POLITICAL, ECOLOGIES OF SCALE AND THE MULTI-TIERED CO-MANAGEMENT OF ZIMBABWEAN WILDLIFE RESOURCES UNDER CAMPFIRE

By

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October 1993
"So many causes of the environmental crisis are structural, with roots in social institutions and economic relationships, that anything other than a political treatment of the environment lacks credibility" (Michael Redclift in "Development and the Environmental Crisis: Red or Green Alternatives").
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Biography

Dr. Richard Hasler is an anthropologist and Research Fellow at The Centre For
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Index words: CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme For
Indigenous Resources)/political ecologies of scale/appropriate local institutions for
managing wildlife/lowest accountable units for managing wildlife/multi-tiered co-
management/levels of analysis/local ownership and control of wildlife/elephant/vested
interests in wildlife/ambiguity of rights to wildlife/implementation ladder/
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INTRODUCTION

Amongst others, Robert Chambers (1987) advocated bottom-up approaches to development, in the hope that grass roots decision-making, and participation would impact on the livelihoods of the poor, the marginalized and the dispossessed. Yet Redclift (1987) raised an important question in the endeavour to solve the many riddles associated with the links between poverty, development and environmental degradation. He asked how could an emphasis on the livelihoods and lifestyles of the poor be effective when international and national political and economic forces systematically marginalized them? Perhaps the answer to the riddle is to put Chambers emphasis (After Christ) on the last being first together with Redclift’s analysis of political economy. The emphasis on the lowest accountable unit (the micro-level) in environmental and development work needs to be contextualized within a broader analysis of the other political and economic levels involved (the macro levels), if objectives are to be attained. In practical terms, we need to understand the implication that bottom-up decision-making may only be able to take place if it is sanctioned from the top down. Certainly in the Zimbabwean communal land context, benefits, participation in decision-making, empowerment and responsibility for ecological resources seem only to be able to reach the bottom if the top agrees. This surely must have impact on the modes of implementation, and the goals set for the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE).

INTRODUCING THE QUESTIONS

An aim of the CAMPFIRE programme is to devolve control and benefits of wildlife and other natural resources to the lowest accountable units at sub-district level (Martin 1986, Murphree 1991). An assumption is that this devolution will enhance the sustainability of the resources while simultaneously benefitting those people who live with them. The conferment of appropriate authority status on district councils1 is seen as a means to devolve a sense of proprietorship for local resources on local communities (Murphree 1991 and 1993). Sub-district level institutions, such as village development committees (VIDCOs) and ward development committees (WADCOs) (see below) are however, not the legal custodians of natural resources in their areas. Producer communities can only make management decisions on natural resources, and receive benefits under the auspices, and within the framework set down by the legally recognized and empowered councils (Murphree 1991,1993; Murombedzi 1990; Hasler 1993).

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1 "Appropriate Authority" held by district councils refers to the legal devolvement of partial authority to accrue revenues and manage wildlife resources on behalf of their constituents. Prior to the 1982 amendment of the Parks and Wildlife Act these were the domains of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) and the central government treasury. Authority is partial for reasons outlined in the body of the paper.
Abiding questions, framed within the set of ideas on decentralization and devolvement of control of wildlife as proposed by CAMPFIRE, therefore remain. These questions are at the heart of the University of Zimbabwe’s Centre For Applied Social Sciences (CASS) mandate to identify communities for CAMPFIRE and to identify the lowest level institutions which can be used for controlling access to resources and reaping the benefits (Collaborative Group Statement 1989). What are the lowest accountable units at sub-district level and for what purpose do we want to identify them? For example, are these units to be empowered and if so how? What is a community and in what circumstances can it operate as an institution for resource management (Murphree 1991)?

To date, the CAMPFIRE programme has worked to set up wildlife committees at village, ward and district levels. These committees run parallel to the system of local government based on village and ward development committees (VIDCO and WADCO respectively) who are represented at the district council level through ward councillors. The effectiveness of the system of VIDCO’S and WADCO’s for CAMPFIRE and the degree to which councillors represent their ward’s CAMPFIRE interests is highly variable (e.g., see Child and Peterson 1991; Hasler 1993). Likewise the effectiveness of village, ward and district wildlife committees in representative decision-making and active participation in management is not always conspicuous. As explained above, one obvious reason for such ineffectiveness, when it occurs, is that sub-district level institutions do not have the legal right to manage resources. Authority is vested in district councils, which may or may not be representative of decision-making within the producer wards where wildlife occurs. Furthermore, district councils represent a broader spectrum of political and economic interests which often tend to dominate the sometimes idiosyncratic, village and ward concerns.

