THE LINK BETWEEN ZIMBABWE’S FOREIGN POLICY
AND SELECTED PUBLIC MEDIA (THE HERALD AND THE
SUNDAY MAIL) 1980 – 2014

BY

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

FEBRUARY 2015
Abstract

The rationale for this study lies in the continued existence of a knowledge gap in contemporary international relations literature pertaining to the link between foreign policy and the media particularly the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media (The Herald and The Sunday Mail) 1980 – 2014. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy occupies the attic on the menu of political, economic and social challenges bedevilling Zimbabwe. The media has both a symbiotic and an adversarial relationship with the political world that it covers. It uses and is used by politicians and their spin – doctors. Convinced that there has been a discontinueing link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the public media, the study sought to critically assess the causes triggering such a dichotomy given the strategic importance of state – controlled media in the articulation of foreign policy of any given country. Adopting a qualitative research paradigm, the research used a three – tier methodological enquiry that made use of content analysis on newspaper articles from The Herald and The Sunday Mail as well as foreign policy documents; in – depth interviews to experts as well as a case study approach upon the New African Magazine – a Pan – African magazine regularly engaged by several African governments in reaching wider audiences in the articulation of their foreign policies. The New African was engaged by the Zimbabwean government to produce two special supplements between June and December 2007. Using all the above mentioned methodological techniques, it was unveiled that whilst the media is undoubtedly an indispensable tool in foreign policy matrix, Zimbabwean journalists were not yet at a level of appreciating national interests. Coincidentally the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was found to be equally clueless on how best it could involve and make a deliberate effort for the public media to become part of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy instrument. In addition the discord or rather disengagement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services was also noted to have exacerbated the situation. It was overally recommended that the Government of Zimbabwe should craft a Strategic Communication Plan/Policy that is holistic and integrates several state departments such as Defence and Security, Foreign Affairs, Media, Information and Broadcasting Services, Zimpapers, ZBC, Journalism training institutions, Universities that offer International Relations and Political Science amongst several critical foreign policy – related institutions.
Acknowledgements

My sincere gratitude goes to my Supervisor and University of Zimbabwe Department of Political and Administrative Studies Chairperson Dr Donald P. Chimanikire for his patience, wisdom and guidance throughout the conduct of the research. Dr Chimanikire is an honest, fair and kind man, may God bless him. I am also indebted to Professor Hasu Patel, who in essence took me through the paces during the initial stages of crafting the research proposal. It was Professor Patel who also encouraged me to ‘specifically look at something to do with Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the media.’ I am also grateful with the encouragement I got from the University of Zimbabwe Dean of Social Studies Dr Charity Manyeruke. Each time she would text me messages saying “Wototsunga”. I thank her for also giving me the green light to my topic during the early stages of the study. Special mention also goes to Mr. Lawrence Mhandara, Professor Stephen Chan, Professor Brian Raftopolous, Dr Tafataona Mahoso, Brother Reason Wafawarova, Ambassador Christopher Mutsvangwa and Brother Geoffrey Nyarota for the opportunity of wide consultations and interviews. Keep on supporting education. I would also like to thank my Teacher “once a teacher always a teacher” Mr. Charles Casper Tawamba for the material support especially magazines for content analysis, as well as proofing and critiquing my research proposal. I would also like to thank my sidekick – Wellington Gadzikwa for all he has done in my life for if it wasn’t him back in 2007 this academic dream would have been deferred. To my Mother Mrs Gloria Rusero, there was absolutely going to be anything tangible I would do without your blessings and intercession prayers. To all those I could not mention by names, God will still remember all you have done for the successful completion of this research. To Brother Tendai ‘Chakazee’ PHD here we come. Last but not least, I thank my beautiful wife Ardie for all the initial days of the research as she had to endure with our lovely two children alone during my long absence. Thank you all – To God be the glory.
Dedication

This study is dedicated to Dr Mark “Mukoma Mako” Chingono for it was through him that I first got to know about Political Science and International Relations back in early 90s when I was still a little boy. Mukoma Mako would return from UK on his vacations throwing inspirational parties and spending more time with us and eventually becoming a role model.

The study is also a special dedication to my late father Professor Lazarus Gumisiro ‘Tiger’ Rusero, who had high regards for me... I will try hard to fulfil your dream....
List of Tables

Table 1: Sample of The Herald........................................................................................Page 40
Table 2: Distribution of Articles......................................................................................Page 40
Table 3: Sample of The Herald........................................................................................Page 42
Table 4: Distribution of Articles......................................................................................Page 42
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANZ</td>
<td>Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting</td>
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<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable Network News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFU</td>
<td>Commercial Farmers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum for China Africa Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTLRP</td>
<td>Fast Track Land Reform Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitution Assembly</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>Office of the President and Cabinet</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBZ</td>
<td>Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPPC</td>
<td>Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADR</td>
<td>Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US(A)</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>ZANU PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIANA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe International News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIDER A</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMCO</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Institute of Mass Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIM ASSET</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio     –Economic Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZINASU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Students Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZMMT</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUM</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Unity Movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Contents

Abstract-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------i
Acknowledgements------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ii
Dedication--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii
Lists of acronyms--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vi
Lists of tables--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vii
Abbreviations------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- viii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW-------------------------------1

Research Topic --------------------------------------------------------------1
Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------1
Background to the problem-----------------------------------------------1
Statement of the problem-----------------------------------------------3
Assumptions of the study-----------------------------------------------4
Objective of the study-----------------------------------------------4
Research questions-----------------------------------------------5
Hypothesis---------------------------------------------------------------5
Justification of the study-----------------------------------------------5
Delimitations of the study---------------------------------------------6
Limitations of the study---------------------------------------------6
Conclusion---------------------------------------------------------------7

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK-8

Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------8
Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy- an overview----------------------------------8
Key principles of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy-------------------------------10
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy objectives-----------------------------------10
Formulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy--------------------------------10
Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy Strategic Plan 2013 – 2015-------------------12
Zimbabwe’s International Relations in the new millennium----------------14
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION, DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction
Categorization of news articles
Genre of news
Analyses/Opinions
Editorial Comments
Hard news story
Fact Sheet
Speeches
Cartoons
Interviews
Letters to the editor
Sample of The Herald
Distribution of articles
Sample of The Sunday Mail
Distribution of articles
Content analysis of The Herald and The Sunday Mail’s coverage of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy related issues

Hard news stories

Opinions/Analysis

Editorial Comments

Interviews

Letters to the Editor

In – depth interview analysis

Does Zimbabwe’s foreign policy have any link to the public media?

In what ways can foreign policy process involve the media?

Moving on to the Look East Policy, has the public media been instrumental in projecting the adopted foreign policy in the post agrarian reform era as a viable option for the country?

What could the public media have done at the height of Zimbabwe’s demonisation during the land reform and how was it going to be effective?

To what extent has The Herald and The Sunday Mail been effective instruments in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy from 1980 – to present?

Has the two respective ministries of Foreign Affairs and that of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services collaborated in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and have such (if any) been effective?

Are there any possible ways in which a deliberate shift can be made to use public media as an instrument of soft power?

Case study: The New African Magazine Supplements and Zimbabwe’s foreign policy

Zimbabwe Special Issue- “Political power alone is meaningless unless people have land.”

Zimbabwe’s Special Issue (second edition) – “Our case is Africa’s case”

Conclusion

CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

Summary of Findings

Recommendations
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW


1.1. Introduction

This chapter highlights the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media (The Herald and The Sunday Mail) 1980-2014. Foreign policy analysis is critical in any social science research endeavour because it is a critical epitome of statecraft. A brief background of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and how public media has articulated it is provided, as well as the statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions, hypothesis, justification, delimitation and limitations of the study.

1.2. Background to the Problem

The study of foreign policy has remained a vital cog in the understanding of international relations and global politics. No state has existed without a crafted foreign policy of its own. Political realism maintains that the primary goal of nation-states’ foreign policies is to ensure their survival through seeking to preserve independence and sovereignty in a hostile environment. It is therefore imperative to establish a correlation between foreign policy and the media for in essence, it is through the media that foreign policy pronouncements are usually either made or recognised.

Various definitions have been coined with special regard to the subject of foreign policy. The Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs website [www.zimfa.gov.zw accessed: 15 June 2014/ 8.15pm] states that: “The foreign policy of a country can be defined as a set of goals that seek to outline how that country will interface at an official level with other countries of the world and to a lesser extent, with non state actors in pursuit of its national economic, political, social and cultural interests.” The website further states that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy objectives are grounded in safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; the protection of its prestige and image; the pursuit of policies that improve the standard of living of Zimbabweans wherever they are; and the creation and maintenance of an international environment conducive for the attainment of these goals. “The creation and enunciation of foreign policy is a prerogative of the Head of State or Government, or by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs. In some instance, the legislature may also have considerable oversight in formulating such policy,” (Ibid: 1).

In addition Patel (1985: 229-230) highlights a major speech by (President) Robert Mugabe, then prime minister, at the United Nations in August in 1980, underscoring the five key principles of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy: 1) ‘national sovereignty and equality,’ 2) ‘attainment of a socialist, egalitarian and democratic society,’ 3) ‘right of all peoples to self determination and independence,’ 4) ‘non-racialism at home and abroad, and 5) co-existence among nations.’

According to Mashingaidze (2006: 57) “Zimbabwe adhered to the positions of the Southern African Development Community, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Commonwealth.” Furthermore, Zimbabwe’s earliest foreign policy stance was buttressed by her earlier involvement in the United Nations Security Council, between 1983 to 1984 as well as 1991 to 1992 when she was a non-permanent member of this United Nations supreme organ, (Ibid: 57). There is a general perception by political scientists that such involvement during Zimbabwe’s early stages of independence gave the state a better and rich foreign policy orientation in international affairs.

Modelski (1962) cited in Kegley and Wittkopf (1995: 45) states that “foreign policy is the activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment.” These definitions seem to suggest that no country or state can afford aloofness in issues to do with foreign policy in the anarchical international arena. Parkash and Prem (1997: 65) note that “a state without foreign policy is like a ship without radar which drifts aimlessly without any directions by every storm and sweep of events.” Nation-states demand attention because they remain the principal repositories of economic and military capabilities in the world affairs, and they alone assert the legal right to use force, (Ibid: 45).

Whilst all states appreciate the need to craft foreign policies, some states in particular in the developing world, Zimbabwe included, tend to underestimate the role that the media can play within the foreign policy matrix. The media matters in that it constitutes a critical element of soft power. The traditional orientation toward the necessities of a state in the international system has been that of accumulating power albeit in an exclusively military-strength position. The measure of state power lay in its strength in a war. However, within the contemporary framework, the definition, application and orientation of state power has
gradually shifted its focus and due attention solely on military force is becoming somewhat less important. This is where the media comes into play.

Exploration of an array of literature echoes the perspective that the media is involved in all stages of foreign policy formulation processes. According to Modelski (1994:7) “media is an important component which foreign policy decision-makers take into consideration as they develop their policies.”

The Herald and The Sunday Mail are two national newspapers belonging to a government controlled company of Zimpapers (1980) Private Limited. The Zimbabwean government has a 51% shareholding which it acquired in 1981 with the aim of democratising and indigenising the media landscape from the vestiges of colonialism. The controlling stake was acquired through a buy-out of the South African Argus Company’s controlling stake in the former Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company (RPPC) by the new Government of Zimbabwe through a US$6 million grant from the Nigerian government, Gadzikwa (2012: 4). Due to the controlling stake, the Zimbabwean government through the Ministry of Information or any department that has been mandated at a particular time has editorial control and determines the group’s publications. The 51% shares are entrusted in the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe, (Ibid: 4).

Foreign policy and media interface can therefore be understood in two scenarios. Firstly, the media shapes and exhibits much of the environment in which foreign policy operates. In this regard, the media can pressure a state actor to behave, respond or act in a certain manner, following exerted pressure or even expose’s. On the other hand, the foreign policy actors can influence and manipulate the media to report certain issues in a manner favourable to foreign policy articulators and formulators. In this regard, the media is used to ‘manufacture consent’ by the powerful elite so as to drum support, influence and manage perception towards a certain foreign policy position.

1.3. Statement of the Problem

The study of foreign policy and media in Zimbabwe is from the researcher’s point of view desperately underdeveloped. There has been exhibition of a discontinuing link between foreign policy and media, precisely the ‘public’ newspapers of The Herald and The Sunday Mail. Despite the fact that the Zimbabwean government has a majority 51 percent stake in
Zimpapers Private Limited, there has not been an appreciation and proper reflection of its foreign policy in that stable, particularly in The Herald and The Sunday Mail publications. The researcher is highly convinced that the public media has so far not made any attempts to reflect or position itself as an instrument of soft power, to ‘soften’ relations where hard power politics has failed, precisely on the turning point of Zimbabwe’s diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, the entire European Union and the United States of America in the new millennium. Instead of projecting Zimbabwe’s foreign policy in the wake of demonisation and image tarnishing, the public media was rather co-opted to be directly involved in the murky politics between Zimbabwe and Britain as well as the European and American communities. The Herald and The Sunday Mail became the official mouthpieces used by President Mugabe and ZANU PF to scold at their perceived enemies. As shall be exhibited as the research unfolds this is where the public media lost the plot hence triggering the need to conduct this research.

1.4. Assumptions of the Study

Prior to the conduct of the research, the researcher had the following assumptions pertaining the study:

1.4.1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services although housed at the same offices at Munhu Mutapa Building in Harare, rarely cooperate.

1.4.2. The articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy 34 years after independence is still at the mercy of a few academics.

1.4.3. Reportage of foreign policy issues in Zimbabwean newspapers and other media platforms is a mere follow up of what politicians would have said pertaining the subject.

1.4.4. Zimbabwean journalists lack understanding of politics and international relations.

1.4.5. Bureaucrats and politicians do not appreciate the important role that the media can play in articulating Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

1.5. Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the research were to:

1.5.1. Assess the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media (The Herald and The Sunday Mail).
1.5.2. Evaluate the extent to which the foreign policy process, be it formulation, pronouncement or articulation could effectively make use of the media.

1.5.3. Examine the extent to which public media coverage of foreign policy had been instrumental and effective.

1.5.4. Explain the relationship between the two respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services.

1.5.5. Recommend ways in which the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Information, Media and Broadcasting Services could interface on particular foreign policy issues.

