Mr Kunene of the Delegation of the European commission for allowing me to use their library facilities which enabled me to produce this document. Special mention is also due to Wing Commander Mafongoya, Professor Patel and Mr Mbanje for their advice and comments which helped to shape this dissertation. My greatest thanks also go to my fellow graduate students at the University of Zimbabwe for their participation and discussions throughout my studies. I must also pay tribute to the Department of Political and Administrative Studies for providing an academic environment that was both challenging and hospitable. Finally, special mention goes to my family which provided me with the inspiration to conduct my studies and yet still manage to fulfill my other duties as a father, husband and breadwinner at the same time.

## **ACRONYMS**

1. ACP -African, Caribbean and Pacific.
2. AIPPA -Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
3. CIDA -Canadian International Development Agency.
4. CPA -Cotonou Partnership Agreement.
5. DAC -Development Assistance Committee.
6. DANIDA –Danish International Development Association.
7. DRC -Democratic Republic of Congo.
8. EC -European Commission.
9. ECSC -European Coal and Steel Community.
10. EDF - European Development Fund.
11. EEC -European Economic Community.
12. EIB -European Investment Bank.
13. EIDHR -European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.
14. ERP -European Recovery Programme.
15. ESAP -Economic Structural Adjustment Programme.
16. FDI - Foreign Direct Investment
17. EU -European Union.
18. FYDP -Five Year Development Plan.
19. GWEP -Growth With Equity Policy.
20. IG - Inclusive Government

21. IMF -International Monetary Fund.
22. LDC -Least Developed Countries.
23. NEPAD- New Partnership for Africa's Development
24. NATO -National Atlantic Treaty Organization.
25. NCA -National Constitutional Assembly.
26. NRZ -National Railways of Zimbabwe.
27. ODA -Official Development Assistance.
28. OECD -Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.
29. POSA -Public Order and Security Act.
30. SADC -Southern Africa Development Community.
31. SARDC – Southern Africa Research and Documentation Centre.
32. SAPES TRUST-Southern Africa Political and Economic Series Trust.
33. TNDP -Three Year Transitional National Development Plan
34. UK -United Kingdom.
35. UN -United Nations.
36. USA -United States of America.
37. USSR- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
38. WB -World Bank.
39. WFP -World Food Programme.
39. WHO -World Health Organization.
40. WOZA/MOZA -Women of Zimbabwe Arise/ Men of Zimbabwe Arise.

41. ZCTU -Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

42. ZINASU -Zimbabwe National Students Union.



## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Foreign aid has taken centre stage in international relations after the Second World War. To some analysts such as Milton Friedman, Peter Bauer and William Easterly, “foreign aid is seen as enlarging government bureaucracies, perpetuating bad governments, enriching the elite in poor countries and just plain wasteful.”<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, supporters of foreign aid such as Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz, Nicholas Stern among others argue that although aid has sometimes failed, it has supported poverty reduction and economic growth in some countries and prevented worse performance in others. These analysts believe that many of the weaknesses of aid “have more to do with donors themselves than the recipients and point to a range of conditionalities which militate against success.” Moreover they invoke the moral argument that it is imperative for the ‘haves’ to share their wealth with the ‘have nots.’ In the case of Zimbabwe there is a compelling argument in favour of aid especially if one takes into account our colonial past which is riddled with pillaging of national resources at the expense of the indigenous people.

According to Kwasi Anyemedu, “aid consists of concessional loans and grants to developing countries to promote development. For him, loans can only qualify as aid if there is a great element of concession built into them of more than twenty five percent.”<sup>2</sup> Steven Radelet in his article, *A Primer on Foreign Aid*, points out that the standard definition of foreign aid comes from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). DAC defines foreign as ‘financial flows, technical assistance and commodities that are designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective and are provided either as grants or subsidized loans.’<sup>3</sup> William Easterly views aid as the “transfer of money from poor people in rich countries to rich people in poor countries.” The assumption is that the working class in rich countries underwrites aid programmes in developing countries but the tragedy is that aid has not been able to achieve the intended goals. It is in this context that this study intends to establish whether aid fosters

---

<sup>1</sup> Easterly, W, Why Aid doesn't Work, New American Magazine, April, 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Adesina, J.O, Yao G and Olukoshi, A, Africa and Development-Challenges in the new millennium. The Nepad debate. Unisa Press, Pretoria, 2004 p 259.

<sup>3</sup> Radelet, S, A Primer on Foreign Aid, Centre for Global Development, July 2006.

economic development or it creates a centre periphery relationship between the rich countries and the Third World. Zimbabwe's relationship with the European Union (EU) since its independence in 1980 will thus become the focus of this study with a view to ascertain whether there are mutual benefits for both or it is just a panacea for further exploitation of Third World countries.

## **STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

According to Walter Rodney in his book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, the pillaging of resources in third world countries created a master servant relationship between the developed countries and the developing countries. For him, "Africa went into colonialism clutching a hoe and came out of it clutching the same hoe."<sup>4</sup> This indicates that Africa did not benefit from colonialism and the trend has continued even after independence. In Zimbabwe, the (EU) has been one of the major players in the aid industry and this study reveals whether its presence has yielded positive results or it has exacerbated the situation. The problems that Zimbabwe is facing today are partly a result of EU activities which centre around regime change through illegal sanctions and the sponsoring of anti government civil and political organizations. It is the contention of this writer that the EU deviated from its mandate of offering official development assistance to Zimbabwe to sponsoring subversive activities. This study traces Zimbabwe-EU relations from 1980 to 1990 when relations were still cordial and then from 1990 to 2000 when issues of structural adjustment programmes and other conditionalities such as good governance and human rights began to take centre stage. The last period is from 2000 to 2008 when open confrontation began to surface especially over elections and the land reform programme. Therefore the most important question asked is whether EU aid in all its various forms has enhanced the fortunes of the people of Zimbabwe or not.

## **OBJECTIVES**

This study assesses the impact of EU aid in Zimbabwe especially focusing on whether it has been complementing government efforts or not. The research also analyses EU aid programmes in Zimbabwe bringing out the humanitarian aspect, the developmental aspect as well as the retrogressive aspect which took centre stage after 2000. This study establishes a link between

---

<sup>4</sup> Walter, R, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Macmillan Publishers, New York, 1985, P 123.

foreign aid and the dependency theory as espoused by scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank, Amir Amin and Theotinos Dos Santos, among others.

In the final analysis this study prescribes alternatives to foreign aid making use of the models of development adopted by the Asian tigers as well as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The question answered is whether Zimbabwe can survive without aid and if not, how it can manipulate aid programmes to its advantage without necessarily subordinating its sovereignty to the dictates of the EU.

### **JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY**

Foreign aid remains one of the tools being used by developed nations such as Britain, USA and others to perpetuate Third World dependency. What is important to note is that aid has done very little to improve lives in Zimbabwe and other Third World countries. According to Davies Blake and Robert Walters, "there is very little evidence that the benefits of aid are serving the basic human needs such as health, education and nutrition."<sup>5</sup> Questions about the efficacy of aid have thus been raised. A radical perspective argues that, "Western aid has never been designed to facilitate development of poor states but rather, it is being used as an instrument that ensures the perpetual subordination of states in the periphery to core countries in the West."<sup>6</sup> This study therefore is very relevant especially as it seeks to reveal how Zimbabwe's situation has deteriorated even in the presence of big organizations such as the EU. The current international relations are shaped by this master servant relationship which states that, 'its either you are with us or you are against us.' Zimbabwe thus is a test case to establish whether withdrawal of aid has a negative effect on development or not. The measures that Zimbabwe has taken to counter the effects of aid withdrawal will be analyzed to establish the possibility of countries surviving without outside assistance. The subject of foreign aid has been explored by several scholars, but it is important to note that new developments surface every time thereby making it a viable area of study. At the moment the EU is making overtures to engage Zimbabwe again because of the changing political landscape. It is imperative to analyze these new developments in the context of the EU's hegemonic tendencies over developing countries.

---

<sup>5</sup> Blake, D and Walters, R, The Politics of Global Economic Relations, Prentice Hall New Jersey, 1984. p146.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p148.

This study will also be useful to policymakers especially in their engagement with the EU and other potential donors. It will also become a scholarly piece that can guide other scholars in future.

### **HYPOTHESIS**

This study hypothesizes that Third World countries do not benefit much from foreign aid and viable alternatives should be sought to address challenges. It is the assumption of this study that aid is failing to address Third World problems due to a multiplicity of factors that have to do with the donors themselves as well as the recipients.

### **METHODOLOGY**

This study relies heavily on written literature on the subject. International and local magazines and newspapers are made use of as they offer current views on the subject. Books by both local and international writers were consulted with a view to come up with a balanced argument. This study made use of the internet to get more information on the subject. The EU library was a good source of information and already arrangements were being made to gain access. Surveys especially on societies that benefited from EU aid were conducted and questionnaires as well as oral interviews were used to get information.

This study was organized into chapters starting with the introduction. The chapters are arranged in such a manner that the flow of information is easy to follow. Where necessary tables and graphs were used to illustrate certain points.

### **LIMITATIONS**

This researcher encountered problems in getting information especially from organizations such as the EU which viewed the research suspiciously. The internet is also expensive to access especially now that everything has been dollarised in Zimbabwe. Issues of confidentiality especially with regards to releasing valuable information also hampered the research. However this researcher made up for that by gathering a lot of information from newspapers, journals and relevant books. Other sources of information such as Sapes Trust, SARDC and government ministries and departments were made use of.

## **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **INTRODUCTION**

For most Least Developing Countries (LDCs), development features as the primary goal of their national plans. Under the difficult circumstances of inadequate resources, especially capital and expertise, they are driven to obtain foreign aid usually from Western developed countries. There exists, therefore a growing paradox between the heavy dependency on foreign aid by LDCs and the negative impact of such aid on actual development.

Questions about the efficacy of aid have thus been raised by many Dependency and Marxist theorists. Despite a wide realization of the negative effects of foreign aid espoused by many radical theorists, more and more LDCs are making a concerted effort to attract European Union (EU) aid on whatever terms it is offered. To them, the misery of receiving conditional aid is much better than the misery of receiving none at all. In Zimbabwe the EU has been one of the major players in the aid industry and this chapter analyzes this relationship using the various theories of international relations namely: realism, idealism, dependency, interdependence, democratization and imperialism.

### **DEFINITIONS AND TYPES OF AID**

Foreign aid has taken center stage in international relations especially after the Second World War. Steven Radelet contends that the standard definition of foreign aid comes from the Assistance Development Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The word aid is used in the strict sense of Official Development Assistance (ODA). DAC therefore defines foreign aid as, “financial flows, technical assistance and commodities that are designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective and are provided either as grants or subsidized loans.”<sup>7</sup> William Olson also views aid as “the transfer of money, goods, technology or technical advice from a donor to a recipient.”<sup>8</sup> Between 1980 and 2005 the total amount spent by the EU for the support of development of Zimbabwe was close to 1,2 billion Euros, 950 million Euros on grants and 225 million euros on

---

<sup>7</sup> Radelet, S, A Primer on foreign aid, Center for Global Development, July, 2006 p 7

<sup>8</sup> Olson, W, The Theory and Practice of International Relations, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1991, p 72

loans from the European Investment Bank.<sup>9</sup> The EU poured a lot of resources in areas such as education, health, housing, infrastructure and it has remained the most important donor to Zimbabwe. Kwasi Anyemedu distinguishes between foreign aid loans and other loans in that, “the former consists of interests at modestly concessional rates while the latter charge high interest rates.” He writes that, “aid consists of concessional loans and grants to developing countries to promote development. Loans can only qualify as aid if there is a grant element of concession built into them of more than 25%.”<sup>10</sup> Kalevi Holsti like Anyemedu acknowledges that, “most bilateral or multilateral loans do constitute aid to the extent that their interest rates and other terms of repayment are more liberal than those available through normal commercial banking institutions.”<sup>11</sup> Theresa Chimombe also concurs with the above two authors when she reaffirms that, “the grace period for a loan can be five years and repayment of the loan can take up to fifteen or twenty years with a very reasonable interest rate charged per annum.”<sup>12</sup>

Most of the assistance Zimbabwe gets from the EU is through bilateral aid (country to country or EU to recipient) in the form of grants and low interest loans with a smaller amount being channeled through multilateral aid (several countries) agencies, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB). It is significant to note that EU aid is multinational rather than fully multilateral. Donald Gumbo argues that, “The European Commission (EC) exercises close control over the overall implementation of EU funded programmes. Funding originates from the European Development Fund (E.D.F) and from the Commission’s budget. Funds from the EC Budget are implemented directly by the Commission.”<sup>13</sup> This therefore implies that the Commission disburses most of the loans and grants directly to developing countries rather than via multilateral channels.

The recipients of aid are the Third World countries. Joseph Frankel correctly observes that the majority of the developing countries are poor and extremely short of resources not only for

---

<sup>9</sup> Delegation of the European Commission, An Overview of EU-Zimbabwe Current Co-operation, Harare, April 2006, p3.

<sup>10</sup> Anyemedu, K, Africa and Development Challenges in the New Millennium, Unisa Press, Pretoria, 2004, p259.

<sup>11</sup> Holsti, K, J, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1988, p230.