A number of related questions arise from this discussion. Is the effectiveness of the institutional set up for CAMPFIRE dependent on the effectiveness of local government institutions? Does CAMPFIRE empower these institutions? Do the institutions empower CAMPFIRE at sub-district level? What alternative institutions and linkages exist at sub-district level which can contribute to the success of CAMPFIRE? These questions will be addressed in the sections that follow as the answers to them are dependent on our analysis of the CAMPFIRE process. In fact, we have to rephrase the questions in terms of our analysis of what is broadly determining the effectiveness of institutional development of CAMPFIRE at the lowest levels.

REPHRASING THE QUESTIONS TO FIT THE ANALYSIS

In asking "what is the lowest accountable unit for CAMPFIRE?" we need to distance ourselves from the question and take into account the following factor:

We need to be careful not to confuse the unit of analysis with the lowest accountable unit.

The unit of analysis in CAMPFIRE can usefully be conceived of as a political and economic
process which operates at various levels of social organization including global, national, provincial, district, ward, village and household levels. Where is CAMPFIRE appropriately located in terms of these levels? Is any one level more important than the others for the success of CAMPFIRE?

See Figure 1 for an illustration of the complex cultural and political dynamics of wildlife resource use which had direct bearing on CAMPFIRE outcomes in Chapoto ward, and Kanyemba. See Figure 2 for an outline of levels and linkages involved in CAMPFIRE outcomes.

Figure 1. Diagramatic Summary of the Political and Cultural Dynamics of Wildlife Resource Use in Chapoto Ward.

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2 An in-depth study of Chapoto Ward was conducted from 1989 to 1991.
Figure 2.

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF SCALE IN HIERARCHICAL CAMPFIRE

GLOBAL LEVEL
For example: links with wildlife lobbies, CITES debates, funding, international alliances, resolving disputes.

NATIONAL LEVEL
For example: influencing national policy, national political and economic alliances with vested interest groups, co-ordinating government ministries, resolving disputes.

PROVINCIAL LEVEL
For example: political and administrative alliances, resolving disputes.

DISTRICT LEVEL
For example: appropriate authority links district level with higher and lower levels, resolving disputes.

WARD LEVEL
For example: forming productive links with higher and lower levels and resolving disputes within this level (e.g., conflict resolution between political and traditional leadership).

VILLAGE LEVEL
For example: forming productive links with higher and lower levels and resolving disputes (e.g., effective consultation on land use planning such as proposed fence lines for resource areas).

HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
For example: forming productive links with higher and lower levels and resolving disputes (e.g., household clusters competing for scarce resources, gender issues).
Global factors such as donor funding, CITES debates on whether Zimbabwe can sell its elephant resources or not, wildlife lobby trends and attitudes towards the global environmental crisis, bio-diversity, safeguarding threatened or endangered species all have direct and often tangible effects on what happens at all levels including the household level.

National level policies, politics and economics can often thwart or enable CAMPFIRE initiatives and therefore CAMPFIRE has to be seen to be operating at this level as well. Indeed a strength of the CAMPFIRE programme is that in practice it often recognizes a multi-sectoral, multi-level approach and has support at all these levels. Internal differentiation and lack of co-ordination does pose difficulties. For instance, national politicians and senior government officials, representing different constituencies and government departments have their own agendas which may or may not coincide with CAMPFIRE objectives. They are often capable of influencing district level decisions concerning what they consider to be appropriate distribution of revenues (Hasler 1989). Such sentiments can directly influence the nature of benefits from CAMPFIRE at household, village and ward levels. Likewise provincial politics can influence the outcome of CAMPFIRE initiatives. If correct protocol is neglected, hold-ups in distribution of revenue to households, misunderstandings and miscommunication have occurred (Child and Peterson 1991). These are lessons which indicate that our analysis of institutional arrangements for CAMPFIRE at sub-district level cannot ignore wider political and economic issues within Zimbabwe and abroad.

3 In Kanyemba (Zambezi Valley), for example, household foraging activities by VaDema entering the Chewore Safari Area were directly affected by increased anti-poaching units attempting to safeguard rhino and elephant from international poaching syndicates allegedly operating from nearby Zambia. The groundswell of concern over these species both at home and abroad has direct impacts on the food security of local households, who generally, and within this context are not involved in sophisticated poaching operations (Hasler 1993). Similarly, the symbolic and purported medicinal value of rhino horn in the Middle East and Asia enhances its value which in turn makes it attractive for a series of middle men to orchestrate connections within impoverished nations such as Zambia for poaching purposes.