1.5.6. Suggest practical strategies to use public media as an instrument of soft power.

1.6. Research questions

1.6.1. Does Zimbabwe’s foreign policy have any link to the public media?

1.6.2. In what ways could the foreign policy process involve the media?

1.6.3. To what extent had The Herald and The Sunday Mail been effective instruments in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy from 1980 to present?

1.6.4. Has the two respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Media, Information and Broadcasting Services collaborated in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and have such efforts (if any) been effective?

1.6.5. What could the public media have done at the height of Zimbabwe’s demonisation after the fast track land reform programme and how was it going to be effective?

1.6.6. Where there any possible ways in which a deliberate shift could be made to use public media as an instrument of soft power?

1.7. Hypothesis

Since 1980 there has been a clear discontinuing link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the media.

1.8. Justification of the study

Local researches had not been fully-fledged in their devotion on the nexus of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the media. Moreover a lot of University of Zimbabwe graduates of
international relations graduates who mostly find the government as their primary employer, ought to know such critical linkage aspects of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the media. Some graduates will automatically find occupations in the media as newspaper columnists, international issues correspondents, journalists, analysts or researchers in the private sector, civil society and the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) sector. There certainly has to be research or researches that cast a focus on the efficacy of the media in foreign policy. The academic world is set to benefit from this research as it can be developed further and hence more knowledge generated; the local media industry will also be enlightened on the strategic role that it can play in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. The government is also set to benefit as it will realise the link between foreign policy and the media that is so critical in the pursuit of the state’s national interests. Journalism institutions may also consider incorporating a component of politics and international relations in their curriculum to enhance journalists’ competences in foreign policy analysis and reportage, whilst likewise the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zimbabwe may also reconsider incorporating a media studies component to enrich its curriculum in harnessing the indispensable link of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the public media.

1.9. Delimitations of the study

The study was restricted to the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media in Zimbabwe with central focus being on The Herald and The Sunday Mail (1980-2014). The reason for these two selected media was that they had the most widely read newspapers with a national coverage in the country. Moreover these were the two newspapers where major investment had been put in place by the government. In addition newspapers have remained a critical tool of intelligence gathering for diplomats since majority of information they report back home is obtained from newspapers. Given that it is not on a daily basis where foreign policy issues are articulated or reported in the media, the period under spotlight was from 1980 to 2014. The study population comprised mostly of well informed people ranging from academics and journalists who had their views solicited to get a fully fledged view of the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media (The Herald and The Sunday Mail).

1.10. Limitations of the study

Extrapolation of data posed to be the greatest challenge to the successful completion of the research as relevant people expected to make contributions to this research mostly
bureaucrats, academics and newspaper editors were exceptionally busy people. Moreover access to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services offices proved to be a challenge given their proximity to the Office Of the President and Cabinet which is a security restricted area. There was also no local literature available pertaining to the research at hand. Hardly has anyone ever attempted to conduct a research on Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the media. The researcher ended up extensively borrowing foreign literature whose context and appeal could not necessarily tally with the Zimbabwean context. However the huddles mentioned above, were overcome since the researcher had a valuable journalism practice and training background and well connected to some of the top officials from both the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services, as well as almost all print media houses in Zimbabwe. The researcher also made use of the University of Zimbabwe’s department of Political and Administrative Studies academic personnel as the department is the citadel of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy knowledge.

1.11. Conclusion

This chapter located the core of the study through highlighting the background of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, statement of the problem, research objectives, assumptions, hypothesis, research questions as well as the significance, delimitations and limitations of the study. Doing so was found necessary with regards to trace the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0. Introduction

The chapter explores a plethora of literature by different authors on foreign policy and the media in Zimbabwe and beyond. According to DE VOS et al (2005: 117) literature review provides evidence of some preliminary reading on the topic as well as the initial ideas that have been developed. Forms of literature that were consulted include textbooks, published research papers, journals and online resources, newspapers as well as magazines. Literature considered under this section is divided into sections such as an overview of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy; Zimbabwe’s international relations in the new millennium; foreign policy and the media; media diplomacy; history of the press in Zimbabwe and the media as an instrument of soft power.

2.1. Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy- an overview

Chan and Patel (2006: 175) state that “since 1980 there has been an organic link between the method of independence, that is, the armed struggle (the Second Chimurenga) for independence, and its values and beliefs, and domestic policy and foreign policy.” This organic link underpins Zimbabwe’s highly active and visible foreign policy, especially since the chief maker and articulator of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, President Robert Mugabe, and other major policy makers were leaders in the armed struggle, (Ibid: 175).

ZANU-PF’s ascendance to become the ruling party since 1980 to date casts a narrative of two liberation movements that came together in 1987, having fought the liberation struggle separately. The two liberation movements were the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) which had its military outfit, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) as well as Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU) which likewise had its liberation army the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). This liberation account has been largely formidable and is a constant reminder of a history that has dominated the discourse as well as the shaping and understanding of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

In a related context, Chigora (2006: 61) states that, “in understanding any country’s foreign policy, it is important to outline the essential actors, their objectives as well as the overall geographical, historical and strategic factors that are at play.” A closer examination of
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy exhibits a constant policy pronouncement that has rarely shifted in terms of its articulation and pronouncement.

Chimanikire (2003) cited in Darnolf and Laasko (2003:181) postulates that:

Soon after independence in 1980 Harare quickly became Southern Africa’s diplomatic hub and a key player in the Frontline States’ efforts to dismantle apartheid and colonialism in Southern Africa. Zimbabwe adopted a policy of non-alignment in international affairs and its foreign policy trajectory was governed by sanctity of the right to life, self-determination, defense of national sovereign states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

Zimbabwe’s high profile foreign policy and effective domestic management record in the 1980s enabled President Mugabe to win numerous international accolades such as the 1988 World Freedom against Hunger Award, Mashingaidze (2006: 58). In addition President Mugabe was ordained Knighthood status in 1994 by the British Government becoming Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath and attaining the title Sir Robert Mugabe.

In the 1980s, many correctly labelled it the “African Jewel,” its economy was diverse and vibrant, it had a young-well educated population, and the currency was even stronger that the United States dollar. Due to international goodwill, many in the Western financial, donor and multilateral communities were enthusiastic to underwrite its economic development programmes. Aid flowed from many quarters of the Western world, including the Bretton Woods Institutions who were to underwrite its economic structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the 1990s, (Ibid: 58).

According to Mashingaidze a former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Zimbabwe’s Representative at the United Nations in New York (2006: 57), in 1986 the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) Summit meeting was held in Harare and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe became the chair of the organisation. In addition, as chair of the Front Line states Zimbabwe strongly argued against apartheid and frequently called for the imposition of economic sanctions against Pretoria. The state was very active in the launch of the African Fund whose aim was to assist the liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa, and Southern Africa states threatened by Pretoria’s policy of destabilisation, (Ibid: 57). In the same period Zimbabwe’s relations with her erstwhile coloniser were remarkably cordial, which explains why in 1991, Harare was host to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) which crafted and adopted the famous Harare Declaration on good governance, (Ibid: 58).
2.2. Key principles of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy

In the first official pronouncement of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy principles, in May 1980, the then President Canaan Banana, emphasised non-alignment, African issues, peaceful co-existence, reordering of the international economic order, and exchange of ideas, culture and trade, (Patel 1985: 228-229). Thereafter, in a major speech at the United Nations in August 1980, Mugabe, then prime minister, expounded on the five key principles of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy (Patel 1985: 229-230): National sovereignty and equality among nations; attainment of a socialist, egalitarian and democratic society; right of all peoples to self-determination and independence; non-racialism at home and abroad and positive non-alignment and peaceful co-existence among nations. It is recognised that there are overlaps between the above five principles, which also incorporate the principles of nationalism, Pan-Africanism, anti-imperialism, solidarity, non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs, multilateralism, and the Look East Policy which has been especially vibrant during the past years, (Ibid: 230).

2.3. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy objectives

The Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website states [http://www.zimfa.gov.zw/foreign-policy accessed 15 June 2014] that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy is guided by the following four considerations: Safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; the protection of its prestige and image; the pursuit of policies that improve the standard of living of all Zimbabweans wherever they are and the creation and maintenance of an international environment conducive for the attainment of the above stated goals. The website further notes that in the creation and pursuit of the above stated objectives, Zimbabwe is guided by the following: Its belief in self-determination and support for liberation movements; adherence to the principle of national sovereignty; respect for territorial integrity of all countries; promotion of the principle of equality among nations; belief in non-discrimination, whether based on colour, creed, religion and other forms and the promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

2.4. Formulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy

The website of Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs [http://www.zimfa.gov.zw/foreign-policy accessed: 15 June 2014] also states that foreign policy creation and enunciation is a
prerogative of the Head of State or Government. It is then articulated either by the Head of State or Government or by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In some instances, the legislature may also have considerable oversight in formulating policy. According to Chan and Patel (2006:176);

The tendency towards the centralisation of power in foreign policy has increased. Zimbabwe is not an exception and this centralisation has been associated with Mugabe, who was the executive prime minister from 1980 to 1987 and has been the executive president since 1987. His ideas, views and personality, and experience as an African nationalist and one of the then co-leaders of the armed struggle, have been crucial. He is an intellectual with a keen interest in foreign policy and he has been the chief maker and articulator of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

It is important therefore to have introspection on the nature of leadership and how it influences foreign policy. According to Herman and Preston (1994) across many fields of endeavour, leadership has long been recognised as one of the most important variables influencing the success or failure of various activities, ranging from military campaigns, to organisational performance in business and management, to the character and quality of nation-state foreign and domestic policies. Thucydides, during his description of the Peloponnesian War between Anthems and Sparta, highlighted just how fundamentally important the nature of individual leaders and their styles were with his contrast between the noble Pericles (who cautiously and pragmatically designed a winning military strategy against Sparta). In addition the depiction of a leader who makes a difference is typical of Machiavellian Prince, (Ibid: 327).

In the same context, Margaret Hermann (1976:328-331) identified eight propositions delineating more specific conditions under which the personality characteristics of leaders would be expected to influence foreign policy decisions and behaviour: the greater the leader’s own personal, general interest in foreign policy, the greater the likely impact of their personality upon foreign policy behaviour; the more dramatic the means by which leaders assume power that is revolutions, coups, landslide elections among many other reasons, the more likely it is that their personalities will affect foreign policy behaviour; the more charismatic leaders are, the more likely their personality characteristics will influence foreign policy behaviour; the more authority (or personal control) heads of state have over foreign policy (the machinery of government, etc), the more likely the personality characteristics are to affect foreign policy behaviour; the less developed and differentiated the foreign policy
organisation of the nation (such as in new or underdeveloped states), the more likely the personality characteristics of leaders will impact foreign policy behaviour; the more crises-like the national situation, the more likely the personality of the head of state is to affect foreign policy behaviour; the less training to affect foreign affairs leaders have, the more likely their cognitive styles are to affect foreign policy behaviour, whereas with increasing training, it makes it more likely their beliefs about the world will affect their foreign policy behaviour; the more ambiguous the external national situation is perceived to be, the more likely the information-processing systems of leaders are to affect foreign policy behaviour.

A forensic examination to the above eight points, juxtaposed against the character and personality of Zimbabwe’s Head of State and Government President Robert Mugabe will highlight a scenario where to a greater extent the above stated points are appealing. Chigora (2006: 62) states that there has been a general assumption that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy is formulated at the highest level of the state apparatus with the president being the articulator of foreign policy making process. Within the formulation of foreign policy, there has been a tendency by Zimbabwe not to solely rely on one or few actors in the international system. For a small, weak, landlocked and vulnerable developing independent country, such as Zimbabwe, the dispersal of dependency is a viable strategy to safeguard its sovereignty and independence in an historically structured international order of dependence and inequality, especially since the demise of the Cold War and its bipolar bloc system, Chan and Patel (2006: 176).

2.5. Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy Strategic Plan 2013 - 2015

Following a victory in the 2013 harmonised elections, the Zanu PF-led government was very quick in pronouncing new policies and strategic plans. One such plan was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic plan 2013-2015. The document spells out the principles, vision, mission and values underpinning Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. The strategic document also sets out foreign policy formulation procedures as well as the overall functions of the ministry. Of the 15 functions noted by the strategic document, three have a direct link on how the media may be effectively used to fulfil such ministerial functions and these can be highlighted below, Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website [http://www.zimfa.gov.zw/foreign-policy accessed: 15 June 2014 ]:

2.5.1. To research and analyse global trends in order to inform policy formulation;
2.5.2. Lobbying for the election/appointment of Zimbabwe and Zimbabwean nationals to regional and international bodies;

2.5.3. To create awareness of Government policies within the diplomatic community and host countries/organisations.

Newspapers are a critical foreign policy instrument that can be used to fulfil research, lobbying and awareness endeavours that the ministry intends to indulge in as indicated above. In addition, the Strategic Plan (2013-2015) stipulates the eight Directorates that are in the Ministry as well as their functions. Of the 22 Directorate functions mentioned, four functions can effectively be fulfilled through the involvement of the media. Again these functions have been highlighted below:

2.5.4. Monitor, report and prepare analytical briefs, position papers on global strategic developments on political, economic, social, scientific, security, technological and environmental issues;

2.5.5. Lobby for Zimbabwe and the region’s position on various issues;

2.5.6. Organise the Minister’s press conferences/briefings;

2.5.7. Manage the Ministry’s library and website.

Diplomatic Missions as well as their functions are also spelled out in the document. Of the 14 functions of the Diplomatic Missions noted, three can effectively be fulfilled through the involvement of the media. These have been noted below:

2.5.8. Monitor and report on political, economic, social, scientific, security, technological and environmental developments in the host countries and regions;

2.5.9. Prepare briefs, speeches, statements and messages;

2.5.10. Provide information in response to the public.

The Strategic Plan identifies five major challenges to the attainment of the Ministry’s objectives: negative perception on Zimbabwe; deliberate distortion of Zimbabwe’s policies by other countries; inadequate political, economic, social, cultural, scientific and technical interaction with other countries, regional and international bodies; resource constraints and debt overhang. As can be seen, the first two challenges can be resolved through a robust
programme that integrates the media in pursuing and attaining Zimbabwe’s strategic national interests and hence fulfilling the country’s foreign policy. Chitiyo and Kibble (2014: 33) argue that the Strategic Plan is an important document that recognises Zimbabwe’s external image problem. The authors also applaud the document for its demonstration of the knowledge of the interface between foreign policy and national economic policy.