<sup>12</sup> Chimombe, T, “Foreign Capital”, in Mandaza I (ed) Zimbabwe The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986, Codesria Book Series, Senegal, 1986, p132-133.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid p134

economic development but also for current minimum consumption.<sup>14</sup> Thompson Scott and Silver Brett also reaffirm that, “Although Africa is well endowed with human and material resources it is an incontestable fact that the continent has been and continues to be the poorest and the most underdeveloped region of the world.”<sup>15</sup> In the case of Zimbabwe there is a compelling argument in favour of aid especially if one takes into account its colonial past which is riddled with pillaging of national resources at the expense of the indigenous people.

EU aid or any official development assistance disbursed by any given donor country or organization is usually in the form of grants, loans or technical assistance. Julius Nyerere divides external aid into two main categories, namely gifts and loans. According to him the meaning of gifts is that, “another government gives our government a sum of money as a free gift for a particular development scheme. Sometimes it may be that an institution in another country gives our government or an institution in our country financial help for development programmes.”<sup>16</sup> The gifts mentioned by Nyerere are also known as grants, for which no economic repayment is expected. This is the form in which most of the EU’s aid to Zimbabwe especially in the health and education sectors is dispensed. Describing loans, Nyerere stresses that, “The greater portion of financial help we expect to get from outside is not in the form of gifts or charity but in the form of loans. A foreign government or a foreign institution, such as a bank lends our government money for the purposes of development. Such a loan has repayment conditions attached to it, covering factors such as the time period for which it is available and the rate of the interest.”<sup>17</sup> Foreign aid loans are thus concessional meaning the terms of repayment are more flexible than those offered by commercial banks.

Technical assistance is another form of aid. According to Kalevi Holsti, “technical aid is designed to disseminate knowledge and skills. Personnel with special qualifications from industrialized countries go abroad to advise on a wide variety of projects such as malaria control, land reclamation, road construction, development of medical, water and educational facilities.”<sup>18</sup> Grants, loans and technical assistance to developing countries are usually in the form of ‘tied’ aid. Daniel Papp argues that “tied aid refers to a donor state’s requirement that aid and assistance

---

<sup>14</sup> Frankel, J, International Politics: Conflict and Harmony, The Penguin Press, London, 1976, p83.

<sup>15</sup> Thompson, S and Silver B, The West and Black Africa, Holmes and Miers, New York, 1982, p13-14.

<sup>16</sup> Mutiso, G, and Rohio, S. W, Readings in African Political Thought, Heinemann, Nairobi, 1975, p518.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p518

<sup>18</sup> Holsti, K, Op cit p237

be used only in conjunction with donor state products, equipment and direction.”<sup>19</sup> This entails that the recipient government is required to use this money to purchase goods and services from the aid giver and usually at much higher prices than those at which they could be bought elsewhere. Some EU assistance to Zimbabwe also falls in the ‘tied’ aid category whereby the EU has tended to dictate how the assistance is to be used. Technical staff from the EU are also seconded to Zimbabwe so that they direct the manner in which aid is disbursed. However, despite these conditions, supporters of foreign aid argue that aid has resulted in poverty reduction and economic growth in some countries and it has also prevented worse performance in others.

### AID AND THE REALIST-IDEALIST PERSPECTIVES

The history of foreign aid can be traced back to the period after the Second World War. Much of Europe had been ravaged by war and the United States of America (USA) through the Marshall Plan, was very instrumental in providing aid for the reconstruction of Europe. The USA spent twelve billion US dollars in the European Recovery Programme (ERP). Much of this money was in the form of grants from which no repayment was expected. Thomas Bailey has hailed this ERP as “the economic blood transfusion which took the Europeans off their backs and put them on their feet.” Robert D Cantor also acknowledges that “the Marshall Plan which was designed to aid recovery in Western Europe after the Second World War successfully achieved its mission of enabling the European countries to expand their postwar economic bases.”<sup>20</sup>

Although aid given by the USA to the Europeans was meant to be an idealist gesture based on humanitarianism and international cooperation, realists argue that the USA utilized foreign aid in pursuit of its economic, military and political goals. Economically a prosperous Europe was essential for America’s own prosperity as it provided markets for American resources. On the military front the National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) proved to be a preponderant force against Soviet expansionism into Western Europe. Politically, the USA’s superpower status and capitalist ideology was maintained.

Hans Morgenthau, a ‘realist’ scholar equates national interest with the pursuit of state power, “where power stands for anything that establishes and maintains control by one state over

---

<sup>19</sup> Papp, D, Contemporary International Relations: Framework for Understanding, Allyn and Bacon, Toronto, 1997, p484.

<sup>20</sup> Cantor, R, Contemporary International Politics, West Publishing Company’s Paul, 1986, p 379.



another .This power relationship can be achieved by coercive as well as cooperative techniques such as the disbursement of foreign aid.” Realists argue that aid is proffered for a variety of reasons, all usually within the context of advancing a nation’s foreign policy. While it cannot be disputed that there are occasions when it is given on humanitarian (idealist) grounds they only account for a small fraction of any state’s foreign aid programmes. The principal goals of foreign aid as advanced by realists, are to strengthen the influence of the donor in the recipient state, provide markets for the donors’ goods and services and deny adversaries influence and access. .According to Adama Gave, “China’s growing influence in Africa was one of the major reasons why the European Union was so eager to hold the Europe-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007.”<sup>21</sup> The Summit’s major goal was political, that is Europe wanted to provide more aid to Africa as a way of safeguarding its geo-strategic resources and interests on the continent. Robert D Cantor asserts that, “the form of aid may vary from outright grants or loans or favorable trade agreements, but regardless of the economic nature of the programme, it has direct political implications that inevitably involve national interest.”<sup>22</sup> Morgenthau also contends that, “decisions concerning national interest should always be made on the basis of concrete demonstrable national advantage rather than on the basis of abstract and impersonal criteria of morality, law and ideology.”<sup>23</sup>

Idealists on the other hand hold that, “foreign aid started as an instrument of state power but arguably its’ competitive, conflictive characteristics (realist) are now being replaced by more cooperative, humanitarian as well as economic considerations (idealism).” This school of thought involves the moral argument that it is imperative for the ‘haves’ to share their wealth with the ‘have nots’ as, acting morally is equated with acting honestly and making your public decisions accordingly. “Thus ,moral behavior in international politics especially involves keeping promises (treaties) being true to your friends, living and letting others live, avoid exploiting others and generally standing up for the principles to which you are morally committed.”<sup>24</sup>

In contrast to realists who see men as inherently evil or possessing an ‘animus dominandi’ (lust for power), idealists are prone to believe that humans and their countries are capable of

---

<sup>21</sup> Gaye,A, “China in Africa: Why the West is worried”, New African, March 2008, No 471, p13-14.

<sup>22</sup> Cantor, R, op cit p 378.

<sup>23</sup> Morgenthau, H, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Knopf, New York, 1978, p75.

<sup>24</sup> Frankel, J, Op cit, p 96.

achieving more cooperative and less conflictive relations. Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued in his famous Social Contract that, “humans joined together in civil societies because they reached the point at which the obstacles to bettering their existence were greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual.”<sup>25</sup> Idealists therefore dismiss the charge made by some realists that pursuing ethical policy works against the national interest. A stable economic order is necessary in an age of global interdependence. Giving aid to LDCs is a sign that foreign policy should be formulated according to cooperative and ethical standards instead of basing it on power. Developed countries by disbursing aid to LDCs are in a way building a cooperative and peaceful global society. China’s willingness to offer both commercial and non commercial viable loans to African nations in order to secure long-term strategic and economic interests is paying off. Politics, as idealists base their arguments can be made to conform to ethical standards. Carr, one of the contemporary realists also acknowledges that, “Political action must be based on a coordination of morality and power. Politics cannot be divorced from power but the ‘homo politicus’ who pursues nothing but power is as an unreal myth as the ‘homo economicus’ who pursues nothing but gain. It is fatal in politics to ignore power as it is to ignore morality.”<sup>26</sup> However other realists like Morgenthau argue that, “there can be no political morality without prudence, that is without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action.”<sup>27</sup> Here Morgenthau is more concerned with the possibility of a given action enhancing the interest of a nation rather than with the morality of that action. Morton Kaplan also maintains that, “the life of a state is a life governed in part at least by law rather than appetite. While states prefer to chart foreign policy courses that are in harmony with international law and the norms of relations among states, an overriding national interest will usually take precedence.”<sup>28</sup>

Realists reject the idealist notion of an ethical policy arguing that politics is not a function of ethical philosophy. This school of thought is of the view that developed countries come to the assistance of developing countries in order to further their own interests. Realists are of the view

---

<sup>25</sup> Rourke, J, International Politics on the World Stage, Duskin Publishing Group, Connecticut, 1995, p 486.

<sup>26</sup> Carr, E.H, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Papermac, London, 1981, p 92.

<sup>27</sup> Morgenthau, H, op cit p 835.

<sup>28</sup> Couloumbis, T and Wolfe, J, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1990, p106.

that a political policy seeks either to keep power or to demonstrate power. They maintain that rarely is aid given to the other governments simply to reduce poverty or to enhance economic growth of the recipient. This school of thought charges that poverty eradication and economic stability are consistently given lower priorities than political needs.

According to realists aid can be used as a device for gaining influence. Robert Jervis observes that, “economic aid appears to be a prominent component of a broader foreign policy designed to expand influence in the underdeveloped countries. The developed countries give aid in order to win client states as well as to increase their power and secure their geo-strategic interests.”<sup>29</sup> Arnold Wolfers distinguishes between power and influence stating that, “the first means the ability to move others by threat or infliction of deprivations, the latter meaning the ability to do so through promises, grants or benefits.” Foreign aid therefore falls under both, depending on the situation and circumstances at hand. Aid can therefore be a cooperative, harmonious instrument but the relationship is usually asymmetrical since the economic advantage of the recipient is not matched by an equivalent economic advantage of the donor, although the latter may derive some benefits. Joseph Frankel argues that, “the quid pro quo is mainly political as the donor may secure an ally, buttress a friendly regime and save it from subversion or secure a change in the recipient’s domestic or foreign policies in the direction desired.”<sup>30</sup>

Joan Nelson lists four ways in which aid can be used to affect international political processes:

- A financial subsidy from a donor can relieve the government of a crisis situation and give it time to formulate programmes to control the economy.
- A donor can also supply funds to help a government cope with specific economic or political problems such as unemployment.
- Occasionally, a grant or aid can be given at a strategic time so as to affect the outcome of an election.
- Aid can be suspended following a coup d’état as a means of promoting constitutional changes of government and discouraging military take overs.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> Wight, M, Power Politics, Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1979, p 77.

<sup>30</sup> Frankel, J, Op cit p 102.

<sup>31</sup> Nelson, J, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy, Macmillan, New York, 1968, p 34-35.

Aid can be used to manipulate a recipient's foreign policy. In 2002, the EU seriously curtailed its economic aid to Zimbabwe, thus depriving Zimbabweans of much needed farm equipment and spare parts and, in particular, slowing down Zimbabwe's land reform programme. Realists see aid as a political tool while idealists view it as a moral tool. Realists believe that aid boosts the political influence of an actor as well as its economic leverage over the recipient. Contrary to such views, idealists see aid as genuine assistance to help LDCs to mobilize their economies for sustained economic growth to help alleviate the worst manifestations of poverty, malnutrition and lack of social opportunities.

### AID AND DEPENDENCY THEORY

Many dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank, Amir Amin, Paul Prebisch and Theotinos Dos Santos assert that, "foreign aid is merely another tool used by the developed countries to control the developing countries." They allege that foreign aid tends to perpetuate the recipient's economic and technological dependence on the donor. According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, dependence means, "a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces."<sup>32</sup> The idea of external dependence stands as a defining characteristic and the most concise and frequently quoted definition is that of Dos Santos who holds that, "By dependence, we mean a situation in which the economy of a certain country is conditioned by the development and expansion of another country to which the former is subjected."<sup>33</sup> The relationship assumes a form of dependence when some countries (the dominant states) can expand and be self sustaining while other countries (the dependent states) can only do this as a reflection of that expansion. This therefore implies that when one party has much more bargaining power than the other, a dependent relationship exists. This power imbalance in turn produces an asymmetry in the distribution of the benefits and costs of the relationship. African states are dependent on the capitalist world for technology, capital and trade. This is because the capitalist world has a virtual monopoly over the means of production.

Foreign aid is typically characterized by an inordinate power distribution between the donors and the recipients. The asymmetrical power balance is caused by the aggregate economic, political

---

<sup>32</sup> Keohane, R, O and Nye, J, S, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Little Brown, Boston, 1977, p 7.

<sup>33</sup> Gilpin, R, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press, New Jersey p 265-6.

and organizational resources of donors and the overall weakness of recipients. The more dependent the actor is, the more he exposes himself to manipulation, control and even exploitation. Donors can manipulate the quantities and types of aid for political purposes and the suspension of economic aid or withdrawal can have critical impact on the ability to stabilize the economy. John Rabin and Bernard Brown convincingly observed that, “the power of aid derives not only from giving aid but also from promising to give it, cutting it off or threatening to cut it off. It means that aid is promised, given or withdrawn as a reward, punishment or encouragement to pursue specific policy courses. It also creates an environment that shapes the norms, outlook and expectations of the actors in the relationship.”<sup>34</sup>

In Zimbabwe too much dependency on EU aid among other donors resulted in Zimbabweans developing a dependency syndrome to the extent that local production and innovation have been stifled over the years. A country using foreign aid is less likely to initiate its own programmes as there is the inevitable stifling of local innovations that perpetuates the periphery’s dependence on the core. This study of EU aid programmes in Zimbabwe abundantly demonstrates that too much reliance on aid reduces the state virtually to the position of powerlessness. In the case of Zimbabwe there is the notion that aid compromises self determination and deeply erodes the state’s capacity to self reliance. In the end the state loses its autonomy on decision making and is subjected to direct or indirect external control.