4 During a February 1993 distribution of CAMPFIRE household revenues at Mahenyew ward, Gazaland district some of these broader issues serviced. Mahenyew ward is made up of mainly minority Shangaan speakers in a district which is dominated by the Shona speaking Ndau. The Gazaland/Chipinge district has historically been a source of opposition to the ZANU(PF) government. This double sensitivity makes it important that government structures are not passed over and that correct protocol is maintained between the traditional leadership structures in the ward and the district council, local government and provincial administrators. The cost of antagonizing existing conflicts of interests between these structures may outweigh the purported benefits of advocating ward interests in opposition to administrative structure interests.

5 The February 1993 distribution of household revenues at Mahenyew ward is significant in that it coincided with a World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) regional workshop held in the ward specifically to observe the manner in which a "successful" CAMPFIRE scheme operated. The workshop was funded and facilitated by WWF-USA in co-operation with the Zimbabwean Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management. Observers came from USA, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa and Kenya. Most participants were directly and actively involved in similar programs aimed at the conservation or sustainable utilization of wildlife in these countries. Whilst the focus of the workshop was the activities in Mahenyew ward, the message of the medium (McCluhan 1964) was that sustainable resource utilization married...
Likewise, at district level, appropriate authority is vested in district councils and not in producer communities themselves. District council and local government represent a distinct set of political and economic vested interests. Such vested interests in the district’s resources do not always run parallel to the interests of particular producer communities. The district council act and the appropriate authority status empower councils to manage resources for the benefit of the communities/wards which they represent. As mentioned, an added tension in this position is that councils represent the entire district not just producer communities. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that district councils are generally reluctant to devolve controls and benefits to producer communities.

Problems of equity and participation in decision-making do not disappear once we arrive at ward and village levels. Internal social differentiation, competing political structures and different vested interests in resources exist at all levels. For example, at sub-district level, cattle rich households dependent on proposed wildlife areas for grazing, or traditional, economic and political rural elites who benefit more than their poor rural counterparts may dominate decision-making and benefits. If a community decides to distribute revenues to households, there is internal differentiation in terms of decision-making and benefit between men, women and children.

This paper argues that the ultimate outcome of CAMPFIRE is not dependent solely on identifying, empowering and training the lowest accountable unit, rather it is dependent on a series of effective political and economic alliances between and within the various levels of social organization which can facilitate CAMPFIRE as outlined above. These alliances will work to safeguard the political sustainability of the programme. The question therefore needs to be rephrased: Under what circumstances can effective decision-making institutions at local level actively participate in the CAMPFIRE process? After answering this question we can identify the range of lowest level institutions appropriate for the task, and the types of relationship between actors and institutions which enable positive outcomes. But first we must pursue our analysis of what is happening in CAMPFIRE and tackle an awkward question.

...
DOES THE EMPEROR WEAR CLOTHES?

Multiple Jurisdiction Versus Local Ownership and Control in CAMPFIRE

One aspect of CAMPFIRE may be a little like the well known story about the Emperor who wore no clothes, but whose admiring subjects thought they would appear foolish if they pointed it out. Local people are continually told by Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and district councils that wildlife belongs to them, that they are or will become the managers, the controllers, the decision-makers, the owners and the beneficiaries of the wildlife resource in their area. As a chief in Binga district said to me concerning Problem Animal Control of elephants (PAC), "we are always told that we can make decisions about wildlife, and decide how to use our own resource, but when we want to kill problem elephants, we are told by district council that it is not possible because the quota does not allow it."

Joint or Multiple Jurisdiction over access to resources precludes total devolvement of control to the lowest accountable units. Multiple jurisdiction in regard to wildlife means that local communities at best, will achieve partial control over their resources. The role such units may play should be seen in this light and implications that local communities will be managing wildlife resources by themselves and for themselves should be clarified and qualified.

WHY MULTIPLE JURISDICTION OVER WILDLIFE?