Although aspects of the 2013 - 2015 Strategic Plan could be improved, it is nevertheless a document that marks a transition. After more than a decade of being a foreign policy ‘problem’ to the region and of being ‘managed’ by the region, Zimbabwe is now reasserting itself. It not only has a greater agency in its foreign policy but is also becoming a major stakeholder in regional and continental policy - making, (Ibid: 33).

Whilst this is the case as concurred above, it is a fact that Zimbabwe is resource constrained, particularly in terms of the money to fund all the programmes that the government puts in place. Whilst policies may be sound and brilliant, experience shows that having a brilliant policy is one thing, but converting the brilliant ideas into fruition through implementation is another thing altogether.

2.6. Zimbabwe’s International Relations in the new millennium

The new millennium is a critical trajectory of Zimbabwe’s international relations in general and her foreign policy in particular because certain historical incidents took place that saw Zimbabwe’s foreign relations with her erstwhile coloniser Britain gradually shifting from cordiality to hostility, which later drew the ire of all European countries as well as the United States of America. Domestically the ZANU PF-led government was facing its major political challenge since the country’s attainment of independence following the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change, the MDC, whose support base constituted the working class, the students, the civil society the private sector and the academia. Internationally Zimbabwe’s image was daunted following an orchestration by the Western media on alleged human rights abuses by the state. For the purposes of clarity, major highlights of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy in the post 2000 era have been categorised in sub themes as follows:

2.6.1. The 2000 Constitutional Referendum

In 2000 President Mugabe appointed a 400 – member Constitutional Commission set out to reach a new constitutional settlement and move away from Lancaster House Constitution. According to Sachikonye (2011: 9) the Commission consulted with the public as to its views
on a new constitution for around four months, and submitted its findings to the president, who from the beginning had stated that whilst views on a new constitution were to be collected from wider society, the ultimate constitutional drafting and choice of provisions was to be an elite affair undertaken by ZANU PF. The draft constitution produced by the Constitutional Commission provided for the acquisition of land by the Government without compensation, unless resources came from the erstwhile colonial power Britain. The draft also provided for a Prime Minister responsible to Parliament and removed the President’s power to appoint up to 30 members of Parliament.

According to the 2000 Parliamentary Election in Zimbabwe report by the Common Wealth Observer Group (2000: 10) Zanu PF supported the draft Constitution while the MDC joined a coalition of civil society organisations – The National Constitution Assembly (NCA) in campaigning for its rejection. The draft Constitution was rejected by 697, 754 votes to 578, 210 (54.7% against 45.3%). The newly formed MDC seized the opportunity of the referendum to test its popularity ahead of the then slated June parliamentary elections of 2000. The referendum became a pure contesting ground between ZANU PF and the MDC. People rejected the draft not because of the provisions in it but largely because of the popular call ‘Vote NO’ which was advocated by the MDC. President Mugabe was quick to endorse the people’s decision, appearing on the national broadcasting television saying his government would respect the wish of the people. However there was a general feeling by political analysts and social commentators that ZANU PF did not take the rejection lightly.

Although the Government accepted the results of the referendum, ZANU PF as a party interpreted the rejection of the draft Constitution as the result of a conspiracy by the black urban middle-class elite (represented by the MDC), the country’s white commercial farmers and the Government’s external enemies. The Government accused the MDC of unleashing a campaign of violence against ZANU PF supporters prior to the referendum and white commercial farmers of intimidating workers into voting for a rejection of the draft Constitution, (Ibid: 10).

The 2000 referendum is a critical point in Zimbabwe’s international relations in that it heralded Zimbabwean Government’s clear cynicism on Britain, re-oriented Zimbabwe’s policy on land as well as Zimbabwe’s ideological leaning from the West and turning to the East.
2.6.2. The ‘Fast-Track’ Land Reform Programme/ The Third Chimurenga

Zimbabwe’s land redistribution programme that was initiated with the coming of the new millennium was a critical domestic policy embarked by the Southern African state which however turned out to affect its foreign policy. Land occupies the attic on the menu of political, economic and social problems bedevilling Zimbabwe. Chari (2013: 291) observes that the extensive coverage of the country’s land revolution in the local and global media, particularly after the launch of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in the year 2000, attests to the potency of the mass media in public opinion formation. The land issue in Zimbabwe has been both a consequence and a cause of the struggle for liberation and has always been at the core of the country’s political, economic and social struggles, beginning with the First Chimurenga (Imfazwe) in 1896, (Ibid: 291). The land issue explains why the Lancaster House negotiations for independence nearly collapsed in 1979.

Even though the pledge by the British and the Americans to fund land reform was not inscribed in the constitution, the Patriotic Front was persuaded to accept the compromise after being put under pressure by the Front Line States who had been their benefactors. In addition the Declaration of Rights (Section 16 of the then Zimbabwe Constitution) circumscribed the compulsory acquisition of any property including land for a period of 10 years after the date of independence. Any constitutional amendments during this 10-year period needed a 100 percent majority, something that was impossible given the fact that whites had 20 seats reserved for them under the same constitution for the next seven years, (Ibid: 294).

As a result, white Zimbabwean farmers who were reluctant to relinquish their land sold land that was mostly in poor ecological regions through the “willing seller willing buyer” arrangement, resulting in land reform moving at a very slow pace during the first few years of independence. Stoneman (1988) notes the situation was compounded by the fact that the Government of Zimbabwe did not have enough funds to procure land for resettlement programmes intended to decongest rural areas. In a damning letter to the Zimbabwean government, the British Government under Prime Minister Tony Blair openly denied responsibility on anything to do with Zimbabwe’s land reform programme as well as issues to do with the compensation of the White Commercial Farmers. The letter was written by the then British Secretary for International Development Claire Short. In brief, Short’s letter read:

I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are
a new government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My origins are Irish and as you know, we were colonised and not colonisers, Utete (2003: 15).

This marked the turning point of Zimbabwe’s relations with her erstwhile colonial master which later drew in other European powers and United States of America, given Britain’s influence in the European Union as well as her traditional bond with the United States. The MDC, whose support among many other social groups such as the workers, students, the civil society, the private sector and the academia also found open support from the White Commercial Farmers. This agitated the Zanu PF-led government who responded by labelling the MDC as a puppet of Britain and an agent of regime change aimed at reversing gains of the liberation struggle. According to Chari (2013: 295) the rejection of the Zanu PF-government’s draft constitution was followed with the effecting of Amendment Number 16 (Act5/ 2000) which empowered the government to compulsorily acquire land without compensation. The Herald celebrated the position citing in its editorial of April 7 2000 (cited in Willems 2004: 167) that:

Zimbabwe yesterday took a giant leap towards correcting the historical imbalances in land ownership when Parliament passed a Bill which gives Government the power to compulsorily acquire land for resettlement without paying compensation. The MPs [who voted in favour of the law], who included Vice-President Muzenda and Msika, immediately broke into the liberation war song “Zimbabwe Ndeyeropa” [Zimbabwe’s independence was won through bloodshed] soon after the bill was passed as British High Commission Officials trooped out of the Speaker’s Gallery. Some MPs could not contain their joy and swayed the rhythm of the song, while others clapped and banged benches in ecstasy.

Chari (2013: 295) further notes that the period following the amendment witnessed an intensification of occupations of white-owned commercial farms. The farm occupations and the subsequent FTLRP in July 2000 became major talking points in the local and international media, soliciting varied interpretations in relation to their causes, objective and impacts on the economy and social relations. Britain’s perceived arrogance became coincidental with government which was facing threats of chaos and seizure of power from every quarter, ranging from the war veterans, civil society, students and the newly formed MDC.

Chigora and Guzura (2008: 7) argue that the implementation of the fast track land reform in Zimbabwe did receive condemnation from the British Government. Robin Cook, the then
British Foreign Secretary indicated in 2000 that they were willing to fund proper land reform process. He noted – “Neither Britain nor any other donor is going to fund the land reform unless: it is based on fair price to the farmer; and it reduces poverty among the rural poor who have no land,” (Cook 2002: 149). According to Scoones (2011) Zimbabwe’s land reform has had a bad press. “Images of chaos, destruction and violence have dominated the coverage. Indeed, these have been part of the reality – but there have also been successes, which has thus far gone largely unrecorded.”

2.6.3. Zimbabwe-Britain/EU relations after the land reform

The period from 2000 to 2008 was characterised by a hostile intricate relationship between Zimbabwe and the European Union. Chan and Patel (2006:177) argue that Zimbabwe has reinvigorated its defence of its sovereignty as the continuation of the struggle for independence, recast in terms of the Third Chimurenga being fought against the UK in particular, and its Western allies, illustrated by the official currency of phrases such as “Zimbabwe will never be a colony again”, and “the land is the economy and the economy is the land”, and by the characterisation of the March 2005 parliamentary elections as the ‘anti-Blair elections’. Zimbabwe’s public media became very instrumental in the verbal war between Zimbabwe and the EU. For example at the height of the EU’s decision to slap Zimbabwe with sanctions, The Herald in its editorial comment of 30 June 2001 noted:

The EU should know that we are not in Rhodesia. We are in Zimbabwe – a free and democratic country that will never be a colony again. It is absurd from the European governments to think that they can save what they perceive as a deteriorating political and economic situation in this country by slapping sanctions. It is complete colonial logic for the European parliament or governments to think that they have the right and means to freeze President Mugabe’s assets, which he has repeatedly said, are in Zimbabwe and nowhere else, (The Herald, June 30, 2001).

The crucial 2002 Commonwealth summit in Australia set the motion for Zimbabwe to be suspended from the group citing human rights abuses, political decay and improper governance by Zimbabwe. President Mugabe announced Zimbabwe’s total withdrawal from the Commonwealth on 7 December 2003, few hours after the 53 – member organisation had decided to extend the country’s suspension. On 20 September 2007, Britain’s then new Prime Minister Gordon Brown publicly stated his position on Zimbabwe through a newspaper article claiming that given Zimbabwe’s “widespread torture and mass intimidation of the political opposition” he was not going to attend the scheduled 2007 EU – Africa Lisbon
Summit on behalf of Britain, (New African Magazine Winter 2007/2008). According to Brown (2007:33) Britain would ensure that the EU maintained sanctions against the 131 individuals in the ruling elite (of ZANU PF), including President Mugabe, who had committed human rights abuses. Britain through the EU would, according to Brown (2007), extend sanctions to other individuals where necessary.

We will suggest to EU partners the appointment of an EU envoy to help support the transition to democracy. We will press the UN Security Council to review more regularly the situation on the ground, and to dispatch a humanitarian mission to Zimbabwe. We also need to support the important efforts of presidents Kikwete [Tanzania] and Mbeki [South Africa] to negotiate a return to democracy, (Ibid: 33).

According to Sasa (2007:35) the EU – Africa Summit was postponed seven times since 2000 because of the dispute over Zimbabwe’s attendance. In 2003, Portugal, under pressure from its ex-colonies – Angola and Mozambique – reportedly tried to have the EU travel ban on President Mugabe and other senior Zimbabwean government officials lifted so that Zimbabwe could attend the first Africa – Europe Summit in Lisbon. Then chairman of the Africa Union, then Ghana’s president, John Kufuor offered a statement stating that no other country had an exclusive right to exclude any single African state from the EU – Africa Summit, (Ibid: 37). Similarly then SADC chairperson the late Zambian President Levi Mwanawasa stated that if President Mugabe was to be barred from that summit then Africa and in particular Zambia would boycott it, (Ibid: 37). In April 2014 another EU – Africa Summit was pencilled and President Mugabe was invited. He however boycotted on allegations that his wife Grace was not welcome at the summit following denials to grant her a visa by the regional bloc.

**2.6.4. Zimbabwe – US relations**

Zimbabwe has had a chequered relationship with the United States following the land reform programme. On 4 July 2004, President George Bush’s then secretary of state, Colin Powell, announced that the US and European Union had “ended all official assistance to the government of Zimbabwe” and that they were lobbying other governments to do the same, Charamba (2007: 26). According to Ankomah (2007: 80) on 21 December President Bush signed into law the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA). On that day, President Bush issued a statement. Part of the statement read:
Today, I have signed into law S.494, the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001. This Act symbolises the clear bipartisan resolve in the United States to promoting human rights, good governance, and economic development in Africa. My administration shares fully the Congress’ deep concerns about the political and economic hardships visited upon Zimbabwe by that country’s leadership. I hope the provisions of this important legislation will support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful, democratic change, achieve economic growth, and restore the rule of law, (Ibid: 80).

Apart from ZIDERA, antagonism and open confrontation between the two countries continued to exist. Addressing the United Nations on the occasion of the 62nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September 2007 in New York, President Mugabe openly rebuked President Bush and his counterpart Prime Minister Blair. On President Bush, President Mugabe had this to say:

Let Mr. Bush read history correctly. Let him realise that both personally and in his representative capacity as the current President of the United States, he stands for this "civilisation" which occupied, which colonised, which incarcerated, which killed. He has much to atone for and very little to lecture us on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His hands drip with innocent blood of many nationalities. He still kills. He kills in Iraq. He kills in Afghanistan. And this is supposed to be our master on human rights?

In August 2014 the US called for the US – Africa Summit. Assistant Press Secretary Jonathan Lalley announced that President Obama would include all African Heads of State or governments, with the exception of those who were not in good standing with the US or under African Union suspension. Zimbabwe was part of the only four countries not invited. The other three countries were Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea.

2.6.5. The Look East Policy

Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy was a deliberate foreign policy stance adopted by President Mugabe following the diplomatic fallout between Zimbabwe and Britain and later the United States of America and the entire European Union. Chan and Patel (2006: 178) note that as early as 1992 Zimbabwe had announced an economic thrust to its foreign policy, which anticipated future trade, investments, joint ventures and tourists coming from the East. Since 1980 Zimbabwe has pursued relations with the then Eastern Bloc, China, Cuba, North Korea both because of their support for the armed struggle and as a method of modulating its historically structured dependence on the West, (Ibid: 178).
The relationship of Zimbabwe and the East precisely China intensified in the post 2000 era, the very same time of Zimbabwe’s antagonistic relations with the West. With the coming of the new millennium, China had adopted a policy to open new markets and trade relations through its initiative of the Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Some scholars however maintain that the Look East Policy was a desperate measure by Zimbabwe at a time the state was facing isolation from the West and the international community. Chan and Patel (2006: 181) argue that the Chinese have been reluctant to ride to Zimbabwe’s economic rescue but instead intends to use the Southern African country as a spring board into other African states. However it has been noted that a considerable judgement on the efficacy of the Look East Policy will require some time, (Ibid: 182).