Dependency theorists allege that the threat to cancel aid can be used as a leverage to influence recipient’s domestic and foreign policies such as creating a more favorable business climate for the donor’s multinational corporations. Western industrialized countries command overwhelming structural power in their relations with the developing countries. André Gunder Frank argues that, “the legacy of colonial relations between developed and underdeveloped nations places the underdeveloped world in a qualitatively different position than was the case for pre-industrial Europe and North America.”<sup>35</sup> It can therefore be argued that this concentration of structural power in the hands of the developed countries accounts for the basic asymmetry in the North-South relations. A network of political, military, economic, cultural and communication ties binds the developing countries to the developed countries. These ties

---

<sup>34</sup> Rabin, J and Brown, B, The World Economic Order: Past and Prospects, Macmillan, London, 1991, p47.

<sup>35</sup> Jaffee, D, Levels of Socio-Economic Development Theory, Praeger, New York, 1990, p158-159.

decrease the South's autonomy and increase its sensitivity and vulnerability to the North's actions. Dependency theorists complain that the South or periphery's options to pursue different political and economic policies are limited or blocked by the structure of international exchanges and that the South's policies are influenced or determined by the North's interests and needs rather than by its own interests and needs.

According to the realist theory earlier alluded to, "foreign aid, economic performance and inequalities are structurally embedded in the asymmetrical relations and are therefore predictable. They tend to work against weak actors either in their attempt to restructure the system as a whole or simply influencing the inequitable distribution of economic rewards." Severine Rugumamu holds that, "the international weakness of most developing states as indicated by their quest for foreign aid and their small aggregate output in comparison with the industrialized states, suggests that they can not directly influence the international system." It also suggests that they will be subject to external forces that they can not change.<sup>36</sup>

The primary tangible power resources that are relevant to the aid process are the overwhelming donor's capital, technology and policy inputs. These resources confer to the donor the necessary capabilities to affect the behavior of their recipient states. "If the donor supplies the developing country with large amounts of important goods for a relatively extended period of time, goods which cannot be replaced at tolerable costs, then the developed country is in a position to influence the developing country quite significantly." The degree of dependence is bound to be very pronounced if the recipient has few or no potential alternative sources. Robert Gilpin strongly believes that economic dependency is a limiting condition on economic development and has some of the following negative consequences:

- Overdependence on raw material exports with fluctuating prices causing domestic economic instability.
- Foreign firms gain control of key industrial sectors and elbow out local firms.
- Introduction of inappropriate technology that is capital intensive rather than labour intensive.

---

<sup>36</sup> Rugumamu, S, Lethal Aid: The Illusion of Socialism and Self-Reliance in Tanzania, Africa World Press, Asmara, 1996, p13.

- Prevention of autonomous or self sustaining development based on domestic technology and indigenous entrepreneurship.<sup>37</sup>

Dependency theorists argue that for all the above reasons, dependent or associated development cannot lead to true development. All these theorists maintain that underdevelopment is due primarily to external forces of the world capitalist system and is not due to the policies of the LDCs themselves. The international aid regime has actually encouraged recipient states to rely on donors rather than on themselves, reject local solutions to local problems and internalize the psychology of dependence. This can be termed the corrupting power of aid. As dependence on aid increases, so does the power and influence of foreign benefactors. The power of donors derives from their ability to provide or threat to withdraw the desperately needed aid. Since 2000, Zimbabwe has been receiving less aid from the EU due to its policies on land, elections and human rights issues. The country has been under illegal sanctions as a way of forcing it to comply with the demands of the metropole. These conditionalities which the Zimbabwean government has refused to accept are the weapons often used by the developed countries to strengthen their dominance in the developing countries.

#### AID, DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONALITIES AND IMPERIALISM

The 21<sup>st</sup> century has witnessed a major shift in the way foreign donors fund aid programmes. Western governments have come up with a new rationale for the disbursement of aid to LDCs which is based on the promotion of democracy and human rights. Severine Rugumamu observes that, “political liberalization, reduction in bureaucratic control, administrative decentralization and the promotion of good governance on an essentially western model are paraded as the necessary conditions for economic liberalization and growth.”<sup>38</sup> This democratic perspective believes that the basic obstacles to economic development within the LDCs are the inefficient government policies. However imperialist theorists such as Frantz Fanon and Theresa Hayter object because economic conditionalities are often attached to such aid and this gives the donors leverage over the affairs of the LDCs. Critics and officials in LDCs also denounce such official

---

<sup>37</sup> Gilpin, R, Op cit, p 286.

<sup>38</sup> Rugumamu, S, Op cit, p 27.

aid as a new form of capitalist imperialism.<sup>39</sup> This has led to President Mugabe's assertion that, "Zimbabwe will never be a colony again either militarily or economically."

Karl Marx saw imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. Joseph Hanlon views imperialism as the extension of a state's sovereignty over other countries. For him, colonialism is a "situation where a group of people settle in a foreign country establishing some form of domination over the indigenous people and maintaining close links with their country of origin."<sup>40</sup> In the words of Theresa Hayter, "foreign aid is merely a smooth face of imperialism." It is used as an economic instrument for promoting and sustaining imperialist interests.

According to Jill Steans and Lloyd Pettiford, good governance, "is consensus and people oriented, participatory, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective, efficient, and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision making."<sup>41</sup> EU aid has thus been tied to policy restructuring in a range of domains such as economic, political, human rights, rule of law and much more. Francis Fukuyama saw the end of the cold war as the ultimate triumph of western capitalism and liberal democracy. "This therefore meant that liberal views were to be widely practiced across the world since communism had been discredited and there was no longer a credible alternative form of social, political and economic organization other than that of the Western democracies."<sup>42</sup>

The EU's European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) aims at promoting human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance by providing financial support for activities promoting these goals, in Zimbabwe and in other LDCs. It is in this area of support that the EU has had clashes with the Zimbabwean government which feels that this kind of support undermines sovereignty and has the potential to subvert government policies. Gerald Meier acknowledges that, foreign engineered changes are likely to be directly or indirectly resented by recipients on at least three grounds viz,

- They will be regarded as direct invasion of sovereignty.

---

<sup>39</sup> Gilpin, R, Op cit, p 270.

<sup>40</sup> Hanlon, J, B Your Neighbours: Apartheid power in Southern Africa, Indiana, 1987, p29.

<sup>41</sup> Steans, J and Pettiford, L International Relations: Perspectives and Themes, Longman, London, 2001, p 78.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p47.



- They carry an explicit claim that the donor knows best what is good for the recipient.
- They openly reflect the much resented power inequalities in the aid industry.<sup>43</sup>

The imposition of conditionalities is by denounced by imperialist theorists as an imperialist interference in the internal affairs of LDCs especially when they are required to take decisions that they deem to be politically dangerous. Imperialist theorists view new Western democratic missionaries as ethnocentric in assuming the innate superiority of Western-style liberal democratic institutions. The primary concern of aid is now more centered on instituting forms of bourgeois democracy which are believed to bring about sustained development and economic growth in LDCs. Frantz Fanon warns African countries against embracing Western models of development. He states that, “Let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions and societies which draw inspiration from her. If we wish to live up to our people’s expectations, we must seek the response elsewhere than in Europe.”<sup>44</sup>

For Nkwame Nkrumah, “the essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it, is in theory, independent and has all the trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.”<sup>45</sup> He therefore concludes that neo colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. Julius Nyerere buttresses this point when he argues that, “Independence can not be real when a nation depends upon gifts and loans from another country for its development.”<sup>46</sup>

Democratic theorists believe that aid can bring about genuine economic growth and sustainable development in the LDCs only if those countries embrace Western democratic principles. Imperialist theorists, on the other hand argue that aid should not have any conditionalities. In their perspective, foreign aid must be in line with the goals of national autonomy and activities of aid givers must be regulated so that they are not at variance with national aspirations.

## CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion, four broad observations are in order. Firstly, this study has shown that the realist perspective views foreign aid essentially as one of the instruments of statecraft.

---

<sup>43</sup> Meier, G, Leading Issues in Economic Development, Oxford University Press, New York,1995.

<sup>44</sup> Fanon, F, The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin books,Middlesex,1985 p254.

<sup>45</sup> Mutiso,G, and Rohio,S, Op cit p431.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid p519.

Donor governments have used aid in pursuit of a wide range of interests such as power, prestige, national security and commercial interests. The study has also shown that deeply grounded in moral philosophy, idealists believe passionately that aid giving is the right thing to do as the 'haves' should share with the 'have nots.' Secondly, a suggestion has been posited to the effect that the inordinate inequalities in power resources between aid givers and recipients significantly influence the nature, content and outcome of aid transactions. It has also been postulated that the more LDCs depend on aid the more they expose themselves to external manipulation, control and even exploitation. Thirdly, this study has argued that foreign aid has been used by donors as one of the major instruments used to advance their respective political beliefs. Those beliefs include among others, good governance, rule of law and human rights. Fourthly, emphasis has been placed on the argument that recipient states have not been mere spectators in the aid industry. Through the theory of imperialism, it has been demonstrated that LDCs are important international actors who decide what is best for their country at a particular period. In the case of Zimbabwe after 2000, the Look East Policy was seen as a viable option to circumvent the stifling of aid by the West.

## **CHAPTER 3:OVERVIEW OF EU-ZIMBABWE RELATIONS SINCE 1980**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Over the years, African countries have experimented with various development policies, strategies and ideologies that were developed outside the continent. Drawing heavily on Zimbabwe's experience, this chapter examines the role of EU's foreign aid in Zimbabwe's development process. It is argued that foreign aid in the 1980s was used to assist development projects as well as to help contain the spread of communism and from the 1990s onwards it was used as an instrument of statecraft to advance various EU interests such as democracy and good governance.

Although the policies and strategies of the EU's aid process underlined the primacy of development and poverty alleviation as seen in the early and late 1980s, the genuine development needs of the majority of the Zimbabwean population were relegated to secondary importance as from the 1990s onwards. As the aid dependence increased in Zimbabwe in the 1990s so did the power and influence of foreign benefactors in the management of development policy. The EU's aid role in Zimbabwe gradually changed from subtle, indirect policy advice on project selection and design to overt or open dictation of structural adjustment policies, political liberalization and prescription of democratic principles. This chapter argues that these EU crafted development strategies and aid conditionalities in the 1990s onwards, reflected EU interests more than those of the people they purported to help.

### **A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Today, the EU is composed of twenty-seven countries from the European Continent. To reach this high level of integration the EU went through a number of transitions dating back from 1951 up to date. These transitions have greatly affected its functioning towards increased integration, and its composition in terms of membership.

Reconciliation between France and Germany gave impetus to European integration in the years after the Second World War. French and German politicians encouraged by the USA, wanted to make another war between their two countries all but impossible ever again. Chester Wilmont observes that, "these two countries began in 1951 by pooling control over their coal and steel

industries in a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg also joined this community.”<sup>47</sup> Each country therefore renounced national sovereignty over strategic assets essential to any war effort. In 1957 the ECSC comprising of these six aforementioned states converted itself into the European Economic Community (EEC).

On 1 November 1993 that the European Community (EC) officially became the European Union (EU) with a membership of twelve European states<sup>48</sup>. It can therefore be noted that from six original member states (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg in 1951) the membership of the European Community enlarged to fifteen, (United Kingdom(UK), Ireland and Denmark in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995). Membership increased to twenty-five in 2005 when the EU welcomed ten new countries: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.<sup>49</sup> Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 raising the EU membership to twenty-seven. Croatia and Turkey started membership negotiations in 2005.

Zimbabwe became independent in 1980 at the height of the bipolar system between the Western and Eastern blocs which was characterized by political, economic, ideological technological and military tension between the USA and the Soviet Union. The communist politico-economic system was based on diametrically opposing philosophical premises from those of capitalism. Kenneth Waltz observes that the end of the Second World War set the political stage for both superpowers to extend their political and ideological influence on a global scale. He states that, “the Soviet Union directed its attention to expand its power and influence in Europe and later in Asia by exploiting the political and economic dislocation that had been created by the war. Later it stretched its political tentacles into the Middle East and later into Africa.”<sup>50</sup>

Hedley Bull points out that the USA responded with the strategy of expansion as well as containment. “It was governed by the two closely related but distinct principles which were containment and collective security.” He concludes that, “containment aimed at hemming in the

---

<sup>47</sup> Chester, W, The Struggle for Europe, Collins Clear-Type Press, 1967, p 25.

<sup>48</sup> Tyler, M, “The United States of Europe”, Los Angeles, May 20, 1996, p A1-A8.

<sup>49</sup> Cottrell, R, “A Survey of Europe” The Economist October 23, 1999, p 53-518.

<sup>50</sup> Waltz, K, Theory of International Relations, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1979, p 49.