Vested Interests in Wildlife

As outlined above CAMPFIRE works with a conglomeration of very powerful vested interests in wildlife resources emanating from different levels or scales of social organization. These long standing claims to rights of control, use, access have to be orchestrated to enable the participation and proprietorship of communities. Some of the diversity of interests and levels have been outlined above. The most important of these for CAMPFIRE is probably the diverse interests of the state (exerted through interested government departments and institutions such as the DNPWLM, local government, district council), the private sector, and last but not least local communities themselves. Neither the state, the private sector nor the community can manage/control wildlife resources by themselves. Each relies to some extent on the mutual good management of the others. Each of these also exerts authority over the resource. For instance, legal authority may be expressed by the DNPWLM for the overall custodianship of wildlife, the district council expresses it in terms of its appropriate authority

6 Murphree says "the delegation of proprietorship over natural resources to communities involves the relinquishment of considerable authority and responsibility on the part of the state, although such relinquishment is never total any more than privatization of land holdings implies a total withdrawal of state authority over land" (Murphree 1991, 6). Thomas (1991) quotes Buck (1989) as saying that wildlife's "overlapping jurisdictions generate complex management problems which require innovative institutional arrangements" (Buck 1989, 130).
status vested in it by the DNPWLM and supported by the District Council Act, safari and tourist operators may claim authority over their concession areas in terms of concession leases or other arrangements with district councils. Local communities may claim authority in terms of ancestral rights to specific territory, use and ownership rights of specific resources are bound up with complex tenure systems (Murombedzi 1990) cultural beliefs and practices and other factors (Hasler 1993).

Ambiguity of Rights to Wildlife Resources

Not only are there a number of long standing rights in the resource which emanate from the vested interests at various levels of social organization, but these rights are usually pervasively ambiguous, overlapping and competitive (Hasler 1993). Such overlapping and sometimes competing claims form a system of rights within rights, forming what has been called a bundle of rights (Maine 1894) of access to wildlife resources. Wildlife is therefore held under a system of joint or multiple jurisdiction, and it is unrealistic to plan for ownership and control to be exerted by any one level or institution alone. At best what can be hoped for is that certain defined controls and benefits are devolved to lower levels. Because of the ambiguity of rights in wildlife resources great care has to be taken to clarify (Murombedzi 1990; Hasler 1993) what rights local communities actually can exert and the legal mechanisms by which this can take place also need to be spelt out.

A MULTI-TIERED CO-MANAGEMENT REGIME

The appropriate management strategy for such a common property regime, involving joint or multiple jurisdiction is co-management (Lawry 1990; Mckay and Acheson 1987; Berkes 1989; Murombedzi 1990).

Multi-tiered co-management refers to the effective management linkages within and between internally differentiated levels of management (and use) which can result in mutually beneficial outcomes from the common enterprise concerning wildlife (see Hasler 1993). These levels or tiers coincide with the political and economic hierarchy outlined above (i.e., global, national, provincial, district, ward, village and household). Because each level is internally differentiated, conflict resolution within levels may be as important as conflict resolution between levels. Thus looking at it horizontally, conflicting aims and objectives between the DNPWLM and the Ministry of local government and district councils may be as important an issue for the success of CAMPFIRE, as vertically, the level of support for the programme from national politicians, or the effectiveness of local wildlife committees in accommodating both the traditional and the political leadership. An effective CAMPFIRE programme requires the resolution of conflict within and between many levels.

Co-management does not preclude the empowerment of local institutions, but it takes cognisance of the stakes held by other institutional levels in the resource. Hypothetically, it therefore would not be inconsistent in terms of a co-management strategy to devolve appropriate authority status to ward or village level, while maintaining certain rights exerted
by DNPWLM, district council, private sector, etc. If such a devolution should or could take place, it would have to be done in such a way that significant vested interests in wildlife by the state, at national and at district level were maintained so that national and district level interests do not run counter to the programme.

**POLITICAL ECologies OF SCALE**

Following Abel and Blackie's (1987) analysis of the hierarchical vested interests of the Zambian political economy in wildlife resources and national parks, we use political ecology to mean the process whereby the different levels (e.g., global, national, district, household) of historical vested interest are exerted in ecological resources and the political forces which articulate such interests. Thus in talking about the political ecology of wildlife resource use in Zimbabwe, we consider the social groups at various political levels outlined above in their direct relation to the use and management of wildlife.