In August 2014 President Mugabe together with a delegation of his Cabinet Ministers visited China to solicit funds and drum support for his government’s newly crafted economic blue print of the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset). The Herald of 26 August 2014 reported that nine mega deals worth billions of dollars had been signed during the visit. As has been noted, the reportage by The Herald and The Sunday Mail missed the plot as much as articulating Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was concerned. Oftenly what the media has managed to do is to just chronicle events as they unfold without any direct or deliberate link with the country’s foreign policy. This is partly because of the nature of the current Zimbabwean journalism training in various institutions, were the focus is more on how to report news instead of what to report and why to report it in the first place. Majority of Zimbabwean journalists are diploma holders whose articulation of complex issues such as matters to do with foreign policy leaves a lot to be desired.

2.7. Foreign Policy and the Media

Malek (1997: 43) states that the nature of international relations changed dramatically after World War II with the information revolution. “The technology of communication linked people all over the world into a global village. Media became a dominant source of information for people all over the world and a powerful player in international relations,” (Ibid: 43). In other words, once a preserve of secrecy and mystery, foreign policy became much publicised with the advancement of communication technology and thus the media.
acceptance of their national identity and political agenda. But in the information age “power” is derived as much from the ability of a nation to use media diplomacy to align its international image with its national identity. The stature of a nation in the world community and its placement in the global political hierarchy is now tied to its media diplomacy capability, (Ibid: 43).

Media has thus occupied a critical space in the realm of international relations in general and foreign policy in particular, for it has become not only a necessity but a matter of strategy for states to frame and orchestrate a preferred image and global stance in the unstructured anarchical system. Whereas nations’ power were traditionally measured in military security contexts, the contemporary international system now puts into consideration how a state is superior in terms of communication technology that influences global flow of information and thus projecting an international global image. Hence foreign policy must be examined within the role of media diplomacy in constructing a preferred national identity and a complementary international image that influences a nation’s global position, (Ibid: 44). The news media determine which issues members of the public think and talk about. Through various discursive practices and interpretive frameworks, the media direct the public’s attention to certain issues and formulate certain mental pictures and perceptions in readers (McCombs 2002; Lipman 1922).

2.7.1. Media Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

According to Ramaprasad (1983: 70) “media diplomacy is the role the press plays in the diplomatic practice between nations.” Terms such as “newspaper diplomacy,” “television diplomacy” and “satellite diplomacy” have also been used to describe the concept, (Ibid: 70). Media diplomacy assumed importance after World War II because of the revolution in communication technology. This is so because as George (1991) noted, in contemporary foreign policy, media diplomacy constitutes a predominant factor that moderates the sense a nation has of itself and the image the rest of the world has of it. Skurnik (1981) and Tunstall (1997) observe that if a nation is to create and maintain a favourable international image in the world community view, it must have the ability to project its preferred national identity in the global arena.

The world states have fast become more dependent on instruments use to project a favourable identity and mutual understanding in the international system. In other words, the media has become an effective instrument used for states’ public relations purposes at an international level. According to O’Heffenan (1991) an important function of foreign policy is to use the
media to articulate and promote a preferred national identity and a complementary image in the world community. “This partly explains why the deficiency which results from the loss of a nation’s favoured image in the world community creates a need for the nation to search for alternative means of delineating its national identity and international image,” (Hansen et al 1982). According to Rusciano and Ebo (1992) Argentina, Indonesia and Turkey serve as examples of nations that were isolated by the international community between 1975 and 1977 because of various crises, and were forced to use professional public relations firms to redefine their national identity and international images.

2.7.2. Media Diplomacy and international image

According to Malek (1997: 47) the respect a nation enjoys in the world community and the role the nation plays in contemporary international relations are influenced by the national identity and international image of the nation. “A major variable in the effectiveness of a nation’s media diplomacy is its ability to use the major international media to assert its version of national identity and international image,” (Ibid: 47). Windrich (1989) also states that for years during apartheid the South African government retained its tarnished image in the world. Malek (1997: 48) states that before the Gulf War, the Kuwaiti Government hired the high powered public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton to portray Saddam Hussein as a monster and to induce the reluctant American public to support military action against Iraq. However some countries take it upon themselves to orchestrate their public relations campaigns. The Togolese Government, for instance, files in foreign correspondents; all expenses paid, and fete them to cover national events as noted by Lee and Astrow (1987). In addition, Malek (1997: 48) states that during the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense media diplomacy aimed at creating negative international image of each other.

According to Gitlin (1987: 35) “when ABC network produced the $40 million controversial mini-series “Amerika” in 1987 which depicted life in United States after a Soviet invasion, the Soviet Government saw the movie as nothing more than propaganda.” A top Soviet official called the programme “a disappointing in the life of the American mass media.” A major variable in a government’s success in asserting its own version of national identity is its ability and capability to strategically project its identity and interests it seeks to pursue through convincing other states in a way that they will endorse its identity and its interests. Mowlana (1989) states that the “Islamization” of the Iranian media after the collapse of the
Shah’s regime was an effort by the new sectarian leaders to legitimise a new Islamic state identity. Part of the goal was to use the media to assure its citizens and the international relationships.

2.7.3. Media framing in foreign policy

The construction of reality by the media is made through employment of certain skills or rather tools known as framing. According to Wolfsfeld (1993: xiii) framing is important since any political conflict centres on the struggle over interpretive frames. In this process, the media transform the nature of events through “formats,” which constitute ideological or value perspectives in which the media focus on “story lines,” symbols, and relevant stereotypes (Entman 1991; Entman and Rojecki 1993; Entman and Page 1994; Lyengar and Simon 1994). In fact Lyengar (1994:141) states that the evidence indicates that individuals’ views of national issues are altered by the way in which news frames them. Thus, in the competition over media frames, some relevant functions should be analysed, such as the ways in which political actors are referred to; and nuances of the use of language, for example in news headlines. Framing is therefore the process in which the media create the images that reflect and filter reality in the foreign policy decision-making process.

2.7.4. The role of the media in foreign policy

Naveh (2002: 1) states that political leaders take the media into consideration in its national and international aspects. Indeed the media tend to be involved at each and every critical stage of foreign policy decision – making process for in essence political leaders learn of certain external and or international events through the media. Bagdikian (1987: 4-10) and Herman (1995: 82-83) identify trends which affect or motivate operation of the media in a foreign policy-related set-up and they have been listed here for a better comprehension of the role of the media in foreign policy: Advertising is the primary income source; media organisations tend to concentrate and merge into large corporations; media organisations are increasingly acquired by non-media corporations; the corporations tend to become part of multi-national global corporations; the corporations tend to become media monopolies; and these media corporations have strong political and other ties with governments. Naveh (2002: 6) states that these trends define the economic setting of the mass media, and communication research in a given state has to take them into consideration. It should however be noted that these trends are mostly appealing in a democratic society. Free-media economics is limited in authoritarian states where the media are state-owned.
2.7.5. Media functions

The mass media provide components of the internal foreign policy decision-making package through their professional performance. Harold Lasswell described this performance in his pioneering presentation of the media functions, distinguishing three roles of the media, (Lasswell 1971: 85): the surveillance of the environment; the correlation of the parts of society in responding to the environment; and the transmission of the social heritage from one generation to the next. Later Dennis McQuail added two functions to the list (McQuail 1994: 78-79) which are entertainment and mobilisation. In providing the foreign-policy environment, three of the roles are relevant: the informative, the correlative, and mobilising functions, Naveh (2002: 6). In addition, in performing these functions, the mass media incorporates and integrate the national society as part of the internal environment, (Ibid: 6). Journalists in their daily work of gathering news, inform the public of international, foreign and security events. The same journalists provide background, interpretation and commentary on the information. In its third but critical role, the media provide support to the established authority and its norms, especially in times of crisis or during a peace process, (Ibid: 6). The press in this regard has its capabilities in performing the mobilising and recruiting role, thus creating a joint media-government environmental component. However in some instances, the media can also invoke its power by mobilising public opinion and shaping a negative perception of the masses against the government.

2.7.6. Political Communication and the Media

A critical function of the media is that it serves as a viable and cheap conduit to convey political communication. It is important to ponder the fact that international relations discourse is just, but an extension of political communication. The study and practice of political communication focuses on the ways and means of expression of a political nature. Denton and Woodward (1998: 11), two important contributors to the field, in *Political Communication in America* characterise political communication as the ways and intentions of message senders to influence the political environment. This includes public discussion (for example political speeches, news media coverage, and ordinary citizens' talk) that considers who has authority to sanction, the allocation of public resources, who has authority to make decision, as well as social meaning. In their words ‘the crucial factor that makes communication 'political' is not the source of a message, but its content and purpose.’
Swanson and Nimmo (1990: 9) define political communication as "the strategic use of communication to influence public knowledge, beliefs, and action on political matters. They emphasise the strategic nature of political communication, highlighting the role of persuasion in political discourse. McNair (2003: 24) provides a similar definition when he postulates that political communication is ‘purposeful communication about politics.’ For McNair this means that this not only covers verbal or written statements, but also visual representations such as dress, make-up, hairstyle or logo design. In other words, it also includes all those aspects that develop a ‘political identity’ or ‘image’.

2.8. The concept of Soft Power

International Relations literature date backing to the times of the earliest political writings of Thucydides and Machiavelli is fully packed with confirmations of the states’ pursuit of power and that it perhaps remains among the most critical and at times confused concepts in political theory. According to Dahl (1957: 201) “power is the ability for one actor to influence the actions of another actor that would have occurred otherwise.” In addition Nye (2002:2) states that “the ability to gain the results one wants is usually associated with the scope of different resources such as territory, population, natural resources, military force, strength of economy, political stability.” The theory of political realism is very clear in its scope of power, narrowing it solely in terms of military and to some extent economic force. As such power in the realist context is attained or defined mainly through the accumulation of sophisticated weapons, artillery and a wholesome package of state – of – the-art military hardware. Nye (2002:2) states that soft power is the influence that derives from intangible sources, like culture, basic principles and values. It is an ability to co-opt people, to achieve political ends through attraction rather than coercion or payment, (Ibid: 2).

2.8.1 Media as an instrument of Soft Power

Nye (2002:2) argues that soft power is an indirect way to exercise power. Soft power therefore arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas, and policies. When the implemented policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, the ‘soft power’ is enhanced, (Rothman 2011: 50). Nye (2002) states that new power resources such as the capacity for effective communication and for developing and using multilateral institutions may prove more relevant. The changing nature of international politics has also made intangible forms of power more important. National cohesion, universalistic culture, and
international institutions are taking on additional significance. Power is passing from the ‘capital – rich’ to the ‘information – rich’.

Information is becoming more and more plentiful, but the flexibility to act first on new information is rare. Information becomes power, especially before it spreads. Thus a capacity for timely response of new information is a critical power resource. With the rise of information-based economy, raw materials have become less important and organisational skills and flexibility more important. While ‘hard power’ rests on threats (sticks) and inducements (carrots), soft power relies on the ability to shape the agenda in the world politics, based on one’s principles and ideas. Using ‘soft’ instruments, it is possible to solve problems regarding which resources of ‘hard power, are powerless, (Ibid 2002:8).

2.9. Background to Zimpapers

In order to fully comprehend the operations of The Herald and The Sunday Mail, an appreciation of the structure of the parent company- Zimpapers is very critical. Zimpapers (1980) Private Limited is a government – controlled newspaper group. The Zimbabwean Government has a 51% shareholding which it acquired in 1981 with the aim of democratising and indigenising the media landscape from the vestiges of colonialism, Gadzikwa (2012: 4). In a way the newly installed Zimbabwean government from the onset was quite aware of the critical role public media plays. This is so because, even at a time many critical sectors such as the commercial farms, the light and heavy industries were predominantly white - settler controlled, a quick decision was made to cast focus on the public media. In a way therefore, the government is quite informed on the need of the media to be on the watchful eye of the government, but probably it is the strategy that is lacking.

The controlling stake of Zimpapers was acquired through a buy-out of the South African Argus Company’s controlling stake in the former Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company (RPPC) by the new Government of Zimbabwe through a US$ 6 million grant from the Nigerian Government, (Ibid: 4). Due to the controlling stake, the Zimbabwean Government through the Ministry of Information or any department that has been mandated at a particular time has editorial control and determines the group’s publications. The 51% shares are entrusted in Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe. Zimpapers has two main divisions namely newspaper and commercial printing divisions. The commercial divisions of Zimpapers are made up of Natprint, Typocrafters and Bold Ads. Zimpapers’ newspapers titles are:
• The Herald- a national daily published in Harare.
• Chronicle- a national daily published from Bulawayo.
• The Sunday Mail- a Sunday national paper published from Harare.
• The Sunday News- a Sunday paper published from Bulawayo.
• The Manica Post- a weekly paper published from Mutare in Manicaland.
• Kwayedza- a weekly vernacular Shona paper published from Harare.
• Umtunywa- a vernacular Ndebele paper published from Bulawayo.
• The Southern Times- a weekly paper from a joint venture between Zimpapers and the Namibian Government.
• H-Metro- a tabloid published from Monday to Friday every day from Harare.
• B-Metro- a tabloid which is published as weekly in an erratic manner from Bulawayo.
• In addition to the newspapers, Zimpapers has a radio station StarFM, established after the company attained a broadcasting license in 2012.

2.9.2. History of the press in Zimbabwe

Mukasa (2003: 171) states that “the development of the press in Zimbabwe can be categorised into three eras: colonial/nationalist era (pre-1980); transitional era (1980-1990) and the post transitional era (1990 to present). During each era, the press exhibited editorial policies and practices that reflected the ideological and socio-political environment of the time. The eras in question are critical to the area under study because they more or less converge with critical foreign policy practices at which the media could have been effectively been utilised to influence, articulate or help in the prescription of the country’s foreign policy in a way that the country could have attained certain targeted interests.

2.9.3 Colonial era

During the colonial era two types of press institutions emerged. Newspapers such as the Rhodesian Herald and the Bulawayo-based Chronicle, their sister weeklies the Sunday Mail and the Sunday News, as well as the Financial Gazette, were clearly aligned with the ideology interests of the white ruling elite in Rhodesia. The journalistic ethos of the time was to promote European cultural standards while denigrating African culture and political agitation as the nemesis of western civilization and Christianity. Stories about Africans were largely, if not exclusively, negative and demeaning, Mukasa (2003: 172). However, alongside the colonial press there emerged a nationalist press exemplified by the Daily News, church
publications such as Moto (Fire) and Umbowo (Witness) which provided a platform of expression for nationalist leaders in the sixties and seventies. Moto was published by the Catholic Church and Umbowo by the United Methodist Church, (Ibid: 172). The nationalist movements, ZANU and ZAPU each had its own publications based outside Rhodesia.

