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**FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES**

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*Strategies of Redressing Colonial Land Imbalances in Southern Africa: Lessons  
from Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme*

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## ABSTRACT

This study examined strategies of redressing colonial land imbalances in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to lessons from Zimbabwe's "*Fast Track Land Reform Programme*" (FTLRP). The objectives of this study were: to identify critical areas of concern in the Zimbabwe's land reform as a strategy for redressing colonial imbalances; to evaluate whether land reform is a panacea for poverty reduction in Zimbabwe; to assess the level of empowerment on resettled farmers brought by the land reform programme in Zimbabwe and to analyse lessons learnt from the FTLRP. The study was anchored on the self-determination, dependency, poverty alleviation and empowerment theoretical approaches as explained and explored by scholars such as Legault (2017), Ferraro (1996) and Kabeer (1999). Literature from various leading scholars such as Moyo (2005), Mashizha and Mapuva (2018) and Moyana (2002) was analysed in relation to the land question and colonial land imbalances. The study also made relevant references to some major Legislative Acts, policies related to land such as the Lancaster House Constitution, Communal Land Settlement Act (1982), the Land Acquisition Act 1985 and 1992, National Land Policy (1990), Constitutional Amendments No. 30 of 1990, No. 17 Act, 2005 and, No. 20 Act, 2013, Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 20:01) of 2004, the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (2007) (Chapter 14:33), amongst others. In order to come up with a comprehensive examination of the subject matter, data was gathered from eight of Zimbabwe's ten provinces and two districts from each of the identified provinces which were purposively chosen. Issues related to redressing colonial land imbalances through the FTLRP were thoroughly examined using predominantly qualitative research approach where key informant interviews, direct observation, documentary analysis and focus group discussions were used as the data generation techniques. Participants were selected using purposive and snowball sampling methods and these were drawn from beneficiaries of the FTLRP, officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, relevant local regional embassy officials, the academia, traditional leaders, Government officials, District Administrator's office, War veterans, Civic organizations, local dominant political parties and policy formulators. The collected data was then analysed through content and thematic analyses. The study findings showed that several policies and strategies were coined by the GOZ in an attempt to redress colonial imbalances, however such efforts could not achieve the desired positive impact in a significant way. As a result, land reform, as a tool for redressing colonial imbalances in Zimbabwe and also in Southern Africa in general, remains an incomplete, yet important issue. Through accessing land, the majority of the beneficiaries from Zimbabwe's FTLRP managed to escape poverty at household level and became better positioned in society as they gained the ability to be self-sufficient and better their lives through working on the land and/ utilisation of various opportunities brought about by having access to the land capital. Therefore, a number of lessons were drawn from Zimbabwe's FTLRP. The land reform initiative resulted in a number of negative implications such as sanctions, decline in productivity, inequalities in the access to land, multiple farm ownership and a lack of agriculture financing. Nevertheless, there were also several positives that came with the FTLRP such as poverty reduction and economic empowerment. The negatives can be addressed by implementation of recommendations from the land audit, having a robust continuous land reform monitoring and evaluation mechanism in place.

## **DEDICATION**

*To my late father, Fulton Mangwanya (Senior), my late mother Lydia Mangwanya  
and my dear son Fulton Mangwanya (Junior)*

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## DECLARATION

I, **Fulton Upenyu Mangwanya**, do hereby declare that that this thesis, entitled '*Strategies of Redressing Colonial Land Imbalances in Southern Africa: Lessons from Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme*', is my own independent work, and it has not been submitted for a degree at any other university.

The propositions contained herein are based on my understanding and interpretation of the literature synthesized as well as field experiences. Parts of the research done is already published, whilst other manuscripts were accepted for publication at the time of submission of this thesis for examination.

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**Signed:**

**Date:**

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

ACP	African-Caribbean-Pacific
Agri-SA	South African Agricultural Union
AgriBank	Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe
ANC	Africa National Congress
AR	Affirmative Reposition
ARDA	Agriculture and Rural Development Authority
AREX	Agricultural Extension
BAZ	Bankers Association of Zimbabwe
B-BBEE	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BSAC	British South Africa Company
BTAF	Boka Tobacco Auction Floors
CFU	Commercial Farmers Union
COPE	Congress of the People
CSC	Cold Storage Commission
DA	Democratic Alliance
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Council
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment

FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GAPWUZ	General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IBEAC	Imperial British East Africa Company
LAA	Land Apportionment Act
LHA	Land Husbandry Act
LRRP I	Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase One
LSCF	Large Scale Commercial Farmers
MCA	Maize Control Act
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MSD	Meteorological Services Department
NUDO	National Unity Democratic Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFAC	Office of Foreign Accounts Control
OPC	Ovamboland People's Congress
OPO	Ovamboland People's Organisation
PDM	Popular Democratic Movement
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PWD	People with Disabilities
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
SABA	South African Bankers Association
SACU	Southern Africa Customs Union

SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SIDA	Swedish International Development Association
SONA	State of the Nation Address
SWANU	South West African National Union
SWAPO	South West African Peoples' Organisation
TIMB	Tobacco Industries Marketing Board
TMALI	Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute
TRB	Tobacco Research Board
TTL	Tribal Trust Lands
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNISA	University of South Africa
USA	United States of America
WCG	Western Contact Group
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WW I	First World War
WW II	Second World War
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZBC TV	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television
ZIDERA	Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association



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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Introduction

Globally, land is increasingly becoming a scarce resource and arguably, it is the most important form of capital. Land is, indisputably, key among a plethora of resources needed by any country in the world to develop a sound political economy. As indicated by Moyo (2005c:146) in Ntsebeza and Hall (2007:60), land remains a basic source of livelihood of the majority of Southern Africans and is key to the development of agriculture, tourism, mining, housing and industry. Nearly two-thirds (63%) of the world's ice-free land is used for agriculture or settlement or is covered by forests (Creutzig, 2017:1). Land is also being traded as it is the means of production in the developed and developing countries alike. Divergent historical paths have led to land tenure systems that are to some extent unique in each locality, country and region (Barraclough, 1999:5). Since 2000, there has been a worldwide exponential increase in the demand for land (Scheidel and Sorman, 2012:588).

In Africa, land reform has always been a contentious issue as it is pivotal in the history, development matrix and economic emancipation of the continent (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010:23). The modern countries that emerged from the '*debris*' of foreign domination in Africa realised the urgency to initiate land reforms and to effect changes in the inherited land tenure systems (Akinola and Wissink, 2019:65). Land reforms, as implemented by many African countries, became important instruments to redress the skewed land patterns and socio-economic transformation on the continent, amid considerable resistance from Africa's former colonisers such as Britain and France for various reasons.

It is therefore important to investigate land reform issues from multi-scale and multi-dimensional perspectives for a holistic understanding of the subject matter. Colonialism essentially ushered in diverse forms of colonial dominance and exploitation of the colonised. As in other parts of the world where colonialism took place, colonialism in Africa resulted in the skewed alteration of resource control, primarily the land (Akinola and Wissink, 2019:2). Colonialism also resulted in changes not only in the right to use or manage land, but also the possession as well as the utilisation of land.

The land had been altered in favour of the colonisers, giving rise to unequal land ownership, insecure land tenure (Akuffo, 2009:73-74) and discriminatory land use regulations that marginalized other sections of the society particularly, the Blacks. Colonialism brought with it inequality, injustice, asperity and imparity, incommensurateness and unjustified preferentiality. The majority of the colonised people were overpowered after they attempted to resist the imposition of colonialism<sup>1</sup>, and were enslaved, pacified and greatly outclassed.

Colonialism thus, created imbalances which are termed “*colonial imbalances*” between the coloniser and the colonised. This was especially true on access, control, ownership and utilization not only of land (Mararike (2014:2-4), but in various facets and spheres ranging from industry and commerce to social service delivery. Colonial imbalance(s) is a term that is characterised by grievance and immense oppression (Akinola and Wissink, 2019) . It refers to the injustice and inequality that prevailed when European imperialists superimposed their domains on the African continent. This background brings-in a complex dimension to understanding the background of the land issues, including land reform, which might not have the

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<sup>1</sup> After realising that the Europeans who had visited Africa had a colonial agenda African societies resisted the invasions but were defeated by the Europeans. These resistances were widespread in Africa but it will suffice to mention the Khoi-San wars in the last half of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century; the Anglo-Zulu war (1879) in South Africa, the Anglo-Ndebele war (1893), the Chimurenga/Umvukela (I) (1896-7) in Zimbabwe, the Maji-Maji uprising (1905-7) in Tanzania and the Nama-Herero uprising (1904 & 1908) in Namibia.



same meaning for different people and in different regions, but having the same fundamental baselines.

Sadomba in Moyo (2001:144) states that between the 1960s and the 1990s the Southern African region passed through a defining phase of social revolutions characterized by anti-colonial armed confrontation to redress colonial imbalances which became a central agenda, especially on the land question mainly because land has been a key resource for the Blacks. However, more than twenty years after the end of apartheid rule in South Africa, which is seen as the end of European colonialism in Africa, the struggle towards a just society continues to dominate post-colonial development politics (Walker in Patrick *et al.*, 2016:153). Both policy and practice are geared towards undoing what the many years of colonial domination established.

The objectives of this study were to identify critical areas of concern in the Zimbabwe's land reform, to evaluate whether land reform is a panacea for poverty reduction and empowerment and to analyse lessons learnt from the Zimbabwe Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). This study therefore mainly focused on Zimbabwe's land reform implemented from year 2000 to 2018. Lessons learnt from the land reform are discussed. The intention was to establish possible models for countries that may wish to pursue land reform of that magnitude.

## **1.2 Background**

Land as natural capital, both for the survival and prosperity of humanity, is a key resource for dealing with challenges of poverty. Apart from The Southern African region is characterized by high levels of unemployment, and gross inequalities (Jauch, 2011:1&4) such that neither agro-based economies (for example, Malawi) nor resource rich countries like Namibia and South Africa, have been able to significantly reduce wealth gaps, the rates of unemployment and poverty. The lack of access to land resources has been a significant factor in the poverty

levels and high unemployment levels that characterise the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Poverty, unemployment and inequality hamper human dignity and socio-economic development in any given society, and this has been the case in most parts of the region in the post-independence era.

Over the years, developing nations have made significant strides to revise the legal and policy instruments left by colonial regimes, transforming them to suit the post-colonial era socio-economic conditions and ideals. Most countries in Southern Africa, upon gaining independence, inherited economies skewed to favour the white minority (Moyo, 2005b:4-8). The need for policy change in post-colonial Africa has been central and fundamental. Countries in Southern Africa have different success stories regarding efforts to undo the past and it can be generally argued that by 2016, most of these countries had done very little towards that direction, (Moyo in Ntsebeza and Hall, 2007:5-6).

It can be noted that on the land issue lies economic development and social welfare, which are unquestionable in the African context. Land has been used, from time immemorial, to promote economic growth and human development and more than half of the world's population live and earn their living out of tilling the land as subsistence farmers (Jonathan, 2006:10). In African countries such as Egypt, which are more than 90% desert, agriculture is the mainstay of economic activity for the majority of people (Tellioglu and Konandreas, 2017:6-8). On the other hand, the development of large-scale, capital intensive farming is also important despite the fact that the majority of Africans are small-scale and subsistence farmers. Such an analysis is true for the SADC countries.

Ownership, control, distribution and access (including the utilization of land) have historically been used to dominate and empower different nations, races, genders and classes in Africa (Batterbury and Ndi, 2018). Even during the pre-colonial era, land was used to create or destroy empires and nations. Therefore, ownership, control, access, equitable distribution and utilization of the land has been lost. It has not yet been fully realised, even decades after independence mainly because of the failure to assess critically the implemented land reform programs with a view of coming up with best options.

Settler colonialism involved land dispossession and the establishment of reserves for the indigenous populations (Hanlon *et al.*, (2012:31-32). This, in turn, created land inequalities in the mounts, quality of land available to settlers compared to Africans, as well as to dual land tenure systems, that is, statutory tenure for European settlers and customary tenure for Africans (United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, 2009). In Southern Africa, countries in the SADC region that did not experience settler colonialism, large-scale dispossession generally did not take place. However, various types of interventions with tenure systems did, and these have created land ownership and utilisation challenges in the region.

Some scholars attempt to make a distinction between those countries which experienced settler colonialism like Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique, and those which did not or in which settlers were relatively few like Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi. among others (SADC, 2010). Though a distinction can be made between the two blocks of countries in the region, a commonality between States in the SADC region is the struggle and the failure of the post-colonial regimes to redress the land inequalities as well as the structural deformations inherited from the colonial periods. Despite the political changes, there has been more continuity than change in the racial and class nature of land ownership, distribution and control in Africa.

Over 90 % of the rural population have access to land through indigenous customary mechanisms in Africa, with around 370 million of them being defined as '*poor*' (United Nations, 2006:3). This situation is similar when looking at individual countries in Southern Africa. For instance, in Zambia, approximately ninety-four percent (94%) of land that is held in customary tenure and efforts to pass a land policy since then have been unsuccessful (USAID, 2013).

Breytenbach in (Hunter, 2004b:5), suggests that another major concern in Southern Africa is the failure to integrate land reform with tenure issues, resettlement programs and meaningful land-use policies that cover all land. In both rural and urban areas, this shortcoming has notably led to the failure to effectively redress the colonial land imbalances. Other countries that have struggled to redress their colonial land imbalances within the SADC region include Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia (Clover, 2005:11-12; Weidlich, 2008; Van den Brink, 2008:28). Following independence of those countries, they inherited the colonial system. As a result, the imbalance that persisted during the colonial period between the majority of Blacks and minority whites immediately manifested between the minority elites and the majority Blacks. This can be termed the establishment of internal colonialism within a formerly colonized state. This, in fact, entails that there have been continued stagnation which brought less change on land ownership and utilization for most Southern Africa states.

Adams and Howell (2001:1-2) note that; colonial land policies left countries like South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe with the highest proportion of privately held land, at 72%, 44% and 41%, respectively. For most countries in Southern Africa, however, large areas of arable land are still held under complex customary tenure. The legal frameworks that govern land ownership and land rights for most of these countries are characterized by tensions around the integration of statutory and customary property rights.

It is therefore noted that, although states within the Southern African region have implemented or attempted to change the prevailing ownership of land, unequal land holding, usage and control of land still existed. However, Moyo, (2014:19) argues that landholding inequality itself is not the problem in that some states in the SADC region have memories of land dispossession (Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and others do not (Botswana), but there is land inequality. The problem seems to be on the manner in which land is distributed or comes about.

In Zimbabwe, through the Lancaster House Constitution, the African nationalists were forced to accept the concept of *willing seller- willing buyer* (Onslow, 2009). This concept facilitated the acquisition of about 3.3 million hectares of land by the government resulting in approximately 60 000 beneficiaries being allocated land between 1980 – 1998 (Chilunjika and Uwizeyimana, 2015). Whilst the transfer of fertile farms was a watershed event, the land-hungry Black majority in Zimbabwe felt it was not enough. Land remained an emotional issue with cultural undertones as later proven by the invasion of Igava, Daskop and Homepark farms in Marondera by the Svosve people in June 1998 (Mlambo, 2005:14-15; Murisa, 2016). The Svosve people were claiming that the land was their traditional land and home to the graves of their ancestors (Mlambo, 2005:14-15). The invasion was a trigger for the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) which was to come after the defeat of the government-sponsored Draft Constitution of 2000 in a referendum.

Land dispossession in Zimbabwe started as early as 1894, and then a Land Commission was appointed in 1925 chaired by Sir Morris Cater. The subjugation of the Blacks intensified following the promulgation of The Land Apportionment Act of 1930. The Act institutionalised racial land allocation which included the establishment of ‘Reserves’ which was land exclusively set aside for occupation by Africans.

The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) was found '*between a rock and a hard ground*' when it was called on to evict land occupiers in 2000 by the Supreme Court led by the then Chief Justice, Anthony Gubbay and the Western countries, while it also knew that the matter was so delicate that it could result in a chaotic situation. The land occupations mutated into the FTLRP characterised by land invasions, compulsory acquisitions and designation of farms. Hanlon *et al* (2012:83) argue that the FTLRP resulted in 170 000 Black farmers occupying 4 000 white farms.

The failure to redress the colonial land imbalances could potentially wreak havoc and has indeed caused some confrontation among the different racial and indigenous groups and classes of people. However, as the old adage goes, '*when you pray for the rain, you got to prepare to deal with the mud*', in land reform there are challenges and consequences for which mitigatory measures should be strategically in place, therefore the need to draw lessons from the FTLRP.

Whilst there are many strategies pursued by countries in Southern Africa to redress colonial imbalances, the land reform in Zimbabwe received global attention. Since independence, many people in Zimbabwe became agitated by land shortages. The government adopted the *willing-buyer, willing-seller* programme to purchase white owned farms which were then distributed to a few Black Zimbabweans. However, the process was very slow since the white farmers were reluctant to sell their land. There were initiatives to engage the British donor community and stakeholders on the issue of land in Zimbabwe, nevertheless, the process was halted as the opposition politics took new twists and turns. This culminated into the FTLRP which was implemented in year 2000 by the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) after the war veterans had spontaneously started an invasion of farms which were owned by the minority white farmers.

It is against this background, that this study sought to analyse the lessons that the Southern African countries can learn from Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme. This study took into account that other Southern African countries such as South Africa, Namibia and Zambia, that are experiencing pressure on various land issues such as land for biofuels, resettlement and plantations. This study also sought to contribute to the development of a land reform model which takes into account the experience from the Zimbabwean case.

This research also analysed lessons that the Southern African countries can learn from Zimbabwe's FTLRP, by focusing on the strategies that were implemented in Zimbabwe as well as the shortcomings. Exploring FTLRP and analysing its hallmarks, noting the blunders and good, in the entire FTLRP since July 2000 can be indispensable for countries in the Southern Africa region to realize a just and fair society where equality and equity run supreme in important socio-economic and political sectors.

### **1.3 Problem Statement**

The unresolved land question and perpetual poverty in rural Africa highlight the neglect of social justice and equity issues which underlie the existing discrepancies of access to land. Colonialism impacted negatively on the colonised people of Southern Africa. The occupation of Southern African countries resulted in the displacement of the indigenous people through the enactment of unjust laws by European settlers. In Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe since 1980), the indigenous people were forcibly removed from fertile lands and settled in areas that are rocky and arid and not suitable for agricultural production.

In South Africa, the Native Land Act of 1913 restricted Blacks to 7 % of the land in the country (Shillington, 2005:364). When the Blacks were pushed into already crowded reserves, that marked the beginning of the key challenges that South Africa is facing in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The escalation of the land conflict in Zimbabwe and growing calls for radical land reforms and reparations in the region reached global spotlight in year 2000. Since then, the Zimbabwean land question became internationalised, representing a classic case of incomplete decolonisation processes in former settler colonies and highlighted various longstanding north-south grievances. When most countries in the SADC region got independent, they adopted various strategies to redress imbalances created by colonialism but the imbalances still remain. In the case of Zimbabwe, the colonial regime established what was called Alienated Land, which was exclusively for white occupation, even though Africans could live on it only as employees. The unequal control over land as a capital resource therefore emphasize the importance of interrogating the land question not only as an agrarian based question but also as a multi-faceted problem reflected in the unequal control of the means of production as well as external capitalist interests.

There were Native Purchase Areas, where African farmers could gain limited ownership of farms owing to limited land available for Blacks, on racial grounds (Scoones *et al.*, 2018:600). Therefore, with such legislation, indigenous people were forcibly removed from fertile lands to areas such as Gwayi, Shangani, Mberengwa and Gokwe, among other areas, that are not suitable for crop cultivation. Understanding these past experiences is useful to contextualize the current challenges (Dekker and Kinsey, 2011). Most post-colonial governments have not adequately addressed the land question and there is a general failure to redistribute land equitably. Land conflicts have therefore occurred between and within States and perhaps the majority of the post-independence land disputes in Africa have been intra-state struggles.

Following Zimbabwe's independence from colonial rule, the Government of Zimbabwe believes that the land reform was necessary, and it had to be done. The central problem is that it is not clear whether Zimbabwe's FTLRP is the best model, which can be replicated across



Southern Africa as a strategy to redress colonial imbalances. Zimbabwe's experience in executing land reforms remains unique as it had significant impacts beyond the region, with both positive and negative consequences. It is also clear that the FTLRP in Zimbabwe was conducted in a chaotic manner which was largely criticised by the global community. There were; cases of nepotism in the allocation of land, problems experienced with implementation programmes to sustain land reform, farm invasions and occupations by the Svosve people and real distribution of land well below targets in every aspect (Mlambo, 2005:15; Bamidele, 2012). Although legitimate beneficiaries such as peasant workers were allotted small plots, they had not been given any farm training. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe is arguably the only country which has made significant progress on addressing the land question, despite the costs, which are politically charged reactions, punitive measures akin to '*punishments*' from former colonial masters.

While the programme managed to resettle agitated and land-hungry Zimbabweans, the nation was plunged into long-term depressed agricultural production. Zimbabwe changed status from being a net-food-exporter to a net-food-importer, and as the crisis deepened, a considerable percentage of the population had to survive on donor aid (Iles, 2002:13). It is a well-known fact that land is the primary means of production and its access and distribution has been a contentious issue both prior and after the colonial era. This study interrogated why post-colonial governments in SADC, particularly Zimbabwe, have not been able to adequately address the land imbalances created by the colonial government.

#### **1.4 Aim**

The Aim of this study was to analyse land reform initiatives and the extent to which post-colonial land reforms redressed colonial land imbalances in Southern Africa, drawing lessons from Zimbabwe's land reform trajectory.

### **1.4.1 Objectives**

The study had the following objectives:

1. To identify critical areas of concern in the Zimbabwe's land reform as a strategy for redressing colonial imbalances.
2. To evaluate whether land reform was a panacea for poverty reduction in Zimbabwe.
3. To assess the level of empowerment on resettled farmers brought by land reform programme in Zimbabwe.
4. To analyse lessons learnt from Zimbabwe's FTLRP.

### **1.5 Research Questions**

The study sought to answer the following questions;

- What were the critical areas of concern in the FTLRP as a strategy for redressing colonial imbalances?
- To what extent is the FTLRP a panacea for poverty reduction in Zimbabwe?
- To what extent have resettled farmers in Zimbabwe been empowered by land reform?
- What were the lessons learnt from Zimbabwe's FTLRP.

### **1.6 Justification of the study**

Zimbabwe has a historical land question that started with colonisation in 1899 (Chiweshe, 2018:13). Zimbabwe came into independence with 700,000 Black farmers squeezed onto 53% of the total farmland and about 6,000 white farmers on 46% of the farmland, which was also the best land (Hanlon *et al.*, 2012:7-8). Given the fact that the government negotiations since independence had not delivered land into the hands of the majority of the people in Zimbabwe, there was also pressure from the war veterans of the country who were living in anticipation of

reclaiming their land. Moreso, the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) political party became another factor that forced the government to support the FTLRP since most white commercial farmers who were unwilling to support the government land reform agenda, owning vast tracts of land, openly supported the MDC.

The FTLRP's major objective was to reverse a racially skewed land tenure system which the country had inherited at independence in 1980 (Chipenda 2018:2). The fast track phase began in 2000 when 10,816,886 hectares were acquired and 162,161 families initially resettled. A total number of 237 858 households were reported to have received access to land under the programme (Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019:1 and Irigoyen, 2017:14). The FTLRP generated heated debates that polarised opinion between those who were in favour of redressing the colonial racial distribution of land in favour of Black farmers and those who were against this objective as well as the way it was done (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011:908). Conflicts, disagreements, battles, contestations and contentions including engagements, competitions and fracas, have been central when it comes to the land question not only in the SADC region or in Africa but the world over. The control, access including the distribution and utilization of land has been affected by the failure to develop a proper, holistic or an all-encompassing practical strategy in the post-colonial era.

The study was unique from other studies which have been brought forward by various authorities in the sense that the study made an assessment of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe as a tool for empowerment with an objective of making recommendations on the best framework for land reform programmes, which Southern African countries can adopt to redress colonial land imbalances in their respective countries and at the same time achieve food security. While most authors published reviews, conceptual analysis and extrapolations from case studies in few districts of one province (Palmer, 1990; Pazvakavambwa, 2000; Bernstein, 2003;

Magaramombe, 2010; Dekker and Kinsey, 2011; Matondi, 2012; Hanlon *et al.*, 2012; Mararike, 2014; Nyashadzashe *et al.*, 2014; Mutenga, 2018; Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019a), this study gathered land reform primary and secondary data from the five agro-regions of Zimbabwe (8 provinces excluding Bulawayo and Harare).

There are few studies that have collated opinions of the beneficiaries of the FTLRP and gathered expert opinions from the grassroots, African technocrats, policy makers and other stakeholders on the subject matter and from the investments made by Government in the aftermath of the FTLRP. Furthermore, few studies have been done even on what new patterns of production have emerged out of the Zimbabwean land reform and how successful it has been in terms of levels of output, productivity and impacts on poverty. Alexander (1991) analysed the process of land redistribution in the western Matabeleland Provinces, using Insiza District in Matabeleland South as a case study. The study sought to redress imbalances by providing an analysis of the conflicts and debates over resettlement which shaped Matabeleland's post-independence development. In a separate study, Andersson (2007) presents a review article on Zimbabwe's economy from an economic perspective, linking annual rainfall figures to Gross Domestic Product growth as a critique that at agriculture-dominated economy as Zimbabwe, sudden changes in government policy, rather than drought conditions, were more responsible for the economic meltdown.

On the other hand, Scoones *et al.*, (2012) focussed on livelihoods and how the FTLRP affected lives of rural people in Masvingo Province in 400 households across 16 sites over a 10 year period. The research by Scoones *et al.* offers a detailed typology of livelihood strategies and agrarian dynamics that emerged. Nevertheless, there are limitations in scope due to the fact that the context of Masvingo Province is unique and may not necessarily be extrapolated for the whole country because it is not in agro region 1&2 which constitute the agricultural prime

lands. In addition, Cliffe *et al.* (2011), like many other researchers such as Hanlon *et al.*, (2012), gave an overview of the FTLRP, focusing on the political rhetoric and polarisation of ideas around the transformations that occurred during the FTLRP as well as the conceptualisation of the policy and practice issues.

A *'reality check'* is necessary to evaluate what has transpired over nearly two decades and extending the scope beyond case studies and to delve too into the consequences. There is need for further research to look into the FTLRP impact through different lenses if realistic policy prescriptions and objective lessons are to be drawn for shaping the land reform debates in Africa.

There is scanty literature documented or put together comprehensively, on the events and policies that have taken place in Zimbabwe's FTLRP. This study, therefore, sought to make a critical assessment of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe and find out whether the approach, if modelled, can be replicated in Southern Africa as a strategy for redressing colonial land imbalances. The effects of the FTLRP on poverty reduction is also fundamental to the SADC member states as how such a model may have impacted indigenous people in the Zimbabwean context. In addition, the study sought to assess the extent to which the land reform programme in Zimbabwe addressed the disequilibrium that was created by colonialism on the land question.

Drawing lessons from the experience of Zimbabwe's FTLRP Policy is important as it brings-out reform strategies and national policy perspectives on how to address the land redistribution disparity within the SADC region, Moreover, the study also contributes and stimulates debate among policy and legal practitioners, the academia and various international relations actors on the best strategy for redressing colonial land imbalances. This research seeks to contribute knowledge on the land question and how citizens can bring an end to colonial land imbalances, deriving from Zimbabwe's experience with the FTLRP. It is not clear whether Zimbabwe's

FTLRP is an effective model which can be replicated in Southern Africa as a strategy to redress colonial imbalances. Cognisant of that the study made an assessment of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe with an objective to make recommendations on the best framework of land reform programme, which Southern African countries can consider adopting or drawing lessons to redress colonial land imbalances in their respective countries.

Whilst several studies have been done on land reform in Southern Africa, none of them have focused on Zimbabwe's Land Reform from a perspective of analysing the policies and processes as a strategy of redressing colonial land imbalances in Southern Africa. Whilst there are numerous studies published on Zimbabwe's land reform programme, (Palmer, 1990; Pazvakavambwa, 2000; Bernstein, 2003; Magaramombe, 2010; Dekker and Kinsey, 2011; Prosper B Matondi, 2012; Hanlon, Manjengwa and Smart, 2012; Mararike, 2014; Nyashadzashe *et al.*, 2014; Mutenga, 2018; Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019a), there remains a knowledge gap on identifying the critical areas of concern in the Zimbabwe's land reform as a strategy for redressing colonial land imbalances, evaluating whether land reform was a panacea for poverty reduction in Zimbabwe, assessing the level of empowerment on resettled farmers brought about by the land reform programme and analysing lessons learnt from Zimbabwe's FTLRP.

Examining the land question in relation to what has been covered by numerous previous research, this study focused on identifying the critical areas of concern in the Zimbabwe's land reform as a strategy for redressing colonial land imbalances; evaluating whether land reform was a panacea for poverty reduction in Zimbabwe; assessing the level of empowerment on resettled farmers brought by land reform programme in Zimbabwe and analysing lessons learnt from Zimbabwe's FTLRP. The study also interrogated the key issues that continue to linger

around the land question in Zimbabwe, this included the impact of land reform on food security, empowerment, poverty reduction, and nature conservation in areas of concern.

A critical assessment of land reform in Zimbabwe to find out whether the model can be replicated in Southern Africa as a strategy for redressing colonial land imbalances has remained a research gap. In addition, the study also sought to assess, through analysis of data gathered from key informant interviews, resettled farmers, policy makers and key stakeholders, the extent to which the land reform programme in Zimbabwe may have reduced poverty and perhaps economically empowered the intended beneficiaries. The research intended to discuss FTLRP issues such as compensation, utilisation capacity and other areas of concern for the benefit of policy makers in concluding the Zimbabwe land reform and give insights for countries in Southern Africa that are facing similar land questions.

### **1.7 Study Area**

The study area is the Republic of Zimbabwe which is located within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, shown on Figure 1.1.

**Figure 1.1: Study Area**



*Source: Adapted from SADC (2020): <https://www.sadc.int/member-states/>.*

The SADC region is comprised of 16 countries, each with its own distinct political, social, cultural and economic history and diverse existing development trajectories. Most of the countries within the regions are former British colonies and were under either direct or indirect British rule with the exception of Mozambique and Angola which were under Portuguese colonial rule. Mauritius and Madagascar were colonised by the French, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was under Belgian colonial rule. Namibia was first colonised by Germany and then by the Apartheid South African government. South Africa itself was initially colonised in the 15th century by Dutch settlers and then later fell into the hands of the British.

Colonial diversity brought in various alien European languages, cultural orientations, political and administrative systems and economic interests that were subsequently embedded onto an assorted range of polities, linguistic and cultural practices, and socio-economic development systems. The European settlers had varied levels of direct control of land and engagement in



agriculture amongst the region's countries, to the extent that about half of the countries became settler colonies. The colonised nations gained their independence from colonial rule over a staggered period of time with a number of nationalist struggles focusing primarily on re-acquiring land and related sovereignty issues. During the 1960's, nine SADC Countries (Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia) attained their independence through negotiated settlements. The remainder of the countries were only decolonised after protracted armed liberation struggles, starting with Angola and Mozambique during the mid-1970s, followed by Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990, and South Africa in 1994.

The countries that gained independence last, have of late started making efforts aimed at confronting numerous political and constitutional reforms, such as land reforms. According to the African Union, African Development Bank and Economic Commission for Africa (2010: 6), the significance of land to economic development within the SADC region is underscored by the fact that farming (mostly small-scale farming activities) and related activities are the direct sources of income and livelihood for more than 70 per cent of the population. Agriculture is the mainstay and the sector contributes about 20 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in most of the countries within the region (*ibid*). However, there is some level of economic diversification in some countries such as mining and tourism and this reduces dependence on farming.

Zimbabwe is a land-locked country within the SADC region. The country was colonised in 1890 by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) acting on behalf of the British government and after 90 years of colonial rule under Britain mainly because of its rich soils, good climate and rich mineral deposits. Zimbabwe gained its independence on 18 April 1980, after a protracted liberation war struggle. The country shares borders with Zambia to the North, South

Africa to the South, Botswana to the West and Mozambique to the East. It sits on an area measuring approximately 390 757 square kilometres. Zimbabwe has a total land area of 39.6 million hectares, with 33 million hectares of this land reserved for agricultural activities whilst the remaining 6.6 million hectares is set aside for forests, national parks and urban human settlements.

### **1.8 Literature Review and Theoretical/ Conceptual Framework**

This section serves the purpose of presenting an overview of previous studies made with regards to Zimbabwe's land reform and related experiences and issues that inform this study. The section also outlines the theories which informed this study, and these are the Self-determination Theory, Empowerment Theory and the Dependency Theory. Important concepts such as colonialism, imperialism, social injustice, land imbalances, land reform and land tenure are also discussed. These concepts and approaches are explained in detail below.

Land reforms are meant to play a pivotal role in the livelihoods of most people especially in developing societies as the essence of any land reform is to improve living conditions and reduce poverty levels. In Europe, land reform was carried in Albania after the state attained independence from the Turks in 1921. According to (Xhamara, 1995) the majority of the land in the country was controlled only by five countries with each owing 60 000 hectares not only of farmland but of forests as well. Just like in most countries where colonialism took place, Xhamara (1995) states that the disparity and inequality was in the most fertile and productive areas. Xhamara (1995) further states that Albania tried in vain to rectify land imbalances before 1945 but as alluded to by (Cungu and Swinnen, 1999) the post war land reform of 1946 redistributed large tracks of land. Albania introduced quick and radical land reforms after World War II and more people accessed land (Cungu and Swinnen, 1999:605). Therefore radicalism greatly played a pivotal role in the case of Albania's land reform program.

Agrarian reform and land reform have been a recurring theme of enormous consequence in world history. In Bolivia, a country with one of the most unequal land distributions in South America, inequitable land tenure has been a persistent problem. Of the estimated 110 million hectares (1 hectare is 2.47 acres) of potentially productive land, the government estimates that 70% of this is in the hands of 400 individuals who claim over 100,000 hectares each, under various ownership guises (Hertzler and Ledebur, 2007). The 32 richest people in South America hold the same amount of wealth as the 300 million poorest people (Ticehurst, 2016:13). It is of paramount importance to note that in 1952 three quarters of Bolivians were peasants and it was during the revolution of the 1950s that the peasants seized the land at which they were working and the Bolivian government legalized such invasions. One therefore needs to note post-colonial governments are reluctant to redress colonial land imbalances until the masses act and this has been the position of states within the SADC region. Land invasions however though with so much international criticism worked for the best in Bolivia as successive governments have acted on the land question since the 1950s. The 2006 bill which authorizing the government to redistribute land to indigenous poor was passed within hours. According to Achtenberg (2013),

*INRA states that 157 million acres of land have been surveyed and titled since 1996 under Bolivia's land regularization laws, benefiting more than 1 million people. Some 134 million acres, or 85%, have been titled during the last seven years under Morales, compared to just 23 million between 1996 and 2005 under past neoliberal governments.*

Therefore Bolivia has made progress in terms of redistributing land but as noted by Achtenberg (2013) the pace of land titling has fallen short of the October 2013 legal requirement and

popular expectation hence the amount of land regularized to date represents only 60% of the total 262 million acres in Bolivia.

Scholars like Ottaway (1998) postulated that land is central to the life of most Ethiopians as it gives sustenance, status and often political power. Dibaba (2020:33) noted that agriculture societies of Ethiopia believe that to have rights over the land is to be human and that to be landless is to be sub-human. Other scholars argue that the peasants should take over the land and organize themselves into peasants associations which chose whether to distribute the land among their members or enter into collective forms of farming. Economic benefits of the land reform were some increase in production and tangible improvement in the peasants' living conditions (Crewett and Korf, 2008). The ugly side of the land reform was that it caused social turmoil which claimed thousands of lives, (Ottaway, 1977:79).

In Kenya Land-related disputes date back to colonial times, when British colonists displaced people from Kenya's fertile highlands and either resettled them elsewhere or left them landless, effectively turning them into squatters (IRIN Africa, 2013). Atsango Chesoni, cited in IRIN Africa (2013) notes that,

*At independence, we did not actually address these issues. We did not redistribute the land in the way which... was fair. Instead we had a situation where the incoming elite then perpetuated some of those injustices and did not even want to address the historical injustices pertaining [to] the land.*

The lack of political will has been a challenge in the implantation of land reform policies and a threat to successful land redistribution and in the case of Kenya land-related grievances were among the underlying causes of the violence that followed Kenya's disputed presidential election results in 2007.

The Cuban experience is one that cannot go unnoticed as it is perceived to be the most complete but not successful agrarian reform. Prior the 1959 land reform, latifundios or large private owned plantations and small farm were in operation. The conditions in the large plantations were unbearable as the workers were exploited and given less for their labour (Paz, 2011:74). The rent system was also part and parcel of the Cuban land system. Land was underutilized and the majority of the people in Cuba were not employed especially in the Cuban provinces and this resulted in rural-urban migration as people were in desperate need for greener pastures (Brown, 1993). The land reform in Cuba was implemented in the late 1950s, not only as a basic law for transforming the country's economy from a privately owned capitalistic system into a planned economy, but also it was the first Agrarian Law approved by the revolutionary government (Fernandez, 1992).

The Middle East has also experienced land reform programs, for instance, the Iranian experience stands as an example. The White Revolution was a far-reaching series of reforms in Iran launched in 1963 by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (Watson, 1976:23). The White Revolution consisted of 19 elements that were introduced over a period of 15 years. The first 6 were introduced in 1962 and put to a national referendum on January 26, 1963. One needs to notice that the land reform introduced in Iran was holistic and it focused on various facets, thus it was not only limited to farm land. Some of the facets that the land reform program touched include, Land Reforms Program and Abolishing Feudalism where the government bought the land from the feudal land lords at what was considered to be a fair price and sold it to the peasants at 30% below the market value, with the loan being payable over 25 years at very low interest rates. Nationalization of Forests and Pasturelands, Privatization of the Government Owned Enterprises, Profit Sharing for industrial workers in private sector enterprises, giving the factory workers and employees 20% share of the net profits of the places where they worked and

securing bonuses based on higher productivity or reductions in costs among others. Such an approach encompassed so many areas (Magazine, 1966).


According to (Farazmand, 1989), Iran's land reform can be analysed in three phases namely private, government and endowed land between 1962 and 1971 where a huge amount of about seven million hectares of land was distributed to rural peasants who previously had no financial capacity of owning land as they were poorly paid labourers. However less than seven hectares were received by 75% of those who benefited from the program and many analysts say that this was not enough to meet most families' basic needs. Scholars like (Agripah, 2000) argue that the Iran program was not a success in the sense that not only were the peasants given small pieces of land but the fact that they lacked basic resources like quality irrigation systems and the know how contributed to the failure of the program. According to Araghi et al (1989), the land reform of Iran did not address land imbalances as by 1979, a quarter of prime land was in disputed ownership and half of the productive land was in the hands of 200 000 absentee landlords. The Iran case was not really a success as the White Revolution faced resistance from angry landlords who had lost their land. Moreover as ibid notes, large land owners were able to retain the best land with the best access to fresh water and irrigation facilities.

The Indian case also reveals that the land reform was part and parcel of the Asian continent as the country experienced what (Besley and Burgess, 1998) termed the voluntary and state initiated land reforms in several states since it gained independence and the overall object of India's land reform was to ensure that there is equity. Shaban (1987) states that the 1949 Indian Constitution gave states the power to enact and implement land reforms thus the analysis of Besley and Burgess (1998) and Shaban (1987) greatly show that the land reform in India was not implemented in all the states of the country. According to Ghatak and Roy (2007:252), the

Land Reform Legislation in India consisted of four main categories namely abolition of intermediaries who were rent collectors prior to independence of the country, tenancy regulation that attempted to improve the contractual terms faced by tenants such as crop shares and security of tenure, a ceiling on landholdings with a view to redistribute surplus land to the landless and lastly attempts to consolidate disparate landholdings. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) that states like West Bengal and Kerala after 1947, Jammu and Kashmir and operations like Operation Barga were initiated which ensured equitable distribution of land among the landless farmers. Land policy in India has been a major topic of government policy discussions since the time prior to Independence from British rule. The peasants of the country strongly backed the independence movement and the "Land to the Tiller" policy of the Congress Party because of the prevailing agrarian conditions.

The northern part of Africa also experienced massive land reform programs so as to better the lives of the poor. The case of Egypt is vital. According to Ansari (1968) rural inequality was prevalent with estimates of the landless rural population ranging from 44% to 60% and the landless represented the majority but they worked in the states within the country. The Egyptian land reform abolished the political influence of the major land owners as it resulted in the redistribution of about 15% of cultivatable land in the country. Ansari (1968) states that 834 377 small holdings known as feddans were distributed amongst 341 982 families. The Land Reform program in Egypt is often considered a success in the sense that it eliminated large holding of land redistributing it to smallholders. Access to land was thus ensured under the Egyptian land reform, Ansari (1968). The importance of Egypt's land reform though abandoned later as there was the need for economic diversification, is that it was not parochial as it allowed farmers to deliver harvest for cooperatives and they could retain some for personal consumption.

### 1.8.1 Conceptual Framework



**Figure 1.2: Conceptualising the land question as a local issue with regional and global implications**

*Source: Author*

Figure 1 shows a schematic framework of the land question taking the centre stage of development, with key issues rooted in colonial legacies and liberation struggles which gave birth to food insecurity and immense poverty, collectively termed as the driving forces (A) requiring redress. Such driving forces resulted in the formulation of a colonial and post-colonial policy and legal system (B) which has the potential to create social/economic (in)justice, ultimately resulting in (or failure to achieve) the desired future (C) characterised by equity, fairness, peace, security, economic development, agricultural productivity and ultimately poverty eradication. Being mindful of the fact that all issues are interlinked from national, regional and global community. It is against this background that land tenure and land use issues (D) need to be



addressed appropriately through sustainable land reform programmes. A number of theoretical concepts are explored in this study

#### **1.8.1.1 Self-determination Theory**

Self-Determination Theory (SDT) is a comprehensive theory of human personality and motivation that is concerned with the manner in which the individual interacts with and depends on the social environment (Legault, 2017:1). SDT describes intrinsic and various kinds of extrinsic motivation and gives an outline of how these motivations have a bearing on situational responses in different domains (*ibid*). The concept of self-determination is as old as statehood itself. According to Berman (1992:389), self-determination describes the right claimed by a 'people' to control their destiny. Since its origin, self-determination has gone through intense modifications in numerous aspects, from a concept conventionally applied to issues like decolonisation, to a justification for the break-up of multi-ethnic states. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) in Kattan (2016) notes that all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they may freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The concept further guarantees people the rights to self-determination, and to control over territories and resources they traditionally occupied or used, be memorialised in instruments of international law.

#### **1.8.1.2 Dependency Theory**

The Dependency Theory has its roots in the 1950s and it arose as an attempt to understand the relations that exist between countries, especially the relations between the more developed and less-developed countries (Ferraro, 1996:7). Beyond this core argument, multiple versions of dependency theory have risen out of the intellectual and political tradition of Marxism, especially during the 1970s.

The dependency theory holds the view that the condition of underdevelopment is precisely the result of the incorporation of the Third World economies into the capitalist world system which is dominated by the West and North America (Randall and Theobald, 1998:120). In that regard, dependency implies a situation in which a particular country or region relies on another for support, survival and growth (Kalu, 2013:48). According to Emeh (2013:119), the concept of dependency can be understood through examining its different forms. There are basically three historical forms of dependency from which the now-underdeveloped nations have passed.

The first of these is what has been termed as colonial dependency. Through this form of dependency, (which has its origins in the early sixteenth century in some sections of the world), European capitalist powers colonized pre-capitalist regions and established a monopoly over land, mines, and labour (*ibid*). Excess wealth was hauled out of these regions through European control over trade relations and the economic character of these regions which had been colonised was strongly moulded by their subservience to European nations (Matunhu, 2011:68).

A second form of dependency is what has become known as financial-industrial dependency which began in the late nineteenth century. This form of dependency was characterized by the expansion of European industrial capital (as opposed to the earlier merchant capital) into the other regions of the world (Emeh, 2013:119) that were regarded as backward. It was part and parcel of the monopoly phase of capitalist development. Financial-industrial dependency encompassed large investments of giant capitalists in the world's backward regions mostly with the aim of producing raw materials which were then exported back to the core nations.

The most recent form of dependency is what has been termed as the new dependency (*ibid*). This form of dependency is a post-World War II phenomenon which encompasses the

occurrence of transnational corporations which have been involved in extensive economic investment in Third World countries (Matunhu, 2011:68).

The dependency theory has been perceived as both pessimistic and structural. At a larger scale, the main presupposition of the structural dependency theory is that it would be impossible to gain an understanding of the challenges experienced by Africa without taking into consideration the wider socio-historical context of Western European expansion (industrial and mercantile capitalism) and the colonization of these places by the Western economies (Emeh, 2013:120). This view is supported by Rodney (1972), who suggested that colonialism was not merely a system of exploitation, but rather one whose main objective was to send back the profits siphoned from Africa to the so called homeland. From a dependency point of view, this repatriation of profits depicts a systematic extradition of the surplus values which were created by the African labour force using African resources.

The development of Europe, therefore, can thus be perceived as part of the similar dialectical processes which underdeveloped Africa. Simply put, Europe's domination of Africa retarded the continent's economic development for five consecutive centuries. This scenario has been succinctly articulated by Rodney (1972:149) whose analysis of the relationship between Europe and Africa is that during colonial era, "*Europe organised herself, accumulated capital gained from her colonies in Africa, shrewdly invested the surplus in productive economy, steadfastly increasing national wealth and riches for its people.*" Amin *et al.*, (1987:2) support this view by stating that;

*"Imperialists partitioned the countries in Africa and then forced the African peasantry into reserves, deliberately planned to be inadequate for the purposes of ensuring the failure of subsistence in earlier traditional forms. The discovery of the mineral riches of Southern Africa (such as gold and diamonds in South Africa, copper in Katanga in*

*Zambia) just when capitalism was entering a new stage of monopolistic expansion inspired a particular form of colonization of the economy of the reserves”*

The result of this was that Africa suffered from the exploitation of her resources by the Europeans. It is because of the centuries of injustice and the subsequent imbalances brought about Europe’s exploitation that many African countries especially those in SADC have sought to redress and addressing the land question through embarking in land reform has been perceived as a major step towards finding a lasting solution.

### **1.8.1.3 Empowerment**

Empowerment is the transformation of the structures or institutions that reinforce and perpetuate discrimination. Marazanye (2016:21) holds the view that empowerment carries both a psychological sense of personal control or influence and a concern with actual social influence, political power and legal rights. Empowerment is thus the process whereby decisions are made by people who have to bear the consequences of those decisions (McArdle, 1989:15). Empowerment basically has the aim of assisting individuals within the society to be able to improve the quality of their lives and also attain an equitable share of the benefits derived from economic growth, (Gergis, 1999, in Business Council of Zimbabwe., 2011:21).

There are basically two forms of empowerment. The first is the “*maximalist*” empowerment which is essentially broad-based empowerment and the second is the narrow-based empowerment which is also known as the “*minimalist*” approach. The maximalist (broad) approach to empowerment, advocates for a restructuring of institutions and the society in general in order to effect radical power relations in the politico-socio-economic spheres. This approach is not interested in replacing white individuals with Black ones, but it however involves the generation and redistribution of resources to the country’s majority (Gqubule, 2006:23). In

contradiction with the maximalist approach, minimalist or narrow approach, empowerment policies and programmes tend to focus more on racial realignment in terms of both the public and private sectors with a bias towards previously disadvantaged groups. This is meant to ensure that their representation is proportionate to their representation in the population, (Edigheji, 2005:67). The narrowness of the minimalist approach stems from the fact that it is not concerned with altering the conditions which brought about and entrenched both the privileges for the minority and the marginalization of the majority.

Madletyana (2011:6) holds the view that people are empowered when they are able to participate in and take greater control over decision-making process – and when they have greater control over assets, policies, organisations and institutions and processes that affect their lives. Changing access to resources through power relations is notably the starting point in empowering people. Rowlands (1997:14) asserts that empowerment should include changing the negative social constructions, in order for people to perceive themselves as possessing the capacity and the right to act and influence decisions. Based on this view, Collins (1994) concludes that empowerment initiatives can thus at times entrench powerlessness of the subordinates.

According to Kabeer (1999:11), the concept of empowerment is not necessarily applicable to everyone but it is aimed at the previously disempowered group(s) in a society. This suggests that the system of social interaction or institutional domains in a society must be liberal in order to allow individual autonomy of all the individuals that comprise a targeted group of the empowerment project. This will in turn allow these individuals to take part in and have a sense of ownership and control in the new order. Therefore, when subordinate group(s) are granted unlimited rights to make choices, it can be said that empowerment would have taken place. Kabeer (1999:12) further argues that, “...*the notion of empowerment is that it is inescapably bound up with the condition of disempowerment and refers to the process by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such ability*”.

It should also be noted that empowerment is not achieved through dependency, but is rather an emancipation from dependency (Rowlands, 1997; Kabeer, 1999; Songelwa, 2009) Therefore, within the land reform context, this can mean an achievement of the individual's direct access to land and their attainment of the ability to take in all spheres of social engagement such as those which involve decision-making. However, it is apparent that access in itself is not a symbol of empowerment but is actually the beginning of the process which will eventually lead to empowerment. Therefore, empowerment programmes should transcend beyond the act of granting previously disadvantaged people access to resources (such as land) which they were previously deprived of but must also create an environment which is conducive to effect change in the lives and social statuses of such people.

#### **1.8.1.4 Conceptualizing Poverty**

The traditional liberal economics definition of poverty was conceptualised in monetary terms. This definition was adopted by the European Council (EC) since the 1970s (Gordon, 2006) and was also drawn from the World Bank (WB) calculations (The World Bank, 2019). For a number of years, the World Bank has calculated and published global estimates of the poor based on what is widely known as the '\$1/day' poverty line. While the conceptualisation was widely known as such, it was just a name as the calculation in years had undergone revisions with the base now being calculated as \$2/day. This is sometimes referred to as income poverty (Mowafi and Khawaja, 2005).

A country's poverty is also measured in terms of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, using the "Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)" against the erroneously held view that it was calculated on nominal exchange rates. The difference between the two is that the PPP model calculates what the dollar (US \$) buys in the United States of America (USA) against the nominal exchange rate which calculates on what the dollar buys in the country in which the

person in question lives (Walter and Walter, 2018). Such a calculation will have exchange rate disparities which would distort the results.

The higher the GDP per capita, the richer a country is considered, while the lower the GDP per capita, the poorer a country is perceived. On an individual basis, the poverty level of an individual is measured by his/her daily income or survival costs translated into monetary terms. It is from this conceptualisation that some economists and international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, would classify people as poor if they lived on less than two United States dollars a day. In short, one can note that the neo-liberal economics definitions are based on national and individual incomes (Abebe and Quaicoe, 2014).

However, the traditional liberal economics conceptualisation (as noted above) has since come under severe attack from development practitioners and social scientists. It has been put forward that, GDP per capita or the growth of GDP as poverty measures are too narrow in scope and lack any form of comprehensiveness since poverty is a broad concept (Abebe and Quaicoe, 2014; Dicany, 2012). This line of thinking was earlier noted by Sen (1984) who posited that, there are good reasons for seeing poverty as a deprivation of basic capabilities, rather than merely as low income. This view is supported by Spicker (2007:230) who asserts that:

*“Not every need can be said to be equivalent to poverty, and there are several interpretations of what makes up poverty. Some interpretations emphasize certain kinds of need, like hunger and homelessness, as particularly important. Some emphasize the seriousness of the deprivations that are experienced: food and shelter are often seen as more important than entertainments and transport (though there may still be grounds to consider people who are deprived of entertainments and transport as ‘poor’). The*

*duration of circumstances is potentially important: a person can be homeless because of a natural disaster, but still be able to command sufficient resources to ensure that needs are met, and met rapidly. Poverty generally refers not just to deprivation, but to deprivation experienced over a period of time.”*

Monitoring agents such as Oxfam have also shown that while the world had been obsessed by GDP growth as a primary measure of national and global development (Hardoon, 2017), the use of this neo-liberal model has not shown the world that inequalities are growing. While there has been a positive trajectory in terms of economic growth measured in monetary terms, the gap between the rich and the poor has widened (*ibid*). Oxfam (2017:6). Hardoon, (2017) further states that:

*“Many people experiencing poverty around the world are seeing an erosion of their main source of wealth namely land, natural resources and homes, as a consequence of insecure land rights, land grabbing, land fragmentation and erosion, climate change, urban eviction and forced displacement. Ownership of land among the poorest wealth quintile fell by 7.3% between the 1990s and 2000s. Change in land ownership in developing countries is commonly driven by large-scale acquisitions, which see the transfer of land from small-scale farmers to large investors and the conversion of land from subsistence to commercial use. Up to 59% of land deals cover communal lands claimed by indigenous peoples and small communities, which translates to the potential displacement of millions of people.”*

The neo-liberal economics definition was seen as monetising social issues which in Africa may not have a ‘*price tag*’. In light of that, there are many rural families in Zimbabwe who might have little earned income but manage to sustain and subsist their



livelihoods from traditional foodstuffs found in the forests like wild fruits, vegetables and wild animals. Added to that, are other food crops that are produced socially in rural areas with little or no monetary value attached but which play a significant part in sustaining families. These food crops include cassava, sweet potatoes and yams (*madhumbe*), as well as some small grains like millet and rapoko, which do not have a well formalised market value. The definition also fails to capture other important social factors. Pieterse (2010:111) proffered important dimensions through which poverty can be conceptualised, and he asserts that;

*“Culturally perceived poverty need not be real material poverty: subsistence economies which serve basic needs through self-provisioning are not poor in the sense of being deprived. Yet the ideology of development declares them so because they don’t participate overwhelmingly in the market economy and do not consume commodities provided for and distributed through the market.”*

The argument put forward suggests that, *“poverty is in the eye of the beholder”* Pieterse et al. (2010:112). The argument put forward therefore, is that for one to truly understand poverty, it must be defined by those who are deemed to be poor, or who see themselves as poor. According to Chambers (1995), in his argument on how to understand and conceptualise poverty, notes that the conceptualisation of poverty by the ‘outsiders’ fails to bring out the true meaning of poverty from the lenses of the poor rural people. Chambers (2013) laments that, *“Outsiders underperceive rural poverty as they are attracted to and trapped in urban ‘cores’ which generate and communicate their own sort of knowledge while rural ‘peripheries’ are isolated and neglected.”* The term outsider is used and defined by (Chambers, 2013a:2) as;

*“Outsiders are people concerned with rural development who are themselves neither rural nor poor. Many are headquarters and field staff of government organisations in the third world. They also include academic researchers, aid*

*agency personnel, bankers, businessmen, consultants, doctors, engineers, journalists, politicians.”*

The combined arguments and explanations show that poverty can best be understood when viewed through the lenses of the persons who are afflicted by it. Only then can development practitioners develop empathy with those living in poverty and such an experience can help development practitioners to come up with meaningful solutions to the problems that affect people living in poverty.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as noted by (Woodward, 2009), conceptualises multidimensional poverty as interlinked forms of deprivation in the economic, human, political, socio-cultural and protective spheres. This concept is drawn from the Human Development concept. Handley *et al.*, (2009) define poverty as, a sense of helplessness, dependence and lack of opportunities, self-confidence and self-respect on the part of the poor. From this definition, poverty is viewed as multidimensional and encompassing various facets of human life. Economically one can be poor if he/she does not have the resources or financial capacity to pay for the needs of life, the most basic of these needs being food, clothing and shelter (McLeod, 2007:3). Socially and politically, one can be rendered poor due to some societal rules like apartheid and racial segregation and caste systems that may define some people as not able to cross certain social and economic lines because of their race or ethnic group. This was the case in colonial Africa in general but was also entrenched in apartheid South Africa, where being Black was an automatic certification of being the lower caste of the society. Besides attempts to conceptualise poverty on the above-discussed issues, the concept is also broken into what scholars have termed relative and absolute poverty (Foster and Foster, 1989:336; Ravallion, 2005:15).

### **1.8.1.5 Understanding Poverty and Empowerment**

Absolute poverty looks at the set of resources a person must acquire in order to maintain a 'minimum standard of living'. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2012) defines absolute poverty as a condition characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends not only on income but also on access to services. Mowafi and Khawaja (2005) states that, absolute poverty, then, is designated as the line below which existence becomes a matter of acute deprivation, hunger, premature death and suffering. In short absolute poverty can also be read as abject poverty in which there is no hope to move out of it.

Relative poverty is defined not as some absolute basket of goods but in terms of the minimum acceptable standards of living applicable to a certain member state (country) and within a person's own society (Gordon, 2006). This conceptualisation is supported by Mowafi and Khawaja (2005) who put forward that, relative poverty is concerned with how well off an individual is with respect to others in the same society. Absolute poverty has been noted to be stable in the short time with some fluctuations in the long run because it is saddled upon specific life needs which do not physically change, relative poverty highly fluctuates with changes in the living standards in a particular society.

There has however, been debates among scholars and development practitioners on the '*absoluteness*' of absolute poverty, a phenomenon other scholars have preferred to call the relativity of absolute poverty. Mowafi and Khawaja (2005) question Townsend's definition of absolute poverty in Ferragina, Tomlinson and Walker (2013) that it is a deprivation of income that would have allowed people to play the roles, participate in the relationships, and follow the customary behaviour which is expected of them by virtue of their membership in the society. This definition of absolute poverty was rebutted by Mowafi and Khawaja (2005) who

argues that, surely what is ‘decent’ or ‘customary’ in society is much less objective a measure than what may, for example, be biologically necessary to maintain physical nourishment. Mowafi and Khawaja (2005) further quote Adam Smith in 1776 when he stated that recognised the relativity of absolute measures by defining ‘*necessaries*’ as not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for a credible people, even of the lowest order, to be without.

In short, the issue of poverty is defined by the society in which the subject person lives. It is also defined by the poor themselves. Hence, what one might view as poverty in Europe, may not be viewed as poverty in Africa or Latin America. Some families might be considered to be poor, for example, if they don’t have a home air-conditioner in the Middle East due to the high day time temperatures, but not having a home air-conditioner is not a measure of poverty in Southern Africa where the temperatures are relatively moderate.

In coming up with a framework for conceptualising poverty, this research adopted the definition forwarded by Handley *et al.*, (2009), who described poverty as a sense of helplessness, dependence and lack of opportunities, self-confidence and self-respect on the part of the poor. The definition is more suitable to Africa in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, because monetary or formal income earnings cannot judge a considerable percentage of the population.

There is also a need to discuss issues surrounding gender and poverty. Some feminists have argued that the African woman has suffered a double tragedy with the coming of colonialism (Lorber, 1997:13). The white colonialists that came to Africa disregarded some cultural practices that empowered African women as they viewed women through the ‘Victorian window’, hence Rothchild *et al.* (2019) argue that, colonial officials propagated Western gender stereotypes which assigned women to the domestic domain, leaving economic and

political matters to men. While the Zimbabwean societies were predominantly patriarchal, colonialism further buttressed the weak position of women through colonial rules that resembled the western treatment of women in Victorian England. Mayoux (2006) aptly captured the phenomenon by stating that, in collusion with patriarchal African leaders, colonial laws were tightened to increase control over women in both rural and urban areas.

Colonial regimes not only in Zimbabwe, but in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, enacted laws which did not permit women to own property and enter into contracts independent of their fathers, brothers or husbands. These laws included the Southern Rhodesia Ordinance No. 10 of 1902 (Rhodesia, 1904), the Native Land Husbandry Act (1951), Master and the Servants Act (1901), amongst others. The Southern Rhodesia Ordinance No. 10 of 1902 never recognised women as full citizens in its promulgation of 'pass documents'. The Ordinance only recognised men above fourteen years of age as being required by the law to have 'pass documents'. While the law was discriminatory, bundling women with children under fourteen showed how colonial powers viewed African women as not being equal to men.