Political ecologies of scale refers to the hypothesis that lower levels of social organization (e.g., chieftainships and headmanships, WADCO and VIDCO) are more likely to effectively participate in the direct management and benefits of ecological resources, if selected institutions at higher levels of social organization such as global lobby groups, national politicians, DNPWLM, district council and local government have political and economic vested interest in these lower levels participating, benefitting, managing, etc. I would argue that this is the process taking place under CAMPFIRE. The sustainability of local level common property regimes is subject to these broader political and economic processes. They can be strengthened through the development of effective co-management links with higher levels of organization or weakened by the disruptive effects of marginalization mentioned by Redclift above. The more active lobbying or advocating for empowerment of the lowest levels and the more conflicts of vested interest resolved at each level that relate to management and use of resources, and the more vested interests there are at each level supportive of devolution to occur, the more likely local level institutions are to play an active role in managing ecological resources.

Murphree (1991) identifies certain principles for running communal management regimes such as CAMPFIRE. These principles all focus on the unit of production, management and benefit whose locus is identified at the lowest level. The principles include "focused value for those who live with the resource", "differential inputs must result in differential benefits", "positive correlation between quality of management and the magnitude of benefit", "the unit of proprietorship should be the unit of production, management and benefit" and "the unit of proprietorship should be as small as practicable, within ecological and socio-political constraints" (Murphree 1991, 7). In regard to the last two principles, Murphree indicates that institutionally the unit of production management and benefit is the only structure which can efficiently combine the other principles, and that it need not conflict with any larger structures of management activity (this presumably refers to institutions at levels outlined above). He also says that the unit of proprietorship should be small because large scale structures tend to be ineffective, inefficient and have potential to become corrupt and avoid responsibility.
These principles are useful guidelines and my intention is not to detract from them. There are, however, added dimensions beyond and above the lowest proprietal units, which facilitate the empowerment and effectiveness of these units. Indeed the management, production and benefits of wildlife are not confined to any one level or unit. As pointed out above (see vested interests in wildlife) management involves decision-making at all levels from global to local. Production of wildlife is also not simply a matter of local concern as wildlife is mobile and crosses boundaries, which emphasizes the multiple-jurisdictions involved in this production. The CAMPFIRE programme seems to indicate that "benefit" and "risk" also seem to involve many levels. For example, both the broader society and the environment are likely to benefit or lose from CAMPFIRE outcomes. National politicians are likely to claim credit or dispute blame. DNPWLM hopes to benefit from CAMPFIRE by establishing localized management regimes in circumstances where the efficiency of historical protectionist policies has come under question, but may lose by not achieving its objectives. District councils who embody the CAMPFIRE principles, who devolve controls, decision-making and benefits to local levels may be in a good position to attract donor funding and other benefits, while those district council's who do not meaningfully involve sub-district levels may in the long run whittle away their programmes and undermine their own potential.

Taking into account political ecologies of scale in the communal areas of Zimbabwe, simply means recognizing that if local people benefit from and look after their resources, the entire society benefits. The same applies to any other area in the world. If local people destroy their resources or deplete them for short term gains everyone loses in the long run. This is essentially a political issue which can mobilize components of the entire society at different levels. Nurturing and taking advantage of the political forces in favour of CAMPFIRE and resolving disputes which undermine it, at the various levels is an example of what is meant by political ecologies of scale.

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7 For example, animals with origins in Kruger National Park, South Africa migrate into ChiKwarakwara VIDCO, Zimbabwe which falls under the appropriate authority status granted the Beitbridge district council. Production is not the domain of the VIDCO in isolation from these and other factors.

8 Beitbridge district council has a good reputation as a council that embodies the principles of CAMPFIRE. This is highly commendable. It is interesting that this reputation has been earned by a council which does not have substantial wildlife revenue in its district, but is wisely developing a reputation for good management practices which will attract growing donor interest in the district and other opportunities. The district reputation is largely based on the willingness to return revenues earned by a single VIDCO (Chikwarakwara) with wildlife resource potential, rather than to absorb these revenues by the district as a whole (see Child and Peterson 1991). In contrast, Nyaminyami district and Guruve district have large revenues from wildlife resources in several wards but appear to be less eager to implement the CAMPFIRE principles. This situation in each of these districts is complex but one reason why councils act in the way they do may be because they perceive themselves as making economically rational choices about perceived benefits. Districts which have little wildlife revenues may think they have less to lose in wildlife revenues and more to gain through donor funding and other opportunities by implementing CAMPFIRE principles. Districts which have substantial revenue earning capacity may feel that they have more to lose and less to gain by implementing CAMPFIRE principles whole heartedly. This argument cannot be taken too far, however, as neo-classical economic theories embody a series of untested assumptions about maximising economic values. Indeed an alleged weakness in the CAMPFIRE program is that it relies on an economistic rationality (see Hasler 1993) which tends to exclude other forms of explanation emanating from culture and politics.
APPROPRIATE INSTITUTIONS: INSTITUTIONS FOR CO-MANAGEMENT AND THE LOWEST ACCOUNTABLE UNITS