2.9.4 Independence and the Transitional era

With the coming of independence in 1980, the bulk of the surviving nationalist press, especially those published externally, and some of the church publications faded into oblivion while the hitherto colonial press switched its allegiance to a new ruling elite. The Transitional era was a period of new and uneasy alliances in a tripartite social and political formation that included the warring nationalist factions (ZANU and ZAPU) and the established white entrepreneurial elite, (Ibid: 173). With no nationalist press to express popular view points, the transitional period saw the emergence of a neo-colonial press that contained most of the characteristics of its predecessor. The Zimbabwean government subsequently bought the majority of shares in Zimbabwe Newspapers, a company that owned all major newspapers in the country. The government then established the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) whose stated role was to promote, through an independent board of non-governmental individuals, the interests of Zimbabweans in the national media. At the end of 1980, the new government replaced all the white editors at Zimbabwe Newspapers, (Ibid: 173).

Farai Munyuki became the first black editor of The Herald; Tommy Sithole editor for the Chronicle; the late Willy Musarurwa editor for The Sunday Mail and Bill Saidi editor of The Sunday News. A government minister Enos Nkala, did not mince his words when he said white editors were incapable of articulating and supporting a black government, (Ibid: 173). This was in the aftermath of the artillery battle in Bulawayo between ZAPU’s armed wing ZIPRA and their ZANU counterparts’ ZANLA. Government also created the Zimbabwe Institute of Mass Communication (ZIMCO) to train black journalists. ZIMCO was headed by a former editor of Umbowo and director of the Zambia-based Africa Literature Centre- the late Ezekiel Makunike. Zimbabwe International African News Agency (ZIANA) was also created at the time with the purpose of receiving and disseminating news. As noted by Mukasa (2003: 173):

What then emerged in the early 1980s was a tame press headed by government-appointed editors. Most of these were committed to serving the interests of the ruling party of which they were card carrying members. The press in Zimbabwe has historically developed
as institutional partners with a coalition of business and government whose economic and political interests are generally articulated in the editorial columns of the press.

2.9.5 The Post-Transition era

By the late 1990s the Zimbabwean press had grown into three categories: the mainstream press owned by Zimbabwe Newspapers, rural newspapers owned by ZMMT, and the independent press owned by the private sector. The mainstream press included The Herald, Chronicle, The Sunday Mail, Sunday News and Manica Post. The most serious challenge to the monopoly control and ownership of the mainstream press was the emergence in 1999 of the Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ) a consortium of local and foreign businesses. The flagship of the ANZ was The Daily News, a daily paper which emerged as a fiery critique of government’s governance malpractices. Other equally important privately-owned press included the Zimbabwe Independent, The Standard and The Financial Gazette.

2.10. Theoretical Framework

This section reveals the study’s theoretical framework in terms of related theories to the study. According to Wolcott (2001: 74) the theoretical framework outlines the project’s contribution to fundamental knowledge by describing how the study fits into theoretical traditions in the social sciences or applied fields. In this regard the study considered the theory of agenda setting.

2.10.1 Agenda-setting theory

According to Herman and Chomsky (2002) the mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. McCombs and Shaw (1972), echoes that the Agenda-Setting Theory refers to salience events in the public mind and how they become part of how political influences of the media. In their research, they saw the media mainly the news media not able to always be successful in telling the audience what to think but rather quite successful in telling them what to think about. In practical terms, agenda-setting theory deals with mass media’s ability to influence the perception of its audience and what they consider the most important issue of the day.

McCombs (2004:52) also evaluates agenda setting as a social process in which the same message is either printed, audio or visual form is disseminated to a vast population.
Numerous characteristics of these messages influence how many persons pay any attention to the message and apprehend at least some portion of its content. Front-page stories in the newspaper have about twice the readership of stories that appear inside the newspaper. Stories with attractive graphics and large headlines attract more readers. Many other characteristics of the newspaper - and analogous characteristics of television and other mass media - influence the extent to which mass communication is successful in finding an audience. According to studies done by Valenzuela (2007) [Kiousis and McCombs (2004)] analysed media content and public opinion and about 11 major political figures during the 1996 U.S. presidential election and found that as media attention on political figures intensifies, the public’s opinions and attitudes about those characters portrayed on the news become stronger — even polarised — and less neutral.

McCombs (2004:40) had an insight into the role of formal education in the agenda-setting process as it comes from a comparison of five demographic characteristics that appear time and again in public opinion polls: age, education, income, sex and race… Citizens with more years of formal education more closely mirrored the media agenda. This primacy of the educational experience is striking throughout the realm of politics and public affairs. Agenda setting theory becomes a critical theory to put into consideration in the government’s endeavour to link its foreign policy with the media. The media remains the cheapest, accessible and perhaps the fastest instrument to articulate a state’s foreign policy stance to any related occurring event within the international system.

2.11. Conclusion

The preceding chapter explored a plethora of literature, ranging from Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, history of the press in Zimbabwe, media diplomacy as well as media as instrument of soft power. It then went on to unveil the theoretical framework through the assessment of the agenda setting theory. All the above were deliberate efforts done to have a clear picture of the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the public media from 1980 to 2014.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

3.0 Introduction

This chapter outlines and discusses the research methodology employed by the researcher. It highlights the research design, sample, sampling, data collection procedures and data presentation and analyses procedures. Effort is made to clarify the validity and reliability of the instruments, techniques and procedures utilised.

3.1. Defining Methodology

Iryny and Rose (2005: 248) define methodology as:

A systematic, theoretical analysis of the methods applied to a field of study, or other theoretical analysis of the body of methods and principles associated with a branch of knowledge. It typically encourages concepts such as paradigm, theoretical model, phases and qualitative techniques.

Best and Kahn (1993) define methodology as the design which encompasses both world views and methods. Haralambos and Holborn (2000) postulate that, methodology is concerned with both detailed research methods through which data are collected and the more general philosophies upon which the collection and analysis of data are based. Methodology thus refers to a cognitive and systematic way of solving a problem. Methodology becomes the research’s life blood, directing how the research is conducted.

3.2. Research Paradigm

The research adopted the qualitative research paradigm. According to Schumacher and McMillan (1993: 3720) “qualitative research is based on a naturalistic phenomenological philosophy that views reality as multi-layered, interactive and a shared experience.” According to Babbie (2003: 281) “qualitative field research enables researchers to observe social life in its natural habitat: to go where the action is and watch.” This type of research can produce a richer understanding of many phenomena that can be achieved through other observational methods, provided that the researcher observes in a deliberate, well-planned, and active way. Creswell (2009) describes qualitative research as “a means for explaining and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. The
process of research involves emerging questions and procedures, data typically collected in the participant’s setting.”

3.2.1 Qualitative Worldviews

According to Creswell (2009) there are many different philosophical approaches to qualitative research which influence the choice of theoretical framework and methodology. Qualitative research design was found to be most appropriate given its flexibility in granting the researcher opportunity to look at context and social meaning and how it affects individuals. Qualitative research is rooted in the use of words, phrases, sentences and paragraphs to describe phenomena. One of the limitations of qualitative research is that, the results are more easily influenced by the researcher’s ideological leaning, political preferences, personal biases and idiosyncrasies. To curb this, the researcher used three different methods to gather data which were in – depth interviews for academics and journalists, content analysis for newspaper articles and documents as well as a case study approach.

3.3. Data Collection Techniques

Data collection techniques used were in – depth interviews for academics and journalists, content analysis for selected newspaper articles as well as the case study approach to two Special Editions of the New African Magazines that the Government of Zimbabwe fully sponsored through the Ministry of Information and Publicity.

3.3.1 In – depth interviews for academics and journalists

The researcher used in – depth interviews for academics and journalists to solicit their views on the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media. According to Boyce and Neale (2006: 3) “In – depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea, programme, or situation.” Mack (2006) states that and in – depth interview is a technique to elicit a vivid picture of the participant’s perspective o the research topic. The researcher found the conduct of in – depth interviews mostly useful in that they provided much more detailed information which was available as compared to other data collection methods such as the use of questionnaires.
Boyce and Neale (2006: 3) also note that in-depth interviews may provide a more relaxed atmosphere in which to collect information – people may feel comfortable having a conversation with someone about their programme as opposed to filling out a survey. The interviews were conducted to solicit meaningful insights on the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media. Given the nature of the research topic, the researcher also found in-depth interviews the most appropriate because the research required some degree of extensive intellectual knowledge from the informants. However, the researcher was very mindful of the pitfalls of conducting in-depth interviews. Interviews are prone to bias from both parties.

Whilst the interviewees have their own biases, mostly influenced by the socio-political and cultural backgrounds and orientation, the interviewer who is soliciting information also contain the same. Since the discretion to capture and not to capture sentiments solely lies with the researcher, bias becomes a major challenge. The major challenge encountered by the researcher during the conduct of the interviews was the reluctance by most interviewees to divulge certain critical information. Journalists who have a limited background on politics, international relations and foreign policy were of little help as compared to what the researcher anticipated prior to the conduct of interviews.

3.3.2. Content Analysis

Bainbridge (2008: 235) states that content analysis is of a form of textual analysis that focuses on the frequency of presence or absence of certain words or categories within texts, often involving the estimation of how often a word, phrase or name recurs in the media. Content analysis is very critical in that it can inform a study of representation. According to de Soola Pool (1959: 23) content analysis is widely used because the focus is on the concept rather than simply words and on semantic rather than just presence. Content analysis also has an advantage in that the researcher has ultimate control of the environment in which the study will be carried out. The intended purpose of certain news stories, editorial comments, opinions, columns, headlines and cartoons assessed in this research could only be fully comprehended through the application of content analysis.

3.3.3. Case Study Approach

VanWynsberghe and Khan (2007: 1) define a case study as, “a trans paradigmatic and trans disciplinary heuristic that involves the careful delineation of the phenomena for which
evidence is being collected (event, concept, programme, process, etc).” Creswell (1998: 61) states that a case study can be regarded as an exploration or in – depth analysis of a “bounded system” (bounded by time and/ or place), or a single or multiple case, over a period of time. DE VOS et al (2005: 272) state that the case being studied may refer to a process, activity, event, programme or individual or multiple individuals. The product of this research is an in – depth description of a case or cases. Creswell (1998: 61) states that the researcher situates this system or case within its larger context, but the focus remains on either the case or an issue that is illustrated by the case. According to Babbie (2001) case study researchers, in contrast to grounded theorists, seek to enter the field with knowledge of the relevant literature before conducting the field research. Cuba and Lincoln (1981: 36) note that:

“Case study research does not aspire to universal generalisability in the positive sense... It is far easier, and more epistemologically sound, simply to give up on the idea of generalisation. If the generalisations are accepted, they should be as indeterminate, relative and the time and context bound.”

3.4. Target Population

Saunders et al (1997) define population as the total number of elements that one can investigate. It refers to the actual or rather specific pool of cases that the researcher wants to study. In conducting this research, the researcher’s target population included professors, academic doctors and lecturers in the disciplines of international relations, media and politics in Zimbabwe and beyond. Newspaper articles from The Herald and The Sunday Mail as well as sected articles from the two special editions of the New African Magazine also formed part of the population.

3.5. Sampling

The research used simple random sampling for content analysis and expert sampling for interviewing academics and journalists.

3.5.1. Simple random sampling for Content Analysis.

The sampled newspaper copies and stories were representative of the population under study as anything that was not representative regardless of its size would have been inadequate for testing purposes. A careful examination of the contents of The Herald and The Sunday Mail show that in terms of slant they were basically the same. Simple random sampling employed in this research allowed each subject in this case copies of The Herald and The Sunday Mail,
to have equal chances of being picked. A random pick of at least 24 news articles, 12 for each paper spread over the study was made. Among several strengths associated with simple random sampling, the following were found to be favourable and tallied with the researcher’s circumstances: Having no need for a detailed knowledge of the population under study; easy statistical inference of external validity; possibility of classification error was eliminated. However the shortcomings of simple-random sampling were that it required a list of population to be compiled and that obtaining a satisfactorily representative sample was not an easy task.

3.5.2 Expert sampling

Key informants who included academics and journalists selected in this study were sampled using expert sampling technique. Lampard (2003) confirms that expert sampling involves the assembling of a sample of persons with known or demonstrable experience in some area. Expert sampling is part of purposive sampling and is a non–probability method. In this case, four key informants in the areas of international relations, foreign policy and the media drawn from the respective University of Zimbabwe, University of London, Zimbabwe Media Commission as well as The Herald were interviewed. The experts were either professors of international relations and or foreign policy, renown media experts as well lecturers of political science and experienced journalists.

3.6. Data presentation

According to Macintosh (1996: 109) data presentation is “A set of skills that seeks to identify, locate, manipulate, format and present data in such a way as to optimally communicate meaning and proffer knowledge.” Data presentation in this research was made possible through the use of tables. Table portrayed a vivid imagination helpful to those without adequate time to read through the text.

3.6.1. Data Analysis

Macintosh (1996: 109) defines data analysis as, “Bodies of methods that help to describe facts, detect patterns, develop explanations and test hypotheses.” Analysis was made possible through coding of data according to a number of themes. Themes that were examined include headlines, opinions, editorials, columns, cartoons and news stories themselves. The researcher analysed data collected in order to develop new ideas and came out with clear clarifications on the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media.
Analysis of data helped in testing the researcher’s hypothesis and whether it could be validated or nullified.

3.7. Ethical considerations

The researcher was highly conscious on the need to uphold ethics. The researcher obtained informed consent from the participants orally. The information as well as the identity of the participants was regarded as very confidential. The researcher did not share the information obtained for any other purposes other than for this research only.

3.8. Conclusion

The chapter outlined the methodological enquiry undertaken during the course of the research. A clear outline was found fit in mirroring findings and recommendations as well as conclusions reached at pertaining the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media (The Herald and The Sunday Mail).
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION, DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

4.0. Introduction

This chapter focuses on data presentation and analysis. Excerpts extrapolated from The Herald and The Sunday Mail articles from 1980-2014 were analysed. Interviews conducted with experts in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the media was presented thematically. Data collected from the two special editions or Zimbabwe – sponsored New African magazines were also analysed. Analysis was done following the order of the research questions. Newspaper cuttings of The Herald and The Sunday Mail were selected from a period under study. Originally The Herald had a large sample of 95 articles as compared to The Sunday Mail’s 35 articles. This is understandable given the fact that the former is a daily paper published from Monday to Saturday whilst the latter is a weekly paper only published on Sunday. After serious considerations the researcher scaled down the sample to 12 newspaper articles each.

