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The politics of Collaboration (South Mashonaland 1896 - 7)

Dept. of History, Henderson Seminar Paper.
Introduction

In the winter of 1896, every chief of a polity in Southern Rhodesia that had experienced penetration by the Europeans had to decide whether or not to rise against them. Communications between African rulers were good, and once the fact of the initial rebellion in the Umzingwani district of Matabeleland became known, they had to make this decision, which became more pressing as district after district rose, in March and later in June. As Professor T.O. Ranger has described in his book *Revolts in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7, A Study in African Resistance*, a large number of chiefdoms revolted, aided by their various religious authorities. This rising has been conclusively related to European penetration, and certainly no rebellion occurred in unpenetrated areas.

Yet the revolt was not total. Many polities remained neutral, doing nothing in the conflict, and in due course submitted to the administration of the victors. In some cases, the reason is obvious: the African people in some areas had no Europeans to fight, and had in fact seen only a few passing hunters and traders, the real European penetration occurring years after the governments had demarcated the frontiers. Thus the neutrality of the Tonga peoples on the Zambezi is hardly surprising, as although they had doubtless heard of the rising, it meant little to them in their isolation. Similarly the Hlengwe people in the extreme south-east of the country had hardly been touched by British rule, some chiefs not being taxed until two years after the risings. Others felt the Portuguese Mozambique Company's penetration more than that of the British, regardless of the frontier. In any case, the Hlengwe and the Shangaan "remnants" of that area were not closely connected to either the Shona or the Ndebele in terms of traditional links. Even in areas surrounded by European roads and settlements, unpenetrated areas existed: Nyashanu's Hera in the angle of the Sabi and Nyaswadi Rivers (between Melsetter, Enkeldoorn and Laurremoedals) were so remote that they had no reason to join their relations, Natekeida's Hera, when the latter rose in June 1896. Even if these remote polities had wished to join in the fighting, the mounting and operation of a field force so far from their base would probably have been beyond them, as very long-range offensives that were not migrations were uncommon in the 19th century Shona past.

Isolation from European pressures is not the whole answer, however. Around Victoria were a whole circle of chiefdoms that had experienced more continuous penetration than anyone else - Bere, Zimuto, Chikwanda, Mugahe, Chamburwa and others - yet although, as this paper will endeavour to show, they had every provocation to rise, even during the rebellion, they did not do so. Even direct contiguity to powerful rebel areas did not lead to rebellion. Alongside Wedza, chief rebel in Balingwe, the first Shona rebel area, were the...
Ngowa chiefs led by Mazwiwa, who did not fight. Alongside the resistant Hera of Mutokodza and Dzote of Maromo were the neutral Njanja. Even among Mutokodza's and Maromo's people there were individuals and whole Houses under headmen who opted out of the fighting. What seemed to Europeans in 1896, confined as they were in their laagers in ignorance of the true situation, to be a total rising against them, was in fact a patchwork affair of rebels, neutrals and collaborators.

It is against this background that we must examine the collaborators of 1896. Neutrality, though not always passive, was at least understandable: the desire not to be involved. But how does one explain a Shona ruler in 1896 who sides with the Europeans while the issue between the British and the rebels is still in doubt? (Obviously it is no mystery why the Company should have received help from certain chiefs after the European victory was apparent.) This paper will attempt to explain the actions of these people.

First, I do not dispute for one moment the assessment of European penetration from 1890 to 1896 that has been put forward by previous writers: one of the main points of this paper is that European pressures in the collaborators' areas were on the whole as powerful as those in the rebel areas, and I have endeavoured to prove this with evidence related as closely as possible to the collaborationist and neutral areas.

It is the proposition of this paper that the reasons for collaboration lie in three main factors: one, the factor of Ndebele political power, if not in their raids; two, the factor of the power struggle between various Shona polities; three, the factor of the power of groups or Houses within the chiefdoms themselves. It is also the proposition of this paper that the origins of these factors lie not only in the six years of European penetration, but in the events of the previous century, varying from case to case.

These theories are not new. L.H. Gann suggested the first in 1965, and Professor Ranger has described the workings of the other two in reference to the polities of Makoni and Mutasa in Manicaland. I have chosen to study the collaborators of South Mashonaland in detail because not only were there many collaborators there, but their collaboration linked to their position had a vital effect on the 1896-7 risings. By their collaboration they safeguarded the Victoria District and surrounding areas. This enabled the Company to co-ordinate striking forces that weakened and eventually destroyed the rebel Shona polities of Belingwe, Gwelo and Selukwe, which were fighting on independently of the main Ndebele forces that surrendered at the Matopos indabas. The collaborationist chiefs helped to destroy these Shona polities, and their work in Charter District minimized the effect of the rebellion of the three chiefs there, and drove a pro-Company wedge between Hartley and Marandellas from which attacks could be launched and supplies raised that helped to decide the issue in the other Shona rebel areas in late 1896 and 1897. It is also true that, to study the rebellion in great depth, a limited area must be chosen, or the material to be studied will be too great for a limited research period.

Unfortunately this paper does not represent any single chapter of my thesis, but is rather based on elements in all of the chapters planned. This means that I must provide at least a sketchy outline.

(1) Ba 2/1/1, N.C. Belingwe, "Return of natives who have surrendered".
(2) In late 1896 the Pako refugees of Belingwe raided Chibi's territory to regain their old stronghold, independently of the risings. NVC 1/1/1, N.C. Chibi to C.I.T.C. 97.
of the pre-European past and the European penetration, in order to
make my claim (that the 1896 collaborators were influenced by the
past and pressured by the penetration) understandable. This means
that for reasons of space I have had to simplify the actual "collabora-
tion" section, and omit many illuminating quotations.

1: The Pre-European Background.

The character of the Shona polities in the area under dis-
cussion in the late 19th century was moulded by several factors that
remained fairly constant throughout the period. These had much to
do with the behaviour of the chiefs in 1896. One factor was the
relations of the polity with the senior political and religious bodies
such as the Rozvi or the Nswai cult, or with intrusive groups such as
the Ndebele. Another was the Shona collateral-succession system
that had much to do with inter-polity relations as well as the balance
of power within the chiefdom.

Prior to the Nguni invasions of the early 19th century, the
Rozvi had been overlords of the entire area, ruling from various
capitals, and also through local provincial clans of Rozvi such as
Musharwana's Rozvi in modern Chivi. They ruled many different Shoria
clans, leaving them largely to their own devices in day-to-day matters,
but acting as arbiters in disputes between different clans. This was
an indirect sort of control, but it still required a prestige that
could not be fully maintained when the Rozvi Imperial rulers were
forced into exile in Gutu and Manganje by the Nguni invasions. Though
not entirely powerless, the Imperial Rozvi had by the late 19th century
reverted to a status more equal to intrusive groups such as the Ndebele,
the Shangana, the Portuguese and eventually the British.

The result was that the Shona polities outside the radius of
these intrusive groups became much more independent in the late 19th
century, especially those farther away from the Ndebele, and the
chiefs became accustomed to carrying out "foreign policies", the strength
of which the Imperial Rozvi might not have approved in the old days.
Open warfare such as the Nemanvura-Mugabe feud, the Gunguwo-Maromo
war of 1899, etc., was probably much more frequent than under the Empire.
The Imperial Rozvi in exile and the intrusive groups were important
factors still, but the Shona chiefs had perhaps reached the zenith
of their power.

The part played by a polity in the Shona country was influenced
considerably by the system of chiefly succession. Very briefly, the
Shona collateral system of succession worked as follows: a man became
chief, and in due course died. If he had younger brothers alive (a
new chief such as Pawengweyi of Chibi or Mhoyo of Chi-curehwa, as the
leader of an intrusive group, appointed by the Rozvi, might have no
brothers) they would succeed in turn. The succession would then go
to the son of the first chief, and then in turn to the Houses of the first
chief's brothers. If the first chief had no brothers, then
his sons succeeded in turn, and then the succession rotated between
their Houses. There were many possible variations and exceptions to
this rule, but the general character of a Shona polity was that it
was politically divided to the point where a chief could only act if
he could swing an important number of Houses behind him. Competition
for the chieftainship was strong, as the succession tended to get so
complicated that dispute was inevitable, and a powerful House could
gain the chieftainship ahead of its turn. Thus the Shona chief, in
his dealings with outside forces, always had to consider the relations-
ships between his Houses, and the possibility of a split was greater
than in a Nguni polity. A dissident House could try to get outside
help, or alternatively split off and form a new polity elsewhere.
This tended to limit the power of a chief to carry out a policy.

Balancing the possibility of disintegration was the tendency
of many Shona polities to expand at the expense of smaller groups,
which might be incorporated as complete headships (but with no right
to succeed to the title). Alternatively they might be completely absorbed into the clan, although retaining their totem.

Thus by the end of the 19th century most Shona polities were virtually independent of outside forces, but were limited by their succession system. By its very complexity this tended to reduce their chances of carrying out a very vigorous policy as compared with Nguni or Sotho chiefdoms. Because of a rapid succession of old men as chiefs, belonging to different Houses in different places, the build-up of a central political-military establishment was difficult.

The Rozvi power had not been completely broken by the Nguni, for a relatively strong influence remained in some ways. One type of Rozvi influence was that of the exiled Imperial dynasty of which the senior member was probably Chief Jiri in Nanga. Jiri's power went beyond claims, and in the Nanga area his influence was considerable. (1) The "provincial" Rozvi also retained some influence. These clans had been settled across the country before the Imperial flight, and dealt with minor inter-clan matters, although serious cases would be forwarded to the Mambo. Thus in Charter District were Musarurwa's Rozvi and their smaller associated group to the west, Sango's Rozvi. Gwengwawa, founder of Musarurwa's Rozvi, prevented Chief Chiwva from killing the "Portuguese" Muroco for the seduction that founded the Njanja clan, but it was the Mambo at Zimbabwe who confirmed Muroro's son Meshangwe as chief in place of the Chiwva dynasty. (2) According to the present Chief Musarurwa, his people were powerful enough in 1896 to stop part of Maromo's Dzote from fighting, but they do not figure much in the records of the time.

With the coming of the Nguni armies, most of the polities in the area were raided by Zwangendaba, the Ndebele, or smaller Nguni forces. (3) Raiding continued, but with the coming of the "gun frontier" - probably in the 1860s - from the Zambezi in the north and the Sotho and Venda in the south, (4) the Shona adapted to a life around their caves and hills, and became virtually impregnable in them, so that raiding over long distances became less profitable, as the people could hide their goods in time. (5) Towards the end of the 19th century the Ndebele penetration in the area north of the present Victoria District varied according to the situation in each polity, and was not a constant factor. To the south, however, the Ndebele heartland was so close that raiders could still hope for success, and raids continued until 1893.

In the case of the Western Hera of Mutekedza for example, a special relationship developed whereby after a Mutekedza travelled to Bulawayo, Lobengula forbade further raids, and accepted a tribute which was collected by two men who visited Mutekedza regularly, Rusane and Munondo. (6) Probably it was one of these men that Bishop Knight-Bruce saw when he visited Mutekedza in 1888 and reported that Mutekedza was tributary to Lobengula. (7) This view was confirmed by Selous in later

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(4) N 9/1/2, N.C. Chilimani to C.N.C., 3/1/97; interview, Mr. Chitsanzo Mbangwa, 3/12/68.
(5) Hist.Mus. WE 3/2/6, Gitsha's story.
(6) Interview, Hera informant, 14/1/69. Mr. Gondo Zigomo
(7) Bishop Knight-Bruce, Gold and Gospel in Mashonaland (ed. C.E. Fripp), C.A.A. Oppenheimer Series, Chatto and Windus, 1949, pp. 79-82.
years, and did much to aid the B.S.A. Company's claim to occupy Mashonaland as part of Lobengula's territory. (1)

Yet to the south and east of Mutekedza, no polity had very much to do with the Ndebele, except as potential targets for raids. Some of the later raids seem to have been relatively peaceful affairs in which Ndebele entrepreneurs extorted hides rather than cattle. (2)

South and east of Mutekedza's Hera were the Njanja, a large group of people in which the collateral system of succession had reached remarkable complexity. The founding chief was Nechhanga, given the title "Gambiza" by the Rozvi, probably in the 18th century. In 1890 the holder of the title was Gambiza Swinurayi of the House of Tambawoga, last but one of the title. (3) However, the Njanja group had become so large that the heads of Houses, such as Nzuwu, Munyimi and Chivese had become chiefs (Ishe) in their own right, not headmen (Sahunhu), as the accounts of the Njanja in the 1890s make clear, and although the assent of the Gambiza was needed to confirm a succession to the headship of a House, (4) each House had to all intents and purposes become independent. In fact the Gambiza title had reached the point where the succession was so uncertain that a new Gambiza could not be appointed when Gambiza Ngwena died in the 1900s. Decentralisation had gone so far that the very Houses such as Nzuwu and Chivese had produced further chiefships that also followed independent lines, so that Kwenda and Ranga were separate chiefs with separate, though sometimes similar policies, although both were contenders for the Nzuwu title in 1901. Similarly the Chivese House had produced a new chieftainship, that of Gunguwo which played a more collaboratisn role than that of Chivese in 1896. Magaya operated independently of his father Gambiza Swinurayi in 1892. (5) Yet the "paramountcy" of Gambiza remained in being in the 1890s, and was given some prominence by Europeans who misunderstood the situation. Really the Njanja formed a number of independent polities.

Between modern Enkeldoorn and the Rango was the land of Zihota, belonging to Maromo's Dzete, a clan closely related to Mashayamombe's people in Kaiti. Smaller than Mutekedza's Hera or the Njanja, but bigger than Musarurwa's or Sango's Rozvi, this clan (according to a member) exercised some influence over Maburutsi's Munobvu clan, which rather resented its position under them. (6) Again, these smaller peoples seem to have had no particular liaison with the Ndebele in the late 19th century.

Thirty miles south of Enkeldoorn lies the Mteo Forest, one of the few natural forests in the area, and in the 19th century a valuable refuge from raiders. To the south of this lay the Chirumanzu chiefdom, which began when the newcomer Mhepo from Manyika was given the title of "Chirumanzu" by Rozvi, and his people became prominent in the area. (7) After Mhepo, the succession to the chiefship becomes confused until one reaches Chirumanzu Simba, but it is evident that the Rozvi remained prominent in the area, installing all new chiefs up to 1892 and even killing Chirumanzu Ruiunga by poison for bad behaviour. (8) After Chirumanzu Simba, Bangwe succeeded. He was a son of Simba, but as Simba's only younger brother "Mabotz" was already dead, there

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(1) F.C. Selous, Travel and Adventure in South East Africa, Rowland Ward, 1893, p.382.
(2) Interviews, Chief Musarurwa, 8/1/69; Mr. Munyuki Mudzivapasi, 13/1/69.
(3) 1/9/1, Lendy to Jameson, 23/6/92; Hist.Mss. SU2/1/1, H.E.Sumner, Notes on the Njanja People of Shurter District, p.24.
(4) 11/7/5, N.C. Charter to C.C.R., 8/9/91.
(5) See Note 3 above.
(6) Interview, Mr. E.M. Dswova, 13/1/69.
(8) Interview, Headman Bangwe, 9/12/68.
was no objection to his succession, in Shona law. (1) But this set a dangerous precedent in that with a patrilineal power so close, it was possible for an ambitious son to consider supplanting his uncles in the succession, for the Ndebele had no objection to Shoria adopting their system - see below, in Chibi - and would readily coerce both House opinion and that of the Rozvi. Certainly in Bangure's reign he paid tribute and repaired the Ndebele huts in Matabeleland, (2) and his son Chinyama became a personal favourite of Lobengula as one of his hunters. (3) Thus the Chirumanzu polity, while remaining on good terms with the Rozvi, was also a client of the Ndebele. Bangure died just before the Occupation (c. 1889-90) and the chieftaincy was vacant when the Europeans arrived. (4)

To the east of Chirumanzu lay the large polity of Gutu, which at the time of the Occupation was reckoned to be strong, (5) and also tributary to the Ndebele. (6) Lobengula definitely exercised a certain judicial power in 1892, as we shall see. South of Gutu lay Zimuto, but this would appear to have been a genuinely weak polity about which little is known, perhaps because of Drew, M.C. Victoria, 1894-1906, who had a prejudice against paramounts vis-à-vis headmen, and gave them little prominence. (7) South and east of Victoria, for a considerable distance, lay a large number of chieftaincies of varying sizes - Magabe, Shumba-Cheka, Mapansure, Ndanga, and so on. They suffered considerably from Ndebele raids from the one side up to 1893, and east of the Mtirikwe River the Shangaans raided them.