Soviets economically, politically and militarily. Collective security was the means, bringing to bear the resources of a variety of states to achieve the goals of containment.”<sup>51</sup>

Both the Western and Eastern powers capitalized on the economic poverty and political weakness of the South to advance their ideological competition and rivalries on a global scale. Hans Morgenthau defines all international politics as the “continuous struggle for power” and so these superpowers used foreign aid as one of their principal economic instruments to impress and win over countries of the South to their ideological side. Due to the threat of Soviet communism on the international arena, the USA called for security burden sharing with its Western European allies. The allies were required to step up aid programmes for the South as a means of securing world political stability and resisting communist infiltrations. As a result, the former colonial powers initiated aid programmes and established diplomatic relations with their former colonies.

Robert Osgood argues that, “it was at this juncture, that the virtual duo play of the USA and the Soviet Union in the aid industry was broken as other donors established complementary foreign aid programmes.”<sup>52</sup> Cooperation between European countries and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries began in 1958 when six members of the European Community unilaterally granted financial aid to overseas countries and territories placed under their jurisdiction. This was also when the first European Development Fund (EDF) came into being.

The early seventies were to see the pace of cooperation between the EEC and developing countries quicken. Firstly there was the enlargement of the European Community from six to nine members, the United Kingdom (UK) bringing in its wake a large number of developing countries which were members of the Commonwealth. Also in 1972, “the desire was expressed by the EEC Heads of State and Government to institute a comprehensive world-wide development cooperation policy, without abandoning the policy of regional association.” Lastly, “the raw material crisis and the definition of a new world economic order within the United Nations were to encourage Europe to take more ambitious cooperation initiatives.”<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> Bull, H, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, p 73.

<sup>52</sup> Osgood, R, Containment: Soviet Behavior and Grand Strategy, Institute of international Studies, Berkeley, 1981, p46.

<sup>53</sup> Commission of the European Communities, “Volume III: Analysis of the European Communities”, Information Development Co-operation/123/1985, p 1-2.

The desire to open up the EEC's horizons was expressed through the negotiations in 1973 and the signature on 28 February 1975 of the first Lome Convention. According to the Commission of the European Communities, "it was the 1975 Lome Convention that forty-six French and English speaking ACP countries came together side by side to engage in a collective undertaking, to deal together with European partners."<sup>54</sup> The Convention ran for five years and was renewed in 1979 for a further period of five years under Lome ii which will be analyzed below.

### **EU ZIMBABWE RELATIONS 1980-1990**

When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980 its main aim was to establish a socialist, egalitarian society based on equitable distribution of resources. In an interview in *The Courier* of March-April 1981, then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe outlined his thinking on making Zimbabwe a socialist, democratic, egalitarian society. He states that, "We must use our political power to achieve economic power and that will give us the national economic independence we want. Once we are sure that the resources of the country and the means to use them are in the hands of the people of Zimbabwe, we can proceed towards socialism."<sup>55</sup>

The new government's preference for socialism arose from the conviction that capitalism could not redress the social imbalances that had characterized the colonial political order. By socialism the new state meant public ownership of the major means of production, the absence of exploitation of man by man, and finally, people's participation in all important national decision making processes. The leadership therefore hoped to achieve this by restructuring domestic institutions and by encouraging popular participation in the economic and political development of their country.

Three major policies were introduced from 1980-1990 aimed at translating the new government's broad intent in creating a socialist society. These policies were the Growth With Equity Policy Statement (GWEP), the Three Year Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) and the Five Year Development Plan (FYDP). Xavier Kadhani points out that the TNDP, which covered the period 1982 to 1985 had embodied, "a range of goals aimed at

---

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, p3.

<sup>55</sup> *The Courier*, "Zimbabwe: Turning Swords into Ploughshares: An Interview with the Prime Minister Robert Mugabe", No 66, 1981, p 12.

completing the programme of post –war reconstruction, generating sufficient growth to facilitate a rapid restoration of income levels- particularly at the lower end and redressing the social inequalities that had characterized the pre-independence political order.”<sup>56</sup>

On the other hand the FYDP adopted from 1986 was the Zimbabwe government’s official framework for managing socio-economic development over the period 1986 to1990. It also assessed the gains and setbacks registered in the first five years of independence. In the external sphere, these policies set out to empower the state and its institutions to establish international cooperation that would facilitate economic development as well as enhance the political economy. These policies did not, therefore, rule out recourse to foreign assistance. Foreign aid was also to be considered within such a framework in order to assess its potential contribution to such goals.

Despite the Zimbabwean leadership’s rhetoric of following a socialist path, “the Zimbabwean state had all the trappings of a capitalist state since it had inherited the key elements of the white colonial apparatus.” The new government had to depend on the goodwill of the European Community in its attempt to build new structures. Ibbo Mandaza clearly points out that, “Therein lay the hope for the transformation of the capitalist system and for the transition to socialism, while at the same time foreign aid was viewed as an important component in that development strategy.”<sup>57</sup>

There was, therefore, no real structural challenge to the capitalist system as a whole. In reality the new government of 1980 found itself having to rely on Western assistance for its reconstruction programme. Even Robert Mugabe had to admit that, “You cannot overhaul capitalism overnight and so there has got to be some co-existence between socialism and capitalism.”<sup>58</sup> Theresa Chimombe, commenting on such contradictions, argues that, “On the one

---

<sup>56</sup> Kadhani,X, “The Economy: Issues, Problems and Prospects”, in Mandaza, Ibbo, Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986, Codesria Book Series, Senegal, 1986, p 99.

<sup>57</sup> Mandaza, I, “The Post-White Settler Colonial Situation”, in Mandaza, Ibbo, (ed), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986, Codesria Book Series, Senegal, 1986, p 99.

<sup>58</sup> The Courier, Op cit, p 12.

hand the government outlines a most convincing economic policy to be based on Marxist-Leninist principles and at the same time expects Western countries to assist in that line.”<sup>59</sup>

Instead of carrying out fundamental socialist reforms in the inherited economy such as land reform, the short cut to development was to get Western aid. Robert Mugabe in his interview with *The Courier* mentioned above, actually admitted that, “Help comes through the EEC, but it also comes to us bilaterally and already we are in association with France, Britain, Belgium Germany and other countries. Quite a number of projects have now been accepted by West Germany. They will participate in the development of our economy by granting us soft loans.”<sup>60</sup>

The second Lome Convention was signed by the nine European and 57 ACP states in 1979. Two new ACP states, the islands of St Vincent and Kiribati, acceded to the convention raising the ACP membership to 59 countries. Zimbabwe joined the Lome ii convention in 1980 becoming the 60th EU-ACP member. The Commission Delegation offices were opened in 1981 in Harare. Since then the EU supported numerous programmes (to be discussed fully in chapter 4) in all fields related to the development of Zimbabwe. The centre piece of the EU’s aid programmes was the Lome Convention. A major part of the Convention related to the provision of financial assistance provided by the community to Zimbabwe and other ACP states.

Within the umbrella of the Lome Conventions, European Development Funds (EDF) which were channeled through the European Investment Bank (EIB) assisted Zimbabwe from 1980-1990 in three major ways. First, EU aid was used to support the Government’s development programmes (TNDP 1983-1985 and FYDP 1986-1990). These aid programmes covered a wide range of activities which included, “rural health promotion including immunization and family planning programmes, rural and community development projects, rural water supply projects, assistance particularly financial aid for the development of low cost urban housing.”<sup>61</sup> Secondly, it was used for infrastructural development. “It involved the following areas of development, assistance for wagon refurbishment for the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), rural road building and rural electrification, construction of the Osborne Dam near Mutare, rural water supply schemes,

---

<sup>59</sup> Chimombe, T, “Foreign Capital”, in Mandaza, Ibbo, (ed), Zimbabwe; The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986, Codesria Book Series, Senegal, 1986, p 139.

<sup>60</sup> *The Courier*, Op cit, p 13.

<sup>61</sup> Eurostat, “Report on Zimbabwe 1990”, Federal Statistical Office of the European Community, Luxemborg, 1990, p170.



rebuilding the coke ovens at ZISCO, funding the construction of the power station at Hwange and other infrastructural needs.”<sup>62</sup> Lastly EU aid was used for technical cooperation assistance. This assistance was in the education, health and agricultural sectors. (More will be discussed in chapter 4).The types of technical assistance varied from donor to donor.

The EU’s relations with Zimbabwe from 1980 up to 1990 can thus be analyzed as follows; firstly, despite Zimbabwe’s call for the establishment of a socialist society in line with Marxist-Leninist ideology, in the early years of independence (1980-1990) the EU continued to channel aid for the development of the newly independent African state. First and foremost, Zimbabwe gained its independence at the height of the bipolar system and the Cold War period which was marked by hostility between the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the USA and its European allies. EC member countries had been tasked by the USA for ‘security burden sharing’ and so they had no option but to assist Zimbabwe simply as a way of impressing and winning it to their ideological side. The greatest threat to Western interests in Africa in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the spread of communism and it had to be contained.

Secondly, aid was given by the EU as a way of consolidating ties with the former colonized countries .At independence, Britain emerged as one of the largest bilateral donors to Zimbabwe. Thirdly, all politics is a continuous struggle for power and scarce resources. Zimbabwe with its geo-strategic mineral resources, would serve well EU interests centered on the exploitation of its raw materials to benefit Western countries. Lastly the EC gave aid to Zimbabwe on simple humanitarian grounds. After independence there was need for the reconstruction of the economy in all sectors especially infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools and dips tanks which had suffered damage or neglect during the war. This was particularly necessary in the rural areas where Zimbabwe’s liberation war was keenly fought.

### **EU-ZIMBABWE RELATIONS 1991-2000**

The 1990s witnessed the collapse of the bipolar power arrangement, ushering in the unipolar system where America unilaterally (and at times bilaterally with its Western allies) became the dominant superpower in the international system. Francis Fukuyama, referred to in Chapter 1, described this era as the ‘End of History’. Literally he meant that the dissolution of the Soviet

---

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p179.

Union in 1991 and the subsequent roll-back of communism around the globe were a clear testimony to the fact that the USA and its allies had won the Cold War. Capitalism had triumphed over communism in the international system and this therefore meant that developing countries had to democratize in order to pave way for genuine development.

Eastern and Western historians and political scientists alike have blamed the former USSR head of state Mikhail Gorbachev for what they term ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century,’ which was the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev came up with his reform programmes of perestroika (restructuring of the economy) and glasnost (openness in the political, social and economic fields). Celestine Bohlen concluded that, “Gorbachev’s political reforms ended up as a mortal threat not only to the continued leadership role of the Communist Party but also to the continued existence of the Soviet Union itself as a superpower.”<sup>63</sup> The political transformations mainly initiated by Gorbachev that occurred in the Soviet Union and in Eastern and Central Europe beginning in 1989 effectively brought to an end the Cold War and the ideological confrontation that had inspired and sustained foreign aid since the 1950s. Foreign aid changed to reflect new realities of global international relations. This new unipolar set up, gave more economic might and political leverage to the USA and its Western allies.

From the 1990s onwards the West undertook a strategy to put itself front and centre on the stage of international relations. The disappearance of the communist threat signaled not only a radical shift in the global power configuration in favor of the Western alliance (USA and EU) but also triggered off democratization demands by the West, on developing countries. From the 1990s onwards the EU could now afford to attach explicit political and institutional conditionalities to its aid without fear of losing most Third World countries to communism. Foreign assistance as an instrument of state craft was now being applied by the EU on Zimbabwe and other LDCs to induce compliance and to show progress towards democracy, human rights, protection of the environment, population control and many other areas. According to Severine Rugumamu, “the EU in 1991 endorsed a common approach aimed at promoting human rights and democracy in developing countries, including not only positive measures but also the possibility of deferring or

---

<sup>63</sup> Bohlen, C, “The Key to Understanding Russia”, The Philadelphia Trumpet, April 2003, p 22-23.

suspending aid in cases of grave violation of human rights.”<sup>64</sup> It is also in the 1990s that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) came up with Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) for LDCs. The IMF and WB assumed the role of policy management for these countries. Zimbabwe and other LDCs could only get EU aid if they complied with IMF and WB policies. It should also be noted that the EU disbursed a lot of funds to the Breton Woods institutions (multilateral aid) to help finance the structural adjustment programmes. Such funds were channeled through the EUs’ Structural Adjustment Support Programmes.

In the case of the IMF/WB loans, new credits could be provided only after a borrower government had signed a letter of intent with the institutions, undertaking to comply with specific borrowing conditions. Leonard Demery points out the specific policy conditions popularly associated with the IMF and WB lending which included: “(a) trade liberalization: abolition of foreign exchange controls and import restrictions (b) devaluation of exchange rate--- (c) monetary anti- inflationary measures (d) fiscal anti-inflationary programmes (e) anti-inflationary control of wage increases (f) open door policy on foreign investment and privatization and or sale of public enterprises.”<sup>65</sup> It should be pointed out that these conditions were uniformly applied to all countries, Zimbabwe included, regardless of the nature and specific circumstances of payment difficulties. It can therefore be argued that these policy prescriptions reflected the broad political and economic ideology of the powerful actors in the WB and IMF (USA, EU and others) rather than the long term development interests of recipient states like Zimbabwe. The primary concern therefore was no longer to achieve equity and alleviate poverty as evidenced in the 1980s, but to institute forms of Western democracy.