The Native Land Husbandry Act gave the primary holding of land to men and, women were seen as dependents of men and not equal citizens. The Master and Servants Act defined the supremacy of men over women. Sections 16 and 28 of the Act, respectively, stated that;

*“All contracts of service stipulating for the service of a married woman shall be made and executed by her as well as by her husband, except where she is living apart from her husband, in which case her signature or consent alone shall suffice,”* and that, *“If any female servant marries during the contract of service, her husband may at any time subsequent to the marriage and by giving seven days’ notice to the master, dissolve the contract and remove his wife from her master’s service.”*

This law can be defined as having been one of the radical gender laws that defined women as perennial dependents of men. Women were reduced to being perennial minors who needed their male relatives to be complete beings and this law was also applied in property ownership, land included.

Discriminatory laws like the Master and Servants Act (1901) were later repealed after the attainment of independence in 1980 in Zimbabwe (Lawani, 2016). However, while these pieces of discriminatory legislation were repealed, the practice of women being taken as second class citizens remained and was even perpetrated from the highest government offices. In July 1998, Zimbabwe's late Vice President, Joseph Msika, was quoted as saying granting women land or having joint ownership between men and women would destroy families and that his head would be cut off by men and had a potential to alienate ZANU PF from men (Pasura, 2010). Msika's thinking should be seen as making attempts to prejudice women of equal access to land and depicting them as being less deserving to benefit from the FTLRP.

As in defining poverty, defining empowerment is also not an easy task. The World Bank (The World Bank, 2019) notes that;

*“The term empowerment has different meanings in different sociocultural and political contexts, and does not translate easily into all languages. An exploration of local terms associated with empowerment around the world always leads to a lively discussion. These terms include self-strength, control, self-power, self-reliance, own choice, a life of dignity in accordance with one's values, capable of fighting for one's rights, independence, own decision making, being free, awakening, and capability—to mention but a few. These definitions are embedded in local value and belief systems.”*

Havnevik (2016:81) defines empowerment as what happens when people, individually or collectively, conceive of, define and pursue better lives for themselves. Combined with the World Bank (2019) explanation quoted above, empowerment can be seen as a process in which people move from a position of weakness in different perspectives of life to a position of strength. These perspectives can be social, political or economic. For the purposes of this research, the primary perspectives were social and economic. Hence, the ability of people to increase their socio-economic power and influence is seen as empowerment.

This study was concerned with the question of whether the FTLRP resulted in the empowerment of people. While reducing poverty cannot be seen as directly empowering the people, there is a very close relationship between poverty reduction and empowerment. If one is to accept that poverty reduction relates to transforming people from the state of helplessness, dependence and lack of opportunities, self-confidence and self-respect, and that empowerment refers to capacity to participate in, contribute to and benefit from growth processes in ways which recognises such contributions, respect, dignity and make it possible to negotiate a fairer distribution of the benefits of growth (Woodward, 2009). Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee Network on Gender Equality, 2011), then one can safely say that there is a direct correlation between poverty reduction and empowerment. The two issues formed major influencing factors on the adoption of the FTLRP. While the programme had other political drives, it also was informed by the need to reduce poverty and empower Zimbabweans especially the rural communities.

## **1.9 Research Methodology**

This section details the methodology adopted for this study. The research methodology can be described as the methods, techniques, and procedures which the researcher employs in the

process of implementing the research design or research plan. It is thus the theory of how an investigation should proceed Auriacombe (2007:219). This study utilised a qualitative case study research design. Documentary review, Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews were utilised as the main sources of data. The collected data was analysed through content analysis and thematic analysis. Key informants were drawn from Government Departments, District Development Fund (DDF), Farmers' Unions, embassies, financial institutions, politicians, parastatals, commodity companies and academics. The study used purposive sampling and snowballing to interview key informants. Whilst the study's case study was Zimbabwe, the experiences of countries in Southern Africa such as Namibia, South Africa and Zambia were briefly looked at as part of background information on what happened elsewhere within the SADC region.

### **1.9.1 Research Approach**

A research approach is the plan and the procedure for research which encompasses the various steps from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation. Benzin and Yvonna (2008:7) describe a research approach as a broad plan for the study. It details the steps, procedures and broad assumptions for data collection, analysis and interpretation. There are basically three research approaches commonly, which are; qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods research which is a combination of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (Auriacombe, 2005:384; Creswell, 2009:3). However, the qualitative and quantitative approaches are the two most common and recognized approaches to social science research (Braun and Clarke, 2006:79).

This study made use of a qualitative research approach to analyse the strategies of redressing colonial land imbalances in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to the case of Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme. Qualitative research refers to any kind of research that



produces findings that are not based on statistical procedures, or other means of quantification (Auriacombe, 2007:89). Through this approach, the researcher is able to build a complex, holistic picture through analysing words or concepts; reports detailed views of informants; and by conducting the study in a natural setting Auriacombe (2007:98). With the qualitative approach, the researcher was able to gather open-ended, emerging data which allowed the researcher to develop themes from the data (Creswell, 2003:21).

The qualitative approach was chosen because, of its interpretive nature which allowed the researcher to make an interpretation of the collected data (Creswell, 2003:209). The process of qualitative research is thus largely inductive, with the inquirer generating meaning from the data collected in the field (Creswell, 2003:9). According to Neuman (2014:177), the qualitative approach has an advantage in that it is not imprecise or deficient but is very meaningful. The qualitative approach also provides depth and detail through looking deeper, analysing and recording feelings, attitudes and behaviours (Mohajan and Mohajan, 2018:17).

### **1.9.2 Research Paradigm**

A research paradigm can be loosely defined as a general worldview of an assumption of how things work. This study was premised on the social constructivist paradigm/constructivism. Placing a study within a research paradigm means that it is located within a specific scientific and methodological framework with interrelated assumptions, concepts, values and practices that comprise the way the researcher thinks reality should be viewed (ontology) and studied (epistemology). One notable element of this paradigm is that it is subjective. Robson (2011:24), notes that the social constructivist worldview is generally a conventional qualitative approach. According to Creswell (2009:8), this paradigm holds the assumption that individuals attempt to understand the world in which they live and work.

Through this paradigm, social properties are constructed through people's interactions, instead of having a separate existence (Robson, 2011:24). Schwandt (2007:14) notes that the emphasis of this worldview is on experiences as they are lived, felt and undergone by people acting in social situations. In this research, there is a greater reliance on the views of the participants regarding the phenomenon under study as there are multiple realities, with no direct access to them, and thus the researcher has the task of understanding these multiple social constructions of meaning and knowledge (Robson, 2011:24). This means that the researcher will rely on such data collection methods such as interviews and focus group discussions in order to gain the multiple perspectives. The participants thus together with the researchers assist in constructing the 'reality'. However, since the objective of the research is to rely on the views of the participants as much as possible, there are bound to be challenges in terms of an objective reality that can be known (Robson, 2011:24).

### **1.9.3 Inductive Approach**

Qualitative research is inductive by nature, therefore the researcher adopted the inductive approach for this study. According to Saunders *et al.*, (2003:86), with the inductive approach, theory follows data i.e. the researcher collects data first' and then derives a theory about the research phenomena. This particular theory was relevant for this study mainly because it has its emphasis on the collection of qualitative data. This particular paradigm was more suitable to the study as it alludes to the use of facts and values together as in the study of the strategies of redressing colonial land imbalances in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to lessons from Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme. Some schools of thought postulated that '*facts and values*' cannot be detached which means that any understanding is inevitably prejudiced because it is situated in terms of the individual and the event (Elliott and Lukes, 2008:90). This inductive approach enabled the researcher to develop a holistic understanding of the phenomenon under study as the researcher was immersed from the issues underpinning

strategies which have been adopted in redressing colonial land imbalances in Zimbabwe's case. However, the inductive approach is not perfect in itself and has some notable weaknesses in that the researcher who is subjective by nature, will most likely affect the reliability of the data to be collected due to bias (Saunders *et al.*, 2003:86).

#### **1.9.4 Research Design**

A research design consists of a clear statement of the research problem as well as plans for collecting, processing and interpreting the observations intended to provide answers to the research question or to test the hypothesis Webb and Auriacombe (2006:589). It seeks to come up with appropriate statements that can be used to explain the situation that is of concern or that describes the causal relationships of interest. It is essentially a plan or blueprint of how a researcher intends to conduct a study. A case study has been defined by Yin (1994) as an all-encompassing empirical inquiry employed so as to investigate contemporary phenomenon within the real-life context or setting. Creswell (2003:15) states that a case study allows for an exploration of a "*bounded system*" over a period of time involving in-depth data collection from multiple sources and this system is bounded by time and place.

This study adopted a case study research design. Ragin (1994:12) asserts that a case study research design involves organising data from specific cases for in-depth analysis. In this study, qualitative data collection methods were used. Qualitative data obtained from in depth interviews with key informants and focus group discussions was by supported documentary review. Through utilising the case study approach, the researcher was able to carry out an empirical investigation by collecting comprehensive, systematic and in-depth information concerning the phenomenon under study. With beneficiaries of Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme as the unit of analysis, the study was able to generate information regarding strategies that have been used to redress colonial land imbalances.

This study chose Zimbabwe as the main case study and from this, 8 of the country's 10 provinces were purposively selected and from these 16 districts were chosen. The chosen provinces and their districts were Manicaland Province (Mutasa and Nyanga districts), Mashonaland East Province (Marondera and Chikomba districts) Mashonaland Central Province (Bindura and Mazowe districts), Matabeleland North Province (Binga and Umguza districts), Masvingo Province (Mwenezi and Chiredzi districts), Mashonaland West Province (Chinhoyi and Zvimba districts), Matabeleland South Province (Beitbridge and Matobo districts) and Midlands Province (Zvishavane and Mberengwa districts. Farmers from these districts were interviewed by the researcher. In order to learn from the experiences of other countries, background information from South Africa and Namibia was provided and the researcher also looked at what happened in other countries beyond SADC.

The case study approach enabled the researcher to narrow down an otherwise broad field of research into an easily researchable topic. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000:9), this approach is an appropriate way of capturing content specific detail. Through utilising the case study approach, the researcher gained the ability to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life contexts (Yin, 2003:12). The case study research design was utilized because the research was focused on how to aid development in southern Africa from the land question point of view since Zimbabwe is one country that is within the region that has undertaken the most noticeable land reform. Moreso, the case study approach was chosen by the researcher as it provided context and narratives behind particular results of Zimbabwe's experience of redressing colonial land imbalances before making an assessment of its relevance as a strategy to the Southern Africa context. Leedy and Ormrod (2005) note that one of the strengths of a case study is that it may be suitable for learning more about a little known or poorly understood situation.

### **1.9.5 Population**

A population is defined by Burns and Grove (1997:779) as all elements (individuals, objects, and events) that meet the sample criteria for inclusion in the study. It is the group of interest to the researcher whereupon the study's results can be generalized (Gibson *et al.*, 2001). The study population often includes the total collection of elements about which the researcher made some inferences. It is the entire group of persons or set of objects and events which the researcher intends to study. The target population is the exact, complete collection of individuals relevant to the research project (Cooper and Schindler, 2002:4; Neuman, 2014:252). This study's research population comprised of officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, relevant regional embassy officials in Harare, the academia, beneficiaries of land (new farmers), traditional leaders, Government officials, AREX officers, District Administrator's office, War veterans, Civic organizations, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) and the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) political parties and policy formulators.


### **1.9.6 Sampling**

Sampling involves the selection of the specific research participants from an entire population (Turner, 2003:3). A sample is used to gather information about a population without having to measure the entire population (Magwa and Magwa, 2015:62). Sampling is the, selection of some cases to examine in detail, and whereupon what is learnt from these cases is used to understand a much larger set of cases (Neuman, 2014:246). Mugenda, and Mugenda, (2004:26) define a sample as a small group obtained from the accessible population. Sampling aims to achieve representativeness thus seeks to choose a sample that will be representative of the population which the researcher aims to draw conclusions from (Blanche *et al.*, 2006:49). There are generally two categories of sampling which are probability and non-probability (Babbie, 2007). Types of probability sampling include simple random sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling and cluster sampling and types of non-probability sampling include:

convenience sampling, purposive sampling, snowball sampling and volunteer sampling (Neuman, 2014:248; Magwa and Magwa, 2015:63). This study utilised non-probability sampling techniques in the form of purposive and snowball sampling techniques. Non-probability sampling was the preferred method as it allowed generalisation to populations (Blanche *et al.*, 2006:139).

Data were gathered from 8 provinces in Zimbabwe regarding the beneficiaries of the FTLRP who took part in this study shows that, out of eighty (80) resettled farmers interviewed, 42.5% were women (Figure 1.3 below).


**Figure 1.3: Gender in the sample population**



*Source: Author*

There were more female participants in Manicaland and Mashonaland Central provinces. Masvingo, Matabeleland North and South and Midlands provinces had more male respondents with an average of 73%.

**Figure 1.4: Age-class distribution in the sample population**



*Source: Author*

**Table 1.1: Sampling effort per province**

#	Province (Districts sampled)	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Human Population Estimate (million) (2012)	Number of Key Informants Interviewed	Number of participants in Focus Groups (No. of groups)	Number of Questionnaires administered	Sampling Effort
1.	<b>Mashonaland East</b> (Marondera, Chivhu)	32 230	1 350 000	10	48 (2)	10	68
2.	<b>Mashonaland West</b> (Chinhoyi, Chegutu)	57 441	1 500 000	10	33 (2)	10	53
3.	<b>Mashonaland Central</b> (Mazoe, Bindura)	28 347	1 152 520	10	51 (2)	10	71
4.	<b>Matabeleland North</b> (Binga, Umguza)	75 025	749, 017	6	36 (2)	10	52
5.	<b>Matabeleland South</b> (Beitbridge, Matobo)	54 172	688, 893	6	29 (2)	10	45

6.	<b>Masvingo</b> (Mwenezi, Chiredzi)	56 566	1 485 090	5	45 (2)	10	60
7.	<b>Manicaland</b> (Nyanga, Mutasa)	36 459	1 752 698	7	42 (2)	10	59
8.	<b>Midlands</b> (Mberengwa, Zvishavane)	46 166	1.614 941	8	36 (2)	10	54
<b>TOTAL</b>				62	320 (16)	80	462

*Source: Author*

### ***1.9.6.1 Purposeful Sampling***

Purposive sampling was utilised by the researcher to select the key informants to take part in the interviews. According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003:713), purposive sampling techniques involve selecting certain units or cases based on a specific purpose rather than randomly. Purposive sampling thus makes it possible for the sample to reflect the population accurately in order for inferences to be drawn (Babbie, 1992). The researcher selected this sampling method since it is widely assumed that for qualitative inquiry samples must be selected purposefully so as to yield cases that are “*information rich*” (Patton, 2002:12). In purposive sampling, the researcher depended on their own judgment to deliberately select organisations and individual participants to take part in the study.

Organisations and participants were chosen based on the assumption that they had sought after information on the strategies of redressing colonial land imbalances in Southern Africa, particularly the case of the lessons learnt from Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Programme. This sampling method ensured that key organisations and participants relevant to the study were covered. Purposive sampling allowed the researcher to choose informants who have expertise in the area under study. However, this technique has a weakness in that the researcher cannot have knowledge of the existence of all participants who may possess the information being sought after and as a result, these participants tend to be left out of the research.



The sample included the resettled farmers from 8 provinces from which 2 districts were chosen from each province as noted above. The sampled districts were each chosen on the basis of proximity to allow the researcher to interview more resettled farmers. However, purposive sampling has weaknesses of its own, particularly with regards to the fact that it is prone to bias since participants were aware that they were being interviewed. Participants would not behave as they naturally would. To address these weaknesses, the researcher gathered data using other data collection methods such as documentary search.

#### ***1.13.6.2 Snowball Sampling***

The researcher also employed snowball sampling. Snowball sampling according to Edwards and Holland (2013:6), is a process through which contact is made with participants appropriate for one's research through whatever access route one can find, and through these first participants, one will be introduced to others of similar/relevant characteristics to the research. Through this sampling technique, the researcher made use of information provided by initial participants to reach the next participants. This was particularly useful in instances where the researcher did not initially have knowledge of the existence of some potential participants or where they were difficult to reach. Snowball sampling has the advantage of allowing the researcher to reach populations that are difficult to sample when using other sampling techniques and it also requires little planning (Castillo, 2009:30). Snowballing was thus used in this study to ensure that important key informants were interviewed for this research and also in coming up with participants for the focus group discussions.

### **1.10 Data Collection Methods**

Data collection methods are the methods which are used by the researcher to create data from a sampled data source in a particular study (Given, 2008). Burns and Grove (1997:383) define data collection as the systematic way of obtaining the data which is relevant to the research objectives, purpose and questions. Data collection can be described as the process of gathering

and measuring information on specific variables which may be of interest to the researcher, in a manner which is established and systematic and which allows the researcher to effectively answer the stated research questions, test hypotheses and evaluate outcomes (Franklin, 2012:13). All data collection done in this research had the main objective of capturing quality information which transforms into a rich data analysis. Data collection methods used often include diverse research approaches, tools and techniques for collecting and analysing qualitative or quantitative data. Thus, study adopted qualitative methods to collect data. Qualitative research methods have a distinct advantage in that they generate rich and detailed data. The qualitative data collection methods utilised for this study include key informant interviews, focus group discussions and documentary search.

#### **1.10.1 In-depth Interviews with Key Informants**

Key informant interviews are described by Scott (1990:54) as loosely structured conversations between the researcher and the people who have specialised knowledge concerning the subject matter the researcher seeks to gain an understanding of. Magwa and Magwa (2015) assert that the most widely used types of interviews are structured, unstructured or semi-structured. For this particular study, the researcher made use of in-depth interviews with key informants as the primary source of data. Edwards and Holland (2013:5) opine that in-depth interviews generally encompass the collection of data through asking questions. Data was collected through listening and recording responses (manually and electronically) given to the researcher by individuals. The research made use of semi-structured interviews. Through conducting interviews, the researcher was able to pursue their own line of inquiry and asked questions in an unbiased manner. Interview guides were first provided to key informants so as to allow them to be familiar with the questions the researcher intended on asking them. In-depth interviews with key informants had the advantage of providing immediate responses. Interviews also had the

advantage of yielding the richest data, details and new insights and provide an opportunity to explore topics in depth (Magwa and Magwa, 2015:75).

The interview questions were developed in accordance with the study's research questions and the researcher utilised an interview guide with open-ended questions that are inductive to solicit responses (Annexure 1). The researcher carried out interviews in person across the wards in each district and with other key informants using either purposive sampling or snowballing. The author used their personal knowledge of the 8 provinces that acted as the specific case studies for this study and of the organisations and individuals from which the researcher interviewed his participants. The farmers who acted as key respondents for the in-depth interviews were selected using purposive sampling. In this case, the choice of sampling technique was driven by the need to gain in-depth knowledge on the exact magnitude of the strategies that have been used to address colonial land imbalances in Zimbabwe's through the Land Reform Programme.

A total of 80 land reform beneficiaries from both A1 and A2 resettlement schemes were interviewed. The key informants interviewed by the researcher were from various backgrounds which included academia, the judiciary, government ministries and departments, civil society, embassies, independent consultants and technocrats, farmers, traditional leadership, war veterans, intergovernmental organisations, bankers, parliamentarians and politicians. A detailed list of the Key Informants interviewed in this research is on Annexure 3.

In conducting these interviews, an audio was kept for reference and recording the responses given by the respondents. After the interviews, the researcher reviewed the results in order to ascertain the existence of any patterns. This allowed for an inductive analysis of the interview responses.

### **1.10.2 Focus Group Discussions**

Focus group discussions were also utilised by the researcher in order to gain some of the sought-after information. Focus group discussions mainly entail mobilising a target group and conducting interviews with them as a group. For this study, focus group discussions were conducted with resettled farmers. The researcher conducted 2 focus group discussions from each of the 8 sampled provinces. This means that 1 focus group discussion was conducted per each district that was sampled by the researcher. A distinct advantage why focus group discussions were chosen is that they saved the researcher some valuable time as the researcher was able to record the responses by the participants all at once.

### **1.14.3 Documentary Search**

Documentary search involves the collection and examination of available documents to supplement field research. According to Oppenheim (1992:2), defines documentary research as the systematic analysis of written records. It involves comprehensive analysis of documents that contain information about the phenomena under study (Bailey, 1994:12). For this study, the researcher familiarised himself with the existing works and discourse regarding the Land Reform Initiatives as part of strategies of redressing colonial imbalances in Southern Africa at large and in Zimbabwe especially. Hence, the documentary analysis encompassed both printed and electronic archives.

The literature used in this study include National Constitutions, reports produced by various Commissions that were carried with regards to land acquisition and redistribution in Zimbabwe, legal and policy documents (e.g. Acts of Parliament, statutory instruments, ordinances and regulations), transcripts of speeches, newspapers, annual reports, official correspondence, internet sources, journal articles and books, among others. Documentary research was conducted so as to gain deeper insight into the subject matter. Official statistical data on the

beneficiaries of Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme revenue was used extensively. By reviewing these documents, the researcher aimed at gaining a deeper insight into the prevailing works and on-going debates regarding Land Reform Initiatives. Document analysis also enabled the researcher to highlight the main assumptions and current implicit theoretical positions. The method was a useful source as the study required the historical development of the processes and events that led to the land reform in Zimbabwe and some attempts that have been made by states within Southern Africa to redress colonial land imbalances.

### **1.11 Data Presentation**

Data reporting should be presented in both textual and visual formats such as, graphs and tables (Hayes, 1997:12). Organizing and displaying the data in visual formats is useful in identifying trends and forecasts. The qualitative data gathered from the interviews was organised, assembled and then compressed. This data was then presented in the form of tables. These allowed the investigator to simplify interpretation and draw conclusions. Also, some of the qualitative data collected was presented in the form of themes and subheadings.

### **1.12 Data Analysis**

Data analysis is the process of transforming, inspecting, cleaning and modelling data with the aim of discerning useful information, proposing conclusions and supporting decision-making (Sternberg, 2004:23). It involves reducing the amount of raw data and identifying significant patterns so as to reveal the essence and true meaning of the data (Patton, 1990:75). According to Tesch (1990:56), data analysis is essential as it discovers patterns and relationships that exist within the collected data during the course of the study. In this study, the researcher utilised content analysis, thematic analysis and statistical analysis in analysing the data gathered.

### **1.12.1 Content Analysis**

The researcher utilised content analysis as a data analysis technique in this research. Powers and Knapp (2006:4) assert that content analysis is a general term for a number of different strategies used to analyse text. Content analysis seeks to describe the characteristics of the document's content by examining who says what, to whom, and with what effect (Bloor, 2006:12). Through content analysis, books, brochures, news reports, other written documents and speeches were analysed. The researcher identified and took note of certain phrases, words and or concepts within the text which will then be coded and categorised into themes. The researcher analysed and grouped the qualitative data obtained from interviews.

### **1.12.2 Thematic Analysis**

This research also made use of thematic analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006:17) describe thematic analysis as an independent qualitative and descriptive approach that is primarily described as a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It is a wide-ranging process which allowed the researcher to identify numerous cross-references between the data and the research's evolving themes. Thematic analysis was thus more suitable for analysing the data since the research aimed at collecting data to completely develop an understanding of a research phenomenon. Thematic analysis allowed the researcher to determine precisely the strategies employed in redressing colonial imbalances, paying particular attention to the case of Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme.

### **1.12.3 Statistical Analysis**

Data that was captured in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets was summarised using pivot tables to establish descriptive statistics describing the data, checked for normality. To test the significance of differences observed in A1 and A2 farms (before and after FTLRP), non-parametric tests (Mann Whitney-U test) were done for data gathered on agricultural production, movable

and immovable assets. Significance levels were determined at 0.05 using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

#### **1.12.4 Establishing Trustworthiness and Credibility**

Trustworthiness and credibility are essential elements for the validation of the collected data. Trustworthiness refers to the degree to which data collection tools will yield the same results if and when the process is repeated (Saunders *et al.*, 2003:7). To ensure that the data gathered was both trustworthy and credible, the researcher utilised numerous methods of data generation. The researcher utilised cross-checking of multiple sources of data and collection procedures so as to evaluate the degree to which all the evidence converges. These methods included the use of interviews with key informants and documentary search. These acted as the methods of validating the data.

#### **1.12.5 Ethical Considerations**

Ethical considerations were thoroughly taken into account in this study. There was adherence to the regulations and other relevant policies as stipulated by the University of Zimbabwe and any other institutions that were consulted during the research such as, the Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Research and Extension (AREX), regional Embassies in Harare, District Lands Officers and District Administrators' offices amongst others. The researcher assured participants that all information collected would remain confidential. To meet this requirement, no identification was required during interviews. Before conducting any interview, the researcher first sought consent from the respondents so as to ensure that the study was based on voluntary participation. The researcher achieved this by explaining the purpose of the research, in this case the academic purpose of the study, and then asking respondents to participate willingly. Further, collected information was not made available to the press and/or any social media.

### **1.13 Research limitations**

Studying land issues in Zimbabwe is akin to studying politics due to the sensitivities around the subject matter. The researcher had to approach a person more than once, in some cases, for them to be convinced that the research was purely academic and not a political investigation. The researcher further made use of prolonged engagement with the research subjects in order to gain their trust which ultimately resulted in their participation in the research. There seemed to be a lot of skepticism from some of the identified and sampled key informants for the research and they seemed to be less willing to participate in the study. In order to gain their full cooperation to participate in the study, the researcher made it known to the participants that their contributions would be highly valued. The initial study area was also vast, and it was costly to traverse all the areas to meet the farmers and other targeted respondents. To counter this, the researcher sampled a few areas who they thought would guarantee the collection of the sought-after information.

Moreso, the researcher faced some challenges in terms of securing appointments with public officials in government departments, embassies and other civic institutions that were sampled. Due to their busy schedules, these officials were, in some cases, unavailable, difficult to reach and in instances kept on postponing the appointments. The researcher, however, persisted until some of the interviews were granted. While most of the limitations were dealt with, it was at the expense of time given that a lot of time was spent on fieldwork.

### **1.14 Delimitations of the study**

The study is geographically confined to the Republic of Zimbabwe, a factor that is captured as the case study of the research. To that end, the study focused on Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme, which is one of the most notable attempts that have been made towards redressing



colonial land imbalances on the continent. This means that greater focus was placed on the period beginning the year 2000 where Zimbabwe embarked on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The study, however, also generally covers the period since the colonial settlers arrived in Zimbabwe (1890 to 2019) to give adequate background and root causes of the imbalances. While the land question is still an ongoing policy issue, the cut-off time of 2018 allowed the research not to be entangled in an endless topic. Although the study's case study was situated within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, experiences of other countries outside SADC such as Kenya, were also discussed so as to draw lessons.

## CHAPTER 2

### AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN LAND ISSUES

#### 2.1 Introduction

At independence, Southern African countries inherited a land ownership system that was heavily skewed in favour of the white minority race. This racial land imbalance was deeper in mostly former British colonies. The rewarding of the Second World War (WW II) veterans with African land and quasi apartheid policies, segregated Africans to peripheral infertile land during the colonial times (Lahiff, 2003a:24; Kariuki, 2004a:7) Such policies exacerbated the segregated nature of land expropriation that had been started on the dawn of colonialism since the arrival of the French Huguenots at the Cape of Good Hope in the mid to late 1600s (Kalabamu, 2000: 307).

This chapter gives a critical analysis of land imbalances of selected countries in Southern Africa. Specific subject countries included in this chapter are South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In the process of analysis, other African countries within Southern Africa or beyond are referred to owing to the centrality of the need to use the examples to strengthen the arguments being put forward. The thrust of the chapter therefore, is to bring to light how the post-colonial land imbalances were created in Southern Africa. This is motivated by the fact that for one to be able to discuss and analyse policies to redress land colonial imbalances, there is an imperative need to understand the historical processes that brought about the situation at hand.

## **2.2 Colonialism and the Development of Racial Segregation**

Before its colonisation by the whites, Southern Africa was a single race region comprised mostly of the Bantu peoples as well as the Khoi and San groups (Moyo, 2005a: 11). The Bantu people claimed ownership of the large tracks of lands that constitute what is now called Southern Africa. At the time of colonisation by the white settlers, the Bantu had established chiefdoms that controlled most of the arable lands in the region. The Khoi and San tribes were also occupants of the area, with some of them inhabiting the semi-arid and arid regions of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia (UNESCO, 1974:15; Rugege, 2004:1).

Different countries in the region fell to the colonialists at different times due to their proximity to the sea, which was by then the primary route of interaction between the Europeans and Africans. After having achieved control of the ocean hinterlands, the British, Portuguese, Germans and Boers moved in-land. They acquired the lands using mostly similar strategies of occupation and conquering after local military resistance, which they squashed due to the advantage they held of superior weapons (Waites, 1999:101). This chapter discusses how the Europeans colonised and expropriated land from the Africans. The focus of this chapter is on the legal and military strategies which were used as tools in forcibly grabbing land from indigenous Africans. These tools had far-reaching consequences in post-independence Southern Africa.

### **2.2.1 The Land Question in Namibia**

Namibia, previously called South West Africa, was colonised by Germany in 1883 and remained so until 1915 when it was conquered by South African troops, where after, in 1919, it became a South African protectorate under the League of Nations. The Germans initially acquired land by purchasing it from the traditional leaders of Namibia, predominantly the

Herero and Nama people (Anderson, 2005: 1155). This means that Namibians in the very beginning freely traded in their land and they got some form of commercial value through exchanging land with the settlers.

However, later on, the Germans made use of the traditional rivalry that existed between the Herero and the Nama people to take over the country now called Namibia. After noting that there was a hostile relationship between the leaders of the Herero and the Nama, the Germans offered protection to the Herero (Anderson, 2005:1159-60). On the other hand, the Nama under the leadership of Hendrik Witbooi were also approached by the Germans with an offer of protection which they rejected (Thornley, 2013: 24). Acceptance of the protectorate agreements by the Herero paved way for the easy colonisation of Namibia, while a rejection as was in the case of the Nama only brought war from the Germans (Thornley, 2012:24). The Germans claimed authority basing on the right of conquest (Berat, 1993:177). The German colonialists aimed to ensure that:

*“the native tribes would have to give up their land on which they had previously grazed their stock in order that the white man might have land for the grazing of his stock.”*

It is established that Samuel Maherero, the Herero paramount chief came under pressure from his people who wanted their land back (de Villiers, 2003a: 29). Samuel gave in to the pressure and began a war of resistance, taking advantage of the fact that the Germans were preoccupied with a war against the Nama people. This led to the Nama-Herero Uprising of 1904 (Anderson, 2005: 1161). The uprising was primarily based on the desire to regain control of the lost lands and the lost independence. The Germans, as was with all the colonial regimes, could not accept any kind of resistance from the African people. They instituted brutal retaliatory tactics that saw the defeat of the uprisings. The nature in which the Germans quashed the uprising was

described by de Rivera (2012:102-105) as a genocide. Following the defeat of the Africans, more land was expropriated by the Germans.

German rule of Namibia was short-lived. Namibia was a colony of Germany for thirty-one years from 1884 to 1915. Millions of hectares of fertile arable land was expropriated by the Germans for either the German administration or the individual settlers (de Villiers, 2003:30). After the end of the First World War (WW I) in which Germany and its allies were defeated by the allied powers, Namibia was given to Britain by the League of Nations as a Trustee Territory in 1920. Britain, in turn, transferred its responsibility to South Africa to run Namibia on its behalf (Dugard, 1973:27).

The South Africans were initially welcomed as ‘liberators’ and there were expectations of South Africa returning some of the land the Germans had taken (de Villiers, 2003a: 29). However, apartheid South Africa's rule in Namibia was, from the onset, bent on expropriation of best farmland from the Africans (de Villiers, 2003:29). The South African policy in Namibia was driven by the need to attain basically two goals. The first goal was to rid South Africa of poor, illiterate Afrikaners. These Afrikaners were given vast tracks of land in Namibia at cheap and concessionary rates (Werner, 1993:144; Odendaal, 2011:5). Namibia, therefore, became a dumping ground for excess and unwanted Afrikaners. The second reason was the need to create a large pool of labour for the mines and the farms in both South Africa and Namibia (Werner, 2003:4-6). The land policy, therefore, became a mere replica of the Apartheid land policy in South Africa.

When the South African government took over the administration of Namibia in 1920, approximately twelve million hectares of prime land were in the hands of the whites. By 1925, a further twelve million hectares had been given to the whites, mostly Afrikaners from South Africa (Ankomah, 2015:12; Dzinesa, 2017:97-101). While large tracts of arable land were

being allocated to the whites, the Native land Commission proclaimed a paltry two million hectares for Africans who constituted ninety percent of the population (Mararike, 2014:17).

After the end of the Second World War (WW II) in 1945, the South African government gave some land in Namibia to the whites who had taken part in the war as gratitude for their different roles in the war. By the 1950s, a further seven million hectares of farm land had been given to the whites (Moyo, 2005b:10). This colonial domination led to the rise of independence movements. One of the major movements was the Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC) formed by a "*group of some 200 Namibian workers and students based in Cape Town, who had been influenced and supported by the African National Congress (ANC), the Communist Party and the Liberal Party in 1957 in South Africa*" (Staff Reporter, 2005:1). The OPC's main aim was to improve the working conditions of the migrant Namibian labourers in South Africa and eradicate the discriminatory contract labour system. In 1985, OPC was renamed Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO). In April 1959, OPO opened offices in Namibia and their struggle was broadened to include the demand for independence (Lamb, 1998:60).

In May 1959, another liberation organisation was formed, called the South West African National Union (SWANU). SWANU's aim was to provide a united front in fighting South African occupation as it was an alliance of the youths and intellectuals from the urban areas and the Herero Chiefs Council (Soggot, 1986:25). SWANU was later rocked by the tribal difference which affected its alliance with the OPO given that SWANU was dominated by the Herero people while OPO was dominated by the Ovambo people. In 1960, the two organisations merged to form South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in order to bridge the tribal differences and intensify the independence struggle (Muenjo and Mapaire, 2010:30).

The initial phases of the struggle attempted to use peaceful means to achieve independence. The leaders of SWAPO led by Sam Nujoma initially attempted to use diplomatic channels and pressure through the United Nations (Anseeuw *et al.*, 2011:17). Diplomacy failed and the liberation movement had to adopt different means to attain independence. SWAPO also adopted guerrilla warfare to force the apartheid government to the negotiating table and negotiate for independence and indeed the struggle paid off. Through the United States of America (USA), Britain, Canada, Germany and France, popularly called the Contact Group mediation efforts, Namibia successfully attained independence in 1990 (Melber, 2003:75). However, as was the case in other former colonies in Southern Africa, the independence they got was an emasculated independence with regards to land issues.

The land issue was very central in the independence negotiations, and the involvement of the Contact Group was more than just mediation. These states played a central role in ensuring that what Africans in Namibia would win was only the 'flag and anthem' (political independence) while perpetuating the colonial status quo (Melber *et al.*, 2007:74). The Namibian Constitution was crafted with the influence of the Contact Group who had a vested interest in the land issue and desired to maintain the colonial status quo (Moyo, 2005a:165). The issue of land redistribution is hampered by Article 16 (1 & 2) of the Namibian Constitution which states that;

*“all persons shall have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all forms of immovable and movable property individually or in association with others and to bequeath their property to their heirs or legatees: provided that Parliament may by legislation prohibit or regulate as it deems expedient the right to acquire property by persons who are not Namibian citizens”* (André *et al.*, 2012:2).

*“The State or a competent body or organ authorised by law may expropriate property*

*in the public interest subject to the payment of just compensation, in accordance with requirements and procedures to be determined by Act of Parliament.”*

The net effect of the article means that land redistribution would be based on a “willing seller-willing buyer” principle, given that the issue of “just compensation” meant that the new government could not on its own determine the price of the land (Walker, 2005:813-815). In extension, the injustice did not take into account the fact that most of the land that was lost by the Africans was through unjust and unorthodox means when the Africans were the indigenous owners of the land. However, it is not the issue of the ‘willing seller- willing buyer’, which was uniform in all former British colonies that found their way into the independent agreements, but the fact Article 16 (1 & 2) of the Namibian Constitution and other articles on the rights issues according to Article 25 (1) of Chapter 3 were non-amendable. Article 25 (1) states that;

*“Save in so far as it may be authorised to do so by this Constitution, Parliament or any subordinate legislative authority shall not make any law, and the Executive and the agencies of Government shall not take any action which abolishes or abridges the fundamental rights and freedoms conferred by this Chapter, and any law or action in contravention thereof shall to the extent of the contravention be invalid.”*

One can interpret this as stating that, “Article 25 is saying Chapter 3 of Namibia’s Constitution cannot be amended – ever! – unless ‘authorised to do so by this Constitution’. And ‘this Constitution’ clearly says not even parliament or the government or the executive “shall take any action which abolishes or bridges the fundamental rights and freedoms conferred by this Charter.” What it means is that the land issue could not be dealt with constitutionally by other



means except on the terms set by those who benefitted unjustly from the colonial policies and laws. While independence was achieved in 1990, the new government led by Sam Nujoma had a daunting task of reconciling the need to address the land issue which was the major reason for the struggle or to placate the rules set by the former colonial masters by defending their land interests.

### **2.2.2 The Land Question in South Africa**

The control of land and other means of production by Blacks in South Africa ended with the colonisation of the South African coastal lands by Jan Van Riebeeck and his Dutch colonialists under the Dutch East Indian Company (SAHO, 2011:1). The idea of the settlement was to have a station for the shippers travelling between Europe and the Far East to rest and acquire fresh foods such as vegetables and meat. In light of that background, the expansion of the colony was subdued in the early years of settlement. Initially, the settlement thrived through trade with the *Khoi Khoi* and the San people, who were popularly and pejoratively called Hottentots or Bushmen (Karklins and Schrire, 1991:61). However, as time passed, the relatively cordial relations between the settlers and the Africans deteriorated as a result of the steady expansion of the colony. Successive governors of the Cape since Riebeeck promoted the growth of the colony which meant expropriating the land and the cattle of the Khoi and San people (Thompson, 2001: 54-55 and Magubane, 1996: 45 quoted in Karklins and Schrire, 1991:81).

In 1794, the Dutch East Indian Company went bankrupt due to competition from other chartered companies and maladministration which paved the way for the British to seize the Cape colony in 1795. This culminated in a conflictual relationship between the Dutch and the British which was partly because of the British's rhetoric support of Black communities against the Dutch.

In a number of instances, the Blacks resisted the takeover of their land by the foreigners with some success but, the Boers had superior weapons which led to the defeat of the Blacks (Walker, 2005:809).

In 1867 and 1886, diamonds and gold were discovered in the Kimberly and Johannesburg, respectively. This attracted more whites to South Africa who sought to invest in mining (Adams *et al.*, 1999; Wilson, 2001:101), resulting in the need for more labour. This resulted in more pressure for land, exacerbating the conflict between the British and the Dutch. The biggest loser in the conflict were the Africans who lost their land to European settlers during the expansion of the mines. The settlement by the Europeans led to repressive laws that were meant to create a cheap labour pool, which had the effect of constraining the ability of African workers to bargain for their wages. The Africans had to put up with various unfair employment conditions. In 1870s and 1880s, the British conquered the African states in Southern Africa, confiscated the bulk of their land and imposed cash taxation demands (Wassermann, 2011:34).

From October 1899 to May 1902 the British and the Boers fought in the Anglo-Boer war (Morgan, 2002:2). The war which was triggered by the desires of the British to dominate the rest of South Africa from the Boers ended with the worst consequences for Africans. The war resulted in the unity of the whites and the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 (Government of South Africa, 1910:220). It was the Union of South Africa that formed the platform for the creation of the apartheid government in South Africa. The Union did away with the traditional British-Boer animosity and created an environment that brought the Boers' dominance in South African politics. Apartheid according to Hughes (2010:146), is a racial segregation concept which is based on the notion that whites are a superior race while Blacks and other non-Caucasians are inferior races who exist only to serve the white race.

The concept is an overall belief in white supremacy and its real meaning can well be captured from the words of former South African President, P. W. Botha (1985) when he said that;

*“We do not pretend like other Whites that we like Blacks. The fact that, Blacks look like human beings and act like human beings does not necessarily make them sensible human beings. Hedgehogs are not porcupines, and lizards are not crocodiles simply because they look alike. If God wanted us to be equal to the Blacks, he would have created us all of a uniform colour and intellect. But he created us differently: Whites, Blacks, Yellow, rulers and the ruled. Intellectually, we are superior to the Blacks; that has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt over the years. I believe that the Afrikaner is an honest, God-fearing person, who has demonstrated practically the right way of being.”*

The apartheid policies were strict in what was termed ‘separate development’ (Tiryakian, 1960:682). The white race lived in its own areas while Africans were relegated to the reserves and the ‘townships.’ The townships were basically squalid high density areas. In the true sense of events, there was no separate development. There was the development of the white communities and underdevelopment of the African communities (Tiryakian, 1960).

While the discriminatory policies affected every precept of South African life, it was on the access and ownership to land where it was heavily pronounced. Black ownership of property, which in most cases is defined by land in either urban or rural areas, was very difficult. African ownership of land was based on communal tenure systems that were promoted by the whites in a manner that strangled African individual and societal development (Tiryakian, 1960; Worldbank, 2018). Successive land laws alienated Africans from their land. The Native Land Act of 1913 confined Africans to reserves that constituted only eight % of the total land in South Africa.

It can be argued that, like all other pieces of legislation in colonial Southern Africa, the main purpose of the 1913 Native Land Act (subsection 4(1) and (2)), was to increase land available for whites (Hall, 2014:9). This could only be achieved by reducing the land available to Blacks since land is a fixed resource (Clark and Worger, 2013:37). The Areas Act of 1950 could have been influenced by the extreme belief in apartheid by the National Party, which came to power in 1948. The Group Areas Act was used to enforce the racial segregation laws by the National Party government. All the Blacks that remained on white land on separate agreements with the whites were relocated to African reserves which were renamed to 'homelands' (Shephard, 1994:3). Using a number of anti-Black laws, Africans who had remained on fertile land because they had title deeds were removed (Boudreaux, 2010:14-15). The process was termed cleaning the 'Black spots' (de Villiers, 2003:46).

The net effect of these policies was the alienation of Africans from their land. From the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck until early 1994, when South Africa gained majority rule, the main influence of the African struggle in South Africa was for land, which was the primary embodiment of freedom (Rugege, 2004:2). According to Rugege (2004:2), one old South African stated that;

*“The land, our purpose is the land that is what we must achieve. The land is our whole lives, we plough it for food, we build our houses from the soil, we live on it and we are buried in it. When the whites took our land away from us, we lost the dignity of our lives, and we could no longer feed our children. We were forced to become servants, and we were treated like animals. Our people have many problems, we are beaten and killed by the farmers, and the wages we earn are too little to buy even a bag of mealie-meal. We must unite together to help each other and face the Boers. But in everything we do we must remember that there is only one aim and one solution, and that is the land, the soil, our world”.*

The centrality of land was captured in the Freedom Charter of 1955 by the ANC, which stated that, Restriction of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger.

The case of South Africa on the land question is particularly important in the region, and its transition to democracy earned its place among the 'miracles' of the twentieth century (Webster and Adler, 1999:25; Ramutsindela, 2001:57). South Africa is one State in the SADC region which is yet to shake off the colonial legacy (Moyo, 2005a:158; Ntsebeza and Hall, 2007). More-so, the segregationist legislation called the Native Land Act of 1913 restricted Blacks to a mere 7% of the land in the country (Shillington, 2005; Feinberg and Horn, 2009:47).

The South African government began to make laws and implement a programme for land reform in 1994. It consisted of three dimensions: redistribution (transferring white-owned commercial farmland to African users); restitution (settling claims for land lost under apartheid measures by the restoration of holdings or compensation); and land tenure reform (to provide more secure access to land in the former Bantustans) (Cliffe, 2000:273). According to Ntsebeza and Hall (2007), when Southern African countries attained independence, the countries inherited the colonial system and the imbalance that persisted during the colonial period between the majority of Blacks and minority whites immediately manifested between the minority white elites and the majority Blacks. This can be termed the establishment of internal colonialism within a formerly colonised state. This entails that there have been continued attainment which brought less change on land ownership and utilisation for most Southern Africa states. Due to the colonial land policies, countries like South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe were left with the highest proportion of privately held land, at 72%, 44% and 41%, respectively (Adams and Howell, 2001:1). For most countries in Southern Africa, however, large areas of

arable land are still held under complex customary tenure. The legal frameworks that govern land ownership and land rights for most of these countries are characterized by tensions around the integration of statutory and customary property rights.

It is important to note that, laws alone do not expropriate land. Laws are simply a legal framework that is created by people to legalise their actions in relation to other people and situations. The Bolivian land reform experience may point to a future resurgence of ethnic consciousness also in South Africa (Steyn and Bosch, 1994:124). It takes people with the will to take up the legislation and implement it even beyond its provisions. With total contempt of African customary rules and laws on the land, they brought in more whites to consolidate the white dominance of the colony (Ratten, 1993).

All these land grabs were done without taking into consideration the Africans, whose culture and customary land laws were never noted in the land grab. Even attempts by Africans to seek recourse from the white established judiciary systems failed to protect them (Mumo and Charity, 2016). The British took no interests in traditional land laws and rights in the lands they colonised. It was because of this reason that the former and late Vice President of Zimbabwe, Simon Muzenda, in one of his speeches that are widely played on Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television (ZBC TV) questioned the relevance of the High Court and the colonial established rule of law on land when it failed to establish justice for Africans during the colonial era. It is posited that the failure of the colonial justice system to bring justice for the Africans meant that another route had to be taken to achieve independence and regain control of the land (Kachika, 2010). As Steyn and Bosch (1994:124) argued, “Land reform should be led by the people.”

### **2.2.3 The Land Question and Land Reform in Zimbabwe**

The colonial process in Zimbabwe began in 1889 when the British South Africa Company received a Royal Charter of Incorporation from Britain. The company, under the leadership of Cecil John Rhodes, established Northern and Southern Rhodesia (now known as Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively). Few lines tell us about the indigenous peoples before colonisation. The pre-colonial Zimbabwe did not have an organised system of land registration as it is today. Land was owned individually and communally amongst tribes. However, during colonisation, the first African reserves were created in the 1890s in Matabeleland and thereafter the exercise was repeated in other parts of the country. Various statutes such as the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council 1898, Land Appropriation Act 1930, Native Land Husbandry Act 1951 and the Land Tenure Act 1969 (Tshuma, 1998:79-82), compartmentalised land holding into racial categories, forced the peasantry into marginal areas and reserved almost half of the agricultural land for whites (Thompson, 2005). For example, the Land Tenure Act allocated 15.5 million hectares to 6,000, mainly white, commercial farmers, 16.4 million ha to 700,000 Black families and 1.4 million hectares to 8,500 small-scale commercial farmers (Southall, 2011:83). In addition to this inequity, the land held by whites was generally in areas with higher rainfall and better soil quality, in natural farming regions I, II and III, covering best agricultural soils of Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2005a; Mupfuvi, 2014:137-138). The colonial era for Zimbabwe ended in 1979 with the signing of the Lancaster house agreement.

The indigenisation policy and drive gripped the country in the post-2000 era at the same time when the nation was embarking on its Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP). The policy sought to redress the skewed control of businesses in the country. It was argued that in colonial times, Europeans had deliberate policies that favoured them to control the means of production

(Arrighi, 2010:42; AGRA, 2018:122; Moyo, 2009:62; Bernstein, 2003), a situation which was sustained into the post-colonial era.

According to the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (2007) (Chapter 14:33) indigenisation can be defined as “deliberate involvement of indigenous Zimbabweans in the economic activities of the country, to which hitherto they had no access, so as to ensure the equitable ownership of the resources.” The same piece of legislation goes on to define indigenous Zimbabweans as persons who, before the 18th of April, 1980, were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of their race, and descendants of such persons, including companies, associations, syndicates or partnerships of which indigenous Zimbabweans form the majority of the members or holds the controlling interests. The policy sought to transform the national business outlook to have local Zimbabweans have controlling stakes in major economic sectors like mining and manufacturing (Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, 2007). However, the intended outcomes did not match the reality on the ground.

While both Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and the Indigenisation Policy were theoretically good affirmative action for racial transformation in the ownership of resources, the implementation was marred by political patronage and corruption. Magure (2014) conceptualised the Indigenisation Policy and the Land Reform Policy as a ‘Maussian Gift.’ According to Tumin *et al.* (1956), in their research on the social interactions of the primordial Scandinavian communities, people used to exchange gifts but there was an unwritten rule that a gift deserved another gift in return. Such a conceptualisation draws similarities to the Shona practice that “*Kandiro kanoenda kunobva kamwe*” (literally meaning a gift deserves a gift in return). Magure (2014) is of the notion that the indigenisation policy was used to reward would be supporters in future elections and politically correct individuals, a situation he noted to



create clientelism and patronage. The policy therefore, failed to succeed in bringing broad based economic transformation.

Other critics put forward the view that while the policy had good intentions, the discord that emanated from the implementation of the policy created a scary environment for investors.

It has been argued that, since its inception, the policy contributed to the depressed inflows of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). The situation led to depressed industrial growth and an increase in unemployment rates, hence a disadvantage to the nation (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017:5).

Political patronage and corruption have also been levelled against the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy in South Africa. Feiring (2004) notes that beneficiaries are usually a small closed group, especially because the BEE structures were protected by elites. This creates a perception of window dressing in which the South African government cherry picked connected individuals to benefit while telling the nation that Blacks were being empowered. The basic argument from the critics is that BEE has the capacity to scare FDI (Ncube *et al.*, 2014:17). It should, however, be noted that while there has been spirited criticism of the empowerment policies, these policies are not new and have been undertaken in other parts of the world. What is important is that the policies failed to meet the promises of bringing broad-based empowerment, especially to the ballooning youth population that is entering a clogged job market. The Zimbabwean land reform process which has had the aim of empowering the Black majority through giving them access to land, went through four major phases, each having unique developments characterising it. These are outlined below;

***a. Lancaster House Negotiations (1980–1990)***, during which the main elements were: market-driven acquisition; the return of exiles and displaced persons; priority on the accelerated resettlement programme; availability of donor funds to assist with reform; huge increases in

small farmer activity; main distribution of marginal and under-utilised land; about 60% of land since independence distributed during the first decade (Mlambo, 2005:15).

**b. *Post-colonial land reform (1990–2000)***, during which the main elements were: a different legal order (Chilunjika and Uwizeyimana, 2015:130); the first steps of a social justice-driven acquisition programme; economic decline and drought (Chikodzi *et al.*, 2013:107); reduction of donor funds to a trickle; Clare Short’s 1987 letter to Zimbabwe which had serious political implications (Tendi, 2000:7); increased criticism of nepotism in the allocation of land; problems experienced with implementation programmes to sustain land reform; farm invasions and occupations by the Svosve people (Mlambo, 2005:15; Bamidele, 2012) and real distribution of land well below targets in every aspect. The British government promised £75 million and the US promised US\$500 million, but none was in the form of written guarantees (Coldham, 1993). By the year 2000, following the 1998 Land Donor Conference, Zimbabwe had only received approximately £30 million, in contrast to Kenya where in its land restoration and resettlement process £500 million was provided (Moyo, 2011a). The struggle for land has been at the root of conflicts and civil wars in many countries in the region (Ticehurst, 2016:16). In 1992 Zimbabwe passed the Land Acquisition Act that provided in section 5 a systematic mechanism for compulsory acquisition of land by the state.

**c. *Land invasion and occupation (2000 and beyond)***, during which the main elements are: a general absence of a clear and sustainable land reform policy; a legal framework that enables the taking of land without due process; termination of international aid; large-scale illegal occupation; economic decline and famine (Roodt, 2012a). Although “*legitimate beneficiaries*” such as peasant workers have been allotted small plots, they had not been given any farm training (Moyo, 2011a), “*no money to buy seeds, not even a spade*” (Mafundikwa, 2014).

After two decades of independence, Zimbabwe has finally reached a goal it envisaged during the liberation struggle, a radical redistribution of land at the cost of white settlers (Hanlon *et al.*, 2012:3). However, the resettlement process has been described as “chaotic” with little attention to implementation or support services such as clinics, schools and roads (Kapuya, et al. 2013). Note that the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures Act) allowed many legislative enactments to the constitution. Amendments number 16A and 16 B of the old constitution sanctioned arbitrary and procedural changes relating to land acquisition. Amendment number 17 was enacted, in blatant contradiction to section 16 of the Deeds Registries Act, and allowed for transfer of ownership of and other than through a deed of transfer. The Land Acquisition Act of 2000 greatly disturbed the legal framework that governed the land tenure system in that it removed the sanction provided for in the Deeds Registries Act to first designate the land before acquisition. Complete disregard of due process in the compulsory acquisition of land was illustrated in *Chapeyama v Chapeyama* 2000(2) ZLR 103. Judge McNally stated in orbiter that the land reform took away real rights conveyed on owners through its violent mode of acquisition. Constitutional Amendment 16A was literally transferred to section 71-72 of the current Constitution. Deprived land owners do not have a right to challenge in court the government’s decision to expropriate their land hence the Supreme Court judgment in *Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe* 2/07

### **2.3 Strategies to redress colonial imbalances in Zimbabwe**

Brett (2006:13) notes that soon after independence, the country embarked on a programme of post-war reconstruction with the support of some foreign donors. Against this background, the need to address inequalities and injustices brought by yesteryear policies underpinned policy making during the first decade. The government hosted the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) in Harare on 23-27 March 1981. The

conference sought financial assistance from the international community for reconstructing the country and to lay groundwork for sustainable development in future. The country recorded its strongest post-independence growth performance during the period 1980-90 with gross domestic product (GDP) growing by an average of around 5.5% (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2017: 6). Several policies and strategies were coined to redress colonial imbalances, however, tabulated below are some of the key examples of strategies (including policies) adopted during the pre and post-independence period in an attempt to redress such imbalances.

**Table 2.1: Key strategies adopted by Zimbabwe to redress colonial imbalances**

#	Strategy/ Policy	Strengths	Weaknesses
1	Passive resistance during the colonial period	Self determination	Informal, and did not make any significant impact
2	Chimurenga 1 Liberation Struggle (1893-1897)(Dawson, 2011)	Uncoordinated, Strong anti-colonialism message	Not coordinated, fatalities (about 2000 Black people died), inferior/weaponry, insignificant impact
3	Chimurenga 2 Liberation Struggle (1966-1979)	Well-coordinated 66 367 voluntary fighters participated*	Ultimate objective not achieved, heavy casualties of Rhodesian soldiers, 11 279 liberation war fighters and Zimbabwean refugees died*
4	Lancaster House Agreement (1979) - 'willing seller- willing buyer' (1980-1990)	Significant change through independence - Amicable soft approach	Little impact - Few willing sellers resulting in stagnation, inadequate funding policy framework
5	Growth with Equity Policy (GWE) 1981	Socially successful	Economically not sustainable
6	First Five Year National Development Plan (1985-1990)	Emphasis on employment and poverty reduction	Critical issues of land redistribution were not addressed
7	Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST)1996-2000	Socially good emphasising on poverty reduction, land reform, employment creation etc	Over ambitious encompassing host of goals to be achieved with no international funding
8	1998 Donor Conference	Strategic and globally acceptable	Donor apathy
9	Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP)	Significant number of beneficiaries, objective largely accomplished	Chaotic and largely criticised by the global community
10	National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP) 2006-2008	Wide range of goals to revive the economy	Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS) was created before NEDPP was implemented

11	Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS) 2007-2011	Socially and economically good as other policies	Political climate was not conducive and ZEDS could not be implemented effectively
12	Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (2007) (Chapter 14:33)	Legally and constitutionally acceptable	Limited impact
13	Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) 2013-2018	Framework guiding various socioeconomic efforts by govt and non-state actors	Very little positive impact on the lives of Zimbabweans
14	Transitional and Stabilisation Programme (TSP) 2018-2020	Practical policy which requires adequate resources to ensure the various strategies envisaged are implemented	There is political will to implement TSP for economic revival and empowerment

*\*Source: Author*

Upon realising that land is the means of production as well as the reason for the liberation struggles (Chimurenga I & II) in Zimbabwe, most Zimbabweans finally got back their land through the FTLRP in 2000 (Hanlon *et al.*, 2012). Unfortunately most agrarian reforms like in Latin America failed to fulfil expectations in the region for a variety of reasons, among them: Incompleteness of land reforms to provide beneficiaries with the prerequisites for competitiveness and a poor capacity in solving the poverty problem. (Bennewitz, 2020:1796).

Nevertheless, productivity of the farms remained suppressed as the roots of that decline lie not only in the confinement of Africans to marginal land but also in the historic forced replacement of their sustainable, indigenous farming system with one whose productivity now relies on the use of large amounts of expensive chemical inputs (Page and Page, 1991).

## **2.4 Evaluating Land Reform Programme in Southern Africa**

A comparative analysis was done to evaluate land reform programmes in selected countries in Southern Africa, namely Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe and the results are in Table 2.2 below. Our research findings from documentary search resulted in the analysis tabulated hereunder:

**Table 2.2: A comparative Analysis of land reforms in Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe**

<b>Variables</b> (In relation to Land Reform Programme initiatives/country)	<b>Zambia</b> ↓	<b>Namibia</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>Zimbabwe</b>
<b>Root cause for land reform need</b>	British Colonialism	German and South African Colonialism	Apartheid (Dutch) Colonialism	British colonialism
<b>Legal and Policy Framework</b>	Land policy available, inadequate instruments	Land policy and supporting legal framework available	A robust legal and policy framework in place	Land policy and supporting legal framework available, however inadequate
<b>Implementation approach</b>	Land policy as guideline  the process revolves around activities of the Land commission that is grossly under-resourced	a national conference (year) on land made recommendations, which were then submitted to government for consideration. the process of involved persons from across the political spectrum and different sectors of society	Constitutional  Phased and guided by specific instruments  the process is increasingly becoming politically-charged as it was a key discussion subject in political manifesto	Phased, in line with Lancaster agreement and then culminated in Pragmatic and some called it chaotic process that was named Fast Track Land Reform  the process became politically charged and allegations of unfairness across the political spectrum became rife
<b>Equitability</b> (Fairness and Access across the Gender, Disability, Age and Race)	Still skewed and not equitable	Still not equitable	Still skewed along the racial divide	Significant changes occurred, However Little consideration on equitability issues
<b>Food Security</b>	Stable, threatened by climate changes	Stable, even though threatened by climate changes and very limited arable land	Stable and secure	Significant changes and a reduction in food security
<b>Poverty reduction</b>	poverty level remain high for the Blacks who have no access to land capital	Insignificant due to the slow pace of the reforms under implementation	Middle-income economy, and poverty is high for the Blacks who have no access to land capital	Significant positive impact on the Black majority, however the poverty levels are still high
<b>International Donor support</b>	Support for government-driven reforms and insignificant contributions from the international donor community	The support is there and assisting the government, however the processes are very slow	It is there, amid threats for pulling-out if the laws and policies are not adhered-to	It was there in the beginning and no support was forthcoming since the Fast Track Land Reform processes
<b>Land reform Grants</b>	No grants	Few grants	Yes, significant and still inadequate	No grants
<b>Completeness</b>	Incomplete Ongoing	Incomplete ongoing	Incomplete ongoing	Incomplete

				Ongoing, reforms at advanced stage
<i>International relations*</i>	3	3	4	1
<i>Economic impact**</i>	Low (+ve)	Average (+ve)	Average (-ve)	Severe (-ve)

*NB: \*International relations measured on a scale of 0-5 (0-very poor, 5-very good), measured from the willingness of the international community to do business with the country and reporting positively about the country \*\*Economic impact measured as (Low, Average, Severe), positive (+ve) or negative (-ve) inferred on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) coupled with country competitiveness in the regional and global economy*

*Source: Author*

Land reform in Southern Africa remains an incomplete, yet important issue (Nelson, 2010). All countries analysed in this study have faced difficulties in the promulgation of the requisite domestic legal and policy issues. In each of these countries, the process of land reform is incomplete. There is a gradient of issues with varying intensity. Zimbabwe, on one side of the spectrum, is facing a crisis in democratisation due to its radical approach to land reform. On the other side of the spectrum is Namibia, which has been a stable democracy in the region; however, there is pressure for changing the pace at which the reforms are being implemented. In South Africa, the same pressure is mounting on government to expropriate land, and there are mixed opinions on whether land can be expropriated without compensation or not given the constitutional provisions, legal implications and policies that deal with land reform (du Toit, 2019:5). Nevertheless, there is also growing impatience from the general public on the pace at which the reforms are being implemented.