The last major powers to be considered in the area are those of the Mhari and of Matibi. The latter lived on the edge of the Hlengwe country, and paid tribute regularly to the Ndebele, even using Ndebele power to drive away Hlengwe rivals. (6) The Mhari were more powerful and less subservient to Lobengula. In fact they never really submitted. In the early 19th century this group entered what is now Chibi District under Tavengaegwaiy, from the Mashaba area. Tavengaegwaiy married the daughter of the chief of the most important local group, the Ngowa. According to oral tradition collected in 1904, the Rozvi backed him against the local Ngowa chief, who suffered a judicial poisoning. Under the energetic Matsweru, Son of Tavengaegwaiy, the Ngowa were expelled to Belingwe District, where they now live. One group, under Musipambi, was allowed to remain. The Mhari, under their chiefs entitled "Chibi", began a process of expansion. Masmanda, brother of Matsweru, drove the Pako people from Chirongwe Hill, the Pako fleeing to Belingwe and Victoria Districts. (9) To the north, the Chibis began to extend their power towards Seiku and Matenda, chiefs between the Lundi and Tokwe Rivers. Other younger members of the Mhari drove into the Nsumbuhe country to the south. In addition, groups related to the Mhari expanded to the north and east. Nhema, a cousin of Tavengaegwaiy, quarrelled with the Mhari and moved to Selukwe District. So, later, did Banka, brother of Tavengaegwaiy; who eventually came to work in association with Nhema. (10) Bere, another brother, settled just west of Port Victoria. Thus by the time the Ndebele presence became felt, the Mhari of Chibi, from their semi-underground stronghold of Nyaningwe, were establishing a minor "empire", in a period of only two generations. They had also established a number of enmities as a result of their success!

(1) M/3/38/8, Acting N.O. Gutu-Chilimanzi to C.N.C. 5/12/03.
(3) M/9/1/1, N.O. Chilimanzi, Chibi and M'Sipambi to C.N.C., Annual Report 1895.
(4) Interview, Headman Bangure, 9/12/68.
(5) M/9/1/1, A.N.O. Gutu to C.N.C. 22/4/01.
(6) A/2/12/1, Colquhoun to Rutherford Harris, 3/8/90.
(7) M/9/2/1, N.O. Victoria to C.N.C., Half-yearly report, 1898.
(8) M/3/38/8, Chibi History, 1904.
(9) NVC 1/1/1, N.O. Chibi to C.N.C. 11/9/97.
(10) BA 2/9/2, Paget to C.S.O., 19/10/96.
The Ndebele raids did much to arrest the Chibis' progress. The memory of them is noticeably more vivid in oral tradition than in the polities to the north. Matsweru died in the middle of a major raid caused by the ambition of his son Makonese. This son went to Bulawayo and got an impi to aid him in an attempt to overthrow his father, and for a short while Makonese ruled as a Ndebele vassal. He was overthrown by the House of Masunda, which imported Venda mercenaries from the Transvaal to counter-balance his Ndebele support. The next Chibi, Mazorodze, was captured in a raid and flayed alive at Bulawayo.

But already a new factor had arrived; the gun frontier. Although the Chibi was taken, the Mhari had by now got guns from the Venda, and fought back so hard that the crack Mbizo regiment suffered heavy losses, being held off for a month. In 1895 Weale noted that the Mhari "very nearly completely killed all the Mbizo regiment when trying to raid them some twenty years ago. On this occasion the Matahele skinned ... the then Tshibi almost entirely alone." The son of the next Chibi (Madhlangove), Tagwiroyi, became famous as a gunman in this battle.

Nevertheless, Ndebele power could not be ignored. Chibi Madhlangove followed a more cautious policy, and in 1877 made no attempt to prevent the Ndebele from picking up Coillard, who wandered into his territory. (1) As Chibi Madhlangove said to Selous in 1891, "And although I should be strong enough to repulse and rout the six hundred, I would be very stupid if I did it, because Lobengula would lead two thousand or three thousand men against me and would put me to death." (2)

Therefore Chibi often paid tribute to Lobengula, but not regularly, like Matibi, Chirumanzu or Mutekedza. He did not regard this tribute as a cession of sovereignty, but merely as a purchase of immunity for another raiding season. Thus Chibi was raided frequently up to 1892, unless he could raise the cattle to buy the Ndebele off. (One method of raising cattle was to raid the other Shona clans to the north and east, sometimes disguised as Ndebele!) Chibi was raided by Ndebele regulars such as the Mbizo, Inakamini and Ingubo, and also by those of the western Karanga who had fallen under Ndebele influence, such as Wedza of Belingwe. (3) One part of the Mhari "empire" took the opportunity to break away with Ndebele help; the polity of Shiku.

Internally, the Chibi dynasty was fairly cohesive. Apart from Makonese's coup against his father Chibi Matsweru, and Chiroyi who incited the Ndebele to kill his elder brother Chibi Mazorodze, the family of Tavengaweyi on the whole tended to stick together against outsiders, however much they intrigued internally. Even in the case of Makonese, when Masunda's Venda mercenaries accidentally killed him, Masunda was so upset that he committed suicide. (4)

The eastern edge of Ndebele power, then, was marked by Matibi, Wedza, Nhema, Banka and Chirumanzu, all regularly tributary to Lobengula even though with many of them this was a matter of policy and not of necessity. To the east of these chiefs, were delicate shades of dependence on the Ndebele ranging from Chibi's basic intransigence to Mutekedza's compliance, these polities sometimes being raided, especially the smaller Victoria chieftains.

(2) D. de Waal, With Rhodes in Mashonaland, Juta, 1896, pp.298-308.
(3) Al/9/1, Paulet to Jameson, 28/7/92.
(4) Unless otherwise stated, I have drawn this Chibi history from the following sources: 19/1/1 (Weale's history of 1895); M/33/8 (Forrestall's History of 1903); articles in F.A.D.A. 1923, 1928, 1931, 1932, K35, 1940, 1943, 1950, 1963; D.K.Parkinson, "Chiefs of Chi-1895", Bantu Studies, 15, Dec. 1966; all by
2. Pressures on the Shona; Initial European impact, and unco-ordinated penetration.

When the Pioneer Column entered the country in 1890, their legal backing, such as it was, was based on the Rudd Concession, which assumed that Lobengula's rule extended at least as far as the Sabi. 

That it did not in fact do so was obvious in some cases, but the Company deliberately tried to play down such an idea. Thus when Colquhoun reported from the Lundi, 

On his way to Salisbury, that: "The question of Chibi's independence has been raised by Selous, and Pennefather intends to execute a treaty with him. Both Jameson and I thought it wise not take the step, but to assume Lo Ben's authority. Pennefather will, however, keep the matter private and I have asked him to cut out from his Progress Report a passage referring to the question."

Rutherford Harris wired back: "Don't let Pennefather repeat that treaty business although done with the best motives. Still you and Jameson are right and it is most impolitic; we rest on one pillar only west of 33° East." 

Ten days after his letter on Chibi, Colquhoun feared that Chirumanzu and Gutu had "thrown off allegiance to Lo Bengula" and that the Portuguese might make treaties with them, and again stated his belief that the Company relied upon Lobengula's authority to be in the area.

For the time being, therefore, nobody bothered to tell the various chiefs officially what was happening, although some Europeans told the curious Shona that they would eventually destroy the Ndebele power.

However, the attempt by Adendorff and Vorster to claim a concession equal to that of the Company around Chibi's country led to the Company leaders visiting Chibi himself in 1891, where questioning produced exactly the answer they wanted, that Chibi was under Lobengula.

In order to keep an eye on Chibi and watch out for Banyaland Trek agents, Brabant was posted as Civil Representative at Chibi's, where he acquired the knowledge of Shona that started his six-year relationship with the Shona people. 

Brabant was withdrawn in 1892, and so ended the first Company-Shona liaison in the area. 

Later, in 1892, Company officials did make some attempt to explain to some chiefs that they were under British rule.

The extent of European penetration up to 1896 in terms of physical occupation can be stated briefly: a town, and a road dotted with various farms, stores and mines. Fort Victoria was occupied in 1890, and there was always a relatively large European centre there.

Fort Charter degenerated into a simple police station and telegraph office, with no real development until farmers settled nearby in 1892.

Post stations kept by trader/farmers were set up at Umfuli, Umnisti, Inyatzitzi, Makori's, Tokwe, Lundi and Matibi's. On the road traders established stores, or moved into the countryside with wagons.

Traders, transport-riders, post-contractors and their coloured or Cape African servants were the most obvious cause of trouble with the African people in the early days. Perhaps some behaved well, but many were drunken "buccaneers" such as Dunne at Charter.

"The transport-riders and others do a great deal of mischief by the way they treat the natives," wrote Short from Umnisti, the next station south.

(1) A2/12/1, Colquhoun to Rutherford Harris, 3/8/90.
(2) A2/2/3, Rutherford Harris to Colquhoun, 25/8/90.
(3) A2/12/1, Colquhoun to Rutherford Harris, 13/8/90.
(4) Interview, Mr. Chitsaka Manatsa, 29/11/68.
(5) A2/8/1, Marshall Hole to Rutherford Harris, 17/11/91.
(6) A1/15/2, Applications of "A" Troop men for B.S.A.C. civil employment, 12/5/91; Interview, Mr. Chitsaka Manatsa, 3/12/68.
(7) A2/1/3, Marshall Hole to Brabant, 15/8/92.
(8) A1/9/1, Lendy to Jameson, 23/6/92.
(9) "Memoirs of D.G. Gisborne", Rhodesiana, 0.17, December 1967.
(10) A1/9/1, Short to Local Managing Director, B.S.A.C., 10/3/92.
and Allenberry, near Gungwuo’s Njanja people. In 1892, Chirumanzu’s people had to complain about these “road people” to the Field-Cornet, and one culprit was flogged.

The Court at Victoria did something to protect the Shona from the “road people”, 23 out of 26 Europeans and their servants being convicted for various crimes against Africans between 1893 and 1896. However, Europeans got lighter sentences than coloureds or Cape Africans.

The expansion of European farming was much slower, for several reasons. In the Charter District a permanent farming community developed, especially out of the 1895 treks, but even in 1897 few farmers could point to much work done, and oral tradition in Charter and Chilimanzi tends to date the “coming” of the European farmers from 1899, when Gillfillan surveyed the land. Even so, the Charter-Chilimanzi farmers in 1897 had a bad name for brutality, attributed to their Transvaler attitude to Africans, which presumably existed when they first arrived. Ominously, in 1895 a farmer named Maritz was murdered, close to the area of Sango’s Rozvi, some of the most devoted rebels of 1896.

The nyika of Sango’s Bozvi was pegged, and some of the west of Maromo’s land of Zihota, but the Hara of Mutekedza were hardly touched. Yet farms such as the Allenberry complex near Gungwuo did not cause enough trouble to start rebellion. In Victoria there was considerable pegging before 1896 – at least 60 farms had been claimed – but only 17 farms were occupied in 1896, which probably reflects the shift of Europeans to Matabeleland after 1893. Some of these farmers were Boers of a type disliked by officials as being “Dutchman of the very poorest class”. Yet these farmers, living in Zimuto’s and ChiEwanda’s areas, provoked no rebellion. In short, it seems that although European farming was a potential threat to all African polities, and annoyed collaborators and rebels alike, the density of European farming was not enough to provoke rebellion in itself.

The gigantic land grants made to companies of people like Sir John Willoughby that were to cause so much trouble in the 20th century had not by 1896 made much of an impact, except when an attempt was made to seize African crops as “rent”, near Victoria. As for mining, the only mines in the area or near it were the Beatrice on the Umfuli, the mines in Selukwe and Balingwe, and those close to Victoria. The Matabeleland mines, especially at Selukwe in 1899, had a grim record of accidents and disease, evoking the cry from Shona’s and Banka’s people, in rebellion in 1896, that “anything is preferable to working in the mines”. At Victoria there was considerable development of mines up to 1893, and then the economic slump caused by the opening up of Matabeleland cut the mining in the district down to two mines only by 1895. Prior to the beginning of the Native Department the recruiting methods of the mines are obscure, but mines were heartily disliked by Shona people, the keenest mine-workers being Shangaan or Hlungwes.

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2. DVI/1/1, F.C. Makorwio’s to R.N. Victoria, 8/10/92.
3. DVI/1/1, Victoria R.M.’s Charge book. This gives full details of cases heard.
5. DE 1/2/2, Farms in district, 10/1/97.
6. Interview, Headman Banguro, 9/12/68, Mr. E.M. Dzwova, 13/1/69.
8. J/1/1/1, Ferreira to Marshall Hole, 14/7/95.
10. L2/2/186, Under Secretary to Administrator to Swynnor-Senegal, 11/3/98. 

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One organisation that kept accurate records of its part in penetrating the area was the Resident Magistrate's Court at Victoria. From 1893 it recorded all cases brought before the Magistrate. Even before the Matabeleland Order in Council of 1894, the court had assumed responsibility for at least some jurisdiction over the Shona, even intervening in purely African cases, although the Public Prosecutor warned the R.M.: "It is absolutely necessary for the preservation of peace in the country that the natives should be allowed to settle their own disputes, whether intertribal or personal, among themselves in their own way and therefore when any application is made by natives to you for your interference in such matters you must tell them that you have nothing to do with it, unless of course you think it necessary to interfere in the interests of peace and then you should only do so after communicating with this office."(1) But the Court did interfere not only in cases between Africans and Europeans but in purely African cases in which the chiefs found their position as 'supreme authority in justice' taken away by the court. On the other hand, as noted above, some justice was given Africans against Europeans and their servants. Between 1893 and 1896, not counting the "political" punishment of four chiefs for wire-cutting in 1893, the following numbers of Shona men and women were charged with the offences of theft (32), desertion from or refusal to work (20), cattle theft (11), assault and attempted assault (5), murder and attempted murder (5), extortions (8) and miscellaneous crimes (21). In this case of the theft charges, 4 were acquitted, one 'cautioned', 8 averaged two months hard labour each, 17 averaged 17 lashes each, one got 40 lashes and one the incredible sentence (for theft and escape from custody) of 6 months hard labour, a fine of 5 cattle and 20 goats, and 100 lashes! In the 20 labour cases, one was acquitted, two "cautioned", one fined £1, 7 ordered to return to work, 3 given a month's extra labour each, and 6 averaged 15 lashes each.(2)

These figures give some idea of the way in which the Court and Police supplemented or supplanted traditional legal procedures, apart from the work of the Field-Cornetcies and the Native Department. The high proportion of theft charges illustrates the undeniable tendency of the Shona people along the road to steal articles from the Europeans, a tendency that was at the root of a large proportion of acts of brutality towards the Shona. Thus Colenbrander, who held land west of Fort Charter, wrote from Bulawayo complaining of cattle-thefts, and asked: "What can we do in self defence should any of these fellows be caught in the act of stealing, stabbing or otherwise with cattle or sheep and goats? We are too far removed from any of your magistracies to go and complain. By the time one comes back from either Salisbury or Victoria the Machonas have disappeared 'like rats'. I should like to be a sort of travelling magistrate and drop in upon them Unawares with just sufficient force to give the rat eating loafers hell."(3) That Colenbrander should write this in 1893 shows how inadequate were the arrangements that had been made to deal with this sort of thing in 1892! It also reveals the strength of European feeling on this matter.

In fact, in March 1892, Short, trader at the Umniati Post Station, wrote to the Company in very similar terms, and added: "I beg to suggest that you would see your way to appoint a Field-Cornet on this line, with powers to act between the European and native in their petty cases."(4) Short's problem was general in Mashonaland

(1) DWl/3/1, Public Prosecutor to R.M. Victoria, 23/12/93.
(2) IW 13/1/1, Victoria R.M.'s Charge book. The 100-lash case was Regina vs. Chizembe, 1893.
(3) AI/3/2, Colenbrander to Jameson, 21/1/93.
(4) AI/9/1, Short to Local Managing Director, B.S.A.C., 10/3/92.
in 1892, and the Field Cornetcies he refers to were based on Cape law, where a Field-Cornet was a local military leader for a farming community in time of war and was vested with authority to carry out limited punishment in time of peace. But Jameson, when he instituted Field-Cornetcies, did not think of them in the traditional way. He tried police patrols, such as Lendy's against Negozo in Marandellas, and Chaplin's and Brabant's in South Mashonaland, but in the end he adopted the course of letting the settlers be their own law, which was much cheaper and more satisfactory to the farmers. In 1892 he set up five Field-Cornetcies on the Umtali road and five on the Victoria road. But each official did not necessarily represent a community: in the case of Short at Umniati he only had jurisdiction over a 10-mile radius from his farm, which as there was no other settlement in that area, meant that he had a "licence to flog"!