From the 1990s onwards the EU now arrogated to itself the right to design development policies and to ensure closer and stricter implementation conditions. The EU- Zimbabwe relations from 1991 to 2000 can therefore be best analyzed as follows: The more aid Zimbabwe received from the EU, the faster its socialist goals were eroded. Firstly, probably because Zimbabwe was afraid of embarrassing its foreign benefactors or simply afraid of forfeiting future EU aid

---

<sup>64</sup> Rugumamu, s, Lethal Aid: The Illusion of Socialism of Socialism and Self Reliance in Tanzania, Africa World Press, Eritrea, 1997, p 87.

<sup>65</sup> Demery, L, “Structural Adjustments: Its origins, Rationale and Achievements”, in Cornia, G and Helleiner G, (eds), From Adjustment to Development in Africa: Conflict, Controversy, Convergence, Consensus?, p 25-27.

allocations it tended to accept costly and inappropriate aid. This was so even when it was well aware that specific projects had low strategic importance in the national plans. Thus the inability of the Zimbabwean government to control and regulate the activities of EU aid steadily eroded its capacity to manage the economy, as will be discussed and analyzed in Chapter 4.

Secondly, aid flows in the 1990s became closely tied to stabilization and structural adjustment policy changes and to other socio-political concerns. In other words, EU foreign assistance was made to reflect progress towards market liberalization and democratic reforms, which would serve Western interests quite well. These conditionalities marked a new form of colonialism which Nkwame Nkrumah, as noted in chapter 1 clearly described as ‘neo-colonialism’, whereby a country has all the trappings of independence, yet its economy is controlled from abroad. This new aid perspective based on Western democratic principles, largely explains why the rate of aid flows to the Zimbabwean economy were not as impressive after the 1990s as they had been in the 1980s. “European donors were now demanding market oriented economic policy reforms, political liberalization, human rights, good governance, population control, environmental protection and much more.”<sup>66</sup>

Lastly, the capacity of the EU in the 1990s to impose restrictive conditions on Zimbabwe like sourcing of machinery, equipment, spare parts and technical assistance personnel was a clear exercise of power. As was pointed out in chapter 1, “power is the ability to subject others to one’s control or to limit their choices.” Kennedy Griffin clearly points out that aid in the 1990s, “followed not necessarily where it was most needed but where the dictates of national self-interest suggest it would be most productive.”<sup>67</sup> Thus the 1990s showed a big shift in the EU’s foreign aid objectives to Zimbabwe, from economic development, poverty alleviation and infrastructural development in the 1980s to serving various EU political and economic interests in the 1990s. The EU therefore designed policies which specified that in their aid allocations the EU also took their own national interests into account. These interests included maintenance of spheres of influence, political or military alliances and promotion of EU’s investments and exports.

---

<sup>66</sup> Rugumamu, S, Op cit, p 96.

<sup>67</sup> Griffin, K, “Foreign Aid After the Cold war”, Development and Change, 22(4), 1991, p645-647.

In the final analysis, it can be argued that the Zimbabwean government found itself increasingly having to follow the broad guidelines of EU donors. This was so even when those directly responsible for Zimbabwe's economic policies wanted to think that those policies were home-grown, independent of external influence.

### **EU-ZIMBABWE RELATIONS 2001 – 2008**

Following Independence, Zimbabwe acceded to the Second Lome Convention, with effect from November 1980 and was a signatory of the Third Lome Convention from its outset in 1985. Together with other ACP countries, Zimbabwe was also a signatory of the successor Lome IV Convention. The Lome Conventions from 1975 to 2000 were essentially economic agreements between the EU and its ACP partners. These agreements were considered to be measures conducive to development in the ACP countries. "The first Lome Convention which led to the relationship between the EC and the ACP states in 1975 was based on the concept of a partnership between equals."<sup>68</sup> This posture was also a product of the Cold War when most ACP countries were non-aligned and several pursued policies oriented to those of the soviet bloc and were thus courted by the EC and other Western powers.

Originally the ACP-EU partnership focused mainly on economic cooperation. Neither the EEC nor the ACP countries were ready to extend their cooperation to political issues. However, the initiative to do so was taken by the EC in 1985 when it sought to introduce a human rights clause in the Lome III Convention. This move was however deemed by the ACP states to be in contradiction to the principles of sovereignty and equal partnership.

The introduction of a link between development and human rights, respect for democratic principles and the rule of law was a major feature of the Lome IV Convention (Article 5).<sup>69</sup> Signed in 2000 and expected to last up to 2020, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) was underpinned by a set of jointly agreed upon core values or essential elements. These covered the respect for human rights and democratic principles whose violation could lead to the suspension of the partnership. In the CPA review of 2005, good governance was defined as "the transparent and responsible management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the

---

<sup>68</sup> Commission of The European Community, *Lome III: Analysis of the EEC-ACP Convention*, Op cit, p 2.

<sup>69</sup> Laporte, G, *Reflections on the future of ACP-EU relations*, Policy Management Report 13, Maastricht, 2007, p XII-XIII.

purposes of equitable and sustainable development”.<sup>70</sup> This was deemed to be a fundamental element in the EU-ACP relationships as from 2000 onwards.

It can thus be noted that from 2001 onwards power politics became one of the pillars of the EU-ACP partnership .Political dialogue, previously confined largely to issues of political conditionalities with ACP governments was now being used as a tool to manage the partnership. It was also used to assess and to review the implementation of EU programmes based on the progress in individual countries on human rights and the rule of law. Rather than responding to the special needs of the ACP countries in general and Zimbabwe in particular, the EU from 2000 onwards responded to its own economic and political needs. It capitalized on the economic poverty and political weaknesses of the ACP countries in advancing its own national interest objectives.

Since 2002 the EU-Zimbabwe relationships have deteriorated. Major disagreements over essential elements of the CPA, the land reform programme and difficulties surrounding the deployment of the 2002 EU election observer mission, led to current restrictions of the cooperation.(more will be discussed in chapter 4). In February 2002, the European Council adopted a decision partially suspending cooperation assistance under the European Development Fund (EDF).As will be discussed in chapter 4, the EU adopted a common position on restrictive measures such as the prohibition of arms supply to Zimbabwe as well as imposing targeted sanctions, a travel ban and the freezing of assets against a number of ZANU PF officials and their business partners.<sup>71</sup>

A brief analysis of the EU-Zimbabwe relations from 1980 to 2008 will be as follows: In the 1980s the EU was involved in development related projects such as poverty alleviation and infrastructure development. Beginning from 2000 onwards the role of EU aid in economic restructuring became so pervasive as to give the impression of recolonisation. Under the Lome Conventions assistance had been given to ACP countries and Zimbabwe in particular mostly on the basis of equality but from 2001 onwards, aid was based on EU dictates and progress shown on human rights, rule of law and democratic principles.

---

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, p8.

<sup>71</sup> “Zimbabwe leadership slapped with sanctions” New York Times, March 10, 2002, p 16-17.

EU aid to Zimbabwe, like most other aspects of international politics, was largely governed by the structural power patterns. The ensuing asymmetry of domination and dependence virtually characterized the relationship between Zimbabwe and the EU from 2000 onwards. Aid provided the EU with the opportunity to intervene and influence the socio-political and economic life of the Zimbabwean state. Through project support the EU was able to control indirectly the direction and pattern of Zimbabwe's development process via country development programmes. Ultimately they were able to pursue their least publicized commercial and security policy goals.

The 2000 to 2008 EU agenda was mainly based on regime change as evidenced by its support of opposition political parties and civil society groups which were very much opposed to the ruling ZANU PF party. AS will be discussed in chapter 3, the EU overtly and covertly provided financial support to various civil society groups so as to bring about a change of government.

## **CONCLUSION**

A closer look at EU's aid in Zimbabwe from 1980 up to 2008 has provided insights into the nature and character of the international aid process. Most of the time, the EU not only fashioned the structure of the aid relationship but also determined what interests were to be served and the modalities for achieving them. On the other hand, Zimbabwe's high degree of need for foreign assistance translated itself into almost total surrender of national sovereignty. It can be noted that from 1980 up to 2008, Zimbabwe's excessive dependence on foreign aid gradually eroded the capacity of the state to design and implement policies and strategies that would have enhanced socialism and promote economic growth. In the absence of credible policies and effective institutions, the EU increasingly usurped the role of policy management. Chapter 4 will look at EU aid programmes in Zimbabwe and the benefits and dangers of overdependence on foreign assistance will also be analyzed.

## **CHAPTER 4: EU AID PROGRAMMES IN ZIMBABWE: AN ANALYSIS OF EU-ZIMBABWE COOPERATION FROM 1980 TO 2008.**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The EU and Zimbabwe have enjoyed fruitful cooperation since 1981. However, the relationship profoundly deteriorated since 2002. Major disagreements over essential elements of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, and difficulties surrounding the deployment of the 2002 election observation mission, led to restrictions on the cooperation. In February 2002, the European Council adopted a decision partially suspending cooperation assistance to the Zimbabwean government under the European Development Fund (EDF).

Excessive dependence of the Zimbabwean state on the EU official assistance severely compromised Zimbabwe's national sovereignty and eroded her economic development. The more Zimbabwe depended on EU aid, the more it exposed itself to manipulation, control and even exploitation. This chapter analyses EU aid programmes in Zimbabwe. The withdrawal of EU assistance to the agricultural, health and education sectors will be examined. An in-depth assessment of the impact of sanctions on the Zimbabwean economy will be carried out. The look East policy is also analyzed. The collected data is shown using tables, graphs and pie charts. There is discussion and interpretation of the findings as a way of analyzing.

### **FOOD SECTOR**


In contrast with most countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Zimbabwe had an efficient agricultural system. It was one of the few countries on the African continent which was self-sufficient in food production. The country was capable of maintaining food supplies to its population without having to make recourse to substantial imports even in most drought years. Over time, Zimbabwe became one of the few countries in Africa to be a net exporter of cereal foodstuffs during the 1980s and 1990s.

The growing importance of Zimbabwe as a regional food supplier was apparent from the fact that considerable quantities of maize were transferred to neighboring countries as a part of triangular transactions. In July 1985, the European Community purchased from Zimbabwe 25,000t of maize at a value of US \$4,5 million in order to provide food aid to Mozambique (10,000t) and Zambia



(15 000t)<sup>72</sup>. In December 1985, the United Kingdom purchased 14,500t of maize which was then distributed in the drought-affected provinces of Mozambique .At the beginning of 1986, Australia and Zimbabwe concluded a contract whereby Australia would purchase 30,000t of maize to be used as food aid to various African countries.<sup>73</sup>In March 1986, South Africa imported 30,000t of maize from its neighbor Zimbabwe at a price some 33% higher than the level on the world market at that time. In 1988, Zimbabwe sold 95,000t of maize to the World Food Programme (WFP) and to other donors.<sup>74</sup>

In the 1980s and 1990s, Zimbabwe became the bread basket of the Southern African region. It was given the food security portfolio in the SADCC region owing to its ability to export surplus grain to its neighbors. The fast-track land reform programme, started by the Zimbabwean government in July 2000, which was geared at levelling out unfair advantages which the colonial era conferred on the minority white group led to the freezing of official development assistance in the agricultural sector. Since 2000, Zimbabwe's food production has declined Figure 1 below illustrates this point.



**Figure 1**

<sup>72</sup> European Communities, Report Zimbabwe 1990, Federal Statistical Office, Luxemborg, 1990, p55

<sup>73</sup> ibid

<sup>74</sup> ibid

Figure 1 illustrates the high fluctuations in maize production levels from 1981 to 2006. Following land resettlement programmes and the distribution of farming equipment to rural and newly settled farmers, there was a marked increase in maize production in 1981 and in 1986. The EU assisted most of these resettled and communal farmers with fertilizer, seed, draughtpower, farming implements and irrigation equipment (in areas with dams or perennial rivers and streams). In 1991, maize production decreased to 1,4 million tonnes as a result of the 1991-1992 drought. As a result of improved weather conditions and donor support, maize production rose significantly in 1996 and with 2,6 million tonnes, it recovered almost to the level of 1981 and 1986. The seizure of farms in 2000 reduced agricultural output by almost 60%. From 2,7 million tonnes in 1981 to only 600 000 tonnes in 2006. The Zimbabwean government's policy of land seizures and tolerance for chaotic disruptions on white commercial farms led to the collapse of Zimbabwe's agricultural output. The farm invasions had a negative impact on the Southern African countries food security. What used to be the 'bread basket' of the Southern African region had turned into a 'basket case'. EU donors responded to these farm invasions by withdrawing their agricultural programmes or by simply freezing their development assistance programmes. With the dramatic withdrawal by the West of funding of agricultural activities in post land reform Zimbabwe, agricultural production went down, as shown in figure 1.

George Charamba attributes the decline in food production from 2001 onwards to the massive sabotage in the agricultural sector by embittered white farmers as they either left their farms or the country altogether. "This massive sabotage included the breaching of big dams in a country susceptible to droughts, digging up and damaging of underground irrigation schemes and massive smuggling of sophisticated agricultural equipment into neighbouring countries."<sup>75</sup> Chinondidyachii Mararike also concurs with Charamba when he argues that, "the decline in Zimbabwe's agriculture is because of an unprecedented cycle of repeated droughts and climatic disorders which appear to have hit the whole Southern African region."<sup>76</sup> The European Union 2006 Annual Report, also admits that, "the 2006/2007 agricultural season had been affected by scattered rains and dry spells in some parts of the country."<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> George Charamba, "Sinning or sinned against", *New African*, August/September, 2007, No 465, pp 148-152.