## **2.5 Independence and the Drive to Redress Colonial Economic Imbalance**

Revisionist historians and political scientists attempt to argue that the battles for liberation in Southern Africa were centred on the need to have democracy pronounced in the concept of one man-one-vote (Matlosa, 2002:137; Moyo, 2005d). This argument is flawed as it tries to relegate the real reasons for the battles for liberation to mere neo-liberal democratic theories that are popular in the current age. The true reasons for fighting for freedom can be found in the true meaning of the term ‘liberation’ Kariuki, (2004a:15) notes that;

*“It is through such skewed ownership patterns that the fight against settler colonialism in Zimbabwe, Kenya and apartheid in South Africa found its genesis. For instance, the emergence of the popular resistance movement Chimurenga in Zimbabwe and the formation of the ANC and its underground armed wing, Umkhonto weSizwe, and the Mau Mau in Kenya were some of the derivatives of land dispossession Africans experienced. The history of liberation in the Southern African region therefore, is one that was rooted in the land struggle as a central political denominator that fuelled the struggle against the white minority rule.”*

In other words, the real issue for liberation was not the people but the land, upon which the indigenous peoples would be liberated based on the connection which exists between the land and the people in Africa. The driving force behind the liberation struggles in Southern Africa was thus to reclaim sovereignty and control resources collectively represented by the control of land (Feéyes, 1987). Major fighting groups like the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and South West Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, were driven by the need to reclaim the lost land and self determination to direct the socio-political and economic issues of their communities (Melber, 2003). From as way back as the First Chimurenga in Zimbabwe in 1896-7 and the Nama Herero uprisings in Namibia in 1904, the battle against colonialism was meant to repossess lost land and realign skewed socio-economic relations that were created by colonialism.

African claims for land are based on two broad reasons, which are historical and cultural ties and when colonialism came, it created what other scholars call hegemonic society where the powerful and dominant states started to take control over the ‘weaker’ nations (Levine, 2013:18). The relationship between an African and land is one that goes beyond the economic



benefits. Land is the link between a living African and his departed ancestor (Gumo *et al.*, 2012:532). Land is the place where Africans live, conduct their economic activities and upon death, it is in the ground where they are buried. These acts are not taken as just natural phenomenon but important cultural issues and events that are conducted with cultural rituals to seek the acceptance and pleasure of the ancestors (Gumo *et al.*, 2012). The use of the term ‘*mwana wevhu*’ is thus popular in Zimbabwe’s context and it literally means ‘son/daughter of the soil’ to refer to indigenous Africans. Land, from this perspective, is seen as the link between the African and his ancestors and the ultimate power, God.

It is because of this link that the battles for liberation were more than just battles to turn the socio-economic tables, but struggles to revert back to the old status quo in which land became a societal good for its cultural value. Secondly, in line with the new socio-economic dispensation, agitation for land was driven by the need to access an economic resource for self-sustenance. Successive colonial laws and policies had driven Africans to poor soils in the reserves (Batterbury and Ndi, 2018). Due to population increase of both humans and livestock, the land lost its fertility and was overgrazed. European policies like destocking (Moyo, 2009:139) did little to solve the situation and Africans at independence were impoverished and overpopulated in the reserves (Ramutsindela, 2001).

The push for the land reform was therefore, also driven by the need to decongest the former reserves while also giving Africans an economic resource they could utilise for economic emancipation and correcting the dual economy system that had been created by colonial policies and laws (Moyo, 2004b). Independence in the region was not brought by outright warfare which would have given the Africans unlimited powers to direct the post-colonial states. Independence came through negotiated peace settlements. This means that the African

leaders who represented their people at different treaties made some unfair concessions which would haunt the post-independence state.

The major concession that African leaders from South Africa, Zambia and Namibia made was the acceptance of the ‘Willing Buyer – Willing Seller’ clauses in independence negotiations and the protection of private property clauses in the independence constitutions. In Zimbabwe’s case, it can be noted that the ‘willing seller- willing buyer’ principle was created in 1975 in South Africa and found its way into the Zimbabwean constitution. Since the creation of this policy, it has been hard for African leaders who inherited independent states to make meaningful inroads in addressing land colonial imbalances. Nyanto (2006) argues that the principle of ‘willing seller- willing buyer’, gives white land owners veto power over a fundamental issue of land and justice, the very reason why Blacks sacrificed their sons and daughters over decades.

However, South Africa, Zambia and Namibia have made efforts to institute land reform policies that sought to redress colonial imbalances and fulfil the promises made by liberation parties (Ankomah, 2015:15). This was driven by two factors. The first reason was the need by those in political power to take a step to fulfil liberation promises. When this seemed to be failing, ordinary citizens, in some cases, took matters into their hands by invading white owned land as was the case in Zimbabwe, and the threats that have been made by opposition leaders such as Julius Malema of South Africa and Job Amupanda of Namibia (*New African*: May 2015).

The efforts to redistribute the land saw South Africa managing to distribute less than 7% (Sura, 2015: 36) of its targeted 30% of the total arable land that was in the hands of the white minority, initially in the first 5 years (1994-1999) (Lahiff, 2007:1581), which was later revised to 2014

(Sura, 2015:36; Nyanto 2006; Lahiff, 2007:1581). Namibia managed to resettle 34,000 landless people leaving approximately 200,000 still without gaining access to land, and this translates to approximately 7.4% of commercial farmland of the land which had initially been targeted for redistribution (de Villiers, 2003:38). At that rate it, would take 60 years before Black farmers owned half the commercial land (*ibid*).

The failure by the governments of the independent nations to meet their targeted acreage was because of a plethora of reasons, chief among them emasculating independent agreements and complacency and lethargy (Masiwa, 2004:3-4; Mubvami, 2004). A critical analysis of the independent agreements that were signed between the Africans and the representative of the Europeans who included Britain, USA, France and Germany show that the Europeans knew that the major African grievance was land, hence they planned to torpedo the land issue before independence. The concept of the 'willing seller- willing buyer' features on all land issues in the case countries. In South Africa, Namibia and Zambia, as was the case with Zimbabwe, the 'willing seller- willing buyer' concept is buttressed by the protection of private property in the respective constitutions (Kariuki, 2004a:13).

It has become apparent that there was a deliberate emasculation of African leaders in relation to the land question. For instance, in Namibia (Moyo, 2004b), the clause in the Constitution which protects private property, including land cannot be amended by any branch of the government. In Zimbabwe, the situation was almost similar, the Lancaster house Constitution of 1979 could not be amended for ten years unless by a 100% majority of the Parliament (Simura 2009:16). However, such a consensus could not be achieved given that the same Constitution guaranteed a twenty seat quota or whites who had vested interests in land for the same ten years (Gerhart *et al.*, 2001:179; Vollan *et al.*, 2013:9).

After the expiry of the ten years, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) coerced Zimbabwe into adopting neo-liberal economic policies which meant that the government could not adopt socialist policies. However, the land policies that the African leaders took were also a matter of their choices. These choices emanated from the political battle between a political path to land reform or an economic one. It must be noted that the major players in the land debates in Southern Africa, have been mainly the white land owners and the developed western world, whose interest had been on safeguarding the status quo.

White land owners and the former colonial masters argue that land reform should be premised on stabilising the economy through a stable agricultural economic sector.<sup>2</sup> This in turn is done through sending scary messages on the dangers of taking a political route in solving the land question. While there has been common rhetoric among different African leaders in Southern Africa that ‘the ‘willing seller- willing buyer’ policy has failed to bring about desired results, no leader has explicitly stated that they will follow the route of nationalisation of the land for redistribution. The South African government has been on record stating that it will not take the path that was taken by Zimbabwe to address the colonial land imbalances (Mararike, 2014), while the Namibian leadership has lambasted some youths who gave the government an ultimatum to address the land issue before they invade the farms (Gwinyayi and Dzinesa 2007). African economies in general and Southern Africa in particular, were structured into dual

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<sup>2</sup> This has been the dominant discourse among advocates of the neo-liberal capitalist doctrine in Southern Africa, with the Zimbabwean private press, which is leaned more on the neo-liberal side arguing that the Zimbabwe’s Fast Track land Reform programme was a major cause of the economic downturn. The argument is however refuted by the Zimbabwean government, nationalists and the state media, who argued that the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) sanctions did more damage to the economy than the land reform. The scary message that land cannot be given to ordinary people and that a fast track land reform programme scares away investors, has also been a dominant argument in land reform debates in other Southern African countries’ debates specifically South Africa and Namibia.

economies. The first branch was the formal and developed economy that was dominated by the minority whites, while the second was the informal African dominated economy.

The second economy was meant to create a cheap labour pool for the developed economy (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010:34-37). The most popular policy that was implemented in most of the countries in the region is Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy. The policy was implemented in most Southern African countries in different names. The most popular names have been the BEE in South Africa and partially in Namibia and Indigenisation Policy in Zimbabwe. BEE was born in South Africa as an affirmative action to bring in formerly marginalised Blacks into the mainstream economy.

The Department of Trade and Industry-South Africa (2008) cited in Makwerere and Chiwada (2014:120) defines BEE as, an integrated and coherent socio-economic process that directly contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about significant increases in the number of Black people that manage, own and control the country's economy as well as significant decreases in income inequalities. According to the South African Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act (2003) (Chapter 1), the term 'Black people' is generic and refers to Africans, coloureds and Indians. The Act goes on to state that the policy of Black empowerment is motivated by the need;

*“To increasing the number of Black people that manage, own and control enterprises and productive assets; facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises; human resource and skills development; achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce: preferential procurement; and investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by Black people (B-BBEE, Chapter 1: a-f).”*

Chapter 2 of the Act states that the objectives of the Act are to ensure meaningful participation of Blacks in economic activities from which apartheid policies deliberately segregated them from. Hence the Black Economic Empowerment policy in South Africa sought to redress the economic imbalances that were created by long years on minority rule, which makes it a noble policy.

## **2.6 Insights from the Land reform experiences of Southern Africa**

Colonialism brought land and economic imbalances in Southern Africa (Feéyes, 1987). While the first arrival of the whites on the continent could have been accidental, after coming into contact with the continent, the Europeans appreciated the vast potential of the resources on the continent and deliberate policies to dominate it were put in place. The colonisation of Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular was deliberate. In order to achieve full control of Southern Africa, specifically South Africa, Namibia, Kenya and Tanzania, deliberate policies to alienate the Africans from their land were institutionalised.

Initially, land alienation was achieved through brute force. Using the policies of conquest, Europeans took over the land of the Africans they had fought and subdued. After having conquered the Africans through the use of superior weapons, and taken over the administration of land, Europeans created laws that deliberately alienated Africans from their land. Through the enforcement of these laws, Africans completely lost their territories to Europeans and became servants in the very land they had initially been masters (Ramutsindela, 2001).

The loss of land as the symbol for African control of the continent led to agitation for independence by the Africans against the colonial masters, who were predominantly British in the case studies. The struggle to regain land and domination of the African lands, began as

early as the arrival of the Europeans. This is exemplified by the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879 in South Africa, and the Nama-Herero uprisings in Namibia in 1904 (May and Lahiff, 2007). The struggles for liberation were intensified after the Second World War (WW II) and with battered economies from the war, the former colonial masters started giving in to African claims and Kenya, Namibia, and South Africa achieved independence in 1963, 1990 and 1994, respectively.

Liberation leaders who assumed the leadership of the independent countries were saddled with the burden of redressing colonial imbalances primarily on land. Agrarian Reform, above all, should be recognized as an obligation of national governments, within the framework of human rights and efficient public policy to combat poverty (Mogab, 2009:1). The land question was adopted in most liberation plans and in the liberation agreements. At independence, some measures to address the land question were instituted. However, these measures were not enough as noted in the chapter. Their considerable failure was due to the emasculating liberation agreements, especially the ‘willing seller- willing buyer’ clause on land agreements and its constitutional corollary, the protection of private property clause (Lahiff, 2003b). In some cases, it was also due to the lack of political will by the leaders who went on a honeymoon with the erstwhile colonial masters (New African, 2007/8,5).

In order to achieve broad based transformation, liberation leaders also attempted to institute economic policies that would change the colonial status quo of white economic domination to create inclusive economies. One of the notable policies that were adopted by African governments is the BEE, which was popular in South Africa and Namibia. However, the economic policies did not yield society-wide transformations. The failure has been attributed to political corruption which saw those who were politically connected to the ruling party elites

benefiting, while those without connections were left out. The economic policies were also diverted from being empowerment projects to being campaign gimmicks in which those supporting the ruling parties, even without the ability to manage the businesses, benefitted and ran down leading to non-performing loans and a destruction to economic development.

## **2.7 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has presented an overview of the land issues in Southern Africa. This chapter gave a critical analysis of land imbalances of selected countries in Southern Africa (Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe). This chapter has successfully brought to light how the post-colonial land imbalances were created in Southern Africa. This chapter elaborated the fundamental issues rooted in the colonial past. The chapter discussed in detail colonialism and the development of racial segregation in Southern Africa. Strategies to redress colonial imbalances in Zimbabwe were discussed and it was noted that soon after independence, the country embarked on a programme of post-war reconstruction with the support of some foreign donors. It was also noted that the liberation leaders who assumed the leadership of the independent countries were saddled with the burden of redressing colonial imbalances primarily on land. The land question was adopted in most liberation plans and in the liberation agreements. At independence, some measures to address the land question were instituted.

The comparative analysis done in this chapter gave useful insights on the key motivations for independence to correct the racially skewed economic imbalances. It is clear, from the evaluation of the different land reforms in Southern Africa, that Zimbabwe's experience in executing land reform remains unique as it had a significant (far-reaching) impact beyond the region, with both positive and negative consequences. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe is arguably the only country within the region which has made significant progress in terms of addressing the



land question, despite the costs, which are politically-charged reactions, punitive measures akin to '*punishments*' from the former colonial masters.

The chapter concludes that land reform in Southern Africa remains an incomplete, yet important issue. All countries analysed in this study have faced difficulties in the promulgation of the requisite domestic legal and policy issues. The chapter also looked at the failure of empowerment initiatives introduced in Zimbabwe and in countries such as South Africa and Namibia. These included the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and the Indigenisation Policy which were theoretically good affirmative action for racial transformation in the ownership of resources, but their implementation did not yield society-wide transformations. The following chapter looks at issues surrounding land occupation, land tenure and land use under the FTLRP.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **LAND OCCUPATION, LAND TENURE AND LAND USE UNDER ZIMBABWE'S FAST TRACK LAND REFORM PROGRAMME (FTLRP)**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter looks at issues surrounding land occupation, land tenure and land use under Zimbabwe's FTLRP. The chapter brings to light the manner in which the black majority occupied white owned land as they made attempts at redressing colonial land imbalances and the subsequent issues that emanated as a result of these land occupations. Amilcar Cabral's theorisation of liberation is used in analysing and describing issues in this chapter. The chapter traces how initially the post-colonial pieces of legislation particularly the Lancaster House Constitution effectively inhibited the newly elected Zimbabwean government from effectively addressing the land question. The post 2000 land occupations are detailed in this chapter and the resultant implications these had on the country's social, economic and political landscape are revealed. The chapter further examines Zimbabwe's land reform model and the accompanying legislative framework. The chapter also looks at the manner the land reform programme was initiated in the post 2000 era and the resultant implications.

Land is the most important resource for Africa (Berry, 2002:638) and since the advent of colonialism, it has been a source of racial conflicts (Moyo, 2004:16). The conflicts between the colonialists and the Africans over land culminated in the struggles for liberation and independence. Solving the land question as a means of dealing with resource conflicts could be perceived as a challenging process. There have been several attempts at resolving the land issues by several Southern African states upon attaining their independence. Although these attempts were carried out, land grievance remained unresolved and the colonial land imbalances

continued (Magaisa, 2010:8) and such issues are now regarded as the world's most urgent problem (Maposa *et al.*, 2010:193). This was especially the case with former settler colonial states in Southern Africa such as Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe (former colonies of the British, German then Dutch and the Boer) and Kenya (a former British colony in East Africa) negotiated their independence agreements. In all these countries, the 'willing seller- willing buyer' concept was initially adopted as the best approach of solving the land ownership and control issues. However, as a conflict resolution mechanism, the policy did not yield the desired outcome, especially in Zimbabwe's case. Consequently, this resulted in land conflicts which in turn culminated into the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe from 2000 (Bourguignon, 2009:23).

It has been noted by scholars such as Cliffe *et al.* (2011:907), that after the high profile – high intensity land occupations of 1998 in Zimbabwe, some officials in the Zimbabwean government might have thought that the fast track route was a simple mechanism that would solve the land question once and for all (Moyo, 2011b). While the agitation surrounding the access and control of land by the native Black majority might have been resolved, this resolution however came with other issues which culminated in a crisis of sorts. Zimbabwe's FTLRP showed that solving the land question, a conflict of many years in creation, was not an easy and simple process. A number of lessons can be drawn from the Zimbabwean case and these are important for the whole Southern African region and other regions.

### **3.2 Land Occupation**

The manner in which the Black majority repossessed land from the former white commercial farmers created a linguistic debate on the word which can be used to describe the process legitimately. Some scholars and writers like Mlambo (2005:11); Lahiff and Cousins, (2001); Maposa, *et al.*, (2010:200) use the term 'land invasions' (Manase, 2019:4). The term is driven

by obtaining legal provisions at the time. The white commercial farmers, in line with the constitutional provisions at the time and as explained by various legal judgements, were the owners of the various pieces of land that they were occupying (Moyo, 2001). This means that those who moved into the land were legally classified as squatters.

Other scholars such Sadomba, (2008) in Mararike, (2014); Moyo, (2001); Hanlon *et al*, (2012) and Madletyana, (2011:2) use the terms 'land reclamation' and 'land occupation' to describe the initial actions undertaken by the native Blacks as an attempt at acquiring land for themselves. Such arguments are simply based on legitimacy issues. On the other hand, scholars such as Manjengwa (2006) has argued that, whilst the process of repossessioning land might have been illegal, according to the legal provisions at the time, the land originally belonged to the Blacks who were unfairly dispossessed violently, without any compensation (Moyo, 2009:139). Hanlon et al. (2012) assert that the legal provisions put in place by the colonialists worked to legitimise and legalise the illegitimate and illegal dispossession. These legal instruments have been questioned in recent times due to the fact that they were rooted in colonial times. Moyo (2001:322) further argues that,

*“However, ‘squattling’ as a concept is problematic and manipulable because the term gains meaning within a particular moral framework that is codified as ‘law’ by the State. ... Rhodesian law defined as a squatter as ‘an African whose house happens to be situated in an area which has been declared European or is set apart for some other reason.’”*

This means that the term squatter has a racial connotation and its continued use brings about memories of colonial land injustices. This research, in a bid to avoid emotional, and in some cases pejorative connotations on the process, applied the term ‘land occupations’ to describe

the efforts undertaken by the native Blacks to acquire land, as this term gives some semblance of neutrality.

The process of land occupations can be best analysed and understood through the lenses of Amilcar Cabral's concept of liberation. In an address to the first Tri-Continental Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America held in Havana, Cabral (1974:10) gave a broad explanation of the meaning of liberation by first conceptualising imperialism. He stated that;

*“We have seen that violent usurpation of the freedom of the process of development of the productive forces of the dominated socio-economic whole constitutes the principal and permanent characteristic of imperialist domination, whatever its form.”*

National liberation would therefore, be achieved *“only when the national productive forces have been completely freed from every kind of foreign domination”* (ibid). Cabral (1974) further explained his conceptualisation of national liberation, by asserting that, the objective of national liberation, is to reclaim the right, usurped by imperialist domination, namely: the liberation of the process of development of national productive forces. Cabral (1974:10) concludes that,

*“It is often said that national liberation is based on the right of every people to freely control its own destiny and that the objective of this liberation is national independence. Although we do not disagree with this vague and subjective way of expressing a complex reality, we prefer to be objective, since for us the basis of national liberation, whatever the formulas adopted on the level of international law, is the inalienable right of every people to have its own history, and the objective of national liberation is to regain this right usurped by imperialism, that is to say, to free the process of development of the national productive forces. For this reason, in our opinion, any*

*national liberation movement which does not take into consideration this basis and this objective may certainly struggle against imperialism but will surely not be struggling for national liberation”.*

An important issue for Southern Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular, that is raised in Cabral’s theorisation on liberation struggles, is the differentiation between struggling against physical colonisation and struggling for national liberation. Failure to liberate the means of production, is argued to be a failure in the liberation struggle even though political independence might have been achieved. It is from this conceptualisation that the struggles in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa could be measured.

The Cambridge (Advanced Learner’s) Dictionary (2013, 891) defines ‘liberation’ as, (1) *an occasion when something or someone is released or made free. ...* (2) *Used to refer to activities connected with removing the disadvantages experienced by particular groups within society.* The two definitions above have meanings on the liberation history of Zimbabwe and land politics in particular. The first definition can be seen as referring to the liberation of the country itself, meaning the liberation of the indigenous peoples and the structures of politics. The second definition, in relation to the first, can be seen as referring to the socio-economic conditions of Black Zimbabweans after the attainment of political independence. It is the second definition with respect to the socio-economic position of Black Zimbabweans and the land that links the dictionary definition to the elaborate ‘liberation’ theorisation by Cabral (1974).

It should be noted that colonialism as a system was not an end in itself, but rather a means to create a superior white economy and an inferior Black one that would only save as a resource

pool for the white economy. The attainment of independence saw few changes on the socio-economic front due to the constraints put on the Zimbabwean government by the Lancaster House Agreement, politics of regional solidarity with Black South Africans, and also internal government lethargy (United Kingdom Secretariat of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1979).

The Lancaster House Agreement and Constitution inhibited the Zimbabwean government from adequately addressing the land question on its own terms, during the first ten years of independence. Amendments to the Constitution, especially on clauses that dealt with land and property rights, could only be done after ten years or through a 100 % vote by Parliament (Asuelime and Simura, 2014:73). However, during this same period, parliament reserved ten seats for whites who had vested interest in property and land rights issues and thus it became an impossible task to redress the colonial land imbalances using legal means (Asuelime and Simura, 2016). In order to avoid raising alarm and at the same time pacifying the apartheid South African government and channel it towards accepting majority rule in South Africa, the GoZ made the choice to follow neo-liberal policy on land after 1990 and delay any radical shifts with regards to the land question. This, however, led many people to question whether the country's leadership still remembered the essence of the liberation struggle. Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, addressing the Zimbabwe Diamond Conference in Victoria Falls on 12 November 2012, said that;

*“... from 1990, a decade earlier, Zimbabwe had delayed dealing with the land question in a new way, especially after the expiry of the restrictive land provisions in the independence Lancaster House Constitution. ... As an outstanding act of African solidarity, the government of Zimbabwe decided on this delay expressly to facilitate the then ongoing negotiations in South Africa,*

*from 1990 onwards. Concerned that nothing should be done in Zimbabwe which would so frighten the white South African population that it would oppose our own country's transformation."*

According to Soko and Balchin (2009), Mbeki went on to revealed that in 1990, when South Africa began its transitional talks, the then Commonwealth Secretary-General, Chief Ameka Anyaoku, persuaded former Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe to institute a moratorium on radical land reform, even though the ten years prohibitions of the Lancaster House Constitution had expired. Mugabe accepted the request.

The result of this was that, ten years after the country's independence, the most important means of production was still not in the hands of the Black majority and this continued to agitate peasants and other landless people to a boiling point. The defeat of the government-sponsored draft constitution in the February 2000 referendum in which the GoZ had made promises that the very constitution would be its instrument for compulsory land acquisition, had the effect of adding the regrouped and reinvigorated war veterans into the matrix and this eventually led to land occupations.

Essentially, land occupations in Zimbabwe began in 1980 when the country attained its independence. Moyo (2001:321) notes that between 1980 and 1985, Zimbabwe experienced low profile, high intensity land occupations, which were followed by, what has been deemed in relative terms as, 'normal low-intensity occupations'. There was no direct classification to the land which was targeted for occupation. State land, communal land, parks estates and private-owned land was targeted by occupants who, at various times were called by different names in line with the government policy towards them as well as the prevailing political



climate. In some cases, land occupants were referred to as ‘squatters’ (Hanlon *et al.*, 2012:58-69). The pejorative naming was influenced by the government policy on the land occupiers.

In cases where the government was hostile towards the occupations, the occupiers were referred to as squatters (Durand-lasserve, 2006:4), and in numerous cases, they were evicted with brute force. According to Moyo (2001:322), “*the brutality with which these evictions were carried out, both by police and (white commercial) farmers, was reminiscent of the colonial era.*” In some cases, while the government might have referred to the occupiers as squatters (Weiner, 1989), it treated them with caution and regularised their stay and this was also common during the early years of independence (Kinsey, 1982). However, the private media and some authors viewed every illegal occupation as squatting and referred to occupiers as squatters (Nyambara, 200:534) even when the government treated them with caution.

Various reasons motivated different groups and classes to be engaged in land occupations. The post 1997 period saw the convergence of ordinary people who yearned to possess land in order for them to have permanent stable accommodation and farming land, those who claimed land-based on ancestral and cultural rites and attachments, politicians who sought to increase their support base mostly from the ruling ZANU PF party, Black bourgeoisie who wanted to increase their investment and capital base into land as well as criminals who sought to poach from parks estates, forestry plantations or to dupe peasants and commercial farmers of their produce, amongst others (Moyo, 2001).

The first phases of the land reform programme before the FTLRP were in some cases, driven or impacted heavily by land occupations. Kinsey (1982:97) notes that in the first one and half years of resettlements;

*“Some of the farms purchased for resettlement have had a considerable number of illegal occupants on them at the time that purchase was made or were occupied shortly thereafter; and in many cases these illegal occupants have been former labourers on the farms. According to one report, more than 60,000 squatters had moved onto white-owned commercial farms during the first year of operation of the resettlement programme, and the police had been instructed not to take action against them.”*

This view is supported by Weiner (1989:402) who states that “half of all resettled households accessed land as squatters immediately following independence.” The process of illegal land occupations continued until the farm occupations of 1998 by the Svosve people in Marondera which are accepted as being the trigger of the 2000 national land occupations which were described by O’Keefe and Moyo (1996) as high intensity and high profile, and gave birth to the FTLRP. Hence, it was not how the land was occupied, but how the government reacted to land occupiers, which mattered most in the development of the national land policy as well as national development.

The land occupations of the post-2000 era was different from the earlier occupations of the 1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, the ZANU PF government was facing pressure for land from some indigenous Blacks, in some cases with tacit support and encouragement from politicians, and the war veterans under the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) (Moyo, 2001). On the other hand, the birth of a strong opposition movement and political party in the form of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) exerted political pressure on the government as it was now clear to it (ZANU PF Government) that in case of failure, there was a strong opposition in contention of power. Hence, while in the earlier farm occupations the government could exercise its discretion in terms of whether

to regularise the stay or evict the land occupiers, in the post-2000 case, driving out the land occupiers was political suicide as it meant angering voters while also protecting white commercial farmers, the majority of whom had already shown that they were no longer supportive of ZANU PF rule.

The post-2000 occupations covered the whole nation at a time when the government was facing economic challenges. The government, therefore, had no capacity to develop the occupied farms and regularize the occupations. In the early years of independence, the government found it easy to regularize the land occupations using in part, funds from Britain and other donors. The early post-independence land occupations mostly targeted state and abandoned land (Moyo, 2001). However, the post-2000 era was a different scenario which presented diverse challenges. During this period, the targeting of land for occupation had racial undertones and there was no differentiation between underutilized and effectively utilised land. In some cases, the land occupied was already under crops and some white owners were given respite to come and harvest their crops (Echanove, 2017). In other cases, the crops were harvested by the occupiers, or simply slashed down, depending on the ‘mood’ of the occupiers and the ‘reactions’ of the white commercial farmers.

The racial connotations surrounding the land occupations and the subsequent loss of production had heavy financial and socio-political costs to the state (estimated around US\$ 17billion) (Mutenga, 2018). It is from such computations of revenue losses that market analysts and thinkers argue that in place of eradicating poverty, the FTLRP entrenched poverty through revenue losses for the government, investment losses, and production losses in the agro-processing industry, as well as job losses and migration (Interview with John Robertson, 15 January 2018, Harare).

One major challenge surrounding the FTLRP was that given its national spread and coverage, with participants driven by different motivations, the process resulted in massive vandalism of movable and immovable farm assets, destruction of crops and theft of movable farm assets (Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019b). Some of the major assets that were destroyed included heavy farm machinery such as tractors and combine harvesters, irrigation equipment, shades and tobacco barns, farm houses, power supply infrastructure and staff residences. Makonese (2017) estimates that the cost of the damage ran into millions of dollars. Such a high magnitude of damage reversed the gains which had been made by that point in Zimbabwean agriculture and the foundation upon which the new farmers could have started their production.

The government was also found wanting legally. The high profile high-intensity land occupations that were driven by the war veterans and the peasants in the post-2000 era saw the government caught between upholding the law and protecting the constitutional property rights of the white commercial farmers, and capitulating to the 'legitimate' but unconstitutional demands of the Blacks who were disadvantaged by the long years of racial colonial domination. The government's decision to capitulate to the demands of the war veterans and the peasants was not necessarily based on the desire to follow a legitimate cause, but rather to guarantee more political votes. Government action was also in line with the GoZ's liberation ideology.

The executive arm of the government found itself on a collision path with the judiciary. The judiciary in any state has a duty to uphold the constitution and to interpret the laws of the state as made by the legislative arm in line with the constitution. When the land occupations were undertaken, white commercial farmers with assistance from their union, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), took the land occupiers and the government to court. From the cases

that were heard in 2000 before the High Court and Supreme Court, the land occupations were ruled to be unconstitutional and the Commissioner-General of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, Augustine Chihuri, was ordered to evict the squatters (CFU vs. Minister of Agriculture Land and Resettlement (HC3985/2000); Commissioner of Police vs. Commercial Farmers' Union (2000 (1) ZLR 503 (HC)). It can be noted that it is not debatable that the land occupations and the FTLRP were unconstitutional. Former Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, Anthony Gubbay, in 2001, argued that;

*“The order (by the High Court) was not meant to prevent the Government from pursuing land resettlement. Not at all. This has never been the objective or policy of the courts. The effect of the order was that land resettlement should be carried out within the framework of the Constitution and in compliance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act; and not by unlawful invasion.”*

In admitting that the FTLRP was unconstitutional, Walter Chambati, Deputy Director of the African Institute of Agrarian Studies (AIAS), interviewed by the researcher on 20 December 2016, argued that;

*“To achieve the cause of land reform, the executive disregarded the rulings of the courts that protected white interests. Also, another question which also came on board alongside the legality issue was the legitimacy issue. While government actions were illegal basing on the legal framework that was created in colonial times, was the clamour for land by Black not legitimate? The answers to that would be that the law in the first instance, beginning with the October 1889 Royal Charter, did not take into account issues of legitimacy but was racially driven; hence any laws that followed lacked legitimacy to the Black Africans.”*


It was noted from information gathered by the researcher from interviews that, land was expropriated by the whites without compensation and without the consent of the Black indigenous people, proving that Zimbabweans were well informed on the manner on how Blacks lost their land. Therefore, some participants interviewed by the researcher noted that “fast track” was a necessary process to right the wrongs of the colonial epoch, especially given the political intransigence by both Britain and some of the former white commercial farmers.

### **3.3 Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Model**

Land reform in Zimbabwe has a long history and is characterised by distinct phases. This study identified 5 phases which are depicted in Figure 3.1 below. Before colonialism (Phase I), the land occupation was based on freehold, governed by traditional/customary rules and regulations which were very strong. Following colonialism (Phase II), unjust laws were enacted, and racial segregation emerged, forced resettlements were done and that signalled the beginning of bloody conflicts for Blacks to reclaim their land until the Lancaster House Constitution was signed (Phase III).

Thereafter, land reforms had to be done to redress the colonial legacies, however, the process became slow and stagnant, triggering impatience on the part of the anticipated beneficiaries, culminating in the FTLRP (Phase IV). Zimbabwe is currently undertaking the last stage (Phase V) of completing its land reform initiative. The following (Figure 3.1) is a conceptual model of the land reform programme for Zimbabwe.

**Figure 3.1: Conceptual Land Reform Model of Zimbabwe**



**Source:** Author

While the model is shown in a linear manner, other elements can be implemented concurrently. For instance, the development of rural amenities can be undertaken concurrently with land allocation. Beneficiaries can also assist in the development, by, among other things, providing manual labour or farm bricks in the construction of schools, dip-tanks and health centres

### **3.4 Legislative Framework Supporting land reform initiatives in Zimbabwe**

Upon attaining independence, the study noted that the GoZ introduced a number of legislative reforms as part of efforts aimed at redressing the colonial land imbalances. The numerous efforts were introduced at various intervals during the country's history and they attained various levels of success. The notable legislative frameworks adopted by the GoZ in attempts at finding legal solutions of addressing the land question are outlined below;

#### **a. Communal Land Settlement Act (1982)**

One of the earliest pieces of legislation introduced by the new government of Zimbabwe in an attempt to address the land question was the Communal Land Settlement Act (1982). This piece of legislation had the effect of changing the Tribal Trust Lands into communal land. Through this Act, there was a transfer of authority over land in Zimbabwe from traditional leaders to local authorities. However, the fact that this was perceived as more or less an initiative from central government, there seemingly was some form of resistance. The changes brought about by this Act were perceived to have been imposed by central government onto the local people without consulting their local traditional leaders (Mafa *et al.*, 2015:78). One notes that this was a bold step on the part of the GoZ as it enacted a piece of legislation which directly repealed colonial laws in the form of the Tribal Trust Lands which had stripped the native Blacks of their most fertile land.

#### **b. The Land Acquisition Act (1985)**

The GoZ further enacted the Land Acquisition Act in 1985 as follow up legislation to the Communal Land Settlement Act. Through this Act, the GoZ acquired land on a 'willing seller-willing buyer' principle. This was in line with what had been agreed upon at the Lancaster House Agreement, and was also pronounced in the 1980 constitution which ushered in the



country's independence. This has been interpreted by some as the first actual attempt at land reform. However, the willing buyer-willing seller approach had weaknesses of its own. Due to obvious reasons, which included an evident lack of 'willing' seller on the part of the white colonial settlers, who were determined to not give up their most prized possession, the willing buyer-willing seller approach failed to attain the desired outcome and the majority of the land still remained in the hands of the whites. It became apparent that; redressing land imbalances would require a more radical approach as whites would not willingly surrender land to the native Blacks under such terms as advocated for the Act and the Constitution at the time.

**c. National Land Policy (1990)**

Upon the realising that the 'willing buyer-willing seller' principle would not deliver in terms of redressing colonial land imbalances, the GoZ came up with the National Land Policy of 1990. In a bid to frustrate any hopes by the native Blacks of acquiring fertile and productive land, the period after independence saw white settlers selling their worst land at high prices, which made it difficult for the GoZ to purchase it and rendered the 'willing buyer-willing seller' approach non-effective. According to Mafa *et al.* (2015:79), the GoZ thus introduced the National Land Policy of 1990 after the realisation that the conditions set-out in the constitution were inadequate in terms of empowering the native Blacks through giving them access and control of land. This policy thus had the objective of revising the aims of the land reform initiative at the time, so as to make them more appealing to the native Blacks, who at this point were beginning to be agitated since the government of the day had not yet been able to deliver land, which the entire liberation struggle had been premised on. The National Land Policy of 1990 as noted by (Chitsike, 2003; Kalogirou and Koutentis, 2016), primarily sought to resettle deserving and landless native Blacks amongst other objectives. It was also meant to ensure that any ambiguities such as those brought by the 'willing buyer-willing seller' principle which

acted in prejudicing Blacks of fertile land years after independence would be rendered ineffective.

#### **d. Constitutional Amendment Number 30 of 1990**

To further complement the National Land Policy of 1990, the Parliament of Zimbabwe further enacted the Constitutional Amendment Number 30 of 1990. This amendment legally authorised and allowed the continuation of the compulsory acquisition of land. It should be noted that before the enactment of this amendment, not all land in the hands of the white settlers could be acquired as the provisions at the time only allowed for compulsory acquisition of under-utilised land for both agricultural and settlement purposes (Mafa *et al.*, 2015:80). However, this specific amendment to the constitution allowed for the compulsory acquisition of all land by the GoZ, including that land which was termed to have been inefficiently utilised. It should be noted that this amendment was still an incomplete tool for ensuring that the majority of the native Blacks gained access to land as the acquisition of the land in question was only permitted on condition that whoever was acquiring such land would pay fair compensation for the acquired land, before or within a reasonable time frame after such acquisition would have taken place.

It has been argued that this amendment was a poor method of trying to provide land for the landless native Blacks. Tshuma (1997) argues that, “*the Constitutional Amendment Number 30 of 1990 served the purpose of specifying the principles upon which compensation of land acquired was to be determined and the manner in which it was to be paid which included fixing the amount payable and the period within which it shall be paid*”. Even though this amendment had a provision which stipulated that compensation had to be paid in the local currency, it was a deviation from previous provisions which required payment in the acquisition of land to be

in foreign currency. However, in an attempt to tip the land question in favour of the native Blacks, the constitutional amendment stated that, issues related to the acquisition of land could not be contested in court. However, all this still did very little in terms of effectively solving the land question at the national scale and the majority of the native Blacks still remained without land.

#### **e. The Land Acquisition Act of 1992**

This act came in as a follow up to the National Land Policy of 1990 and the Constitutional Amendment Number 30 of 1990. The main aim of this Act was to strengthen the state's position in terms of its ability to decisively act with regards to the land question which by the 1990s had become topical and was arousing a lot of tempers. Through the Land Acquisition Act (1992), the GoZ abolished the 'willing buyer-willing seller' principle which in fact had acted more as a tool for prejudicing the native Blacks of fertile land rather than a tool for speeding up the GoZ's land resettlement initiative.

The Land Acquisition Act (1992) authorised the GoZ to effect compulsory acquisition of land, at a price which was to be determined by the GoZ itself. According to Mafa *et al.* (2015:81), this act established a process of land designation through which the GoZ's specialists, farmers' interest groups and policy makers identified the land which was to be acquired. However, the white farmers disputed these attempts by the GoZ particularly the prices that were being proposed for the acquisition of land. Numerous attempts were made to seek recourse by the white farmers from the courts, but they achieved very little. This set the stage for the whites' ultimate loss of land at the turn of the new millennium.

#### **f. Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 20:01) of 2004**

After the FTLRP in 2000, the government sought to come up with further legislative frameworks that would legitimise the violent and chaotic land occupations that had characterised the FTLRP. This was done so as to come up with mechanisms that would ease the management of the land reform initiative. The GoZ thus enacted the Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 20:01) of 2004. The Act provided for the creation of an Agricultural Land Settlement Board, its functions and duties thereof. The Act further set the conditions for the settlement of persons on and the alienation of agricultural land and for matters incidental to and connected with the foregoing. Through this Act, the state was authorised to lease state land (with the option of purchase in the future) to individuals for agricultural purposes. However, those individuals to whom this land would be leased, were required to possess or have access to capital and other resources essential for the effective utilisation of the land. More important, through this Act, the President was authorised to repossess any of the leased land for public use at any time and the lessee had no legal right to challenge the President in that regard.

The 99-year lease agreements were thus introduced. This meant that there was essentially no ownership of land by individuals and only access to the state land as a means of production was given through an offer letter (from the relevant Minister) which then graduates into a 99-year lease agreement upon proving land utilisation capacity. These 99-year leases applied to the A2 farm model, with those resettled in the A1 model receiving offer letters at district level. An A1 plot has 6 hectares of arable land, one hectare for homestead and 13 hectares communally owned grazing area. An A2 is a commercial farming area measuring 20 hectares plus and maximum size is determined by agro-region (Government of Zimbabwe, 2004). It

can be argued that this officialised the native Black's access to land and was the most notable means of addressing colonial land imbalances in Zimbabwe, legally, that is.

**g. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005**

Further amendments were made to Zimbabwe's Constitution in 2005, where the GoZ enacted the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005 addressed issues surrounding the distribution of land right (Manjengwa and Mazhawidza, 2009:3). Through this amendment, the GoZ recognised that although land was now in the hands of the native Black majority, there was still a pertinent need to ensure equity and equality in the distribution of land. According to Section 4, subsection 3b of the Amendment;

*“In implementing any programme of land reform, the Government shall treat men and women on an equal basis with respect to the allocation or distribution of land or any right or interest therein under that Programme.”*

This ensured that the women too, who had had been denied access to land during the colonial era, could benefit from this critical resource through having access to the land in their own right and on an equal basis with their male counterparts. This was a notable effort by the GoZ to address all forms of colonial imbalances in terms of the access to land.

**h. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013**

Zimbabwe enacted a new Constitution in 2013. This was seen as an important step in breaking away from the colonial chains that had for so long been a shadow to each and every step the country took with regards to the land question. The previous constitution had been more or less imposed by the former colonial masters and they had inserted clauses that were meant to maintain their colonial hold on the land. However, the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment

(No. 20) Act 2013 was entirely different as it provided for agricultural and land issues in relation to the reality of the native Black majority. For instance; Section 3(2)(j) speaks of the “equitable sharing of natural resources, including land” Sections 288 through to 297 deal with agricultural land; Section 289 deals with principles guiding policy on agricultural land to redress unjust land ownership brought about by colonialism through stating that;

1. *Land is a finite natural resource that forms part of Zimbabweans’ common heritage;*
2. *Every Zimbabwean citizen has a right to acquire, hold, occupy, use, transfer, hypothecate, lease or dispose of agricultural land regardless of his or her race or colour (right is subject to section 72).*
3. *Use of agricultural land should promote food security, good health and nutrition and generate employment, while protecting and conserving the environment for future generations.*

However, it should be noted that even though Section 289 provides for the ‘right’ to agricultural land, the right is not a ‘fundamental right’ as it is not enshrined in Chapter 4: Declaration of Rights. This notion was supported by the case of *Zinyemba v Minister of Lands* CCZ 3/2016, Malaba, the Deputy Chief Justice at that time stated that, section 291 (continuation of rights of occupiers of agricultural land) as in Chapter 16 and “*its provisions do not enshrine a fundamental right.*” Section 71(2) on the other hand provides for property rights. Given Africa’s close link with land and its importance as the primary resource, land should be classified as a fundamental right. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013 is notably a positive step towards redressing colonial land imbalances.

### **3.5 Land Tenure**

According to Mogab (2009:4), a comprehensive land reform program must address land tenure and land rights issues. Clear land tenure increases incentives for farmers to invest and develop their private landholdings. Furthermore, secure land tenure is associated with better access to credit and greater productivity, all of which will ultimately further contribute to improving agricultural yields and alleviating poverty. Land tenure refers to regulations on ownership and related policies (Adams and Turner, 2005:4). The policies on land tenure in Zimbabwe have remained one of the major contested subjects of the FTLRP. Land tenure has continued to be the subject of discussion, especially on issues regarding the feasibility of the 99-year leases and multiple farm ownership. Issues relating to land tenure have been affected and closely linked with nepotism and political patron-client relationships.

Hall (1974:506) puts forward that, the term 'patron' is derived from the Spanish 'patron', meaning a person of power, status, authority and influence. It may signify an employer, a ceremonial sponsor or even a protecting saint, but is only relevant in relation to a less powerful person or 'client' whom he/she can help or protect. The patron-client relationship can only exist in cases where there is uncertainty and anxiety on people who consider themselves or are considered by the society to be weak in societal politics. Stein (1984:30-31) holds the view that, mediating the social universe on behalf of his clients, the patron offers protection in the face of danger, greater security in an insecure world, greater predictability for the powerless, more resources for the resource-starved or deprived, reduction of stress, stability in the face of uncertainty and reliability in an untrustworthy world. Patron-client relationships can be traced to various facets of life, that include business and religion.

Stein (1984:31) for instances states that, theologically, one thinks of the roles of Jesus and Mary, who intercede with God the Father on behalf of Christendom's faithful. Just as those who believe in the catholic doctrine accept that they are not powerful enough to represent themselves in front of the father, so do those who consider themselves weak in social lives (*ibid*). They look up to others to protect them or represent them on issues of pertinent importance, hence creating the patron-client relationship.

Patron-client relationships are practically more pronounced in politics and are used from the grassroots to the highest bureaucracies. The practical application of patron-client relationships results in a hierarchical order in which the patron is viewed as superior or superordinate while the client accepts the inferiority or subordinate position. However, in reality, both the patron and the client need each other. Stein (1984:33) summarises the relationship when he states that, “indeed, we can discern two levels of messages by the patron, the overtone being, ‘*You need me to protect you*’, and the covert one being, ‘*I need you to protect you*’.” In practice, the patron needs the clients to give him the power which he then uses to protect the clients and himself/herself.

The concept of patron-client relationship is not a European import into Africa in general or Zimbabwe in particular. The concept was used as a state-building mechanism in precolonial states like the Mutapa and Rozvi states in Zimbabwe. In, *A Political History of the Munhumutapa (c. 1400 – 1902)*, In Liesegang (1991), Mudenge notes that the creation of the empire-state succeeded in part due to the parcelling out of land and vassalage to those who expressed loyalty to the Mutapa. On the flip side, those who harboured rebellious plans or rebelled, lost their claims to chieftainships or the lands they ruled or utilised. All across the world, the politics of rewards to those who support those in power and/or punishments and reprisals to those who challenge and question those in authority has been a norm for centuries.



Magure (2014:34) likens the land transactions between ZANU PF and the beneficiaries as a Maussan Gift. This perception is adopted from the view by Marcel Mauss' (1966), who argued that, there are no free gifts in the world and a gift deserves an equal in return. Magure (2014:21) notes that;

*“What is suggested here is that gift transaction that takes place in the context of political relationships, especially in Africa, are governed by mutual obligations and indebtedness. ... For example, in the case of Zimbabwe, beneficiaries of the ZANU-PF driven land reform programme are called new farmers-cum-small-scale miners, and a majority of them are identified as ZANU-PF supporters.”*

In short, land becomes a gift to those who supported or those who will support those in power and could be taken away from those whose political alignment is questioned. The concept is used in this chapter to understand the manner in which the ZANU PF government has managed land tenure using the 99-year lease agreements instead of title deeds. It has been noted that the financial sector has made calls to the GoZ to utilise the title deeds as the ownership model for agricultural land so as to unlock the financial value of the land (Rugube *et al.*, 2003:15). This chapter sought to answer questions pertaining to the reasons behind the use of the 99-year lease model and its effects on poverty reduction and empowerment of the beneficiaries of the FTLRP.

### **3.5.1 Land Ownership Models**

There have been competing arguments for and against whether to issue the resettled farmers with title deeds to the land or the use of the GoZ's preferred 99-year lease agreements. A 99-year lease refers to an agreement in which the government allows an individual or group of individuals to occupy a particular piece of land for 99-years. Under this agreement, the

occupants are allowed to use the land for the stated purpose while the government retains ownership of the land (Kaakunga and Ndalikokule, 2006).

According to the Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 20:01) (as Amended, March 2004), a ‘lease’ includes the tenure of a holding after the right to purchase the holding has been exercised and until title has been issued in respect thereof. During the FTLRP, the GoZ issued those who occupied the A2 farms with offer letters which are being upgraded to 99-year lease agreements after demonstrating capacity to utilise the land. This meant that the government only gave the offer letters to lease agreements holders the rights to use the land but retained the ownership rights. Since the 99-year lease is legally classified as a long lease, which is defined as a lease extending to ten years and more, the lessee can occupy the land for his/her lifetime. However, his/her rights are limited to use and not ownership. The limitations against a lessee are stated under Section 13 of the Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 20:01) which states that the lessee;

*“shall not, (a) cede, assign, hypothecate or otherwise alienate his lease or his rights thereunder or place any other person in possession of his holding; (b) enter into a partnership for the working of his holding; without the consent in writing of the Minister.”*

There have been disagreements regarding the best model to implement in Zimbabwe for the achievement of desired results on the issue of land ownership under the FTLRP (e.g. Title deeds or Lease Agreements). On the one hand, some experts in the agricultural sector have argued that title deeds are the best as they give security of tenure. By extension, the title deeds mean that farmers would be comfortable in undertaking capital investments to increase and maximise productivity on their farms, something that is argued to be uncommon with the 99-

year lease model. Some of the participants interviewed by the researcher supported the title deeds system against the 99-year lease system by stating that;

*“The best land ownership system is that of availing title deeds. It promotes clear property rights regime and is investor friendly. This is debatable though on the basis that land ownership may end-up being in the hands of the elite. The Government may, therefore, endeavour to circumvent such scenario”*  
(Participant KI 43, Mwenezi).

Participant KI 52, interviewed by the researcher in Beitbridge noted that;

*Title deeds system is ideal because it transfers ownership of land to the beneficiaries. Title deeds can be use(d) as collateral security in the event of borrowing from financial institutions.”*

And Participant KI 44, from Zvimba further noted that;

*“The title deeds ownership should be adopted as this makes the beneficiary the sole owner of land and hence-forth land can be passed on to the beneficiary’s family.”*

The arguments in support of the title deeds system were followed by justifications against the 99-year lease holding as respectively given below. Participant KI 56, Nyanga noted that,

*“Private banks, in most cases, are less enthusiastic in funding farmers who are under such a model (99-year lease) and this may culminate in restricted funding to the farmers. Encumbered capitalisation on the farms would result (in) less production and prosperity.”*

According to Participant KI 44 from Marondera;

*“The model also inhibits international investment. Foreign investors are normally sceptical about 99-year lease ownership model as it places land indirectly under state ownership. Not recognised (99-year lease) by financial institutions on the basis that the*

*land remains under government control. Investing in such land is hampered because investor lacks confidence as govt (government) can have another plan on the land.”*

Participant KI 45 from Mutasa also noted that;

*“The 99-year lease model technically denotes that a farmer is a temporary holder of the land and therefore, inhibits one comprehensive ownership of the land. As such, it inhibits access to loans for one to institute meaningful development.”*

The arguments in support of title deeds are based primarily on two major issues namely, bringing development due to ownership which propels one to develop on his/her property, and the deed being bankable and hence opening different financing avenues from various financial institutions. What one should question is the practical truthfulness or correctness of there being a direct correlation between development and private ownership. Aristotle, writing in 300 B. C. argued;

*“For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest, and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfil.”*

The argument by Aristotle is to the effect that by nature, human beings are inclined to exert their maximum energy on that which they perceive is exclusively their own. People will, therefore, invest more in what they exclusively own and tend to give limited attention to that which is communally or nationally owned. People only seek to extract maximum value at the least capitalisation from that which is communally or nationally owned, which leads to deterioration of the resource in question in the long run. In the case of land, one is bound to increase development on that land if they have the private ownership rights to it. Farm

development requires extensive capitalisation. Personal savings for farm development may not be enough to deal with capital projects such as dam construction or rehabilitation, acquisition of irrigation equipment and farm mechanisation.

Title deeds give land value and allow for that value to be used by the farmers as collateral to be used in accessing funds from financial institutions for farm development. John Robertson, in an interview with the researcher on 15 January 2018 in Harare, noted that, property ownership is the driving force behind success. Property ownership is the link between the banks and landowners. Robertson further gave a long history of the development of property rights from the rise of Protestantism and Calvinism in Europe, which led to the transformation from feudalism to capitalism. He argued that land under communal and feudal system has no economic value but political value. He also stated that the communal system in Zimbabwe in the colonial times was sustained by the traditional Chief who rejected the idea by Charles Coghlan and Milton that all communal lands be privatised so as to give them financial and economic value, arguing that by doing that they (the Chiefs) would lose their power over the tribesmen, which they drew from the ability to allocate communal land.

The argument for title deeds has also been supported by the financial sector, who have argued that it is difficult to finance the new farmers under the 99-year leases. The Bankers Association of Zimbabwe (BAZ) stated that the 99-year leases alone could not be used as collateral to access agricultural funding. The organisation explained its conditions that;

*“It should be noted that having a 99-year lease on its own does not guarantee a farmer access to bank loans. ... Banks usually rely on the forced sale value of the collateral presented by the farmer (be it moveable assets such as tractors, vehicles etc. or other immovable buildings and infrastructure). Banks will,*

*therefore, only be able to offer loans that do not exceed the forced sale value of assets listed as collateral. ... Will banks be able to lend to farmers who have no improvements on the land? It is quite difficult if not impossible for a bank to lend against non-existent collateral. It will be therefore, incumbent on farmers, in addition to providing the bank with a sound business proposal, to also present alternative non-farm-based collateral to support the facilities that they may need from the bank.” (Mphambela, 2016).*

The argument put forward by the banks seems to be fair enough especially with regards to A2 farmers, whereupon one of the conditions that were laid down by the government in its policy was the provision of proof of enough capital to run an A2 farm successfully (Roodt, 2012a). However, in several cases, this condition was flouted, and those who had strong political or economic connections managed to acquire A2 farms without the requisite financial standing. The position taken by the financial sector is supported by John Robertson interviewed by the researcher on 15 January 2018 in Harare, who stated that it is a legal requirement for banks to lend money where there is security and he went on to quote Moore and Walker (1860:1286 & 647) stating that, the bridge between the land and banks (which is property ownership through title deeds) was broken. This meant that it was not possible for financial institutions to lend to farmers without any other collateral except only the 99-year lease (Paradzayi, 2007).

Ironically, the celebrated advantages of the title deeds are the cause of the fear expressed by those in support of the 99-year leases. Those in support of the 99-year leases argue that the land question is a political question and giving title deeds may trigger a process that would lead to the reversal of the land reform process. Below are some of the responses from those in support of the 99-year leases against title deeds:

*“Currently, the 99-year lease is the best suited for the situation in Zimbabwe. This is to stop beneficiaries of the land reform programme from selling the land back to the former white owners”* (Chief Musarurwa-Enos Pfungwa Masakwa, Interview with Researcher, Chivhu, 12 November 2016).

*“I believe the 99-year lease is better than any other alternative because it does not reverse the land reform given that the land belongs to the state and cannot be bought by the few rich individuals and push the current Black farmers off the land”* (Chief Ngezi-Peter Pasipamire, Interview with Researcher, Chegutu on 22 November 2016.)

*“The 99-year lease holding system is the best option. It leaves the government in control of the land on behalf of the masses. However, the lease document needs to be revised so that it becomes bankable”* (Lovemore Vambe, Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development Chief Agricultural Education Officer, Interview with Researcher, Harare on 28 November 2016.)

*“The 99-year lease gives the state total control over the land which is good in that the land is going to be owned/bought by the rich or the elites alone, hence, creating ‘new whites with Black colour’. Therefore, the best ownership is the 99-year lease. It’s only a new system and therefore, people have not yet understood it”* (Participant RF 16 (Bindura), 28 November 2016.).

The dominant argument that was put forward by the proponents of the 99-year lease agreements from the participants was that title deeds give beneficiaries of the FTLRP full ownership of the land with the right to dispose of the land as they wish. Such a situation as noted by Chief Musarurwa and Chief Ngezi, among others, can lead to some white farmers repurchasing the

land and regaining their dominance over the means of production again. The responses reflected a highly politicised and polarised society.

The responses showed that the majority of those who benefited from the land reform programme viewed the land not as an economic resource, but as a political one whose holding should also be a reflection of national political power. The reason for this could have been the dominance of the land issue in both the private, public and international media and the manner in which it was given prominence by political parties, especially ZANU PF. The land question was ZANU PF's primary subject of its political campaigns from 2000 until 2013, as espoused in its campaign catch phrases like, the land is the economy and the economy is the land; Zimbabwe will never be a colony again, and indigenise, empower, develop, and create employment.

Apart from the return of the former white commercial farmers, one other fear which dominated the minds of many participants who were in support of the 99-year leases, was the possibility that big companies and rich individuals may purchase the land and create a new crop of a few land barons controlling vast tracks of land. This was the argument that was put forward by Rodgers Ngara, quoted above. A District Lands Officer from Mashonaland Central Province interviewed by the researcher also noted that:

*“Not all who acquired land are farmers. Some of the beneficiaries of the fast track (land reform programme) are not farmers at heart. There are those who acquired the land for speculative purposes, and such individuals may not hesitate to sell those pieces of land they are holding, for quick financial gains.”*



The possibility of this scenario is noted by the fact that, a number of beneficiaries from the A1 model are not financially stable and if tempted with large sums of money, they may sell the land and this could eventually lead to the creation of land barons and land oligarchs. This kind of thinking is not entirely inaccurate, given that the creation of Mitchel and Mitchel Estates on the eastern outskirts of Marondera town was through the purchase and amalgamation of relatively smaller units of adjacent plots. With the will and financial resources, the creation of large estates through the purchase of adjacent A1 and some A2 farms is possible.

Some writers brushed aside the claim by ZANU PF that title deeds would create room for the return of the former white commercial farmers. These writers characterised the 99-year leases as a weapon in ZANU PF's hands to create perpetual servitude of those who benefitted. Lahiff and Cousins (2001) cited the issue of political interference as strong, and this is in tandem with a number of people who left ZANU PF and were threatened with the loss of their farms. Mliswa, who defected from ZANU PF once stated in 2016 that;

*“No one is safe. ... they use the land to control you”*

(<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/africa/zimbabwe-farms-zanu-pf-defectors.html>).

This notion takes us to the patron-client relationship which has existed between the government and beneficiaries of the land reform. Kinsey (1982) argued that as early as 1981/2 in the first land reform programme settlers (resettled farmers) of no - or the wrong - political affiliation have been asked to leave their holdings. The situation had been in some cases similar to the post-2000 era, as noted above. Justice for Agriculture Trust (JAT) and the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ) (2008: 57-58) argued that,

*“Allocation of land to these ‘new farmers’ reinforced a patronage system between the government and its supporters. By securing the loyalty of these new farmers, the State managed to invest itself with a strong and sustained political network in the commercial farming sector, thereby ensuring the continued political intimidation of its opponents. The patronage system, however, is questionable. Not only has the State bought the loyalty of its supporters, but it is in a position to punish those who renege on their political obligations through immediately confiscating land under the new laws enacted to remove white farmers. This gives the patronage clients a double motivation to continue to support ZANU PF. Not only must they show their gratitude for the farm that has been given to them, but they must also constantly be aware that the farm can be taken away at any stage.”*

The arguments given above make it imperative for the government to deal with issues of ownership and remove the fears in people, whether real or perceived, by creating security of tenure that is elastic to changes in even government personnel like individual ministers in order to dispel the patronage allegations as well as give confidence in the farmers that they can institute long term infrastructure projects.

The major difference between those in support of title deeds and those in support of the 99-year leases established by the research is that; generally, those in support of the title deeds view the land question from an economic perspective. The primary concern from the economic perspective in land reform and resettlement is the increase in crop and livestock production, and positive developments on the newly acquired farms. Those in support of the economic perspective, therefore, were dominated by economists as well as the financial services sector.