4.1. Categorisation of news articles

The news articles were categorised into various genres of news ranging from analyses or opinions, editorial comments, hard news stories, fact sheets, full speeches, cartoons and letters to the editor. These have been further clarified below:

4.1.1. Genre of news – refers to various journalism styles, fields or separate genres, in writing accounts of events. The way into which news is packaged ranging from hard news, feature or soft news, opinions or analyses, cartoons among several others.

4.1.2. Analyses/Opinions – this is a specialised writing which goes beyond just reporting an event but seeks to analyse issues through a in – depth introspection of an issue. The section is normally written by experts in various disciplines and not necessarily journalists only.

4.1.3. Editorial Comments – this is an important section in a newspaper that depicts the ideology or slant that a media house believes in. It is normally written by the editor of the paper.
4.1.4. **Hard news story** – this is a direct report of an event that does not explain or include the reporter’s feelings and or opinions, but rather chronicles the news as it is. Majority of what is packaged as news will be in hard news format normally answering the **who, what, where, when, why and how** commonly referred to as the 5Ws and H in journalism.

4.1.5. **Fact sheet** – this is a paper containing essential details that guides to journalists who may want to write a story pertaining the subject issue. Normally used when crafting profiles of countries, individuals or organisations, newspapers have since adopted a style of reproducing fact sheets as they are, without converting them into news stories.

4.1.6. **Speeches** – when officials officiate important events they normally deliver keynote addresses which are then converted into news stories by journalists. Some newspapers again now adopt the style of reproducing officials’ speeches in full without converting them into news stories.

4.1.7. **Cartoons** – a simple drawing or sketch showing the features of its subjects in a humorously exaggerated way, especially a satirical one in a newspaper or magazine. Cartoons like editorial comments depict the slant or ideological leaning of a media house.

4.1.8. **Interviews** – a news interview is a dyadic conversation between the news reporter and the source of news be it the person(s) involved, affected, interested or even experts in a particular issue. Whilst almost all stories in the newspaper are a product of news interview, newspapers have now adopted a style of reproducing the full interview in full.

4.1.9. **Letters to the editor** – newspapers are quite conscious of the importance of feedback. As such they devote a page on the letters to the editor that now has got categories like written letters sent through the e-mail as well as the SMS text messages. This section is helpful in understanding how appreciative ordinary people are in the issues covered by a publishing house. They also act as forums for discussion and debates by readers.

**4.3. Sample of The Herald**

The Herald news articles were scaled down from a total number of 95 articles to 12 articles (see the appendix at the end of the dissertation). Reducing articles to 12 was found to be most appropriate as the researcher could easily convert the raw data into meaningful analysis and discussion from a flexible sample of 12 articles as compared to 95. The articles finally selected were as follows:
Table 1: Sample of The Herald

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Article</th>
<th>Genre of News</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith’s special force banditry in Mozambique exposed</td>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>16 November 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putting land first</td>
<td>Editorial Comment</td>
<td>12 November 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan’s duties</td>
<td>Editorial Comment</td>
<td>9 November 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crunch meeting of OAU coming up</td>
<td>Opinion/ Analysis</td>
<td>9 November 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘We want China to be leading partner’</td>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>9 August 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe battles ‘world propaganda’</td>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>22 November 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do the noble, remove sanctions entirely</td>
<td>Letters to the Editor</td>
<td>19 August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congratulations President, Sadc needs a leader like you</td>
<td>Letters to the Editor</td>
<td>19 August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions: The silent atomic bombs</td>
<td>Opinion/Analysis</td>
<td>30 January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The truth shall set you free, Mr Obama</td>
<td>Cartoon</td>
<td>8 August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President meets Chinese counterpart today</td>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>25 August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK, MDC and strangulation of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Opinion/ Analysis</td>
<td>2 February 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was deemed pertinent to analyse the distribution of the sample in relation to the genres of news as illustrated by the table below. This was helpful in broadening the research’s understanding of the prime target of articulation of foreign policy used by the media. The distribution was critical in bringing to the fore, responsible media sections that were pertinent in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

Table 2: Distribution of Articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genre of news</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>Out of</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial Comments</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyses/ Opinions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartoons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters to the Editor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of articles</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the above table it can be seen that the hard news stories constituted the biggest sample totalling 33.3%. The trend was normal given that The Herald is a daily paper and that the core business of a daily paper is distribution of news normally in its ‘hard’ news format. Analyses/opinions followed closely with a 25% distribution of the total sample. Whilst articles in The Herald were dominated by hard news stories, space was also granted to analysis/opinions whose purpose is mainly to elaborate on what would have been articulated through hard news stories. Editorial Comments though a critical component of a newspaper had a 16.6% largely because a daily paper has space constraints as compared to a weekly paper. In a daily paper editorial comments will be competing with a lot of equally important genres such as opinions/analysis, hard news stories, feature stories, graphical illustrations and or cartoons among several already identified genres of news.

Cartoons had an 8.3% distribution. This was normal given the complexity of international relations in general and foreign policy in particular. Newspaper cartoonists hardly have any academic background beyond Ordinal Level, and the majority in Zimbabwe normally rely on talent. In such circumstances it becomes very difficult for cartoonists to depict a foreign policy related issue through a cartoon and this explains the lower distribution. Letters to the Editor had a 16.6% distribution. This is so because hardly would ordinary people be in a position to comment on foreign policy related issues which largely have remained a complex issue to the broader society who thus requires the services of the media to at least deconstructed and depict the bearing of occurrence of certain foreign policy related events upon their daily lives. The researcher’s experience in the newsroom reveals that readership response through letters in newsrooms has become low to the extent that at times junior reporters may be tasked to write letters to the editor. Therefore letters to the editor were highly treated with suspicion in this research.

4.4. Sample of The Sunday Mail

The Sunday Mail news articles were scaled down from a total number of 34 articles to 12 articles (see the appendix at the end of the dissertation). Reducing articles to 12 was found to be most appropriate as the researcher could easily convert the raw data into meaningful analysis and discussion from a flexible sample of 12 articles as compared to 34.

The articles finally selected were as follows:
Table 3: Sample of The Sunday Mail

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Article</th>
<th>Genre of News</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe to lead Non – Aligned Movement</td>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>8 September 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed economy not best road to riches</td>
<td>Opinion/ Analysis</td>
<td>8 September 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO, Frontline have common foe, says envoy</td>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>8 September 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC team okays beef deal</td>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>8 September 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US blocks Zim funds, medicines</td>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>20 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show us the money</td>
<td>Opinion/ Analysis</td>
<td>26 August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New chapter in EU – Zim relations?</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>23 August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciating the battle we face</td>
<td>Editorial Comment</td>
<td>20 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zim less of a threat – SA whites</td>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>25 November 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zim praised as ‘striking exception’</td>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>1 September 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After sanctions and terror: Donating leaders,</td>
<td>Opinion/ Analysis</td>
<td>11 April 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>donating memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zim right to send UN team back to New York</td>
<td>Opinion/ Analysis</td>
<td>21 April 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was deemed pertinent to analyse the distribution of the sample in relation to the genres of news as illustrated by the table below. This was also helpful in broadening the researcher’s understanding on the prime target of articulation of foreign policy used by the media. The distribution was critical in bringing to the fore, responsible media sections that were pertinent in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

Table 4: Distribution of Articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genre of news</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>Out of</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard news story</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial Comments</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyses/ Opinions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of articles</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the above it could be seen that hard news stories continued to dominate the sample of news articles that had a link with Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. Whilst it is rare for such a distribution to occur in a weekly paper, it should be noted that foreign policy related issues when they are covered in newspapers normally dominate the pages and firstly being packaged as hard news before they are repackaged in other various formats. The Editorial Comments sample slightly deteriorated with an 8.3% as compared to The Herald sample. This is so because in a weekly paper like The Sunday Mail, editorial comments normally focus on the most dominating story of the week unlike editorial comments of a daily paper such as The Herald whose focus will be the most dominating story of the day. Thus at times it is not always the case that foreign policy related issues dominate the news on an occasional basis. There was a marginal increase on the analysis/opinions distribution from The Herald’s 25% to The Sunday Mail’s 33.3%. This is so because a weekly paper has enough space to devote to other genres as compared to a daily paper. Moreover foreign policy related issues from a local point of view are still tackled from an elitist point of view to the extent that hardly has the ordinary inexperienced journalists attempted them. Columnists are effectively made use of to fill the vacuum of journalism personnel on the area. A new dimension of a news interview constituting an 8.3% was encountered. As has already been mentioned, a weekly paper tries all it can to broaden its genres so as to present news in different flavours. A news interview presented in its raw form makes life easier for the journalist who does not have to tire in sifting what news is from what news is not but rather gives the reader a full account of what came out of the interview. A closer analysis on news interviews originally looked at before sampling revealed the same journalist interviewing different people, supporting the point that foreign policy is still a complex issue in the field of journalism at a local level.

4.5. Content analysis of The Herald and The Sunday Mail’s coverage of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy related issues

The section critically analyses the news sampled articles from The Herald and The Sunday Mail in terms of their link to Zimbabwe’s foreign policy in all their genres. Attention was mainly given on the headlines of the articles, sources of news stories, as well as the use of language, narrative and metaphors.
4.5.1 Hard news stories

*Zimbabwe to lead the Non Aligned Movement (NAM)* was a headline as well as the leading story of The Sunday Mail of 8 September 1985. Apart from the amplification of the headline that Zimbabwe was to lead NAM, nothing of substance came out of the story as far as articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was concerned. The story was not informative of what NAM was all about, how good and prestigious was it for Zimbabwe to assume leadership of such. Similarly The Herald of 16 November 1984 had a headline *Smith’s special force banditry in Mozambique exposed.* One would be mistaken in thinking that the paper indulged in some investigative journalism but the story was derived from a published book *The Elite* by Barbra Cole, wife of a former Special Air Services (SAS) officer – Peter Cole. Apart from conducting former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith on the links his government had with the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), the story did not have any source able to articulate the bearing of the news from a Zimbabwean foreign policy point of view. *PLO, Frontline have common foe, says envoy* was a news story in The Sunday Mail of September 8 1985, which sought to expose the strong links between Israel and South Africa. The story relied on the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Cde Ali Halimeh, and had strong foreign policy thrust but more aimed at projecting PLO’s foreign policy as compared to that of Zimbabwe.

“The Palestinian National Council has adopted a clear policy regarding Jews as a people. We said that we are fighting a political system inside Palestine and we are not against the Jews as human beings because we have all along lived together, before the establishment of the state of Israel, and we are quite capable of living together. We are fighting the Zionist movement, which came to Palestine claiming that it had an historical claim to that land,” claims the envoy. The story was to a greater extent an in-depth coverage of substance of PLO’s foreign policy but Zimbabwe’s was not clear. *US blocks Zim funds, medicines* was a lead story of The Sunday Mail of 20 July 2014. The story was neither clear in terms of its sources, as it was neither investigative, nor a story based on an authentic source or even documents. Instead the story skipped detail and went on to quote Hilary Clinton and United States’ Ambassador Bruce Wharton, whose views in defending their country has always been consistent. *Former US secretary of state Hilary Clinton said during a visit to South Africa in 2012 that Washington would review the sanctions and ‘reward Zimbabwe action for action’, citing the Constitution as well as free and fair elections as benchmark,* reads the seventh paragraph of the story. Whereas there was nothing wrong in recalling previous events in
newly emerging details of a news story, for The Sunday Mail to take the readers back by two years before full elaboration of details on the blocking of Zimbabwe’s medicines and funds as substantiated in the headline was highly misleading and shallow in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

_We want China to be leading partner_ was a headline in The Herald of 9 September 1985, where it was reported that Zimbabwe wanted to see China become its leading partner in development. The story quoted Prime Minister Robert Mugabe who had returned from an official visit to China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The story at least met the expected standards of media’s articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. For example it quoted the Prime Minister saying, “One would want to see partners who not only have the necessary technology and inputs you need, but also whose ideological and political direction is correct, is your own ideological and political direction.” “Such partners would be more sympathetic, would appreciate what Zimbabwe was trying to do and whose heart and soul are with you. These countries were not those of a mercenary instinct who want to make profit out of enterprise that they run in your country or who want to derive some benefit by extending to you what is called aid.” In analysing news stories it is important to realise that news stories serve a narrative function circulating meanings that, in general, confirm and conserve existing political, social and economic relationships, (Carey 1988, Hartley 1982 and Manoff and Schudson 1987).

### 4.5.2. Opinions/Analysis

After sanctions and terror: Donating leaders, donating memory was an opinion/analysis carried in The Sunday Mail of 11 April 2010. The article projected Zimbabwe’s foreign policy through exposure of how evil sanctions were followed by erasing of African memory as well donating leaders (puppets). This was articulated in the carefully phrased words: _After illegal sanctions and terror against a people, imperialism is not satisfied with just engaging in criminal humanitarianism, donating food, blankets and medicines which people could have easily made or bought for themselves if there were no sanctions and terror organised on them. No. Imperialism uses terror and sanctions to erase the stubborn people’s memory; and, having erased or scrambled that memory, to donate leaders, to donate heroines and heroes to fill the presumed blanks created through violence, terror and sanctions._ The above opinion/analysis resonates well with another article by the same author in The Herald of 30 January 2010 entitled _Sanctions: The silent atomic bombs_. In the article Mahoso argued,
“Dovetailing into global and regional crises affecting the future of Zimbabwe is the mass shock inflicted on the entire Zimbabwean population through illegal and racist sanctions at the instigation of the United Kingdom.” According to Mahoso it was through the work of sanctions that saw Grade Seven Examinations pass rate of 2007, 2008, 2009 in the rural areas recording a zero percent pass rate.