<sup>76</sup> Chinondidyachii Mararike "Zimbabwe's' Agricultural Onslaught: The True Story", *The Sunday Mail* July 8-14, 2007, p7.

<sup>77</sup> European Commission-Zimbabwe, *Joint Annual Report 2006*; EC- Zimbabwe, p14.

After the farm invasions of 2000, and the withdrawal of EU official assistance in 2002, the Zimbabwean government has been working to rebuild and re-equip commercial agriculture from 'ground zero'. The massive reinvestment in agriculture by way of dam construction, draught power and agricultural inputs is still far from yielding tangible results. Zimbabwe still needs EU support if its land reform programme is to bear fruit.

## **HEALTH SECTOR**

On achieving independence in 1980 the new government realized that health care was not adequately and equitably distributed to all sections of society. The structure of health care was biased in favour of certain groups such as Europeans who were in control of the health services. Samuel Agere, observes that, "based on this understanding of the nature of the problem with health services, the Ministry of Health adopted a policy of 'Equity in Health' which indicated a radical departure from the previous system."<sup>78</sup> The Ministry decided to shift resources from urban to rural and from curative services to preventive services.

The government's national health programme was in line with the World Health Organisation's (WHO) "Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000." In the interests of an improved public health services, the government implemented a series of special programmes which followed the policies announced in its "Primary Health Care" strategy. "These included an extension of the vaccination campaign against the six main killer diseases affecting infants; the diarrheal disease control programme; children's supplementary feeding programme; national village health worker programme and provision of free health care to the low income groups' programme."<sup>79</sup> The EU was the most important donor to the health sector in Zimbabwe, contributing millions of euros to fund the above health related programmes. Ever since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the EU has provided the bulk of the country's essential drugs including Anti-Retrovirals and other medical requirements.

Following the deterioration of relations between the EU and the Zimbabwe government in 2002, the health sector has suffered a lot of set backs. Brain drain of qualified health personnel has impacted negatively on the health sector. Through bilateral agreements, doctors, pharmacists,

---

<sup>78</sup> Samuel Takurinda Agere, "Progress and Problems in the Health Care Delivery System," in Mandaza Ibbo (ed) Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition: 1980-1986, CODESRIA, Dakar, 1986, pp 363-364.

<sup>79</sup> European Communities, Report Zimbabwe 1990, op cit, pp 39-40.

dentists and medical equipment engineers were recruited from Cuba and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to fill the gap created by those who had left the country. However less experienced health workers have occupied the majority of decision-making positions in the health sector since 2003. Table 1 below shows the critical human resource vacancy status in the health sector as of October 31 2003.

<b>Table 1: Health Personnel Vacant Posts for 2003</b>				
Title	Establishment	In Post	Vacancy	In Post Rate
Doctors	1530	695	835	45%
Pharmacists	132	12	120	9%
Pharmacy Technicians	155	68	115	36,75%
Nurses	11 576	6 780	4 796	55,56%
Radiographers	159	77	82	48,42%
Hospital Equipment Techs	95	39	56	41%
Laboratory Scientists	385	249	39	64,67%
(Source: World Development Indicators: 2003 – 2006)				

In Table 1 the vacancy rate for doctors and nurses increased from 31% and 24% in 1999 to 55% and 45% respectively in 2003. From 2002 onwards, “following the partial withdrawal of EU official aid to the health sector, there was recorded a depletion of essential drugs in 73% of Zimbabwe’s health facilities.”<sup>80</sup> WHO concluded that one million people in the country during 2003 and 2004 lacked basic health care. From 2003 to 2008, inadequate resources in the form of

<sup>80</sup> Peter Richardson, “Zimbabwes’ Health Dilemma”, Sunday Times, August 19, 2007, p13.

drugs supplies and human resources hampered the health delivery to the population. The health sector suffered from little access to foreign currency for procurement of drugs and other supplies. The number of vacancies in the health sector (as shown in table 1) increased as the continuous high attrition rate of trained staff from the sector to outside the country rose. Furthermore, strikes by doctors and nurses during 2003-2008 period pleading for better salaries greatly affected the health delivery systems.

The deteriorating socio-economic situation eroded the conditions of the health professionals, whose salaries failed to keep up with inflation during 2007-2008 period. “The bulk of the workforce in the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare earned net salaries well below those of their SADC counterparts.”<sup>81</sup> Three quarters of the equipment in hospitals around the country was not functional and this had serious repercussions on the ordinary people.

Zimbabwe’s health system has deteriorated markedly since 2000 and consequently the health status of the population has also suffered. This decline has accelerated over the last eight years during the 2000-2008 period with both availability of services and access to them being affected. On the backdrop of an already overburdened health delivery system, many Zimbabweans have found it difficult to access affordable health facilities and essential drugs. The only way Zimbabwe’s health sector can be revived is through strengthening relations with the EU, which has since Zimbabwe’s independence been the largest donor in this sector.

## **EDUCATION SECTOR**

The majority of Zimbabwe’s young people were poorly served by the education system until independence in 1980. “Whereas virtually all of the white minority had access to educational institutions, the vast majority of the black population had no access to secondary and higher education and tens of thousands never even started school.”<sup>82</sup> After independence in 1980, the new nation made changes in the education system to reflect political changes and the new


---

<sup>81</sup> EC-Zimbabwe, Joint Annual Report, 2008, p10.

<sup>82</sup> European Communities, Report Zimbabwe 1990, opcit, pp43-44.

circumstances .Rungano Zvobgo postulates that, “education become a vehicle for social change. Racial education was replaced by unitary multiracial education.”<sup>83</sup>

In the 1980s there was stunning evidence of the rapid expansion in the secondary and primary education. The EU played a major role in ensuring increased education and improved infrastructure. The rationale behind this was the realization of the role education played in development. Rural schools immensely benefitted from EU grants through the building of teachers’ houses, classrooms and the provision of textbooks. In the 1980s and 1990s,the Zimbabwe government encouraged private organizations to construct schools so as to ensure accessibility to children of all races and classes and also to improve physical infrastructure. Figure 2 below illustrates this point.



**Figure 2**

**(Source: Zimbabwe Ministry of Education: ODA Statistics: 2008)**

From the above estimates it can be noted that in the 1980s EU’s official assistance to Zimbabwe’s education sector was very high. This aid was used to support the government’s Transitional National Development Plan (1983-1985) and the Five Year National Development Plan (1986-

<sup>83</sup> Rungano J Zvobgo, “Education and the Challenge of Independence”, in Mandaza Ibbo (ed) Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition: 1980-1986, CODESRIA, Dakar’ 1986, p334.

1990).”The EU’s aid programmes involved construction of teachers’ houses; provision of wells and boreholes at rural schools; training of teachers; construction of classrooms, laboratories and libraries; capacity building and supply of special education needs.”<sup>84</sup> EU aid inflows were also high in the 1980s owing to the Soviet communist threat to Western democracies. The EU used aid to court the newly independent African countries to its ideological side. Ignatius Chombo points out that, “between 1980 and 1984, 1000 schools were built. Between 1984 and 1988, 310 schools were built and only 42 schools were built between 1992 and 1994.”<sup>85</sup>

After the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1990s, the EU demanded that pupils pay ‘user fees’ if schools were to remain viable. This new aid perspective based on Western liberal principles largely explains why the rate of aid flows to the education sector was not as impressive after the 1990s as it had been in the 1980s. From 2000 to 2005 and 2008, EU funding to the education sector had greatly decreased to 8%, 6% and 3% respectively. The EU did not fund any new programmes in the education sector from 2005 onwards. Such programmes would have greatly improved education standards in the country.

The decrease in aid from 2000 onwards had a lot to do with the deterioration of relations between the EU and Zimbabwe. This also resulted in low morale among teachers due to low salaries and poor conditions of service. As a result teachers flocked mostly to neighboring countries such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. The European Commission reported that in 2006 about 4500 Zimbabwe teachers quit their jobs.<sup>86</sup> This greatly affected the quality of education in Zimbabwe.

The overall education system in Zimbabwe continues to decline. Infrastructure is deteriorating. Zimbabwe needs to re-engage the EU if its education sector is to be saved from total collapse.

### **CIVIL SOCIETY, HUMAN RIGHTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND RULE OF LAW**

The Cotonou Agreement of June 2000 unlike the previous Lome Conventions, has a significant innovation that emphasizes the participatory approach. It removes the monopoly of the state by

---

<sup>84</sup> Ibid 338.

<sup>85</sup> Ignatius Chombo, “The Human Factor and Education Content in Zimbabwe” in Vimbai G Chivaura and Claude C .Mararike (eds) The Human Factor Approach to Development in Africa , University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 1998, p48.

<sup>86</sup> European Commission, Joint Annual Report, 2006 p73.

integrating non-state sectors of the civil society and private sector. This Agreement provides for a mechanization of constant and sustained dialogue and information exchange with a variety of non-state actors. It facilitates these groups' involvement in the implementation of development cooperation. The Agreement also ensures direct access to financial resources for these non-state actors.

The EU provides support to civil society in Zimbabwe, essentially through thematic budget line funds. Larry Diamond et al, maintain that, "civil society will eventually stabilize the state because citizens will have a deeper stake in social order. Furthermore, although civil society may multiply the demands of the state, it may also multiply the capacity of groups to improve their own welfare."<sup>87</sup> The diversity of civil society will ensure that the state is not held captive by a few groups. These groups are also a reservoir of political, economic, cultural and moral resources to check the power of the state.

The European Union supports the efforts of civil society to create and defend democratic space. EU's goal is to work with and through partner organizations to strengthen the institutions of democracy. EU funding is thus directed to groups such as, The Christian Alliance (CA), National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe (CCZ), Woman/Men of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA/MOZA), Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), Zimbabwe Doctors for Human Rights (ZDHR), Media Alliance (MA) and many NGOs dealing with political issues, human rights and rule of law.<sup>88</sup>

The EU funds international and local NGO programmes that promote a wide variety of causes, including social welfare, democratic processes, human rights, peace building, women's and youth empowerment and public advocacy. More specifically, "the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is aimed at promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and conflict prevention."<sup>89</sup> It provides financial support to civilian organizations and NGOs for activities promoting these goals in Zimbabwe.

---

<sup>87</sup> Diamond L, Lipset SM and Juan, L (eds) Democracy in Developing Countries Vol 2, Boulder, London, 1988 pp83-90.

<sup>88</sup> George Charamba, "The Democracy Façade of Politics of Regime Change", New African, summer 2007, pp26-36.

<sup>89</sup> Herbert Simon, "Democratic initiatives in Sudan and Zimbabwe," The Sunday Times, November 4, 2007, p10.



European donors, through various NGOs mentioned above have continued to work in Zimbabwe but have changed their areas of focus and the modus operandi. Herbert Simon points out that, “concentration of donor funding is now on humanitarian aid, social sectors, democratization, respect for human rights and the rule of law.”<sup>90</sup> One can argue that humanitarian assistance is, short term and does not contribute to long term economic development. Governance, human rights and the rule of law are central issues of concern to the EU in its relations with Zimbabwe. Cooperation between the two can only resume if the Zimbabwean government shows a commitment to the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement. The EU sees the governance profile as a potential solid basis for possible dialogue with the Zimbabwean government. However the Zimbabwean government does not share the EU’s position that the country has serious governance, human rights and rule of law deficits to warrant any dialogue with the EU over these issues.

The government of Zimbabwe states that the conditions on which ‘restrictive measures’ were devised were unilaterally and arbitrarily defined and imposed by the EU.<sup>91</sup> The Zimbabwean leadership maintains that any dialogue between themselves and the EU has to be conceived as a dialogue between equal partners (as stated in the Lome 1 Convention) and that no party should dictate to the other on the elements or coverage of the dialogue process. The possibility for fully re-established official EU assistance and cooperation between the EU and Zimbabwe remains a reality. All that is needed is for the Zimbabwean government to show a commitment towards the essential clauses of the Cotonou Agreement.

### **ECONOMIC WAR: EU SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE**

Sanctions have played an important role in foreign policy since time immemorial as an alternative to diplomatic persuasion, covert action, political coercion and military force. Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf expose the following undesirable effects of sanctions on vulnerable groups of the targeted society. These are, “High death toll due to inadequate health facilities; high incidents of school dropouts; high unemployment as factories close; low volumes of international trade; and acute shortage of basic commodities leading to high prices, malnourishment and deaths.”<sup>92</sup> Kofi Annan, the former United Nations Secretary General, also highlighted that “sanctions remain a

---

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> European Commission, Joint Annual Report, 2008 pp14-17.

<sup>92</sup> Kegley C. W, and Wittkopf R. E, “World Politics :Trend and Transformation (Ninth Edition)”, Wadsworth, Belmont’ 2004 pp 522-530.

blunt instrument which hurt large numbers of people who are not their primary targets.”<sup>93</sup> The EU’s ‘targeted sanctions’ and ‘travel bans’, have failed to coerce the Zimbabwean leadership into submission, but they have actually hurt ordinary Zimbabweans. When ‘targeted’ sanctions are directed against political leaders and government officials of a particular country, it is usually the vulnerable groups of society who suffer more than the targeted group. Sanctions are meant to coerce target governments or individuals into a particular course of response or individuals into a particular course of response or behavior. They could be declared or undeclared. William Finnegan points out that, “declared sanctions are officially pronounced and normally legislated by the imposing country or organization.”<sup>94</sup> EU’s targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe fall under this category.