At Charter, Dunne became responsible for a small community. Young covered "Inyatztzi", Coole "Makowrie's" and Duncan, "Tokwe". In the cases of Dunne, Young and Coole they acquired more responsibilities as the European community slowly grew, in the early days of their appointments they represented almost no one but themselves. Dunne's character has been described. As for Duncan, the Public Prosecutor told the H.M. at Victoria, "You should take most vigorous proceedings against Duncan ... as it is most important that this form of filibustering under the cover of Field Cornets should at once be put a stop to."(3) (Duncan was fined £10, or three months, for "theft, extortion and oppression" and ordered to return the 20 cattle he stole.) (4) Young and Coole both flogged Africans to force them to work, although Coole did defend African rights in the case of the Parkers, who settled in the middle of African ploughed land.(5) On the whole the Field Cornetcies were not a very creditable extension of European rule, but between them they covered almost the whole area from Umfuli to Lundi, and they constituted yet another pressure on the Shona polities.

A final form of unco-ordinated European penetration, quite different from that of the other Europeans, was that of the missionaries. In 1892, the Dutch Reformed Church settled at Morgenster, near Zimbabwe;(6) in 1892 the Berlin Mission started at Gutu, adding another station at Chibi in 1894;(7) and in the north, John White's Methodists settled at Kwenda's in the Chianja country.(8) The Chibi mission, to give an example, did much good work—c.1000 Africans received practically free medical treatment in 1897 alone—although fewer finally forced the Germans to leave Chibi to their Transvaal African preachers.(9) The D.R.C. did a good deal of farming, but spiritually the impact of the missions up to 1896 appears to have been as slight as the missions elsewhere. "In so far as I can judge none of the missions in Victoria District have up to the present time produced any particular effect."(10) As we shall see, all the local chiefs next to the missions were collaborators (Kwenda, Gutu and Chibi) or neutral (Mugabe at Morgenster) but the exact influence of the missions is uncertain.

(1) L2/1/4, Marshall Hole to Short, 23/6/92. Actually Short was unusually friendly to Africans, and married Mutekedza's daughter. Hist.MSS. WB3/2/6.
(2) L2/1/3, Marshall Hole to Dunne, 13/4/92; Young, 8/6/92; Duncan, 8/6/92 and Inskip to Coole, 8/6/92.
(3) DV1/3, Public Prosecutor to H.M.Victoria, 7/2/93.
(4) DV13/3/1, Regina v. Duncan, R., Field-Cornet, Toqui, 31/1/93.
(5) DV1/1/1, Young, memo to H.M., 26/1/92; DV1/1/2, Coole to H.M., 5/12/94; DV12/4/2, Parkers' Land application, 1/7/92.
(6) L2/2/90/1, Dutch Reformed Church.
(7) L2/1/19, District to Surveyor General, 6/1/02.
(8) S.1107, 4/7/93. (9) L2/1/19, M.C.Chibi to C.N.C., 8/12/97.
(10) L2/1/19, C.N. Victoria to Surveyor General, 21/3/98.
We have now seen something of European penetration up to 1896 - except that of the Native Department - and the effect it had on the Shona. But all this has been from the European side. In the meantime, the continual process of African inter-clan and clan politics had been proceeding unabated. The events already noted in the year 1892 from the European viewpoint as leading up to the Matabele War and as illustrating European rule(1) can now be seen in the African context, as factors that had much to do with the behaviour of the collaborators in 1896. The old forces of Ndebele and Rozvi were involved," and so was the new element of the British occupation. It is in years like 1892 that the idea becomes convincing that Shona chiefs did not regard the Europeans as an entirely new factor so much as just another tribal group, to be used to further their own ends if the opportunity offered.

In the far north of the area, Lendy, while patrolling through Salisbury and Marandellas Districts in June, received a complaint from some Rozvi down the Sabi against Magaya, son of Gambiza Svinumuyi of the Njanja. Magaya had been raiding across the Sabi, and when Lendy went to Gambiza the latter proved unable to control his junior. Lendy did nothing at the time, but the incident is important because it illustrates the decline of the Gambiza title, because it indicates some hostility between the Njanja and the future rebels across the Sabi, and because Lendy was so impressed by Gambiza that it is possible that his report led the Native Department in 1895 to think that the Gambiza paramountcy was more important than it really was.(2)

European intervention in Charter took a different course further south. Chiduku, brother of Gunguwo Nokwara of the Njanja, provoked a fight with Maromo's Dzote (over land, goods or even because Chiduku sought Nokwara's death, according to one report).(3) First, in March 1892 he got the support of Werrott and Young, trading partners at Inyatzitzi, and then raided Maromo to steal cattle, one of which he paid to Werrott.(4) Then Brabant, representing the Magistrate at Victoria, came by accident on the "war", and as a result Young was called upon to explain what had been going on.(5) Unfortunately for the Company it had little cause to be indignant, as Brabant had apparently appropriated Gunguwo's spoil and removed it to Victoria without official sanction, and so the matter was allowed to drop.(6) (Werrott was later tried for inciting some Africans to assault Brabant,(7) but Young was appointed Field-Cornet, Inyatzitzi!(8) As far as the African people were concerned, Brabant was held to have acted impartially,(9) but a feud had started between Gunguwo's Njanja and Maromo's Dzote that had a lasting effect, especially in 1896.

It is said that in this war, Gunguwo tried to get "help from Chirumanzu, to whose son he had given a daughter, but Chirumanzu had quite enough to do as it was, and it is not surprising that no help was sent.(10) At this time, the Chirumanzu dynasty was undergoing

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(1) S. Glass, The Matabele War, Longmans, 1968, chs. 3-7; and T.C.Gomara, 1bd., chapters 2 and 3.
(2) AL/9/1, Lendy to Jameson, 23/6/92.
(3) Interviews, Mr. Shanhu Chinjekure, 7/1/69; Chief Musarurwa, 8/1/69; Mr. Matunga Marots Soewe, 12/1/69; Mr. M.M.Dzivose, 13/1/69.
(4) AL/9/1, Brabant to R.M. Victoria, 26/4/92.
(5) A2/1/1, Marshall Hole to Young, 10/5/92.
(6) EN/1/1, Acting Secretary to Administrator to R.M. Victoria, 20/6/92.
(7) CT 1/15/1, Jameson to Rutherford, 20/6/92; J 1/8/1, R.M. Victoria to Public Prosecutor, 7/7/92.
(8) A 2/1/3, Marshall Hole to Young, 8/8/92.
(9) Interviews, Mr. Shanhu Chinjekure, 7/1/69; Chief Musarurwa, 8/1/69.
(10) Interview, Chief Musarurwa, 8/1/69.
a constitutional crisis, which involved outside forces as well as the Houses of the polity. On the death of Chirumanzu Bangure before the Occupation, his brother Chatikobo was installed by the Rozvi as the new chief, according to the collateral succession system. (1) The son of Bangure, Tavingu, nicknamed Chinyama, already a favourite with Lobengula as a hunter, went to Bulawayo and got the aid of the Matabele. They drove Chirumanzu Chatikobo into exile in Gutu District where he joined Makuwaza, claimant to the Gutu title. (2) Chinyama became Chirumanzu, as his father had done, by patrilineal succession, but in this case it was not a matter of chance. The next threat to his position came from his father's other brothers, Chaka and Owatizo, but after a day-long battle in the Mtoo Forest they were defeated, (3) and moved to the northern edges of the forest. "A deadly hatred is kept up to the present day between Manowe [Weale's name for Chinyama] and Owatizo," wrote Weale, the first F.C. for Chirimanzu District in 1895. (4)

One of the most unusual characters of the period, Mansel Edeye Weale left the B.S.A.C.P. on 8-10-91, (5) and began trading from his farm of Idhladha, north-west of Victoria. (6) From there he began to trade (illegally) over the border - the Shashe River - into Chirumanzu's territory, (7) and some time between 1891 and 1897, he married Mapowe, daughter of Chinyama. (8) Whether this was a love-match or not from Weale's point of view, in Chinyama's opinion this was a valuable alliance, for Weale and his coloured servants were a useful force to be kept in reserve against Chaka and Owatizo, even if he did not actually fight them. An indication of the value of such a marriage is that other daughters or girls were given by Chirumanzu Chinyama to Lobengula, and later to Hamba, chief of a group growing in importance to the south-east. (9) The partnership of Weale and Chinyama will be seen regularly up to 1899, but there seems no doubt that it began at about the time Chinyana rose to power, and that Weale's feelings for his father-in-law were almost always friendly, even years after the latter's death, as the eulogy of him in Weale's Reminiscences shows. (10)

To the east of Chirumanzu, the Gutu chiefdom was also undergoing a crisis in 1892, and once again the Matabele were involved. In early 1892, Gutu Donews Iid, and in June Makuwaza "this rightful successor complained to Chaplin of white men interfering with him and his people and taking cattle. Brabant (native commissioner) and Clarke sent out to enquire, were seized and assaulted by rival claimants to Goto's chieftainship." (11) Makuwaza's rival was of the House of Chingombe, and the rivalry between these two men reduced the once powerful Gutu polity to a much weaker state. (12) Brabant and Chaplin, the Resident Magistrate, settled the affair with a Maxim, one of Chingombe's men being killed, and the Company henceforth supported Gutu Makuwaza. (13)

But Makuwaza's position was still not secure, for towards the end of 1892 intelligence reached Chaplin at Victoria that "Chirimanzu on the way to Goto to punish him for supporting us ... the news is

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(1) Interview, Chief Chirumanzu, 9/12/68; HG/4/13, N.C. Chirimanzu to C.N.C., 1/11/92.
(2) Interview, Chief Chirumanzu, 12/12/68; Hist.MSS. E1 5/1/1, N.C. Williams Diary, 7/4/97.
(3) Hist. MSS. WT 3/2/6.
(4) HG/1/1, N.C. Chirimanzu to C.N.C., Annual Report, 1895. Weale calls Chinyama "Mapowe" and Bangure "Rashamira", but there is little doubt of their identity.
(6) NF 12/1/1, Applications for Farms, 17/11/91.
(7) Hist. MSS. WT 3/2/3; Interview, Mr. Ngezav Randolph Mutingwa, 10/12/68.
(8) Interview, Mr. Ruzive Chinyama, 10/12/68; BC 3/1/1, N.C.O. to Chief Secretary to Administrator, 22/8/99.
(9) Sr. Mary Aquina, O.P., life; Interview, Mr. Ruzive Chinyama, 10/12/68.
(10) Hist. MSS. WT 3/2/6. (11) ST 1/15/2, Jameson to Rutherfoord Harris, 9/9/7/17, C.N.C. to C.M.C., 22/4/17. 15/7/92.
(11) Hist. MSS. WT 3/2/3; Interview, Mr. Ngezav Randolph Mutingwa, 10/12/68.
(12) Hist. MSS. WT 3/2/6. (11) ST 1/15/2, Jameson to Rutherfoord Harris, 9/9/7/17, C.N.C. to C.M.C., 22/4/17. 15/7/92.
(13) Hist. MSS. WT 3/2/6. (11) ST 1/15/2, Jameson to Rutherfoord Harris, 9/9/7/17, C.N.C. to C.M.C., 22/4/17. 15/7/92.
verified ... this party of Matebeles is distinctly here for the purpose of attacking Goto."(1) In other words, it seems very likely that Chirumunzu Chinyama was using his hired Ndebele who had put him in power to pursue Chirumunzu Chitikobo who had fled to Gutu Makuvaza, while the Ndebele were exercising their power as overlords over the Gutu polity. The matter was put to the arbitration of Lobengula, and Makuvaza was confirmed as Gutu.(2) Thus Gutu ruled by the patronage of both Lobengula and the Company! Even so, Chingombe was liable to be fractious, and in 1894-5 there was nearly a repetition of the incident, when N.C. Drew once more confirmed Makuvaza as Chief.(3) Chingombe was not particularly bitter towards the Company,(4) but Makuvaza relied heavily on Company help after the death of Lobengula.

The final example of European intervention in African politics was in Chibi's country. There, Chibi's expanding Mhari had mounted two invasions of the territory of the Nemavuzhe to the south, driving them out. The Nemavuzhe went to some Europeans - not necessarily officials - and with their help the Mhari were driven back to their own lands.(5) This represented a direct affront to the ambitions of the Chibi dynasty.

The events of 1892 are worthy of note, because they formed components of the Shona past that eventually decided chiefs' attitudes in 1896.

4: The Impact of the Matabele War on South Mashonaland.

The Matabele War has been written on frequently, but usually in the context of Company - Ndebele relations; even the Newton Report dealt largely with the events close to Victoria, and was in any case not really concerned with the standpoint of African politics.

We have already seen how Mutekedza's Hera, Chirumanzu and Gutu were placed vis-à-vis the Ndebele in 1892, and how the remaining Charter chiefs had been largely left alone, at least since 1890 and probably before this. But how did the other peoples in the area regard the Ndebele? The effect of the raids over a long period had been severe in places. As late as August 1897 a veterinary officer reported: "Many natives formerly resident in this district [Victoria] who migrated to Magatos country in the Transvaal to escape from the Matabili raiders have been returning to their country to reoccupy their old locations."(6) Those Shona who stayed - doubtless a majority - had adapted to a "stronghold" existence, and the "gun frontier" had helped to restore their position. Chibi had survived very well. But the Ndebele were still a dangerous nuisance.

Travelers as far back as Carl Mauch noted the terror caused by Ndebele raids,(7) and although there is no record of raids in the

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(1) A 1/9/1, Telegraphic conversation between Chaplin and Jameson, Salisbury. N.D., filed between 6/9/92 and 6/12/92. It is significant that the robbery of the post cart between Makorla's and Inyatsitzi by part of a Ndebele impi, exactly between Chirumanzu and Gutu, took place on 3/9/92. See CT 1/15/8, Fitzpatrick to Jameson, 15/9/92.

(2) N 1/1/9, A.U.C. Gutu to C.N.O., 9/9/00.

(3) N 3/1/20, N.C. Victoria to C.N.O., 28/9/00.


(6) By 9/2/1, Report of journey made by N.C. Chibi and Veterinary Officer, August 1897.

area up to July 1892, (1) raiders began to be noticeable from then until 1893. Although Matibi was regularly tributary to Lobengula, (2) his people and the polities nearby suffered from raids in August 1892. (3) In July 1892, Napier and Paulet rode into Chibi's territory, found the area being raided, and met an impi whose induna, Somfuli of Haslana's unit, courteously explained that he was collecting tax for Lobengula, but that although they had not killed anybody, Chibi's men had fired on them, wounding one. Most of the men were from Wotza's Karanga in Belingwe District, "Gialalapansi", and others, but units of three regular regiments were present. In November, Colenbrander heard that an impi was being sent to punish Chibi, perhaps because of his resistance in July. (4) In June 1893, Sere's proto-Mhari were raided, (5) and in July the villages around Victoria, including Makumhe and Gokomere, were raided in the events that led up to the "Victoria Incident" on the 18th. (6)

To judge the effect of the Victoria Incident upon the people of South Mashonaland, one must look not only at the present-day statements of old men who were alive at the time, but at the emphasis given to the events by different clan traditions. Thus in Charter District the story of the Victoria and Salisbury Columns' march to Bulawayo is known, (7) and in Chillimanzi the name of M’gandane is remembered. (8) But in Chibi the whole affair is recalled with a remarkable vividness: the names and actions of Manywo and M’gandane, the clothing given them by the Europeans at the indaba, and even apocryphal conversations are given. "When the amandelele people disagreed with the Europeans, then the Europeans reported this to [Salisbury?] and so they gave the Europeans authority for fighting against the amandelele... He was called M’gandane, he was killed and his head was cut off." (9) The details of the Victoria Incident and the Matabele War are remembered more readily in Chibi than other events, and the reason would seem to be that the defeat of the Mabels was extremely important, as removing a dangerous menace to Mhari power.