Those who supported the 99-year leases viewed the land question from a political perspective. From a political perspective, it was noted that land is a political resource whose holding reflects or should reflect the composition of socio-political power in the society. Production becomes a secondary subject to the preservation of land ownership for the benefit of the indigenous Zimbabweans. It was because of this view that those who supported the 99-year leases noted that land, firstly, should never go back into the control of the whites, secondly, that it should not be controlled by a few individuals, be they Black or white, and lastly that the state should be the ultimate authority on land issues and should have a say on who owns what, depending on one's production capacities and in response to national interests.

While there have been the two main competing landholding policies which were discussed in this chapter, some experts from the agricultural sector came up with two conciliatory models. The first model would be to retain the 99-year leases for the A1 beneficiaries and unveil title deeds to the A2 holders. Beitbridge District Agricultural Extension Officer, Masauso Mawocha, in his response to this study on 12 November 2016, opined that;

*“Both systems (99-year leases and title deeds) should be used depending on the capacity of the resettled farmer. The vulnerable groups of the community need 99-year leases whereas progressive and productive farmers can migrate from 99-year leases to title deeds, depending on production,”* and went on to point out that, *“farmers are hesitant to commit resources fully because they believe the land is still owned by the government and that it is not theirs. There is no motivation to fully develop unless there was an incentive to move to title deeds.”*

This proposed model seeks to create a middle line between the concerns of the farmers and the bankers. As earlier noted, bankers argued that the primary reason why they could not extend agricultural loans to farmers was because the 99-year leases could not be used as collateral, as they were not bankable. The suggestion to unveil 99-year leases for A1 landholders and title deeds for the A2 model was inspired by the notion that on the one hand, the A1 models were not meant to be high-end commercial farming holdings, but models for poverty alleviation, decongestion of the communal lands and allowing farmland for the low-income families (Government of Zimbabwe, 2001). On the other hand, the A2 models were meant to bring Blacks aboard mainstream commercial farming as a profitable business venture. It can be argued that this objective may be achieved when the requisite business linkages that include banking and insurance sectors, are in place.

It has to be noted that while the FTLRP policy clearly stipulated that those who were to apply for the A2 model and get considered should provide proof of the capability to run the farms competitively, in most cases those who benefitted under the model had no adequate resources as required. These individuals managed to acquire the farms through the influence they wielded in government or in politics, in general. There is therefore, need for the government to issue out title deeds after land audits and stipulations of payments to be made so as to unlock the financial value of the land.

The idea of unveiling title deeds to the A2 farmers may be noble but has the potential of creating heated friction with the A1 farmers. This act may be interpreted as discriminating between the A1 and the A2 farmers and relegating the A1 farmers to mere subsistence farmers with no meaningful contribution to the national agricultural output and in turn the national fiscus, since Zimbabwe's economy is agro-based. Research since the colonial times and

extending into the post-colonial era has noted the central role of smallholder and communal farmers in food crop production nationally (Machingaidze, 1979). In the post-FTLRP era, the A1 farmers have been central not only in food crop production, but also in cash crop and livestock production.

Production statistics from the GMB and TIMB show that A1 farmers have been central to national crop output and in some cases surpassed some A2 farmers. From the interviews conducted by the researcher, the majority of A1 farmers and some A2 farmers generally noted that a number of A2 farmers were underutilising the land that was allocated to them and advocated for the downsizing of the A2 farms in line with ecological zones and production capabilities. Given these salient issues, the government should come up with a well set out model of giving full ownership of land without considering the ownership model but based on production and productivity variables. These variables can include developments made on the land since the date of acquisition and effective occupation, production capabilities and statistics as shown by sales vouchers from buyers like the GMB, TIMB and various abattoirs for livestock farmers, and even random physical checks in various farms.

The second model proposed that the GoZ continues with the 99-year leases until after some time when the farmers are fully established. After the lapse of the time, beneficiaries can then be issued with title deeds. Judge President of the High Court of Zimbabwe, Justice George Chiweshe, interviewed by the researcher on 30 November 2016, put forward the idea when he said, *“It is prudent to start with the lease system then, with time and due consideration of experience, move on to the deeds system or a hybrid of both systems.”* The researcher further noted that while this may not have been in the public domain, the hybrid system with an option of availing title deeds at some point in the future, has been part of the government’s plans.

The 2001 FTLRP policy document states that, the land tenure system also offers each family a 99-year lease with an option to purchase, and the land leases and title deeds (researcher emphasis) for married couples should be in both spouses' names. The policy, however, needs to be dealt with carefully and all concerned stakeholders should have a say given that the majority of those who hold A2 farms are influential in government as senior government officials, business personnel, security chiefs or related to any of these highly influential portfolios. The danger is that in setting out the migration plan to title deeds and in coming up with requisite amount to be paid for the land, those with interest always attempt to manipulate the processes in their favour and disenfranchise those without influence.

Given that the bulk of the land was distributed, it is prudent for the GoZ to come up with an all-encompassing land tenure system. After developing the system that can balance between the need for defined ownership and government control of lands and land use, the policy should be announced. Such a move will allay the fears by some landholders that the government may dispossess them at some point in time, while also putting to rest the arguments by government critics that the land tenure system is used as a patronage tool by ZANU PF for political expediency.

### **3.5.2 One-Man One-Farm Policy**

In a bid to come up with equitable land redistribution, the GoZ through the FTLRP, adopted a '*one man one farm*' policy. The policy was meant to ensure that most of the families who are in need of land are beneficiaries and at the same time constrain the challenge of multiple farm ownership by the politically and economically connected. However, the policy has faced two contrasting interpretations. The official interpretation of the policy is that one family should occupy only a single farm as noted by the *former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands*

and Rural Resettlement, Ambassador Grace Mutandiro, in an interview with the researcher on 6 June 2018 that;

*“the government was saying one man – one farm meaning a family unit of mother, father and the minor children, meaning ‘one family – one farm’.”*

This could also be deduced from the FTLRP’s policy document when it stated that;

*“the land tenure system also offers each family a 99-year lease with the option to purchase and the land leases and title deeds for married couples should be in both spouses’ names”.* The policy, however, allowed for children who have reached the legal age of majority to qualify for land allocated in their own right. This led, in some cases, to some siblings having separate farms and in some cases, this was seen as multiple farm ownership.

The former Minister of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa, was cited by Norimitsu Onishi in (2016) as saying that,

*“some member of the same family might have been allocated farms and people mistake it for multiple farm ownership which to him was not a problem.”* Ambassador Mutandiro pointed that *“when children had gone beyond eighteen years, they were allowed to apply and they qualified to own land beside that which their parents owned as they were constitutionally regarded as adults.”* One notes that the GoZ’s policy therefore, did not discriminate on whether one’s relative had been allocated farms as such cases could be legally contested.

Others have chosen to literally interpret the policy as to mean a single person holding a single farm. Chinamasa, quoted by Norimitsu Onishi (2016) stated that, we have a policy that it was one person, one piece of land. The policy is clear. It’s not a problem. Such an interpretation

could allow for a married couple to have a farm each in their names and create a situation of inequity. The interpretation might be driven by a failure to interpret the spirit and letter of the policy which sought to create equity over land occupation. However, owing to the positions in government of those alleged to have more than one farm, it is easy to conclude that the challenge is driven by those with political and financial power.

The full list of multiple farm owners amongst influential Zimbabweans has remained a mystery due to the fears that if it was released to the public, it would expose the political, security and business leadership of the country. According to a United States of America Embassy cable of 4 August 2004, the then Minister of Lands, John Nkomo, compiled a list of 329 violators of the GoZ's "*one-family one-farm*" policy. However, the list was never made public and has been embargoed by the government. Pigou (2016:9) notes that,

*"The government has instituted several land audits since implementing the fast-track land reform, but none have been made public. A pilot land audit funded by the United Nations Development Programme in 2015 confirmed allegations that top government and ZANU PF officials owned multiple farms."*

After the revelations, the government changed the focus of land audits from the issue of multiple ownership to issues of (under)utilisation (Pigou, 2016). The majority of those who are alleged to have acquired more than one farm and in some cases land beyond the agreed limits for the various ecological zones, were senior government officials. According to Mlambo (2012) in *The Independent* (14 September), information gathered from anonymous sources from the Ministry responsible of land reform revealed that;



*“Those who own multiple farms include Senate President, Edna Madzongwe with six farms, Local Government minister Ignatius Chombo (five), Home Affairs co-minister Kembo Mohadi (four), Mines minister Obert Mpofu (three), Water and Climate minister Saviour Kasukuwere (two). Madzongwe was given an offer letter for Stockdale farm (750 hectares) but is said to be the owner of Aitape farm (2 000ha), Couburn Estate (560ha), Mpofu farm is (450ha), others are Bourne farm (445ha) and Reyden farm (1 340) all dotted around the country.”*

The biggest challenge of multiple land ownership, according to Mlambo (2015), was the former President, Robert Mugabe, whose family was reported to have been in possession of fourteen farms. This alleged multiple ownership betrayed the notion and national policy of one man one farm and made it difficult for the Minister and his officers to institute meaningful land audits that could revise ownership issues. The major issue of concern on the subject of multiple farm ownership is that it created a new class of Black land barons. When the FTLRP was instituted, the government argued that some white commercial farmers owned multiple farms at the expense of the native Blacks. Participants who were against the issuing of title deeds argued in part that, issuing the title deeds would create a new crop of Black land barons which was against the essence of the FTLRP. The revelation that those in political power had broken one of the cardinal policies of the FTLRP was a betrayal of what the same political leadership described as a revolution.

The subject of multiple ownership was proven to be a public secret given that some ordinary A1 and A2 farmers who took part in this research raised the issues of multiple ownership and the challenge of holding land for speculative purposes. Participant RF 4, a sugarcane farmer in

Chiredzi District said that; “...an audit was needed to correct anomalies and irregularities done during the inception of the programme. Cases of double farm ownership and huge farm sizes, remain as source of disenfranchisement.”

There was a high level of awareness by key informants, in both A1 and A2 farming models regarding the problem of multiple farm ownership as well as a number of acknowledgments of the prevalence of the scourge in secondary data materials like newspapers published in Zimbabwe and the Southern African region.

### **3.5.3 Consideration of people with disabilities in the FTLRP**

Approximately 15% (1 billion) of the world’s population, experience some form of disability, and disability prevalence is generally higher in developing countries such as Zimbabwe. According to World Bank statistics, about one-fifth (110-190 million) of the estimated global total, experience significant disabilities (Uwi Basaninyenzi, 2019). It is, therefore, important to understand the meaning of the term disability first, if its implications regarding access to land are to be well-articulated. The United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights and Dignities of Persons with Disabilities (PWD) recognises that disability is an evolving concept and that disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments that hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2016).

Tennant *et. al.*, 1994:899; Leonardi *et al.*, 2006 refer-to disability as “...any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in a manner or within a range considered normal for a human being...” The GoZ defines a disabled person as someone with a physical, mental or sensory disability, including a visual, hearing or speech functional disability, which gives rise to

physical, cultural or social barriers inhibiting him from participating at an equal level with other members of society in activities, undertakings or fields of employment that are open to other members of society (Government of Zimbabwe, 1996).

It is against this general background that special attention is given to people with disabilities when the allocation of significant capital resources such as land is being done. In Zimbabwe, the issue of access to land by people with disabilities is not adequately documented and hence often left out in key policy debates at national level. The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) requires an in-depth introspection on how it took into consideration issues revolving around disability.

The research found out that the FTLRP policy is silent with regards to issues revolving around the access to land by PWDs. The FTLRP covers land redistribution in relation to the financial and production capacities of applicants in general. It also defines the land sizes for the proposed models namely (A1, A2) in relation to the country's natural regions (Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019a). Some schools of thought argue that the FTLRP was not a pre-planned programme but a government reaction to land occupation, as it (the government) sought to rectify against a wave of farm occupations that was already underway (Moyo, 2000). On that note, there was no comprehensive or inclusive planning processes (to take needs of PWDs into consideration), which is generally normally expected when such initiatives are executed. In some provinces, the few PWDs who were politically connected or with financial resources had better chances of getting land allocation, whilst the majority from rural poor communities did not have a chance due to physical impairments which hindered them from actively participating in the *Jambanja* (the violent land occupations).

**Table 3.1: Perceptions of Key Informants on the consideration of people with disabilities during FTLRP**

Perception on benefit of FTLRP to People with Disabilities					
Province	KII Interviews			Focus Group Discussions	
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Not Sure (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)
Mashonaland East	0	16.13	5.44	8	92
Mashonaland West	1.61	14.52	9.54	4	96
Mashonaland Central	1.61	14.52	8.42	5	95
Matabeleland North	1.61	6.45	6.67	3	97
Matabeleland South	0	9.68	3.21	0	100
Masvingo	0	8.06	4.53	6	94
Manicaland	0	6.45	5.24	2	98
Midlands	0	12.9	8.59	1	99
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4.84</b>	<b>88.71</b>	<b>6.46</b>	<b>3.63</b>	<b>96.38</b>

*Source: Author*

Findings of this study from Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions established that people with disabilities did not significantly benefit from the FTLRP, as compared to people without disabilities.

In addition, the researcher established that there was a general perception that disability is inability (Muderedzi *et al.*, 2017) and hence when land allocation was done, PWDs were not considered as they were perceived as not having the capacity to utilise such an important resource, whilst some thought it could be a waste of land, basing on the premise that they may not fully utilise it. The majority of the PWDs live in rural areas in poverty, and such people were more disadvantaged under the FTLRP whilst an insignificant number of them indirectly benefitted from the land reform programmes.

### **3.5.3.1 The land reform and persons with disabilities in modern society**

The land reform has broadly been seen as an exercise to redress colonial imbalances. This is a broad conceptualisation. Broken down, one can note that what are termed colonial imbalances refer to the deliberate impoverishment of Africans by successive colonial regimes. The deliberate impoverishment was meant to create a cheap labour pool for white owned farms and urban industries, as well as to eliminate socio-economic and political competition from the Africans in the colony. Hence, redressing colonial imbalances should be understood to mean that land was being redistributed to Africans to transform them from their relatively poor conditions to socio-economic empowered citizens, regardless of disability status. Initially, the dominant practice has been that the land issue was a simple matter of giving land to a family headed by a father (male). From this, the benefits would accrue to the family, especially to women and children, leading to universal upliftment and empowerment. This concept was true to some extent but was found to be somewhat exclusionary.

Women and the youths argued that the process of giving land to the elderly, especially men was in some cases a disenfranchisement. Women lobby groups also made loud calls to consider distributing land in the names of females as well. In admitting tremendous changes that women have achieved through struggle and lobbying, Manjengwa *et al.*, (2013) argued that; women are far from reaching equality; however, the fast track land reform has been a major change, created by women themselves who have been pushing for quotas, credit, and their names on land documents. While the process did not bring equilibrium, it tremendously changed the status of women with the Utete Report (2003) informing that a total of 22 723 and 796 were allocated land under the A1 and A2 models respectively, representing respective percentages of beneficiary of 18% and 12%.

Given that the Utete Commission undertook its research during the FTLRP, the figures could have increased due to the pressure exerted by women pressure groups. The lobbying had a positive impact as the government gave a positive response. While the government prioritised race with patriarchal norms skewing the programme to males in the FTLRP (Hanlon *et al.*, 2012), the FTLRP policy document stated that; “...*the land tenure system also offers each family a 99-year lease with the option to purchase and the land leases and title deeds, for married couples should be in both spouses’ names...*” (authors’ emphasis).

The policy moved a step forward in terms of the recognition of women as equal holders of rights on the land. Furthermore, there was also the unveiling of land leases in the names of women in the cases of those who applied for the land independent of their spouses or those who were single, widowed or divorced.

The case with the women, which was driven by intense lobbying, has not been the same with PWDs. With regards to the land question, it seems responsible authorities have never been concerned with the land question with regards to PWDs. In relatively rare cases where a person with a disability (which is deemed to be limiting on their ability to be active and work) visited land offices applying for land as a means to try and emancipate themselves from poverty. In most cases, such applications would not be taken seriously by the authorities. It is important to note that, there have been differences in the manner in which the rich and poor PWDs have been treated. One representative of PWDs interviewed by the researcher on 08 August 2017 in Harare noted that, for those PWDs who were influential, rich and in some cases politically connected, their disabilities become socially invisible to those in authority. As a result, through the FTLRP, very few influential PWDs were allocated land. They representative further added that;

*“Influential members of the society due to their political connections of senior members in the security forces with disabilities which could be classified as having a considerable limitation, were allocated land.”*

While there can be nothing wrong as they deserved the land as citizens, the problem arose when other persons living with similar or relatively lighter disabilities are denied land leases only because they were not equally rich. Some names of influential people with disabilities that accessed farms include former proportional representative (persons with disabilities) senator, Anna Shiri, former proportional representative (persons with disabilities) legislator, Ronah Moyo and ZANU PF Politburo Member, Joshua Malinga.

It became apparent that, the social visibility of disabilities differed when an individual was not influential and seeking land as a source of poverty alleviation. In the case of one anonymous farmer under the A1 model (LRRP I) who had a crippled hand, the Lands Officer had to ask him to go and get married so as to allocate him a piece of land. In an interview with an anonymous A1 farmer (Interviewee 1), from Macheke Holton 6 (Marondera District), Mashonaland East Province, on 14 July 2017, he revealed that the lands officer allegedly said to him;

*“...how will you work on the land with a single hand? I may want to give you the land but if my superiors are to visit and see you owning land with your condition, I will lose my job. I advise you to go and get an able-bodied wife then return and I will allocate you the land. In your current state, I cannot take that risk.”*

The story of this farmer, who had adopted a small hoe (*mbezo*) to weed the fields given that bigger hoes need two hands noted that land was equally a need for fellow PWDs as it was a means for them to live independently and be emancipated from being a lifelong burden of

relatives. There are some lessons that could be deduced from the attitude that was exhibited by this particular lands officer. The primary lesson is that there is a general assumption that PWDs are a burden to their relatives and besides begging and asking for handouts, they cannot work for themselves. Farai Cherera, Director of National Council for Disabled Persons in Zimbabwe interviewed by the researcher, stated that;

*“...lands officers when approached by persons with disabilities for land allocation, may not rebuke one, but through their attitude, one would deduce that there is discrimination and in some cases they use subtly stigmatising language like, unozoita sei, une mari here, unozodii (what will you do with the land and do you have the money to use in farming?).”*

Combining what Cherera noted and what was revealed in the case of the farmer who had a disability quoted above, one can note the existence of a perception by the land authorities that allocating land to persons with disabilities is a waste of the resource. It tells of a perception that PWDs cannot fully utilise land hence allocating them when they do not have money might be a waste of the resource. Such a public assumption is dangerous to the plight of PWDs.

It however, informs them that you can only be your own liberators. Cherera noted that out of as many reference letters they had written for their members, only six informed that they had been allocated land. Cherera could however not account for those who did not report back but opined that most of these people might not have gotten the land due to the stigma. Questioning whether one had the financial capacity means that there is a general perception that without heavy financial backing a person with a disability cannot own land. This misconception reinforces the circle of poverty among PWDs who, like any other poor Zimbabwean, might have looked up to owning land as a means of upliftment and empowerment.



The negative perceptions of the capabilities of PWDs to own and utilise land as a means for poverty alleviation were not only witnessed by government officials. In some cases, societal members also exhibit signs of stigma towards PWDs as charity '*objects*' who cannot be entrusted with the means of production to work for themselves and their dependence. In one case in Mukumbura, a lady with a moving impairment who had inherited a farm from her father had to battle against an able bodied who had encroached onto her land. When the matter was taken to the courts, the neighbour argued that the lady did not need the land because she had a disability and used a wheelchair (interview with Cherera). With these challenges, it is therefore, not surprising that PWDs and DPOs have been preoccupied with awareness campaigns to fight stigma and create a space of equality in both rural and urban areas.

While there have been the above noted misconceptions, it is also important to note that part of the blame of the failure by the GoZ to come up with a land reform policy that takes into consideration the plight of PWDs rests with those chosen to represent their interest in Parliament. The Zimbabwean Parliament reserves two senatorial seats for representatives of PWDs. It has to be the duty of these '*special*' representatives to push for the reservation of a certain percentage of land for various PWDs. The experience of the first phase of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme should have informed these members that they had a task to actively engage all the respective arms of government to set a quota for PWDs on all acquired land. The failure at this stage, while it is regrettable, should save as a lesson that as the government engages in land audits and come up with best holding models, DPOs and the representatives of PWDs, especially in Parliament should engage the GoZ and have some land set aside in case there is repossession of land from those who are multiple owners of land, underutilised land and land above stipulated agro-region farm size. On their part, DPOs'

assistance to their members who expressed interest in acquiring land was limited to issuing reference letters which in most cases might have been ignored by land officials.

In seeking to understand why people with disabilities could not have a fair share in the FTLRP, it is apparent that there were perceptions of oppression arising from physical impairments, in other cases, marginalisation due to over sympathy or excessive compassion from the able bodied. This over sympathy and compassion led many, who did not understand the notion of disability, to feel that PWDs were a charity case and perennial dependents who only survive on handouts. It is this line of thinking that led to the exclusion of PWDs from many national development projects and policies, with the land reform programme being one of them.


### **3.6 Land Use**

The question of land use seems to be a simple question that should not, at face value, be subjected to scrutiny. However, in the aftermath of the FTLRP, the question is a pertinent one. Land use is a broad subject that is not only limited to who is farming what in which region. According to the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources of the Australian Government (<http://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/aclump/land-use>), Land use information shows how our land resources are used. This includes the production of goods (such as crops, timber and manufactures) and services (such as defence, recreation, biodiversity and natural resources protection). It extends to issues of how certain farming practices impact the environment, issues of crop and animal disease control and land productivity in the long run. It also encompasses issues of land use conflicts between farming and mining or urban development, among many other issues. Land use may be seen as referring to the human use of the physical (land) surrounding for socio-economic purposes. Land use should be carefully planned by responsible authorities when planning on community development and changes as

there are needs to balance various human needs that include residential, recreational, forestry, wildlife parks and farming, among many other variables.

Zimbabwe was demarcated into five (v) agro-ecological zones in the 1960s (Chikodzi *et al.*, 2013). The demarcations were done through analysing climatic and soil conditions obtaining in these zones so as to influence on land use planning (Mugandani and Wuta, 2012). The zones, therefore, define the various kinds of agricultural activities that can be conducted in different zones in order to realise maximum yields and potentials in both farming and non-farming businesses. Figure 3.2 below shows the Agro-ecological regions of Zimbabwe.

**Figure 3.2: The Agro-ecological regions of Zimbabwe**



*Source:* McAllister and Wright (2019:7)

A description of the natural farming regions of Zimbabwe Table 3.2 below.

**Table 3.2: Description of the natural farming regions of Zimbabwe**

Natural Region	Area (000 ha)	% of total land area (%)	Annual rainfall (mm)	Farming Systems
I	613	1.56	> 1 000. Rain in all months of the year, relatively low temperatures	Suitable for dairy farming forestry, tea, coffee, fruit, beef and maize production
II	7 343	18.68	700-1 050. Rainfall confined to summer	Suitable for intensive farming, i.e. maize, tobacco, cotton and livestock
III	6 855	17.43	500-800. Relatively high temperatures and infrequent, heavy rainfalls and subject to seasonal droughts and severe mid-season dry spells	Semi-intensive farming region. Suitable for livestock production, together with production of fodder crops and cash crops under good farm management
IV	13 010 036	33.03	450-650. Rainfall subject to frequent seasonal droughts and severe dry spells during the rainy season	Semi-extensive region. livestock and resistant fodder crops. Forestry, wildlife/tourism
V	10 288	26.2	< 450. Very erratic rainfall. Northern low veld may have more rain but the topography and soils are poor	Extensive farming region. Suitable for extensive cattle ranching. Zambezi Valley is infested with tsetse fly. Forestry, wildlife/tourism

**Source:** Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 2012 in Mugandani and Wuta (2012)

The manner in which the FTLRP in Zimbabwe was undertaken resulted in little attention being paid to sustainable land use. The chaotic nature under which the land was occupied and later sanitised by the FTLRP saw people occupying any available farm without due consideration of what the occupied land was for. For instance, land use in Manicaland, Masvingo and

Matabeleland Provinces was dominated by forestry farming, horticulture, fruit production, animal husbandry and wildlife parks.

However, in the wake of the FTLRP there has been marked threats to forestry preservation in Manicaland Province, while a substantial number of the wildlife in parks and conservancies were poached in Matabeleland North and Masvingo Provinces (Government of Zimbabwe, 2003). In some cases, farmers pulled down the fences that separated their lands from conservancies (Mhlanga, 2001:49) which resulted in their livestock being muled by predators like lions, while the mixing of cattle and wild animals like buffaloes increased the prevalence of animal diseases like foot and mouth (Government of Zimbabwe, 2003)

The threat to forestry, especially the indigenous forests, was not only limited to Manicaland Province alone but also the Mashonaland Provinces, due to the sharp increase in tobacco farming (TIMB, 2018). The displacement of the former white commercial farmers who dominated tobacco production prior to the FTLRP, coupled with unpredictable payment systems by GMB, led a number of the resettled farmers from both the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme, First Phase (LRRP I) and those of the FTLRP turning to tobacco farming. This seemed to be more lucrative than food crop production. While tobacco farming was dominated by large scale commercial farmers prior to 2000, with 7 194 farmers in 1999, statistics from TIMB show that by 2015, there were approximately 75 000 registered growers, with approximately 27 000 being A1 farmers and communal farmers totalling 35 000 (TIMB, 2016, 2017).

The small-scale A1 tobacco growers had no capacity to use electricity for tobacco curing; hence there was a high destruction of indigenous trees in the tobacco growing provinces, mainly in the three Mashonaland Provinces and Manicaland Province. The growers had no capacity to

buy and transport coal. Those who used coal were mainly under contract growing with various tobacco companies like Boost Africa Traders P/L, Chidziva Tobacco Processors (Pvt) Ltd, Curverid Tobacco P/L, Mashonaland Tobacco Company, Tianze, Northern Tobacco, Tobacco Sales Floor and Classic Leaf P/L who provide them with coal as part of the contract package.

Information obtained by the researcher showed that, TIMB and other tobacco companies, in their drive to save the environment and promote sustainable farming, encouraged farmers to grow gum trees and use the gum trees for tobacco curing. During some interactions with various farmers at Boka Tobacco Auction Floor (BTAF) in Harare in 2016, the researcher gathered that A1 farmers noted the destruction caused by the use of indigenous trees in tobacco curing but most of them argued that the trees burnt slower than the gum trees and hence were easier to use than the gum trees. Other farmers argued that they had not developed enough gum tree plantations and to buy the gum trees from those with plantations, added to the cost and reduced their profits, hence the continued use of indigenous trees.

At an institutional level, TIMB, having noted the problem of deforestation, deducts a levy from every sale. This is called afforestation levy which is used to finance projects to replenish the damages caused by tobacco farming to the environment. The producers and distributors of the tobacco seed, Tobacco Research Board (TRB) commonly known as '*Kutsaga*' also distribute a sachet of gum tree seeds for every one-hectare sachet of tobacco seeds purchased by the farmers. The programme is meant to encourage the farmers to develop their own gum tree plantations and gradually move away from the use of indigenous slow-growing trees to the fast-growing gum trees.

However, some of the farmers who acted as participants, especially those from Beitbridge District in Matabeleland South Province, Matobo District in Matabeleland South Province and those from Mwenezi District in Masvingo Province, proved that they knew the types of farming that were suitable for their respective regions. For instance, one farmer from Matopo District, in Respondent RF 19, pointed out that;

*“Indawo le kayivhumi izilimo ezinjengo mumbu lezinye izilimo ezandise ukulinywa endaweni ye Mashonaland. Kuyatshisa njalo izulu liluthswane kodwa engakubona kungcono yikuthi ngilime inkomo lokhu ngibona kusenza kuhle ngiyazama ukwaka unhlambi ngoba yikho okuhambelana lomhlabathi ongapha. Okuhlupayo yikuthi amanye amadhlelo asetshenziswa yisigaba sonke kunzima ke ukuthi ubone ukuthi indlelo lingaba lenkomo ezinganani.” (This place is not good for doing crops like maize or others done in Mashonaland. It’s very hot and has less rains so yes, I am doing well as I am building my head of cattle which is suitable here. The problem is that some paddocks are communally owned hence one cannot easily gauge how big the head should be).*

The researcher further noted that most farmers attempted to fill in the gap that was left by the former white commercial farmers in their regions, though at various scales. However, in the Matabeleland and Masvingo regions, there were challenges from some of the farmers, especially those in the A1 farm models, who attempted produce crops which require less capital, against animal husbandry, even when they did not have the needed capital to finance such production like irrigation equipment, given the regional climatic conditions.

### **3.7 Socio-political issues surrounding FTLRP in Zimbabwe**

To document socio-political issues surrounding FTLRP in Zimbabwe, the following were the research findings that are summarised into three thematic areas, namely racial, political, international community and media framing.

#### **3.7.1 Racial Divide and Land Reform**

The land reform and resettlement question in former settler colonies had been a racial question. Settler colonialism refers to colonial domination that was deliberately driven by an influx of settler Europeans in targeted lands for a permanent settlement and supplanting of the socio-cultural norms of the indigenous populations with that of the settlers and creating a new society dominated politically and economically by the new settler colonialists (Rutherford, 2004). The process was characterised by resource expropriation (primarily land) from the indigenous peoples through various means that included war and genocide (Wolfe, 2006).

Since the institutionalisation of colonialism, land became a racial asset. The colonial governments deliberately pushed out the indigenous Black people from the land in order to politically and economically disempower them. Genocide for land was rampant in the country case studies, where the native Blacks resisted the expropriation of their land. In Zimbabwe, for instance, Chief Chingaira and his people were subjected to scorched earth policy and dynamiting of the caves in which the warriors hid in the Eastern parts of Zimbabwe now known as Manicaland Province (Ranger, 1988). Over 2000 Black people lost their lives. These methods were used to various degrees in all the parts of Matabeleland and Mashonaland. South African and Kenyan tribes also faced the same fate in the process of colonialism. In Namibia, the first genocide of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was committed by the Germans against predominantly



Ovaherero and Nama peoples, who like the other groups in Southern Africa, were condemned to native reserves (Melber, 2019).

In relation to the subject of land and genocide in Namibia, Bamidele (2012) states that, “colonialism went along with violent land theft, and the current distribution of land in Namibia is a constant reminder that colonialism has not ended despite independence.” Land alienation was therefore, the first step towards total control and the creation of settler colonies (May and Lahiff, 2007). It also meant that when the African governments had to redress colonial imbalances, land reform had to be a central policy.

The creation of the settler colonies was along racial lines. In South Africa, the whites took over the land and condemned Blacks to perpetual poverty through a raft of laws that came to be known as ‘Apartheid’. Apartheid, simply defined, meant ‘separate development’ (Mhlauli *et al.*, 2015). However, in practice, the concept meant more than that. It was a racial policy that stratified society based on race in a caste system that saw the white (Caucasians) on top and enjoying political, economic and social privileges primarily because of the colour of their skin and indigenous Blacks occupying the lowest strata also primarily because of the pigment of their skin. In order to sustain this system, a raft of laws and policies on labour, race relations and land were enacted and that made it easier to sustain the system. The most important of these policies was the alienation of land based on race.

Racial land alienation saw the white populations in the country case studies (Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and Kenya), who constituted the minority, having the best fertile land reserved for them at concessionary prices, while Blacks were banished to poor lands (Bourguignon, 2009:6; Moyo, 2009:139) that came with various names like homelands, Bantustans, Native

Reserves and Tribal Trust Lands. Land alienation was conducted in various ways that included military conquest, deceptive treaties and after effective colonisation, racial government policies and legal instruments which partitioned land for various racial groups with whites having the best lands which strategically positioned them economically, while Blacks were resettled in mostly poor areas that were also remote from the economic infrastructure (Arrighi, 2010:42).

Land expropriation was a continuous process which meant that at the time of independence, a lot of the native Blacks in affected countries had the memories of how they lost their lands only because they had a Black skin. Earlier expropriation was meant to provide whites with land for farming and denying Blacks the same land in order to reduce competition and also create a large cheap labour pool (Werner, 1993). Later expropriations, however, came as means of punishment against those seen as supporting the cause of liberation as well as creation of buffer zones to alienate the masses from incursions by the liberation fighters, mostly in the border areas. Such expropriations remained in the memories of the people who wished to see such processes reversed at the dawn of independence. For the democratic and liberation process to be completed, it was therefore, imperative for the new independence governments to institute broad-based holistic land and agrarian reforms. Moyo (2011a:494) states that;

*“In former settler colonial Africa, which suffered long-term racial minority rule, particular grievances over land alienation, and institutionalised race-class and ethno-regional inequalities, the politics of redistributive land and agrarian reform entail historically specific socio-political demands that have to be satisfied.”*

The issues around property ownership were not well appreciated by the majority of white landowners in all country cases. In the Zimbabwean case, the white landowners continued to dig-in against any forms of land reform even when it had been accepted that the ‘willing seller-

willing buyer' policy had failed, and the British government had reneged on its colonial responsibility.

The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) having been put between a rock and a hard surface by the land occupations and the refusal by Britain to honour its contractual independence agreements, convened a donors' conference in September 1998 which targeted to raise 42 billion Zimbabwean Dollars (US\$ 1.9 billion) at the time targeting to resettle 100 000 families (Masiiwa, 2004:10). However, the conference only brought in 7 339 000 Zimbabwe dollars (US\$ 332 000), with most of the western donors pledging technical assistance and support (Masiiwa, 2004:11). When the government chose to support expropriation of farms, the white land owners went the legal route, which they knew would give them protection, but would on another level put the government in a complicated situation as it was required by law to use force pushing out illegal land occupiers from the farms.

The judgements by Justice Garwe on 17 March 2000, in which the white commercial farmers under the Commercial farmers Union sought an order from the High Court (Case No. HC 3544-2000) to declare land occupations "invasions" illegal and to evict occupiers if they failed to vacate the farms in seventy-two hours of the order, and Justice Chinhengo on 13 April 2000 (Commissioner of Police V Commercial Farmers' Union 2000 (1) ZLR 503 (HC) 2000 (1)), in which the Commissioner of Police sought the High Court to relieve it from the orders in the ruling by Justice Garwe that the Commissioner disregard orders from the executive and implement the eviction of farm occupiers, are some amongst several land related cases in Zimbabwe, which directed the government to use the police force to protect the legal rights of the white commercial farmers.

However, as the case had become political, as noted by the then Commissioner (General) of Police, Augustine Chihuri, in the Commissioner's application against the use of the police force to evict land occupiers, it was difficult for the police to use force against land occupiers without a political solution to the problem, even when it meant following the judgements of the various courts in the land (Commissioner of Police V Commercial Farmers' Union 2000 (1) ZLR 503 (HC) 2000 (1)).

The challenge that Zimbabwe, and the other country case studies, faced was that their respective legal systems, constitutions and subsequent laws that had emanated from them after attaining their independence, sought to protect the future relations, especially on racial harmony by conveniently ignoring the history of such racial relations especially as they related to property rights. However, when the Zimbabwe government was asked by the British government as well as the white commercial farmers to use the anti-riot police and the military to remove land occupiers, the Zimbabwe government noted that the matter was political and only a political solution would bring finality and not force (see Commissioner of Police V Commercial Farmers' Union 2000). It can be noted that at this point, the bigger part of the process had turned racial.

Racial rhetoric began dominating most of the debates on land. Mugabe lashed out at the white commercial farmers, alleging that they were not grateful to the reconciliation efforts extended to them at independence. There were cases of active violence against the supporters of the MDC by the members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), as a result of the perception that they were taking sides with the whites who were now seen as a national threat (Asuelime and Simura, 2014).

White commercial farmers in their court cases, specifically in the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe, at the now defunct SADC Tribunal in 2007 submitted that; *“The actions of the Government of Zimbabwe in expropriating land for resettlement purposes has been based solely or primarily on consideration of race and ethnic origin... It is being directed at white farmers... In reality it was aimed at persons who owned land because they were white”* (Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe: SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007).

While the constitutions of the case studies generally noted that no one will be discriminated on the basis of among other things, race, it has to be noted that the land question in the former settler economies was and has been a racial question simply because settler colonialism was driven by resource expropriation based on race. It was because of this reason that the GoZ’s response at the SADC Tribunal noted that there was a racial aspect to land reform because of the colonial history of the country (Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe: SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007).

In South Africa, the land question has also been debated along racial lines. Commenting on the debate on land, especially as it related to the discussions and debates on the amendment of section 25 of the South African Constitution, the President of Agri-SA, Dan Kriek, stated that the sentiments had become racially polarized. The skewed racial land redistribution, was one of the central issues for the struggle for liberation (Kariuki 2015), and majority rule, but became a dormant subject after the independence negotiations (Cousins and Scoones, 2010:33). This became a central issue with the rise of the South Africa Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) political party in July 2013.

On numerous occasions, the EFF raised the skewed racial allocation of land, calling for a radical land reform by the ANC government without which the EFF would lead land

occupations by the masses. Malema stated that there would be no real reconciliation without redressing the land question in racial terms (News 24, 2013). Malema accused the whites of always coalescing when their land interests were threatened (Makinana, 2018). This observation was also noted by South African Embassy in Harare, Counsellor-Political, Linda Maso, (Interview with Researcher, South African Embassy, Harare, 05 February 2019) who was of the opinion that while whites may have various heterogeneous interests and constituencies, when it came to the land question, they all coalesced and supported each other in a manner that could be seen as defending racial gains and racial interests. This shows that race is central to the land question in South Africa's case.

The white commercial farmers in South Africa have also failed to help the government in the sustenance of the "willing seller- willing buyer" policy. The Interview with Linda Maso further revealed that, as was the case in Zimbabwe, the white commercial farming community in South Africa and its representative organisations like Agri-South, Africa grew intransigent through either not releasing the land or hiking the prices of land. Maso, in reference to the white commercial farming sector in South Africa, put to the researcher that, whites continue to raise prices to deny Blacks opportunities to own land in former whites' areas. They are selling land between Johannesburg and Pretoria which was a prime agricultural land so that they preempt the land claims to the land by Blacks, a practice which has seen the area commercialised with shopping malls, which would only mean that in case of Blacks winning such land restitution claims, they will only have a single option of monetary compensation.

Following in the footsteps of the former white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe, the white commercial farmers in South Africa, under their umbrella body, Agri-SA, issued a statement that they would not accept changes to the South African Constitution that would legalise land

expropriation from the white commercial farmers without compensation. This was after the EFF had successfully brought the motion of land expropriation without compensation to the South African National Parliament which initiated debates on amendments to Section 25 of the South African Constitution which was seen as the bulwark against land expropriation without compensation to address colonial imbalances. The Joint Constitutional Review Committee adopted a resolution in favour of amending Section 25 of the Constitution in November 2018 after nationwide public hearings and written submissions. Even the ANC government, which favours a moderate approach on land reform, has noted that there is need to deracialise the land ownership in the country, which would also help to diffuse racial tensions on land.

In his State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 16 February 2018, South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa noted that;

*“We will accelerate our land redistribution programme not only to redress a grave historical injustice, but also to bring more producers into the agricultural sector and to make more land available for cultivation ....We are determined that expropriation without compensation should be implemented in a way that increases agricultural production, improves food security and ensure that the land is returned to those from whom it was taken under colonialism and apartheid.”*

However, the land reform debate in South Africa should not necessarily follow the Zimbabwe script, not least because of the damages brought by ill-planning, but also because of the manner in which the various populations view and value land. Due to the different lengths and depth of apartheid in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the differences in the liberation struggle styles and rhetoric, as well as post-independence leadership, the overall appreciation of the land and the

contexts of land reform are generally different between Zimbabweans and the South Africans. There is a comparative difference in the appreciation of the value of land between the two countries' indigenous populations with Zimbabweans having a higher appreciation of acquiring land and utilising it for economic empowerment. The lack of appreciation of the value of land by ordinary South Africans was captured by former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, who stated that;

*“It’s not many South Africans who went to the farmer to say can I use your farm (which the farmer had stopped to use due to alleged barrenness in the Western Cape). But Zimbabweans did. Because Zimbabweans have a very different attitude to land. That’s why you find here many times you get land settlements. People make land claims. They get the land. Instead they say no, rather than take the land and give us money. So, I am saying that you even want to talk about the land issue. One has to understand this thing quite seriously, what is the nature of the issue. Isn’t urban land the more urgent issue in the country? It may very well be, rather than agricultural land.”* (<https://youtu.be/y-o0LKSKHN8>).

South Africa Counsellor-Political, Linda Maso, with the South African Embassy in Harare, informed the researcher (in an interview on 5 February 2019) that the nature of apartheid domination in South Africa created a Black African who did not appreciate the economic value of land beyond the construction of houses. Maso held the opinion that;

*“South Africans are more inclined to city life than Zimbabweans. Zimbabweans know how to work the land and produce. That is a stark reality that we have to face. Some Black South Africans who were allocated the land left the farms and abused the loans given to them on luxuries like cars and urban houses without investing anything on the*



*land. After an audit that was conducted in 2005 to assess the impact of the land reform by the government, it was discovered that some of those who had benefited from the land reform had sold back the land to the white commercial farmers.”*

In Namibia, there has been a divide between racial and ethnic contextualisation of land. The racial question, while having remained the primary question, especially on what has been classified as absentee landlords, has also been overshadowed by the ethnic question, defined as ancestral land rights (Interview with Namibia's Minister of Urban and Rural Development, Samuel A. P. Mushelenga, Windhoek, Namibia, 17 March 2019; (de Villiers, 2003b). The subject of ethnic divide is discussed in the following section under political divide and land reform. However, it is important to note that, these problems have fed from the racial divide and having been frustrated by the slow pace in resolving the land question through the ‘willing seller- willing buyer’ principle, to deracialise land ownership, some people have resolved to reconfigure the debate into ethnic and ancestral rights.

Kenya has also experienced shocks stemming from the after-effects of the racial land divide emanating from the colonial past. Kariuki, (2004a:20) explains that the debate on land “...is a debate whose discourse resonates around the need to reclaim the indigenous land rights of communities who were displaced during settler colonialism and those who lost out as a result of the implementation of tenure reforms and through sophisticated forms of land grabbing.”

In 2004, some Maasai occupied white-owned farms in Laikipia District in the rift valley basing their actions on the Maasai Treaties of 1904. The Maasai Treaties refer to Anglo-Maasai Agreements, allegedly signed in 1904 and 1911, between the British Colonial Government

representatives and by the Maasai representatives. The treaty alleges that the Maasai had agreed to move from their lands out of their will to pave the way for the construction of a railway line and create room for European settlement under a lease agreement of a lifespan of one hundred years.

While the Maasai case has been more pronounced in recent years due to the expiry of the Anglo-Maasai Agreements, there is a general notion that the Kenyan political leadership failed to appreciate the need to deal with skewed racial land ownership by agreeing to the British proposals at the Lancaster House talks in 1962 (Veilleux-Lepage and Fedorowicz, 2015). However, while there have been the debates on the racial divide on land, the ethnic divide, as well as allegations of corruption by the political leadership, race has been more pervasive in land issues in Kenya (Ratten, 1993). The ethnic divide question is beyond the scope of this research as it cannot be debated on the lines of primary colonial imbalances, except in cases of the colonial policies of divide and rule.

The racial divide that was created by the alienation policies of settler colonialism has come to haunt the independent governments many years after the attainment of majority rule. The reconciliation policies that were adopted by the Black governments at independence were seen as elitist, as they were not done in consultation with the ordinary majority (Simura and Mudimu, 2019). The policies failed to inspire the white landowners to be responsive to releasing enough fertile and affordable land for resettlement. In Zimbabwe, such a failure led to the successive land invasions that culminated in the FTLRP in 2001. The racial polarization of land ownership in Zimbabwe in favour of whites should serve as a lesson to other white landowners in South Africa, Namibia and Kenya.

The stance by the white dominated Agri-SA that they would fight any moves to amend section 25 of the South African constitution to allow meaningful land expropriation without compensation, could lead South Africa into a scenario similar to that of Zimbabwe. White landowners and the government should seek amicable but sustainable land reform to avoid the pitfalls of land invasions and an improperly planned land process.

### **3.7.2 Political Divide and Land Reform**

Besides the racial divide, political ideologies and principles have also impacted on the land question in Africa in general and the selected countries in particular, for various reasons. In the selected countries, political alignment is generally divided into independence nationalist parties and 'reformist' parties that were created after the attainment of independence, remnants of colonial parties, or break away parties from the former liberation movements. For instance, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) rose as a reformist party in 1999 against what it alleged as ZANU PF mismanagement of national affairs.

In South Africa, issues revolving around race and the land question have resulted in divergent political ideologies and this in return has led to the rise of a number of political parties. The Democratic Alliance (DA) was born in 2000 through coalition of apartheid era political parties and has remained against radical changes to the socio-economic status quo, while the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and Congress of the People (COPE) broke away parties from the African National Congress (ANC). Land, being an important issue on the subject of colonialism, neo-colonialism and the liberal political order saw it become an ideological question.

Both in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the land question became a subject of ideological differences between ruling nationalist parties (ZANU–PF and the ANC) and the liberal

opposition political parties namely the MDC and later the MDC's breakaway formations after the party split -up in 2005 and the Democratic Alliance (DA), respectively. However, in South Africa, the matter was made more complicated by the fact that, while the ANC took a more liberal stance in term of the land policy since attainment of majority rule in 1994, it was the birth of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013 with its hard stance on the land question that saw the ANC revisiting its initial land policy.

The EFF and the DA made their positions on land very clear. On the one hand, the EFF's envisaged land policy is one based on land expropriation without compensation. The EFF put forward the motion for land expropriation without compensation in the South African Parliament in February 2018 which brought the question to a national discussion involving all concerned South Africans through public enquiries as well as forwarding written submissions to the Parliamentary Constitutional Review Committee.

On the other hand, the DA's policy is driven by the need to continue with the neo-liberal approach to land reform based on the 'willing seller- willing buyer' policy. When the South African Parliament opened the debate on land expropriation without compensation through the amendment of Section 25 of the constitution, the DA made it clear that it was not in support of it (African News Agency (ANA), 2018). When the Constitutional Review Committee of the South African Parliament voted in favour of recommending to Parliament for the amendment of Section 25 to clear the way for land expropriation without compensation, the DA announced that if this recommendation is accepted by Parliament, the DA would take it to court (Makinana, 2018). The DA saw the political stances taken by the ANC and the EFF as a marriage of convenience in which the EFF was using the land expropriation for political mileage, while the ANC, desperate not to lose more seats to the EFF, joined in to claim credit

on the land reform process and basing on the notion that it was the founding party of Black empowerment.

However, the ANC has sent conflicting signals regarding their land policy. Whilst the traditional policy of the ANC (which is influenced by the principles of Nelson Mandela that there will be no racial domination again in South Africa) informed the land reform initiative based on the 'willing seller- willing buyer' policy, the ANC 53<sup>rd</sup> Conference in December 2012 took a different approach and the party called for an acceleration to its land reform initiative, even with the use of land expropriation without compensation (Maso, Interview with the researcher, Harare, 05 February 2019). However, the South Africa President, Cyril Ramaphosa, in 2018, informed the country that; "*We will not make the mistakes that others have made in dealing with the question on land, we will not allow smash and grab interventions. That we will not allow.*"

Ramaphosa's response and stance on land should be weighed in line with internal and external pressure. Internally, economic institutions like the South African Banking Association (SABA) and the South African Federation of Agricultural Organisations (Agri-SA) issued strong statements that any wholesale land expropriation would result in devastating consequences on the economy (Martin and Abrahamsen, 2001). Externally, there has been overt and covert pressure from western countries that any attempt to expropriate land which disregards the liberal economic processes (i.e. 'willing buyer - willing seller' would see South Africa being turned into a *'pariah state'* which would impact negatively on its economic stability (Thompson, 2007). This has made it difficult for the South African government to come up with a definitive stance regarding the land question, and whilst they have announced

the intention of land expropriation without compensation, it still remain to be seen how exactly this will be carried out.

The political divide emanating from the land question was also witnessed in Namibia. However, the Namibian situation was different from the Zimbabwean and South African cases. Whilst the Zimbabwean and South African political landscapes had mutated from being dominated by the liberation parties with opposition political parties having gained legislative influencing seats, in Namibia, the South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) still remains the dominant political party which has had strong electoral victories since independence. This means that the influence of dissenting voices on emotional matters is limited except when the influence comes from tribal leaders. The parallels can be drawn with Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1999, when ZANU PF had less opposition in Parliament. However, the danger with such a scenario is that it creates lethargy within the ruling parties to solve amicably emotional questions, which would haunt the nation at the birth of strong political movements representing such interests such as the land question.

What has risen in Namibia is a movement for urban land for the youths spearheaded by the youthful leaders who were expelled from SWAPO, Job Amupanda, Dimbulukeni Nauyoma and George Kambala, as well as ethnic/regional differences on how to distribute acquired land (Interview with Namibia's Minister of Urban and Rural Development, Samuel A. P. Mushelenga, Windhoek, Namibia, 17 March 2019). The internal differences as well as differences on the land question between Namibia and its regional sisters is influenced by the land terrain and climatic conditions which have some differences with other country cases. Namibia's land can be broadly defined as ranging from semi-arid to arid. The land offers more opportunities for extensive ranching, which may require extensive financial investments

(Interviewee 1, Windhoek, 18 March 2019). Because of the natural set up, there has not been widespread clamouring for land to the extent of what it was in Zimbabwe.

This, however, does not mean that Namibia is safe from the squabbles that arise with attempts at redressing the land question. On one hand, there has been clamour for urban land especially by the youths, due to the expensive nature of urban residential land which the youths argue to be beyond their reach. On the other hand, there has been a push by the tribes who were heavily affected by the Germans' and apartheid South Africans' land expropriation policies (namely the Herero, Nama and Damara) (de Villiers, 2003b). These tribes aim not only to be resettled in their lands but also to be accorded first priority on land allocation in their ancestral regions (*ibid*).

The clamour is so powerful that some political parties, politicians and tribal leaders like the Popular Democratic Movement (PDM), Swanu of Namibia, Workers Revolutionary Party, National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO), Affirmative Reposition (a land pressure group), and Ovaherero Chief Vekuii Rukoro, boycotted the 2018 National Land Conference which was sponsored by the government, in protest against the government's policy of according equal chances to all Namibians with regards to land reform as a policy aimed at nation building.

The two calls for land reform, (i.e. the urban call by the youths and the tribal prioritisation) should be taken as build-ups which may in the future create a larger land occupation movement if the government does not act to rewrite the colonial imbalances when it still has time. It has to be noted that the massive land occupation movement since the year 2000 in Zimbabwe was

a culmination of isolated land occupations and clamours since 1980 by ordinary Zimbabweans (Moyo, 2011b).

As was in the case of racial polarisation, political polarisation has the capacity to engender populist policies as political parties seek to outdo each other in campaigns and in remaining popular. There were such elements on Zimbabwe's FTLRP. There are also signs that the EFF has such tendencies which have seen the ANC attempting to become populist so as not to lose its support base. In Namibia, such tendencies could come into play in the politics of the Affirmative Repositioning (AR) movement led by Job Amupanda, which has its main interest in urban land. Populism can only be avoided through the implementation of comprehensive land reform policies without procrastination by the governments.

### **3.7.3 International Community and Media Framing on FTLRP in Zimbabwe**

The land question in Africa has become an international question, with most western countries having vested interest in the land question due to the racial ties between the white landowners in Africa and the Europeans. The international community's (mostly western states) interest in the land question was exhibited in the independence constitutions of the countries in question which they mediated through various forums that included the United Nations (UN) and the Commonwealth, voluntary groups and direct and indirect interactions with antagonistic parties in the country case studies. The constitutions of the case countries had similar clauses that governed protection of private property rights and the land reform being based on the 'willing seller- willing buyer' policy.

The 'independence Constitutions' of Zimbabwe (Lancaster House) (Section 16 (1)), South Africa (Article 25), Namibia (Article 16 (2)) and Kenya (Section 75 (1) (2) of the 1963. Kenyan



Constitution (as amended to 2008)) show similarities regarding land and the protection of private property clauses. This shows that the whole idea of the clauses was to perpetually protect the status quo and undermine the ideas and principles of the liberation and independence struggles before the sitting of the Black governments. The clauses seem to have been driven by a genuine concern of balancing between the power of the state and the rights of the citizens, especially as it pertained to ownership of property and equality before the law. However, the constitutions developed after independence disregarded the manner in which the whites in the region had acquired the properties, which now had to be governed by protection of private property laws. The land ownership at independence in the country cases were a reflection of the colonial period and maintaining such a status quo was detrimental to the racial and political harmony of the newly created states.

Another question which has been put forward by the 'radical' constituencies in the country cases pertains to why the new governments were being saddled with the burden of paying a 'just and market value' compensation for the land which had been stolen from the Blacks in the first place, for which the struggles had been fought for, and in some cases was seized with the massacre of the Blacks. The clauses, therefore, were unjust according to the natural laws of justice and also meant that the new laws on property at independence were illegitimate. It is crucial to spell out is; who sponsored such ideas and influenced their inclusion in the constitutions? The interests of the United States of America (USA) regarding the land question and the so-called protection of private property were, however, not only confined to South Africa.

The USA was also heavily involved in the negotiations for Zimbabwe's and Namibia's independence, especially after the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, had twice

embarrassed the British by unilaterally declaring independence and refusing to compromise in two meetings with the then British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson aboard HMS Tiger (December 1966) and HMS Fearless (October, 1968), which had driven the British leadership to resent dealing with Smith (Sebenius *et al.*, 2016). The USA worked with Britain and apartheid South Africa to preserve white minority social and economic interest, after having accepted that continued white minority rule was no longer tenable. (Miller *et al.*, 2010:81-82) state that;

*“... Zimbabwe’s 1980 constitution continued the colonial legacy in the sense that some of its provisions maintained the economic status quo. ... The Lancaster House Constitution itself failed to serve as a framework for a local political and economic transformation from a colonial state with great economic disparities to a more equitable Zimbabwe, largely because it contained entrenched provisions, which ensured certain policies could not be changed until a specified time. As a result, the basic structure of Zimbabwean society, especially as it related to land ownership, remained the same.”*

The argument by Miller et al (2010) shows that there was a negation of the legitimate concerns by the native Blacks who had formerly been colonised that had triggered the liberation struggle. The western powers that had greater influence in the crafting of independence settlements, chose to protect the interest of the white landowners through various clauses which would make it impossible for the Black majority governments to implement meaningful land reform. While the argument by Miller et al. (2010) relates mostly to Zimbabwe, the same can also be said for Kenya, whose Constitution was also a product of the Lancaster House, a place where Zimbabwe's ‘independence Constitution’ would be discussed and concluded some two decades

later. On Zimbabwe's, the land question was described as one sticking point that nearly broke up the ceasefire negotiations and a peaceful roadmap to independence.

The Patriotic Front, which was a joint negotiation team by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), was pushing for radical land redistribution, while the British Government with support from South African and the Internal Settlement Government of the then Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, favoured only cosmetic modifications to white dominated land ownership. Both the British and USA governments had interests in keeping the economic status-quo, while offering changes in the political status-quo. The USA government intervened when the conference had reached deadlock on the land question by promising to be part of those who would provide the funding of the land reform in Zimbabwe (Smith *et al.*, 2010).

The USA made the pledge on the basis that the land reform would be based on the 'willing seller- willing buyer' principle. The agreement on the 'willing seller- willing buyer' with British and American funding as had been promised might have worked well with the availability of the funds and the 'willing seller'. However, when there were no funds and no 'willing seller' the programme was bound to collapse as it still played a part in perpetuating the racial control and ownership of land. This meant that the interference by the western powers was therefore, not sincere. It was not based on good will.

With respect to Namibia, the western countries formed what was known as the Western Contact Group (WCG) in 1977 which comprised of Britain, Canada, France, USA and the then West Germany, to spearhead the negotiations to end South African occupation of Namibia against the legal mandate of trusteeship territories (Researcher's interview with Samuel A. P.

Mushelenga, Namibia's Minister of Urban and Rural Development, Windhoek, Namibia, 17 March 2019). The WCG came up with principles for the liberation of Namibia and placated South Africa to adhere to the resolutions by the UN, especially Resolution 435 of 1978.

The Resolution 435 of (1978) reaffirmed the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia, noted that South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal and called for "the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations" (UN Resolution 435/1978: Art. 2). However, the Contact Group did not negotiate with the conflicting parties in Namibia without altruistic motives. They had the desire to cripple land ownership transformations. Such notions have substance if analysed from the historical facts that the WCG, after the change of leadership in the USA from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan in 1980, made technical amendments to what had been agreed by the UNSC which had culminated in Resolution 435 (1978). Among the added issues, was the proposal for the Constitution to have "*a bill of rights, including individual rights to life, liberty and freedom of movement and protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property - without prompt and just compensation.*"

Geingob (2004) states that Germany and South Africa, as the former and the then current colonial powers during the years of independence negotiations, had vested property interests, specifically land. The primary means of the colonial powers to assert their authority and the basis of their colonisation was land expropriation from the indigenous peoples of Namibia. By 1915, Germany had taken virtually all land in Central and Southern Namibia, and when South Africa took over, it encouraged the German farmers to stay while also alienating more land to white from South Africa (The Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia, 1981). There was a cumulative increase in the occupation of prime land in Namibia by whites

since the South African government took over from about 2000 farms in 1920 to 5100 farms in the 1970s, and controlling nearly half of the total area of the country and 95 % of viable pasture on the central plateau (*ibid*).

There was a close relationship between the South African government at the time and the Reagan administration to protect the interests of the South African government, primarily land occupied by white South Africans. While it can only be logically accepted that as was the case in Zimbabwe, where Britain stood for white interests, West Germany also stood for the interests of the Germans in Namibia, especially on property rights. The interference by the international community, specifically the western countries to safeguard capitalist interests and disregard the socio-cultural and economic interests of the majority, could be seen as part of the process of decolonisation. Hence, Geingob (2004:118) clearly states that;

*“Various parties involved in addressing the Namibian question, i.e., South Africa, the Western Contact Group... tried to influence the ultimate outcome of the nature of the Namibian state to suit their own vision or interests. The critical provisions of the constitution, the Constitutional Principles, were 'imposed' on the Constituent Assembly because the West wanted to ensure that the liberation movement did not opt for socialism that might compromise the interests of the settlers.”*

In the post-independence land reform processes, there has not been much international interference. Mushelenga, in an interview with the researcher, on 17 March 2019 stated that;

*“...there might be non-interference because the Namibian government has not hinted on suspending the property rights clauses of the Namibian constitution on property*

*rights and just compensation for expropriated land, unlike in South Africa where there were talks of expropriation without compensation.”*

The United States of America (USA) seems to still have vested interests in the land question in Southern Africa. When the South Africa government began serious talks and engagement on land expropriation without compensation in 2018, the western voice again came up against such a policy. The USA President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of August 2018, tweeted that;

*“I have asked Secretary of State @SecPompeo (Michael Pompeo) to study the South African land closely and farm seizures and expropriations and the large scale killing of farmers. ‘South African Government is now seizing land from white farmers.’”*

While President Trump’s response was based on unfound fake news, the importance of the tweet was that it showed western interests in Southern African land politics. While the USA government openly interfered, the British government interfered in a more subtle but strong way by reminding the South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa that if he attempted to follow the Zimbabwean route of expropriating land without compensation, the British would lead Europe to pull out businesses and investments from South Africa, as was the case with Zimbabwe. The interference by western countries on land reform should be seen as negative interference as it generates a resentment of the perpetuation of colonialism and the protection of imbalances created in colonial times.