Sanctions negatively affect the image of the targeted country through negative perceptions by the international community. Zimbabwean companies are therefore finding it extremely difficult to access lines of credit because of the perceived country risk. As a result, “Zimbabwean companies have had to pay cash for imports or secure offshore funds at prohibitive interest rates.”<sup>95</sup> This has had ripple effects on the country’s employment levels. These negative perceptions have also made it difficult for private and public enterprises to secure funding as donor funding agencies are no longer willing to support projects in Zimbabwe. The negative perception associated with sanctions has also adversely impacted on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 1998, “FDI inflows into Zimbabwe amounted to US\$444.3m, but by 2006, it had declined to a paltry US\$40m.”<sup>96</sup> In addition, British and other Western companies have been strongly discouraged by their home countries from investing in Zimbabwe. This has adversely affected investment levels into the country, thus accentuating the foreign exchange shortages leading to further shortages of imported raw materials.

The withdrawal of the multilateral financial institutions from providing balance of payments support to Zimbabwe led to other bilateral creditors and donors also scaling down or suspending disbursements on existing loans for both government and parastatal loans. The current socio-economic environment coupled with sanctions led several NGOs and European donor agencies to

---

<sup>93</sup> Baffour Ahkomah, Sanctions, which Sanctions,” New African, summer 2007, p81.

<sup>94</sup> Finnegan, William, “Economic Sanctions,” The New Yorker, April 18, 2002, pp43-53.

<sup>95</sup> Tom Mbakwe,” The World Bank and others,” New African, August\September, 2007, No465 p94.

<sup>96</sup> Sidik Kromah, “Look East My Son,” New African, March 2007, No 460, p75-77.

relocate their offices from Zimbabwe to neighbouring countries.”The Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) pulled out of Zimbabwe in 2001 and 2003, respectively, terminating all projects in progress and retrenching their employees.”<sup>97</sup> Another major effect of the ‘targeted sanctions’ has been the shortage of foreign currency. This has resulted in the country accumulating external payment arrears. Gideon Gono, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe observes that, “a combination of current account deficits and reduced capital inflows, resulted in excessive pressure on foreign exchange reserves which as a result, declined from US \$830m in 1996 to less than one month import cover in 2006.”<sup>98</sup> The foreign exchange shortages adversely affected the country’s capacity to meet its foreign payment obligations and finance critical imports such as drugs, grain, raw materials, oil and electricity.

Zimbabwe used to have a transport sector support programme, started in April 2000 and funded by DANIDA. It was established to support the transport sector with a value of US\$48 million. “The programme was aimed at rehabilitation and maintenance of the Harare – Nyamapanda and Kwekwe – Lupane roads; institutional support to the road sectors; and labour- based rural rehabilitation and maintenance of roads.”<sup>99</sup> The Danish government suspended cooperation with Zimbabwe in 2001 and the programme was never completed. Had this programme been completed, it could have created employment opportunities and enhanced trade through efficient movement of commodities within the country and the region.

The EU’s ‘targeted sanctions’ have also greatly affected the standard of living of the general population. The deteriorating economic conditions have led to large scale emigration, especially of skilled labour, thus further straining the economy. The protracted foreign currency shortages that the country has faced since 2000 have crippled the operations of industry, which heavily rely on imported inputs for its daily operations. Declines in the key sectors of the economy have resulted in high unemployment, an inefficient health delivery system, deteriorating education standards, reduction in FDI and the drying up of balance of payments support. All in all, the EU sanctions have greatly retarded the economic development of Zimbabwe.

---

<sup>97</sup> Tafataona Mahoso, “Sanctions are hurting Zimbabwe,” The Sunday Mail September 9-15, 2007, p8.

<sup>98</sup> Gideon Gono, “Sanctions are more deadly than Warfare,” New African, Summer 2007, pp86-91.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid p90.

## **EU CONDITIONALITIES ON ZIMBABWE.**

The main framework of the relationship between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa is the Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000 by 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. “The most salient aspect of the Cotonou Agreement is the retention of the essential elements clause and the addition of good governance with a special focus on the fight against corruption as a fundamental element. Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are essential elements of the Partnership Agreement whose serious violation leads to the imposition of sanctions on the violating ACP state.”<sup>100</sup> Sharda Naidoo writes that “As part of this framework, the European council set aside approximately 22,7 billion Euros for cooperation with ACP countries for 2008 to 2013.”<sup>101</sup>

Zimbabwe signed the revised text of the Cotonou Agreement in December 2005. Re-establishment of cooperation between the EU and Zimbabwe is only possible if the Zimbabwe government adheres to democratic principles set out by the EU and its Western allies. EU aid and financing for Zimbabwe is dependent upon the Zimbabwe government embracing good governance, the restoration of the rule of law, the conduct of free and fair elections, a free media and the respect for human rights.

Good governance entails that the Zimbabwean government becomes accountable, transparent, responsive to the people’s needs, is effective and efficient and follows the rule of law. “Collective decisions should no longer be made by a single leader, political party or a single group (cabinet). Rather policies should emerge from consultations between affected interest or civil society groups.”<sup>102</sup> Through good governance the Zimbabwean government should ensure that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision making.

The restoration of the rule of law should also include, “respect for the ownership and title to property. Freedom of speech and association should also be respected and an end to lawlessness, violence and intimidation sponsored, condoned, or tolerated by the government of Zimbabwe, the

---

<sup>100</sup> Caesar Zvayi, “Hunting with the hounds, and running with hares”, New African, August/September, 2007, No465 pp84-85.

<sup>101</sup> Sharda Naidoo, “EU hopes to cement ties with ACP countries,” Sunday Times, December 9, 2007, p7.

<sup>102</sup> Ambassador Christopher Dell, “Is it really “voodoo economics”, bringing Zimbabwe Down,” New African, August/September, 2007, No 465, pp 100-105.

ruling party and their supporters or entities should be observed.”<sup>103</sup> The police, army and intelligence organizations should be non-partisan or impartial when it comes to cases that involve ruling party officials and their supporters. The law of the land should apply uniformly to everyone.

Elections in Zimbabwe should widely be accepted as free and fair by local, regional and international monitors. “All foreign and local observers willing to observe or monitor elections should be invited.”<sup>104</sup> The Zimbabwean government is required to sufficiently improve the pre-election environment to a degree consistent with accepted international standards for security and freedom of movement and association. Shadrack Gutto stresses that, “democratic elections should provide a mechanism for peaceful institutionalized competition for legitimate power and authority.”<sup>105</sup> Zimbabwean elections should offer regular opportunities for people to change or renew their government and provide the peace and stability necessary for development.

The Zimbabwean government is also required to support an independent free press and electronic media. John Makumbe and D Compagnon point out that, “the role of the mass media in a country is that of informing the people as fully and as impartially as possible on various issues.”<sup>106</sup> The EU therefore demands that the Zimbabwean government removes monopoly on access to the electronic and print media. Pronounced partisanship in the public media should be done away with. A free and vigorous press always plays a key democratic role in supplying the people with information on various economic, social, cultural and political issues for citizens to make informed choices.

Human rights are also part of the agenda of the Cotonou Agreement. The EU wants the Zimbabwean government to have respect for human rights and individual freedoms. This entails the repealing of legislation such as Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) which have been deemed by the EU to be draconian and repressive to individual rights and freedoms. The EU therefore remains ready to cooperate with the Zimbabwean government provided the Zimbabwean leadership is prepared to comply with the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement on good governance and democracy.

---

<sup>103</sup> Baffour Ankomah “Sanctions, which sanctions?” opicit, pp80-83.

<sup>104</sup> Sithole M, Mair S, Blocked Democracies in Africa, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Harare, 2002, pp 7-10.

<sup>105</sup> Shadrack Gutto, “Seminar on the Interdependence Between Democracy and HRs” United Nations : Office of the High Commissioner for HRs, Geneva, 25-26 November, 2002 pp 4-8.

<sup>106</sup> Makumbe J, Compagnon D, Behind the Smokescreen : The Politics of Zimbabwe’s 1995 Elections, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2000, pp15-16.

## **ZIMBABWE'S CONTINGENCY PLAN : LOOK EAST POLICY**

The withdrawal of EU aid to fund major government programmes, plans, policies and projects forced the Zimbabwean leadership to adopt the 'Look East policy'. This meant attracting Eastern countries such as China, Russia, India, Malaysia and many other Asian countries to invest and assist Zimbabwe with the much needed aid. David Baldwin maintains that, "sanctions depend a great deal on a combination of circumstances, including the target's vulnerability and dependence upon the source of sanctions whether the sanctions are applied individually or by a group of states, the availability of alternative sources of supply and markets and other factors."<sup>107</sup>

Zimbabwe shifted its focus from the EU and its Western allies and formed economic partnerships with the Eastern countries. The Eastern countries, unlike the EU have not been imposing economic and governance models on Africa. These attributes have made the Eastern countries a particularly attractive alternative to the EU.

China which has shown a great deal of interest in assisting Zimbabwe through a foreign policy which is guided by, "an adherence to the principle of non- interference in the internal affairs of the host country and also a determination not to impose conditionalities on aid."<sup>108</sup> By offering aid without preconditions China has presented Zimbabwe with an attractive alternative to Western 'tied' aid. However, critics deplore the Chinese principle of non intervention and non conditionalities as counterproductive to good governance, rule of law, human rights and democracy. These critics also believe that such a foreign policy helps to keep dictators in power whilst turning a blind eye on human rights abuses.

Whilst the neo liberal point of view on democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance can be valid, Adama Gaye observes that, "it is also important not to overlook the fact that the foreign policies of European Union member countries are also marked by a gap between claims and realities."<sup>109</sup> It can be argued that in contradiction to the liberal-humanitarian ethical foundations of foreign aid, Western countries also often pursue their own egoistic national interests which are also detrimental to Africa's development. The strategic partnership between China and Zimbabwe can be seen to be based on a 'win- win' principle rather than the winner

---

<sup>107</sup> Baldwin, D,A Economic Statecraft, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985 pp122- 130.

<sup>108</sup> Oludolapo Onujin, "Debating Zimbabwe, "New African, October, 2007, No 466, pp58-63.

<sup>109</sup> Adama Gaye, "China in Africa", New African, March 2008, No 471, pp 13-18

takes all principle of the West which leads to the dependency syndrome. (Discussed and analysed in Chapter 2).

The Chinese straight forward approach to trade and aid to African countries and Zimbabwe in particular, has proved to be an attractive alternative to European tied aid and also to that of the Paris Club of Creditors which has also been insisting on conditionalities for years. Michael Frith points out that, “many African countries are now fed up with the intrusiveness of the European Union fussing about corruption, good governance and rule of law.”<sup>110</sup> Zimbabwe embraced the ‘Look East’ policy because Chinese aid and that of other Eastern countries comes with no strings attached to it. Ken Flower contends that, “when a country is under sanctions it always looks elsewhere for alternative assistance.”<sup>111</sup> Although Europe remains Zimbabwe’s main trade and aid partner, owing to its colonial history, EU aid directed to the government has gone down whereas China’s is increasing. The ‘Look East’ policy can therefore be analyzed on the following assumptions. It was a policy implemented from a grand strategy which did not look at a single issue but an overall picture of economic, cultural, social and political needs. Kwaku Atuahene-Gima holds that, “this policy was aimed at reviving and sustaining the Zimbabwean economy which was collapsing under Western ‘targeted’ sanctions.”<sup>112</sup>

For the Zimbabwean state to survive from total collapse it had no option but to seek assistance from the East. ‘Looking East’ also meant that the EU sanctions would not be very effective unless the whole international community joined in. The Zimbabwe Government, by looking east managed to avoid complete isolation within the international system. Complete isolation would have meant a total collapse of the economy which would have led to social and political instability. In the international system the competition for scarce resources between powerful countries usually helps the target country to survive under sanctions. Zimbabwe found new friends in the East despite the fact that the relationship was highly commercially motivated. Atuahene-Gima maintains that, “sanctions will never be very effective as long as there is international sympathy for the government of the target.”<sup>113</sup> Some Middle Eastern, Latin American, African and

---

<sup>110</sup> Michael Frith, “Beijing in major bid to woo Africa,” Sunday Times, November 5, 2006, p9.

<sup>111</sup> Ken Flower, Serving Secretly : An Intelligence Chief on Record Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981, John Murray, London, 1987, pp 70-73.

<sup>112</sup> Professor Kwaku Atuahene-Gima, “China may be right in Africa,” New African, July 2008, No 475, pp 76-77.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid pp 76- 77

Eastern countries have shown a lot of sympathy to the Zimbabwe government thus defeating the whole purpose of the EU sanctions.

The policy was also a veiled threat to the EU so as to make it reconsider its position on Zimbabwe. The relationships between Zimbabwe, China and other Eastern countries made the EU realize that it was losing out to Eastern investors. According to Baldwin, “the whole essence of sanctions is that the costs of applying the sanctions to the coercer are significantly less than those suffered by the target.”<sup>114</sup> If the target has strategic resources that the coercer needs, then it will be a bigger disadvantage to the coercer than the target. Zimbabwe’s strategic mineral resources would make the EU realize that the continued stand off between it and Zimbabwe would not pay off in the end.