Internal differentiation of vested interests within levels and hierarchical differentiated rights of access to resources between levels is explicitly recognized as a working feature of co-management. Devolution or decentralization of control on the other hand may imply that the locus of control, management, ownership becomes the exclusive right of a particular level (e.g., the district, or the ward). Co-management dynamically takes place both within and between levels. Thus a husband who neglects to consult his wife on how a household dividend will be used is adopting a poor strategy in terms of co-management. Likewise chiefs and councillors from particular wards who fundamentally disagree and whose conflict undermines the ability of the ward to make effective decisions are undermining the institutional capacity of their wards. Equally, a district council executive who neglects to consult actively and broadly with producer communities on how revenues can be earned and how revenues should be spent, is a poor co-manager and is effectively undermining the programme. Similarly a ward or VIDCO which advocates complete autonomy of decision-making and fails to recognize the important role of the district council and the political hierarchies which enable CAMPFIRE may be in danger of antagonizing and unleashing larger centralized political forces which may hold back the programme in politically sensitive areas.

District administrators, provincial governors, and local members of parliament play quite different roles in each district. These details need to be taken into account as vital components for the success of CAMPFIRE. Trade-offs between and within the levels have to be made and powerful lobbying groups may have to hold in check aspirations of groups or individuals whose plans run counter to CAMPFIRE objectives.

"GLOBAL TO LOCAL" OMBUDSMAN

There are multiple co-management institutional arrangements currently in place, at all the levels through which CAMPFIRE operates to achieve its objectives (also see Collaborative Group Statement). The authority vested in the DNPWLM acts as an important umbrella for implementation and dispute resolution. Perhaps equally important is the networking taking place within the Collaborative Group (CAMPFIRE association, DNPWLM, CASS, World Wide Fund for Nature [WWF] and ZIMTRUST, the implementing agency) and between it and the various organs of the state. At district or sub-district level, ward and district wildlife committees, district boards of management, or district wildlife management trusts work out the mechanisms of their different programmes with the

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9 Illustrations might include the hopes of the Zimsun chain of hotels to invest in Tsholotsho communal area next to the Hwange National Park.

10 For instance, global or international interest in CAMPFIRE and the principles it proposes is an important incentive for all the levels identified above to participate in it.
representatives of the villages and wards involved. A feature of these co-management arrangements is that key personalities within the collaborative group advocate CAMPFIRE at national and district level, and are influential about working out disputes between and within the various levels. The role of ombudsman (or ombudsmen) for CAMPFIRE is not formally designated but it may be worth discussing the merits and demerits of institutionalizing a role of dispute arbitrator between and within the levels identified.

THE LOWEST ACCOUNTABLE UNITS

Both district councils and producer communities have to accommodate the rights of the various arms of the state (e.g., parliament, government ministries and departments), recognize the political and economic forces they are subject to, and work within existing frameworks by creating effective alliances and management links. The lowest accountable units are a matter of "convenience" (personal communication with Mr. Maveneke, chief executive officer of the CAMPFIRE Association). To rephrase the statement, they are a matter of co-management convenience.

The potential for effective co-management involving the lowest accountable units has already been established by the CAMPFIRE programme. The following typology is presented to illustrate a range of possible experiences involved. The types are overlapping and should be thought of as a continuum of experiences in local level participation.

Type 1: Formal political structure is effective.

The formal government ordained political structure at sub-district level (ward councillor, VIDCO and WADCO) liaises with village and ward wildlife committees and together they advocate (with varying degrees of success) for their mutual benefit at district level and respond to district level decisions. This can be done through district wildlife committees (inter-ward committees) or district boards of management or through wildlife management trusts. The formal political structure may be bolstered or undermined by traditional leadership roles and other features of the cultural and political dynamics at this level. This essentially is the central model behind CAMPFIRE. Note that it emphasizes co-management and joint jurisdiction rather than solely community control and empowerment.

Type 2: Traditional political structure is effective.

Given the above general structures, traditional and cultural leadership play a more active role in decision-making and their role is more important than the formal political structure. This may occur when dealing with relatively geographically, culturally or politically isolated communities. Chieftainships or headmanships may be associated with a specific territory and political units, such as wards or VIDCO’s may coincide. Internal disputes, sometimes involving traditional and political leadership may occur.
Type 3: Charismatic or dictatorial leadership is effective.