Sanctions discourse continued to dominate the newspapers’ opinions/analysis section, with The Herald of 2 February 2010 reproducing an analysis that was firstly published in Zambia’s mass circulating paper The Sunday Post entitled: UK, MDC and strangulation of Zim. The central argument of the analysis was the hypocrisy of the UK and the MDC as well as the US in their sanctions role on Zimbabwe. The article extensively quoted the then British foreign and Commonwealth secretary David Miliband while addressing the House of Commons. “In respect of sanctions, we have made it clear that they can be lifted only in a calibrated way, as progress is made. I do not think that it is right to say that the choice is between lifting all sanctions and lifting none at all. We have to calibrate our response to the progress on the ground, and, above all, to be guided by what the MDC says to us about the conditions under which it is working and leading the country.” In Miliband’s statement, exposure was revealed upon the MDC, who within the tenure of the inclusive government had insisted that they did not have any role in the slapping of sanctions on Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe right to send UN team back to New York was an opinion/analysis by Professor Jonathan Moyo in The Sunday Mail of 21 April 2013. In the full page analysis, Moyo argued that Zimbabwe’s request to the UN to fund its election to the tune of US$132 million did not necessarily meant the surrender of her entire sovereignty and independence to the extent that the UN would dictate the conditions at which the elections could be held. Right to self determination and sovereignty have always been at the core of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

Mixed economy not best road to riches was an opinion/analysis carried in The Sunday Mail of 8 August 1985 where the writer warned that despite its prospects, the capitalist model was less feasible for the developing nations. “The more prudent choice for a country like Zimbabwe, in my view would be development in a socialist framework,” argued the writer. The writer concluded by stating “Thus the foremost step the Koreans had to take before they could partake of the fruits of socialist development was to disgorge all remnants of monopoly finance. In other words complete break with the world economic order was seen to be necessary. This is because the intrusion of the world economy on a national economy is not always beneficial. In many cases it is positively harmful.” Zimbabwe’s foreign policy is also
embedded in Pan Africanism. This was resembled in the opinion/analysis entitled *Crunch meeting of OAU coming up* carried in The Herald of 9 November 1984. The article warned African leaders to embrace unity ahead of the 20th Summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that was scheduled for Addis Ababa. It traced what it termed “the OAU’s miraculous” recovery from the debate of the abortive 1982 Libyan Summit where Morocco boycotted the meeting following the admission of the Polisario Front’s government – in exile, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

4.5.3. Editorial Comments

Editorials are an important part of a newspaper’s content because they give a newspaper power to shape perception and public opinion. Hulteng (1973: 11) and Davies (1998: 7) argue that as a result of their importance, editorials should be part of any consideration of any study of press and politics. However, Mukundu (2010: 46) argues that while the distinction between news and editorials is vast, this does not indicate a dichotomy – Editorials actually represent the voice of the newspaper especially on lead stories or a topical national or global issue. *Appreciating the battle we face* was an editorial comment in The Sunday Mail of 20 July 2014. The article traced the United States’ sanctions on Iraq and contrasted with the sanctions the same state slapped on Zimbabwe. The comment argued that sanctions were simply an extension of US’ foreign policy and served no other function apart from furthering that country’s national interests. “*Washington does not impose sanctions for our good, it is done to pursue their own foreign policy objectives and the price of the deaths of non – Americans is a small one to pay in their reckoning.*”

*Putting land first* was another editorial comment in The Herald of 12 November 1984. Whilst the comment was of a domestic policy nature, it fell short of articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy in terms of the land. The basis of the comment was a parliamentary debate on the preservation of natural resources. “*Once again there were horrific accounts of forests disappearing under the woodcutters’ axe faster that they can be replaced, the devastation wrought by squatters, uncontrolled cultivation and grazing, the destruction of wildlife by poaching,*” argued the comment. However the comment could have done more in explaining that the heart of the land problem in Zimbabwe was the unfinished business at Lancaster House Conference of 1979. *Reagan’s duties* was another editorial in The Herald of 9 November 1984. The comment was excellent in its localisation of a United States matter – that of the re-election of Ronald Reagan as US president into a Zimbabwean issue. The
comment posed some brilliant arguments – “We hope Pretoria’s jubilation at Mr Reagan’s victory will prove premature. It is high time that Mr Reagan turned the screws on the racists down south. Sports isolation must continue, American firms and banks must be dissuaded from investing in South Africa or providing loans that bolster apartheid and the Reagan administration should abandon constructive engagement in favour of those freedom fighters who want to destroy the evil apartheid system.” The comment concluded articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy through registering concern on the Middle East conflict charging Mr Reagan to stop pandering to Israel and to Zionist supporters and support a comprehensive settlement that includes a Palestinian homeland.

4.5.4 Interviews

The Sunday Mail of 23 November 2014 carries a headline New Chapter in EU – Zim relations? The article was a full interview between the paper and the newly appointed EU Ambassador to Zimbabwe Mr. Philippe Van Damme. The interview fell short of expectations in that the ambassador skilfully used the platform to defend the EU’s stance on Zimbabwe whilst the reporter did not have sufficient detail to ask apart from rather obvious and unintelligent questions such as: What is your general impression of Zimbabwe so far; What exactly does the recent scrapping of “appropriate measures,” against Zimbabwe mean; or Has the EU formally written to the Government of Zimbabwe about scrapping the sanctions. Reporters should learn that diplomats are ‘honest men sent to lie abroad’.

4.5.5. Letters to the Editor

Letters to the editor act as a public forum that gives readers a chance to give feedback and thus also generate opinion on issues. Do the noble thing, remove sanctions entirely, is a letter written by Loverage Masvinu in The Herald of 19 August 2014. Masvinu argued that time had come for Britain and the US to realise that it was ZANU PF through a secured electoral victory of July 31 2013 elections, that was in charge of running Zimbabwe. “There is really no justification for Britain, or even their allies, to continue with the sanctions regime, first, after the illegal embargo achieved nothing as one still have President Mugabe and ZANU PF at our country’s political apex,” argues Masvinu. In the same edition another letter was carried out: Congratulations President, SADC needs a leader like you, written by Nickros Kajengo. Kajengo noted that the assuming of SADC chairpersonship by President Mugabe in 2014 was a blessing especially to the youths “given that the iconic figure in President
Mugabe will be directly in charge in giving light to Africa on the vitality of total independence.”

4.6. In – depth interviews analysis

This section discusses and analyses responses derived from the interviews that were conducted. Four people were interviewed, three academics and one journalist, to solicit their views pertaining the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media (The Herald and The Sunday Mail) 1980 – 2014.

4.6.1. Does Zimbabwe’s foreign policy have any link to the public media?

Three of the four interviewees concurred that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy indeed has a link to the public media. One interviewee noted “Insofar as we are speaking about official media that is media owned by the government or closely linked to the government, then that media has reflected and portrayed official government foreign policy, particularly in editorial comments and in comments by columnists.” The other two interviewees were even more specific, noting that The Herald has played a critical role in the projection of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. One noted “In as far as the diplomatic standoff between Zimbabwe and the West is concerned; the public media has developed a pro-government editorial policy, if not an anti – West editorial stance. To this end one could say, yes, the foreign policy of Zimbabwe does have a bearing on the editorial policy of the public media. In 2000 The Herald declared that it would support the government’s position on sovereignty, land reform, and would be opposed to any form of Western meddling and intervention.” The other interviewee noted that the assumption of every political scientist was that mass media has a profound and overt impact on virtually every aspect of political activity, including foreign policy. The public media in Zimbabwe clearly influence, to a noticeable extent, the way in which citizens and politicians acquire knowledge, interpret information and transform it into meaningful and coherent understanding of the country’s behaviour. The Herald, among other publicly – owned papers are a vital source of knowledge for foreign policy decisions and reactions. The media discourse is one critical avenue that citizens and politicians alike use to make sense of politics, domestic or foreign – it is a dual for conveying public opinion and setting the policy agenda for the government of the day. However, unlike domestic policy, foreign policy is a complex arena which is not always easily understood hence the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the media may also be a complex one which may not be easily discernible in all circumstances.”
The fourth interviewee gave a rather different account, citing that the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media (The Herald and The Sunday Mail) had been circumstantial and not systematic. The interviewee noted that, “Nathan Shamuyarira’s tenure as Information Minister (18 April 1980 – 22 December 1987) and later as Foreign Affairs Minister (22 December 1987 – 15 March 1995) was a fortuitous era as the incumbent was both conscious of media and foreign policy interaction and how best the two could be harnessed to articulate Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. Then Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was highly anchored in the principles and beliefs of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and well projected by the public media of the day.

The geo-strategic interests of NAM were daily articulated in editorial comments and analyses of newspapers to the extent that the public media was more of an extension of the Foreign Affairs ministry. With the departure of Shamuyarira from both the government and mainstream politics, Zimbabwe’s foreign policy posture has always been changing depending on the Foreign Affairs Minister of the day. At present Zimpapers is drifting from those frameworks laid in the 1980s. Since 1997 to date, Zimpapers appear more of volunteers in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. There has not been a deliberate link between Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Zimpapers as much as issues to do with the state’s foreign policy are concerned. In addition the Zimpapers organisation like any other media outlet in Zimbabwe heavily relies on foreign downloads and blogs as if there is no local talent to tap into the articulation of pan-African sentiments as well as Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

4.6.2. In what ways can foreign policy process involve the media?

Although all the interviewees concurred that one way or the other foreign policy do involve the media, they proffered divergent views. One interviewee noted that the media was one important component which foreign policy decision makers must take into consideration as they develop their policies. Another interviewee cited examples of some Western mainstream media like Fox News, CNN, BBC, Sky News and many others, saying that they have a general bias towards Western foreign policy. “Zimbabwe is led by a tyrant, Iraq is undemocratic, Libya is led murderous dictator, Russia is led by a lunatic Putin, China abuses human rights, Iran is capable of destroying this planet, but Western atrocities in Afghanistan, Libya, Nicaragua, El Salvador are all down played in the history recorded in the Western media.”
The other interviewee weighed in, saying that “In Western mainstream media, enemy states are vilified and criminalised while friendly states are allowed to get away with almost any manner of atrocity.” The other interviewee stated that newspaper columnists play an important role in supporting foreign policy, but said there was absolutely no media influence in the formation of official foreign policy. “In as far as foreign policy is concerned the record must be set straight by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, not by the media. The media’s role is to report, and of course reporting according to a defined editorial policy, in Zimpapers’ case, a declared policy “to defend the sovereignty of Zimbabwe.”

4.6.3. Moving on to the Look East Policy, has the public media been instrumental in projecting the adopted foreign policy in the post agrarian reform era as a viable option for the country?

One interviewee noted that the public media to this day had portrayed China in sympathetic terms but not in portraying China as itself having a very complex foreign policy involving many countries, of which Zimbabwe was just one. The other interviewee noted that the public media had encouraged support for the Look East Policy as compared to the private media which had bloviated that the policy was puerile and diabolic, literally preaching hate against the Chinese in particular, and deriding any other Far East deal in general. Another interviewee also noted, “The public press has operated in terms of attracting attention to the Look East Policy, and even dramatising and sensationalising achievements under this policy. The public media hype after the recent visit of the President to China misled people about mega deals which were in fact non – existent and insignificant for the desperate economy. In this way, the media is being used in the process of framing public opinion in the interest of the party, in fact the ruling elite.”

4.6.4. What could the public media have done at the height of Zimbabwe’s demonisation during the land reform and how was it going to be effective?

One interviewee noted that the public media could not do anything beyond just defending the land policies. “It could do nothing about external ‘demonisation’ because Zimbabwean official media simply has little readership outside the country and certainly not beyond the Zimbabwean diaspora.” The other interviewee noted that the public media had a duty to inform and outline the country’s policies to the public, whether foreign or public policy. The other interviewee noted that the public media could only sell out and colludes with the EU,
the US and other Western outposts if the idea was to say something acceptable about the land reform programme.

“No one in support of those reforms was acceptable to the West, and it is doubtful anyone is today, and by the West I loosely refer to the Western ruling elites. Apart from writing in support of the land reform, there is very little the public media could have done to stop the denunciation of the land reform programme especially at the height of Zimbabwe’s demonisation,” the interviewee argued. The other interviewee unveiled some academic insights stating that foreign policy, from the dynamic paradigm approach, was an outcome of continuous negotiation, where the media assumes the role of assisting the equitable negotiation and or abstraction of competing interests through democratic processes. It is assumed that the media preserves an autonomous role in foreign policy – that is a gate keeping role.

4.6.5. To what extent has The Herald and The Sunday Mail been effective instruments in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy from 1980 – to present?

One interviewee noted that from 1980 to around 1997, Zimpapers was effective in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy partly because of the sentiments expressed previously that, it was fortunately due to the late Nathan Shamuyarira’s appreciation of the media factor in the articulation of foreign policy. However at present the interviewee noted that there had not been a deliberate link between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the public media as far as issues pertaining Zimbabwe’s foreign policy were concerned. Another interviewee noted that given the government’s direct involvement in the day – to – day operations at Zimpapers, and given the heavily factional fractures rocking the ZANU PF ruling party, the leading faction of the day would have an upper hand at operations of Zimpapers even at the expense of critical issues to do with the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. “The modern Zimpapers as an organisation is marred by many organisational problems such as envy, petty jealousies as well as back stabbing such that team work and therefore putting national interests ahead of individual interests becomes very impossible. Zimbabwean journalists are not yet at a stage of appreciating national values; this is where America and the West appear to be much ahead in their reportage.”

However the other interviewee differed stating that, “The public media has almost always supported the country’s foreign policy, from Socialism, to Scientific Socialism, to ESAP and IMF interventionism, to DRC war, to anti – imperialism and so on. It is the trend of
mainstream media the world over, and Zimbabwe has not been an exception.” The other interviewee noted “Newspapers in Zimbabwe fight local battles for national agendas. The outside world finds these battles and agendas too dense. Basically the model television news channel from an academic point of view is Aljazeera (English); the model print newspaper is the Financial Times, with the International New York Times being a close second, not because everything they write is agreeable but for the simple technical quality of their journalists and production standards; the model online sources are the BBC and the Huffington Post, again for the quality of presentation. African media need to take the best global models and use their techniques. You can’t just bang a few stories together and call it a newspaper. Unfortunately that is the level where the Zimpapers still is and to think they can meaningfully tackle a complex aspect of statecraft such as foreign policy will be farfetched.”

4.6.6. Has the two respective ministries of Foreign Affairs and that of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services collaborated in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and have such efforts (if any) been effective?