Once the battle of 18th July was over, the Karanga polities had to adjust to the new situation. Chirumanzu’s people had been regarded with some hostility by the Company in June 1893, when Jameson complained to Lobengula about thefts committed by Chirumanzu’s people and threatened to cross the Sheshe River border if the King did not act himself. (10) Weale describes in his reminiscences how Zilha, the proto-Mhari chief in Selukwe District with whom Chirumanzu had a "standing feud", informed Jameson that Chirumanzu was pro-Ndebele and would attack Victoria. Hence Willoughby planned to eliminate him as a military force, but Weale objected to this, and his friend Arnold was sent to raise a force from Chirumanzu to aid the Column. The chief sent a force of his best men, and told Arnold that he thought the Europeans would win. (Banka then offered a force as well, but because of the feud they were put under another man, quoted.) (11)

These Shona forces accompanied the Columns into Matabeleland,

(1) S. Glass, ibid., pp. 51 ff. (2) F 3/33/6, Chibi History, 1904. (3) A2/8/3, Marshall Hole to Rutherford Harris, 22/6/92. (4) A1/9/1, Paulet to Jameson, 25/1/92; A1/8/1, Colenbrander to Marshall Hole, 13/11/92 and 12/12/92. Since the story of the death of Mazorodze is still connected with this incident (S. Glass, ibid., pp. 56–7), recent research may correct this notion. Oral tradition in Chibi agrees that Mazorodze was flayed alive after the raid in which the Nkizo regiment was so badly damaged (see NY/1/4, N.C. Chibi to S.W. Victoria, 9/13/14, and 9/11/1, N.C. Chibi to C.M.C., Annual Report, 1895), but it is unanimous that Chibi Madhlangovw was ruling from Shaningwe in 1890 (see my informant, Chibi District, and D.K. Parkinson, ibid.). This makes Mazorodze’s death earlier than 1890, and since Coillard described "Maliankobô" at "Nyanikò" ruling over Nyanobe in 1877, he probably died before then, as "Maliankobô" is evidently Chibi. See F. Coillaud, Sur le Haut-Zambeze, p. 29. The English text gives "Maliankowski", which was the Zululand form.
and Chirumansu's action marked a major volte-face in his foreign policy, as he now depended on a Company victory, and the possibility of a Ndebele renaissance was as unpleasant to him as it was to Chibi and the other Karanga people to the south. The fall of the Ndebele state also removed one of the props of Gutu Mukwazis's rule over Chingombe and the other discordant elements of his polity, and from now on his main external support was the Company. Oral tradition in Chibi states that Chibi Madlilangove was asked to help the Europeans in 1893, but he did not do so, whereupon he was forced to hand over cattle as compensation. (1) On the other hand, Chibi was able to start to restore his "empire" in the north-west, over Shiku, who had been taken from his rule by the Ndebele, and by early 1897 Shiku was under Mbari rule again. (2)

John Meikle described how in 1893 he entered Matabeleland to raid the "King's" Ndebele cattle; (3) and many other Europeans raised large numbers of cattle in the tumultuous months after the fall of Bulawayo. (4) But the Europeans were not the only ones to take advantage of the collapse of Ndebele power. The Shona who had for so long lost their cattle in raids took every opportunity to recoup their losses, and parties of Shona from as far away as the Sabi raided Matabeleland for cattle. (5) By 1894 very considerable quantities of "Ndebele" cattle bearing the King's mark were in the Karanga polities of Mashonaland and eastern Matabeleland, and this posed a problem for the Native Department when it was formed.

One result of the War was ironic in the extreme. The great objection of the Europeans to the Ndebele raids had been that they made economic development of the Victoria area impossible by scaring off the local labour. Now that the Company had conquered Matabeleland with a force raised under the Victoria Agreement under which each man got 3,000 morgen, 20 claims — twice the standard Mashonaland allowance — as well as loot, Victoria as a European area was largely depopulated. In 1895 the Mining Commissioner reported: "Very little prospecting has been going on in the district since '93." (6) By 1900 the Civil Commissioner could report only 200 Europeans living in the district, no mining at all, and most Europeans being engaged in trading for grain from the Africans. (7)

This depression in the Victoria area lasted for many years, and for the Shona people, in view of the pressure put upon them by European settlement in the past — traders, transport riders, miners, farmers — as we have seen, this "local economic depression must have made life much easier. However, whereas unco-ordinated European pressure upon the Africans in the area decreased after 1893, a new pressure began in 1894 with the foundation of the Native Department.

[notes continued from previous page]:

(5) CT 1/4/1/1, Landy to Jameson, 19/6/93.
(6) Interview, Mr. Chitsaka Manatsa, 29/11/68.
(7) Interview, Chief Musarurwa, 8/1/69. (8) Interview, Mr. Ngwavaire
(9) Interviews, Mr. Nyota Makotose, 27/11/68; Mutizigwa, 10/12/68.
(10) A2/1/5, Jameson to Goldbrand, 30/6/93. (11) Hist. MSS. MS 3/2/3.

(1) Interview, Mr. Nyota Makotose, 27/11/68.
(2) N 1/1/12, List of Paramounts and Sub-Chiefs in Chibi District, 5/3/97.
(3) Hist. MSS. MS 1/1/1; DW 2/2/1, G.C. Victoria to Hoyle (solicitor), 7/12/93.
(4) L 2/3/8, Vigors to Duncan (Surveyor General), 7/12/93. 8/12/93.
(5) N 1/1/2, N.C. Charter to C.N.C., 19/2/93; Hist. MSS. MS 1/1/1.
(6) F 4/1/1, N.C. Victoria to Statist, August 1895.
(7) DW 9/1/1, Agricultural Report, 31/3/00.
A final effect of the war was its impression upon European attitudes: "all the Europeans who were coming into the country, because they were telling us to accept them because they had fought for us against the Matabele." (Referring to Afrikaner settlement in Enkeldoorn.) "It is my power, who defeated the Matabele people, I ought to take their cattle," said Nkale to the Mhari in 1895, (1) and it was in this spirit that the Native Department set to work.

5. Pressures on the Shona; the Native Department, 1894—6.

The origins and early development of the Native Department in Rhodesia, in terms of general policy and legislation, have already been covered by J. J. Taylor in his Henderson Seminar paper of 1968. The purpose of this section is to assess the role of the Native Department as a pressure upon the area under discussion, between its foundation and the outbreak of the rebellion in 1896.

The end of the Matabele War saw two new factors to be considered by the Company in South Mashonaland. One was an outbreak of lawlessness among the Shona people; the other was the great mass of Ndebele cattle retrieved by the Shona after the war. The first problem was dealt with by the existing authorities, the police and Magistrates courts, but the second problem devolved from these authorities to the Native Department, which was created in 1894.

In the confusion of the Matabele War, some Ndebele units raided Matibi's towards the end of 1893, necessitating the erection of a police station there (about 11-11-93). (2) But the Ndebele were not the only culprits. In November, some Shona chiefs stole oxen and mules from the coach service, and upon a patrol being made, the Civil Commissioner reported: "They had some difficulty with the Kaffirs, but succeeded in recovering a few of the oxen, and found the telegraph wire that had been stolen [in April 1893, in "Setoutsi's" area (3)] in one of the kraals." Many stock were taken in punishment, and as "Mr. Rhodes agreed that the men engaged (6 Europeans, 250 Africans) should take half the loot. I have received 100 head more or less of cattle and 320 goats and sheep being half the stock captured from the Kaffirs." (4)

There was also trouble between the local chiefs, and as some Europeans complained that these faction fights stopped labour supplies, Vigors called them to an indaba and warned them that they would be punished if they persisted. "All natives or most of them at any rate understand that after the New Year they will have to pay a hut tax of £1 per annum," wrote Vigors, who had apparently anticipated the tax legislation of 1894 in his own way. (5) If the southern Shona chiefs had imagined that the defeat of the Ndebele left them totally free, they had been rapidly disillusioned!

The cattle problem was more serious and long-lasting. According to the Victoria Agreement, all Ndebele cattle were regarded as "loot" to be divided between the Company and the volunteers of the war. The seizure of the herds in Matabeleland has been described elsewhere, (6) but the seizure of the Ndebele cattle that had been taken by the southern Shona deserves a special mention. The Company tried to keep the early seizures by private individuals within the

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(1) Interviews, Mr. Munyuki Mudziwupasi, 13/1/69, Mr. Mativenga Mapenguire, 3/12/68.
(2) D. & R. Rutherfoord Harris, 7/3/94.
(3) S. Glass, ibid., p. 63.
(4) Vigors to Duncan (Surveyor-General), 7/12/93.
(5) Ibid.
bounds of reason, condoning Weikle's raid, but "I refused to give them [some Boers] permission [to collect cattle] because I know that they would raid the whole country taking Mashona as well as other cattle."

Even in December 1893, Brabant had collected Ndebele cattle, and by mid-1894 the Field-Cornets had been recruited to collect the herds - Coole of Makori's got 39 out of 200-odd head being taken to the Sabi for safety in July, N.C. Drew collected 270 head in Chiibi's area in October, as well as tax cattle. Shortly afterwards he added 60 head from Chirumanzu's area. Drew noticed no overt opposition when doing this, but he felt it necessary to warn Chiibi's people that Shona (Maholi) refugees coming into the district must surrender their herds, or the chiefs would be punished. The search for Ndebele cattle was continued into 1895 and is well remembered by old men who saw it in progress. "I was the young boy, to herd the cows of the cattle which were taken from the Amandebele, and I was milking the cattle and would go with the milk to the tent [of Brabant and Drew]." "The Europeans were looking for those cattle ... and Charli [Weale] looked very much for those which had come, and found some of them, and he would take them."

The seizure of the Ndebele cattle might have been looked upon as "easy come, easy go" by the Shona, but the real function of the Native Department, the collection of hut tax, bit far more deeply. This was because it was intended to tax their accumulated wealth of crops and herds that had survived the Ndebele raids, whenever cash derived from labour for European employers was not forthcoming.

As the Hut Tax returns for 1894-5 do not differentiate between cash derived from labour and cash derived from sales of tax stock, it is difficult to estimate the extent to which the Native Department actually persuaded the Africans to work for European employers. Some of the Africans around Victoria had been all the way to Johannesburg and Kimberley to earn the money by late 1895, as much tax was paid in gold earned there that year. The labour system inside Rhodesia was less voluntary: in Victoria, Brabant recruited 50 men for the Ayrshire Mine in Lomogundi, but only 20 arrived, whenceupon he collected 100 more from Charter. Precisely how Brabant recruited these men is uncertain, but in view of his unsavoury reputation, and N.C. Taylor's statement that forced labour existed in Charter before the rebellion, one can legitimately make a guess.

In the case of the supply of the local demand for labour, the N.C. was expected to "provide boys for mines in this district first," but even this was not easy. "Mine labour has been scarce for the past few months on account of the rivers being full, and the natives working in their gardens. I have sent word to most of the Chiefs in the lower part of the district to send boys for mine work, and expect a regular supply about the middle of February, and as I

(1) L 2/3/8, op.cit.
(2) DV l/1/2, Coole to Inspector M.M.P. Victoria, 9/7/94.
(3) N 1/1/12, N.C. Victoria to G.N.G., 2/10/94.
(4) N 1/1/12, N.C. Victoria to G.N.G., 16/10/94.
(5) Interview, Mr. Chitsaka Manatsa, 29/11/68.
(6) Interview, Headman Masunda, 2/12/68.
(7) Interview, Headman Masunda, 2/12/68.
(8) N 1/1/12, A.N.C. Victoria to G.N.G., 3/2/96.
(9) N 1/1/12, N.C. Victoria to G.N.G., 4/6/95.
(12) N 1/1/12, N.C. Victoria to Lingard, 14/10/95.
am returning to that part of the district [Ndanga], will be able to hurry them on; they are mostly a mixture of Shanganes and Makalakas. As for the raw Makalakas these are coming in daily for work, but they will on no account work in the mines, only outside work, and then only for a month. As the two mines only employ a limited amount of boys for outside work they will be compelled before long to work in the mines and especially now as grain is getting scarce and in some parts the crops are a complete failure."(1) Thus although labour was not enforced in chain-gang fashion, it was none the less compulsory in the sense that the Company was accustomed to ordering Chiefs to supply labour, in order to get cash for tax as well as to satisfy European needs.

The recruitment of labour hit the young, able-bodied men more than anyone, but the collection of stock, especially cattle, and grain in lieu of cash hit at the entire chieftainship. Cattle did not play such an important part in a Shona polity as it had in the Ndobele state, but nevertheless, cattle were wealth and their loss was the more keenly felt because the Shona had smaller herds. Stock were being sold under the aegis of the Civil Commissioner at Victoria in April 1894.(2) By the end of the year 483 head of cattle and 875 sheep and goats had been collected in Tuli, Victoria (including Chilimani and Chibi) and Charter Districts. Between January and July 1895, the corresponding figures were 1,187 and 3,020, and between July and December, 2,333 and 1,760. Thus the total stock - apart from Ndobele cattle seized - taken between August 1894 and December 1895 were 3,903 cattle and 5,655 sheep and goats.(3) The progressive increase in cattle figures is partly explained by the presence of the C.N.C., Brabant, in the south of the area with a "pack" of three N.Cs. (Weale, Meredith and Ecksteen, as well as Drew at Victoria) and the transfer of Meredith from Charter to the Lundi in September and October. Obviously a concerted effort was being made to collect cattle in the Victoria area, and Charter, a future "rebel" area was even neglected, with eleven personnel changes at the Range office in a year.(4)

What effect did this stripping of the accumulated stock wealth of the southern Shona have? According to the 1895 census, compiled by the N.Cs., the total stock of these areas only amounted to 9,580 cattle and 17,920 sheep and goats.(5) In other words, the Native Department took roughly one-third of the cattle and one-quarter of the sheep and goats of the hords that they could see, in only seventeen months! No wonder when Taberer became C.N.C. he emphasised that stock was not to be taken if cash from labour could be gained.(6)

The impact of the Native Department was not confined to the general collection of tax and the encouragement of labour. Members of the Department also intervened in African politics, and although any decision may have favoured one side, it also alienated the other. Thus when Weale was in Marandellas District as N.C., the old Chirumanzu Chinyama - Chaka feud flared again. (Weale had returned to his farm between Victoria and Chirumanzu after the War, and having joined the Forestry Department in May 1893, continued in this post until March 1894.(7) By a coincidence the chief natural forest near Victoria was the Mtoo, near Chirumanzu and Chaka!)

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(1) D l/l/2, A.N.C. Victoria to C.N.C., 3/2/96.
(2) Dw 1/2/1, Duncan to C.J. Victoria, 27/4/94 and 15/5/94.
(3) These figures are derived from a critical examination of the hut tax returns for 1894 and 1895, 45/1/1, C.N.C. to Acting Administrator, 7/2/95 and Secretary of Native to Administrator, 19/7/95, and correspondence for the period from the Victoria and Charter offices, N1/1/12 and N1/1/2.
(4) Correspondence in N1/1/2, N1/1/10 and N1/1/12.
(5) F4/1/1, Lingard to Statist, 21/9/95. Although the census figures do not reflect the real stock population of each district, it does give some idea of the wealth of the area the N.C. had been able to penetrate by 1895, and shows that the final impact of his tenure upon the
In accordance with Administration policy, N.C. Drew in October 1894 ordered Chaka to move from his position in the Mteo Forest where he had been since the coup of Chirumanzu Chinyana in c.1892. Drew's motive was to preserve forest land, but he warned that "the dispute between Chilimanzi and Chaka will now be renewed in consequence of Chaka having to go back to the old lands which Chilimanzi claims to be in his territory."(1) Sure enough, in a few days Coole, now Hut Tax Collector (N.C.) for Nhoma's District, reported that Chirumanzu's and Nhoma's people were very unsettled. Brabant's reaction was to suggest a show of force, but this was forestalled by the Acting Administrator, Duncan, who merely had Chirumanzu warned to pay tax regularly.(2) Thus as a result of these moves, Chaka was put in a more dangerous position by being evicted from the Mteo, while Chirumanzu Chinyana was nearly raided as a result of Coole's report. (It is noticeable that up to his death in 1897 Coole was usually aligned against Chirumanzu Chinyana. The part played by Coole and Quested in the area of the Chirumanzu-Nhoma-Banka chieftoms needs a lot more research.)