Unspecified individual leaders (such as ward councillors, ward wildlife committee members, chiefs, headmen, or VIDCO chairmen) liaise with other vested interests within the community or outside the community at higher levels to influence outcomes at the local level and possibly also at district level.

Type 4: District level influence at local level is the dominant feature of local institutions.

District councils manipulate weak councillors, VIDCO and WADCO representatives, chiefs and headmen to fit in with the district council agenda which may be to consolidate power, control, and benefits at district level.

Type 5: Reaction to district influence dominates local politics.

Wildlife committees are relatively accountable to the households they represent and effectively advocate for these interests at district level. Their effectiveness may rely on either the formal political structure or the cultural leadership to various extents. They respond actively to the perceived top-down practices of the district council.

Type 6: Internal dispute and dispute with council dominates local politics.

Conflict and lack of effective decision-making is rife at the lowest levels because of both internal disputes and hierarchical power relationships. Local people are in the dark as far as CAMPFIRE is concerned, and they do not participate or perceive the benefits. Under these circumstances district councils can easily justify why they should maintain the locus of CAMPFIRE at district level.

The typologies are not exhaustive and they are meant as heuristic devices. They illustrate that the lowest accountable units are a response to both internal community factors and hierarchical power relationships. Each CAMPFIRE case may involve aspects of each type as local people dynamically respond to different factors through time. The lowest accountable units emerge as task oriented institutions manipulating social factors to obtain their goals through time. Negotiations and resolution of disputes between:

a) the formal political structure,
b) the cultural leadership (chiefs, headmen, including mediums where these are active),
c) CAMPFIRE wildlife committees and the households which they represent

are vital components of co-management at the lowest accountable levels.
Effective co-management links with district councils might include:

1) Willingness of district council to devolve clearly defined areas of decision-making and benefits to producer communities is obviously a desirable co-management strategy. This should not simply be window dressing of district level interests by co-opting individuals from producer communities onto district management boards or district wildlife committees. Simultaneously, CAMPFIRE should not expect district councils to undermine their own vested interests in wildlife. Incentives should be provided to encourage the devolution of responsibility and benefits. Under present circumstances, where the district council has appropriate authority status, councils who meaningfully devolve responsibilities and benefits should gain, and those who do not should lose. Those councils that are effective should attract district level donor funding or other benefits. However, CAMPFIRE should not encourage a situation where resource rich councils who devolve responsibility and benefits to local communities feel that they will lose since the value of the resources is high, while resource poor councils feel that they will gain since the resource stakes are lower but potential donor funding is attractive. The value of donor funding for district projects should be attached to the value of benefits returned to producer communities, the degree of participation in decision-making and the institutional development at the lowest accountable levels.

2) In general, within CAMPFIRE there is a reluctance to devolve both benefits and responsibility to lower levels and as a result CAMPFIRE is still basically a district level programme. In some cases benefits have been devolved without broadly consulting the community on the responsibilities associated with such benefits. Meaningful consultation between district council and the diverse interests within producer communities will make management easier for both, but in some areas it is clear that this devolution is not going to take place because district councils cannot work meaningfully with their lower level co-managers. In this case, changing the law so that producer communities themselves can earn appropriate authority status, would allow the shoe to be worn on the other foot. Producer communities would be at the locus of the programme, but district councils could act as co-managers through the provision of services (e.g., training technical expertise, donor funding channel, liaising with NGO’s) to these communities.

The active participation of district council in the provision of services to producer communities could be encouraged by providing funding for the provision of such services as needed on a pro rata basis.

11 The conditions under which appropriate authority could be earned are discussed elsewhere (Hasler 1993).
THE IMPLEMENTATION LADDER

As mentioned, the implementation of CAMPFIRE takes place at many levels not only the district and sub-district levels. Zimbabwe argued at the CITES debates (global level) that local communities would be the losers if our elephant could not be used as a resource. Parliamentary debate (national level) often touches on the difficulties rural people face in contending with wild animals (especially crop raiding elephant) and the hopes and fears associated with CAMPFIRE.

A key player in the implementation ladder is the CAMPFIRE Association. The CAMPFIRE Association is not simply an association of district councils with vested interests in CAMPFIRE, it is intended to be an association of producer communities who have to lobby for CAMPFIRE at district, provincial and national level. If the CAMPFIRE association, is dominated by district interests it may not be able to advocate successfully for producer communities at national, provincial and district level. A vital component of the co-management package is to advocate for producer communities at these levels by showing how all levels can stand to benefit if there is successful proprietorship of the resource at the lowest levels.