One interviewee noted that the Information Ministry had reflected and articulated the policies of Foreign Affairs Ministry without necessarily saying there had been collaboration. The other interviewee expressed disappointment in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, stating that “The Foreign Affairs Ministry has been disappointingly quite over the last few years. Since the late Stan Mudenge left the Ministry (in 2005), it is as if we have abandoned Foreign Affairs Ministry. When Professor Jonathan Moyo took over the Information Ministry, he has had to step in and issue statements on behalf of government. Announcements over US/UK/EU/Australia sanctions would come and go, and Simbarashe Mumbengegwi (the current Foreign Affairs Minister) would watch like the rest of us, only visible in pictures where he would be accompanying the President to the UN or some such other summit.” Another interviewee noted that there had not been any meaningful collaboration between the two ministries, and “if truth be told, Zimbabwe has had to rely on newspaper columns for responses on issues to do with foreign policy.”

The other interviewee responded through pausing a series of questions. “Who spoke at the height of the most recent Israeli – Palestinian conflict? Who said Zimbabwe’s policy position when Libya was on fire? Who spoke when Lindiwe Zulu was playing politics with the GPA? It was the media and President Mugabe. Our Foreign Affairs minister was just silent. That is
not the pattern in Western countries. They talk about everything foreign through their foreign secretaries or ministers.”

The other interviewee also noted that at policy level, Cabinet or government had not worked the structure of foreign policy with a direct involvement of the media, particularly the public media and also more importantly the private media. The interviewee noted that the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Simbarashe Mumbengegwi was more of an operator than a foreign policy maker or formulator.

4.6.7. Are there any possible ways in which a deliberate shift can be made to use public media as an instrument of soft power?

Interviewees expressed divergent views pertaining to the feasibility of media as an instrument of soft power. One interviewee noted that the media could not be used as an instrument of soft power because soft power was most effective in its cultural forms and also when it had economic weight. Citing examples, the interviewee noted that when Western countries award scholarships, that would be an instrument of soft power, but such scholarships would cost money and given that Zimbabwe was in dire economic straits, any efforts to invest in soft power were futile. Another interviewee differed, stating that the media could effectively become an instrument of soft power if it assumed its role as the fourth estate. The interviewee noted, “The public media plays a central role in shaping public opinion, even manufacturing consent for government actions. That is what the mainstream media does, and governments do use the media as a tool to articulate policy, especially during conflict times.”

Another interviewee however noted that although the media in general was largely an instrument of soft power, Zimbabwe did not have the advocacy system for the propagation of local ideas and Zimbabwean journalists and bureaucrats at Foreign Affairs lacked originality and uniqueness in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. The interviewee further noted that journalists’ major weakness was their obsession on events. Zimbabwean journalism, the interviewee observed, was still at events stage, where beyond an event there was unlikely to be a news story, yet news in the modern era should be more on analysis than events. Analysis of issues then paves way to articulate a country’s position on a related event more clearly as compared to just reporting an event. The interviewee also said Zimbabwe had failed to emulate how other countries, particularly the United States of America were handling their media.
“There is an American document called Strategic Communication. The US government sees
the media as an instrument of foreign policy. The rhetoric is well supported because the State
Department is both linked to the media and the Pentagon. As such media operation is highly
affected by the American approach in a very direct way.” Indeed in the United States,
instruments of Strategic Communication which are at the command of the president include
local media, foreign media, broadcasting, cultural exchange, sports and scholarships. A closer
examination of all these factors would point to the fact that they are all instruments of soft
power.

The interviewee also noted that it was not only the media that was out of touch with the
African realities. “Even the publications, the films, the adverts, the designs and virtually
everything. There are no traces of indigenous knowledge in the way we are doing things. In
Zimbabwe 34 years after independence, only two books have so far been written from an
African perspective. These books are entitled Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums
in Zimbabwe as well as None But Ourselves,” argued the interviewee. Although the two cited
texts recognise African ideas which were independent of Western schooling, they were
unfortunately written by non Zimbabweans with the former having been written by David
Lan and the later by Julie Frederiske.

4.7. Case study: The New African magazine Supplements and Zimbabwe’s foreign
policy
The New African magazine is published by IC Publications and is a pan – African magazine
that has published for over 45 years. According to IC Publications website the magazine has
been the world’s biggest selling English language pan African magazine (IC Publications
website (www.africasia.com – accessed on 02/01/2015). Between June and December 2007,
the Zimbabwean government through the Ministry of Information and Publicity, tasked the
New African Magazine to produce two sponsored supplements entitled “Political power
alone is meaningless unless people have land’ and “Our cause is Africa’s cause.” Each
magazine had 99 pages. The projects were aimed at projecting Zimbabwe’s position
following ‘massive distortions’ by Western media on political events that were manifesting
home and abroad. Domestically the Zimbabwe Republic Police had ruthlessly beaten
opposition party leaders on 11 March 2007 who were attending a prayer meeting.
Internationally, the EU – Africa Summit had been pencilled to take place in Lisbon and there
were divisions among EU member states on whether the Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe was to be allowed to attend. Two articles have been selected from each edition and a brief analysis done in terms of the articles’ link to Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

4.7.1. Zimbabwe Special Issue- “Political power alone is meaningless unless people have land.”

*It was about land in the beginning... it has remained about land today!* The article was the lead story for the first supplement edition stipulated above. It was an interview extracted from a book, *The Day After Mugabe*, written by Gugulethu Moyo and Mark Ashurst. In their book, the authors interviewed former secretary general of the Common Wealth from 1975 – 1990 Sir Shridath ‘Sony’ Ramphal, who acted as an advisor to Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, then leaders of Zimbabwe’s Patriotic Front Liberation movement, at the Lancaster House negotiations in London in 1979. The interview made some important remarks in understanding the fallout between Zimbabwe and Britain over land hence projecting the ‘correctness’ of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. Asked on whether at Lancaster House the land was the only question on which the parties did not agree and whether there were any other concerns in that draft constitution, Sir Ramphal responded:

“It (land) was the major stumbling block. And it came up very early. While the Patriotic Front was absolutely clear that the land issue was central, the draft constitution contained the standard convention clause on property, which was a guarantee against the deprivation of property without the payment of prompt and adequate compensation. It was what was in the tenets of international governance, in the UN conventions, but what it signalled to Mugabe and Nkomo was maintaining the status quo on land....There was something of a sleight hand because when Mugabe and Nkomo threatened to leave Lancaster House unless the land issue was dealt with in a way which would allow for land redistribution, the fudge was: ‘You will be helped to pay the compensation, that the constitution requires to be paid.’” Indeed it would be academic injustice to understand any articulation and execution of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy without involving the land question. The interview was aimed at invoking memories through recalling the initial Lancaster House Agreement and what was agreed and promised.

The other article was entitled *EU admission: ‘Many in Africa still view Mugabe as a hero’*. The article was subject of the Evaluation Services of the European Union published by a study commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and supported by France,
Belgium and the UK, in which the EU admitted short changing Zimbabwe regarding the rule of law laid down in the Cotonou Agreement of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP). The reproduced verbatim was aimed at exposing EU’s hypocrisy on slapping Zimbabwe with sanctions as evident in the verbatim, without exhausting all appropriate channels in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement. Zimbabwe could not argue the bullying it suffered more than the revelations made by the EU members themselves in the verbatim.

4.7.2. Zimbabwe Special Issue (second edition) - “Our cause is Africa’s cause”

In this edition was an eight paged interview between New African Magazine editor Baffour Ankomah and Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe produced in full bearing the same title of the cover page – *Our cause is Africa’s cause*. The interview was conducted after the March 11 2007 event that saw opposition leaders beaten up by the police followed by the convening of a SADC Extra Ordinary Summit on Zimbabwe in Tanzania. The interview was tactful in its ability to project Zimbabwe’s foreign policy from the highest level as it is believed that President Mugabe has been the chief maker and articulator of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy since 1980. In his remarks, President Mugabe tactfully said that Zimbabwe’s problem was an entire African problem which SADC and AU could not afford to ignore.

“If you want to read Nkrumah’s own principle – Ghana would not regard itself as totally free and independent unless every inch of Africa was free. So every inch of Africa matters. If that inch loses its freedom, then the whole African continent is affected. It’s freedom minus. And you don’t want anything of that nature to happen to Africa. And in Dar es Salaam, President Thabo Mbeki put it very clearly. He said: ‘The fight against Zimbabwe is against us all. Today it is Zimbabwe, tomorrow it will be South Africa, it will be Mozambique, it will be Angola, it will be any other African country. And any government that is perceived to be strong and to be resistant to imperialists, would be made a target and would be undermined. So let us not allow any point of weakness in the solidarity of SADC, because that weakness will also be transferred to the rest of Africa.’”

In another article entitled *Sanctions, which sanctions?* Baffour Ankomah first analyses and then reproduced in full the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act passed by the US Congress in December 2001. The article was aimed at exposing the United States cowardice on the Zimbabwean issue, as well as fully exposing the US Government’s direct role in Zimbabwean sanctions. For example Section 4 of the Act entitled Support for democratic transition and economic recovery reads, “Through economic mismanagement,
undemocratic practices, and the costly deployment of troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the government of Zimbabwe has rendered itself ineligible to participate in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [also known as the World Bank] and the International Monetary Fund [IMF] programmes, which would otherwise be providing substantial resources to assist in the recovery and modernisation of Zimbabwe's economy.” However under 4(d) the Act states that the US President could waive conditions through Presidential Certification after meeting certain conditions such as Restoration of the rule of law, Election or pre-election conditions, Commitment to the equitable, legal, and transparent land reform; Fulfilment of agreement ending was in DRCongo and Military and national police subordination to civilian government. From the extract, claims by the Zimbabwean government at every forum it has attended that the US government was meddling in its internal affairs with the purposes of effecting regime change may to a considerable extent be valid.

4.7.3 Conclusion

The chapter presented data analysed through methodological techniques like content analysis, in-depth interviews as well as the case study approach. Using three different methodological techniques was purposefully done to curb research biases that were likely to emanate should the researcher have thought of using one methodological technique.
CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.0. Introduction

The thrust of the research was to trace the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media (The Herald and The Sunday Mail) 1980 – 2014. In this chapter the researcher revisited discussions proffered in the previous chapter to come out with a summary of findings, recommendations and the overall conclusion.

5.1. Summary of Findings

A plethora of literature consulted as well as interviews consulted and a case study referred to all pointed to the critical role that the media in general and state – controlled media (public media) in particular could play in projecting Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. Whilst this is the case, the manner at which foreign policy – related matters were reported in The Herald and The Sunday Mail from 1980 to present leaves a lot to be desired. Zimbabwean journalists, it was established, were still obsessed with events – driven reporting ahead of analysing and articulating issues, especially to do with the state’s foreign policy. As such, there was a clear exhibition in the reportage, that Zimbabwean media and its practitioners have not undergone an orientation exercise on a slant to take on national and international issues which have a direct bearing on Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. In addition, it also came out that there has never been a meaningful strategic coordination and cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services. Such disengagement has largely caused a lot of discord and a lack of clear policy direction and articulation of foreign policy in the public media.

In addition, it also came out that the factional dynamics in the ruling ZANU PF has had a spill over effect to the way the public media particularly the Zimpapers is run and thus national interests were sacrificed at the altar of political expedience. The rare era where the public media exhibited some direction in terms of articulating Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was between 1980 – 1997, were the late Nathan Shamuyarira was very active in harnessing the two critical aspects of foreign policy and media information. This was largely due to Shamuyarira’s background as a journalist and a political scientist. It was also realised that it was not only the media that was out of touch with the African realities, as even the publications, the films, the adverts, the designs and virtually everything had no traces of
indigenous knowledge in the way things were done. The media was also said to be an instrument of soft power only if it assumed its role as the fourth estate. Lack of media clarity on foreign policy was also largely due to the fact that Zimbabwe unlike other countries such as the United States did not have a Strategic Communication Plan. In this regard, the research’s findings to a greater extent concurred with the researcher’s assumptions and hypothesis that since 1980 to present there has been a discontinuing link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the public media.

5.2. Recommendations

In light of the above proffered summary of findings, the study made eight strong recommendations that may be put into consideration to establish the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and public media:

5.2.1. It is high time the Government of Zimbabwe should appreciate and harness the role that public media can play in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.

5.2.2. There must be a vigorous strategic orientation exercise or capacity building programme that reinforces what journalists ought to do in handling foreign policy – related stories/issues.

5.2.3. The two respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Media, Information and Broadcasting Services should constantly engage, cooperate and strategically work together in the articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy through the public media.

5.2.4. Members of the ruling ZANU PF ought to prioritise national interests ahead of retrogressive factional biases which in turn have some repercussions in the manner in which public media is managed.

5.2.5. There is need by the Government of Zimbabwe to see what can be learnt from the late Nathan Shamuyarira’s efforts as far as Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and the public media are concerned.

5.2.6. Apart from the media, there are other critical aspects such as publications, films, adverts, designs and virtually everything, which are in dire need of re-alignment with the traces of indigenous knowledge.

5.2.7. The media as an instrument of soft power should assume its fourth estate role in assisting the state in the consolidation and furtherance of national interests.
5.2.8. The Government of Zimbabwe should as a matter of urgency craft a Strategic Communication Plan/Policy that integrates several state departments such as the Ministry of Defence and State Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services, Zimpapers, ZBC, Journalism as well as International Relations departments of Universities and Colleges.

5.3. Conclusion

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy is a critical element of state craft whose articulation and coverage should be given first priority and placed at the responsibility of those with a better appreciation and knowledge. The media is undoubtedly an indispensable tool that societies rely on for information. As such the public media of which The Herald and The Sunday Mail are by far the biggest print media outlets in Zimbabwe has a critical role of projecting Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. There is a great need to expose journalists to knowledge and orientation on Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, as the study has since established that media’s appreciation of foreign policy is pathetically minimal. Foreign policy is a critical aspect of state craft whose execution should be projected through coordination and cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Media, Information and Broadcasting Services. Finally the results of this research buttressed the idea that the public media can be an effective instrument of soft power and thus foreign policy if a Strategic Communication Plan/Policy that integrates various state departments such as Defence and Security, Foreign Affairs, Media, Information and Broadcasting Services, Office of the President and Cabinet among several others is immediately crafted or put in place.

5.4. Areas of further research

The research dwelt on the link between Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and selected public media (The Herald and The Sunday Mail) 1980 – 2014. It could be used as a spring board to land on other research avenues such as Strategic Communication Policy and foreign policy in Zimbabwe, the role of ZBC in executing Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, articulation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy by the privately owned media among other several other foreign policy and communication/media/journalism – related researchable aspects.
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