In Chibi's district, already the scene of a raid by European police from Salukwe, loading Ndebole troops, in November 1894, in which Drew defended the right of the Mhari to bear arms because they had not been involved in the Ndebole surrender,(3) fresh trouble arose. Weale was transferred back to the Victoria area from Marandellas in 1895, and was appointed N.C. at Victoria, under Drew, with responsibility for Chirumanzu's and Chibi's with effect from about May 1895,(4) the idea being to take some of the load off Drew's shoulders. Weale went into Chibi District, where he found the situation mentioned earlier (p. ) in which Chibi's Mhari were overlords over several groups, including Musipambi's Ngowa who had once ruled the district. Weale was collecting cattle for tax and the Matabele Loot fund, and is still vividly remembered. "He would tell the people, you can't take these cattle, the cattle are ours, because it's we who defeated those Amandebelo people. Because he was very harsh, Chari, and his father-in-law was Chirumanzu!" (laughter). (5) "Chari was very harsh ... he was thrashing people, he could not settle them."(6)

When Weale arrived, a dispute was in progress between Musipambi and Matsweru's House of the Mhari, over the hill Chidziva, and Weale was given a girl by the Ngowa, in order to settle the case in their favour. "Chari was given a woman by the Bungoma people, ... and he gave that woman to the police ... and Chari had to call the Bungoma people brother-in-law!"(7) "He married her first, then gave her to the police."(8) The decision made by Weale in this matter was the subject of a letter from Forrestall to Weale in 1897: "You would greatly oblige me by giving me some particulars re the settlement of M'Sipambio's by yourself and whether Makonese [of Matsweru's House] is the sub chief of that part of the District as he

[Notes 6 & 7 from previous page]

(7) A 2/8/4, Acting Secretary to Administrator to Rutherford Harris, 30/6/93; A2/4/1, Duncan to Weale, 29/3/94.
(8) Interview, Headman Masunda, 2/12/68.

(1) N1/1/2, N.C. Victoria to C.N.C. 2/10/94 and 16/10/94.
(2) DV 1/2/1, Duncan to R.M. Victoria, 30/10/94 and 1/11/94.
(3) N 1/1/12, N.C. Victoria to C.N.C., 25/11/94.
(4) N 1/1/12, N.C. Victoria to C.N.C. Office, 12/6/95.
(5) Interview, Headman Masunda, 2/12/68.
(6) Interview, Mr. Chitsaka Manatsa, 29/11/68.
(7) Interview, Mr. Nyota Makotose, 27/11/68.
(8) Interview, Mr. Chitsaka Manatsa, 3/12/68.
claims to be such, and I wish to act in accordance with the arrangements made by you."(1) All of my informants who mentioned the matter except one state that Weale's decision was made in favour of the Ngowa, which is supported by the way Weale wrote his report for 1895, which refers to Msipambi as though he was equal in status to Chibi, although not as powerful.(2) If this is so, then the Chibi dynasty had one more cause for annoyance against the Company, because Weale had backed an undoubted subject against his paramount.

Finally, in Charter, N.C. Thompson was tactless enough to try to enforce the rights of Gambiza Ngwena over four headmen or chiefs including one named "Marumo". If this man was Marumo of the Njanja House of Rutanga, then Thompson was ignoring Chief Rutanga's rights, while if the man concerned was Marumo, then he was trying to enforce the paramountcy of an Njanja over a fully independent Dzete ruler! He reported to Salisbury, "(detectives) report natives fired on them saying they recognised no say of Company neither Gambese although under him ... all down there refuse absolutely pay but tax saying if any white people come they will shoot them. Detectives showed marks where natives had sjamboked them."(3) Brabant apparently restored the situation with a threat of force,(4) but the Department's action had certainly not strengthened the Gambiza paramountcy as Thompson had obviously intended.

6 : Collaboration.

In March 1896, a majority of the Ndebele and a part of the Shona people of the province of Matabeleland rose against the Europeans. Professor Ranger has described how the traditional authorities of the Ndebele nation, the Mwari cult and the Karanga chieftaincies involved all combined to eliminate the European presence outside the few laagers by the 30th March. He has described the way in which the Mwari cult's system of manyusa spread the word and arranged an almost simultaneous rising and how some of the Belingwe Shona had commenced a limited campaign against the local Europeans even before the main risings occurred. Later, he describes the extension of the rebellion to Mashonaland in June, with the same main factors of the Mwari cult and the Shona chieftaincies, including the Rozvi element, but with the factor of the Ndebele military revival almost non-existent and with the Shona system of spirit mediums taking its place in the organisational trinity of rebellion.(5)

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the effect of these two great surges of revolt upon the area under discussion, and to explain the role of the collaborationist policies not only in relation to these forces of revolt, but in relation to the common history of the area.

First, one must delineate the policies that actually rebelled. Since there was no gradual spread of the revolt between the first onslaught in March and the second in June, it is convenient to deal with these separately and to discuss the committal of the collaborators to the European side according to whether it was the first or the second rising that forced them to make their choice.

The easternmost rising of March was that of the Shona in Belingwe District, who made their first moves against the Europeans on the 27th March,(6) although Native Department patrols had been ambushed as early as the 10th.(7) At first the Europeans in the local

(1) NVC 1/1/1, N.C. Chibi to N.C. Chilimanzi, 14/2/97.
(2) N 9/1/1, N.C. Chilimanzi, Chibi and Msipambi to C.N.C., Annual Report, 1895.
(3) N 1/1/2, N.C. Charter to C.N.C., 19/2/95.
(4) N 1/1/2, Brabant (Charter) to Ogilvie (Salisbury), 8/3/95.
(6) En 2/9/1, C.G. Belingwe to Duncan, 5/4/96.
(7) En 1/2/27, Acting 3.7.3, Belingwe to Administrator, 10/3/96.
lager referred to their besiegers as "Matabele", (1) but in the campaigns that followed it became evident that the rebels were Shona, consisting principally of the chieftains of Wedza, Nyamondo, "Solomba", "Umliat", "Nkholontshile" and "Senda" of Mpateni. (2) However, not all the Shona of Belingwe rebelled; groups to the east and south, especially the Ngwa chieftains headed by Mazwima, stayed neutral. (3) To the north, the proto-Mhari clans of Nhema and Banka maintained an uneasy peace until June. (4) In the first three months of the Matabele Rebellion the areas north and west of Gwelo were in resistance, but the south and east were quiet. (5) In the action on the Iron Mine Hill road in April the attackers evidently came from the regimental depot at Amuyoni. (6)

The actual resistance in the Karanga country may have had these limits, but the raw material for resistance did not. We have already seen something of European penetration in general from 1890 to 1896—the roads and towns and their attendant traders, wagonners, field-cornets and courts; the farms and mines and their need for labour; and the Native Department that attempted to satisfy that need as well as to collect taxes and seize Ndebele cattle. We have also seen some European intervention in African politics.

Granted that the Karanga country had as much cause to rebel as any other area, did the mechanism for revolt exist here also? We have seen the chieftainships of this area in action up to 1896, and there is little in this record to suggest that they were very different from those politics that took part in the risings of March and June—Wedza, Nhema, Banka, Maromo, Mutekaiwa or Mashayamombe, to mention only a few. Some, such as Gutu, may have been internally weak, but others such as Chirumanzu and Chibi have been seen to be equally strong.

The factor of the Mdebele military tradition was—naturally—absent, but this did not stop the rising in places that lacked that tradition. Nor did the factor of the great supra-clan moniornos such as Nehanda and Kagubi exist in the south to the same extent as in the north, but the Mwari cult had very strong links there. (7) For example, in February 1897, only a few months after the fighting stopped in the Mwari cult's area, "The Police captured a man who was travelling in the Southern part of the district, he was carrying a battle-axe and blowing a war-horn, he stated that he had been sent by the Mlimo to settle a chieftainship that was in dispute." (8) The presence of both the Mwari cult and the great spirit mediums was not necessary to promote rebellion in northern and eastern Mashonaland or in eastern Matabeleland, and the Mwari cult by itself ought to have been enough to raise South Mashonaland.

Moves were definitely made in March and April to get the Karanga people to join with their compatriots in Belingwe and the Ndebele. Thus in Victoria in early May two "Maholis" from Nhema's area were executed after a Karanga man with them "turned Queen's evidence and stated that Maholis were sent by Mahli to kraals in this district to blow the war horn and incite the natives to rebel." (9) This was later considered to have prevented rebellion in the vicinity of Victoria, (10) but as we shall see in the case of Chibi and Chirumanzu, the question of rebellion was considered by the Karanga chiefs.

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(1) A 1/12/10, Vizard to Vintcent, 19/4/96.
(3) BA 5/1/12, Vintcent to C.R.O. Belingwe to C.R.O. Bulawayo, 10/9/96.
(5) BA 2/3/1, Gibbs to C.S.O., 22/6/96.
(6) A 10/10/2, Gibbs Column Order Book. (6) A1/12/35, Bel to Vintcent.
(7) Ranger, ibid., pp.146, 149-51, 153. Files A1/2/12/ii, NV01/1/1, 1/5/96
(8) N3/3/12, N3/33/12, NH9/2/1, NH9/4/5 and many others contain much on the power of the Mwari cult, which is still extant in Chibi.
(9) N3/1/8, NH3. Pidzana to C.S.O., 2/1/97. This indicates the cult's
We must now examine the part played by the collaborators. In the far south of the Shona territory, close to both the Ndebele and the Hlengwe, was Matibi's polity. Up to 1892, Matibi had paid tribute regularly to the Ndebele and was left alone, but in that year he suffered raids, as we have seen, and in the event he decided to join the Europeans in 1896. In early June, Brabant, recalled from the Cape, arrived at Belingwe with 200 of Matibi's men, and on the 10th took a major part in the Battle of Belingwe Peak, distinguishing themselves in the action. They then retired to their own territory when Brabant went to Charter, but there was no doubt that the Matibi dynasty was committed to the European side, and that it was not simply a case of Brabant's reputation forcing unwilling men to fight. In June, Matibi's son Machedu aided the above action, and in 1897 Matibi himself was commended for his help being one of the first subsidised Karanga chiefs. (Unfortunately, because of research difficulties, I can at present only offer the hypothesis that Matibi's attitude was determined by a dislike of a revival of Ndebele power.)

In Chibi, the evidence is more certain. By 1896, the Chibi dynasty had suffered various threats from European penetration. One type of threat was sheer nuisance-value; that of the road and its problems of thefts and assaults by the transport-riders and traders, as well as the activities of such men as Duncan, Field-Cornot, Tokwe, whose pillaging has been seen earlier. There was also the threat to the clan wealth of cattle, and its labour-force, posed by the seizure of stock as "Matabele loot" or hut tax, and the recruitment of labour for the mines. Finally - and this was perhaps the most telling point of all - the dynasty itself had been threatened by the establishment of the Court at Victoria, which could override the chief's judicial power, and especially by Weal's aid to the previously subject Ngom of Musipambi and the European aid that helped regain the Nemavuzhe lands. This dynastic threat was especially dangerous and likely to cause a rising, because it endangered the position of the traditional leaders who could bring a rising about.

Accordingly, some time in the early days of the Ndebele rising, "a meeting was called at Chibi's by some of the chiefs to discuss the advisability of rising". Masunda's House - situated near the passes and therefore more subject to European penetration than any other - advocated rebellion. "The spirit of Chikanga, through his medium Maziriri so strongly discountenanced the rising that all thought of it was given up." "Maziriri is the medium for the spirit of Tshikanga who also came to the district with Mraripave and is also a great spirit of the same tribes as Dombo." (Nhema, Banka and Bere). On the face of it, it appears that the religious power of the mhondoro Chikanga had decided the matter, against rebellion.

But there are several objections to this interpretation. First, the Chikanga mhondoro had power over Nhema and Banka as well as Chibi, yet these two polities fought the Europeans. Secondly, there is evidence that Mazarire the svikiro worked very closely with his younger brother, Chibi Madzhangove. On this basis, the

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(1) N3/33/8, Chibi History, 1904.
(2) BA 2/9/1, O.C. Belingwe to Administrator, Bulawayo, 25/6/95.
(3) N 3/14/4, N.C. Chibi to S.N. Victoria, 9/10/14.
(4) BA 2/9/1, O.C. Belingwe to Carrington, 2/7/96.
(5) BA 2/1/1. Return of Natives who have surrendered in Belingwe District.
(7) N 9/2/1, N.C. Chibi to C.N.C., 19/10/97.
(9) "Mazarire", NAM, 1935.
(10) Interviews, Headman Madzanga, 2/12/68 and Mr. S.Takavarasha (great-nephew of Mazariri), 28/11/68.
decision of Hazarire may have been that of Madhlangove as well, and if
this is so, the decision becomes understandable.

If the Matabele Rebellion were to be successful, this would imply a renaissance of Ndebele power, especially in view of the revival of the traditional Ndebele leadership in the rising. The possibility of such a revival was too great a menace to the Chibi dynasty. The raids of the Ndebele had done very severe damage to the polity, both in terms of lives lost, stock captured and in a general inhibition of agricultural development away from the hill-
strongholds. Secondly, the political expansion of the Mhari power had been halted by Ndebele rule: under the Ndebele, Shiku had been removed from Chibi's orbit, whereas after 1893 Shiku had tended to revert to his old status as vassal. Thirdly, Ndebele power was a threat to the dynasty: the Ndebele system of patrilineal succession had led Makonese to supplant his Father Chibi Hatoweru with the Ndebele military backing, while Chirori's betrayal of Chibi Hazorodze had led to the latter's fleeing. The Chibi dynasty could not feel really secure with Ndebele power to the west. On the whole it seems evident that Chibi Madhlangove, forced like every chief in 1896 to make a choice between rebelling or not, chose not to on the grounds that the Europeans were the lesser menace. (1) However, he could not afford to see an Ndebele victory, and therefore he moved from neutrality straight to collaboration.

Chibi did not mount a large field force as did some other collaborators, but his friendship proved vital for the survival of the Belingwe laager. In May, Chibi sent a message to Leing at Belingwe "saying that he is willing and anxious to assist in the putting down of the rebellion in this district". Leing replied that he was not ready yet, "but that when we require his assistance shall let him know at once." (2) Chibi did from the beginning given an open passage to messengers between Belingwe and Victoria, and it was only through his area that communications between Belingwe and the Company were maintained, so that forces from Tuli, Victoria and Gwelo could converge to destroy the rebel forces in Belingwe. A measure of the personal commitment of Chibi Madhlangove to the Europeans was his delegation of his son Tagwireyi to carry messages and scout for the Belingwe Europeans. (3) (Even the House of Masunda included members in the force later raised by Weale for service in Charter.) (4) When Weale accompanied Hopper's force to Belingwe in May, he had some of Chibi's men with him, although he personally was not friendly to Chibi's people. (5) (Because of the Mutsimbwa affair of 1895?) By August, Chibi was being relied upon to capture rebel refugees, and in the same month Wedza threatened to attack him. (6)

In August the Native Department raised a force of 1,800 men from the districts around Victoria to fight Muteke's Hera in Charter, and a proportion of this was raised by Weale in Chibi, including Masunda's area. In general, although Chibi did not provide the same military strength on the European side as, say, Chirumazu, his was a sustained collaboration from the decision of

(1) Another factor was that the chief Belingwe rebel, Wedza, had raided Chibi with the Ndebele in 1892.
(2) RA 2/9/1, O.C. Victoria to Administrator, 26/5/96.
(3) RA 2/9/2, Leing to Carrington, 28/8/96; interview, Mr. Chitsaka Manatsa, 29/11/68; Weale later wanted to reward Tagwireyi himself - NVC 1/1/1, N.C. Chibi to C.M.C., 5/3/97.
(4) Interview, Headman Masunda, 2/12/68.
(5) RA 2/11/1, O.C. Belingwe to Administrator, n.d.; Hist.MSS. WE 3/2/6.
the Chikanga mhondoro to the end of the fighting, and his power made possible not only the survival of Belingwe laager but the co-ordination of forces in Eastern Matabeleland against the rebels.