The response by the USA to the South African land question, as was the British and Western response to the FTLRP in Zimbabwe, only helped to fan the fires of racial and political disharmony between the white landowners and the Black indigenous peoples of the region.

Some indigenous people still feel that the transition into independence was incomplete due to the failure of a wholesale land reform programme. It aggravated racial disharmony which had been on the mend after the numerous years which preceded the attainment of independence and majority rule. It has to be noted that in all the country case studies, the liberation parties adopted reconciliation as a policy to establish racial harmony and maintain economic and social development. The negative interference, which was bullish in nature, created a sense of the need to dismantle what could be seen as remnants of colonialism which was both political and racial.

The interference by the western leaders could be interpreted as going beyond natural engagement but a show of force and control over the former colonies and the indigenous peoples. The policy compounds internal racial and political relations especially when it is coupled with open political support to some political parties. In 2003 the then Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Blair, informed the House of Commons that;

*“On the latter two points, we work closely with the MDC on the measures that we should take in respect of Zimbabwe, although I am afraid that these measures and sanctions, though we have them in place, are of limited effect on President Mugabe’s regime”* (ZBC, 2011: [www.zbc.co.zw/mdc-formations-boycott-blasted/](http://www.zbc.co.zw/mdc-formations-boycott-blasted/); Sengupta: 2004).

The statement was taken to have been a policy driven by the need to reverse the land reform programme. Apart from the local issues and events that unfolded during Zimbabwe’s FTLRP, the interference of the international community (biased and without objectivity) due to the important role played by the media in the process de-railed and delayed the progress which could have been realised. Insights on Zimbabwe’s experiences should guide progressive global

policy frameworks on land issues from regional initiatives such as the African Union Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy aimed at improving equitability, governance and productivity in line with Africa's Agenda 2063 and sustainable development goals (SDGs). With land formally recognized as a target in three SDGs, land is acknowledged as a critical metric of progress in this shared worldwide agenda. Land-related targets and indicators under SDGs 1(No Poverty), 2(Zero Hunger), 5 (Gender equality), 11 (Sustainable cities and communities) and 15 (Life on land). Many land organizations and stakeholders are committed to fully implementing the SDGs and to monitoring the land-related indicators in order to promote responsible land governance. Land is a significant resource, both cross-cutting and critical to achieving the SDGs. It is therefore important to ensure the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources as reflect in target 1.4 of the SDGs. Furthermore, one of the indicators (Indicator 1.4.2) on attainment of SDG1 is the proportion of total adult population with secure tenure rights to land, with legally recognized documentation and who perceive their rights to land as secure, by sex and by type of tenure.

Even the conservation impact of the FTLRP was framed differently by western media houses, misrepresenting the reality in Zimbabwe (Gandiwa *et al.*, 2014:269). Whilst most wildlife populations were increasing in Zimbabwe's protected areas, unrealistic myths that were propelled by various media houses misrepresented the situation in Zimbabwe and played an important role in influencing public perceptions regarding the impact of the land reform program on wildlife, political conflict, crisis and disaster. This, in turn, influenced policymakers and (inter) national assistance and aid programmes that could have supported the initiative.



### **3.8 Chapter Summary**

This chapter focused on issues surrounding land occupation, land tenure and land use under Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The chapter concludes that the FTLRP in Zimbabwe was an inevitable process that, one way or the other, had to be undertaken especially under conditions of the political climate which existed from 1997 until 2000. The manner in which the Black majority repossessed land, through land occupations from the former white commercial farmers was unquestionably illegal when measured against the legal provisions available at the time.

It should be noted that various reasons motivated different groups and classes to be engaged in land occupations. It is thus apparent that the need to address the land question became more of a racial and political issue, not only in Zimbabwe but in other countries that have also attempted to institute land reform initiatives such as South Africa and Kenya. As a result, the FTLRP was reported in a negative manner by the international media. The international community still harbours a lot of interest on land related issues in Southern Africa and they are heavily opposed to any expropriation of white owned land by the Blacks.

Land Reform Model has a long history and is characterised by distinct 5 phases, which are, Phase I, Phase II and Phase III. However, these first 3 initial phases failed to decisively act on the land question and this culminated in Phase IV, which is essentially the FTLRP and Phase V is currently being undertaken. This chapter has also revealed that upon attaining independence, the GoZ introduced a number of legislative reforms at various intervals as part of efforts aimed at redressing the colonial land imbalances and these attained various levels of success. Zimbabwe's policies on land tenure have remained one of the major contested subjects of the FTLRP, especially on issues regarding the feasibility of the 99-year leases and multiple

farm ownership. These issues have been affected and closely linked with nepotism and political patron-client relationships. The chapter also discussed how the FTLRP policy is silent with regards to issues revolving around the access to land by PWDs and how they have been marginalised and excluded in terms of land access due to their disability.

This chapter further concludes that the manner in which the FTLRP in Zimbabwe was undertaken, resulted in little attention being paid to sustainable land use. The chaotic nature under which the land was occupied and later sanitised by the FTLRP, saw people occupying any available farm without due consideration of what the occupied land was for. Zimbabwe's experiences, therefore, serve as an example of the complex issues surrounding land conflicts and their redress that requires a more holistic and multi-faceted approach. The next chapter focuses on food security, nature conservation and land reform in Zimbabwe.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **FOOD SECURITY, NATURE CONSERVATION AND LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Land, when coupled with natural resource endowment, becomes a very important capital resource for modern economies, particularly those that rely on primary production. This factor has presented a number of challenges for many developing countries, including Zimbabwe (Rayner, 1962:104; Mararike, 2014:12). Some of the leading global economies are ravenous for resources and this is evident from the exploitation of high-value natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals, wildlife and timber. This hunger has often been cited as a key factor in triggering, escalating or sustaining violent conflicts around the globe (UNDP, 2012:1). There is also increasing competition over resources that are getting depleted very fast, such as land and water, characterizing some of the protracted discourses at all levels from local to the global stage (Peters, 2004:270; Meinzen-dick and Appasamy, 2014:2830). This is also aggravated by the worsening degradation of the environment in most communal lands, human and animal population growth and climate change (Obioha, 2008:314-15). The shortage of land and natural resources is contributing to a new paradigm of conflicts and obstructing the peaceful resolution of long-term debates around the land question at all levels. Land is therefore arguably the most important assets one can possess in the modern world Ding (2007:1). The role of land and natural resources in conflict is therefore attracting increased international attention even beyond Southern Africa. This chapter will further discuss the impact of economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe (Chingono, 2010:66) in relation to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP).

On the other hand, food security is at the core of any national planning and has the potential to destabilise nations and can, in some cases, lead to civil wars. Related to the subject of food security, is the issue of land ownership and control. Land is the primary means of production and without it, one cannot claim control over any form of investment. As a result, conflicts related to the access and control of land have been witnessed worldwide (UNDP, 2012).

The land question has been more pronounced in Africa, given the history of colonialism (Mararike, 2014:9). The colonial process was occupied with alienating Africans from their land, especially in settler colonies like Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Hanlon *et al.*, 2012:9). This has been espoused in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Land was important to the colonial governments because whoever owned it had control over primary production, including agriculture and urban development. Having failed to secure the second rand (gold) in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the white colonial government led by the British South African Company (BSAC) transfixed its attention to land control with agriculture becoming an important economic activity (Phimister, 1973:29). Food production for both local and regional consumption became strategic economic activity as the settlers faced intense competition from Africans (Mupfuvi, 2014:76-78).

From colonial times and post-colonial times, Zimbabwe developed a strong food industry that linked the productive farming sector with the agro-processing industries. However, the politics of land ownership, which had been haunting Zimbabwe since the end of colonial rule in 1980, heated up with high profile – high intensity land occupations in 1998 led by the Svosve people in Marondera (Mlambo, 2005:15; Moyo, 2005:158 and Muchetu, 2018:75). The process triggered massive nationwide land occupations which culminated in the FTLRP in year 2000 (Matondi, 2012:20-21). While the programme managed to resettle agitated and land-hungry

Zimbabweans, the nation was plunged into long term depressed food crop production. Zimbabwe fell from a net food exporter to a net food importer, and as the crisis deepened, a considerable percentage of the population had to survive on donor aid (Moyo, 2011:947-48). Given the political dynamics at the time, this chapter sought to critically analyse the reasons why Zimbabwe fell from being the '*bread-basket*' of Southern Africa (Maphosa, 1994:53) to being a nation surviving on food imports and food donations. The chapter sought to question different reasons proffered by the polarised academic, economic and political sides in the country and puts forward an objective analysis of the national decline. The analysis in this chapter is conducted through the lenses of the concept of politics given that all the land upheavals and food crop production were influenced by politics of the day from the colonial to the post-colonial times, and sought to influence the political leadership.

Food security is central to the well-being of every nation (Clapp, 2014:11). Inadequate food supplies have high a potential of brewing socio-political instability in any community. Food security is a broad term, responsible for subsistence farming, smallholder development and the provision of inputs, implements and infrastructure support (Department of Agriculture, 2011:52). According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, 2002), food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Taking note of the importance of the definition and other broad definitions proffered by various organisations and researchers, this research confines itself to a basic definition that sees food security as the ability by people (Zimbabweans) to secure adequate nutritious food for a healthy life without being reduced to begging.

Central to the issue of food security is the ownership and control of land as the main means of production (Mararike, 2014:3). While a number of reasons such as heritage, habitation and other economic activities like mining are forwarded, the primary importance of land is the production and acquisition of food. This can be in the form of cultivated crops and fruits, or gathering wild crops and fruits. The relationship between food security and land ownership in Zimbabwe has been a subject of debate both among the academia and in the opinion write-ups in the media.

Prior to the FTLRP, Zimbabwe was known as the 'bread-basket' of Southern Africa (Maphosa, 1994:53). The country was a major regional exporter of cereals and beef and countries like Malawi and Zambia relied on Zimbabwe to supplement their inadequate agricultural produce. The country's reach also extended to the European Union (EU). The implementation of the FTLRP led to an instant fall in food crop production which culminated in food shortages in the country. A plethora of reasons have been put forward to explain the country's drastic change from being a net food exporter to being a net food importer that relies heavily on donors to supplement food shortages (Moyo, 2011b:947). It is the thrust of this chapter to critically interrogate the different reasons put forward to explain food shortages and contrast them against the FTLRP.

While there are a number of crops that are produced in Zimbabwe, this chapter paid particular attention to maize and tobacco as the primary case study crops in analysing the crop production changes that have occurred from the colonial era to the post FTLRP era. The choice of the two crops was based on the fact that maize is the dominant staple crop in Zimbabwe and mostly produced food crop while tobacco is the dominant commercial cash and non-food crop

produced. The two crops dominate the national agricultural policy debates as well in Zimbabwe.

#### **4.2 History of Food Crop Production in Zimbabwe**

Colonialism came with an unintended benefit to the Black people of Zimbabwe. This blessing was the realization that Blacks had the potential to produce food crops for commercial purposes. Scholars like Machingaidze (1979) and Kramer (1997:160) note that when the whites took over the country in the initial days, they concentrated more on mining. This resulted in a boom in food crop production by the native Blacks as they saw an economic niche in producing for the mining sector to pay for taxes imposed by the colonial regime and also to advance their livelihoods and lifestyles (*ibid*). This was one of the signs which showed the colonialists that the native Blacks had the potential to develop in line with the challenges and opportunities that the environment presented. However, Arrighi (2010:42) notes that, this development potential was destroyed by the colonial land and agricultural policies and legislations introduced at the time, which promoted the development of the white race at the expense of the Blacks in order to perpetuate colonialism.

The native Blacks in Zimbabwe, have been noted to have been engaged in productive farming activities even before the advent of colonialism (Moyo, 2004:4); Arrighi 2010:41) and Machingaidze, 1979). Kramer (1997:159) notes that during the early and pre-colonial times, “African farmers were farming extensively using a system of rotational cultivation.” This shifting cultivation was not barbarism as portrayed by some supremacists, Europeans who were bent on vilifying anything African (Kramer, 1997:159 in Mangwanya and Manyeruke, 2019:19). Lord Hailey, quoted in Allan (1960) noted that shifting cultivation is less a device

of barbarism than an approach to improve and conserve soil properties. Pun (1979:11) in support of the argument states that;

*“Both tribes practised methods of shifting cultivation. This system was not as inefficient and primitive as the settlers, and later historians, believed. If one looks at the agricultural prospects prior to the arrival of the white settlers in 1890, taking into consideration climatic conditions - erratic rainfall and the nature of the soil, in conjunction with population- land ratios and the needs of the people - it becomes increasingly apparent that the general consensus as to the nature of African agricultural methods is grossly inaccurate.”*

Shifting cultivation meant that while there were low yields per area cultivated, the cultivation of relatively large portions meant that enough yields for subsistence and surplus would be realized. The argument by Pun (1979:11) is also shared by Hormay (1970:16) who notes that, there was enough land relative to the sparsely populated people; hence there was enough land for the method which was ecologically friendly allowing land rest and also for other land uses such as homesteads and pastures.

As noted above, the conquest of Zimbabwe was driven by the myth of the second rand, as the whites speculated that Zimbabwe had equally concentrated goldfields as was the South African deposits. It therefore, followed that in the early years of colonialism, the settlers concentrated on developing mines and speculated on finding larger mineral deposits, primarily gold. The creation of the mines without active white participation in the farming sector, saw the native Blacks filling this gap of the increased demand in food crops such as maize in these mines (Phimister, 1974). It can be noted that crop production by the native Blacks increased steadily from the time of occupation until around 1905, when the white settlers concentrated more on



finding the second rand and were less interested in other activities such as agriculture (Machingaidze, 1979:2). Both push and pull factors contributed to the increase in crop productivity by the Native Blacks.

The push factors for this increased crop production by the native Blacks were also related to the new taxes that had been imposed on them by the colonialists. The new colonial regime imposed upon Blacks a number of taxes that included hut tax, cattle tax, dog tax and even bicycle tax (Mlambo, 2019:11). The tax regime was meant to create finances for the BSAC in its day to day 'administration' of the colony as well as pushing the native Blacks to conform to the new capitalist mode of production and open room for their (Blacks) exploitation. Blacks had a choice of either working for the settlers for a certain period of time as a form of payment of the taxes or to settle the actual taxes in cash.

As the Africans despised the labour form, they increased their productivity in order to meet their tax requirements. Kramer (1997:160-161) notes that;

*“Not only were peasants competent farmers but they were quick to respond to the new demands made on them for agricultural produce by the opening of the mines. Tax obligations were also met through the sale of foodstuffs and cattle rather than by the sale of labour.”*

Later on, after the creation of reserves, Blacks had two choices, of either migrating to the reserves or actually paying the land rent/tax (Kramer, 1997:162). Blacks who had stayed at white partitioned lands had to produce more to pay for the rent, instead of working for the white settlers as a means of paying the rent/tax.

Aside from the push factors, Blacks also found opportunities to develop their livelihoods. Colonialism came with technical developments like the ox-drawn plough and other household goods which attracted Blacks. In order to acquire such goods from various traders, Blacks had to produce grains or cattle to sell or barter for the goods (Moyo, 2009). This desire to acquire household goods led Blacks to increase their production for commercial purposes. According to (Van Onselen, 1976) in 1903, the sale of grain and livestock by the native Blacks amounted to £350,000, and in the same year, wage earnings amounted to between £100,000 and £150,000. In other words, agricultural sales totalled 70 % of all cash earnings. The increase in sales gave signs of a threat to the labour needs of the white settlers since the native Blacks were concentrating more on producing for themselves, which essentially deprived the white settlers of valuable cheap labour.

The failure of the second rand mythology saw the British South African Company (BSAC) rethinking its land policy after 1905. Blake (1977:415-416) notes that farming was not to play any significant part in the settler economy until 1896 at the earliest. Blake (1979)'s assertion could have been driven by the historical developments which saw Europeans expropriating more African land after the end of the 1896-97 Chimurenga/Umvukela in the colony, using the principle of the right of conquest.<sup>3</sup> The right of conquest may be defined as the right of the victor, in virtue of military victory or conquest, to sovereignty over the conquered territory and its inhabitants. In support of this assertion, Machingaidze (1979:2) notes that;

*“The post-1908 period up to the beginning of World War I has been depicted by Palmer as the phase of the ‘white agricultural policy’, different from the period prior to it in that it marked the time during which the BSA Co.*

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<sup>3</sup>“The right of conquest may be defined as the right of the victor, in virtue of military victory or conquest, to sovereignty over the conquered territory and its inhabitants” ((Korman, 1996:8). The right of conquest was accepted in international relations and law until the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries

*systematically implemented its new policy of promoting settler farming, settlement and agrarian production. The burial of the 'second rand' myth thus gave settler agriculture a tremendous boost as the Company began to focus its attention on agricultural development and the realization of 'its' land asset."*

Since the mid to the end of the first decade of the 20th century, the colonial regime took deliberate policies to promote settler agriculture (Arrighi, 2010:42). These policies had far reaching negative impacts on African peasants who had already established viable farming ventures in response to the push and pull drives brought about by colonialism.

The colonial regime went on to enact land and labour laws that limited the participation of Blacks in the agricultural sector to mere peasantry for subsistence and created a labour pool for the farms and urban industries. The most notorious of these Acts were the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) of 1930 and the Maize Control Act (MCA) of 1931 with the amended version of the same law coming in 1934. The battle for markets and labour between the settler and Blacks was captured by Vickery (1985:17), who states that;

*"In such areas of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, African peasant producers responded with alacrity to early marketing opportunities. This conflicted with the interests of white farmers, who wanted the land and the markets, and white employers, who wanted Africans as low-wage workers, not independent producers. Europeans used the instruments of political power, which they dominated to apply to African peasants what Palmer (following an early official) calls the 'squeezing-out process.'"*

Much has been written on the segregatory nature of the LAA (Mazingi and Kamidza, 2009:324). The Act was passed to buttress the previous policies and orders that had been passed to have a total restriction on African development through farming and restricting Blacks' production to subsistence (AGRA, 2018:122; Moyo, 2009:62). This was especially so, given that the land in the reserves which was allocated to Blacks was not suitable for either human habitation nor agriculture (Williams, 1973:145). The Gwaai and Shangani reserves were wasted lands which the Ndebeles looked to as 'cemeteries' (Mupfuvi, 2014:36) while other scholars (Mazingi and Kamidza, 2009:332) and (Kwashirai, 2014:36) understand them as remote, arid and clearly insufficient for African needs without some development of water supplies.


The reserves in Gokwe and Muzarabani were infested by tsetse-fly and received little rainfall (Mangwanya and Manyeruke, 2019:20), making them simply wastelands to which Blacks were condemned (Bourguignon, 2009:6; Moyo, 2009:139). The wastelands were meant to push Blacks to join the labour market as farm or mine workers or later as the urban proletariat, given that on their own they could not support agriculture that could meet the subsistence and tax demands by the colonial government.

This study argues that, Europeans never sought to destroy the African race in the colony. Whites knew very well that they needed the native Blacks as a source of cheap labour. Whites were very much aware of how much they needed Black labour to develop their enterprises in either agriculture, mining or later on in the manufacturing industry. They also needed taxes from the native Blacks in order to finance the administration of the colony. Lopcke (1985:15-16) notes that the colonial government, besides being served by Black cheap labour, was also substantially subsidised by the Blacks through a system of exorbitant taxes. Machingaidze

(1979:13) also gives the instances of 1909 and 1910 in which the BSAC's Lands Department collected 18 653 pounds and 35 422 pounds, respectively. Of the 209 423 pounds collected from Blacks taxes and different fees, the native department had an expenditure budget of 52 640 pounds, with the rest going to national coffers and in most cases, used as cheap loans to settler farmers.

This resulted in laws being gradually promulgated to answer to different needs of the settlers as and when they arose. In this respect, the LAA was promulgated in order to deal with the needs of the whites to drastically limit the competition that was coming from African agriculture, specifically on maize, by removing the native Blacks from fertile land and settling them in lands that were infertile, unsuitable for animal husbandry (as was the case with the reserves in Gokwe and Muzarabani) (Moyo, 2009:139), and far away from the main roads and railway lines which were very important since they were the cheapest and most reliable modes of transport (Mangwanya and Manyeruke, 2019:20). Figure 4.1 below shows the land apportionment in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) in 1965.

Figure 4.1: Land Apportionment in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), 1965



*Source:* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern\\_Rhodesia#/media/File:Rhodesialand.png](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Rhodesia#/media/File:Rhodesialand.png), 28.10.2016, modified by Author

Figure 4.1 above shows the location of reserves. Note that at the time of the production of the map, the name native reserves had been replaced by the term, ‘Tribal Trust Land’ also known by the initials TTL). This process would then lead to the achievement of the second goal; that of proletarianization of the native Blacks and the creation of a sustainable cheap labour pool for the mines, farms and manufacturing industries in urban areas. The places marked as European area were predominantly found in the country’s high veld and were mostly comprised of natural regions I, II, and III. The areas marked Tribal Trust Land, originally called

Native Reserves dominated the low lying areas of the country mostly natural regions IV and V. These areas receive less rainfall with some of them being semi-arid, prone to diseases and were far from main national transport and communication lines particularly railway lines and roads.

The LAA, therefore, did not really bring many new concepts regarding the colony's policy on land demarcations. The policy of reserves was first put in place in 1894 through the creation of the Gwaai and Shangani reserves in Matabeleland through the Matabeleland Orders in Council of 1894. The Orders in Council was followed by the Native Reserves Orders in Council (1898), and the Private Locations Ordinance (1908), amongst a raft of provisions, that were meant to promote white settlement and agriculture in the colony (Mlambo, 2019:10-11). By around 1905, long before the promulgation of the LAA in 1930, there were around sixty established reserves on about 22 % of the colony's landmass (Mushunje, 2005).

Based on this reasoning, the research accepts the argument that the main purpose of the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) (Mafa *et al.*, 2015:41) was to formalise separation by law, land between Blacks and whites (*Land Issue - Fact Sheet*, 2008) which separation had already been instituted by different Ordinances and Orders in Council as well as informal land grabs. This argument is also proven by the fact that the LAA (1930) in its definition of a reserve states that, Reserve mean land set aside for the use and occupation of natives by the Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1920, or any amendment thereof. It makes reference to different colonial government notices and the Private Locations Ordinance (1908) enacted and promulgated before it. The second notorious law that destroyed African agriculture was the Maize Control Act (MCA) of 1931 and its 1934 amendments. Whitehead (2012) notes that white farmers had been lobbying the colonial regime to regulate the maize market from as early as 1924.

This proves that native Blacks had been great farmers who had given Europeans a torrid competition since the early years of colonialism in Zimbabwe.

However, the government only responded to the calls of regulating the maize market after the colony was hit by the aftershocks of the Great Depression of 1929-39. Lopcke (1985:13) notes that, after the maize price on the world market dropped tremendously in 1930 (from 10 shillings to 4shillings 3d a bag), the Rhodesian Agricultural Union fully committed itself to maize interests and actively entered politics to press for maize control (Mangwanya and Manyeruke, 2019:21). The outcome of the activities was the Maize Control Act of 1931.

The Maize Control Act of 1931, with its 1934 amendment, created the Maize Control Board which had a monopoly on maize transactions. Maize produce was also grouped into two categories/pools. European maize produce was given the best grades, while Black produced maize could not be brought to the board with ease. This forced the Blacks to sell their produce to middlemen at heavily depressed prices (Moyo, 2004-6). Those who managed to bring their maize to the Board equally met lower prices as their maize would be categorized in the inferior pool. The Act was mooted as a direct way of dealing with competition that was exerted on whites by Black farmers after the indirect act of land apportionment.

The last of the major steps that were taken by the colonial regime to destroy African agriculture and prop up settler agriculture, is the cheap financing and subsidies policy on settler agriculture that was done through the Land Bank. The Land and Agricultural Bank had been established in 1924 to provide credit to settler farmers (Weinmann, 1975:196). The Bank and in some cases through the Maize Control Board, extended cheap long term loans to settlers for crop



production and farm development. This insulated settler agriculture against native Blacks who could not compete given the unfair advantage that the settlers were now enjoying.

The net effect of the settler and colonial policies on land and agriculture as shown in this chapter was the destruction of rising and thriving African agriculture. The major reasons for the destruction of African agriculture was the need to create a sustainable labour pool for European enterprises both in agriculture, mining and later in urban areas in the manufacturing and domestic industries. The development of African agriculture had been pushed by the need to pay taxes without using the gruelling root of '*chibaro*'<sup>4</sup> labour and the pull factors of the need to acquire household and capital goods that came with the introduction of colonialism. These developments created stern competition for settler agriculture, leading to laws and policies that destroyed African agriculture and propped up settler agriculture, specifically in maize production. In short, Blacks were great farmers whose mythical failure was a deliberate creation of the colonial state.

### **4.3 History of nature conservation in relation to land reform in Zimbabwe**

The Government of Zimbabwe recognizes the importance of its natural resources in terms of both ecological (biodiversity conservation) and economic (sustainable utilisation) value. Wildlife is an integral part of this biodiversity. The Government's commitment is shown by the fact that as far back as 1991, it had already set aside 13% of Zimbabwe's land as protected State Land under wildlife (Policy for Wildlife, 1992). This land, which constitutes the Parks

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<sup>4</sup> Chibaro was a term coined to refer to the semi-slavery labour model that was used by settler in colonial Zimbabwe. (Marobela, 2008:4) notes that, "At the heart of the collapse of agriculture in Southern Africa was an obnoxious colonial tax system ... It was the introduction of this tax that created what Marx called "a reserve army of labour" which was barbarously exploited by mining capital. It was such forced labour that worked colonial plantations and mines"

and Wildlife Estate is not subject to land speculation and it cannot be reduced except by the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Since attaining its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has been implementing a Land Reform programme aimed at addressing historical inequities of land distribution. There are three distinct phases of the land reform programme. Manjengwa (2006:6) notes that;

*“The first phase of the resettlement was from 1980 to 1997. Approximately 71,000 families were resettled on 3,500,000 hectares of land that was acquired. The second phase was from 1998 to June 2000. During this phase, approximately 4,097 families were resettled on 200,000 hectares of the acquired land. The third phase of the land reform programme was launched in July 2000. This phase is also referred to as the “Fast Track” land redistribution phase. The “Fast Track” phase resulted in the resettling of approximately 134,452 families on 6,300,000 hectares of the acquired land. A further 14,286 families informally settled on 416,808 hectares of land.”*

The ‘Fast Track’ phase is believed to have had two major impacts on the wildlife sector. Firstly, there was an upsurge in both poaching of animals and land clearance (for construction of houses and crop production) in some of the newly resettled areas. Secondly, the unplanned settlement patterns in the newly resettled areas disrupted wildlife habitats in some of the existing conservancies. There is therefore, need to take a close look at the extent to which the FTLRP affected Zimbabwe’s wildlife conservation agenda.

#### **4.3.1 Nature conservation under the land reform programme**

Wolmer (2003:13-14) conducted extensive research on wildlife conservation and the impact of the land reform programme in the south east lowveld of Zimbabwe. On the commercial ranches of Zimbabwe’s southeast lowveld, wildlife was conceived as a lucrative venture in the 1960s.

Previously, wildlife was considered detrimental to cattle ranching (Wolmer *et al.*, 2004:2). However, game meat and hide production was initiated on a few ranches and briefly flourished before stagnating due to difficulties in market-related challenges. The safari hunting industry began to develop and legislative changes were facilitated, including (but not limited to) devolution of “*Appropriate Authority*” over wildlife to land owners in the 1970s. Thereafter, significant growth in live game sales and a notable increase in tourism activities was experienced; even though that was also limited (to a certain extent) by successive severe droughts (Manyeruke *et al.*, 2013:275), inevitably resulting in the subsequent collapse of the country’s economy. There was a general shift to export-oriented agricultural products, which consequently increased the popularity of game ranching and promoted community based conservation initiatives (Bond and Cumming, 2006:486)

The evolution of the conservation and agriculture history became a topical issue as there was a lot of global attention on Zimbabwe’s formative stages of the Land Reform Program (Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019:8-9). The historical underpinnings are embroiled in colonial displacements and resettlements from the farms that were now wildlife areas (Mubvami, 2004:76; Masiwa, 2005:71). As a result, the same forces that were mounting on commercial farms for crop and livestock agriculture in natural farming regions 2 and 3, became the same driving force behind resettlements in the wildlife farms.

In the 1980s and 1990s, production of the wildlife as compared to beef, became a very important matter in natural farming regions 4 and 5 of Zimbabwe (Walker, 2005; Child *et al.*, 2012:3). Wildlife was increasingly viewed as more ecologically resilient and stable in the low veld dry lands, allowing biodiversity conservation, and being more sustainable; under both private and communal land (Cumming, 2006:490 in Rukuni *et al.*, 2006).

By 1994, wildlife ranching became one of the fastest growing industries in the country, bringing up new uses of commercial farming land in Zimbabwe generally with 20.7% of white commercial farms under wildlife utilisation (Wolmer, 2003 quoted in Hill, 1994). Since the late 1980s is the emergence of wildlife conservancies which are amalgamations of privately owned ranches surrounded by veterinary fencing and with internal fencing removed.

#### **4.3.2 Emerging realities of the impact of land reform on nature conservation**

Private land set aside for wildlife conservation was not spared under the FTLRP. This was consistent with findings of other researchers (Wolmer, 2003:10) who interviewed respondents from Fair Range estate and Chitsa Community in Chiredzi. One settler was quoted as saying;

*“...we were overcrowded in the communal areas with less fertile soils and our children are finding it hard to get land, yet whites have these huge tracts of land . . . We fought during the liberation struggle for the sole purpose of land and this has taken so long . . . We will never forget the land where our forefathers were buried . . . There are sacred places in these large estates...”*

Such expressions bring out deep-rooted colonial issues that ran across the racial divide and needed redress.

This study’s findings indicate that some privately owned wildlife areas (depending on the history of establishment) were affected negatively. Chiredzi River Conservancy is one of the worst affected areas (Zisadza-Gandiwa *et al.*, 2014:269) and Bubiana Conservancy was also affected in a significant way. Table 4.1 below shows the wildlife areas affected by the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe.

**Table 4.1: Wildlife areas affected by the Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe**

	<b>Private Wildlife Area (Area in km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	<b>Percentage Estimate of Area Affected (spatial context)</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
i	Save Valley Conservancy 3035km <sup>2</sup>	1002km <sup>2</sup> (33%)	middle and southern parts were settled
ii	Chiredzi River Conservancy 1074km <sup>2</sup>	864km <sup>2</sup> (80%)	a few places around Buffalo Range Airport and Ruware Ranch remain unsettled
iii	Bubiana Conservancy 283km <sup>2</sup>	220 km <sup>2</sup> (78%)	the entire conservancy was converted to a resettlement area and a very small proportion remained good habitat for wildlife
iv	Midlands Black Rhino Conservancy 660km <sup>2</sup>	315km <sup>2</sup> (48%)	some new farmers were incorporated in the conservancy initiative whilst some decided to settle on in the wildlife areas
<b>Protected Areas</b>			
i	Gonarezhou National Park 50053km <sup>2</sup>	38km <sup>2</sup> (0.8%)	the settlement is along a basalt strip of the Guluji Area, north-western Gonarezhou by people under Headman Chisa
ii	Chirisa Safari Area 1713km <sup>2</sup>	(5%) 245km <sup>2</sup>	a strip of land on the boundary of the safari area was settlement following successful land claim by the local community (SI 47 (2014) and 2017)

**Source:** *Author*

It should also be appreciated that land use in some areas that could not support any meaningful crop agriculture, such as Mateke Hills, did not necessarily change significantly with resettlements, despite the losses that were incurred (Marongwe, 2011:202). There were several other areas such as Fair Range Estate in Chiredzi, Part of Mkwasine Estate, Hippo Valley Game section and small wildlife areas inside commercial farms, set aside for crop agriculture which were not officially designated. Such areas constituted small portions of the farms set aside for wildlife primarily for recreational purposes by white commercial farm owners. Some new

initiatives to expand the area under wildlife conservation in the post-colonial era were also established, and some of these are indicated in Table 4.2 below;

**Table 4.2: Wildlife areas established after the Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe**

	<b>Wildlife Area established in the Post-Colonial Period</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
i.	Ingwizi Community Conservancy Mangwe, Matabeleland south	Farmers converted part of their farmland into a wildlife conservancy in 2015. The African Wildlife Foundation is supporting this initiative.
ii.	Mucheni Community Conservancy Binga, Matabeleland north	Established in 2018 with support from the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations under the sustainable wildlife management programme.
iii.	Jamanda Community Conservancy Chipinge, Manicaland	Established in 2016 when the Mahenye community ceded land for wildlife conservation. The initiative was supported by funding from the European Union.
iv.	Sidinda Wildlife Corridor Hwange, Matabeleland north	Communities in Binga supported the establishment of the corridor in 2017 for protection of wildlife habitat with support from the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).
v.	Sengwe Tshipise Wildlife Corridor Chiredzi and Beitbridge, Masvingo	This joint community initiative was initiated in 2000 and aims to ensure connectivity in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area.
vi.	Nyangambe Community Conservancy Chiredzi, Masvingo	Community based conservation initiative following the guidelines of the Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE).
vii.	Mujingwe Community Conservancy	Established in 2017 in Mbire communal land.
viii.	Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) and Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA)	Established in 2002 with the signing of a Treaty to collaboratively manage the area adjacent to protected areas in southeast Zimbabwe (and other countries namely Mozambique and South Africa), CAMPFIRE areas and private wildlife reserves, expanding the area where wildlife is a recognised land use option.
ix.	Kavango Zambezi TFCA	Established in 2006 with the signing of a Treaty to collaboratively manage the area adjacent to protected areas in northwest Zimbabwe (and other countries namely Angola, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia) and CAMPFIRE areas, expanding the area where wildlife is a recognised land use option.
x.	Greater Mapungubwe TFCA	Established in 2006 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to collaboratively manage the area adjacent to protected areas in south west Zimbabwe, including private land and communal areas (and other countries namely Botswana, and South Africa) significantly expanding the area where wildlife is a recognised land use option.
xi.	Chimanimani TFCA	Established in 2001, including the buffer areas adjacent to Chimanimani National Park and surrounding communal area, in collaboration with the government of Mozambique to protect the unique wildlife habitat in the eastern highlands.
xii.	Lower Zambezi Mana Pools TFCA	This initiative was started in 2002, involving the mid-Zambezi region of the Zimbabwe and adjacent areas in Zambia, consolidating multiple land use areas for the advancement of conservation.
xiii.	ZIMOZA TFCA (Zimbabwe Mozambique Zambia)	An initiative under conceptual stage involving areas that are largely communal and offering very little for agriculture, yet regarded as pristine wildlife habitat with a regional and global significance. This is being pursued with the objective of promoting sustainable development.

*Source: Author*

An analysis of the information gathered through key informant interviews and information published about the FTLRP, showed the programme as being a catalyst for wildlife losses and destruction of habitat. This information contained extreme views and scenario imaginations that did not necessarily tally with reality. The Land Reform Programme was thus perceived as an economic, ecological, moral and historical issue.

#### **4.3.3 The Role of the Media during FTLRP**

Media framing is a growing concept and an issue which needs particular attention when interrogating the land question. The term seems to take on three major meanings. Sometimes, it is applied to news that purportedly distorts or falsifies reality (*distortion bias*), sometimes to news that favours one side rather than providing equivalent treatment to both sides in a political conflict (*content bias*), and sometimes to the motivations and mindsets of journalists who allegedly produce the biased content (Entman, 2007:163).

The research findings indicate a lot of media framing to deliberately exaggerate the impact of FTLRP on key wildlife species. This was meant to attract global media attention and undesirable sanctions on Zimbabwe. There was a deliberate attention placed by the media on wildlife issues as compared to other environmental ills that could have occurred, particularly with regards to the destruction of indigenous forests by new farmers who ventured into tobacco farming. This was done as a way of supporting the tobacco industry which experienced growth with new farmers coming on board.

This also masks an array of diverging viewpoints but on the other hand broadly encompasses a sense of reparation of re-asserting territorial identity claims (Wolmer, 2003). The study's findings are consistent with entitlement issues tied to the history of land occupation during the colonial era. One of the respondents from Chiredzi River Conservancy was quoted by the researcher as saying;

*“...our land was taken from our forefathers and converted to cattle farms and because the settlers did not bring cattle from overseas, they snatched them from our great grandfathers and gave them matching orders...we are simply returning to our land...”*

Another development that is believed to have had an impact on the wildlife sector, especially on privately owned land, is the enactment of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (2007). The promulgation of this Act has resulted in much uncertainty among some stakeholders in the wildlife sector. Zimbabwe has an opportunity to support community engagement through sustainable utilisation of its land and wildlife, supported by relevant policies to sustain and improve conservation and decrease poverty, should it choose to do so (Lindsey *et al.*, 2006:286-289). In view of these developments, there is a need to develop new models for indigenous participation, partnerships and profit sharing in the wildlife sector to ensure sustainable conservation and legitimate community engagement (Hanlon *et al.*, 2012:10).

Some settlers in Bubiana Conservancy expressed the views that de-congesting over-crowded communal land was more important as compared to the conservation of wildlife. One emotional participant stated that;

*“...what is more important in the eyes of government are people because people vote and animals don't...”*

In addition, some new farmers in the Mateke Hills area of Mwenezi District located in Masvingo Province and others from the West Nicholson area of Matabeleland South exuded confidence that Black people can also become wildlife farmers if they are supported and trained. They brought out the significance of the government's wildlife-based land reform policy recommendations (Du Toit, 2004). It is therefore, important to ensure the



operationalisation of the initiatives including those aimed at promoting community based conservation (Roe *et al.*, 2009). It can thus be noted that the FTLRP, had a significant impact on wildlife conservation in privately owned areas that were resettled. There are policy prescriptions that need to be promoted in the post land reform phase encapsulated in the Wildlife-Based Land Reform Policy framework.

The net effect of the settler and colonial policies on land, agriculture and area set aside for biodiversity conservation was evident. The reasons for the destruction of African agriculture were the political needs of the colony which included the need to create a sustainable labour pool for European enterprises both in agriculture, conservation, mining and later in urban areas in the manufacturing and domestic industries. The development of African agriculture had been pushed by the need to pay taxes without using the gruelling root of ‘*chibaro*’ labour and the need to acquire household and capital goods that came with the introduction of colonialism which acted as pool factors (Marobela, 2008:4). These developments created stern competition for settler agriculture leading to laws and policies that destroyed African agriculture and in turn propped up settler agriculture specifically in maize production (Arrighi, 2010:42; Green, 2016:5). In short, Africans were great farmers whose mythical failure was a deliberate creation of the colonial state to justify colonialism in general and expropriation of African land in particular.

#### **4.3.4 The First Land Reform and the rise of the communal and small-holder food-crop producers**

Having noted that indigenous Africans in colonial Zimbabwe had been successful farmers whose fate on failure was premeditated and systematically constructed by successive colonial regimes, at independence, the new Black majority government sought to bring back Africans

into farming through the land reform and resettlement programme. The struggle for independence had been primarily based on land ownership and control.

With support from international partners, mainly the erstwhile colonial master, Britain, the government successfully implemented the land reform which saw 71 000 households benefitting mainly A1 smallholder model plots/farms (Bond and Cumming, 2006; Rukuni, et al, 2006:274). The programme was a full package that saw targeted farms capacitated in terms of the development of infrastructure and social amenities (Scoones *et al.*, 2012:509).

Given that the programme was aimed at reducing poverty and economically empowering the new farmers through commercial production, the resettled farmers were trained in best agricultural practices that were affordable. The government also chipped in with input loan schemes and grants. Agricultural Extension Workers/Officers were deployed in different wards to assist with on the field training. Veterinary Officers were also deployed to control and help with livestock diseases.<sup>5</sup> The net result of the government's efforts was an increase in food crop and livestock production. This boom saw the small scale farmers overtaking the white commercial farmers as the primary producers of food crops, particularly maize.

#### **4.4 Understanding the Nexus between the FTLRP and the fall in Food Crop**

The Zimbabwean land reform programme's inception and impact have been studied from various disciplinary perspectives, chronicling and profiling both its negative and positive implications (Jakaza, 2019). During the FTLRP, there was a sudden decline in food crop production. A number of reasons have been proffered to explain the sudden decline which

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with Mr. Mache, (Director in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development), Harare, 19 January 2017

coincided with the FTLRP. The reasons that have been put forward include the recurrent droughts that have affected Zimbabwe since 2000, economic sanctions and a shift from food crop production to cash crop production by farmers (Manyeruke *et al.*, 2013:275).

This chapter established that a plethora of reasons contributed to the fall in food crop production. One of the major reasons for the fall in production which was established by the research is the migration from food crop production to cash crop production by the traditional food crop producers who were mostly the beneficiaries of the first phase of the land reform programme under the A1 scheme, communal farmers and small scale holder farmers. These traditional food crop producers, after the displacement of the white commercial farmers who had traditionally produced cash crops, found a vacuum that they sought to fill with increased earnings.


Some beneficiaries of inputs would convert seed maize, sugar beans and cow peas for consumption<sup>6</sup>, while fertilizers were sold cheaply to raise money for people to purchase food. Coupled with this, is the issue of recurrent droughts. While droughts have always been a part of the climate of the country at known intervals, at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, rainfall patterns changed drastically since the 2002/3 season, (Department of Meteorological Services). These droughts have generally been attributed to climate change, which is a phenomenon that is still under research locally and regionally (Unganai, 1996:1421; Serdeczny *et al.*, 2017:7; Frischen *et al.*, 2020:17). It is also apparent that the sanctions that were imposed on Zimbabwe by the west as a result of the FTLRP, can be used to partially explain the decline in agricultural production.

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<sup>6</sup> One farmer from Marondera District noted that, “Mbeu yechibage yaigezwa yonankwa kuti iome vanhu vonogaisa hupfu (literally translated to: people would clean the chemical preservatives off the maize seed by washing it and dry it before grinding it to mealie meal).”

Moyo and Chambati (2013) note that the land question was the trigger that led the Zimbabwe government falling-out of favour with the western powers, and that while the issue was internationalized and the sanctions laid on the basis of lack of democracy and human rights, these were only meant to legitimise the sanctions as they could not be legitimately slammed basing on the land question. All the same, the result was a significant decline in the country’s agricultural produce in the years after the FTLRP. Figure 4.2 below depicts the Grain Marketing Board’s estimated production figures from 1990 to 2010, and shows the trends in decline. Figure 3 shows how the country’s agricultural production has declined from the years prior the FTLRP and after the FTLRP was carried out.

**Figure 4.2: Grain Marketing Board Estimated Production Figures (1990/00 to 2009/10)**



*Source: Grain Marketing Board (GMB) (2019).*

As shown on Figure 4.2, there were significant declines in production of the country’s main food crops such as maize and wheat, while soya beans and ground nuts, which are the primary

crops for vegetable oil suffered a notable decline as well. A number of reasons have been proffered to explain the sudden decline that coincided with the FTLRP. Among the reasons that have been put forward, include the recurrent droughts that have bedevilled Zimbabwe since 2000, ‘illegal’ economic sanctions and a shift from food crop production to cash crop production by farmers. Deliveries of grain to GMB are used as a proxy for food security at national level, and not at household level. Based on that understanding, the decline in maize deliveries to GMB should therefore not be automatically regarded as food insecurity as that may simply mean the farmers had no excess to sell to GMB or GMB pricing for grain was a deterrent factor.

#### **4.4.1 Shift from food crop production to cash crop production**


The researcher further established that a plethora of reasons contributed to the fall in food crop production. One of the major reasons for the fall which was established by the research is the migration from food crop production to cash crop production by the traditional food crop producers namely the beneficiaries of the first phase of the land reform programme under the A1 scheme, communal farmers and small scale holder farmers. It was noted that the major cash crops that the Black farmers migrated to include tobacco and paprika, as well as horticultural products like tomatoes. An interview conducted by the researcher with Meanwell Gudu, a Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB) Technical Services Executive in Harare on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December 2016 revealed that;

*“Prior to year 2000, white commercial farmers dominated tobacco production with over 90 % of the marketed crop, while Black farmers, who consisted mainly the small holders of both the A1 and communal farmers, had less than 10 % of production. After the year 2000 and the promulgation of the FTLRP, government policy scrapped*

*classification of farmers in terms of commercial farmers and other and ushered in new classifications of A1, A2, small holder commercial and communal farmers.”*

This was meant to deal with the racial connotations that were brought about by the earlier classification. The FTLRP saw the number of tobacco growers increasing from 1 547 in 1980 to 8 537 in 2000 at the dawn of land occupations and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, and the number skyrocketing to 97 066 in 2017, as shown by statistics from the Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB, 2015)<sup>7</sup> shown in Figure 4.3 below:

**Figure 4.3: Number of Tobacco growers since 2000**



**Source:** Tobacco Industries and Marketing Board (2018).

<sup>7</sup> The TIMB Annual Statistical Report (2015) does not only show production related issues of 2015. It is rather a continuously updated report up-to the immediate past year.

The increase in the number of registered tobacco growers was initially accompanied by a fall in production. This phenomenon was followed by fluctuating depressed production from 2003 to 2009 before a steady sustainable increase from 2010 to 2017. Figure 4.3 gives a simplified picture of the obtaining phenomenon between 2000 and 2017. However, it should be noted that production initially fell and went through a spell of fluctuations before the sustained increase. An interview conducted by the researcher with Ignatius Mateveke, Agronomist and Managing Director at Itmosci Nutriology in Marondera on 19 October 2018, revealed that;


*“This phenomenon is explained by the fact that tobacco is a technical crop whose production is demarcated by technical phases from monitoring the seedbed, field stage, curing and bailing stages. Many Blacks who ventured into tobacco production went in without the technical knowhow and took time to learn how to produce a quality crop with high yields. This was at a time when the former white commercial farmers who dominated a near monopoly of production were being moved off the land.”*

One other explanation which can be deduced in relation to the rise of the Black tobacco farmers is that the country slid gradually into an economic crisis from 1997 period<sup>8</sup> whose effects became more pronounced in the post 2000 era. The crisis led to hyper-inflation, lack of inputs and finance to undertake farming, not only tobacco but also food crops as well. Figure 4.4 below shows the trends in tobacco Production from 2000 to 2017.

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<sup>8</sup> In 1997, the Zimbabwean government paid gratuities amounting to ZW\$ 50 000 to the veterans of the second Chimurenga (liberation struggle). The number of beneficiaries was estimated at approximately fifty thousand (Dzinesa, 2017:68); (McCandless, 2011:79); (Nyathi, 2004:71) While politically there was no problem, economically the funds had not been budgeted. The payment triggered an instant economic shockwave that saw the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange losing 46% of its value and the Zimbabwean dollars losing more than 70% of its value in a single day (Marawanyika, 2007): <https://mg.co.za/article/2007-11-11-zim-marks-10-years-since-black-friday>). The day is remembering in economic corridors as the black Friday. In 1998, the government undertook a military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The intervention angered western capitals who are alleged to have had vested interests in the conflict through the extraction of conflict resources. In 1999, the IMF denied Zimbabwe Balance of Payment (BoP) support, a policy that had already been undertaken by the African Development Bank in 1998, and the World Bank followed suit in 2001 (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2007:5). The leading International Financial Institutions (IFIs) argued that Zimbabwe had failed to meet its financial obligations with the IFIs. However, on its part, Zimbabwe viewed the suspension of BoP support as vengeance against its intervention in the DRC and its FTLRP.

**Figure 4.4: Tobacco Production from 2000 to 2017**




*Source: Tobacco Industries and Marketing Board (2018).*

In contrast, food crop production dominated by maize as shown by deliveries to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), fell from over a million metric tonnes that dominated the pre-1996/97 season to 154 847 tonnes during the 2001/02, at the eve of the promulgation of the FTLRP, but with farm occupation already underway. The maize deliveries went on to tumble to 49 418 metric tonnes in the 2002/03 season. While it resurged, from 2003/4 and 2007/8, it fluctuated close to 200 000 metric tonnes, which was far below the average of a million metric tonnes at the peak of production and also far below the national annual demand of approximately two million metric tonnes each year (Chingono, 2010:71). Figure 4.5 below shows the maize deliveries (metric tonnes) to the Grain Marketing Board 1999/00 to 2016/17 season.



**Figure 4.5: Maize deliveries to the Grain Marketing Board 1999/00 to 2016/17 Season**



**Source:** Grain Marketing Board (2018).

The decline in maize deliveries as initially noted, was driven by the shift from food crop production to cash crop production by the smallholder Black farmers. Returns from the crops drove the migration. As earlier noted, after the first phase of the land reform, the government came up with initiatives to increase maize production. According to an interview the researcher conducted with Bernard Mache, a Director in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development in Harare on 19 January 2017;

*“These initiatives included active extension workers who assisted farmers in monitoring their crops. Extension workers offered training programmes in the production of food crops and livestock rearing, input loan schemes and timeous payment for products delivered to the GMB. However, in the post 2000 era, with the economic challenges that were biting the country, the visibility of extension workers*

*became thinner while government training programmes were either reduced or dropped.”*

The government input schemes under GMB were dropped and replaced by political input schemes such as the Presidential Input and Support Scheme which were marred by corruption, allegations of politicisation and late disbursement. As drought and food shortages became more entrenched, some beneficiaries of inputs would convert seed maize, sugar beans and cow peas for consumption<sup>9</sup>, while fertilizers were sold in order for people to purchase food. Such noble programmes that were meant to create food security, at least at the household level as a result failed to succeed and the issue of food insecurity remained one of the thorny issues that emerged as a consequence of the FTLRP. Most farmers in the A1 resettlement areas were more concerned with food production for subsistence purposes whilst most farmers in the A2 resettlement areas were interested in both subsistence and commercial production. Most farmers expressed understanding of food security at household level as the ability of a farmer to meet food requirements for their family for the whole year.

However, it should also be noted that while Black smallholder farmers produced the bulk of the maize, white commercial farmers also produced considerable quantities of food crops. While some of the produce was not sold to the GMB, it was marketed by some of these farmers to private players such as Agrifoods and National Foods for processing into products for both human consumption and animal feeds. Some white commercial farmers also processed their own produce into animal feed for their livestock. The displacement of the white commercial farmers, through land occupations meant that the FTLFP was undertaken without having properly planned for its negative implications. One of these negative implications would be the subsequent subtraction of the production percentages by the white commercial farmers.

#### **4.4.2 Vandalism during the FTLRP**

The researcher further noted that vandalism also impacted negatively on agricultural production with food crops being the hardest hit. The manner in which the FTLRP was undertaken was through ordinary people occupying the farms in a haphazard, violent and poorly coordinated manner, without any legal process being followed. This process went on for more than twelve months in which the presence of the law enforcement agents was either minimal or non-existent at all, which gave room to criminal elements to vandalise property and other white farmers, out of spite, also vandalized the farm properties and equipment. This situation meant that opportunists took advantage of the ensuing chaos to vandalise irrigation equipment, roofing materials of tobacco barns and other sheds, and tillage equipment like tractors. The government has not been able to come up with the total costing of the equipment lost due to vandalism. However, in total, the cost could also be felt from the fact that irrigation equipment which could have assisted in keeping the production of food crops high was no longer there. Land which had, been under irrigation, before the FTRLRP, was effectively turned into dry land due to the vandalism which consequently prejudiced the nation of the high yields that are generally associated with irrigation farming (Nhundu and Mushunje, 2010:1).

#### **4.4.3 Impact of economic sanctions**

The impact of economic sanctions on Zimbabwe's agricultural production cannot be overlooked. The research notes that sanctions on Zimbabwe have been a controversial topic and have been interpreted differently by constituencies both inside and outside the country. Sanctions on Zimbabwe are indeed a diverse and controversial topic. They have been noted to have had an adverse impact on the country's declining economic fortunes, with agriculture being one of the hardest hit sectors. As a result, it is important to discuss sanctions in relation to how they have influenced and affected the FTLRP and Zimbabwe's agricultural sector.

Chingono (2010:66) states that, “between the year 2000 and 2003, Zimbabwe was on the receiving end of a host of sanctions mainly from the United States of America, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the European Union.” Chingono (2010:67-69) further outlines that the controversies in the defining and contextualisation of the sanctions and notes that the sanctions had their roots in the government’s policy to legalise the land occupations that had started in 2000 and turn them into a government policy through constitutional amendments and the institutionalization of the FTLRP in 2001.

While the ZANU PF led Zimbabwean government has maintained the stance that the nation has been suffering from illegal sanctions which were not authorised by the United Nations (UN), opposition elements in Zimbabwe led by Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (USA-Government, 2018) and western countries, among them the United States of America (USA), the European Union (EU) and Australia, argue that the sanctions are targeted at ZANU PF officials, individuals and entities that prop up the machinery that oppress citizens in Zimbabwe. A closer look at the sanctions in the form of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) (2001) enacted by the USA, shows that these sanctions are causing a great deal of damage to Zimbabwe’s economy and its agricultural sector has not been spared as well. Section 4 (c) of ZIDERA (2001) states that;

*“Until the President makes the certification described in subsection (d), and except as may be required to meet basic human needs or for good governance, the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director to each international financial institution<sup>10</sup> to oppose and vote against— (1) any*

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<sup>10</sup> Section 3 of ZIDERA states that, “In this Act: (1) ... The term “international financial institutions” means the multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund. (2) ... The term “multilateral development banks” means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development

*extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the Government of Zimbabwe; or (2) any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution. Subsection (d) read that;*

*A certification under this subsection is a certification transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees of a determination made by the President that the following conditions are satisfied:*

*(1) RESTORATION OF THE RULE OF LAW.—The rule of law has been restored in Zimbabwe, including respect for ownership and title to property, freedom of speech and association, and an end to the lawlessness, violence, and intimidation sponsored, condoned, or tolerated by the Government of Zimbabwe, the ruling party, and their supporters or entities.*

*(2) ELECTION OR PRE-ELECTION CONDITIONS.—Either of the following two conditions is satisfied: (A) PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.—Zimbabwe has held a presidential election that is widely accepted as free and fair by independent international monitors, and the president-elect is free to assume the duties of the office.*

*(B) PRE-ELECTION CONDITIONS.—In the event the certification is made before the presidential election takes place, the Government of Zimbabwe has sufficiently improved the pre-election environment to a degree consistent with accepted international standards for security and freedom of movement and association.*

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Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Investment Corporation, the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency.

*(3) COMMITMENT TO EQUITABLE, LEGAL, AND TRANSPARENT*

*LAND REFORM.—The Government of Zimbabwe has demonstrated a commitment to an equitable, legal, and transparent land reform program consistent with agreements reached at the International Donors' Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1998.*" (United States of America Government, 2018).

An analysis of the above mentioned subsections of the ZIDERA (2001), reveals that while there was the inclusion of issues of human rights and democracy, a major influence on the enactment of the law was the FTLRP. It is because of this reason that the Act refers to the International Donors' Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement of 1998 that was the last documented trace where there is mention of the issues pertaining to the compulsory acquisition of land outside of the GoZ's draft constitution. This proposal contained a clause on compulsory land acquisition. It set forth the need to have a properly planned land reform programme which took into account the need to redress colonial land imbalances while allowing white commercial farmers to remain with considerable land, in line with Lancaster House agreements that Britain had reneged on. However, it is important to note that while government had extended this goodwill gesture, the international community, as well as local and international financial institutions, frowned upon it given that from a target of 42 billion Zimbabwean dollars which the government needed to resettle 100 000 families, only ZW\$7 339 000 was pledged by attendees who comprised 48 countries (Simura, 2009).

The net effect of ZIDERA and other western imposed sanctions was that Zimbabwe failed to access lines of credit which were not only important for the government in its support to the newly resettled farmers, but also to the private producers of fertilizers, chemicals and farming

equipment. While it was argued that the sanctions were targeted, a closer look at the individuals and entities that were on the sanctions lists by the USA's Office of Foreign Accounts Control (OFAC) and the EU list, shows that the placement of these targeted sanctions on entities and individuals would result in an economic nosedive which would be detrimental to agricultural production, especially food crops that were mainly meant for internal consumption.

Sanctions also resulted in shortages in the country. The role of fuel in agricultural and economic development cannot be overemphasized. Fuel powers the mechanised equipment in the industries that produce the needed farming implements and inputs and also the farm machinery. Fuel shortages, therefore, had a negative impact on the country's agriculture sector through either reducing production or increasing the costs of production when sourced from the informal market.

#### **4.5 Food Security and Climate Change**

Southern Africa is one of the regions that, without sufficient adaptation measures to climate change, will be affected negatively. The production of several crops that are important to large food-insecure human populations within the region and beyond, will most likely be affected (Lobell *et al.*, 2008). The uncertainties presented by climate change vary widely and therefore, the priorities at the national level will depend on various factors. Given the inevitable impact of land reform on food security, climatic factors also influence agricultural production and food security in a significant way.

While the socio-political changes, noted in previous chapters, impacted on the production of food crops, natural changes in weather patterns also had an influential impact on the production of food crops. There has been a global acceptance of the phenomenon of climate change which

is shown by the vast literature on the subject as well as the creation of a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or simply referred to as UN Climate Change in 1992 (United Nations, 1992). According to the Cambridge Dictionary, climate change refers to *changes in the world's weather, in particular, the fact that it is believed to be getting warmer as a result of human activity increases the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere* (<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/climate-change>). Climate change can generally be seen as long term noticeable and permanent changes in a region's average weather. This includes mainly changes in temperatures, wind speed and direction, and rainfall patterns. Asuelime and Simura (2016) state that; *"global warming, influenced through the enhanced greenhouse gases (GHG) effect caused by past and continuous emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, had resulted in a continuous increase in the temperature of the Earth's surface."*

Climatic conditions brought about by climate change have seen various parts of the world experiencing gradual changes in weather patterns. With respect to sub-Saharan Africa, which is home to countries (Zimbabwe, South Africa Namibia and Kenya), under study. (Lobell et al. (2008:15) note that;

*"In Zimbabwe, for example, there are more cooler and hotter days, and the length and depth of the drier periods is increasing. In the future, the frequency of extremely dry winters and springs in southern Africa will increase as will the frequency of extremely wet summers."*

Serdeczny et al. (2017:1585) also support this view by stating that;

*"The repercussions of climate change will be felt in various ways throughout both natural and human systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. Climate change projections for this region point to a warming trend, particularly in the in land*




*subtropics; frequent occurrence of extreme heat events; increasing aridity; and changes in rainfall—with a particularly pronounced decline in Southern Africa and an increase in East Africa.”*

The unpredictable nature of rainfall has become a hallmark in Zimbabwe, with detrimental effects to agricultural production. An official from the Zimbabwe Meteorological Services Department (MSD) (Interviewee 3, Harare, 16 June 2019), in an interview with the research, informed that;

*“What we have mostly noted with reference to Zimbabwe is not the decrease of annual rainfall the country receive, but the shift in the patterns of rainfall from the traditional months and the increase in uneven distribution.”*

Statistics acquired from the MSD, as shown in Figure 4.6 below, show that there has been a sustained near constant fluctuation of the amount of rainfall that the various provincial MSD stations recorded from the 1979/80 to the 2017/18 seasons.