The CAMPFIRE association has the potential to bring together political vested interests at national, provincial and district level as co-managers and advocates of the proprietorship by local communities. However, the responsibility for advocacy for CAMPFIRE should not be the CAMPFIRE association’s alone. The collaborative group and the CAMPFIRE ombudsman or ombudsmen, should also play an active role in this. However, all CAMPFIRE agents have to be careful about advocating for the lowest levels if this is grossly at the expense of other levels, as this could undermine the political sustainability of the programme. Consultation between levels can avoid this.

CONCLUSION

In response to the question what is the lowest accountable unit for CAMPFIRE, this paper has taken the perspective that it is a matter of effective political and economic alliance between and within levels. The lowest accountable units, the institutions for local resource management, emerge situationally in response to the historical hierarchy of vested interests

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12 As pointed out by Professor Murphree (pers com) the CAMPFIRE program has to date been working with the equation "producer community = WARD (WADCO) [in some cases VIDCO]. As pointed out at the beginning of this paper, this approach mirrors the formal government political structure laid down by local government, and its effectiveness in representation of local dynamics is highly variable. The initial CAMPFIRE document (Martin 1986) suggested that natural resource co-operatives should be established. A strength of this, would be that such associations could be recognized by law, but a weakness is the overwhelming failure of such organizations, which according to Thomas, is ironically because of their official recognition by the state (Thomas 1991, 18). Interestingly the same argument has been put forward as to the waning of cultural leadership through chiefs and headmen under the colonial state’s indirect rule policies, and to the ineffectiveness
in resources, local cultural and political dynamics and the specifics of the ecological resource base. There is therefore no formula for identifying the nature of these institutions in every ward in every district, since they emerge as a result of both local and broader circumstances and they change over time.

Multiple jurisdictions in regard to wildlife and the ambiguity of overlapping rights between global controls, the state, the private sector, and the community, and the competing rights and vested interests within each of these domains need to be taken into account when we talk about devolving proprietorship to the lowest accountable units.

This analysis of CAMPFIRE argues that it is the orchestration of a multi-tiered co-management regime which takes into account social and political organization at global, national, provincial, district, ward, village and household levels. Despite working at the various levels, the analytical discourse of CAMPFIRE sometimes does not reflect this spectrum of activities. Being realistic about the rights and vested interests in wildlife emanating from the different levels can lead to political ecologies of scale. For example, advocating for control, ownership, management of wildlife resources at local level, while simultaneously ignoring or antagonizing district and national level rights and interests in wildlife (such as those of the DNPWLM or those of the district) is obviously counterproductive. Good working relationships between the DNPWLM, district councils and local communities can lead to positive outcomes. In the same way ignoring political hierarchies with vested interests in CAMPFIRE outcomes is also counterproductive. The successful lobbying for CAMPFIRE at the various levels can facilitate participation and good proprietorship at the lowest levels. In identifying the role and nature of the lowest accountable units it is important to see them as part of this larger process. This paper has identified a spectrum of institutional arrangements at the lowest levels. Various combinations of these form the local dynamic in each area. Dispute resolution and the formation of effective alliances within these institutions and between them and other levels is an integral part of the CAMPFIRE process. It is a result of the process of clarifying rights of access, control and use of a resource held under multiple jurisdictions.

of government political structures in certain areas of Zimbabwe. In terms of co-management analyses as presented in this paper, arrangements which involve both the state and the local community can be highly effective when mutual benefits are to be gained. CAMPFIRE should not be reduced to a prescribed formula, and effective institutional arrangements, including the formal structure, the traditional structure, natural resource co-operatives (all of which are not mutually exclusive) should be considered for integration into existing programs. Where one set of institutional arrangements is not effective, alternatives should be explored, in liaison with existing political hierarchies.

An example of this adaptive approach recently took place in Plumtree district (Matabeleland) where an inter-ward wildlife committee constituted by representatives from several producer ward wildlife committees in that district lobbied for support to advance their interests at district level, in effect to replace or augment an existing statutory natural resource conservation committee and a district wildlife committee supposedly in place to represent wildlife interests within the district. The workshop was attended by the Member of Parliament, DNPWM, other ministries, NGO's including the CAMPFIRE association, local ward representatives and representatives from other district council's in Zimbabwe. A wide array of co-managers to help resolve the issue.
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