Two other collaborating politics were those of Zimuto and Gutu, north of Victoria.(1) In June, after news had reached Victoria that Nhema and Banka had joined the main rising, R.S. Forrestall and Ekesteen went into Zimuto's territory and recruited a force of 450 men, and then travelled via Gutu's, where they raised a further 250, to the border between Chirumanzu and Banka, where they did considerable damage to Banka's kraals, but then retired as Nhema's force seemed menacing.(2) In July a force of 2,000 similarly raised by Forrestall accompanied Hurrell in his attack on Nhema's.(3) At the same time, Drew took 240 Victoria 'friendlies' up to Charter District, but on his leaving then at Altons while he went to the Fort, they were routed by a counter-attack of the local rebels, and had to be withdrawn. Another force did rather better under Weale in Charter in September.(4) Zimuto's motives for this sort of collaboration remain obscure, but Gutu's attitude is easier to explain: although Gutu Makuvaza owed his position to Lobengula's arbitration as well as B.S.A.C. support against his rival Chingombe, since 1893 he had relied upon Company support alone vis-à-vis his position in the chieftaincy. When the Europeans were asking for help he could hardly refuse: the Europeans were much closer than the Ndebele!

The outstanding collaborator in the area is Chirumanzu, yet his position in the early days of the Ndebele rising was rather ambiguous. Weale had taken over the Chirumanzu area in 1895, and although he had made himself useful to his father-in-law before, it is from this time that their relationship became very close. Hama Mheware, claimant to the title of the emergent Hama polity south-east of Chirumanzu, went to either Embient or Meredith in 1895 and got his support for the Hama title. Chirumanzu was so angry that he complained to his son-in-law, who flogged Hama until he cried "Ndaiadza", "I have done wrong". This strengthened Chirumanzu's power over Hama, which exists today and was cemented by the gift of a daughter by Chinymiya.(5)

In March 1896, Weale was warned, by Chirumanzu that the rebellion had broken out, and that "He did not know what to do - he did not want to fight the white men, and did not wish to see them go. However circumstances might become too strong for him and he did not wish to have any white men in his district while the trouble was on." He added: "If you hear that I have rebelled it will be because I have had to do so against my wish, but that is not to stop you from fighting for the white man whom I feel convinced will win out in the end."(6) Chirumanzu allowed Weale to take some of his relatives as a police force to Victoria, but remained neutral for the time being, although Weale's Chirumanzu men went on active service with him.

Chirumanzu's attitude is understandable under the circumstances as although he could expect no friendship from the Ndebele after his behaviour of 1893, the fighting had not yet involved any of his neighbours. But in June 1896, an African reported that Banka and Nhema had cut the communications of Gwelo with the north,(7) and it was soon afterwards confirmed.(8) This brought the active allies of the Ndebele to the Ngazire River on Chirumanzu's boundary, but

(1) Professor Ranger writes (Ranger, ibid., p.222): "These testimonies [of Kagubi's influence] came from the Hartley ... and Gutu districts - a spread covering virtually the whole area of the Shona rebellion." Gutu Makuvaza definitely did not rise, and the chief Gutu referred to (R.M., No.342, now S.401, No342) is a minor chief near N.C. Campbell's camp in Salisbury District.
(2) Al/12/36, O.C, Victoria to Vintcent,19/6/96; B4/1/1,S.O.Salisbury to O.S.O. 24/6/96.
(3) Bk 2/9/92, Hurrell to G.O.C., 2/9/96.
(4) Bk 2/2/92, Hurrell to G.O.C., 2/2/96.
(5) Bk 2/2/92, Hurrell to G.O.C., 2/2/96.
a far more serious threat is revealed by the following report:
"Subchiefs Chaka and Gwatizo living in the Mteo Forest had gone to Kwalu prior to rising against the whites." (1) And in the light of subsequent reports, it seems that Chaka and Gwatizo, Chirumanzu's uncles who had been exiled in the coup of 1892, were out to regain their position. At Engelbrecht's farm of Driehoorn near Mteo, some Africans came wanting to kill "Charlie" (Woole) for burning down their kraal; (2) the location of this event and the circumstantial evidence suggest that Chaka and Gwatizo had already been active by April. (3) By the end of June Chirumanzu was asking for help against Nhema and Chaka, and by the 7th July a patrol had reported that it had been fired on by Chaka's men. (4) From then on Chaka was treated as a rebel. That he killed no Europeans is chiefly due to the fact that after March the local Afrikaners stayed near Enkeldoorn until 1898, leaving only Woole, who seems to have been hostile to Chirumanzu and certainly was hated by Woole. (5)

The fact that Chirumanzu's traditional enemy and neighbour Banka (6) had joined the rebellion brought the possibility of Ndebele revenge for '93 closer, but the really decisive factor was the committal of Chaka and Gwatizo to the rising, for if they were on the winning side his very title would be in danger. Accordingly his forces joined Forrestall and Boksteen in their attack on Banka in late June, (7) and accompanied Forrestall and Woole in the 2,000-strong force of levies that aided Burrell's attack on Nhema in July. (8) In August Woole raised what ultimately rose to be a force of 1,800 men from Chibi, Victoria and Chirumanzu. (9) This force aided Jonner's Mounted Infantry against Mutsukadza's Herer but one survivor of the force, Headman Masunda, is insistent that a battle took place at Mteo, which suggests that Woole took the opportunity to harass Chaka on his way north. (10) Certainly by September refugees from Chaka's area were moving into Owalo District. (11) In October Woole and Boksteen took 200 of Chirumanzu's men into Nhema's district, and with Paget's 7th Hussars and Watson's Mounted Infantry they had broken Nhema's and Banka's resistance in two campaigns by the 30th October. (12) With this, Chirumanzu's active work on behalf of the Company ended, as there was no action closer than the Umniati after that date. He was now free to settle with Chaka, with his son-in-law as his ally.

Chaka surrendered at Victoria to Vizard, the Civil Commissioner, on the 26th October, "having been persuaded by Woole at Makowri who promised him protection." (13) (Woole had remained at

[Notes continued from previous page]:

(5) Sr. Mary Aquina, O.P., ibid.; G.W. Collett, "Chilimanzi Delination Report," 1964. The date has to be 1895 because Brabant and Meredith were only there at the same time as Woole, then.
(8) Ibid., O.C. Victoria to Vintcent, 19/6/96.
(10) Interview, Headman Masunda, 2/12/68.
(11) Interview, Headman Masunda, 2/12/68.
(12) Ibid., O.C. Victoria to Vintcent, 20/1/96.
(13) Ibid., O.C. Victoria to Vintcent, 25/6/96.
his post for most of the rebellion, apparently unworried by Chaka's hostility to Weale and Chirumanzu. (1) Vincent guaranteed Chaka's life unless he had committed or organised any murders, (2) and Chaka returned to his kraals, having convinced Vizard that "it appears that he has never been unfriendly to the whites." (3) Meanwhile, Weale had met Watson's Mounted Infantry on the 30th October, and led him to Chaka's kraal, which they destroyed on the 2nd November, fighting continuing for two more days. (4)

This was the first of a number of actions by Weale that suggest that he acted more as Chirumanzu Chiryama's son-in-law than as a B.S.A.C. official.

In January 1897, Weale complained to Taberer, the C.N.C.: "Please let me know what I am to do about Chaka he will not be collected from by me and refuses to recognise that I have any authority over him since Vizard's interference. I had told them to quit the Mteo and this they will not do. They have threatened to kill my police if they see them. I have tried all sorts of friendly inducements, the only thing to do now is to smash them up, will you let me do this?" (5)

Taberer gave Weale permission to attack Chaka, on condition that he ran no risk of defeat, (6) and in due course Weale proposed "attacking by night with all Chillimanzo's people. Have sent to Chaka to see if he won't come to reason." (7) Meanwhile, the Administrator sent Vizard and Coolo a severe reprimand for "intervening [with] Tshaka behind the back of the N.C. responsible for the district," and stated that "my N.C. Mr. Weale is the only person in the Chillimanzo District authorised to act as the mouthpiece of the Government - Mr. Coolo should be warned that he must not interfere in any way with the work of the native department or try to persuade the natives that he has any official position." (8)

Having secured the elimination of any official backing by Coolo and Vizard for Chaka, Chirumanzu and Weale could proceed to settle the feud that had existed since c.1892. In March, N.C. Taylor reported that "an impi of Chillimanzo's men with some of Weale's police" had pursued Chaka's and Gwatozo's people to the very walls of Cungwuku's Njanja kraal, killing 13 men. Taylor arrested Weale's men because they "trespassed into my district". (9) Taberer, who seems to have been rather friendly to Weale, ordered Taylor to send Weale's men back, with the refugees, (10) deciding that all the Mteo Africans must be prevented from settling under Charter. (11) But on the 5th April, "Gwatozo from Mteo and few others came in today to surrender ... he is afraid of Chillimanzo who all along has been threatening to kill him and Chaka and that he is the cause of all this trouble, they have been loyal all along and have always paid taxes." (12) Chaka surrendered to Taylor on the 6th, (13) and as it had obviously become impossible to force his faction back to Chirumanzu, the two refugee groups were allowed to stay in Charter District until Chirumanzu Chinyama's death. (14)

By driving Chaka and Gwatozo into exile, Weale had made his father-in-law's position secure against his most troublesome rivals. There

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(1) A 1/12/35, O.C. Victoria to Acting Administrator, Salisbury, 14/5/96.
(2) A 1/12/40, Vincent to C.G. Victoria, 29/10/96.
(3) BA 2/8/1, Victoria to O.C. Salisbury, 17/11/96.
(4) IB 2/9/2, Watson to Paget, 4/11/96. By the 5th, at least, Watson was aware of Chaka's surrender. Ibid., Paget's diary, 6/11/96.
(5) W 1/1/12, Weale to O.C.N, 25/1/97.
(6) Ibid., Lingard for C.N.C. to Weale, 27/1/97.
(7) Ibid., Weale to C.N.C., 4/2/97.
(8) W 1/2/12, Administrator to Vizard, 17/2/97.
(9) IB 1/1/2, N.C. Charter to C.N.C., 27/3/97.
(11) Ibid., Note by Taberer on N.C. Charter to C.N.C., 30/3/97.
(12) Ibid., Taylor to C.N.C., 5/4/97.
(13) Ibid., Taylor to C.N.C., 19/4/97.
(14) A 11/2/12/11, Preliminary examination of Manyanga, 2/2/04; W 9/4/15, acting N.C. Chillimanzo to C.N.C., 2/6/03.
remained Chatikobo, the Rozvi-sponsored Chirumanzu deposed by Chinamora. On the 14th August 1897, Weale agreed with the A.R.C. of Gutu, where Chatikobo had been in exile since 1892, that he was to stay in Gutu District from then on.(1) Whether Weale realised the part he was playing or not, his actions were undoubtedly directly favourable to Chirumanzu Chinamora.

The final examples of collaboration in the area under discussion are those of Charter District. In June 1896 the bulk of Mutekedza’s Hora, Maromo’s Dzete (less the House of Hokonya) and Sango’s Rozvi rose against the Europeans. Rangers were formed at Charter and at Enkeldoorn (again), and on the 6th July Beal’s Column, which had been recalled in haste from Matabeleland, camped at the latter place. With the Company force were 200 Charter Africans under Taylor, mostly of Mutekedza’s Hora, but with other polities represented. These had been down to Bulawayo, and might almost be classed as collaborators if their Chief had not been in rebellion at that moment! Taylor allowed some to leave,(3) and by the 22nd had only 55 left.(4)

The first sign of serious collaboration came when Gunguwo of the Njanja and Maburutsi of the Manobvu arrived at Enkeldoorn on the 10th, with gifts and information for the Europeans.(5) Gunguwo Chiduku had been involved in the war with Maromo in 1892, when Gunguwo Nokwara was killed. It is noticeable that Bonda, the Rozvi Mwari-officer who normally lived nearby,(6) had made no attempt to recruit the Njanja chiefs,(7) and it is not unreasonable to suppose that Gunguwo was taking the opportunity to pay off old scores. As for Maburutsi, his Manobvu had been under the domination of Maromo, and it is the opinion of a modern Dzete oral historian that Maburutsi sought to gain land and be free of Maromo’s power.(8)

At all events, only 22 days after the rebellion had started, and even before Hoste had finished his attack on Maromo’s,(9) months before resistance was over in the Enkeldoorn area, these two chiefs had committed themselves to the European side, travelling to Salisbury,(10) and maintaining contact regularly after that, even facing the danger of a small Matabele unit that toured the area in August.(11) From then on they remained in constant contact with Taylor at the Range, and generally assisted his work in administering the district.(12) The whole point about these two collaborators is not that they made any great contribution to the war from the European point of view, but that they collaborated with the Europeans long before it was clear which side was winning.

To the north, a slightly different situation obtained. Kwenda, another Njanja chief, had had a Wesleyan mission in his area, and when in 1896 men from Soswe in Marandellas and Mutekedsa came to kill the African evangelists there, Kwenda protected them.(13) When Brabant entered the Njanja area in July, he was able to raise

(1) Hist. MSS. W1 5/1/1, Diary of A.R.C. Williams, entry 14/8/97.
(2) A 10/10/4, Salisbury Column Diary.
(3) A 1/12/13, Seal to Vintcent, 12 and 13 July 1896; Interview, Chief Musarurwa, 13/1/69.
(4) A 1/12/29, Seal to Vintcent, 22/7/96.
(5) A 1/12/37, Seal to Vintcent, 10/7/96.
(7) A 1/12/27, Chief’s evidence, 13/7/96; Interview, Chief Musarurwa, 13/1/69.
(8) Interview, Mr. E.M. Dzewwa, 13/1/69.
(9) A 1/12/37, Seal to Vintcent, 10/7/96.
(10) A 1/12/27, B.S.A.C. to Strickland, 25/7/96.
(12) N 1/1/2, Range Diary, and correspondence for 1897 in general.
a force of 120 levies from Kondo, which helped in the early raids on Mutekedza. Ranga, another Njanga chief of the same House (Nzuma) as Kondo, also collaborated in the above operations, but he had previously shown little inclination to help, his first reaction to the European forces' moves two weeks earlier having been to flee for shelter. (2) So his aid to Brabant may have been more due to fear of Makuvure. (3) Possibly the hostility noted between some of the Njanga (House of Tamhawoga) and the peoples of Marandellas District at the time of Lundy's 1892 patrol had spread to Kondo's chieftaincy, so that Kondo's action against the missionaries met a naturally hostile response. Whatever their motives, Kondo and Ranga operated independently of each other at the time of the initial rising, as well as independently of their House leader, Nsama Masembe, who appears to have remained neutral, and of Gambiza Ngwena, the "paramount" of the Njanga, who vacillated between declarations of loyalty and diplomatic contact with Mulzinganyama Jiri Htseve, Hamba-elect of the Imperial Rozvi revival in the beginning of 1897, (6) which led to his arrest. (7)

There were two minor cases of collaboration that should almost be classified as "neutrality", being borderline cases. When Jenner's Mounted Infantry besieged Mutekedza Chiwashira in his stronghold in September 1896, it was partly the persuasion of his brother, who was co-operating with E. E. Taylor, that led to his peaceful surrender. (8) Similarly, the head of the House of Hokonya refused to join his chief Maromo in the rebellion, protected some Cape Africans, (9) and made his peace with Taylor as early as September 15th. (10) Even though his Chief was still alive in the country of Mashayamombe's Dzete in Hartley. (11)

It is not yet certain which brother of Mutekedza collaborated, but Hokonya, although reportedly influenced by Musarurwa, the local "provincial" Rozvi leader not to rebel, (12) had obviously a dynastic reason for his actions; on the 14th July 1897 he became the next Chief Maromo. (13)

7: The Rewards of Collaboration.