China’s political and economic interests are fuelling Africa’s economic leverage and this has become a major concern for the EU simply because China is encroaching upon what has traditionally been an area of interest and influence for European powers. China’s involvement in Zimbabwe means that the latter does not have to rely on one set of development partners who in the past have not shown the African continent the maturity it deserves. However, it should not be overlooked that Zimbabwe’s relationship with China also raises issues of concern especially whether its official assistance will lead to Zimbabwe’s economic development and stabilization. Zimbabwe needs to understand that China is not going to provide the panacea for its developmental challenges and the onus rests on the Zimbabwe government and other local institutions to ensure that regulatory frameworks are established to monitor good governance. The Zimbabwe government must push the development agenda with its Chinese counterparts to ensure that the relationship is translated into viable development practices which are not as exploitative as those of the

## **CONCLUSION**

Dependency theorists (in chapter 2), argued that official development assistance is characterized by an inordinate power distribution between the aid donors and the aid recipients. This asymmetrical power balance is as a result of the aggregate economic, political and organizational resources of donors and the relative weakness of recipients. Extreme aid dependence reduces a state to a condition of powerlessness. Significant progress that Zimbabwe had made in the health, education

---

<sup>114</sup> Baldwin D,A, *Economic Statecraft*, opicit,p127.



and agricultural sectors was severely affected by the partial withdrawal of EU official aid .A country that used to be the ‘bread basket’ of Southern Africa was reduced to a ‘basket case’. The health delivery system totally crumbled .Its high quality education which used to be the envy of many African countries drastically deteriorated.

The economic warfare against poor defenceless countries often results in the cancellation of life line projects, humanitarian assistance and infrastructural development support which further impoverishes the already impoverished. Therefore, it is evident from the above that sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe have adversely affected vulnerable groups and the economy in general. The achievements that Zimbabwe had scored in the development of infrastructure, health and social service delivery were severely affected by the EU’s ‘targeted’ sanctions. On the whole, EU sanctions are in a major way responsible for the decline in economic activity in Zimbabwe from 2002 onwards.

## **CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION.**

In this study, foreign aid has been defined as financial flows, technical assistance and commodities that are designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objectives. The aid is provided either as grants or subsidized and is directed at economic development as well as addressing humanitarian issues. This study does acknowledge in Chapter 3 that development assistance has been of benefit to Zimbabwe since independence. It has helped to build physical infrastructure, human and institutional capacities and deliver some level of growth in Zimbabwe. It has also been further noted that through civil society organizations, voices have been raised on the need for good governance so as to stem the tide of corruption and promote development in Zimbabwe.

However, from this study it has also been observed that foreign aid decreases national control and increases donor control over the internal economy of a recipient state. The whole issue of aid, whether for humanitarian or developmental needs, is anchored on the belief that the stronger should be free to exercise its strength without moral or legal limitations that protect the poor and weak. This study has also concluded that foreign aid can be used as a strategy for exploitation and external control of African countries. The economic inequalities among different actors in the global political economy translate into the uneven distribution of opportunities. Side by side with the social and political inequalities is the inability of the poor and weak to determine how foreign aid should be used since the aid regime is usually a monopoly of the powerful Western countries. In typical Thucydidesian fashion, “the strong do whatever they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

This study has also further shown that the push for democratization of African states is yet another renewed camouflaging tendency of the foreign aid regime used by the Western powers to create governance structures that are conducive for the exploitation and external control of African affairs. In the name of good governance and rule of law, modern democracy crystallises the capitalist social project based on private property, free enterprise and market competition. As such the establishment of Western models of government is an attempt by the Western donors to restore and consolidate what was once achieved through the strong political administration of colonialism. Below are recommendations from this study which might help remedy some of the

shortcomings of foreign aid thus enhancing rather than diminishing its importance as a global humanitarian and developmental regime.

Development assistance has tended to supplant local capacity, undermine local knowledge and institutions and render recipient countries more vulnerable and dependent on aid. EU's aid projects, plans and programmes should be derived from aid recipient's development priorities and should not be an expression of an attitude by these donors that they know better, they lecture and recipients listen, they know and recipient countries learn and they take care of the things because poor countries cannot. Aid that undermines a recipient's capacity and sense of ownership of policies and programmes cannot support sustainable growth. It perpetuates dependence.

Technical assistance programmes should be built on local knowledge and development priorities. This will not undermine human and institutional capacity nor does it perpetuate aid dependency and destroy peoples' motivation to take charge of their own futures. EU development assistance should be driven and guided by a recipient's development priorities and capacity building strategies. Foreign aid that does not have a clear path to sustainable capacity building and growth is of little or no value. To this, African governments should say 'NO'.

The EU should stop pushing blueprints for development written at their headquarters. They should shift from procedures to real impact. They should move away from supply-driven projects and tied aid. Sometimes these projects have had temporary successes at the micro level but have been irrelevant and thus a waste of scarce resources at the macro and sectoral levels. Governments, policies and institutions should work for Africans and Zimbabwe, in particular, and citizens should be empowered to hold their governments accountable for results. This is the essence of democracy. Capacity of parliaments and civil society organizations needs to be stepped up to promote accountability of the governments. However, improving accountability should be the job of African leaders, political institutions and social organisations rather than the EU governments. The EU should encourage African leaders to democratize rather than forcing and imposing Western democratic blueprints on African governments. This will be met with stiff resistance as analysed in the Zimbabwean case study. Democracy is a process and in each process there are likely to be positive and negative aspects. The Zimbabwean leadership should

broaden the participation of ordinary people in government processes, in part by strengthening institutions like parliament, local authorities, trade unions, the justice system and the media.

The UK under Tony Blair coaxed its allies in Europe, America, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and elsewhere, including the international financial institutions, to impose economic and other sanctions on Zimbabwe because it was alleged to have failed to comply with the Cotonou Agreement. These 'smart sanctions' have had a negative impact on ordinary Zimbabweans as analysed in Chapter 4. The targeted group has not been affected much by these sanctions. Dialogue between the EU, particularly Britain and Zimbabwe should be carried out. It is quite heartening to note that the new Inclusive Government's (IG) thrust is of reengagement and normalisation of relations with the EU. This will go a long way in bringing the much needed aid. Zimbabwe is in dire need of aid to kick start its battered economy.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

1. Anyemedu, K, Africa and Development Challenges in the New Millennium: The Nepad Debate, Unisa Press, Pretoria, 2004
2. Baldwin, D, A, Economic Statecraft, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985.
3. Blake, D, and Walters R, The Politics of Global Economic Relations, Prentice Hall, 1984.
4. Bull, H, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977.
5. Cantor R,D, Contemporary International Politics, West Publishing Company, St Paul, 1986.
6. Carr, E, H The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Papermac, London, 1981.
7. Chan, S, International Relations in Perspective: The Pursuit of Security, Welfare and Justice, Macmillan Publishers, New York, 1984.
9. Chimombe T,” Foreign Capital” in Mandaza, I (ed) Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986, Codesria Book Series, Senegal, 1986.
10. Chombo, I, “The Human Factor and Education Content in Zimbabwe” In Chivaura V.G and Mararike C.G (eds) The Human Factor Approach to Development in Africa, 1998.
11. Coulombis, T, A and Wolfe, JH, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice, Prentice Hall International, New Jersey, 1990.
12. Diamond L, Lipser S.M and Juan L (eds) Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol 12, Boulder Books, London, 1988.
13. Fanon, F, The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1985.
14. Flower, K, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981, John Murray, London, 1987.
- 15 Frankel, J, International Politics: Conflict and Harmony, The Penguin Press, London, 1976.

16. Gilpin, R, The political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1987.
17. Hanlon, J, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, World Press, Indiana, 1987.
18. Holsti, K, International Politics : A framework for Analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1988.
19. Kadhani, X.M “The Economy :Issues, Problems and Prospects,” in Mandaza I, (ed) Zimbabwe : The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986, Codesria Book Series, Senegal, 1986.
20. Keohane, R, O and Nye, J S, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition, Little Brown, Boston, 1977.
21. Jaffee, D, Levels of Socio-Economic Development Theory, Praeger, New York, 1990.
22. Kegley C, W, and Wittkopf R, E, World Politics : Trend and Transformation, Ninth Edition, Wadsworth, Belmont, 2004.
23. Makumbe J and Compagnon, D, Behind the Smokescreen : The Politics of Zimbabwe’s 1995 Elections, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2000.
24. Mandaza, I, “The Post-White Settler Colonial Situation” in Mandaza, I (ed) Zimbabwe : The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986, Codesria Book Series, Senegal, 1986.
25. Meier, G, Leading Issues in Economic Development, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
26. Morgenthau, H, Politics Among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace, Knopf, New York, 1978.
27. Mutiso, G, C and Rohio, S .W, Readings in African Political Thought, Heinemann, Nairobi, 1975.
28. Nelson, Joan , Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy, Macmillan, New York, 1968.

29. Obrien, R and Williams, M, Global Political Economy : Evolution and Dynamics, Macmillan, New York, 2004.
30. Olson, W, The Theory and Practice of International Relations (Eighth Edition) Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1991.
31. Osgood, R, Containment : Soviet Behaviour and Grand Strategy, Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1981.
32. Papp, D.S, Contemporary International Relations : Framework for Understanding, Allyn and Bacon, Toronto, 1997.
33. Pfaltzgraff, R and Dougherty, J, Contending Theories of International Relations, Harper and Row, New York, 1980.
34. Rabin, J and Brown, B, The World Economic Order : Past Prospects, Macmillan, London, 1991.
35. Rodney, W, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Macmillan Publishers, New York, 1985.
36. Rourke, J, T International Politics on the World Stage (Fifth Edition), Duskin Publishing Group, Connecticut, 1995.
37. Rugumamu, S, Lethal Aid : The Illusion of Socialism and Self Reliance in Tanzania, Africa World Press, Asmara, 1996.
38. Sellingson, M and Passe-Smith, J, The Political Economy of Inequality, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1991.
39. Sithole, M and Mair, S, Blocked Democracies in Africa, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Harare, 2002.
40. Steans, J and Pettiford, L, International Relations : Perspectives and Themes, Longman, London, 2001.
41. Waltz, K, Theory of International Relations, Addison- Wesley, London, 1979.
42. Wight, M, Power Politics, Pelican, Harmonds work, 1979.

43. Zvobgo, R J,"Education and the Challenge of Independence," in Mandaza I(ed) Zimbabwe : The Political Economy of Transition, Codesria Book Series, Senegal, 1986.

### **MAGAZINES**

1. Ankomah, B,"Sanctions which Sanctions," New African, Summer2007.
2. Atuahene-Gima, K, "China maybe right in Africa," New African, July 2008.
3. Bohlen, C, "The Key to understanding Russia," The Philadelphia Trumpet, April, 2003.
4. Charamba, G, "Sinning or Sinned against," New African, August/September, 2007, No465.
5. Cottrell, R, "A survey of Europe," The Economist October 23,1999.
- 6.Dell, C, "Is it really voodoo economics bringing Zimbabwe down," New African, August/September,2007 , No465.
7. Gaye, A, "China in Africa," New African, March, 2008.
8. Gono, G," Sanctions are more deadly than Warfare," New African, Summer 2007.
9. Kromah, S, "Look East my Son, New African, March 2007.
10. Mbakwe, T, "The World Bank and Others," New African, August/September,2007.
11. Onajin, O," Debating Zimbabwe," New African, October 2007.
- 12."Zimbabwe : Turning Swords into ploughshares :An Interview with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe," The Courier,No 66 March/April, 1981.
13. Zvayi, C, "Hunting with the hounds and running with hares," New African August/September, 2007.

### **JOURNALS/REPORTS**

1. Commission of the European Communities," Lome III : Analysis of the European Communities," Information Development Cooperation, X/123/1985.



2. Delegation of the European Commission, An Overview of EU-Zimbabwe Current Cooperation, Mt Pleasant, Harare.
3. European Commission, Joint Annual Report, 2006.
4. European Commission, Joint Annual Report, 2008.
5. Eurostat, "Report Zimbabwe 1990" Federal Statistical Office of the European Community, Luxemborg, 1990.
6. Griffin, K, "Foreign Aid After the Cold War," Development and Change, 22(4) 1991.
7. Gutto, S, "Seminar on the Interdependence Between Democracy and Human Rights," United Nation : Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 25-26 November, 2002.
8. Laporte G, "Reflections on the future of ACP-EU relations," Policy Management Report 13
9. Rodrick, D, "Development Strategies For The Twenty First Century," Annual World Bank Report, Washington, 2000.
10. Sanandaji, N, "Foreign Aid Folly : A View from Sweden," The New American, June, 2008.

### **NEWSPAPERS**

1. Frith, M, "Beijing in major bid to woo Africa," Sunday Times, November 5, 2006.
2. . Mahoso, T, "Sanctions are hurting Zimbabwe," The Sunday Mail, September 9-15, 2007.
3. Mararike, C, "Zimbabwe's Agricultural Onslaught : The True Story," The Sunday Mail, July 8-14, 2007.
4. Naidoo , S, "EU hopes to cement ties with ACP countries ," Sunday Times, December 9, 2007.
5. Richardson, P, " Zimbabwe's Health Dilemma," Sunday Times, August 19, 2007.
6. Simon, H, "Democratic initiatives in Sudan and Zimbabwe," Sunday Times, November 4, 2007.