**Figure 4.6: Annual Rainfall/Province from 1979/80 to 2017/18) in Zimbabwe**




**Source:** Meteorological Services Department (2019)

However, what the statistics do not show is the shift in the traditional rainfall patterns which the small scale and communal farmers relied on for their agricultural production. An interview conducted by the researcher with Herbert Harufaneti on 23 February 2016 revealed that;

*“Most of the farmers do not have meaningful irrigation systems, with some having small water pumps (ranging between 4 horsepower to 9 horsepower) that can only sustain small vegetable gardens and small horticulture fields for crops like onions, tomatoes, cabbages and butternuts.”*

Nevertheless, the water pumps and the size of the riverside gardens cannot sustain the production of cash and food crops at a larger scale. This also comes with the risk of river siltation. The other variables that can be used to establish climate change are changes in the minimum and maximum temperatures of a region or country. Figure 4.7 below shows the average temperature in Zimbabwe (1963-2010)

**Figure 4.7: Average Temperature from 1963-2010, in Zimbabwe**



*Source: Meteorological Services Department (MSD) (2019).*

As shown in Figure 4.7 above, the department has recordings from 1963 to 2010. The data shows that there has been a slight warming in the national temperatures between 1963 and 2010. In line with this establishment, Uganai (1996:141) notes that,

*“Both the national mean minimum and maximum ambient temperature time series show 2 phases of temperature increase. The first warming phase was from 1935 to 1949, and the second phase was from 1980 to present.”*

This trajectory, if read with the statistics given in figure 4.7 above, shows that there has been a continued increase in temperature until the present day.

Temperature changes notably have an impact on agricultural production. Crops respond differently to various temperatures with varying effects to germination, growth and yields. Seed varieties that are produced to suit some temperatures, and water quantities and distribution tend to be affected by the changes in the temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns which in turn has the consequence of negatively affecting the productivity of farmers.

While droughts have always been a part of the climate of the country at known intervals, in the post-2000 era, the recurrent nature of the droughts has been unprecedented and perennial during the traditional wet months. Manyeruke et al. (2013:275) attributed these droughts to climate change, and put forward that;

*“In Zimbabwe, the past decade has seen an increase in food and nutrition insecurity at household and national levels emanating from reduced productivity and production of the main crops partly due to climate change and other socio-political events that were unfolding in the country”.*

An interview conducted by the researcher with Herbert Harufaneti, an Agricultural Extension Officer, in Marondera District on 23 February 2016 revealed that;

*“The issue of droughts and shifts in rainfall patterns now makes it difficult for farmers to properly plan on their farming calendars such as on when to plant their crops. There have been instances where farmers would plant their crops after some good rains but those crops would be destroyed by sun heat after a long dry spell.”*

The researcher further obtained data which showed that farmers, particularly those that got their land in the LRRP-I are aware of climate change. Herbert Harufaneti in his interview with the researcher further added that;

*“Our farmers are aware of climate change. They might not mention it by name, but when you interact with them, they talk of changes in rainfall patterns, confusing rainfall patterns, and less rainfall than was the case when they first settled on their plots in the late 1980s to early 1990s. Some of them tell us that they have abandoned their rain-fed fields for riverbank gardens when doing crops like maize and beans because in the river banks, they have enough water to irrigate their crops.”*

The researcher found out that there is need for localised adaptation by the farmers in a bid to remain productive. While strategies such as riverbank cultivation may offer quick fix solutions to the challenges of climate change, such strategies tend to have long term side effects like siltation of rivers which tend to have the net effect of ruining the potential of gaining livelihoods from agriculture and exacerbating climate change. The long term solution would be the empowerment of the farmers to have sustainable, low-cost irrigation development. This can be achieved through partnerships with research institutions and favourable payment terms for the farmers. This would include the construction of dams of various sizes on rivers, borehole drilling, or combining adjacent fields to create large farms where water can be centralized and allow the farms to be run as productive farming companies. There is also need for the

government to revise the agricultural natural regions so as to be able to come up with relevant agricultural and land policies which would answer to the realities on the ground.

## **4.6 Issues arising from the link between Food Security and Nature**

### **4.6.1 Conservation during FTLRP in a changing climate**

The chapter analysed the intricate relationship between food security, biodiversity conservation and land reform in Zimbabwe. The chapter was inspired by the desire to answer questions that arose after the FTLRP pertaining to the argument that the policy destroyed a thriving farming industry, particularly through dispossessing the white commercial farmers of the land which they had allegedly successfully utilised in agricultural activities and giving it to the native Blacks who were inexperienced. In order to come up with an objective analysis, the chapter traced the history of food crop production in particular and farming in general, from the colonial times into the first post-independence land reform and resettlement programme and concluded with an analysis of the nexus between FTLRP and food crop production.

It was noted that the native Blacks were great farmers who proved their prowess by giving settler farmers stiff competition especially in the production of maize. The great strides that the Blacks had made were undone by the introduction of colonial agricultural and land laws and policies that favoured settler agriculture at the expense of the native Blacks. This actively worked to the detriment of the African farmers. These policies were instrumental in creating a myth that Blacks were poor farmers and that Europeans were expert farmers.

In post-colonial Zimbabwe, the government embarked on the land reform and resettlement programme that saw Blacks being given land, mostly smallholder plots that averaged seven hectares through the Lancaster House agreement of the willing buyer – willing seller principle.


Under this programme, the native Blacks who received numerous government support and training proved, as was during the early years of colonialism, were good farmers. White commercial farmers retreated mostly to cash crop production particularly tobacco and horticulture as well as cattle production, while Blacks took the burden of food crop production.

Production by the native Blacks rose exponentially to a point they were contributing more than seventy % of the maize that was being delivered to the GMB at the eve of the FTLRP. This however, as noted earlier in the chapter, did not mean that white commercial farmers became peripheral players in food crop production as well as meat and milk production. There were a number of white farmers, as noted earlier in the chapter, who produced considerable amounts of maize and supplied to private players, the GMB as well as the export market. This means that if the FTLRP directly destroyed production by driving out white commercial farmers from the land, it was only a fraction of production which was affected, hence the need to search for other reasons that affected production. This was the motivation of the last section of this chapter.

As noted above, there was a coincidental decline in food security in the country with the advent of the FTLRP. This section deconstructed the myth that the food insecurity that came in the post-2000 era was primarily and directly as a result of the implementation of the FTLRP. While the programme had a proportional direct impact on agricultural production, it was not solely responsible for this decline in production due to the fact that the production of the staple crop (i.e. maize) by the native Blacks had surpassed the production of white commercial farmers. The direct impact of the slump in production can be explained by the displacement of white commercial farmers who were into food crop production as well as the vandalism of agricultural infrastructure that took place during the FTLRP.

Irrigation and production infrastructure was destroyed as an attempt to spite the white commercial farmers by land occupiers and also as a result of premeditated criminal activities by those who stole the equipment for resale. This means that other factors were responsible and as noted earlier in the chapter, these factors included recurrent droughts, sanctions, and unfriendly maize marketing policies that led to the migration to cash crop production by the native Blacks. The net effect of these factors was that Zimbabwe's agricultural industry tumbled to its knees and there was food insecurity. The GoZ's interventions failed to resuscitate the industry due to corruption, recurrent droughts and the politicization of interventions meant to revamp the country's agriculture sector. Figure 4.8 below shows the land-use patterns before the FTLRP in Zimbabwe.

**Figure 4.8: Main Land-use pattern before the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe.**



*Source: Child (1996).*

Considering the losses and gains that inevitably altered the composition of the land-use patterns following the FTLRP, there is a need for in-depth spatial analysis, using available tools for mapping for the government of Zimbabwe to keep track and take stock of the status quo (Matondi, 2012). Such an exercise is very important for reporting on various scales from national to global commitments.

#### **4.7 Chapter Summary**

This chapter's main focus was on food security, nature conservation and land reform in Zimbabwe. The chapter showed the history of food crop production by Blacks in colonial Zimbabwe and how they were disempowered by a myriad of colonial laws and policies such as the Land Apportionment Act, amongst others. All this being done in order to give room for settler agricultural endeavours. The pull and push factors that resulted in Blacks actively engaging in agriculture were also looked at. The chapter explored the importance of food security and the relationship between food security and the ownership and control of land. The increased participation in agriculture by whites had a negative impact on the agricultural production of the native Blacks as they were disposed of their land to make way for the white farmers. Black people were thus pushed into reserves such as Gwaai, Shangayi, Gokwe and Muzarabani which were not suitable for crop production. It should thus be noted that Blacks were great farmers whose failure was a deliberate mythical creation of the colonial state.

A general evaluation of the impact of the FTLRP on nature conservation efforts in Zimbabwe was done and the chapter found out that private land set aside for wildlife conservation was not spared under the FTLRP. However, contrary to popular belief, the findings from this chapter proved that the FTLRP did not have a significant impact on Zimbabwe's wildlife estate, but,



there were losses recorded in private wildlife areas that were set aside for nature conservation to augment the government conservation agenda. There was thus a lot of exaggeration by the media with regards to the impact of FTLRP on key wildlife species, to attract global media attention and sanctions on Zimbabwe. Therefore, it is a myth that the FTLRP resulted in the decimation of Zimbabwe's wildlife and habitat. Significant negative consequences for the conservation industry were widely investigated in this chapter.

The positive and negative implications of the FTLRP in terms of agricultural production and food security in the face of climate change were also analysed. This chapter presented evidence of the growth in popularity of tobacco farming amongst the resettled farmers. Nevertheless, the reduction in maize production was significant and since maize is a staple food crop in Zimbabwe, this resulted in food insecurity at national level. It should also be appreciated that, since 2000, food security and nature conservation in Zimbabwe have been affected by a number of issues which include drought, lack of expertise, unavailability of capital, inadequate inputs, policy inconsistency and conflicts. It is important to note that concerted efforts are being made to address the issue of economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe following the implementation of the FTLRP, for the country to return to its previous status as the 'bread-basket of Africa'. Deliberate efforts should also be made to support nature conservation initiatives beyond the protected area network, including a government policy on Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM). The following chapter gives an analysis of poverty reduction and empowerment of resettled farmers through the land reform programme in Zimbabwe.

# **CHAPTER 5**

## **POVERTY REDUCTION AND EMPOWERMENT OF RESETTLED FARMERS THROUGH THE LAND REFORM PROGRAMME IN ZIMBABWE**

### **5.1 Introduction**

Poverty is one of the most debated concepts worldwide. This is because the concept is at the centre of economic development as well as socio-political development policies that governments and community leaders undertake. The meaning of poverty varies, depending on the context and time. The definition becomes more complex in Africa for a number of reasons, as it is mostly influenced by the long history of colonialism and exploitation by Europe. In Africa, besides all the other benchmarks used in trying to measure poverty in general, issues of race and gender should also be factored-in. In other words, poverty in Africa is also racial and has gender connotations. In analysing poverty, this chapter mainly contrasts the neo-liberal economics model and the Human Development (HD) model (Ranis and Stewart, 2000). The aim of this chapter therefore, is to evaluate whether the FTLRP empowered resettled farmers and contributed to poverty reduction

### **5.2 Beneficiaries of the FTLRP**

The majority of the beneficiaries of the FTLRP were men with women being taken as part of the households.

Table 5.1 below shows the beneficiaries of the FTLRP for A1 and A2 models in each province.

**Table 5.1: Beneficiaries of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP)**

Province	Model A1	Model A1	Model A1	Model A1	Model A2	Model A2	Model A2	Model A2
	Number of Males	%	Number of Females	%	Number of Males	%	Number of Females	%
<b>Midlands</b>	14 800	82	3 198	18	338	95	17	5
<b>Masvingo</b>	19 026	84	3 644	16	709	92	64	8
<b>Mash. Central</b>	12 986	88	1 770	12	1 469	87	215	13
<b>Mash. West</b>	21 782	81	5 270	19	1 777	89	226	11
<b>Mash. East</b>	12 967	76	3 992	24	*	*	*	*
<b>Mat. South</b>	7 754	87	1 169	13	215	79	56	21
<b>Mat. North</b>	7 919	84	1 490	16	574	83	121	17
<b>Manicaland</b>	9 572	82	2 190	18	961	91	97	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>106 986</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>22 723</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>6 043</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>796</b>	<b>12</b>

*Source: The Utete Report (2003).*

*\* The breakdown of figures by gender for Mashonaland East Model A2 were not readily available.*

The 2001 FTLRP policy document states that, the land tenure system offers each family a 99-year lease with an option to purchase, and the land leases and titles deeds (researcher emphasis) for married couples should be in both spouses' names. The research noted the arguments put forward by development scholars like Chambers (1995:10) that to understand poverty and development; one should be taught and be informed about those issues by the people living in poverty themselves as they have a better capacity of defining their needs, wants and successes. The Presidential Land Review Committee on the Implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, 2000-2002, reported that a total of 106 986 offer letters were in the names of men, representing 82% of the land distributed under the A1 model, while only 22 723 offer letters, representing 18% were in the names of women . The gender situation was slightly worse in the A2 model where there were 6 043 male holders representing 88% while female holders

were 796, which accounted for 12 %. However, figures in the report do not show statistics for the Mashonaland East province for the A2 model, which were unavailable.

### **5.3 Poverty Reduction and Empowerment under the FTLRP**

The FTLRP was a Black empowerment programme that sought to redress imbalances on land ownership that had been created by the colonial system. The principles of the FTLRP are spelt out in the *Land Reform and Resettlement Programme: Revised Phase II* document of 2001. According to the document;

*“The Zimbabwean agrarian reform involves the restructuring of access to land, and an overall transformation of the existing farming system, institutions and structures. It includes access to markets, credit, training and access to social, developmental and economic amenities. It sought to enhance agricultural productivity, leading to industrial and economic empowerment and macro-economic growth in the long term”* (Government of Zimbabwe, 2001:1).

From the set plan, one can deduce that the land reform policy in Zimbabwe in general had been predicated on poverty alleviation and economic and social empowerment of the Black people in the country. Colonial imbalances in general and specifically in this research, are laws and policies, written or unwritten that were crafted by the colonial regime to benefit the minority whites socially and economically, while impoverishing the native Blacks ‘*in a zero sum game manner*’. Hence, poverty alleviation and socio-economic empowerment of the native Black people can be seen as a component of the broad aspects of Black economic empowerment in the post-independence era. From a FTLRP perspective, the GoZ aimed to;

*“decongest the over-populated and/or overstocked wards and villages for the benefit of landless people, under model A1 (villagized, self-contained and three-*

*tier land use plans), indigenise the large scale commercial farming sector through Model A2 – Small, Medium and Large Scale Commercial Settlement Scheme, and to reduce the extent and intensity of poverty among rural families and farmworkers by providing them with adequate land for agricultural use.”*

From this, one can deduce that the programme had two main principal objectives, namely poverty reduction and empowerment. The government also had an objective of decongesting the overpopulated and overstocked wards and villages, a scenario which had been caused by the colonial land tenure policies introduced by the white settlers. Overpopulation and overstocking had led to an ecological disaster and deterioration of the land in the communal areas, previously known as Reserves under colonial rule.

The colonial government had even at some point noted the effects of overpopulation after its promulgation of the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) (1930) and sought to make amends by enacting the Native Land Husbandry Act (LHA) (1951). The effects of the LAA (1930) which gave the bulk of the fertile land to whites and relegated Africans to infertile reserves above the carrying capacity of the people and cattle, resulted in high land degradation. The colonial regime then promulgated the LHA (1951) which, among a raft of other measures, forced Africans to destock their livestock, especially cattle.

It should be noted that the net effects of overpopulation and overstocking to a farming community is the destruction of soil fertility which leads to reduced yields and death of livestock. In sum, it creates or recreates poverty. Hence the objective of decongestion should be viewed as a poverty reduction strategy. Reading from the objective of indigenising the large scale commercial agriculture sector, one can note that the policy sought to empower Black

farmers into the economic sector that is central to the national economy in both revenue generation and employment opportunities.

In agreeing with the notion that the FTLRP managed to decongest the communal lands, former Minister of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment and Legislator for Mberengwa South Constituency in Midlands Province, Chiratidzo Iris Mabuwa, interviewed by the researcher on 19 December 2017 in Harare, opined that;

*“The FTLRP was helpful as it decongested the former Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) known in the Shona vernacular as Maruzevha. However, a number of youths who were now competing for farming space against their parents in Mberengwa South were allocated land in the former white large scale commercial farms in Mberengwa North where they were now farming. As a result, there has been conflict between regulations on farming and mining given that the areas where people were resettled is rich in gold and stated that while some of the resettled families have managed to venture into small scale mining at their lands, others have been plunged into court battles with some people claiming mineral rights in their farms. The powers given to the Mines and Minerals Act (Chapter: 21:05) saw some people attempting to wrestle the lands from those who had been given the farms arguing that they had discovered gold and had registered the claims.”*

She added that;

*“The programme brought good fortunes and at a national scale, it increased potential for agricultural growth given that more fertile virgin lands were parcelled out to many farmers. What affected the increase in the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was that the programme was undertaken as a reaction to angering comments in 1987 by former British Foreign Secretary, Claire Short, which meant that it lacked a*

*legislative framework that would act as a guide and it brought the country at loggerheads with its former allies”.*

On a different note, Zimbabwe’s former President, Robert Gabriel Mugabe viewed the ownership of land by more Blacks as the primary success of the FTLRP, sentiments that were also shared by Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) Board Chairman, Basel S. E. Nyabadza. In the early days of the FTLRP, former President Mugabe remarked that;

*“Those of you who come from, or are in contact with, our rural constituencies would vouch that the past few months have seen quite a thrustful agrarian revolution in the countryside. As long promised, the past two months or so have seen real advances in bringing land to our people in 2001...”* (Mugabe, 2001:108).

From his strong convictions, on the FTLRP, President Mugabe was of the opinion that the land reform programme was a great success given that land was the primary reason why people took up arms to fight against the colonial regime. The satisfaction emanates from his conceptualisation of the policy which he saw as the only meaningful means to empower Black Zimbabweans and kick-start a process in which Black Zimbabweans would have a greater share in the economy. From this conceptualisation, according to the former President, the ownership of the land by the native Blacks on its own was empowerment from which further empowerment or working to create livelihoods against poverty can be undertaken. It is because of this reason that he pointed out that;

*“I am happy my Government has managed to fully implement one of the prioritised areas on poverty alleviation through the historic land reform programme, which has decongested the rural areas which were characterised by excessive land use pressures that caused land degradation and desertification. The historic programme was aimed at, among its goals, poverty*

*alleviation, and equitable distribution of land, income generation and environmental restoration of the decongested land” (Mkwate and Ogbuna, 2011).*

Another key informant, Basel Nyabadza, the Board Chairman for ARDA, interviewed by the researcher on 05 January 2018 in Harare, was of the opinion that;

*“First and foremost, it was the achievements of our government to bring balance to land ownership and utilisation of same. It is the cornerstone of any developing nation. Land to be secure and in the hands of the indigenous people. ... Our challenge is now to deploy resources to utilise our land”.*

In support of this view, he further pointed to the geometric increase in the number of farmers in the production of cash crops, horticulture and wildlife. The example of the increase in tobacco farmers, as shown in this chapter, supports Nyabadza’s argument. From just above 8 000 farmers of tobacco in 2000, the number jumped to more than 75 000 in 2015 (TIMB, 2018). However, from his arguments, Nyabadza said that; *“we could not honestly say that we have reached the levels we can say that the FTLRP has fully achieved its desired results. It is for this reason that he noted that the next challenge is the full utilisation of land for national development.”*

The view that the FTLRP was successful basing on the number of recipients is also shared by former South African President, Thabo Mbeki. In his address to the University Of South Africa (UNISA) Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI) on 23 August 2013, Mbeki noted that the FTLRP in Zimbabwe had benefited between 300 000 and 400 000 people who were having direct socio-economic gains from the land, and at the least owned their land. Mbeki (2016) further noted that the FTLRP had given Zimbabweans a different perception of land and how it can transform lives. He noted this when five Zimbabweans who were working



in South Africa managed to convince a white farmer to allow them to farm on his piece of land when the farmer had claimed that the land was barren. In his lamentations, Mbeki noted that while Zimbabweans saw the land as an asset to empower themselves, South Africans who successfully won land claims, in most cases, chose to be paid in cash, a situation which showed how they lacked an appreciation of the empowerment brought by owning and utilising the land (New Zimbabwe, 2016).

#### **5.4 Poverty Reduction and Empowerment: Views of the Beneficiaries**


There was unanimous agreement by all beneficiaries interviewed for this study that the FTLRP had a direct impact in transforming their lives for the better. It must be noted that while all respondents cited a positive change, the issue of poverty reduction and empowerment should be viewed separately between the A1 and A2 farmers. On the one hand, the A1 model was meant to reduce poverty among the landless and farm workers as well as decongest the communal areas, while at the same time empowering the beneficiaries. On the other hand, the A2 model was not a model for poverty reduction given that beneficiaries in this model had to show proof of a strong financial backing that would give the beneficiary the capabilities to produce at a commercial level. It, therefore, should be noted that while both models aimed at empowering the beneficiaries, it was only the A1 model that was driven by principles of poverty reduction, at least on paper. Practically, however, there are a number of instances in which people who did not meet the benchmarks set in the policy document were found benefitting under the A2 programme. This was driven by corruption, politics, and in some cases, nepotism.

Participant KI 9 from Chivhu District noted the “*massive abuse of the process especially by some politicians who sought personal political gains,*” while Chief Ngezi from Chegutu District informed that among some of the noted wrongs of the FTLRP was multiple farm

ownership all caused by lack of coordination between issuing authorities and corruption by land authorities. Some officials who were in charge of the land redistribution process parcelled out land to themselves, their relatives, friends, and political allies under the A2 scheme even when some of them did not meet the selection criteria for the scheme.

From the study, the researcher noted that there could be some differences in the manner in which some academics and policymakers define poverty reduction in comparison to the manner in which the ordinary people especially the A1 model beneficiaries perceive poverty reduction. Most A1 farmers viewed poverty reduction as the opportunity to own the means of production, producing adequate food for their own consumption at household level (sometimes with excess for the market) and not surviving on handouts/food aid from government and non-governmental organisations. In terms of conceptualisation of poverty by A1 land beneficiaries under the FTLRP, most of their insights can be categorised into the traditional conceptualisation and contemporary views. By traditional conceptualisation standards, A1 farmers noted that they were moving out of the poverty zone as they now managed to own some livestock, mostly cattle, which according to Hall (1986) have traditionally been taken as a symbol of wealth and store of value. This response came from the majority of participants in both the A1 and A2 categories and from almost all the provinces.


**Figure 5.1: Average number of cattle owned by A1 Farmers**



*Source: Author*

The mean number of cattle owned by A1 farmers before FTLRP was significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=0.0$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) from the average number of cattle they owned after the FTLRP as shown on Figure 5.1.

**Figure 5.2: Average number of cattle owned by A2 Farmers**




*Source: Author*

The mean number of cattle owned by A2 farmers before FTLRP was significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=0.0$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) from the average number of cattle they owned after the FTLRP as shown on Figure 5.2.

Livestock, particularly cattle are important as a source of wealth in Zimbabwe, as it is in most parts of Africa. The importance of cattle has managed to transcend generations from pre-colonial times to contemporary times. Similarly, both A1 and A2 farmers also owned goats which are an important economic asset in rural livelihoods (Kumar *et al.*, 2010:762). Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 show the comparative analysis of goat ownership under A1 and A2 resettlement areas.


**Figure 5.3: Mean Number of Goats owned by A1 farmers**



*Source: Author*

The mean number of goats owned by A1 farmers before FTLRP was significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=8$   $P<0.05$ ) from the average number of goats they owned after the FTLRP as shown on Figure 5.3.

**Figure 5.4: Mean Number of Goats owned by A2 farmers**



*Source: Author*

The mean number of goats owned by A2 farmers before FTLRP was significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=13$   $P<0.05$ ) from the average number of goats they owned after the FTLRP as shown on Figure 5.4.

The A1 farmers noted that prior to the FTLRP, some could not afford to send their children to school and those who managed nominal schools could not afford good schools, after benefiting from the programme they could now afford schools and good schools, respectively. Nominal schools can be seen as rural government schools that have poor amenities and are shunned by


good teachers. They also lack in basic schools' requirements which apart from good teachers, include textbooks and laboratories, among others (Mupa and Chinooneka, 2015:126).

Other poverty reduction benchmarks evaluated included the ownership of both immovable and movable assets in A1 and A2 resettlement models. Immovable assets considered are urban residential stands, houses and farmhouses constructed. The movable assets considered are farming equipment and transport.

### **5.5 Investments in residential stands by resettled farmers**

There were also variances noted in the prices of residential stands. The perceived value of the area influenced the differences. Hence, stands acquired in towns and cities like Marondera and Mutare (seen as small town and small city, respectively) were expensive when compared to stands acquired in rural growth points like Mutasa and Mberengwa. In the towns, the stands ranged from US\$ 12 to US\$ 20 per square metre, while in the growth points the prices ranged from US\$ 5 to US\$ 10 per square metre. Farmers, in most cases, purchased urban residential stands from the nearby growth point/urban centres while others would purchase the stands in their towns of birth/growth. Among the growth points/urban areas that were mentioned were Macheke, Marondera, Chivhu, Mazowe, Bindura, Mwenezi, Chiredzi, Mutare, Chegutu, Chinhoyi, Beit Bridge, Gwanda, Zvishavane, Mberengwa, Gweru, Umguza, Binga, Vic Falls, Rusape and Nyanga town, in the selected sample for the study.

**Figure 5.5: Ownership of urban residential stands by A1 farmers**




*Source: Author*

Whilst many farmers invested in purchase of residential stands in small towns and growth points in their respective districts, the percentage number of A1 farmers who owned urban residential stands significantly increased after the FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=10$   $P<0.05$ ) as compared to the ownership status of such assets before the FTLRP.




**Figure 5.6: Ownership of urban residential stands by A2 farmers**



*Source: Author*

Unlike A1 farmers, there were more A2 farmers who owned/ residential stands in urban areas of their choice, including growth points close to their rural homes in their respective districts. The mean number of urban residential stands owned by A2 farmers before FTLRP was not significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=26.5$   $P>0.05$ ) from the average number of urban residential stands they owned after the FTLRP.


**Figure 5.7: Average number of urban houses owned/acquired by farmers under A1 resettlement model**



*Source: Author*

Most A1 farmers did not have ownership of properties such as houses in urban areas before FTLRP. Nevertheless, investments in the acquisition/construction of houses in a number of urban areas by A1 farmers, increased significantly (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=10$   $P<0.05$ ) after the FTLRP.

**Figure 5.8: Average number of urban houses owned/acquired by farmers under A2 re-settlement model**



*Source: Author*

Whilst there were a number of A2 farmers who owned houses in urban areas/ were already constructing, the ownership of houses in urban areas by A2 farmers increased after FTLRP. Nevertheless, that increase was not significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=28$   $P>0.05$ ) when the average number of houses in urban areas that are owned by individual A2 farmers was compared before and after the FTLRP.

### **5.6 Average number of rural homes owned/developed by farmers under A1 resettlement model**


There were more A1 farmers who owned/developed their rural homes before the FTLRP as compared to the period after the programme (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=4$   $P<0.05$ ). This shows a significant shift in investment priorities in the small-scale farmers under the A1 model as

they started focusing more in the development of their newly acquired farms, leaving their rural homes. Only 50% of the respondents from Masvingo, Matabeleland North and South, retained their rural homes, despite having A1 farms. In contrast, we did not find a significant difference in the A2 farmers programme (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=14$   $P<0.05$ ).

### 5.7 Investments in the construction of farmhouses by resettled farmers

Following the FTLRP, most resettled farmers made significant investments in the construction of farmhouses of various sizes at their respective plots

**Figure 5.9: Farmhouses constructed by A1 Farmers**




**Source:** *Author*

There were no farmhouses constructed by A1 farmers before FTLRP and all farmhouses and ownership thereof was only realised after the FTLRP. Highest percentage of farmhouse construction was noticed in Mashonaland Central (60%), followed by Manicaland (55%) then Midlands and Masvingo (50%). Least development of farmhouses was in Mashonaland West (35%) and Matabeleland North (30%). There was a significant difference in the number of A1

farmers who constructed farmhouses after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=0$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) and no one had a farmhouse before FTLRP.

**Figure 5.10: Farmhouses constructed by A2 Farmers**




**Source:** *Author*

The A2 farmers in the 8 provinces invested in the construction of various sizes of farmhouses ranging from small 2 bedroom houses to 5 roomed houses. All provinces scored above 50% and on average, 62% of A2 farmers in provinces invested in the construction of farmhouses. There was a significant difference in the number of A1 farmers who constructed farmhouses after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=0$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) and no one had a farmhouse before FTLRP.

### 5.8 Livestock production by resettled farmers

The livestock prices varied with areas and the size of the animals in the sample selected for the study. On average, the price of a heifer was US\$ 350, while a goat went for an average price of US\$ 30.


**Figure 5.11: Production of Goats in A1 resettlement areas**



Source: Author

The farmers settled in Midlands, Masvingo and Matabeleland Provinces under the A1 scheme produced the highest number of goats after the FTLRP, with an average market value above \$1500 USD/farmer as compared to Manicaland and Mashonaland Provinces. There was a significant difference in the production of Goats after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=10$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) as compared to the period before FTLRP.


**Figure 5.12: Production of Goats in A2 resettlement areas**



Source: Author

The A2 farmers in Masvingo and Matabeleland Provinces produced comparatively higher number of goats after the FTLRP, with an average market value exceeding \$3000 USD/farmer as compared to Manicaland, Midlands and Mashonaland provinces. There was a significant difference in the production of Goats by A2 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=13$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) as compared to the period before FTLRP.


**Figure 5.13: Production of Cattle in A1 resettlement areas**



*Source: Author*

Cattle production in the A1 resettlement areas significantly improved following the FTLRP. Mashonaland Central province had the highest stock value averaging \$5500 USD/farmer, followed by Midlands province that had an average stock value of \$3200 USD/farmer, as compared to all other provinces. There was a significant difference in the production of cattle by A1 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=0$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) as compared to the period before FTLRP.

**Figure 5.14: Production of Cattle in A2 resettlement areas**



*Source: Author*

Cattle production in A2 resettlement areas significantly improved following the FTLRP. Masvingo and Matabeleland provinces had the highest stock value averaging \$4500 USD/farmer whilst Midlands, Manicaland and Mashonaland provinces had an average stock value of \$2000 USD/farmer, as compared to all other provinces. There was a significant difference in the production of cattle by A2 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=0$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) as compared to the period before FTLRP.


### **5.9 Comparative analysis of farming implements acquired by resettled farmers**

With regards to farm implements, the A1 farmers who participated in the study boasted of having acquired ox-drawn scotch-carts, ploughs and harrows, among other important implements needed for a farmer to claim self-sufficiency in undertaking their work. According to the respondents, the implements were acquired from hardware stores in the urban areas close



to their farms. However, some tobacco farmers who sold their produce to tobacco auction floors in Harare such as Tobacco Sales Floor, Boka Tobacco Auction Floor, Premier Tobacco A.F. Contract tobacco sales are conducted at TSL, Boka, Boost Africa, Tianzee, Mashonaland Tobacco, Cuverid Tobacco Limited would purchase their implements from agro-equipment dealers at the auction floors. Horticulture farmers sold their produce in cities like Harare, Mutare, Masvingo, Bulawayo, Gweru, Chinhoyi, Bindura, Marondera, Gwanda, Beitbridge and other smaller urban areas such as Rusape, Nyanga, Chipinge, Bikita, Victoria Falls, Kariba, Chirundu, Plumtree, Zvishavane, Gokwe, Kwekwe, Chegutu, Kadoma, Mazoe, Shamva, Guruve, Mvurwi, Macheke and Chivhu. They would also purchase their implements from the cities and towns at the end of the sales. A few farmers managed to acquire tractors and ploughs. However, the acquisition of large farm implements was relatively more pronounced amongst the A2 beneficiaries.

**Figure 5.15: Number of Ox-drawn ploughs acquired by A1 farmers**




*Source: Author*

There was a significant number of ox-drawn ploughs acquired by A1 farmers after the FTLRP, as compared to the period before the programme. Fifty percent (50%) of A1 Farmers in Mashonaland East had the highest improvement from 15% (before FTLRP).

There was a significant difference in the number of ox-drawn ploughs acquired by A1 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $U=0$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) as compared to the period before FTLRP.


**Figure 5.16: Number of Ox-drawn ploughs acquired by A2 farmers**



*Source: Author*

A significant increase in the number of Ox-drawn ploughs acquired by A2 farmers was recorded after the FTLRP. About 30% of A2 farmers in Manicaland purchased such ploughs, increasing from 6% who had ploughs prior to the FTLRP. Similarly in the Mashonaland provinces, 25% of A2 farmers in Mashonaland East and 20% in Mashonaland West acquired ox drawn ploughs. When compared with A1 farmers on Figure 5.15, the A1 farmers made more investment in Ox drawn ploughs than their A2 counterparts in the same provinces. There was a significant difference in the number of ox-drawn ploughs acquired by A2 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $U=5$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) as compared to the period before FTLRP.


**Figure 5.17: Number of Tractors acquired by A1 farmers**



*Source: Author*

Figure 5.17 shows a comparative analysis of the percentage number of A1 farmers who acquired tractors after the FTLRP, in relation to their status before the programme. Findings of this study established that most A1 farmers did not have tractors before FTLRP as less than 2% of such farmers had tractors before FTLRP. Even after the FTLRP, our results show that the A1 farmers did not make significant investment in tractors since Mashonaland Central had only 10% (being the highest). There was a significant difference in the percentage number of A1 farmers who acquired tractors after FTLRP as compared to the period prior to the FTLRP (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $U=5$ ,  $P<0.05$ )


**Figure 5.18: Number of Tractors acquired by A2 farmers**



*Source: Author*

Figure 5.18 shows a comparative analysis of the percentage number of A2 farmers who acquired tractors after the FTLRP. Comparing with A1 farmers on Figure 5.17, A2 farmers had more tractors before FTLRP and they also made significant investments in purchasing tractors after the FTLRP. A2 farmers in Mashonaland West Province made the highest percentage of farmers with tractors after the programme. Just like A1 farmers, there was a significant difference in the percentage number of A2 farmers who acquired tractors after FTLRP as compared to the period prior to the FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=5$ ,  $P<0.05$ ).


**Figure 5.19: Number of Trailers acquired by A1 farmers**



*Source: Author*

Figure 5.19 shows only 3 provinces had A1 farmers who had trailers before the FTLRP and Mashonaland Central A1 farmers (approximately 5%), had the highest number of farmers who acquired trailers. The results show a general low investment in trailers by A1 farmers despite improvements recorded after FTLRP. Nevertheless, there was a significant difference (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=5$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) in the percentage number of A1 farmers with trailers for use at their farms after FTLRP as compared to the period before FTLRP.


**Figure 5.20: Number of Trailers acquired by A2 farmers**



*Source: Author*

Unlike A1 farmers, A2 farmers made a lot of investments in acquisition of trailers as shown on Figure 5.20. About 50% of A2 farmers in Mashonaland West acquired trailers after FTLRP, increasing from 9% in the same province. We recorded a significant difference (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=0$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) in the percentage number of A2 farmers with trailers for use at their farms after FTLRP as compared to the period before FTLRP.


**Figure 5.21: Number of Scotch Carts acquired by A1 farmers**



*Source: Author*

Scotch carts are an important asset in A1 farming areas and Figure 5.21 shows an increase in the number of Scotch Carts in all provinces, with the highest percentage number of A1 farmers owning scotch carts recorded in Manicaland and Midlands with 40% each. We recorded a significant difference (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=0$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) in the percentage number of A1 farmers with trailers for use at their farms after FTLRP as compared to the period before FTLRP


**Figure 5.22: Number of Scotch Carts acquired by A2 farmers**



*Source: Author*

Figure 5.22 shows an increase in the number of scotch carts acquired by farmers in all provinces, and the highest percentage number of A2 farmers with scotch carts was recorded in Mashonaland East with 40% followed by Midlands that had about 35%. A significant difference (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=3$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) in the percentage number of A2 farmers with scotch carts for use at their farms was recorded after FTLRP as compared to the period before FTLRP

**Figure 5.23 Number of Cultivators acquired by A1 farmers**




*Source: Author*

Figure 5.23 shows only 3 provinces had A1 farmers who had cultivators before the FTLRP and Manicaland A1 farmers (approximately 14%) had the highest number of farmers who acquired trailers, followed by Mashonaland Central and Masvingo with 10% and 7%, respectively. The results show a general low investment in cultivators by A1 farmers despite improvements recorded after FTLRP. Just like A1 Farmers, a significant difference (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=3$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) in the percentage number of A1 farmers with cultivators for use at their farms after the FTLRP as compared to the period before FTLRP.




**Figure 5.24: Number of Cultivators acquired by A2 farmers**



*Source: Author*

In Figure 5.24, the percentage number of A2 farmers who had cultivators before the FTLRP was much lower (below an average of 10% in all provinces) and a significant change occurred after FTLRP, when more A2 farmers acquired the cultivators. Mashonaland Central, Masvingo and Midlands had the high number of farmers with cultivators. The results show a generally higher investment in cultivators by A2 farmers as compared to their A1 counterparts in the same provinces. There was a significant difference (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=0$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) in the percentage number of A2 farmers with cultivators for use at their farms after the FTLRP as compared to the period before FTLRP.


**Figure 5.25: Number of Grinding mill, Boom Spray, Generator, Row Planter acquired by A1 farmers**



*Source: Author*

A1 farmers did not make significant investment in acquiring Grinding mills, Boom sprays and Generators after the FTLRP and the majority did not have such equipment before the programme as well. The results show a general low investment in such equipment by A1 farmers, despite improvements recorded in Mashonaland Central (8%) and Matabeleland north (10%) provinces after FTLRP. We did not find significant difference in the number of Grinding mills ( $U=16$ ), Planters ( $U=20$ ) and Boom sprays ( $U=18$ ) acquired by A1 farmers before and after the FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $P>0.05$ ). On the other hand, there were significant differences in the number of generators acquired by A1 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $P<0.05$ ) as compared to the period before the programme.


**Figure 5.26: Number of Boom sprays acquired by A2 farmers**



*Source: Author*

The percentage number of A2 farmers who had Boom sprays increased after the FTLRP when more farmers acquired such equipment. More than 20% of A2 farmers in Mashonaland Central, Midlands and Matabeleland north have Boom sprays. We did not find any A1 farmer who owned a Boom spray before the FTLRP. There was a significant difference in the number of Boom sprays acquired by A2 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $P < 0.05$ ) as compared to the period before the programme.


**Figure 5.27: Number of Row Planter acquired by A2 farmers**



*Source: Author*

The percentage number of A2 farmers who had Row planters increased after the FTLRP when more farmers acquired such equipment. More than 30% of A2 farmers in Mashonaland East, and Masvingo have Row planters. We did not find any A1 farmer who owned a Row planter before the FTLRP. There was a significant difference in the number of Row planters acquired by A2 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $P<0.05$ ) as compared to the period before the programme.


**Figure 5.28: Number of Generator acquired by A2 farmers**



**Source:** Author

There was a significant change in the percentage number of A2 farmers who owned a Generator (various sizes) after FTRLRP. Less than 5% of most A2 farmers in Manicaland, Mashonaland, Masvingo and Matabeleland had generators before FTLRP, as compared the period after the programme. There was a significant difference in the number of generators acquired by A2 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $P<0.05$ ) as compared to the period before the programme.

**Figure 5.29: Number of A2 farmers who acquired Pivot, Water pump, Bailer, Grinding mill and Harvester**




*Source: Author*

Equipment such as Pivot, Bailer and Harvester were the least acquired and only found in the A2 resettlement areas, with an average of 1% of farmers with Bailers and Pivots in all provinces. Significant acquisition of water pumps was done after the FTLRP with Mashonaland Central recording the highest with 8%, followed by Manicaland and Mashonaland West.

We found significant differences in the number of Pivots, Water pump, Bailer and Grinding mills acquired by farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $P < 0.05$ ) as compared to the period. On the other hand, there were no significant differences in the number of combine harvesters acquired by A2 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $P > 0.05$ ) as compared to the period before the programme.

**Figure 5.30: Number of A1 Farmers who acquired Water pump, Water bowser, Truck and Light vehicle**



*Source: Author*


The number of A1 Farmers who acquired Water pumps, Water bowsers, Trucks and Light vehicles were generally low (not exceeding 2% of the farmers). Nevertheless, there were notable increase in the number of water pumps and water bowsers that were acquired after the FTLRP

In terms of family cars, the majority of the A1 farmers who had acquired vehicles had the ‘ordinary’ Toyota models like Corolla 1998 model, Nissan Bluebird models, and Mazda 323 both sedans and hatchbacks. Others had pick-up trucks, models ranging from Toyota Hilux 2.4, Nissan Hardy Body, Mazda B-series, while a few had small lorry trucks, like Nissan Atlas and Mazda Bongo, popularly known as ‘ex-jap’ (short for ex-Japanese). According to the farmers,

all these assets were purchased from the income realised after the sale of their various agricultural produce. However, some individuals who left their full-time jobs to be engaged in agriculture full-time, used their termination benefits to purchase the trucks which are notably important assets in the farming business, while others who are still at work said that they used the incomes earned from the farms to top-up on their savings from their monthly salaries and personal loans to purchase the vehicles.

We did not find significant differences in the number of water pumps ( $U=16$ ), trucks ( $U=20$ ) and light vehicles ( $U=19.5$ ) acquired by A1 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $P>0.05$ ) as compared to the period before FTLRP. On the other hand, there were significant differences in the number of water bowsers acquired by A1 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $P>0.05$ ) as compared to the period before the programme.

**Figure 5.31: Number of A2 Farmers who acquired Water bowser, Truck and Light vehicle**




Source: Author

The percentage Number of A2 Farmers with Water Bowser, Truck and Light vehicle shown on Figure 5.33 was significantly more than those observed in their A1 counterparts in the same provinces. About 20% of A2 farmers acquired Trucks, Light vehicles and water bow-sers in Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West and Masvingo provinces whereas Farmers in Midlands and Mashonaland Central had an average of 15% for the same implements.

The majority of A2 farmers reported that most of the farming equipment, including vehicles were purchased from the proceeds of farming after FTLRP. Whilst there may be no significant difference in the type of vehicles owned by A2 farmers (in comparison with A1 farmers), there were more expensive models owned by A2 farmers such as Mercedes Benz, Man, Nissan UD, Hino and Scania for trucks. The light vehicles acquired by A2 farmers ranged from Ford Ranger, Mercedes Benz, Range Rover, Toyota Landcruiser to Land Rovers.

We found significant differences in the number of water bowsers, trucks and light vehicles acquired by A2 farmers after FTLRP (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $P < 0.05$ ) as compared to the period before the programme.

**Figure 5.32: Number of Disc harrows acquired by A2 farmers**




*Source: Author*



We did not find A2 farmers who had disc harrows before the FTLRP in Manicaland and Matabeleland provinces. However, notable changes were recorded in Mashonaland East (25%), followed by Midlands and Mashonaland Central provinces with 20%. A2 farmers in Matabeleland North Province also invested significantly in the acquisition of disc harrows with about 15% and Masvingo Province had the least with only 5%.

We did not find any A1 farmers who acquired disc harrows before and after the FTLRP as such, there was a significant difference in the percentage number of A2 farmers with Disc harrows after the FTLRP as compared to the period before the programme (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $U=5, P<0.05$ ).

**Figure 5.33: Number of Disc ploughs acquired by A2 farmers**




*Source: Author*

Disc ploughs are important for commercial crop farming under the A2 resettlement model hence farmers invested in the acquisition of this crucial means of production. Mashonaland central had the highest number (45%) of farmers with disc ploughs and the Matabeleland

Provinces had the least. Nevertheless, there was a significant increase in the disc ploughs after the FTLRP as compared to the period before the programme.

We did not find any A1 farmers who acquired disc ploughs before and after the FTLRP as a result, there was a significant difference in the percentage number of A2 farmers who acquired Disc ploughs after the FTLRP as compared to the period before the programme (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $P < 0.05$ ).

**Figure 5.34: Number of Vicons acquired by A2 farmers**



**Source:** Author


Figure 5.34 shows the percentage number of A2 farmers who acquired vicons, and a comparative analysis of the number of vicons before and after the FTLRP. A considerable number of A2 farmers in Mashonaland East (30%) and Mashonaland central (25%) and West (24%) acquired vicons for use on their farms after FTLRP which was a significant improvement since less than 5% owned such equipment before the programme.

We did not find any A1 farmers who acquired vicons before and after the FTLRP as such, we found a significant difference in the percentage number of A2 farmers who acquired vicons after the FTLRP as compared to the period prior to the programme (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $P < 0.05$ ).

### 5.10 Comparative analysis of food production by resettled farmers

The researcher noted that food security cuts across all participants who cited the acquisition of any other benchmarks of empowerment. This is deduced from the notion that any other acquisition before someone secures enough food is regarded as a luxury. Hence, the majority of beneficiaries were food secure except those who failed to make a breakthrough in their own farming endeavours, which resulted in them becoming labourers at farms owned by others, as alluded to in the discussions that follow.


**Figure 5.35: Farmer's perceptions on food security after the FTLRP**



**Source:** *Author*

Figure 5.35 shows the perceptions of resettled farmers on food security at household level. About 80% of respondents reported that food security increased whilst 9% who were predominantly A1 farmers from Binga, Beitbridge, Chiredzi, Matobo, Mberengwa, Mwenezi, Umguza and Zvishavane districts, have food insecurity, despite the gain in the land as a means of food production. Some of the reasons advanced by those farmers facing food insecurity after the FTLRP, include successive droughts, inadequate irrigation facilities including dams, insufficient support from government in the form of certified seeds, insufficient access to inorganic fertilisers, insufficient access to lime, inaccurate meteorological services and insufficient research and extension services. About 11% of the farmers reported no change in food security when a comparison is made with the period before FTLRP.

**Figure 5.36: Maize production by A1 farmers**




*Source: Author*

Maize is a staple food in Zimbabwe and is used to evaluate food security in the majority of rural areas. A significant improvement in the tonnage of maize harvested by A1 farmers was recorded after the FTLRP, with Bindura, Chegutu, Chinhoyi and Mazoe districts that had an average production exceeding 10 tonnes/A1 farmer. Farmers in Binga, Chiredzi and Mwenezi

had generally low maize yields (with a mean value of 3.3 tonnes of maize/A1 farmer), despite the increases in yields when compared to the period before FTLRP. The production of maize after the FTLRP was significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $P < 0.05$ ) from the production of the same staple food crop before the programme.


**Figure 5.37a: Maize production by A2 farmers before FTLRP**



*Source: Author*

The production of maize before FTLRP by A2 farmers was relatively higher than that of A1 farmers shown on Fig 5.36


**Figure 5.37b: Maize production by A2 farmers after FTLRP**



*Source: Author*

Maize production by A2 farmers after the FTLRP increased significantly across all districts, nevertheless, A2 farmers in Beitbridge, Binga and Chiredzi districts had generally low yields. On the other hand, A2 farmers in Bindura, Mazoe, Chegutu, Chinhoyi and Marondera recorded significantly high maize yields averaging 1350 tonnes/A2 farmer. Just like in the A1 resettlement areas, the production of maize by A2 farmers after the FTLRP significantly increased (Mann-Whitney *U* test,  $P < 0.05$ ) from the production levels before the programme.


**Figure 5.38: Rapoko production by A1 farmers**



**Source:** Author

Rapoko is a drought resistant crop (small grains) that is normally grown in the semi-arid regions of Zimbabwe. High yields of Rapoko were recorded in Beitbridge, Chiredzi and Mwenezi. There was general decline of Rapoko yields by A1 farmers after FTLRP comparing with the period before the programme. The lowest yields of Rapoko were recorded in Bindura, Binga, Chegutu, Chinhoyi, Mazoe, Nyanga and Zvishavane districts which had an average of 1 tonne of Rapoko/A1 farmer. Significant declines were recorded in Bindura, Binga, Chegutu, Nyanga, Zvishavane, Mazoe (from an average of 2 tonnes to 1 tonne of Rapoko/A1 farmer). Chegutu, Chinhoyi, Mutasa and Matobo also experiences declines. Marondera and Umguza Rapoko yields/A1 farmer remained unchanged. The production of Rapoko by A1 farmers after the FTLRP was significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=10$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) from the production of the same food crop before the programme.

**Figure 5.39: Rapoko production by A2 farmers**




*Source: Author*

The production of Rapoko in A2 resettlement areas increased in Beitbridge, Chiredzi and Mwenezi districts. Mberengwa, Binga, Chivhu and Umguza also recorded increase, however with relatively lower yields when compared to the 3 strongholds mentioned earlier. On the other hand, a general decline in Rapoko yields/A2 farmer was observed in Bindura, Chegutu, Marondera, Mutasa and Mazoe. Similar to the A1 farmers, the production of Rapoko by A2 farmers after the FTLRP was significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=16$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) from the production of the same crop before the FTLRP.




**Figure 5.40: Sorghum production by A1 farmers**



*Source: Author*

Sorghum production by A1 farmers generally increased after the FTLRP across all districts, except for Bindura. The A1 farmers in Beitbridge, Binga, Chiredzi and Mwenezi districts recorded the highest production of sorghum with an average of 4.5tonnes/A1 farmer. The production of sorghum by A1 farmers after the FTLRP was significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=11$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) from the production of the same crop before the FTLRP.

**Figure 5.41: Sorghum production by A2 farmers**



*Source: Author*

Sorghum production by A2 farmers after the FTLRP increased significantly across all districts, except Mazoe. The A2 farmers in Beitbridge, Chiredzi and Mwenezi districts recorded the highest with an average of 9 tonnes/A2 farmer in sorghum yields.

Sorghum is the second most important cereal in Zimbabwe (after maize), however the yields are generally lower than maize. Zimbabwe is estimated to have produced an average of 81 000 tonnes per year between 2011-2015 (FAO, 2017:10). The highest production of 175 000 tonnes was in 1987 and has declined over the years. In 2016 it was at 20 000 tonnes despite several efforts made by government and civil society to boost production levels. We also established that there are several varieties that are grown by farmers which also determine the yield such as different shades of white sorghum including macia, dwarf sorghum, red variety which is not affected by common pests and yielding very high and also a specific variety of red sorghum that is preferred for beer brewing. The production of sorghum by A2 farmers after the FTLRP

was significantly different (Mann-Whitney  $U$  test,  $U=22.5$ ,  $P<0.05$ ) from the production of the same crop before the programme.

### **5.11 Farmers' perceptions of poverty**

For the A1 beneficiaries, poverty, referred to being an adult person who is lacking in property and not being able to take care of one's dependents, or being a dependent by staying at the property of one's parents. Most beneficiaries viewed owning land as the first step towards moving out of the zone of those who can be considered poor in society.

However, this is not to say that all those who benefited easily came out of poverty. It should be noted that beneficiaries of the FTLRP were different from beneficiaries of the first phase of the land reform and resettlement programme which was implemented in the 1980s. Beneficiaries of the first phase were allocated serviced lands and enjoyed considerable support from the government and the donor community. Bernard Mache, a Director in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development, in an interview with the researcher in Harare on 19 January 2017, noted that;

*“The government could fund extension services both for crop and animal farming given that the World Bank substantially supported government's extension services. This funding was also increased by support from the donor community like the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA,) among others. The support included inputs, tillage services, on the field extension support and social amenities development.”*

In contrast, as revealed by Bernard Mache in an interview with the researcher, beneficiaries of the FTLRP were allocated land which had not been serviced. There was no basic infrastructure such as gravelled roads, schools, and shopping centres as was the case with beneficiaries of the first phase of the land reform and resettlement programme, given the financial challenges that

the government was facing. For instance, in Marondera District, Mashonaland East Province, farmers who were allocated land at Locke farm, popularly known as ‘*Kwaloki*’ and ‘*KwaChimimba*’ and Ruwari Farm have to make do with amenities that were established for farmers who were resettled under the first phase in the late 1980s. These amenities are very far away from the farms with one of the closest clinics and primary schools, Wenimbe Clinic and Tafadzwa Primary school at Village 8, being more than fifteen kilometres away from the farmers and their families. The GoZ did not construct access roads in the area but tracks created by farmers and their animals as well as the old roads left by the former white commercial farmers which are now yearning for rehabilitation.

In some areas such as Mutasa District in Manicaland Province, and as was the case with one of the issues raised by former Deputy Minister of Industry and Commerce, and Minister of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, Chiratidzo Mabuwa, in relation to Mberengwa District in Midlands Province, the newly resettled farmers had to make do with amenities that had been created for the communal areas. The amenities are not centrally located while the road infrastructure is dilapidated. In addition, the donor community shunned the FTLRP due to policy divergences. The dominant donor funding was from the West, which harboured the perception that the land reform programme was a policy laden with racial and human rights abuses. The farmers therefore, had to mobilise their own start-up capital and those who failed either ended up as labourers to those who were successful in either the A1 or A2 models, while others returned to their communal lands and held the allocated land in speculation (Cousins and Scoones, 2010).


Information gathered through Key Informant Interviews indicated that the average monthly wages for general farm workers ranged between \$50 to \$60 (United States Dollars/USD) whilst

those with special skills such as drivers or machine operators ranged from \$75 to \$100 USD. Foremen earned anything between \$120-150 USD. Nevertheless, some farmers paid a general daily rate of \$2.50. The issue of economic emancipation on part of the farm workers was therefore not necessarily addressed under the FTLRP and most of them remained trapped under the poverty datum line. Those A1 farmers who chose to be labourers have done so with the hope of raising some income to be used in the purchase of inputs for the upcoming seasons, while others have resigned to a fate of being labourers as long as they earn enough to subsist on food and pay fees for their children at government schools in their areas.

### **5.12 Economic emancipation of resettled farmers**

Information acquired from various interactions with this group of people (A1 farmers) in various provinces, showed that most of those who chose to be labourers would either be paid in cash as indicated above, which they saved and used for the purchase of inputs (Tobacco 1 ha seed pack=US\$75; 25kg 1 ha maize seed=US\$18; Fertilisers x 50kg x D=US\$28-30; AN=US\$33; C=US\$33 and lime=US\$15), or requested their fellow farmers to purchase the inputs like fertilizers for them on his/her return from the markets or when they made visits to the nearest urban centres to purchase their own inputs, while others chose to be paid in foodstuff. However, the payment means are not as fixed.

**Figure 5.42: Average cost of crop production/ha**




**Source:** *Author*

According to respondents mostly in low rainfall areas like Chivhu, Mwenezi, Chiredzi, Gokwe, Beit Bridge, Binga, Gwanda, Zvishavane and Mberengwa, depending on how much one would have worked for, some requested a mixed form of payment in which, part of the payment was requested in cash, part in food stuffs or inputs.

The A2 model, as noted earlier, was not meant to deal with issues of poverty reduction given the fact that those who were targeted as beneficiaries had to prove that they had enough resources to undertake farming at a commercial scale. According to the Government of

Zimbabwe, “Model A2 is aimed at increasing the participation of Black indigenous farmers in commercial farming through the provision of easier access to land and infrastructure on full cost recovery basis (researcher emphasis)” (Paradzayi, 2007). One of the main objectives of the model was “to empower Black entrepreneurs in the economy” of the country. Beneficiaries, therefore had to “show proof of experience and/or resource availability and entrepreneurship” (Marongwe, 2011). The model was thus supposed be evaluated from the empowerment facet, given that the question of poverty could not be raised against individuals who were already entrepreneurs in their own right.

**Figure 5.43: Perception on general impact of FTLRP on poverty reduction and empowerment of resettled farmers**



**Source:** *Author*

However, as noted earlier, there were others who accessed land under the model without the requisite financial power to fund their projects. These individuals were either politically connected or were employees (such as land officers and district administration officers) or held some kind of office in various departments that dealt with land issues. These beneficiaries had various survival skills that included joining contract farming, especially on tobacco production,

surviving on government input schemes, or simply putting to use a small portion of land that was within their farming capacity (Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019b). The primary concern was to utilise the land and have some proof of production to give to various land auditors since the GoZ had signalled the intention to visit and evaluate the usage of the land.

The various definitions of empowerment given in the conceptualisation framework of this study compared against this chapter's findings, prove that the FTLRP evidently empowered the beneficiaries. For instance, one of the definitions of empowerment discussed showed that empowerment gives "*self-strength, control, self-power, self-reliance, own choice, the life of dignity in accordance with one's values, capable of fighting for one's rights, and independence*" (The World Bank, 2019) . As noted by some A2 farmers, the simple fact of owning the land is empowerment enough, especially when weighed against the importance of land amongst Zimbabweans and Africans in general. In the African context, land defines people not only in economic terms but also culturally. Closely linked to that was the importance of capital goods as empowerment in the African context. In pre-colonial times, the most valuable capital assets were cattle and to some extent cattle have still maintained that level of importance (Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019b). In contemporary times, however, other important assets such as urban houses, cars and farm implements have also become equally important. All these important elements of 'power' were mentioned signifying that to a greater extent, the FTLRP managed to meet its objectives with regards to empowerment.

### **5.13 Government Interventions: Policies, Laws and Processes**

The government, having promulgated the FTLRP played a central role in attempts to sanitise land occupations and limit the impacts of abrupt and unplanned change in land ownership (Roodt, 2012b). The success of the FTLRP was important given that the policy was facing western condemnation with some African countries like South Africa and Southern African



Development Community (SADC) criticising the programme (SADC, 2010). Mbeki in 2013 also alluded to this by stating that;

*“Many years ago and as part of the leadership in this region, we engaged the Zimbabwean leadership – President Mugabe and others – in a very sustained process to discourage them from the manner in which they were handling the issue of land reform. We were saying to them, ‘Yes indeed we agree, the land reform is necessary, but the way in which you are handling it is wrong,’ that is what we were saying. But, fortunately, the Zimbabweans did not listen to us; they went ahead.”*

Due to such criticisms, it became apparent and all the more important for the GoZ to see to it that the programme would succeed in terms of not just being land redistribution but also in terms of land use and utilisation (crops and animal production) (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Zikhali and Chilonda, 2012; Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019b). Among the most topical issues which consequently arose was the subject of holding/ownership between the 99-year lease holding and the title deeds system (Mafundikwa, 2014).

It is, however, important to recall here that the GoZ chose the 99-year lease holding as a tenure system. The 99-year lease holding, as argued, was chosen because the government feared a return of the former white commercial farmers through the purchase of land from those who would have benefitted from the land reform programme. As a result, the GoZ was motivated to prevent land sales by the beneficiaries of the land reform initiative given the powers bequeathed by title deeds to the holder (Paradzayi, 2007). This could have had the impact of a media backlash by those against the programme who were preaching that land was given to those who never wanted it and that land had been redistributed only because of racial hatred. The other narrative was that, the land could also have fallen into the hands of a few native

Blacks who had the financial muscle to purchase it from the poor peasants hence creating a new crop of powerful land barons. In all the cases, the programme would have qualitatively proven to be a failure.

Even with the difficulties that came after the implementation of the FTLRP, the GoZ sought to increase the productivity of the farmers amid difficult times. The international donor community shied away from the programme, given that the Western capitals from which the agencies are mostly domiciled were against the programme. The choice of the 99-year lease holding model, though making political sense, failed to appease the local financial institutions which also shied away from financing the programme on the basis that the 99-year lease could not be taken as collateral security.

The beneficiaries of the FTLRP, therefore, suffered from a lack of support from financial institutions. The banking sector argued that while it could support the agricultural sector, it however could not extend loans to farmers who hold 99-year lease agreements because the lease agreements were not bankable and could not be used as collateral (Matondi, 2012). In short, what the lease agreements mean is that the land remains the property of the state which has only allowed the holder of the lease to use the land for farming without assuming ownership. In such a case, farmers who do not have any other forms of collateral, cannot access bank loans.