It might be supposed that collaboration brought the collaborators the esteem of the Europeans, as valuable allies who helped them in time of need. On the whole this was so, at least as far as Company policy went: the "friendlies" had been most useful, and besides the passive assistance of not rebelling had actively helped the destruction of the rebel forces. Even after the fighting was over near the collaborators' polities, they aided the campaigns in other rebel areas by providing men to carry and scout for the Europeans. Thus Charter Africans were used in 1897 to help the war in the Mazowe District. (14) Very often the local C.C., on whose advice the C.C. relied heavily on local matters, developed a special relationship with the collaborators. (Woold's case was exceptional.) Thus in 1897 Taylor referred to Gunguwo as "perhaps the most loyal chief in the district". (15) and in 1904 he and Maromo Hokonya were given an increased salary. (16)

References:
(1) A 1/12/14, Vintcent to Firm and Brabant, 27/1/96, Vintcent to Judson, 1/1/96; A 1/12/27, Brabant to Vintcent, 29/1/96.
(2) A 1/12/37, White to Vintcent, 14/1/96.
(3) A 1/12/1, Vintcent to White, 13/1/96. (4) E. E. Sumner, op. cit.
(5) A 1/12/5, Charter Diary, Taylor to Judson, 24/8/96.
(8) BA 2/8/1, Jenner to C.C., 17/11/96.
(9) E. E. Sumner, "Notes on the Kondo Chieftainship"; Interviews, Chief Musarurwa, 8/1/69, Mr. E. M. Dzwara, 13/1/69.
(10) N 1/1/2, Range Diary, 15/9/96.
(12) Interview, Chief Musarurwa, 8/1/69.
(13) N 1/1/2, A.N. Charter to C.C., 22/7/97.
(Chetowura) was even given a salary equal to that of the major paramounts, Gambiza and Mutekeda.(1) The twelve major Njanja chiefs were all made equal to each other, which rewarded those who had collaborated and punished Gambiza Ngwena for his dalliance with the Rozvi revival in 1897.(2) Chirumanzu, Gutu, Zimuto, Chibi and Matibi were all granted subsidies in 1897, for "loyalty and assistance during Rebellion".(3)

But although the collaborators enjoyed European favour for a while, there was from the beginning an underlying suspicion of them by certain elements in European society, that in many cases became apparent in government policy. "I may remark that the chief Matibi ... is not as friendly as he might be and has always been more or less under suspicion."(4) "Lyle who is a trader of many years in Matabeleland and is well known by Matebeles and other tribes feels confident that Chibi's people will loot cattle, etc., and not stop to commit murder if resisted by owners."(5) Brabant in Charter reached the point of alcoholic suspicion where he regarded Maburutsi and Gunguwo as traitors for not checking on the telegraph wire all the way from Salisbury to Charter, and was charged with "declaring publicly that he would shoot any or all natives friendly or otherwise without regard to passes that might fall into his hands, this statement he also made to two chiefs belonging to the Zinjanja tribe."(6) He even recommended that all friendy and neutral tribes be drafted to Matabeleland to prevent them joining the rebels.(7) In later years, Drew wrote, "the natives in the above named districts have never risen and ... people have the opinion (quite a wrong one) that these Natives like all others are sure to rise sooner or later, and that the position will be better when they have done so and been conquered."(8)

The collaborating polities have experienced varying fortunes since 1896. Kwenda and Hanga have had an unexceptional history as Njanja titles.(9) Maburutsi has moved to Buhera, where his title remains in being,(10) but Gunguwo's polity has disappeared, in ironic circumstances. The Narira and Mangeni reserves were founded initially for refugees from Maromo's and Mutekedza's areas, and happened to include most of the Njanja land because of Taylor's original Rango-Wedza line.(11) Collaborators such as Gunguwo, not being initially classed as refugees, had no reserve set out for them in 1897. By c.1914 the farms Lancashire Estate, Seacombe, Gungubu, Kildoon, Ngosi, Daybrook, Riversdale, and others had been surveyed,(12) and the process of European occupation had begun over Gunguwo's lands. Divided by boundaries that had existed but had not been enforced before 1896, Gunguwo's chieftaincy shrank as families moved to Narira and settled under chiefs previously established there. In 1948 an official wrote: "This chief now resides alone in the south of the Chipese area and virtually has no following. His people are scattered throughout the district, mostly in European farms," and in 1951 the chieftaincy was abolished entirely.(13) Had Gunguwo's people risen, they might just possibly have been given a reserve in 1897, and the title might have survived.

(1) N 3/1/5, N.C. Charter to C.M.C., 31/5/94; M 2/1, C.M.C. to Acting Secretary, 10/5/39.
(2) N 3/1/2, N.C. Charter to C.M.C., 3/8/97.
(3) M 9/1/4, N.C. Chibi to C.M.C., 14/2/98; M 1/1/2, C.M.C. to N.C. and C.C. Victoria, 1/1/97 and 30/11/97.
(4) DA 1/1, A.M. Tuli to Administrator, 22/6/96.
(6) DA 1/12/1, Vincent to Brabant, 27/7/96; A 1/12/3, Charges against J.S. Brabant.
(7) DA 1/12, O.C. to High Commissioner, Cape Town, 3/7/96.
(9) Hist. MSS. SU 2/1, H.E.S. Sumner, ibid.
(11) D.F. Bosh, ibid., pp.16 and 19.
(12) M 3/1/1, M. M. 1/8/65; L 1/2/8, Suirvive General to C.M.C., 16/7/97.
Yet Chirumanzu Chinyama survived this debacle. His people were disarmed and he clashed with an official in 1901, but in the same year another official was writing: "He is most sensible if treated properly and kept in his place."(9) When he died in 1902 a three-cornered succession dispute arose between Chaka, who pressed his old claim from exile in Charter, Rucho, the younger brother of Chinyama, and Jumo, son of Chinyama. Jumo was as strongly favoured by the officials as Chaka was distrusted, but apparently the clan elders chose Chaka, and the Company confirmed him as chief in 1903.(10)

Chirumanzu Chaka was unpopular with M.C. Holland from the start, and in 1914 the opportunity was taken to depose him for connivance at cattle theft.(11). Jumo Chinyama became chief, only dying in 1954.(12)

This means that from the 1880s (at least) to the 1950s, with only a ten-year gap, the succession to the chieftaincy of Chirumanzu has run from father to son for the last 17 generations and still uphold this custom," which was either deliberate complicity or an ignorance remarkable in one so interested in anthropology.(3) But in 1898 Weale seems to have grown less attached to his friends; "These natives have so to awake from their moral barbarism into semi-civilised viciousness."(4) After a "Scare Scare" in January 1899 in nearby Selukwe,(5) he seems to have panicked in July when, after further rumours from Nkoma's and a sudden refusal of Chirumanzu to pay tax, he assumed that a rebellion was imminent and started a "scare" that put Enkeldoorn into laager once more. In the enquiries that followed, Weale's marriages and loans of money to Chirumanzu came into the open, and he was forced to resign.(6)

If the burghers of Enkeldoorn had not panicked as well, Weale might not have been removed as a scapegoat.

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while Musipambi's Ngcwa chieftaincy reverted to its old position before Weale's interference in 1895. (1) Chibi even had the satisfaction of seeing the Pako refugees of Belingwe District, who had been a menace to Masunda's House ever since the latter had seized Chirogwe Hill from them, and who had raided Masunda in late 1896, forced to accept his authority or to lose all claim to their old land. The Pako are now a settled, chiefless people as a result. (2) As far as Chibi Madhlangove's relations with the other Houses went, his son Tagviroyi, who represented his aged father in Salisbury at Edward VII's coronation celebration in 1902, took the opportunity to gain a headmanship for himself (equal to the true House leaders), a considerable gain for the Madhlangoves. (3)

Conclusion.

What exactly did the collaborators do in 1896? In military terms their help was useful but rarely vital. Only in the Battle of Belingwe Peak did a collaborator force play a major part in an action. In the case of Drew's force at Altona, they were roundly beaten and forced to retreat. In most of the other campaigns the collaborator forces acted as a cloud of scouts, foragers, messengers and field-labourers around a small core of Company or Imperial troops. Jenner's description of them in the Charter campaign is typical: "The large number of friendlies sent up from Victoria were very useful. I could not of course have completely destroyed so many kraals and collected the grain in anything like the time, without them, on the march they covered a great deal of ground to the flanks thus making good a large track of country and enabling me to push on, for the places I have named with the certainty that I was not leaving any new or unknown stronghold unvisited." (4)

Only on Belingwe Peak did the "friendlies" act as anything but auxiliaries to the European forces. But this is hardly surprising; excelling in the defensive, Shona polities in the 19th century were not organised for the offensive over long distances, with some notable exceptions. Nobody really expected the "friendly" forces to be able to act vigorously a long way from their bases, and in fact they often proved hesitant in battle. But this is not the true measure of their part in the 1896-7 risings. It was the decision to collaborate that counted, and thus it is the decisions reached by the leaders of the chiefdoms that must be analysed, not the actual record of their forces in battle. Thus Gunguwo and Chibi, who mounted no field forces, are just as much collaborators as Chirumanzu or Matibi. Had the military decision gone against the Company, they would have been in exactly the same position as the chiefs who had fought actively.

We have already seen an outline of what the collaborators achieved (in general) in the introduction and (in detail) in Section 6, but one more aspect of collaboration must be mentioned briefly: the fact that a collaborationist policy, whether active or not, and however much it achieved against the rebels, was a major factor in keeping its neighbours neutral. Thus those Njanga who did not collaborate, were neutral, as were Nama, Gwore and Sardina between Chirumanzu and Guta, and the Ngowa and Nkaviza next to Chibi. If every polity had risen in 1896 the outcome might have been very different, and that "neutrals" existed at all partly due to the collaborators.

(1) Interview, Chief Chibi, 30/11/68; 33/33/8, Chibi History, 1904.
(2) N.3 1/1/1, N.C. Chibi to N.C. Belingwe, 17/10/97; T.C. Chibi to C.N.O., 11/9/97. Neutrality did not necessarily mean weakness in 1896.
(4) EA 2/9/1, Jenner to G.S.O., 17/11/96.
To sum up, there were four types of collaboration, and three basic reasons for collaboration. The first type of collaboration was that of a chief who mobilised his clan war-host and fought alongside the Europeans as an ally, even though there may have been an N.C. in command in the fields; the decision to rise was his, and the N.C. was basically a liaison officer. Obviously, Chimamanzu fell into this category. So, really, did Matibi, in the sense that Matibi's dynasty had decisively committed themselves to the European side, Matibi himself, Machedu, "Mkelis" (who led the Balingwe force under Brabant), and "Mranda" all being named as "chiefs who sent people with the impi",(1) even though Brabant led the force.

The second type of collaborator was one who permitted an N.C. to raise forces from his people, but at the N.C.'s initiative: Zimuto, Gutu, Ranga, Kwonda, Chibi and perhaps Matibi, if one does not put him in the first category. The third type of collaborator—often as important as the first—was one who, before the military victory was apparent, joined the Europeans, provided scouts, messengers, information and supplies, but not a field force. Chibi fell into this category also, as did Kwenda (who helped the catechists), Gunguwo and Maburutsi. Finally, and perhaps these really are neutrals, were those individuals and clan houses who opted out of the fighting and aligned themselves with the Europeans—Mutekeda's brother, and Hokonya's section of the Dzeto. The fact that some chiefs belonged to two categories illustrates the delicate shading of commitment that ranged from resistance through neutrality to collaboration.

The three motives for collaboration were: a desire to avert a Ndebele political revival; a rivalry with another polity and the dynastic factor between the Houses of the Chiefdom concerned. The first motive can be seen in the case of Chibi, whose polity had been previously threatened by Ndebele raids, Ndebele support of chiefs such as Shiku against Chibi, and, most serious of all, Ndebele support of dissident members of the Mhadi dynasty, such as Makonese and Chirar. It can also be seen in Chimamanzu's case, in so far as Banka's rebellion brought Ndebele allies, who might seek revenge for his aid to the Europeans in 1893, to his borders, and it possibly applies to Matibi as well.

The second motive, a rivalry with another polity, applies to Gunguwo's feud with Maromo since the 1892 war, Maburutsi's desire to be free of Dzeto rule, perhaps Kwenda's relations with Soswe and the peoples north of the Sabi, Chimamanzu's pre-1893 feud with Banka, and Chibi's animosity towards Wedza, who raided him in 1892.

The third motive, the dynastic factor, applies to Chibi Madhlangowe, who faced the possibility of Ndebele interference in the relations between the Houses, as already mentioned above, and the possibility of Masunda's House asserting the claim to the Chibi title, on grounds of championing resistance, that had been forfeited with Masunda I's suicide. It also applies to Gutu, who relied on E.S.A.C. support for his dynastic claim, and, pre-eminently, to Chimamanzu, whose lukewarm attitude towards either the rebels or the Europeans changed dramatically once it was reported that Chaka and Swatiso were on the move against him. Hokonya of Maromo, and Mutekeda's brother were obviously motivated by the dynastic factor, and perhaps Kwenda and Ranga saw commitment to the European side as being an assertion of their rights as chiefs against the ultimate head of the Kjanja, Gambiza, who toyed with the anti-European Rozvi revival in 1897.

(1) NVC 1/1/1, M.C. Chibi to C.C.S., 15/9/97.
On the whole, then, certain conclusions can be reached. Firstly, the Ndebele power over south Mashonaland, once defined, can be seen to have played a part in Shona attitudes in 1896. Secondly, the complicated Shona succession and inter-chiefdom history deserves the closest possible research in future in order to account for the actions of any polity at a given time. Thirdly, that "collaboration" and the topic not covered in this paper, "neutrality", deserve consideration alongside "resistance" as aspects to be considered by students of African history in situations such as the British penetration of Rhodesia in the 1890s.

Finally, a knowledge of the behaviour of collaborators has a certain relevance in the present day. In 1966, Professor Ranger suggested two possible futures of African politics in Southern Rhodesia. One of these "may lie in a revived uprising; a new form of guerilla warfare drawing upon the heroic memories of 1896 and Mapondera."(1) This is certainly possible, but it depends on the extent to which such an uprising relies upon genuine memories of 1896. If it relies upon real as opposed to legendary history, memories of old feuds and jealousies and of collaboration may rise along with those of resistance. A knowledge of the psychology of collaboration may be of use to all concerned.

---

## APPENDIX I.

### SHONA POLITICS AND PERSONALITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Personalities or location in 1890s</th>
<th>Variant Spellings</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Banka</td>
<td>proto-Mhari</td>
<td>Solukwe District</td>
<td>Banga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bare</td>
<td>proto-Mhari</td>
<td>West of Victoria</td>
<td>Beri, Biri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibi</td>
<td>Mhari</td>
<td>Chibi Tavongeveyi</td>
<td>Tahibi. (A more correct spelling is Chivi.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chibi Matesweru s.o. Tavongeveyi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chibi Makonese s.o. Matesweru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chibi Mazorodze y.b. Mazarire, d.o. 1877.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Chibi Madhlangove y.b. Masunda, c.1877-1907.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Masunda (House leader) y.b. Mazorodze</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mazarire (svikiro) y.b. Matesweru</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chirori, y.b. Mazorodze</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tagwireyi (Headman) s.o. Madhlangove</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Chibi Madhlangove s.o. Masunda, c.1877-1907.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Masunda (House leader) y.b. Mazorodze</td>
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<td>Chirori, y.b. Mazorodze</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Tagwireyi (Headman) s.o. Madhlangove</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirumanzu Govera</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chirumanzu Banguro s.o. Simba d.c. 1869-90</td>
<td>Chilimanzi, Tehilimanzie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chirumanzu Chakikobo y.b. Bangure, c.1891-2</td>
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<td>Chirumanzu Chaika, y.b. Chatikobo, 1903-14</td>
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<td>Chirumanzu Jumbo s.o. Chinyama, 1914-54</td>
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<td>Gwatizo (House leader) y.b. Chaka</td>
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<td>Huchu y.b. Chinyama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambiza Njana</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gambiza Swinurayi d.c. 1893-5</td>
<td>Gambesha, Zinjanja</td>
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<td>Gambiza Ngwena c.1893-5 to 1900s.</td>
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<td><strong>Major House Leaders.</strong> Tambahoga Makumbe Chivese</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nzua Munyini</td>
<td>Nza</td>
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<td><strong>Minor House Leaders.</strong> Gungwuo (of Chivese)</td>
<td>Gungubu, Gungubor.</td>
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<td>Kwenda (of Nzua)</td>
<td>Gwenda</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ranga (&quot; ) Masendu(&quot;&quot;) Swinurayi (of Tambahoga)</td>
<td>Langa</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Magaya (of Swinurayi)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guta Govera</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guta Denere, d.1892</td>
<td>Goto</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guta Makuvaza y.b. Denere 1892-1900s. Makuvadza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hama</td>
<td>Shawasha</td>
<td>Hama Nkulule 1895-1954</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jiri</td>
<td>Rozvi</td>
<td>&quot;Imperial&quot; Rozvi, Ndanga District.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maburutsi</td>
<td>Manotvu</td>
<td>North East of the Range, Chartor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Makonde</td>
<td>Dzete</td>
<td>Makonde Machingante, d.1897</td>
<td>Morepo</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Variant Spellings

- Banga
- Bari, Biri
- Tehibi. (A more correct spelling is Chivi.)
- Chilimanzi, Tehilimanzie
- Gambesha, Zinjanja
- Gungubu, Gungubor
- Gwenda
- Langa
- Cheboso
- Nza
- Chivese
- Nzua
- Makumbe
- Chivese
- Nzua
- Munyini
- Gungwuo (of Chivese)
- Kwenda (of Nzua)
- Ranga (”)
- Masendu(")
- Swinurayi (of Tambahoga)
- Magaya (of Swinurayi)
- Goto
- Makuvadza
- Hama Nkulule 1895-1954
- "Imperial" Rozvi, Ndanga District.
- North East of the Range, Chartor.
- Makonde Machingante, d.1897
- Morepo
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Personalities or location in 1890s</th>
<th>Variant Spellings</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Maromo</td>
<td>Guzho</td>
<td>Maromo Hokonya, 1897 -</td>
<td>Meromo, Marromor.</td>
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<td>Mashayamonbe</td>
<td>Dzeto</td>
<td>Hartley District</td>
<td>Mashiangombi</td>
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<td>Matenda</td>
<td>Hera</td>
<td>Selukwe District</td>
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<td>Matibi</td>
<td>Pfumbi</td>
<td>Matipu, Belingwe and Tuli Districts</td>
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<td>Ngowa</td>
<td>Belingwe District</td>
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<td>Duma</td>
<td>South of Victoria</td>
<td>Moghabi</td>
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<td>Rozvi</td>
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<td>Ngowa</td>
<td>Chibi District</td>
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<td>Hera</td>
<td>Mutekedza Mutiti Chigonero d.c. 1893</td>
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<td>Mutekedza Muchecheterwa Chiwashira, 1893-6.</td>
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<td>Mutekedza Sungendaba Chiso 1897-</td>
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<td>Nemavuzhe</td>
<td>Govera</td>
<td>Chibi District</td>
<td>Mabushe</td>
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<td>Nhema</td>
<td>Proto-Mhari</td>
<td>Selukwe District</td>
<td>Ndoma, Endayma</td>
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<td>Nyashanu</td>
<td>Hera</td>
<td>Buhera, Charter District</td>
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<td>Chinaka</td>
<td>Pako</td>
<td>Refugees in Victoria and Belingwe Districts</td>
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<td>Sango</td>
<td>Rozvi</td>
<td>Chigaro Hill, south of Enkeldoorn.</td>
<td>Chigarru, Sigala Hill.</td>
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<td>Shiku</td>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>Selukwe District/Chibi District.</td>
<td>Tshiko</td>
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<td>Soswe</td>
<td>Mbiro</td>
<td>Marandellas District</td>
<td>Weza, Uesa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wodza</td>
<td>&quot;Swazi&quot;</td>
<td>Belingwe District</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimuto</td>
<td>Govera</td>
<td>North of Victoria</td>
<td>Zimutu, Zimuntu.</td>
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Spellings are derived from Delineation Reports.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adendorff, L.D.</td>
<td>Banyaland Trek promoter, 1890-1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alderson, Brevet</td>
<td>O.C. Mounted Infantry Battalion and Mashonaland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold, J.</td>
<td>Trader, Chilimani District, 1893-6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bezuidenhout, W.A.</td>
<td>Variously Civil Representative at Chihi, &quot;Native Commissioner&quot;, Interpreter to Court at Victoria, 1891-4; O.C. Mashonaland 1894-5; Captain, Rhodesia Horse Volunteers at Belingwe and Charter, 1896.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brabant, J.S.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chaplin, Capt.G.</td>
<td>Resident Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, Victoria, 1897-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colenbrander, J.W.</td>
<td>B.S.A.C. Agent at Bulawayo, 1889-1893.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colquhoun, A.R.</td>
<td>&quot;Resident Magistrate&quot; and &quot;Administrator&quot;, 1890-1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coole, A.E.R.</td>
<td>Farmer/Trader at Makor's 1891-7; Field-Cornet, Makor's 1892-4; But Tax Collector and Native Commissioner, Ndemba, 1894-5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Waal, D.C.</td>
<td>M.A., Piketberg, Cape Colony, traveller in Mashonaland 1891.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drow, A.</td>
<td>Native Commissioner, Victoria, 1894-1906.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duncan, A.H.F.</td>
<td>Surveyor-General to 1896, Acting Administrator 1893-4 and (at Bulawayo) 1896.</td>
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<td>Dunne, R.</td>
<td>Field-Cornet, Tokwe, 1892-3.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dunko, E.N.</td>
<td>Trader, Field-Cornet; Fort Charter, 1892-5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eckstoern, J.W.</td>
<td>Assistant Native Commissioner, Nhami 1895-1900; Acting Native Commissioner Victoria, 1895-6.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fitzpatrick, S.</td>
<td>Post-cart driver, Victoria-Salisbury line, 1892.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilfillan, C.M.</td>
<td>Government Surveyor, 1899.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holland, A.T.</td>
<td>Assistant N.C. and N.C. chillimani, 1904-14 and later.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hulley, T.B.</td>
<td>Acting C.N.C. 1895.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurrell,</td>
<td>O.C. troops operating out of Gwelo 1896.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inskip, F.S.</td>
<td>Secretary to the Administrator, 1892-6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jameson, L.B.</td>
<td>Chief Magistrate and Administrator, 1891-5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knight-Bruce,</td>
<td>Anglican Bishop of Bloemfontein, touring Mashonaland, 1888.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lendy, Capt.J.P.</td>
<td>Royal Artillery, seconded to B.S.A.C. 1890-4.</td>
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<td>Lingard, K.</td>
<td>Registrar of Natives, Secretary for Native Affairs, Acting C.N.C. 1895.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritz, F.J.</td>
<td>Farmer, Jackalsbank near Enkeldoorn, 1892-5.</td>
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<td>Marshall Hole, H.</td>
<td>Secretary to the Administrator, R.H.V. and C.S. Salisbury, 189.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moickle, J.</td>
<td>Trader and businessman, Victoria, 1893-4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meredith, L.C.</td>
<td>N.C. Charter, and at Victoria, 1895.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Napier, W.</td>
<td>Merchant at Victoria, Captain R.H.V.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<td>Ogilvie, O.H.</td>
<td>Clerk of the Office of C.N.C. Mashonaland, 1895.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paget, Col.</td>
<td>O.C. the 7th Hussars, British Army.</td>
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<td>Paulet, Lord Henry</td>
<td>Resident at Victoria, 1892.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pennefather, Col.</td>
<td>O.C. Pioneer Column 1890 and B.S.A.C.P. 1890-1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quested, W.</td>
<td>Trader/farmer in Iron Mine Hill area, 1892-4.</td>
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<td>Rutherfoord Harris, F.</td>
<td>Secretary of the Cape Town Office of the B.S.A.C. 1890</td>
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<td>Salous, F.C.</td>
<td>Hunter, writer and adviser to B.S.A.C.</td>
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<td>Short, E.</td>
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<td>Strickland, A.</td>
<td>Field-Cornet, Charter, 1895 and Officer at Charter 1896.</td>
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<td>C.N.C. Mashonaland, 1895-1902.</td>
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<td>Thompson, R.H.C.</td>
<td>N.C. Charter, 1895.</td>
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<td>Vintcent, Mr. Justice</td>
<td>Judge of High Court of Matabeleland 1894-99, Acting Administrator, Salisbury, 1896.</td>
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<td>Vorster, B.</td>
<td>Banyailand Trek promoter, 1890-1.</td>
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<td>Weston, Major</td>
<td>O.C. Mounted Infantry, Gwelo area, 1896. British Army.</td>
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<td>Weale, M.B.</td>
<td>Trader/farmer near Victoria 1891-3; Foraster 1893-4;</td>
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<tr>
<td>White, Capt. the Hon. C.</td>
<td>Trader/farmer, Inyatitzi, 1892-4.</td>
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<td>Williams, J.H.</td>
<td>Wesleyan Missionary, 1893-6 and later.</td>
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<td>Willoughby, Sir J.</td>
<td>Associate of Jameson, owner of three major land companies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Young, A.L.</td>
<td>Trader/Farmer, Field-Cornet, Inyatitzi, 1892-5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>also Manyawo Mbandane</td>
<td>Induna i.e. Matabele Foros, Victoria, July 1893.</td>
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<td>Induna, Matabele Foros, Victoria, July 1893.</td>
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APPENDIX III

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT OR NOTES

A. N. C.  Assistant Native Commissioner
B. S. A. C.  British South Africa Company
B. S. A. C. P.  British South Africa Company’s Police
C. C.  Civil Commissioner
C. N. C.  Chief Native Commissioner
C. S. O.  Chief Staff Officer, British Army
F. C.  Field Cornet
G. O. G.  General Officer Commanding British Army
M. L. A.  Member of Legislative Assembly, Cape Colony.
N. M. P.  Mashonaland Mounted Police
N. C.  Native Commissioner
O. O.  Officer Commanding
R. M.  Resident Magistrate
R. H. V.  Rhodesia Horse Volunteers
S. N.  Superintendent of Natives
S. O.  Staff Officer, British Army

SOURCES

Oral : Eyewitness Accounts

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<tr>
<th>Informant</th>
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<td>Mhari</td>
<td>Makotose House</td>
<td>Saw Weale at Chibi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Chitsaka, Manatai</td>
<td>29/11/68, 3/12/68</td>
<td>Mdarikwa</td>
<td>Mhari Clan</td>
<td>Messenger to Chibi, 1891-2.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headman Masunda, Jim Nyika</td>
<td>2/12/68</td>
<td>Mhari</td>
<td>Masunda House</td>
<td>Fought for Weale in Charter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headman Chipindu</td>
<td>3/12/68</td>
<td>Mhari</td>
<td>Chipindu House</td>
<td>Saw Pioneer Column.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mativonga</td>
<td>3/12/68</td>
<td>Hera</td>
<td>Madhlangove House</td>
<td>Saw Brabant at Chibi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapengure</td>
<td>8/1/69, 13/1/69</td>
<td>Rozvi</td>
<td>Musururwa House</td>
<td>Young man in 1896.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Oral Tradition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant</th>
<th>Interviewed</th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Affiliations</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Chibi (Marire Makotose)</td>
<td>26/11/68</td>
<td>Mhari</td>
<td>Makotose House</td>
<td>Nephew of Madhlangove.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. J. T. Makotose</td>
<td>26/11/68</td>
<td>Mhari</td>
<td>Makotose House</td>
<td>Nephew of Madhlangove.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. S. Takavarasha</td>
<td>28/11/68</td>
<td>Mhari</td>
<td>Madakone House</td>
<td>Grandson of Madhlangove.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headman Madhlangove</td>
<td>28/11/68</td>
<td>Mhari</td>
<td>Madhlangove House</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Zische Kranos)</td>
<td>28/11/68</td>
<td>Mhari</td>
<td>Madhlangove House</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Chirumanzu</td>
<td>9/12/68</td>
<td>Govera</td>
<td>Chatikobo House</td>
<td>Son of Chatikobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jaravasi Chakirakura)</td>
<td>9/12/68</td>
<td>Govera</td>
<td>Bangure House</td>
<td>Nephew of Chinyama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headman Bangure</td>
<td>9/12/68</td>
<td>Govera</td>
<td>Nhoroza House</td>
<td>Under Banguro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. N. Mutuziga</td>
<td>10/12/68</td>
<td>Govera</td>
<td>Chitutu House</td>
<td>Under Banguro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. K. Muzesa</td>
<td>10/12/68</td>
<td>Govera</td>
<td>Bangure House</td>
<td>Son of Chinyama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. R. Chinyama</td>
<td>10/12/68</td>
<td>Govera</td>
<td>Chaka House</td>
<td>Son of Chaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headman Chaka</td>
<td>11/12/68</td>
<td>Govera</td>
<td>Mutungamire family</td>
<td>Under Chaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. S. Ziwangi</td>
<td>11/12/68</td>
<td>Njanja</td>
<td>Nzwuwa</td>
<td>Under Chiveso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Chineshe</td>
<td>7/1/69</td>
<td>Njanja</td>
<td>Nzwuwa</td>
<td>Under Chiveso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. M. Mudzivapasi</td>
<td>9/1/69</td>
<td>Mushava</td>
<td>Kuncorma</td>
<td>Under Chiveso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. K. M. Boewe</td>
<td>9/1/69</td>
<td>Njanja</td>
<td>Chivoza</td>
<td>Travelling through district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. E. H. Dzovo</td>
<td>13/1/69</td>
<td>Dzeto</td>
<td>Maromo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. S. Zibhede</td>
<td>14/1/69</td>
<td>Eora</td>
<td>Mutokodza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Written

1. The vast majority of the sources used derive from the National Archives of Rhodesia, Salisbury, which contains the records of the B.S.A. Company and the Crown Colony of S.Rhodesia. Documents are filed, regardless of content, according to the office of provenance. A code letter identifies the office, an initial number gives the basic class, e.g. In letters, Out letters, a second number gives the secondary class, e.g. Official, Demi Official, and third and fourth numbers identify the file by date or in some cases, subject. With one exception the code letters used in this paper refer to Archives files:

\[ \text{A files were collected by the Office of the Administrator, Salisbury. This covers the bulk of Company business inside Rhodesia in the first five years of Occupation.} \]

\[ \text{BA files were collected by the Chief Staff Officer, British Army in Rhodesia, in Bulawayo in 1896. Together with the A telegram files of 1896, these cover most of the rebellion material available.} \]

\[ \text{CT files were collected by the Offices of the B.S.A.C. in Kimberley and Cape Town.} \]

\[ \text{DE files were collected by the Resident Magistrate at Enkeldorn.} \]

\[ \text{DV files were collected by the Resident Magistrate and Civil Commissioner at Victoria.} \]

\[ \text{F files were collected by the Department of the Statist, Salisbury.} \]

\[ \text{J files were collected by the Department of Justice, Salisbury.} \]

\[ \text{L files were collected by the Department of Land Settlement, including much of the Surveyor General's personal correspondence and papers relating to the periods when Surveyor-General Duncan was Acting Administrator.} \]

\[ \text{N files were collected by the C.M.C., Mashonaland, and of Rhodesia after 1913.} \]

\[ \text{NB files were collected by the C.M.C., Matebeleland.} \]

\[ \text{NUA files were collected by the S.M., Umtali, and the N.C.} \]

\[ \text{NVG files were collected by the N.C. Chibi.} \]

\[ \text{NVG files were collected by the N.C. Gutu, and cover some matters in Chilimanzi.} \]

\[ \text{RC files were collected by the Resident Commissioner, Salisbury.} \]

\[ \text{S files were collected by the Crown Colony Government and follow a different classificatory system.} \]

The exception to the above in regard to code letters is "C.8547 (1897) British South Africa Company's Territories: Report by Sir R.E.H. Martin, on the Native Administration of the British South Africa Company, together with a letter from the Company commenting upon that Report", London, H.M.S.O., 1897.

2. Code numbers beginning with "Hist.MSS." or "Misc.Hist.MSS" relate to private papers filed in the Archives.

Misc.Hist.MSS. LO5/1/1, Mrs. Loots Reminiscences, on Afrikaner settlement in Charter.

Hist.MSS M111/1, John Meikle's Reminiscences.

Hist.MSS SU 2/1/1, H.E.Sumner, "Notes on the Njanja People of Charter District", November 1968, Unpublished paper. Based on oral tradition and records still held in the Range Office, this is a historical and genealogical work that at last makes the Njanja paramountcy and chieftoms understandable.
Hist.MSS WE 3/2/1-7, M.E. Welde's Reminiscences. Detailed, vivid and outspoken, these reminiscences were written in the 1930s. Welde totally ignores his relationship with Chinyama's daughter even though it is recorded officially, and is inclined to gloss over the part played by his enemies, as when he suppresses the fact that Forrestall commanded the levies that fought under Hurrell in July 1896, so that it appears as though he was in charge. (EA 2/9/2, Hurrell to G.O.C. 2/8/96; Hist.MSS WE 3/2/6).

Hist.MSS WI 5/1/1, Diary of A.N.C. Williams at Gutu. Very detailed.


5. Books and Periodicals.

These are rarely used, and are only for isolated references, except for: T.O. Ranger - Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7, Heinemann, London, 1967.

The standard textbook on the Rebellions, its subtitle "A Study in African Resistance" explains why collaboration and neutrality are not covered in detail. As a general book, it could not go into detail on any one area.


The part of this book relevant to this paper, Chapters 1-10, gives an account of European rule in Mashonaland up to 1893, from the European viewpoint. Inexplicably it ignores the raid on Chibi in July 1892, in the Paulet letter (A 1/9/1, Lord Henry Paulet to Jameson 26/7/92).