The stance taken by the banks to not extend loans to farmers against a 99-year lease as the collateral asset was supported by John Robertson (in an interview with the researcher on 15 January 2018). Robertson who argued;

*“ownership of the land (by the borrower) is key for the banking system because the banks can only lend money entrusted to them by depositors only if they have a concrete security from which they can redeem the money in case of default.”*

In that interview on 09 January 2018 in Harare, Robertson reasoned that the current ownership model is akin to communalisation of the land, which strips it of any financial-economic value. On the other hand, farmers who could afford other means of security have complained that the interest rates charged by banks are too exorbitant and not viable for business. These sentiments were also echoed by the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Dr John Mangundya, in his July 2015 Mid-Term Monetary Policy Review Statement (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2015) and the business sector at large. Giving the Mid-Term Monetary Policy Review Statement, the RBZ Governor stated that;

*“In view of high-interest rates currently obtaining in the economy, there is scope for reduction to ensure that lending rates are supportive of economic recovery. In this regard, banks are urged to reduce their cost structures to enable them to contribute to the reduction of the cost of doing business in Zimbabwe.”* (RBZ, 2015)

The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Governor went on to instruct banks to reduce their interest rates in August 2015, as shown in Table 5.2 below:

**Table 5.2: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Interest Rate Guidelines (2015)**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Lending Rates</b>
<b>Lending to Productive Sectors</b>	
Prime Borrowers with Low Credit Risk	6% - 10% p.a
Borrowers with Moderate Credit Risk	10% - 12% p.a
Borrowers with High Credit Risk	12% - 18% p.a
<b>Housing</b>	
Housing Finance	8% - 16% p.a
<b>Consumptive</b>	
Consumptive Lending	10% - 18% p.a
<b>Default Rate</b>	3-8% above the interest rate charged to the borrower

*Source: RBZ Mid-Term Monetary Policy Review Statement (2015: 49)*

The interest rates before the RBZ 2015 intervention, had been hovering above 20 % and after the intervention, they were capped at 18 %, which in business terms, is still very high, and as compared to the short to long term cheap money in other economies, Zimbabwean banks can be seen as de-facto loan sharks. For instance, the Agribank of Namibia's interest rates averaged 4.0 % and 7.50 % for short term communal/resettlement and commercial loans, respectively, with a payment period of between one to two years. The same bank had medium term loans of which were averaged at 5.0 % and 8.0 %, for communal and commercial farmers, respectively, for a period of between five and ten years while long term loans which were only extended to commercial farmers averaged at 8.0 % and were for a period of fifteen to twenty-five years. The average commercial bank interest rates in South Africa was 10.5%, and in Botswana it was pegged at 7.5% (Nanjunga *et al.*, 2016).

The notion of high interest rates which dominated public and media discussions for a long time before the RBZ Governor worked on reducing the interest rates from 2015, was also strongly reflected in the responses obtained by the researcher through key informant interviews where it was noted that the majority of farmers could not afford bank loans as they were too expensive and thus obtaining such loans posed a risk to the few capital goods they had. The subject had not been only peculiar to farmers but also to the business sector which complained about expensive short term loans that were not sustainable in business terms.

When the GoZ embarked on the FTLRP, it was well aware of the fact that giving land alone would not be enough to address issues related to poverty alleviation and empowerment for both the A1 and the A2 models' beneficiaries. The GoZ therefore, knew that it had to come up with programmes to augment the meagre finances the beneficiaries of A1 farms possessed while having programmes that would bring easy recapitalisation for the A2 farmers. It is apparent that the FTLRP was not well coordinated in its formative stages and this created room for

vandalism and larceny by opportunists and other social malcontents. This had the negative implication of compromising and scaring away any future financiers of the programme.

As a result, the government, came up with three main programmes to support the farmers. The programmes were, Operation Maguta (spearheaded by the Zimbabwe National Army), Presidential Well-Wishers Input Scheme and the Farm Mechanisation Programme (spearheaded by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe). These programmes, which were also extended to communal farmers and to beneficiaries of the first phase of the land reform and resettlement programme had mixed results. Of these programmes, the most prominent ones were the Presidential Well-Wishers Input Scheme and the RBZ-driven Farm Mechanisation Programme because they were implemented nationwide with the Presidential Well-Wishers Input Scheme being a campaign tool for ZANU PF. The programmes attracted positive and negative media publicity in both the state and private media and were subjects of great debate in the public domain.

Beneficiaries of both the A1 and A2 models have argued that the support schemes by the government have not been enough. While the majority of the farmers had received some support from the government in the form of maize and other small grain seeds like cowpeas, and millet, fertilizers, and diesel for tillage since 2005, only a minority stated that the support was adequate to propel them into meeting their production targets. From the research, 82.6% and 76.2 % of the A1 and A2 farmers, respectively, noted that they had access to government support in the form of ox-drawn ploughs, scotch cart, cultivator, motor bikes, small generator, chain (for A1) and tractors, disc harrows, disc ploughs, combine harvesters, commercial power generators, trailers, boom sprays, motor bikes etc (for A2). However, of these, only 16.7 % and 25 %, respectively, stated that the support they had received was adequate. This means that

from those who had received the support from the government, an average of more than 75% had found the support inadequate as it did not cover all production requirements by the farmers.

Farmers noted that the Presidential Well-Wishers Input Scheme ended up benefiting some people who had the means to procure the inputs. The Presidential Well-Wishers Input Scheme provided basic inputs of 10kgs of seed (mainly maize but has in the years been diversified to include small grains for beneficiaries in semi-arid regions), a single 50kgs basal (Compound D) and a single 50kgs of top dressing (Ammonium Nitrate) fertilizers. These inputs were meant to create a base for food security at household level as reported by Mafundikwa (2014). Nevertheless, it is evident from the findings that the implementation of the FTLRP, in 2000 had adverse effects on agricultural production which culminated into food insecurity (Hove and Gwiza, 2012).

While the Presidential Well-Wishers input scheme was heavily criticised because of the corruption that surrounded it, an A2 farmer from Chiredzi (Respondent RF 4) who participated in this research opined that;

*“It (the Presidential Well-Wishers Input Scheme) is a very good programme but the government should use the funds to subsidize the cost of inputs so that all the farmers benefit instead of just those who are politically connected who get all the required inputs for free.”*

This opinion was also shared by several farmers who reported that the programme only catered for a few people as shown on Figure 5.44. Another respondent added that the inputs that farmers received through the programme were too few and insignificant to actually make a notable impact on their livelihoods. The corruption allegations were centred on the personnel that distributed the inputs and their criteria for choosing recipients. Allegations vacillated between the ZANU PF leadership at cell and branch levels, as well as the headmen who were


accused of allocating inputs to their friends and relatives while side-lining their foes even when they deserved to be allocated. There were some allegations that senior party officials at the district level hoarded the inputs for themselves even when they had the capacity to purchase and thus were not supposed to qualify for allocation in the scheme.

However, that notion is countered by the fact that the programme was never meant to increase production to a commercial scale. The programme was meant to prop up needy households who did not have the capacity to purchase inputs for the production of crops to attain household food security. However, such issues might not have been fully communicated to some of the beneficiaries. One of the militating factors against the scheme was the fact that it became perceived as a political tool to mobilise and lure votes against the broader need for food security. It could still be for the same reason that an A2 farmer from Bindura who participated in this research noted that;

*“Although it was a noble idea, it (presidential well-wishers scheme) is suitable for rural small scale farmers. For A2 farmers, there is a need to secure loans rather than rely on donations. Donations do not catapult farmers into prosperity.”*

Some farmers might not have been informed that the programme was meant to benefit the poor. Figure 5.46 below shows the farm mechanisation support programme under A1 and A2 land reform models.

**Figure 5.44: Farm mechanisation support programme under A1 and A2 land reform models**



*Source: Author*

This study established that the beneficiaries of both the A1 and A2 resettlement models suggest that the support schemes put in place by GoZ have not been enough. From the research, about 82.6% and 76.2 % of the A1 and A2 farmers, respectively, noted that they had access to government support. Of these farmers, only 16.7 % (A1) and 25 % (A2), respectively, reported that the support they had received was adequate. This means that from those who had received the support from the government, an average of more than 75 % found the support inadequate.

The farm mechanisation programme was seen by most farmers as having been a noble idea that failed to meet its intended goals. Most of the farmers viewed it as a programme that became ineffective because it only benefitted those who were politically connected. However, this argument was disputed by Gideon Gono, who was then the Governor of the RBZ, the institution



that was responsible for spearheading the mechanisation programme in 2007 (RBZ, 2008). In an interview with the researcher in Harare on 24 March 2017, Gono argued that many people viewed the mechanisation programme in terms of heavy machinery only such as tractors and their accessories and combined harvesters.

While his programme included this heavy equipment which was primarily meant for beneficiaries under the A2 model, it also included the small and lighter equipment like ox-drawn ploughs, scotch-carts and harrows. He noted that people should view the mechanisation in such terms. One notes that there were many misconceptions and people knew very little with regards to this particular programme due to a number of reasons, including lack of sufficient outreach and awareness for the target beneficiaries. The print media options that were used to disseminate information (for example newspapers and magazines) were not accessible to some potential beneficiaries in the remote areas

The Farm Mechanisation Programme was a four-phased farm equipment supply initiative to selected A2, A1 and communal farmers in all the 59 districts across the country. Under the programme, farm equipment was given to beneficiaries under a loan scheme in which beneficiaries were expected to pay back. The programme was launched in March 2007 and the fourth phase was launched in September 2008. According to the RBZ (2008), the mechanisation programme was conceived as part of the broader and swift measures to revitalise and capitalise the agricultural sector of the country and consolidate the gains of the historic land reform programme.

The US\$ 200 million programme was designed as a loan scheme in which the beneficiaries were supposed to pay back their loans but, the beneficiaries did not pay up. Thereafter, the government enacted the RBZ (Debt Assumption) Act of 2015 which provided for the

government to assume the RBZ debt that it incurred prior to 31 December 2008. The equipment distributed under the programme as at 31 December 2008 is tabulated in Table 5.3 below;

**Table 5.3: Heavy Duty Farming Equipment Distributed to Resettled Farmers (2008)**

<b>Equipment</b>	<b>Total Distributed</b>
Tractors	3 215
Combine Harvesters	126
Ploughs	1 931
Harrows	1 551
Vicons	323
Boom Sprayers	662
Planters	460
Bay Balers	30

*Source: RBZ Annual Report (2008: 51).*

Apart from heavy duty equipment distributed to resettled farmers, the government also provided animal-drawn farming equipment shown in Table 5.4 below.

**Table 5.4: Animal Drawn Framing Equipment Distributed to Resettled Farmers**

<b>Equipment</b>	<b>Total Distributed</b>
Ploughs	46 729
Chains	47 435
Knapsack Sprayers	45 280
Harrows	10 012
Scotch carts	6 367
Cultivators	5 628
Planters	106

*Source: RBZ (2008), Annual Report:51*

Several participants from both the A1 and A2 models mentioned that the programme benefited the political elites and those with political links. It is testimony to some irregularities that

affected the programme. Distribution of the lighter equipment was allegedly tainted by corrupt practices from those who were entrusted with the identification of beneficiaries and the distribution of the implements. One resettled A2 farmer from Mutasa district (Participant RF 13) in Manicaland Province opined that;

*“It (the RBZ mechanisation programme) did not have any effect because those farmers who were supposed to receive the tractors, etc, did not get anything. It only benefitted the rich and powerful. Some of the tractors are still parked in garages in urban areas because the owners do not have land. It is outright deceitful for somebody with six hectares to get a combine harvester, a machine that can be used by 20 farmers. Recipients of this equipment should have been given 5 to 10 years to pay rather than giving them for free. Most of them are now grounded because they did not pay for them and have no capacity to maintain them.”*

This was supported by other A2 participants, with one participant from Chivhu District in Mashonaland East Province, arguing that, the fact that the selection of beneficiaries was centralised at the RBZ, led to the looting of implements by some non-farmers. Consequently, the programme missed its objectives. Another A2 farmer from Beitbridge District in Matabeleland South Province reasoned that this programme (RBZ mechanisation scheme) was meant for the chosen few. While Gideon Gono has attempted to justify the RBZ’s farm mechanisation scheme and the manner in which it was done, the majority of the FTLRP from both the A1 and A2 models viewed the scheme as a means in which the political elites sought to enrich themselves and those who were close to them.

It could be argued that the scheme could have gone a long way in empowering the farmers if the distribution was done to groups of farmers using either village models for A1 farmers and

club models for A2 farmers so that the resources could have a maximum reach. While some of the beneficiaries were land owners, some of them were financially able to purchase some of the implements that they were given at highly subsidised prices and the programme in some aspects contradicted the policy document which noted that the A2 farmers should demonstrate ability to cater for the needs of farming in which equipment like tractors and their accessories are basic requirements.

In addition, the researcher observed that due to the manner in which the programme was undertaken, there were no provisions for equipment backup and maintenance services. Beneficiaries were not given maintenance training in case of breakdowns in which they could operate and maintain the heavy machinery that included tractors, tractor accessories and combine harvesters. Most of the equipment failed to get appropriate servicing when it was due for service and when it broke down, it was simply put aside and decommissioned.

Robertson, who was interviewed by the researcher on 15 January 2018, in Harare, has a different view regarding these interventions by the GoZ. While he does not judge their effectiveness or otherwise, he argued that the issues of land reform centre on the ownership model and the financing mechanism they create. He further stated that, *“had the landholding been supported by private holding in the form of title deeds, farmers would not have required government support in terms of inputs and tillage. Farmers would simply use their title deeds to borrow from financial institutions.”* He further stated that, *‘the move would have saved the Government and the RBZ from quasi-fiscal interventions as well as the sale of unsustainable treasury bills that in later years had the negative effect of fuelling inflation.’*

The argument put forward by Robertson had already been raised by the former RBZ Governor, Gideon Gono in his 2011 Monetary Policy Statement when he stated that;

*“Security of tenure for land acquired under the historic land reform programme is critical to ensure long-term agricultural planning and access to financing. Under the current scenario, the land has no value and is considered as Dead Capital, since it cannot be used as collateral. In this regard, we urge the Government to ensure that the 99-year leases are market valued, registrable and executable, so as to enable farmers to use them as collateral against bank financing. Security of tenure ensures that there are no disruptions to farming activities through re-allocations, multiple ownerships, fresh occupations and other disturbances related to ownership disputes” (RBZ, 2011).*

It is apparent that issues surrounding agricultural financing, had remained a topical issue and many key informants including interviewed officials from Agribank, CBZ and Barclays banks, have agreed that there is need for security of tenure to unlock the land value. Such a move would allow private players to come in and finance production while the government can have extra revenue for the development of social amenities in the farming communities. One notes that the GoZ may need to continue with its initiatives of trying to provide different means of support to farmers due to lack of agreement between the government and banks at a time when there is a need for financial and material support to farmers. Some of the previous support initiatives notably yielded good results, while others had negative consequences for the nation.

However, in an interview with the researcher on 5 February 2019 in Harare, South African Counsellor-Political, Linda Maso, with the South African Embassy argued that agricultural financing had not been much a burden of private finance in South Africa. She said the government facilitated financing through the establishment of financial institutions dedicated to agriculture due to the constraints that characterise the farming industry which requires long term cheap loans. While Zimbabwe has a bank dedicated to agricultural development in the

form of the Agribank of Zimbabwe, the bank has since gone commercial and it can be seen as having deviated from its primary mandate of providing dedicated support to farmers. Views gathered from one of the Key informants (*Mr Dzorai Mudavanhu-Executive Banking and Corporate Properties Manager*) were that the bank ceased issuing-out loans to farmers in year 2000 after the FTLRP. Mr Dzorai further explained that the Government of Zimbabwe is working on a framework to regularise issues around transferability of the 99-year lease. In addition, he pointed out that Agribank is coming-up with a dedicated facility for agricultural financing under what is termed the '*LandBank Wing*' within 12 months.

#### **5.14 Agricultural Produce Pricing and Market Issues**

Producer prices and markets have been noted to affect the land reform objectives of poverty alleviation and empowerment. Good producer prices and availability of stable markets make farming a sustainable business and inspire the farmers to produce more, hence the growth in production and income. In Zimbabwe, there are two broad markets, namely the government via various agricultural boards (such as the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and private buyers that include private millers for crops and private abattoirs for livestock and chicken, that impact and affect each other in terms of prices.

Farmers who took part in this research also raised the question of markets and producer prices. Before the FTLRP and the economic crisis that engulfed the country from the year 2000, the leading buyer of grain produce was the GMB. The GMB was famous for buying maize and other small grains from the farmers and other agro-processing industries like the National Foods (Ltd) purchased produce such as different varieties of beans (mainly sugar beans). In most cases, farmers were timeously paid, with private buyers even paying on the day of delivery, as noted by Participant RF 9 from Marondera District (Mashonaland East Province).

Given that the FTLRP coincided with the economic crisis, the markets and producer prices were heavily affected (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 2017). With respect to the GMB, the institution suffered a number of corruption cases with the then Minister of Lands and Agriculture, Kumbirai Kangai and this has been one of the most damaging cases in the history of the GMB. The corruption scandals hampered the capacity of GMB to pay farmers on time and hence could be seen as one of the reasons that militated against the smooth take off of the newly resettled farmers. In 2014, The Sunday Mail reported that;

*“Problems at GMB date back to 1997 when the then responsible minister, Kumbirai Kangai, was embroiled in a nasty maize scandal that sent shock waves in Government and resulted in severe grain shortages across the country. On reflection, Mr Kangai’s case is viewed as part of a cancer of corruption that was in its formative stages but is now full blown and tearing the parastatal apart. He was alleged to have exported 80 000 tonnes of maize to Malawi and Zambia at a loss, during a time the country was facing serious grain shortages. ... Allegations were that the former agricultural minister siphoned Z\$228, 4 million from GMB and he was charged with contravening the Prevention of Corruption Act.”*

The then Minister, Kangai, was also accused of flouting tender procedures in a case where he had been tasked to import 460 000 metric tonnes of maize for consumption and to replenish strategic grain reserves, and prejudiced the parastatal of around Z\$157 million (The Sunday Mail, 2014). This means that the board could not pay for the produce on time and in a number of cases, the backlog overlapped into the following seasons with farmers running into losses during the hyper-inflationary Zimbabwe dollar era (Participant RF 9, Marondera District, Mashonaland East Province).

The problems at GMB were further compounded by the continued corruption syndicates that were driven by a dubious pricing model in which the board purchased grain from farmers at a higher price than the price the parastatal sold to the millers (Dlamini, 2017). Under this scenario, hundreds of thousands of dollars which were meant for the purchase of grain from farmers, were siphoned out by syndicates involving some GMB depot managers who bought the maize from GMB and brought it back for sale to the GMB as farmers, hence corruptly benefiting from the dubious pricing discrepancy. In other cases, syndicates at some GMB depots would manipulate the moisture content testing machines in a manner that saw farmers being turned away on the basis that their grain had high moisture content only to be approached by ‘vulturistic’ buyers who gave them very low prices and sold the same grain with no further drying to the same GMB depots (Dlamini, 2017).

The economic hardships that were experienced by the country, coupled with corruption at GMB, saw farmers opting for private buyers and stock brookers like Staywell, Northern Farming, Profeeds and Blue Ribbon (maize and wheat), who in some cases offered lower prices but paid timeously to prepare for the following season. A farmer Participant RF 4 (A2), who was interviewed by the researcher in Mazoe District (Mashonaland Central Province) noted that; *“Maize production has dwindled due to lack of lucrative markets in the country. The traditional buyer, GMB has failed to offer meaningful prices for agro-products while at the same time failing to timeously avail money for procured products. The boom in production of cash crops can be attributed to contract farming as well as availability of lucrative markets.”*

Another farmer, Participant RF 2 (A2) from Chivhu District (Mashonaland East Province), also lamented the issue of non-payment saying that;

*“The changes came about because of non-payment of crops like maize by the GMB. Another factor is that one does not need a lot of fertilizers to grow cash*



*crops like tobacco or horticulture yet the profit is handsome compared to maize where you need a lot of fertilisers also going at a very huge price.”*

The presumption that cash crops demand less fertiliser can only be taken as figurative speech. In terms of quantity, the basal and top fertiliser demands of maize and tobacco are nearly similar at around ten 50 kg bags of basal fertiliser and four 50 kg of top dressing. However, the cost of the basal tobacco fertilisers (i.e. Compound C/Tobacco fertiliser) is higher than that of maize (i.e. Compound D/Maize fertiliser) (FAO, 2006:7). Tobacco is also more demanding in terms of the chemicals needed, the level of supervision and concentration on the crop as well as turn-over time from planting to marketing. However, the cash crops, despite being capital intensive, have better returns as compared to food crops like maize.

Most farmers put forward the view that the major reasons that made them migrate to cash crops and dump commercial production of food crops, included the relatively lower producer prices as well as the late payment for the produce delivered by the GMB. While the GMB had the highest producer prices, it took very long to pay the farmers after they had delivered their produce, hence farmers opted for intermediaries who paid upon delivery or switched to cash crops and horticulture. From 2009, when the government officially adopted the multi-currency regime with the US\$ being the de facto trading currency, the producer price of maize was pegged at US\$ 275 and progressively increased to US\$ 390 per tonne in 2014, which subsisted until the 2017 marketing season. Private buyers had however been offering between US\$ 150 and US\$ 200 per tonne to the farmers, arguing that they paid promptly and also took advantage of stranded farmers who were in desperate need for cash so as be able to meet their needs such as buying food, inputs and paying school fees for their children. It was because of the GMB's inability to pay farmers on time and the drastically low prices by private buyers that a considerable number of farmers migrated to the cash and horticultural crops.

However, not all the farmers who ventured into horticulture and cash crops got better prices. At urban markets dominated by Mbare Musika in Harare, the prices fluctuated heavily and in some cases farmers sold at losses only to be able to rid the produce they would have brought and raise money to pay for the transport costs. This was revealed by Participant RF 9 (A1) (Marondera District) who went on to say that;

*“Haa zvekurima matomati nemavhegi pamwe pachu injuga. Pandakapedzisira kuita mavheji takatozoita ekutiza muMbare vekanzuru vakuti nguva yakwana torai miriwo yenyu muende nayo panze. Ndakangoti kumudzimai, amai mwana totoita setiri kuenda kutoilet toonana panze” (Horticulture production maybe like gambling. The last time I did green vegetables we had to sneak away from our produce after having failed to sale them at any price and the council officers were now ordering us to take our produce out and return the next day. We pretended as if we were going to the toilet and never returned).*

Horticulture products like tomatoes and cabbages are highly perishable and given that most of the A1 farmers have not developed infrastructure to store the produce for longer periods of time, the marketing style of ripping and selling as soon as possible before the produce gets bad, may not be the best when the farmers aim to get the best possible prices. Some established and large scale farmers had the capacity to sell to big retailers and industries like Cains Foods, Sunspun, Food Lovers, Bon Mache, Pick and Pay, TM and OK supermarkets but, a lot of farmers, due to lack of marketing skills and knowledge of markets, just produced what they would have heard as being on demand hence flooding the market or producing products they had no knowledge of in terms of where to market them except on general markets like Mbare Musika and other urban agricultural produce markets like Beit Bridge Market where the prices are not very competitive.

The picture collage below (Plates 5.1 and 5.2) show the farmers selling their produce at Mbare Musika. One can notice that the sale of produce is done at an open space with some of the produce spread on the ground. With the passage of time, in a day, especially in the hot summer season, the produce gets bad quickly, leading to losses on the part of the farmers.

**Plate 5.1: Farmers at Mbare Musika (August, 2016).**



*Source: Author.*

**Plate 5.2: Farmers at Mbare Musika (April, 2017).**




*Source: Author*

With respect to tobacco, information gathered by the researcher showed that most resettled farmers in their initial years starting from the year 2000 until around 2006, failed to break even

given that tobacco is a technical crop whose production is demarcated by technical phases from monitoring the seedbed, field stage, curing and bailing stages. Many resettled farmers who ventured into tobacco production went in without the technical knowhow and took time to learn how to produce quality crop with high yields. This was at a time when the former white commercial farmers who dominated a near monopoly of production were being moved off the land.


The relationship between resettled farmers venturing into tobacco production and the fluctuations in the production are shown below in Figure 5.47 (statistics of tobacco growers since 2000) and Figure 5.48 which show the fluctuations in tobacco production also explained in the preceding paragraph.

**Figure 5.45: Registered Tobacco Growers in Zimbabwe since 2000**



*Source: Tobacco Industry Marketing Board (2018).*

**Figure 5.46: Tobacco Production in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2017**



**Source:** *Tobacco Industry Marketing Board (2018).*

According to Meanwell Gudu, TIMB Director Technical Services, in an interview with the researcher in Harare on 19 December 2016, the farmers failed to meet the quality and the quantity as demanded by the market. However, intervention by contractors who were given the green light by the government to finance the production of the crop assisted farmers in dealing with input issues. Contract farming had proven to be a success in cotton farming in the 1980s and in sugarcane production (Roodt, 2012a).

The contractors and the Tobacco Research Board (TRB), at Kutsaga Research Centre, after noting some of the technical deficiencies among the farmers, initiated a training programme for tobacco farmers while employing agronomists who visited the farms to check on the production of the crop in the fields. This resulted in increased quality and quantity of the crop at the market. It should be noted that TRB is the sole producer of tobacco seed in the country, given that tobacco is one of the crops that are prone to diseases that spread quickly, known as ‘notifiable diseases’.

The researcher noted that, whereas there were transformations in the quality and quantity of the crop, most farmers still complained against the producer price. There were allegations that the buyers and the auction floors colluded to maintain a price ceiling of US \$ 4.99 from 2009 until 2016, when there were louder protests which saw a slight increase of the price at contract floors but without any changes at the auction floor. However, the tobacco price issue has not been as damaging to production and trust in the sales process as the maize and GMB issue and tobacco production has continued to increase. The payments to tobacco farmer have been timeous, in most cases, particularly after the introduction of bank accounts. If the farmer followed all the procedures of registration and sales, it was noted that, in most cases, the money was paid in less than 24 hours. This scenario was contrary to the maize situation in which farmers had to wait for months, in some cases, before they were paid by GMB.

The major bone of contention that remained between the buyers, auction floors and government and the farmers in the tobacco marketing sub-sector, was on the method of payment after the introduction of the national surrogate currency called the 'bond notes', and the forcible drive that saw farmers opening bank accounts and getting the bulk of their earnings in electronic money. This problem is still ongoing. The picture collage below (Plate 5.3) shows some farmers at Boka Tobacco Auction Floors in Harare.

**Plate 5.3: Tobacco Farmers at Boka Tobacco Auction Floor (2016 selling season)**



*Source: Author.*

In the picture to the left, farmers are seen waiting for their names to be called out in order to collect their payment vouchers and cheques before going to their respective banks. In the picture to the right side, farmers are being controlled by the police officers after they had been angered by the delay in being paid due to shortages of cash supplies on the floors.

### **5.15 Critics of the FTLRP on poverty reduction and empowerment**

However, there are some analysts who view the FTLRP as a monumental failure, as an agrarian revolution policy. Tony Hawkins and John Robertson, who are both economists, are some of the scholars and analysts who argued that the land reform programme was a failed policy. Hawkins et al. (2013) base their argument of this failure on production levels. He put forward his view thus;

*“In 2000 – the year in which the Fast Track Land Reform (FTLR) took off, Zimbabwe farms produced 3.7 million tonnes of output (excluding estate-grown sugar). In 2012, the Ministry of Finance estimated output at less than half that (1.7 million tonnes) and just two months ago (from May 2013), the government estimated a 20% fall in plantings for the 2013 season that will translate into*

*lower output this year. Food and livestock production (excluding beef) collapsed from three million tonnes in 2000 to 1.3 million tonnes 12 years later, with cereal output down 55 % at 1.1 million tonnes. The country that consumes over two million tonnes of cereals a year and that, prior to land resettlement, was largely self-sufficient in foodstuffs and a substantial exporter of farm produce, now imports some \$650 million of food a year, increasing to \$731 million in 2012 or 11 % of total imports.”*

The argument on production failure was also noted by the South African Counsellor-Political, Linda Maso, who was interviewed by the researcher on 05 February 2019 in Harare. She argued that the land reform programme cannot be judged to be a success when Zimbabwe is still importing food including staple food. Maso went further to argue that there was also some skewed allocation especially in the A2 model where elites benefitted more large tracts of land that could have been subdivided and allocated to more poor and needy families. Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen (2010), also share this view and state that, “*land reform not only broke down the functioning agricultural system that constituted Zimbabwe’s most important business sector, it also disabled the entire economy’s access to working capital as well as longer-term finance.*” These arguments essentially depict the FTLRP as the foundation upon which all the economic challenges facing the country were erected.

The sentiments by Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen (2010) that the breakdown in the national agriculture led to the fall of the national economy are equally shared by the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) President, Charles Taffs. In an interview with a Newsday journalist, Wisdom Mdzungairi, in September 2013, Taffs argued that the Zimbabwean government transformed the land from an economic asset into a political asset, presumably to win elections. Taffs went on to argue that “*the collapse in commercial farm output has been the primary*



*cause of total economic decline in Zimbabwe. At its peak, agriculture contributed to as much as 30% of GDP as well as being a significant employer of human effort” (Mudzungairi, 2013).*

Economically the argument is factual. Writing in 2010, Maiyaki (2010: 4163) notes that the contribution of agriculture to GDP had fallen to between 11% and 14%. However, the downward spiral in Zimbabwe’s economy was driven by a plethora of factors which were triggered by the corruption facilitated government officials in the 1990s as well as the payment of unbudgeted gratuities to the veterans of the second liberation struggle in 1997.

The arguments by Hawkins, Robertson and Taffs, can be referred to as neo-liberal, given that they analyse the success of the FTLRP in terms of the GDP/per capita and national macroeconomics. Quton Seed Company, Executive Director, Edwork Mhandu, in a rebuttal to the assertion by Hawkins and Robertson, opined that, *“Tony Hawkins and John Robertson use racist lenses to view the FTLRP. They live in their own world where Blacks should not be the masters of their destiny”* (Interview with Researcher, Harare, 09 January 2018). Mhandu argued that one of the primary successes of the FTLRP was that it managed to give back land to its original owners without them being forced to pay for it, given that it was forcibly grabbed from them in the first place. In the neo-liberal analysis by Hawkins, Robertson and Taffs, there is no regard for the non-monetised transformation of the lives of the A1 and A2 farmers who benefited.

Robertson sought to analyse the issue of poverty alleviation and empowerment from a broader perspective, away from the beneficiary targeting perspective that was employed by other perspectives. In his interview with the researcher on 15 January 2018 in Harare, he alluded that, *‘it could be because of this reason that he sees the FTLRP as having failed to alleviate poverty as it resulted in job losses firstly to those who were employed on the farms and secondly to those employed in the agricultural value chain’*. Robertson further argued that the major

fault was on the basis that the FTLRP sought to define every Black Zimbabwean as a farmer and also as a tool to disempower the white commercial farmers who were viewed by ZANU PF as too powerful in the socio-political matrix of the country.

As noted in the introduction, there are different methods in which people conceptualise poverty reduction and empowerment. The classical neo-liberal method of using economic growth models have shown that they do not fully apply in developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. The use of financial and economist figures tends to ignore the voice of most rural people who are not formalised in the different economies in sub-Saharan Africa. This neo-liberal model is characterised by Cousins and Scoones (2010) as, “... *narrow technocratic economism, a perspective backed often by powerful interest....*” This perspective dominated the explanation and analysis of the land reform in Zimbabwe, especially as it was dominated by former white commercial farmers and big capital that had vested interests in land. While agreeing with the analysts that the FTLRP coincided with an economic downturn, it does not translate that the programme did not redress a major colonial imbalance. The programme coincided with the economic plunge and drought as direct and indirect consequences of the FTLRP. However, the downturn was mostly driven by the shortfalls in its implementation than in the programme itself. Cousins and Scoones (2010) put forward the view that the FTLRP was not a monumental failure as portrayed in the media and other fora. Cousins and Scoones (2010) state that;

*“The overall picture is complex, but a simple narrative that land reform has been dominated by grabbing by elites is clearly inaccurate. Land previously occupied by a single farmer, often absent but with a manager and a few workers resident, is now being used by a highly diverse group of people. Overall, the new resettlements are populated by younger, more educated people with a greater diversity of backgrounds, professional skills and connections than their*

*neighbours in the communal areas and old resettlements. The new resettlements are therefore, not a replication of the 1980s resettlement schemes or an extension of the communal areas, nor are they simply a scaled-down version of large-scale commercial farms. Instead, a very different social and economic dynamic is unfolding, one that has multiple potentials, as well as challenges.”*

What can be noted from different arguments above is that the land reform programme managed to empower those who benefited from it. There could be varied perceptions on the impact of the whole process on the national macro-economy. Those in support of the programme in Zimbabwe’s political hierarchy argued that what destroyed the economy was not the FTLRP but primarily the retributive sanctions that were later imposed on the country, both formally and informally, mostly by Western governments. Those who are against the programme argued that the programme disrupted the foundation of the economy hence the economic downturn.

It must be noted that the financial and economic downturn was already in motion due to the Black Friday crash, when the government paid veterans of the second liberation struggle ZW\$ 50 000 each as gratuities which had not been budgeted for in the national fiscus (Bond, 1999). There were also other issues that such as sanctions and corrupt practices in public sector which had a negative impact on the economy. Therefore, the FTLRP was one amongst several other issues that caused Zimbabwe’s economic woes. It must be noted also that there were difficulties when it came to managing the FTLRP mostly because it was not only the first of its kind in the country but it was new to the entire regions as well and the backlash that the programme received from the west and lack of support, made it difficult for the programme to be a success.

## 5.16 Chapter Summary

This chapter analysed poverty reduction and empowerment under the FTLRP in Zimbabwe, evaluating whether the FTLRP succeeded in meeting its objectives in terms of poverty reduction and empowerment of historically marginalised Zimbabweans. From its set plan, it is apparent that the land reform policy in Zimbabwe in general had been predicated on poverty alleviation and economic and social empowerment of the Black people in the country. The chapter looked at the different conceptualisations of poverty and their applicability in Zimbabwe's context. It was observed that there is need to re-define poverty, depending on scale and context. The neo-liberal economics model and the human development model were tested in this chapter throughout the discussion, in relation to the findings which emphasised on the need for contextualising issues to do with poverty reduction and empowerment. Similarly, empowerment emerged to be a very complex issue, subject to the interpretation of one's mind-set and ideals. Data gathered from different beneficiaries under the A1 and A2 models, government officials and analysts gave meaningful insights. It was however observed that the majority of the beneficiaries of the FTLRP were men and very few women benefited from the programme. Contextualising poverty through various lenses is very important, as there is no conventional definition acceptable to all, particularly when discussing the subject matter with those that are regarded as 'poor' by global standards (subject to various parameters). Mindful of the interpretation issues surrounding poverty reduction and empowerment, the information gathered in this study suggests that the FTLRP contributed to poverty reduction and economic empowerment of ordinary Zimbabweans. There were views which suggested that the land reform programme was a great success given that land was the primary reason why Black people took up arms to fight against the colonial regime. Nevertheless, this assertion is critiqued with the fact that the performance of the Zimbabwean economy plummeted after the FTLRP, resulting in the 'impoverishment' of many citizens and most production sectors

were negatively affected by the global responses. It also robbed the country of its powerful economic status in Southern Africa.

In this research, we observed that changes in land use (through land reform initiatives) are known to cause considerable problems for the environment and it is important to take note of the thresholds/tipping points beyond which certain (un)desirable consequences of the unfolding events can actually trigger much more significant issues for a country. Based on the Zimbabwean experience, other countries can consider incorporation of a monitoring framework in their land reform process/design to manage potentially explosive developments.

Consequently, the FTLRP has been classified as a monumental failure as an agrarian revolution policy from this perspective. In attempts to revive the country's agricultural production, the GoZ came up with three main programmes to support farmers, namely; Operation Maguta, Presidential Well-Wishers Input Scheme and the Farm Mechanisation Programme. However, these programmes had mixed results. They were depicted by some as a series of campaign tools for ZANU PF. They attracted positive and negative media publicity in both the state and private media and the beneficiaries argued that they were simply not enough. The following chapter presents the study's conclusion and recommendations.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the study's overall conclusion and recommendations. This study examined strategies of redressing colonial land imbalances in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to lessons from Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme. In order to come up with a comprehensive analysis of the subject matter, this study chose Zimbabwe as the main case study and from this, eight (8) out of ten (10) of the country's provinces were purposively selected and from these, 16 districts were chosen. The chosen provinces were Manicaland, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central, Matabeleland, Masvingo, Mashonaland West, Matabeleland South and Midlands. In an attempt to draw lessons from the experiences of other countries which share colonial similarities with Zimbabwe, the study also examined the cases of Namibia and South Africa from the SADC region and Kenya, from East Africa. The conclusion presented in this chapter is in line with the research objectives and research questions as outlined in the first chapter. Therefore, this chapter sought to give a concise evaluation of whether the research met its objectives and also to evaluate if the research assumptions were valid.

#### **6.2 Study Objectives, Key Findings and Interpretations**

This section evaluates the objectives of the study in relation to the key findings of the research. This study interrogated why post-colonial governments in SADC, especially Zimbabwe, have not been able to adequately address the land imbalances created by the white colonial settlers. The research findings revealed that colonialism was the root cause of most conflicts on land occupation, land tenure and land use challenges that the former colonies still struggle to resolve to date.

This study further showed that the process of redressing colonial land imbalances in the post-2000 referendum was very chaotic. In order to meet the objectives of this study, the researcher formulated research questions which tallied with the study's objectives. The relationship between the study's objectives and research provided the study's unit of analysis. The study's objectives were thus sufficiently met through answering the research questions.

### **6.2.1 Objective One: To Identify Critical Areas of Concern in the Zimbabwe's Land Reform as a Strategy for Redressing Colonial Imbalances.**

The study found out that, at independence, Zimbabwe and several Southern African countries inherited a land ownership system that was heavily skewed in favour of the white minority race. This racial land imbalance was deeper in mostly former British colonies. The existence of these land imbalances was not peculiar to Zimbabwe alone but also to the specific subject countries included in this study, namely South Africa and Namibia in Southern Africa and Kenya, which is located in East Africa.

#### **6.2.1.1 Strategies to Redress Colonial Imbalances**

The study noted that soon after independence, Zimbabwe embarked on a programme of post-war reconstruction with the support of some foreign donors. The study uncovered several policies and strategies which were coined by the GOZ in an attempt to redress colonial imbalances. These included (but not limited to); (a) Chimurenga 1 Liberation Struggle (1893-1897); (b) Chimurenga 2 Liberation Struggle (1966-1979); (c) Lancaster House Agreement (1979) - 'willing-buyer willing-seller' (1980-1990); (e) Growth with Equity Policy (GWE) 1981; (f) First Five Year National Development Plan (1985-1990); (g) Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) 1996-2000; (h) 1998 Donor Conference; (i) Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP); (j) National Economic

Development Priority Programme (NEDPP) 2006-2008; (k) Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS) 2007-2011; (l) Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (2007) (Chapter 14:33; (m) Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) 2013-2018 and (n) Transitional and Stabilisation Programme (TSP) 2018-2020.

However, the study also noted that all these efforts failed to make significant impact. This explains why there have been many of such efforts to resolve the land issue since independence. Several factors were noted as explanations to why these factors failed to come up with the desired impact. These include, amongst others; poor coordination, few willing sellers of land resulting in stagnation, inadequate funding, unsustainable economy, the failure to address critical issues of land redistribution, over ambitious goals, donor apathy; chaotic and a lot of criticism from the global community.

As a result, the study concludes that land reform as a tool for redressing colonial imbalances in Zimbabwe and in Southern Africa in general, remains an incomplete, yet important issue. This is shown by the fact that Zimbabwe and all the other countries analysed in this study, have faced difficulties in the promulgation of the requisite domestic legal and policy issues which are essential in the process of addressing colonial land imbalances. There is thus a number of critical issues with varying intensity, revolving around the land question. Zimbabwe, on one side of the spectrum, is facing a crisis in democratisation due to its radical approach to land reform. On the other side of the spectrum is Namibia, which has been a stable democracy in the region; however, there is pressure for changing the pace at which the reforms are being implemented. In South Africa, the same pressure is mounting on government to expropriate land, and there are mixed opinions on whether land can be expropriated without compensation, given the constitutional provisions, legal implications and policies that deal with land reform



in that country. Therefore, there is need to come up with an approach that not only fully addresses the land question but one that also completes the process in a timely manner and ensure that the colonial land imbalances are thoroughly reversed with no outstanding issues relating to the access to land by the native Black majority in South Africa. This will, no doubt, quell the agitation of the native Blacks who are yet to fully acquire and control land as the key means of production.

#### **6.2.1.2 Skewed Legislative Frameworks Introduced at Independence**

Findings from this study revealed that the push for the land reform was driven by the need to decongest the former reserves while giving Africans an economic resource they could utilise for economic emancipation and correcting the dual economy system that had been created by colonial policies and laws. However, it was noted that independence in the SADC region was not necessarily brought by outright warfare, but that in the majority of cases, independence came through negotiated peace settlements (ECA, 2010:5). This gave the Africans limited powers in terms of directing the post-colonial states. The ‘*willing-buyer willing-seller*’ principle found its way into the Zimbabwean constitution upon independence. The Lancaster House Agreement and Constitution inhibited the Zimbabwean government from adequately addressing the land question on its own terms, during the first ten years of independence. In South Africa, Kenya, and Namibia, the leaders accepted the ‘*willing-buyer willing-seller*’ clauses in independence negotiations and the protection of private property clauses in the independence constitutions.

It is apparent that this made it difficult for African leaders who inherited independent states to make meaningful inroads in addressing land colonial imbalances as it gave the white land owners veto power over a fundamental issue of land and justice, the very reason why Blacks

sacrificed their sons and daughters over decades in liberation wars. As a result, the efforts to redistribute the land saw South Africa managing to distribute less than 7 % of its targeted 30 % of the total arable land that was in the hands of the white minority. Similarly, Kenya did not take a very loud stance on the land issue in the first 5 years, since independence and Namibia managed to resettle 34,000 landless people leaving approximately 200,000 still without gaining access to land, and this translates to approximately 7.4% of commercial farmland of the land which had initially been targeted for redistribution (de Villiers, 2003:38).

The failure by the native Blacks to fully gain control over land as a result of such provisions ultimately led to ordinary citizens taking matters into their hands by invading white owned land as was the case in Zimbabwe. There has also been the threats that have been made by opposition leaders such as Julius Malema of South Africa and Job Amupanda of Namibia. Therefore, the study concludes that the governments of the independent nations failed to effectively redistribute land as a result of a plethora of reasons, chief among them; emasculating independent agreements and complacency and lethargy. The former colonial masters, through various constitutional provisions, ensured that even though independence had been attained by the native Black majority, land would for the greater part remaining in the hands of the colonial white settlers. Up to this day, white land owners and the former colonial masters in countries such as South Africa argue that land reform should be premised on stabilising the economy through a stable agricultural economic sector. This in turn is done through sending scary messages on the dangers of taking a political route in solving the land question.

### **6.2.1.3 Post-independence Empowerment Initiatives**

The study established that the indigenisation policy and drive gripped the country in the post-2000 era at the same time when the nation was embarking on its Fast Track Land Reform

Program (FTLRP). The policy sought to redress the skewed control of businesses in the country. The study noted that the empowerment process in Zimbabwe notably began with land reform initiatives. Various reasons motivated different groups and classes of people to be engaged in land occupations. However, the intended outcomes did not match the reality on the ground. It was noted that the post 1998 period saw the convergence of ordinary people who yearned to possess land in order for them to have permanent stable accommodation and farming land. Some of these people included; those who claimed land based on ancestral and cultural rites and attachments, politicians who sought to increase their support base mostly from the ruling ZANU PF party, the Black bourgeoisies who wanted to increase their investment and capital base into land as well as criminals who sought to vandalise and steal farm equipment, poach wildlife from parks estates, forestry plantations or to dupe peasants and commercial farmers of their produce, amongst others.

The study further revealed that while both Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in South Africa and the Indigenisation Policy were theoretically good affirmative action for racial transformation in the ownership of resources, the implementation was marred by political patronage and corruption. It was noted that even though the indigenisation policy had good intentions, the discord that emanated from the implementation of the policy created a scary environment for investors. As a result, the land reform policies in Zimbabwe and in South Africa, failed to meet the promises of bringing broad-based empowerment, especially to the ballooning youth population that is entering a clogged job market. Therefore, it should be noted that the failure to liberate the means of production, is seen by extension, to be a failure in the liberation struggle even though political independence might have been achieved. It is from this conceptualisation that the struggles in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa can be measured.

All these divergent reasons for the land occupations rendered the FTLRP as an ineffective tool for empowerment and redressing colonial imbalances. In order to guarantee, the success of future land reform initiatives, there is need to spell out a coherent objective for undertaking such action and ensuring that it is not used as a political tool, but rather as a means for empowering ordinary Blacks.

#### **6.2.1.4 Legality Issues**

The study further established that, legally the GoZ was caught off-guard with regards to how the FTLRP was carried out. The high-profile high-intensity land occupations that were driven by the war veterans and the peasants in the post-2000 era saw the GoZ caught between upholding the law and protecting the constitutional property rights of the white commercial farmers and capitulating to the '*legitimate*' but unconstitutional demands of the Blacks who were disadvantaged by the long period of racial colonial domination. It was thus noted that the GoZ's decision to capitulate to the demands of the war veterans and the peasants was not necessarily based on the desire to follow a legitimate cause but rather this decision was chosen because it guaranteed more political votes and was also in line with the GoZ's liberation ideology.

The study noted that the result of this was that the executive arm of the government found itself at war with the judiciary. The study also observed that from the cases that were heard in 2000 before the High Court and Supreme Court, the land occupations were ruled to be unconstitutional. This study thus concludes that, in order to achieve the complete land reform, the executive disregarded the rulings of the courts that protected white interests. In order to make land reform initiatives more successful, there is thus a need to ensure that the process

ensures there is an enabling legal and policy framework which protects interests/rights of the those disadvantaged by the colonial regime.

#### **6.2.1.5 Politics of Rewards**

The study further noted that the *'politics-of-rewards'* played a central role in the FTLRP. It was observed that land became a gift to those who supported or those who will support those in power and could be taken away from those whose political alignment is questioned. This partly explains why the ZANU PF government has managed land tenure using the 99-year lease agreements instead of title deeds. That is the character of the 99-year leases appears as a weapon in ZANU PF's hands to create perpetual servitude of those who benefited. This study noted that the majority of those who benefited from the land reform programme viewed the land not as an economic resource, but as a political one whose holding should also be a reflection of national political power. The reason for this could have been the dominance of the land issue in both the private, public and international media and the manner in which it was given prominence by political parties, especially ZANU PF. This study has shown that the FTLRP in Zimbabwe was a highly politicised process and this in turn partly explains why it had some certain undesirable consequences. This means that the distribution of land was not fairly done and some citizens were thus prejudiced and prevented from accessing land due to their political affiliations.

#### **6.2.1.6 Equitable Distribution of Land**

The study also noted that, in a bid to come up with equitable land redistribution, the GoZ through the FTLRP adopted a *'one man one farm'* policy. The policy was meant to ensure that most of the families who were in need of land benefit. The research however established that

the policy has faced two contrasting interpretations. The official interpretation of the policy is that one family should occupy only a single farm. Others interpreted this policy as to mean a single person holding a single farm. Such an interpretation could allow for a married couple to have a farm each in their names and create a situation of inequity.

The study observed that the result of this was that the land redistribution was not equitable. Those with influential positions in government ended up benefitting more than others and even acquired multiple farms. However, the study further noted that the full list of multiple farm owners, to include influential Zimbabweans, has remained a mystery due to fears that if the list was released to the public, it would expose the political, security and business leadership of the country. The major issue of concern on the subject of multiple farm ownership is that it created a new class of Black land barons. When the FTLRP was instituted, the government argued that some white commercial farmers owned multiple farms at the expense of the native Blacks. All the same, as a result of this multiple farm ownership, the study found out that those in political power broke one of the cardinal policies of the FTLRP which was a betrayal of what the same political leadership described as a revolution. This study concludes that the FTLRP was, in this case, unable to fully redress colonial land imbalances in terms of guaranteeing the equitable distribution of land. Many Blacks still remained without access to land due to the ambiguous interpretation of the *'one man one farm'* policy. There is still need for the GoZ to clearly state in its policy its exact stance and meaning of *'one man one farm'* policy. There is need to come up with mechanisms that ensure that multiple farm ownership by a new class of Black land barons is done away with.

#### **6.2.1.7 Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) and People with Disabilities (PWD)**

The study found out that the issue of access to land by people with disabilities in Zimbabwe was not adequately documented and this way they are left out in key policy debates at national

level. This comes in at a time when approximately 15% (1 billion) of the world's population, experience some form of disability. Disability prevalence is generally higher in developing countries such as Zimbabwe. The research noted that the FTLRP policy was silent with regards to issues revolving around the access to land by PWDs. However, it was also observed that the FTLRP was not a pre-planned programme but a government reaction to land occupation, as it (the government) sought to regularise farm occupations that was already underway. On that note, there was no comprehensive or inclusive planning processes to take needs of PWDs into consideration, which is generally expected when such initiatives are executed. This is not to mean that PWDs did not benefit from the programme at all.

Findings from this study showed that in some provinces, the few PWDs who were politically connected or with financial resources had better chances of getting land allocation, whilst the majority from rural poor communities did not have a chance due to physical impairments which hindered them from actively participating in the *Jambanja* (the violent land occupations) (Mangwanya and Manyeruke, 2020:15).

In addition, the researcher established that there was a general perception that “*Disability is Inability*” and when land allocations were done, PWDs were not considered as they were perceived as not having the capacity to utilise such an important resource. The GoZ thus needs to do more in terms of ensuring that PWDs get equal access to land. This will ensure that the GoZ's land reform initiatives are deemed as comprehensive.

#### **6.2.1.8 Land Use**

The study further noted that the manner in which the FTLRP in Zimbabwe was undertaken resulted in little attention being paid to sustainable land use. The chaotic nature under which the land was occupied and later sanitised by the FTLRP saw people occupying any available

farm without due consideration of what the occupied land was for. For instance, land use in Manicaland, Masvingo and Matabeleland provinces was dominated by forestry farming, horticulture, fruit production, animal husbandry and wildlife parks. In the wake of the FTLRP, there has been marked threats to forestry preservation in Manicaland Province, while a substantial number of the wildlife in parks estates and conservancies were poached in Matabeleland North and Masvingo provinces. Similarly, the study noted that farmers pulled down the fences that separated their lands from wildlife conservancies which resulted in their livestock being mullled by predators like lions, while the mixing of cattle and wild animals like buffaloes increased the prevalence of zoonosis (animal diseases like foot and mouth).

The researcher also found out that the threat to forestry, especially the indigenous forests, was not only limited to Manicaland Province alone but also the Mashonaland provinces due to the sharp increase in tobacco farming. The displacement of the former white commercial farmers who dominated tobacco production prior to the FTLRP coupled with unpredictable payment systems by GMB, led a number of the resettled farmers from both the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme, First Phase (LRRP I) and those of the FTLRP turning to tobacco farming which seemed to be more lucrative than food crop production. The same farmers have no capacity to procure coal for tobacco curing and along the way, trees (part of wildlife habitat) suffered as a substitute for coal. There is need for specific interventions to reduce this impact on trees. (Manyanhire and Karangwa, 2014:1457).

#### **6.2.1.9 Nature Conservation**

The study observed that private land set aside for wildlife conservation was not spared under the FTLRP. Some privately owned wildlife areas (depending on the history of establishment) were affected negatively. The FTLRP, had a significant impact on wildlife conservation in



privately owned areas that were resettled. The findings from the study also proved that the FTLRP did not have a significant negative impact on Zimbabwe's wildlife estate, but, there were losses recorded in private wildlife areas that were set aside for nature conservation to augment the government conservation agenda. It is therefore a myth that the FTLRP resulted in the decimation of Zimbabwe's wildlife and habitat.

It should also be appreciated that, since 2000, food security and nature conservation in Zimbabwe have been affected by a number of issues which include drought, lack of expertise, unavailability of capital, inadequate inputs, policy inconsistency and conflicts. This study holds the view that there are policy prescriptions that need to be promoted in the post land reform phase encapsulated in the Wildlife-Based Land Reform Policy framework. Deliberate efforts should also be made to support nature conservation initiatives beyond the protected area network, including a government policy on Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM). As a result, the "*Fast Track*" phase is believed to have had two major impacts on the wildlife sector. Firstly, there was an upsurge in both poaching of animals and land clearance (for construction of houses and crop production) in some of the newly resettled areas. Secondly, the unplanned settlement patterns in the newly resettled areas disrupted wildlife habitats in some of the existing wildlife conservancies. The Land Reform Programme was thus perceived as an economic, ecological, moral and historical issue. However, findings from the research also established that there was a lot of media framing that tended to exaggerate the impact of FTLRP on key wildlife species. This was done to attract negative global media attention and justify sanctions on Zimbabwe.

## **6.2.2 Objective Two: To Evaluate Whether Land Reform was a Panacea for Poverty Reduction in Zimbabwe.**

The study also sought to evaluate whether land reform has been a panacea for poverty reduction in Zimbabwe. The study found that poverty was one of the most debated concepts worldwide and the traditional liberal economics definition of poverty was conceptualised in monetary terms. A country's poverty is also measured in terms of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, using the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). However, the traditional liberal economics conceptualisation was found to be too narrow in scope and lacking any form of comprehensiveness since poverty is a broad concept. The neo-liberal economics definition was seen as monetising social issues which in Africa may not have a '*price tag*'. For instance, there are many rural families in Zimbabwe who might have little earned income but manage to sustain and subsist their livelihoods from traditional foodstuffs found in the forests like wild fruits, vegetables, mopani worm, honey, fish and venison. There are also some small grains like millet, sorghum and rapoko, which do not have a well formalised market value. Therefore there is an evident need to factor in such issues when defining and conceptualising poverty. Poverty is thus argued to be relative and not absolute (Unwin, 2007:18).

### **6.2.2.1 The FTLRP and Poverty Reduction in Zimbabwe**

The study established that the FTLRP was a Black empowerment programme that sought to redress imbalances on land ownership that had been created by the colonial system. It was noted that the land reform policy in Zimbabwe had been predicated on poverty alleviation and economic and social empowerment of the Black people in the country. There were however different perceptions noted during the study with regards to the success of the FTLRP as a tool for poverty alleviation. On the other hand, the study also noted that there were others who held the view that the FTLRP was a monumental failure as an agrarian revolution and poverty

alleviation policy. These views were based on the argument of this failure on production levels. There were arguments noted during the research that there was also some skewed allocation especially in the A2 model where elites benefitted more large tracts of land that could have been subdivided and allocated to poor and needy families. These arguments essentially depict the FTLRP as the foundation upon which all the economic challenges facing the country were erected. It was further established that, economically the argument is factual as it was noted that the contribution of agriculture to GDP had fallen to between 11% and 14% after the FTLRP (Maiyaki, 2010:4163) due to lack of exports.

However, it was also apparent that the FTLRP programme coincided with the economic plunge and drought. It should also be taken into consideration that this down-turn was mostly driven by the shortfalls in its implementation than in the programme itself and therefore, the FTLRP was not a monumental failure as portrayed in the media because it managed to evidently empower those who benefited from it. It must be noted also that there were difficulties when it came to managing the FTLRP mostly because it was not only the first of its kind in the country but it was new to the entire region as well. The backlash that the programme received from the west and the lack of western support made it difficult for the programme to be a success.

From the study, the researcher noted that there could be some differences in the manner in which some academics and policymakers define poverty reduction in comparison to the manner in which the ordinary people especially the A1 model beneficiaries it. By traditional conceptualisation standards, the study noted that the majority of A1 farmers who took part in the study were moving out of the poverty zone as they now managed to own some livestock, mostly cattle and goats, which have traditionally been taken as a symbol of wealth and store of value (Kumar *et al.*, 2010:762). Notably livestock production, particularly goat and cattle production significantly increased in both A1 and A2 models across all 8 provinces sampled

after the FTLRP. It was also established that prior to the FTLRP, some could not afford to send their children to school and those who managed nominal schools could not afford good schools.

After benefiting from the programme, they could now afford regular meals and good schools, respectively. Other poverty reduction benchmarks noted in the study included the ownership of both immovable and movable assets in A1 and A2 resettlement models. Immovable assets considered are urban residential stands, houses and farmhouse constructed. The movable assets considered are farming equipment (ploughs, trailers, ox-drawn carts, trailers, boom sprays amongst others) and vehicles.

The study further noted that food security cuts across all participants in the 8 sampled provinces. This was deduced from the notion that any other acquisition before someone secures enough food is regarded as a luxury. Hence, the majority of A2 beneficiaries (80%) were food secure except those who failed to make a breakthrough in their own farming endeavours, resulting in some of them becoming farm labourers and these constituted about (9%) of the participants. This study noted that through accessing land, the majority of the beneficiaries from the FTLRP managed to escape from the jaws of poverty and became better positioned in society as they owned the means of production, gained the ability to be self-sufficient and better their lives through working on the land.

It was also established that prior to the FTLRP, some could not afford to send their children to school and those who managed nominal schools could not afford good schools. After benefiting from the programme, they could now afford regular meals and good schools, respectively. Other benchmarks included the simple fact that they now owned a piece of land, the ability to build a decent house at the farm, purchasing farm implements and purchasing of vehicles.

The study noted that food security cuts across all participants. This was deduced from the notion that any other acquisition before someone secures enough food is regarded as a luxury. Hence, the majority of A2 beneficiaries were food secure except those who failed to make a breakthrough in their own farming endeavours, resulting in some of them becoming farm labourers. This study concluded that through accessing land, the majority of the beneficiaries from the FTLRP thus managed to escape from the jaws of poverty and became better positioned in society as they owned the means of production, gained the ability to be self-sufficient and better their lives through working on the land.

#### ***6.2.2.2 PWDs, FTLRP and Poverty Alleviation***

With regards to PWDs and poverty, the study established that the majority of the PWDs live in rural areas in poverty, and such people were more disadvantaged under the FTLRP whilst an insignificant number of them indirectly benefitted from the land reform programmes. It was noted that the PWDs case was different from that of women, which was driven by intense lobbying. The study established that with regards to the land question, it seems responsible authorities have paid very little attention to the needs of PWDs. The study noted that the majority of PWDs were completely shut out from gaining access to land. Only in relatively rare cases where a person with a disability made visits to the lands offices with the goal of attaining land as a means to try and emancipate themselves from poverty, such individuals were not taken seriously by the authorities.

The study also noted the existence of differences in the manner in which the rich and poor PWDs have been treated. For those PWDs who were influential, rich and in some cases politically connected, their disabilities became socially invisible to those in authority. As a result, through the FTLRP, very few influential PWDs were allocated land. Therefore, the study concludes that the FTLRP as a tool for alleviating poverty, but failed to cater for the

needs of PWDs as a majority of them did not benefit from the programme and escape poverty. The GoZ should come up with inclusive policies that take the needs of PWDs into consideration and also ensure that they benefit in terms of access to land in the same manner as the able bodied so as to put them in a better position to fight poverty.

### **6.2.3 Objective Three: To Assess the Level of Empowerment on Resettled Farmers Brought by Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe**

This study established that the land question was more pronounced in Africa given the history of colonialism. The colonial process was saddled with the task to alienate Africans from their land and disempowered them. The study further revealed that there were however different interpretations of the effect the FTLRP had with regards to the subject of empowerment. The high-profile high-intensity land occupations in 1998 led by the Svosve people in Marondera (Mlambo, 2005:14-15) sparked a process that eventually led to many ordinary Black Zimbabweans gaining access to land. The process triggered massive nationwide land occupations which culminated in the FTLRP in year 2000. The mere access to land has thus been considered by many as empowerment.

#### ***6.2.3.1 Empowerment of FTLRP Beneficiaries***

The study established that there was unanimous agreement by all beneficiaries interviewed for this study that the FTLRP had a direct impact in transforming their lives for the better. It must be noted that while all respondents cited a positive change, the issue of poverty reduction and empowerment should be viewed separately between the A1 and A2 farmers. Land was also perceived as the most meaningful means to empower Black Zimbabweans and kick-start a process in which Black Zimbabweans would have a greater share in the economy. It was noted

that the ownership of the land by the native Blacks on its own was empowerment from which further empowerment or working to create livelihoods against poverty can be undertaken. This empowerment came in different forms and was seen through factors such as increase in the number of farmers in the production of cash crops, horticulture and wildlife. The example of the increase in tobacco farmers, supports this view as noted by the dramatic increase from just over 8 000 Black tobacco farmers in 2000 to more than 75 000 in 2015. Also to substantiate this, the research further noted that the FTLRP in Zimbabwe benefited between 300 000 and 400 000 families who are having direct socio-economic gains from the land. As a result of the empowerment that came through the FTLRP, the study noted that there was an increase in the number of rural homes owned/developed by farmers under A1 resettlement model. More so, following the FTLRP, the A2 farmers across the 8 provinces sampled made significant investments in the construction of farmhouses of various sizes at their respective plots and these ranged from 2 bedroom houses to 5 roomed houses.

On the one hand, the A1 model was meant to reduce poverty among the landless and farm workers as well as decongest the communal areas, while at the same time empowering the beneficiaries. The A2 model was essentially not a model for poverty reduction given that beneficiaries in this model had to show proof of a strong financial backing that would give the beneficiary the capabilities to produce at a commercial level. It therefore, should be noted that while both models aimed at empowering the beneficiaries, it was only the A1 model that was driven by principles of poverty reduction, at least on paper.

Practically, however, there are a number of instances in which people who did not meet the benchmarks set in the policy document were found benefitting under the A2 programme. This was driven by corruption, politics, failure to follow laid-down procedures and in some cases nepotism. This study therefore concludes that the FTLRP managed to empower and transform

the lives of Zimbabweans for the better. This however, only holds water when looking at the ability of the FTLRP's ability to transfer the means of production (the land) from the white minority to the Black majority, beyond that, the level of empowerment becomes very debatable.

### **6.2.3.2 The FTLRP and Crop Production**

The study found out that, there are those who have argued that while the programme managed to resettle agitated and land-hungry Zimbabweans. Several explanations have been put forward to explain the decline in crop productivity and these include; the recurrent droughts that have affected Zimbabwe since 2000, *'illegal'* economic sanctions and a shift from food crop production to cash crop production by farmers.

It was noted that food security is central to the well-being of every nation and a population which can feed itself is perceived as empowered. Inadequate food supplies (particularly for the urban dwellers) have high a potential of brewing socio-political instability in any community. The study found that, paradoxically, central to the issue of food security is the ownership and control of land as the main means of production. Prior to the FTLRP, Zimbabwe was known as the *'bread-basket'* of Southern Africa (Maphosa, 1994:53) and the implementation of the FTLRP led to a decline in food crop production (especially for export markets) which culminated in food shortages in the country.

The study also found out that the FTLRP was aimed at reducing poverty and economically empowering the new farmers through commercial production and as a result, some A1 resettled farmers received training in agricultural practices that were affordable. This effectively empowered the new farmers with the requisite knowledge to be successful in agriculture. The GoZ also chipped in with input loan schemes and grants. Agricultural Extension



Workers/Officers were deployed in different wards to assist with on the field training, however such training did not benefit all farmers. Veterinary officers were also deployed to control and educate farmers on livestock farming, diseases, nevertheless the initiative was limited by budgetary resources. The net result of the GoZ's efforts was an increase in food crop and livestock production. This boom saw the small scale farmers overtaking the commercial farmers as the primary producers of food crops, particularly maize in 2004, 2006, 2010-2012, 2014 and 2017 (Government of Zimbabwe and World Bank, 2019:31) which effectively empowered the Black majority. This evidently proves that the beneficiaries of the FTLRP were empowered in different ways.

#### ***6.2.3.3 Shift from food crop production to cash crop production***

The study also found out that the FTLRP empowered more farmers to be able to take up the production of cash crops which had previously been a monopoly of the white commercial farmers. This effectively empowered the native Black farmers to expand their agricultural endeavours into new areas that they had previously been excluded from. It was noted that the major cash crops that the Black farmers migrated to, included tobacco, cotton, soya and paprika, as well as horticultural products like tomatoes. This therefore meant that the empowerment of the native Blacks in a sense, negatively affected the country's agricultural production for both food and cash crops. Consequently the government input schemes under GMB were dropped and replaced by political input schemes such as the Presidential Input and Support Scheme which were marred by corruption, allegations of politicization and late disbursement of inputs. As drought and food shortages became more entrenched, some beneficiaries of inputs would convert seed maize, sugar beans and cow peas for consumption, while fertilizers were sold in order for people to purchase food. Such noble programmes that were meant to create food security, at least at the household level, then failed to succeed and

the issue of food insecurity remained one of the thorny issues that emerged as a consequence of the FTLRP. Some farmers were discouraged to participate in food crop production due to delays in payments anticipated by farmers for their produce which characterised GMB as compared to tobacco auction floors that paid instantly.

#### **6.2.3.4 Agricultural Financing**

Agricultural financing is one other factor noted by the research as having put a dent on the empowerment brought by the FTLRP. The study established that, even with the difficulties that came after the implementation of the FTLRP, the GoZ sought to increase the productivity of the farmers amid difficult times. However, the international donor community shied away from the programme given that the Western capitals from which the agencies are mostly domiciled, were against the programme. The choice of the 99-year lease holding model, though making political sense, failed to appease the local financial institutions who also shied away from financing the programme on the basis that the 99-year lease could not be taken as collateral security.

The beneficiaries of the FTLRP, therefore, suffered from a lack of support from financial institutions. The banking sector argued that while it could support the agricultural sector, it however could not extend loans to farmers who hold 99-year lease agreements because the lease agreements were not bankable and could not be used as collateral. In short, what the lease agreements mean is that the land remains the property of the state which has only allowed the holder of the lease to use the land for farming without assuming ownership. In such a case, farmers who do not have any other forms of collateral cannot access bank loans. This essentially means that the 99 year lease initiative failed to empower farmers with regards to access to agricultural financing.

The study noted that this is because this ownership model is akin to communalisation of the land, which strips it of any financial-economic value. This situation was however eased to some extent by the contract farming model, which mainly dominated tobacco, cotton, soya beans, seed maize, commercial maize, wheat, barley and sorghum farming, in which the processors and brokers engage willing farmers who are then contractually obliged to sell all their produce to the contractor. It should be noted that, as a model for empowering farmers, the contract farming model can also be improved on animal husbandry taking into consideration cattle, piggery, goats, sheep, chicken, layers, dairy and fish. The contract farming system as shown by the manner in which it was applied to the tobacco farming sector, shows that if applied on a larger scale, it can also help lessen the GoZ's burden of availing technical assistance and could be a very useful tool to financially empower farmers and improve agricultural sector contribution to GDP.

#### **6.2.3.5 Farmer support programmes**

The study further found out that when the GoZ embarked on the FTLRP, it was well aware of the fact that giving out land to the people on its own would not be enough to address issues related to poverty alleviation and empowerment for both the A1 and the A2 farmers. The GoZ therefore, knew that it had to come up with programmes to augment the meagre finances the beneficiaries of A1 farms possessed while having programmes that would bring easy recapitalisation for the A2 farmers. The study noted that the violent nature of the FTLRP had the negative implication of compromising and scaring away any future financiers of the programme. As a result, the government, came up with four main programmes to support the farmers. The programmes were, Operation Maguta, Presidential Well-Wishers Input Scheme, Command Agriculture and the Farm Mechanisation Programme. These programmes had mixed results and they both attracted positive and negative media publicity in both the state and

private media. Positive sentiments focused on the production capacity that was enhanced, though inadequate, whilst critiques made allegations of corruption by personnel that distributed the inputs and their criteria for choosing recipients.

The Farm Mechanisation programme was seen by most farmers as a noble initiative that failed to meet the desired impact due to several reasons, chief among them being budgetary constraints and lack of transparency. The study noted that due to the manner in which the programme was undertaken, there were no provisions for induction, equipment backup and maintenance services which could have improved the effectiveness of such interventions.

#### **6.2.3.6 Producer Prices and Marketing**

The study also noted that producer prices and markets affected the land reform objectives of poverty alleviation and empowerment. Good producer prices and availability of stable markets make farming a sustainable business and inspire the farmers to produce more, hence the growth in production and income. Given that the FTLRP coincided with the economic crisis, the markets and producer prices were heavily affected. With respect to the GMB, the institution suffered a number of corruption cases. The corruption scandals hampered the capacity of GMB to pay farmers on time and hence could be seen as one of the reasons that militated against the smooth take off of the newly resettled farmers. The problems at GMB were further compounded by the continued corruption syndicates that were driven by a dubious pricing model in which the board purchased grain from farmers at a higher price than the price the parastatal sold to the millers. Under this scenario, hundreds of thousands of dollars which were meant for the purchase of grain from farmers were siphoned out by syndicates involving some GMB depot managers who bought the maize from GMB and brought it back for sale to the same GMB as farmers, hence corruptly benefiting from the dubious pricing discrepancy.

In other cases, syndicates at some GMB depots would manipulate the moisture content testing machines in a manner that saw farmers being turned away on the basis that their grain had high moisture content only to be approached by ‘*vulturistic*’ buyers who gave them very low prices and sold the same grain with no further drying to the same GMB depots. This meant that farmers’ productivity was in vain and thus farmers could not rely on farming and marketing their produce to the GMB to sustain their livelihoods. This system essentially failed the farmers and in actual fact disempowered them. Serious improvement at GMB remains a priority in order to win back farmers’ confidence in the system.

#### **6.2.3.7 The FTLRP and Women Beneficiaries**

The study found out that both men and women are active participants in Zimbabwe’s land reform and agricultural activities under both A1 and A2 resettlement models. The role of women in land issues has been evolving with the policy framework being taken as part of the households. The Women and Land Lobby Group (WLLG) which was formed in 1998 by Zimbabwean women activists committed to the land issue should have also played a significant role in encouraging women to become more involved. Deliberate efforts were also made by GoZ to improve women's formal rights to land as stated in policy documents. The study established that in some provinces (particularly Manicaland and Mashonaland Central), there seemed to be more women who might have benefited from the land reform programme. Nevertheless, the FTLRP had more male beneficiaries and as compared to women as shown by the fact that 73 % of participants were male. However, the causes of the limited landholding by women are not due to male chauvinism alone but some cultural beliefs held by women that a male figure (Zimbabwe being a patriarchal state) should be the official holder of land in a family.

The gender situation was slightly worse in the A2 model where there were 6 043 male holders representing 88 % while female holders were 796, which accounted for 12 %. The gender situation was slightly worse in the A2 model where there were 6 043 male holders representing 88% while female holders were 796, which accounted for 12 %. This study therefore concludes that the FTLRP did not adequately empower women in terms of the access to land. Efforts are being made to align the land reform process to guard against the marginalization of women, particularly those made relating to customary law, practices and attitudes and modern individual rights represents complex issues about the gender/women and land in Southern Africa in general. The FTLRP policy document makes it clear that the land tenure system offers each family a 99-year lease and for married couples the lease should be in both spouses, protecting women land rights and ownership thereof.

#### **6.2.4 Objective Four: To Analyse Lessons Learnt from Zimbabwe's FTLRP.**

##### ***6.2.4.1 Nature of Land Occupations***

This study found out that land reform in Zimbabwe has a long history and is characterised by distinct phases. This study identified 5 phases. Before colonialism (Phase I), the land occupation was based on freehold, governed by traditional/customary rules and regulations which were very strong. Following colonialism (Phase II), unjust laws were enacted, and racial segregation emerged, forced resettlements were done and that signalled the beginning of bloody conflicts for Blacks to reclaim their land until the Lancaster House Constitution was signed (Phase III). Thereafter land reforms had to be done to redress the colonial legacies, however, the process becomes slow and stagnant triggering impatience on the part of the anticipated beneficiaries, culminating in the FTLRP (Phase IV). Zimbabwe is current undertaking the last stage (Phase V) of completing its land reform initiative. It is thus of paramount importance that, the land reform policies and audit recommendations should be

concluded and implemented respectively with the utmost urgency if Zimbabwe is to start economic development on a clean slate.

The study further established that the land occupations of the post-2000 era were quite different from the earlier occupations of the 1980s and 1990s. The ZANU PF government was facing pressure for land from some indigenous Blacks, in some cases with tacit support and encouragement from politicians, and the war veterans under the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). On the other hand, the birth of a strong opposition movement and political party in the form of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Maroleng, 2004:1-2; Asuelime and Simura, 2014:70-71) exerted political pressure on the government as it was now clear to the ZANU PF government that in case of failure, there was a strong opposition in contention of power. Hence, while in the earlier farm occupations, the government could exercise its discretion in terms of whether to regularise the stay or evict the land occupiers.

In the post-2000 case, driving out the land occupiers was tantamount to political suicide as it meant angering potential voters while also protecting white commercial farmers, the majority of whom had already shown that they were no longer palatable with a continued ZANU PF rule. This study concludes that there was a need to divorce issues related to the land question from the politics of the time as this distorted the entire process. This study found out that the post-2000 occupations covered the whole nation at a time when the government was facing economic challenges. The government, therefore, had no capacity to develop the occupied farms and regularize the occupations. As a result, the post-2000 era presented diverse challenges. During this period, the targeting of land for occupation had racial undertones and there was no differentiation between underutilized and effectively utilised land. In some cases, the land occupied was already under crops and the white owners were either given respite to

come and harvest their crops or the crops were harvested by the occupiers, or simply slashed down, depending on the mood of the occupiers and the reactions of the white commercial farmers.

The racial connotations surrounding the land occupations and the subsequent loss of production had heavy financial and socio-political costs to the state (estimated around US\$ 17 billion) (Mutenga, 2018). It is thus apparent that in place of empowering the Black majority and eradicating poverty, the FTLRP entrenched poverty through revenue losses for the government, investment losses, and production losses in the agro-processing industry, as well as job losses and migration. Although it seems difficult to achieve, it is important that future land reform initiatives are conducted on an empowerment basis and not on racial lines.

The land reform initiatives should not be destructive in nature and should seek to consolidate any gains that would have been made up till the point that they are effected. However, on the other hand, and without getting into the manner in which it was carried out, the FTLRP was a necessary process to right the wrongs of the colonial epoch, especially given the political intransigence by both Britain and some of the former white commercial farmers as well as failure of the *willing-buyer willing-seller policy* vis-a-vis public and war veterans legitimate expectations on land, 20 years after the liberation war.

#### ***6.2.4.2 Legislative Frameworks Supporting Land Reform Initiatives in Zimbabwe***

The study noted that upon attaining independence, the GoZ introduced a number of legislative reforms as part of efforts aimed at redressing the colonial land imbalances. The numerous efforts were introduced with very little success at various intervals during the country's history. The notable legislative frameworks adopted by the GoZ in attempts at finding legal solutions of addressing the land question are outlined below;



- a. Communal Land Settlement Act (1982)
- b. The Land Acquisition Act (1985)
- c. National Land Policy (1990)
- d. Constitutional Amendment Number 30 of 1990
- e. The Land Acquisition Act of 1992
- f. Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 20:01) of 2004
- g. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005
- h. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013

However, the study noted that these legislative frameworks achieved very little success in terms of individually addressing the land question in a comprehensive manner. This study concludes that, governments should come up with clear concise policies from the beginning, to avoid enacting various pieces of legislation which are unable to settle the land question once and for all and tend to lead to agitation of the locals. In such a scenario, violent occupations which are difficult to control thus tend to occur and this heavily stains the entire process and leads to its widespread condemnation.

#### ***6.2.4.3 Inadequacies in land resettlements as a tool for redressing colonial land imbalances***

Generally, addressing colonial imbalances in former settler colonies refers to transforming the former deliberately marginalised and impoverished communities into empowered communities. While there are various ways in which such transformation can be achieved, in former settler colonies, as argued in this study, the reallocation of land in an equitable manner is key to achieving this. Resettlement is central as it relieves the former reserves of the pressure from overpopulation while also bringing more land, which would have been left fallow due to extensive land holding/underutilisation.

However, resettlement alone is not enough to transform communities and pull the people out of poverty. What is important and transformative is agrarian reform. Binzewanger *et al.* (2009:4) define agrarian reform as, “*a collection of activities and changes designed to alter the agrarian structure of a country. Factors that influence the characteristics and evolution of this structure include bioclimatic conditions; socio-economic, cultural, and political systems; population density; and technology.*” Adams (2000) also notes that the concept of agrarian reform is a Cold War construct by Western (capitalist) states to counter communist countries’ led land reform programmes.

Land reform, as defined by Binzewanger *et al.* (2009:4) comprises of land redistribution, which centres on transformations in land ownership, and land tenure reform, which “*is a program designed to change the legal and institutional framework for land administration*”. Agrarian reform broadens the concept of land reform through “*improvements in both land tenure and agricultural organization*” (Adams, 2000:7). In other words, agrarian reform would also include reforms in the financing systems, extension services, social amenities, input and technical equipment supply systems as well as markets.

What Zimbabwe implemented, particularly under the FTLRP, vacillated between land and agrarian reforms. The government concentrated mainly on land reform while agrarian reforms came as reactive policies to the pitfalls of the land redistribution exercise (Moyo and Yeros, 2013). For instance, the contract farming system between land beneficiaries and private companies was mooted by the companies having suffered from drastic shortfalls in the supplies of various agricultural produce, with the GoZ only giving a positive nod. There were notable failures in transformations of the other supporting systems like the finance and banking

systems, agricultural extension services, social amenities, input and technical supply systems and the marketing systems.

#### ***6.2.4.4 Racial and Political Divide***

The study found out that the racial divide that was created by the alienation policies of settler colonialism has come to haunt the independent governments, many years after the attainment of majority rule. The reconciliation policies that were adopted by the Black governments at independence were seen as elitist, as they were not done in consultation with the ordinary majority. The policies failed to inspire the white landowners to be responsive to releasing enough fertile and affordable land for resettlement. In Zimbabwe, such a failure led to the successive land invasions that culminated in the FTLRP in 2001. The racial polarisation of land ownership in Zimbabwe in favour of whites should serve as a lesson to other white landowners in South Africa, Namibia and Kenya. Addressing racial issues which can be volatile at times is central to avoiding highly heated and emotionally charged means of redressing colonial land imbalances. Reconciliation can be a useful tool in the endeavour and thus it should be tried before the actual land reform initiatives are carried out.

Besides the racial divide, political ideologies and principles have also impacted on the land question in Africa in general and the selected countries in particular, for various reasons. In the selected countries, political alignment is generally divided into independence nationalist parties and '*reformist*' parties that were created after the attainment of independence, remnants of colonial parties, or break away parties from the former liberation movements. For instance, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) rose as a reformist party in 1999 against what it alleged as ZANU PF mismanagement of national affairs (Maroleng, 2004; Asuelime and Simura, 2014). This study thus noted that due to such a scenario, issues revolving around race

and the land question have resulted in divergent political ideologies and this in return has led to the rise of a number of political parties. Consequently, a lot of political tension and conflict can arise with regards to the handling of the land related issues and may even lead to the rise of extremism and populism.

#### ***6.2.4.5 Political Interference***

The study noted that in the post-independence land reform processes, there still is some international interference. Up till now, the USA seems to still have a vested interest in the land question in Southern Africa. This study found that, when South Africa's government began serious talks and engagement on land expropriation without compensation in 2018, the western voice again came up against such a policy. For instance, the response by the USA to the South African land question, condemning the proposed action, as was the British and western response to the FTLRP in Zimbabwe, only helped to fan the fires of racial and political disharmony between the white landowners and the Black indigenous peoples of the region. The negative interference, which was bullish in nature created a sense of the need to dismantle what could be seen as remnants of colonialism which was both political and racial.

The interference by the western leaders could be interpreted as going beyond natural engagement but a show of force and control over the former colonies and the indigenous peoples. Such a stance aggravates the situation and raises emotions and tempers and threatens the smooth and peaceful resolution to the land question. Consequently, it is the land question that was the trigger, that led the Zimbabwe government falling-out of favour with the western powers. While the issue was internationalised and the sanctions laid on the basis of lack of democracy and human rights, these governance rhetoric were only meant to legitimise the sanctions as they could not be legitimately slammed basing on the land question.

#### ***6.2.4.6 Sanctions and decline in agricultural productivity***

One other critical lesson to be learnt from the FTLRP is that such programmes aimed at redressing colonial land imbalances will always be met with disapproval by the former colonial masters. Even though the GoZ justified its actions to retake and redistribute land, this action resulted in sanctions being imposed on the country by the USA and the EU countries, according to Chingono (2010:66). The result of these sanctions was a significant decline in the country's agricultural produce in the years after the FTLRP. The impact of sanctions on Zimbabwe's agricultural production cannot be overlooked. The research noted that sanctions on Zimbabwe have been a controversial topic and have been interpreted differently by constituencies both inside and outside the country. Sanctions on Zimbabwe are indeed a diverse and controversial topic. They have had a clearly adverse impact on the country, leading to declining economic fortunes, with agriculture being one of the hardest hit sectors. Therefore, it is important to discuss in depth sanctions in relation to how they have influenced and affected the FTLRP and Zimbabwe's agricultural sector.

The net effect of ZIDERA and other western imposed sanctions was that Zimbabwe failed to access lines of credit which were not only important for the government in its support to the newly resettled farmers, but also to the private producers of fertilizers, chemicals and farming equipment (Chingono, 2010). While it was argued that the sanctions were targeted, a closer look at the individuals and entities that were on the sanctions lists by the USA's Office of Foreign Accounts Control (OFAC) and the EU list, shows that the placement of these targeted sanctions on entities and individuals resulted in an economic nosedive which was detrimental to agricultural production, especially food crops that were mainly meant for internal consumption. This study concludes that any action of redressing colonial land imbalances will always be met with serious disapproval and retaliation from the former colonial masters.

#### ***6.2.4.7 Vandalism during the FTLRP***

The researcher noted that vandalism also impacted negatively on agricultural production with food crops being the hardest hit. The manner in which the FTLRP was undertaken was through ordinary people occupying the farms in a haphazard, violent and poorly coordinated manner, without any legal processes being followed. This process went on for more than twelve months in which the presence of the law enforcement agents was either minimal or non-existent at all. This gave room to criminal elements to vandalise property and other whites, out of spite, also vandalized the farm properties and equipment. This situation meant that opportunists took advantage of the ensuing chaos to vandalise irrigation equipment, roofing materials of tobacco barns and other sheds, and tillage equipment like tractors. The government has not been able to come up with the total costing of the equipment lost due to vandalism (Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019b). However, in total, the cost could also be felt from the fact that irrigation equipment which could have assisted in keeping the production of food crops high, was no longer in place.

Some farms which had been under irrigation (before the FTRLRP) were turned into unproductive drylands due to the vandalism of key irrigation equipment and infrastructure, which consequently prejudiced the nation of the high yields that are generally associated with irrigation farming. Vandalism should thus be avoided when carrying out any land occupations as this effectively destroys the necessary infrastructure needed to keep the land productive once the land reform initiative has been completed. It can thus be argued that Zimbabwe has not recovered or been able to replace the infrastructure and farm implements which were destroyed or stolen during the violent land occupations.

#### ***6.2.4.8 Government Interventions: Policies, Laws and Processes***

The study found out that, the government, having promulgated the FTLRP, played a central role in attempts to sanitise land occupations and limit the impacts of abrupt and unplanned change in land ownership. The success of the FTLRP was important given that the policy was facing western condemnation. Due to such criticisms, it became apparent and all the more important for the GoZ to see to it that the programme would succeed in terms of not just redistribution, but also in terms of land use and utilisation (crops and animal production). The three case studies presented in this study have notably shied away from addressing the land question politically, given that the whole liberation politics were premised on land. Zimbabwe however took the political route in addressing the land question. It therefore seems the nationalist and political approach to the distributions of land seems to be the only way to effectively complete any land question.

#### ***6.2.4.9 Land Tenure System and Agricultural Financing***

The banking sector argued that the 99-year leases that were given to farmers were not bankable and hence could not be used as collateral for bank loans. The government and the financial services sector held various meetings to try and come up with a bankable lease. However, the banking sector remained sceptical towards the 99-year lease and continued to request farmers to supply some moveable assets as collateral security for loans, hence limiting the amount of money that was extended to the agricultural sector by the banks. The situation was however eased to some extent by the contract farming model, which mainly dominated tobacco farming, in which the processors and exporters financed some farmers who were then contractually obliged to sell all their produce to the contractor. It should be noted that, as a model for empowering farmers, the contract farming model can also be extended to other strategic crops like wheat, maize, soya beans and cotton, as well as animal husbandry. The contract system as shown by the manner in which it was applied to the tobacco farming sector, shows that if

applied to other strategic crops, it can also help lessen the GoZ's burden of availing technical assistance.

#### ***6.2.4.10 Extensive financing for land reform initiative***

It was noted that the extension and social amenities were broad and required extensive financing. In the first phase of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP-I), the government was cushioned by the western donor communities and the World Bank who also provided finance for extension work as well as amenities such as the construction of Blair toilets/pit latrines at homes, schools, clinics, dip-tanks and drilling of boreholes (Interview with Bernard Mache, a Director in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development, Harare, 19 January 2017). However, under the FTLRP, the donors did not come in with any assistance as they were against the policy, while the manner of fast tracking offered very limited space for the GoZ to budget and mobilise financial resources for the development of social amenities. There is now need for the GoZ to begin the process of developing the primary amenities (schools, health centres and dip-tanks, among others) so as to complete the agrarian reform and increase production through a reduction in human and animal diseases as well as lessening the distances travelled to school by the farmers' children.

#### ***6.2.4.11 Exclusion of People with Disabilities (PWDs)***

There appears to have been no deliberate lobbying from the disability movement for the recognition of PWDs in the allocation of land, specifically during the FTLRP, especially given that their constituency had not benefitted much from the first phase. There is further need for (DPOs) to advocate for inclusive policy reforms and social protection of persons with disabilities in Zimbabwe. If the provisions of the legal and constitutional framework are not



implemented, it will remain difficult for people with disabilities to be allocated land as compared to their able-bodied counterparts. It was noted that PWDs had lesser chances of being allocated land as compared to their counterparts without disabilities. There is a need for policy-driven affirmative action by the GoZ to empower and protect PWDs in terms of their access to land and capital. The issue of exclusion also emerged to be complex due the broad spectrum of disability conditions beyond physical impairment/ those disabilities that are not obvious to the naked eye.

#### 6.2.4.12 A summary of Key Lessons learnt on Land Occupation, Land Tenure and Land Use under Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP)

Key lessons drawn from the FTLRP are summarised in Table 6.1 below;

**Table 6.1: Key Lessons learnt from Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme**

<b>FTLRP Impact variables</b>	<b>Land Occupation</b>	<b>Land Tenure</b>	<b>Land Use</b>
<b>Political</b>	<p>Political leadership should be responsive to peoples’ needs and grievances to avoid revolt elements</p> <p>Liberation war promises should be honoured to avoid unfulfilled legitimate expectations</p> <p>People with disabilities need protection and support of political leadership if they are to benefit from land reform</p>	<p>Property rights should not be politicised.</p> <p>Title deeds were supported to be issued to new tenants, with appropriate ‘caveats’ to ensure government control so that they remain bankable</p> <p>Land allocation quota for war veterans should be observed</p>	<p>Client-patronage relationships, of not managed, can defeat the new land policy objectives of the Agricultural Land resettlement Act (2004)</p> <p>Recommendations of land audit reports covering issues of multiple land ownership, absentee land lord, underutilisation and maximum farm sizes should be implemented</p>
<b>Environmental</b>	<p>Resettled farmers need awareness and education on environmental issues</p> <p>Congested drylands in the semi-arid regions of the country were relieved of anthropogenic pressure</p> <p>Unplanned settlements increased countrywide</p>	<p>User rights only without ownership creates diverse environmental problems akin to Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968)</p> <p>Squatter settlements need regularisation before they become a permanent feature</p>	<p>Changing of land use from wildlife area to human settlement results in increased human-wildlife conflicts</p> <p>Land use planning requires consideration of environmental factors to ensure productivity and sustainability</p>

<b>Economic</b>	<p>Access to land at household level is important for economic empowerment</p> <p>Consideration of eligibility criteria (including financial and technical capacity) is important to sustain commercial farming operations</p>	<p>A land lease system which is not bankable stifles agro-funding and affects food security and economic production</p> <p>An effective communication strategy is important at all levels to manage perceptions and negative publicity.</p>	<p>Lack of an effective monitoring and evaluation system for land reform can result in unchecked underutilisation of the land capital, resulting in undesirable agro-economic performance</p>
<b>Social</b>	<p>Changes in the social structures requires people to adjust to the emerging system and traditional leadership boundaries became fuzzy and more fluid</p>	<p>The traditional tenure systems become stronger and more recognised as people 'returned' to their ancestral land</p> <p>Swift action is necessary to define a new land tenure regime</p>	<p>Ideally land use planning should be done before people are in the area to ensure provision of social services and amenities</p>
<b>Legal</b>	<p>Theft and destruction of property essential for agricultural production should be avoided at all costs</p> <p>The laws governing land and property were 'violated' in the process of redressing colonial injustices that 'violated' such legal rights in the first place</p>	<p>Farming requires a secure land tenure system for access to funding if land is to be recognised collateral</p>	<p>Land use planning should be prioritised to provide a conducive environment for investments and sustainable developments</p> <p>Effective rule of law is important to deal with criminal elements of vandalism and theft of critical agricultural systems and equipment</p>

**Source:** *Author*

Table 6.1 shows key lessons identified from Zimbabwe's FTLRP which need to be taken into consideration when issues pertaining to land occupation, land use and land tenure are being considered.

### 6.3 Theoretical Framework Summary

The study utilised the self-determination, dependency and empowerment theoretical frameworks. Closely related to these theories are important concepts such as imperialism, colonialism, liberation and the land question which were also utilised in the study to examine the strategies of redressing colonial land imbalances in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to lessons from Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme from a theoretical perspective.

### **6.3.1 Self-Determination Theory**

Self-Determination Theory (SDT) is a comprehensive theory of human personality and motivation that is concerned with the manner in which the individual interacts with and depends on the social environment (Legault, 2017:1). SDT describes intrinsic and various kinds of extrinsic motivation and gives an outline of how these motivations have a bearing on situational responses in different domains. Self-determination describes “*the right claimed by a 'people' to control their destiny*” (Berman, 1992:389). It can thus be argued that, the very act of trying to redress colonial imbalances through land reform can be explained best using this theoretical perspective. The study found out that upon attaining independence, and having failed to gain control of the main means of production, the native Black majority effected the FTLRP with the sole aim of gaining control of the land they had lost upon colonialism. This determination to acquire land has been noted as the main driving force behind the liberation war struggles that ensued, not only in Zimbabwe but within the region as well. This skewed racial land redistribution, was one of the central issues for the struggle for liberation (Kariuki, 2015) and majority rule and further became a dormant subject after the independence negotiations. It is self-determination that has acted as a catalyst in the quest to redress the colonial land imbalances.

### **6.3.2 Dependency Theory**

The dependency theory holds the view that “*the condition of underdevelopment is precisely the result of the incorporation of the Third World economies into the capitalist world system which is dominated by the West and North America*” (Randall and Theobald, 1998:120). In that regard, dependency implies a situation in which a particular country or region relies on another for support, “*survival*” and growth (Kalu, 2013:48). According to Emeh (2013:119), the concept of dependency can be best understood thoroughly through examining its different forms. There are basically three historical forms of dependency from which the now-

underdeveloped nations have passed and these are; colonial dependency, financial-industrial dependency and new dependency. This study focused more on colonial dependency.

It was noted that colonialism was not merely a system of exploitation, but rather one whose main objective was to send back the profits siphoned from Africa to the so called homeland. Whatever was derived from the land in Africa had to be sent abroad for the benefit of the colonialists and their economies. From a dependency point of view, this repatriation of profits depicts a systematic extradition of the surplus values which were created by the African labour force using African resources. Therefore, the development of Europe can thus be perceived as part of the similar dialectical processes which underdeveloped Africa. The result of this was that Africa grossly suffered from the exploitation of her resources by the Europeans. The study concludes that, it is because of these centuries of injustice and the subsequent imbalances brought about by European exploitation that many African countries, especially those in SADC, have sought to redress the land question through embarking in land reform.

### **6.3.3 Empowerment**

Empowerment is the transformation of the structures or institutions that reinforce and perpetuate discrimination. It carries both a psychological sense of personal control or influence and a concern with actual social influence, political power and legal rights (Marazanye, 2016:21). Empowerment is thus “*the process whereby decisions are made by people who have to bear the consequences of those decisions*” (McArdle, 1989:15). People are empowered when they are able to participate in and take greater control over the decision-making process and when they have greater control over assets, policies, organisations and institutions and processes that affect their lives. Changing access to resources through power relations is notably the starting point in empowering people. Therefore, when subordinate group(s) are granted unlimited rights to make choices, it can be said that empowerment would have taken

place. It should also be noted that empowerment is not achieved through dependency, but is rather an emancipation from dependency (Rowlands, 1997; Kabeer, 1999; Songelwa, 2009) Within the land reform context, this can mean an achievement of the individual's direct access to land and their attainment of the ability to take in all spheres of social engagement such as those which involve decision-making. However, it is apparent that access in itself is not a symbol of empowerment but is actually the beginning of the process which will eventually lead to empowerment.

This study established that the native Blacks were empowered by gaining access to land through the FTLRP, which was a critical step towards redressing colonial land imbalances. The access to land seemed to offer the native Black access and control of the means of production and they were in a better position to tackle poverty. The FTLRP in Zimbabwe benefited between 300 000 and 400 000 people who were having direct socio-economic gains from the land, and at the least owned their land. As a result of being empowered through the FTLRP, the native Blacks were in a better position to be engaged in the production of both food and cash crops for both domestic consumption and marketing. Most notably, the empowerment through access to land allowed the native Blacks to turn to tobacco farming which seemed to be more lucrative than food crop production and was previously a monopoly of the commercial white farmers.

There was a dramatic increase from just over 8 000 native Black tobacco farmers in 2000 to more than 75 000 in 2015. It was noted that this empowerment through the access to land allowed the native Blacks to freely make choices with regards to how they were going to use their land. However, tobacco farming by native Blacks has a detrimental effect on the environment through disruption of wildlife habitats and the destruction of indigenous forests,

but, the most important aspect still stood, in the fact that the land is now in the control of the native Black majority.

## **6.4 Recommendations**

Having answered the questions which the research sought and noted as areas of concern, the following section presents some of the recommendations which the researcher proposes that they be implemented in order to transform the successes of the FTLRP as a strategy for redressing colonial land imbalances.

### **6.4.1 Agrarian Reform**

Resettlement is central as it relieves the former reserves of the pressure from overpopulation while also bringing more land, which would have been left fallow due to extensive land holding. However, resettlement alone is not enough to transform communities and pull people out of poverty. What is important and transformative is agrarian reform. Binzewanger *et al.*, (2009:4) define agrarian reform as, “*a collection of activities and changes designed to alter the agrarian structure of a country.*” Land reform, as defined by Binzewanger *et al.*, (2009:4) comprises of land redistribution, which centres on transformations in land ownership, and land tenure reform, which “*is a program designed to change the legal and institutional framework for land administration*”. Agrarian reform broadens the concept of land reform through improvements in both land tenure and agricultural organization (Adams, 2000:7). There is thus need to effect an agrarian reform to carry on the gains made by the land reform initiatives. In other words, agrarian reform would also include reforms in the financing systems, extension services, social amenities, input and technical equipment supply systems as well as markets.

#### **6.4.2 Review of the Land Policy**

The biggest challenge that has affected agricultural development in the country is the lack of a comprehensive land policy. The land question in Zimbabwe is governed by various pieces of legislation which include constitutional clauses, the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15), and the Rural District Councils Act (Chapter 29:13). There is, therefore, need to have a consolidated document which explains the national land uses, rights and governance. The policy should be all-inclusive and could be developed after national consultations with all various stakeholders. The final compilation team should also endeavour to be all-inclusive and have representatives from various government ministries and departments, farmers' associations, traditional leaders and the civil society. Deininger and Bank (2004) suggest that, *“land policies are of fundamental importance to sustainable growth, good governance, and the wellbeing of and the economic opportunities open to rural and urban dwellers - particularly poor people.”* The concise definitions and demarcations of rights and use would reduce land use conflicts between issues such as mining and farming, farming and urban development, as well as mining and wildlife conservation. In most cases, the poor are the biggest losers in land use, and land rights conflicts and such policies will pave ways for arbitrations in cases of conflicts.

#### **6.4.3 Adherence to the provisions of Constitution of Zimbabwe on land issues**

Generally, constitutionalism refers to *“a system of government where authority is shared among a set of different branches (broadly separated between the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary) and limitations are implied in these divisions”* (Mbondeni and Ojienda, 2013) Constitutionalism is a broad concept which seeks to guide political players and the citizens on how to observe various rights and adhere to certain responsibilities. In the instance of this research, the notion is taken to mean adherence to the constitution and legal instruments on

property rights and balancing between legal and legitimate actions. The major bone of contention on the FTLRP was on the lack of adherence to constitutional and legal provisions on responding to the clamour for land. The Supreme Court (then sitting as a Constitutional Court), noted that the government had digressed from the tenets of constitutionalism under which rules laid out to balance between the governors and the governed were flouted.

On future land acquisitions, the government should be guided by the laws and in cases of the laws, being deficient, the government should begin by crafting the relevant legislation and not to legislate in retrospect. While the racial question on land allocations has been solved, the question of compensation is still outstanding. The acquisition laws of the country stipulated that, when agricultural land is acquired for resettlement purposes, the government only pays for developments made in or on the land which is being acquired (Land Acquisition Act: Chapter: 20:10). The government should, therefore, come up with mechanisms to compensate the farmers on developments made on the acquired land. The government should constitute a commission of evaluators who should evaluate the land before some of the developments are depreciated. The commission should be constituted in a way that ensures that all interests are represented. These would include the government, the former commercial farmers, the financial sector, and the legal sector.

In addition, the government could also come up with a land acquisition compensation act. The act would lay the legal foundation for all matters that deal with compensation of farmers whose land was acquired under the FTLRP. These include the definition of improvements, the evaluation process, the compensation process, including the reference currencies for compensation, and the time span between the evaluation and the payment of compensation. A return to constitutionalism on the land would also help in unlocking capital for investment into farming.



#### **6.4.4 Implementation of Land Audit Recommendations**

Since the inception of the FTLRP, the government has constituted various audit teams to evaluate the process, establish beneficiaries and proffer recommendations. Among the most popular was the 2015 Utete Commission sponsored by the 2015 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sponsored pilot land audit. The 2015 pilot land audit established that there was multiple ownership of farms by mostly the politically connected persons. However, this was against the FTLRP policy document which reiterated the policy of one man (person) one farm, which should be read as one family one farm. The government should begin by studying the previous audits and implement some of the recommendations made which are still valid and implementable. Meanwhile, the ongoing Land Audit, which is at advanced stage, was conducted by the Zimbabwe Land Commission of 2017, chaired by Commissioner Tendai Bare.

Similar recommendations raised by the Land Commission include, amongst others, the need for observation of stipulated farm sizes by agro-ecological regions, re-allocation of identified under-utilised farms and those for absent landlords/recipients, dealing with multiple ownership of farms, addressing the bankability of 99-year lease, financing and revamping of irrigation systems.

The study further noted that, currently, Zimbabwe is at the last stage of completing the land reform initiative (Phase v), which is the finalisation. In order to finalise the land reform programme, implementation of the land Audit recommendations is necessary. Relatedly, instituting a realistic monitoring and evaluation system (where initiatives or activities can be added (+) or removed (-) as necessary) should be prioritised. The GoZ can guarantee productivity and food security on the land by ensuring sustainable land use, meeting national obligations for biodiversity conservation, ensuring access to finance for agriculture and

facilitating markets which will ultimately empower and help reduce poverty in the country. In all the noted stages, the GoZ should be involved to ensure justice and fairness in the process. It should be noted that agrarian reform in former settler colonies should not be taken as a racial vendetta against whites. It should be undertaken as an affirmative action to have equitable racial land ownership and production for poverty reduction and empowerment. By so doing, the reforms can be quickened while the resettled farmers would be part of the development process. For the reforms to be a success, the process should involve the private sector, the donor community and private financiers.

#### **6.4.5 Policy Driven Affirmative Action**

There is a need for policy-driven affirmative action by the GoZ to empower and protect PWDs in terms of their access to land and capital. The issue of exclusion also emerged and became problematic due to the broad spectrum of disability conditions beyond physical impairment/ those disabilities that are not obvious to the naked eye. PWDS should also make initiatives to be more visible through lobbying through various groups for their equal share in the access to land as a productive resource. The GoZ has already done much in terms of ensuring that PWDs are well represented in the legislature, their representatives should thus be more visible in the quest to enact more laws that cater for the inclusions of PWDs in the access to land.

#### **6.4.6 Measures for Mitigating against Climate Change**

The researcher found out that there is need for localised adaptation to the effects of climate change by the farmers in a bid to remain productive. While strategies such as riverbank cultivation may offer quick fix solutions to the challenges of climate change, such strategies tend to have long term side effects like siltation of rivers which tends to have the net effect of

ruining the potential of gaining livelihoods from agriculture and exacerbating climate change. The long term solution would be the empowerment of the farmers to have sustainable, low-cost irrigation development. This can be achieved through partnerships with research institutions and favourable payment terms for the farmers. This would include the construction of dams of various sizes on rivers, borehole drilling, or combining adjacent fields to create large farms where water can be centralized and allow the farms to be run as productive farming companies. There is also need for the government to revise the agricultural natural farming regions so as to be able to come up with relevant agricultural and land policies which would answer to the realities on the ground.

#### **6.4.7 Ensuring Access to Agricultural Financing for Resettled Farmers through Reviewing the Tenure System**

The study noted that one key policy which needs urgent attention is the country's land tenure system. The land tenure issue, especially with regards to issues around security of tenure and the issue of collateral need to be addressed. The study found these issues to be hindering the beneficiaries of the FTLRP from using their pieces of land as collateral in accessing loans. However, even though in Zimbabwe any lease that is of 10 years or more can be used as collateral, the 99-year leases that were offered to beneficiaries of the FTLRP could not be used as collateral to secure loans from formal financial institutions. This poses a major obstacle to financing and the GoZ should review this and make these leases bankable. Security of tenure is critical to agricultural investment and financing and this is a crucial factor if the country is to realise any meaningful gains from the land reform initiatives.

#### **6.4.8 Establishment of a bank dedicated to financing agriculture**

Agricultural ventures are capital extensive. This requires huge amounts of (financial) loans spread over a long period of time. Most of the beneficiaries of the FTLRP had no financial capacity to meet the full financial needs of commercial farming. These needs include infrastructure development, mechanization and funds for seasonal inputs. The research noted that Zimbabwe has Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe (Agribank) (Ltd), which was dedicated to financing agriculture initially under the name Agricultural Finance Corporation (which had been transformed from colonial Land Bank that had been established in 1924). However, while the bank was turned into a commercial bank in 1999, and later reverted to Agricultural Development Bank in 2003, its lending rates have mirrored those of commercial banks and cannot be accepted as tailor-made for agriculture which requires cheap long term loans. While the bank still prides itself as a bank dedicated to in part, finance agricultural production, using commercial banking lending rates means that it cannot be taken as a dedicated agricultural development bank which can transform farming in the country.

The importance of a dedicated agricultural bank in Zimbabwe is predicated on the fact that after the FTLRP, all agricultural land in the country is vested in the state. All the farmers claim rights to the land based on the 99-year leases extended to them by the government. Various banks in the country were sceptical of lending to newly resettled farmers based on the lease agreements without any immovable collateral as they feared that such loans would not be secured loans. Various government initiatives, like the Presidential Well-Wishers Input Scheme, and the Farm Mechanisation Programme, to support farmers have proven to be short term, mostly on the input supply side and of limited finance. Establishing a bank dedicated to agriculture, or relooking at the constitution of the Agribank to provide long term cheap loans can help the dedicated farmers with financial capacity to take-off in their agricultural ventures.

#### **6.4.9 Re-institute on the Field and Extended Training Programmes for Resettled Farmers**

The research established that during the first phase of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP – I), the government deployed agricultural extension officers who did on the field training and monitoring the resettled farmers. The government, through various vocational training centres, came up with various training programmes for the farmers. These training programmes were driven by various needs, as noted by the agricultural extension officers and also by the institution of new crops in some areas.

The training programmes have not been witnessed in the aftermath of the FTLRP (Pilossof, 2016). While agricultural extension officers are still being deployed into various agricultural areas, they have not been undertaking on the field training programmes due to lack of mobility and there is also low morale among the extension officers. The training programmes have been overshadowed by a government grappling with providing necessary inputs and the need for urgent increase in production to increase foreign currency and to increase food crops to cover up the national cereal foods deficit that has been gobbling scarce foreign currency. Some of on the field monitoring and training were witnessed on the farmers who are under contract farming, especially tobacco and maize seed farmers.

The failure by the government was due to the withdrawal of non-governmental and intergovernmental supporting partners. These partners like the World Bank and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), were against the manner in which the land was acquired and also followed in the footsteps of their parent countries that were against the FTLRP in Zimbabwe which they viewed as against the observance of human rights. These partners assisted in providing extra funding and equipment like motor-bikes for the agricultural extension officers for ease of mobility and funding other rural developmental amenities like

water and sanitation health. There is therefore, need for government to look at other means of training the farmers so as to increase the quality of agricultural produce and guard against the destruction of the farming ecology.

#### **6.4.10 Promoting Partnerships between Government and Private Firms in Assisting Farmers**

Private agricultural companies can also introduce an agronomist (agricultural extension officers) to help contracted farmers with technical expertise as part of efforts to ensure maximum production and reduction in losses. The GoZ and the private companies can develop legal contracts to guard against side marketing of produce, misuse of supplied inputs and the protection of farmers from predatory contract agreements that would only benefit the companies while impoverishing the farmers. This could also be augmented by subsidizing basic farming inputs at the source (to the manufacturers) so as to ensure affordable shelf prices in the shops. These policies would ensure that the production side of the land reform is transformed into agrarian reform.

#### **6.4.11 Development of Primary Amenities**

Under the FTLRP, the donors failed to come in with any assistance as they were against the policy, while the manner of fast tracking offered very limited space for the GoZ to budget and mobilise financial resources for the development of social amenities. There is now need for the GoZ to begin the process of developing the primary amenities (schools, health centres and dip-tanks, among others), so as to complete the agrarian reform and increase production through a reduction in human and animal diseases as well as lessening the distances travelled to school by the farmers' children.

#### **6.4.12 Improvement of Marketing Conditions**

With regards to marketing in an agrarian reform, the government is supposed to prepare the markets for the entrance of new farmers as well as expanding the markets, while the farmers should also be trained on market needs, expectations and marketing skills. Where the government can, or with the help of the donor and business community, it can have direct training programmes. Where it cannot or is incapacitated, government should create an enabling environment for other organizations and the business community to come in.

#### **6.4.13 Implementation of the wildlife-based land reform policy**

Following criticism that wildlife habitat was being destroyed in new resettlement areas under the FTLRP, the government responded by developing a Wildlife Based Land Reform Policy (2006) which was, however, not implemented. This policy remains important if the country is to achieve its national targets under the National Biodiversity Action Plan and Attainment of Sustainable Development Goals.

#### **6.4.14 Improving Policy Implementation**

The study established that the GoZ has faced various challenges in terms of the implementation of its land and agricultural policies over the years. This mainly emanated from the fact that land and agricultural policies have been a contentious issue and the GoZ has often taken a solitary and political approach when coming up with land and agricultural policies. There is thus an evident need to involve various stakeholders in the policy making and implementation process, if the country's land and agricultural policies are to generate the desired outcomes. Such policies must be all encompassing for various societal groups such as PWDs, women and the youth. The GoZ must, therefore, engage and work in consultations with stakeholders at

national and subnational levels to garner support for the formulation and development of national policies and strategies that come up with tailor-made and appropriate land policies which should in turn benefit the country's agricultural sector. Further support should be provided by the donors and stakeholders towards the implementation of national policies.

### **6.5 Major Contribution to Knowledge**

Through interacting with beneficiaries of the FTLRP and other key informants, it was discovered that the struggle for access to land is deeply rooted in colonial legacies which resulted in gross inequities with respect to land as a capital resource, resource scarcity in less productive communal areas, extreme poverty and liberation struggles. The land imbalances in South Africa, Namibia, Kenya and Zimbabwe had some similarities and differences and the processes to redress the colonial ills were complex and at different stages of implementation in each of these countries.

Colonial land policies therefore, effectively started a cycle of forced resettlement, resource exploitation and degradation, inevitable food insecurity and land conflicts. The study's research findings confirmed that colonialism was the root cause of most conflicts on land occupation, land tenure and land use challenges that the former colonies still struggle to resolve to date. The study established that the FTLRP had a significant negative impact on food security and biodiversity conservation, particularly on private wildlife areas as some wildlife habitat was lost. On the other hand, the study also established that distributing land to people trapped in poverty requires viable support systems to make it more successful. However, setting out on land redistribution is not regrettable, considering the long-term implications. Some wildlife private and parks wildlife conservancies were partially affected by the FTLRP. Nevertheless, such losses were recovered through various new conservation initiatives that



expanded the area where biodiversity conservation is a recognized land use. The gross inequities on access to the land resource, therefore, undermine conservation efforts. Whilst many Zimbabweans benefitted from the FTLRP, those with disability were not taken into consideration. This compromised on equitability of the land reform initiatives in Zimbabwe.

The study observed that in the aftermath of the FTLRP, Zimbabwe was still facing challenges on balancing the control and access to land, redistributing from landholders who underutilised their land to new small and medium scale users. Rationalisation of land acquisition and redistribution which was mainly done on the basis of legitimate historical wrongs and political demands, as well as valid economic reasons is important. Zimbabwe's FTLRP can therefore, be viewed as a radical approach-without a prototype, which revolutionised land reform and accelerated empowerment of previously disadvantaged people, however, resulting in significant socio-economic and political ramifications for the country. The main recommendation from the research findings is the need for prioritisation of the implementation of the land audit prescriptions. This is a very important step that ensures finalisation of the land reform in the country as well as creating a conducive environment for a robust monitoring and evaluation process anchored on promoting productivity. The conceptual model developed in this study summarises Zimbabwe's land reform journey from inception to finalisation. Such a model can be used by other countries in Southern Africa with a similar history, as a reference for implementing realistic land reforms on the African continent.

## **6.6 Suggested Areas for Further Study**

The land question has been a subject of extensive research not only in Zimbabwe, but in Southern Africa and the world in general. However, the subject has not been exhausted.

There are various areas which could not be addressed comprehensively in this research and

the researcher feels that if explored further, these areas would be of help to Zimbabwe, the developing world and the global community in general. These are but not limited to;

**1) The impact of settler colonialism on resource allocation in the post-colonial period**

It would be very beneficial to future generations if there is a scientific documentation of how colonial policies have continued to impact on the current and future generations and also proffer solutions to put an end to the impact of colonial policies on future governance and social development in former settler colonies.

**2) The failure of the agricultural financing models**

This is an issue which should influence researchers to study various financing models and sustainable government interventions in agriculture. Such studies would help bring the much needed suggestions for the improvement of the financing mechanism in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector.

**3) Equity and fairness on access to the land resource**

Whilst to a greater extent, the FTLRP managed to address the skewed land distribution between Blacks and whites, there are still a lot of imbalances that need to be addressed to ensure equitable land distribution, taking into considering different variables such as; gender, disability, youths, war veterans and war collaborators, religion, ethnicity and the political divide.

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# ANNEXURES

## Annex 1: General Interview Guide for Resettled Farmers and other Key Informants

### Section A

#### Demographic Profile

Respondent Number				<input type="text"/>
1. Province.....				
2. District.....				
3. Name.....(if respondent is comfortable to provide)				
4. Gender: M		<input type="checkbox"/>	F	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Age: 18-24		<input type="checkbox"/>	25-44	<input type="checkbox"/>
			45-59	<input type="checkbox"/>
			60+	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Occupation (other than farming, if any, please specify)				

### Section B

1. When did you settle on the farm?
2. What is the size of your farm?

3. What do you produce at the farm in terms of crops and livestock? *Quantities and quality.*
4. What has been your farming experience since settlement at the allocated farm?
5. What challenges are you facing as a new farmer?
6. Are you getting any support from the public and private institutions? *Explain.*
7. Is (was) the support you are getting for your farm adequate? *Explain.*
8. Are you aware of people with disabilities who benefited from the FTLRP? *Do you have issues of concern that you see them experiencing and how they can be addressed?*
9. From your own perspective, what has been the impact of the FTLRP on the environment and conservation?
10. Which issues have arisen as a result of the manner in which land was distributed under the FTLRP?
11. What is your view regarding the 99-year lease arrangement?
12. What do you think should be done by Government and stakeholders to improve farming and land reform?
13. Has the land reform programme contributed towards poverty alleviation?
14. Has any aspects of your life have changed as a result of your benefitting from the FTLRP? *Explain.*
15. Where do you market your farm produce? *Any related challenges that you face?*
16. What are the costs that you incur in your agricultural operations and are you able to meet the costs?
17. Do you have people working at your farm? *If yes, how many, how much are you paying them and is it sustainable?.*
18. Comparing the period before and after FTLRP, have you managed to procure any movable or immovable assets?

19. What is the market value of your livestock and crop produce comparing the period before and after FTLRP?
20. What do you think can be done to improve your farm productivity and also for other farmers?
21. What is your opinion of how the FTLRP was implemented (*and continues to be implemented*)?
22. Was there political interference in the allocation of farms? *Explain your answer.*
23. What are the key lessons learnt that we can draw from the FTLRP which can benefit the Southern African region on redressing colonial land imbalances?
24. What are the issues of concern that affect land policy and land legal framework in Zimbabwe? Any recommendations for consideration on land policy and land legal framework?
25. What are the key issues of concern emanating from the FTLRP?
26. What has been the impact of the FTLRP on the environment and conservation?
27. Are there any initiatives to regain any losses of land set aside for conservation, after the FTLRP?
28. Did livestock and crop production change after FTLRP?
29. In terms of food security before and after FTLRP, are there any changes at (household/national)? *Explain if it increased, decreased or did not change.*
30. What are the costs being incurred by the resettled farmers in their agricultural operations and are they able to attain any profits after marketing their produce?
31. What is your opinion of how the FTLRP was implemented (and continues to be implemented)?
32. Are the resettled farmers fully utilising the land that they were allocated?

33. In your opinion, are the people in resettlement areas better-off or worse-off (*in terms of poverty status*) after the FTLRP as compared to the period before the programme?
34. Do you think the FTLRP achieved the objectives of land reform in Zimbabwe in terms of empowerment?
35. Are there any recommendations which you want to make with regards to land reform policy, processes and outputs.

*NB: The questions were translated to a language that the respondent was comfortable to communicate with and several follow up questions were asked to probe the subject matter further. Relevant questions were selected for specific Key Informants as applicable and other relevant questions developed appropriately.*

## Annex 2: Focus Group Discussion Guide with Resettled A1&A2 Farmers

1. What is your general view of the land reform programme?
2. Was there any assistance rendered to the resettled (A1/A2) farmers by government and the private sector?
3. What challenges have been associated with the FTLRP and how can they be addressed?
4. Do you think the FTLRP achieved the objectives of land reform in Zimbabwe?
5. In your opinion, are the people in resettlement areas better off or worse off (*in terms of poverty and empowerment*) comparing the period before and after the FTLRP?
6. Are you aware of people with disabilities who benefited from the land reform. *Any issues of concern that you see them experiencing or that you are concerned with.*
7. What are the key lessons that can be drawn from the Zimbabwe's FTLRP for Southern African region and other countries that may have similar issues?
8. What should be done to improve the land reform programme as a tool for redressing colonial land imbalances?

### Annex 3: Summary of Key Informants Interviewed

INSTITUTIONS	PEOPLE INTERVIEWED
A1 and A2 Farmers	Resettled Farmers
Former Vice President of the Republic of Zimbabwe	Joyce Mujuru
Ministry of Environment, Climate, Tourism and Hospitality Industry	Parks and Wildlife Management Authority Director
	Meteorological Services Department Director
	Environmental Management Authority Director
	Forestry Commission Director
Boka Auction Floors	Chipo Boka ( <i>Chief Executive Officer</i> )
Tobacco Sales Floor	Official
Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board	Dr Andrew Matibiri ( <i>Board Chairman</i> )
Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement	Honourable Minister
	Permanent Secretary
	Director of Lands Management and Administration
	Director - Mechanization
	Director - Crops and Livestock
	Director - Agricultural Extension Services
	Agricultural Research and Extension District Officers
	Provincial Lands Officers
	District Lands Officers
	Provincial Lands Committee members
Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing	District Administrators
Ministry of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs	Justice George Chiweshe ( <i>Judge President</i> )
	Justice Moses Chinhengo ( <i>Retired</i> )
	Guvamombe Mishrod ( <i>Chief Magistrate</i> )
	President of the Chief's Council – Chief Fortune Charumbira
Ministry of Defense and War Veterans	War Veterans Representatives
Ministry of Finance	Official
Ministry of Urban and Rural Development – Namibia	Honourable Minister Samuel A.P. Mushelenga
Ministry of Home Affairs	Senior Police official
	Dr Godfrey Mahachi- National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe ( <i>Director</i> )



Ministry of Youth, Sport, Arts and Recreation	Minister Chiratidzo Mabuwa
European Union	Official
National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe	Chair
Agribank	Dzorai Mudavanhu ( <i>Executive Banking and Corporate Properties Manager</i> )
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe	Official
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe	Maureen Marimirofa ( <i>Banker</i> )
Barclays Bank (now First Capital Bank)	Godfrey Chipumha ( <i>Banker</i> )
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)	Senior official
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T)	Senior official
Food and Agriculture Organisation	Official
Grain Marketing Board	Operations Manager
Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe	Official
Zimbabwe Farmers' Union	Official
Churches	Church leaders
Academia	University of Zimbabwe
	Midlands State University
	Africa University
	Catholic University of Zimbabwe
	Great Zimbabwe University
Independent Consultants	Professor Sam Moyo ( <i>Deceased</i> ) African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS)
	Dr Maxwell Mutema ( <i>European Union</i> )
	Dr Solomon Mombeshora ( <i>Women's University</i> )
	John Robertson ( <i>Economist</i> )
South African Embassy	Linda Maso ( <i>Counsellor- Political</i> )
Quton Seed Company	Dr Edwicks Mhandu ( <i>Managing Director</i> )
Agricultural and Rural Development Authority of Zimbabwe (ARDA)	Basel Nyabadza ( <i>Board Chairman</i> )
Patriot Newspaper	Legal Officer

## Annex 4: Introduction Letter from University of Zimbabwe

**DEPARTMENT OF  
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES**

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**UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE**

10 February 2016

**TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN**

Dear Sir/Madam

**RE: APPLICATION FOR RESEARCH ASSISTANCE – MR MANGWANYA FULTON UPENYU** 0712800791

This letter serves to introduce Mr Mangwanya Fulton Upenyu, a Doctor of Philosophy (DPhil) student in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies. He is doing field research in fulfillment of the requirements of a DPhil degree.

The Department kindly requests you to assist the student to the best of your ability in his search for thesis information entitled: *"Strategies of Redressing Colonial Imbalances in Southern Africa: Lessons from Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme"*. His areas of specialization are Politics and International Relations. Currently, he is gathering data for his thesis.

May I also assure you in advance that the information gathered during this exercise **will be used for academic purposes only.**

Should you have any queries, please contact the Department.

Yours faithfully

**MR. T. C. RUBAYA  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT**