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TOPIC: The Great Lakes region intra and interstate conflict and development aid: interrogation and transformative prospects in the new millennium.

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1. Introduction

The fundamental question of devastating civil strife, wars and conflicts on the African continent originates mainly from colonial and imperial expansionism which saw in its earliest stages European powers subdividing the African continent in Berlin, Germany at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885. Accentuating the impact of the imperial factor, Lundini I.B (1994) critically observed and commented that when European powers divided the African continent in Berlin in 1984/85 they literally created the socio-economic problem that Africa faces at present, ethnic homogeneity, which culminated in every African state having more than one nation within its borders. This haphazard imperial process mainly operating on the principle of cohesion saw several ethnic groups, tribes and clans being lumped up to make a state not by mutual or multilateral consent among these African ethnic groups to co-exist but through colonial and imperialist compulsion. Such a development in itself constituted and still continues to constitute a gross interference with the fundamental human liberties and democratic rights and rights to exist of the African people. It would again appear that by sanctifying and institutionalizing the boundaries born out of colonial and imperial cohesion, the United Nations International Bill on Human Rights actually solidified the recipe for the resultant political upheavals experienced on the African continent characterized by coups, rebellions, separatist movements, tribalism and civil wars. While wars were not only peculiar to the Africa before colonialism, but because since 1945 to date most civil wars were confined to the African continent, civil war has been wrongly perceived as an African phenomenon. To the extent that communities constitute the foundation of existence in Africa with Africans pursuing a basically communal life, colonialism just disrupted this set-up and failed to replace it successfully with a more superior communal pattern by African standards. This principle found expression in Smith A. J. (1986) who observed that African people are communal human beings, whose communal pattern was disrupted by European colonization creating new inconsistent socio-economic patterns.

Unfortunately in the post-colonial era, the African new nationalist governmental elite in their national building challenge could not revert to a process of building African states on the principle of cultural communities but maintained the former alien colonial territory which favored the aspirations and values of the colonial powers, that is the colonial socio-political pattern. It is within this breath of analysis and seeking solid solutions to the problem of civil wars in Africa that this research investigates:

- the background and historical context of civil wars, that is intra and inter-state conflicts in Africa;
- the Great Lakes crisis, and its pronounced impact on the belligerent states including the SADC Allied Forces;
- the advantages and disadvantages of development aid that could have been otherwise used to bring about peace and transformation in Africa;
• the African initiatives by the African Union, African governments, regional blocs, complemented by the United Nations in a bid to consolidate peace on the African continent;
• and gives conclusive recommendations on how efforts on peace building and development in Africa could be better handled, etc.

2. Background to intra and inter-state conflicts in Africa.

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s whereby the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) together with the former Socialist Eastern European States both collapsed considerably dispelled the protracted and wrongly perceived notion in world political affairs that civil wars were a political constant and an African mode of living. Analysing the entrenchment of this misconception in world politics, Kambudzi A.M (1998) noted that, over the 1945-1988 period most civil wars were confined to the African continent and they broke around or soon after independence. Such a development in which civil wars had and continue to feature on the African continent to a given extent corroborated the contentious arguments by the former colonial masters that Africans were incapable of managing their own affairs competently on one hand and again the contention that African independent states were considerably underdeveloped in economic terms and so they had to remain subordinated to their colonial masters to ensure development on the other hand. The new brand of sovereign states in Africa met the challenges of resource management and the inability to create a broad inter-ethnic cohesion critical for new nation building and development. This yet again controversial position was confirmed by Diamond L (1987) who observed that the brand new (African) sovereign entities were seen as unviable especially given the multiplicity of ethnic groups, ethnic divisions and their shallow sense of nationhood. Refuting sustainability of the above arguments Kambudzi A.M reasserts that, while world history has exploded the “myth of civil war” as a typically African problem there however remains a basis upon which to more accurately interpret and argue the prevalence of civil strife and civil war on the African continent, which are characteristically recurrent and tend to embrace more than one state. For instance the Liberian civil strife in 1977 after eight years saw a democratically elected government installed in Liberia and the United Nations Peace-building Support Office (UNOL) in Liberia being established, yet political instability and insecurity persisted and over the 1999-2003 period fighting broke between the government forces and the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy. As the conflict intensified the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent to Liberia a vanguard force of 1000-1500 troops which was authorized to operate as a multinational force in 2003 by the United Nations Security Council, (United Nations 2004: p 93-94). Yet again in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), following the genocide in Rwanda and the establishment of a new government there, some 1.2 million Rwandese Hutus that had participated in the genocide fled to Kivu provinces of eastern Zaire an area inhabited by ethnic Tutsis, (UN 2004: p 83-84). In the Kivu region a rebellion began in 1996 pitting rebel forces led by
Laurent Desire Kabila backed by Rwanda and Uganda against the army of President Mobutu Sese Seko took the capital city of Kinshasa. While paradoxically again in 1998 a rebellion against the Laurent Desire Kabila government started in the Kivu provinces seizing within weeks a large area of the DRC, a development which saw the SADC Allied Forces from Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe provide military support to the DRC. Settlements to this dispute only came after the signing of the July 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which led to the end of hostilities and holding of the inter Congolese dialogue, after diplomatic efforts by the UN Secretary General, the African Union and the South African Development Community (SADC).

Basically what all these civil strifes and wars serve to prove is rather not the contentious argument that Africans cannot manage their affairs and that their economies are underdeveloped and therefore need the leadership and guidance of the former colonial states, but that the model of the African state on which the Great Lakes states also are founded, is typically an imported one be it a federation, a unitary state system or whatever the case may be. Analyzing this problem in his scholarly work Kambudzi A.M (1998) stated that this issue emanated from the convictions held by the colonial powers that it was part of their right to extend political civilization to Africa, so the colonial state was established in the image of the colonizing master with again the constitutional apparatus adopted from the master. Citing further colonialism as the main underlying factor to civil wars in Africa the author argues that, without colonialism if the pre-colonial African empires, the ethno-centric entities were allowed to evolve, viable African states and state systems could have logically emerged from these very entities, with large ethnic groups conveniently forming their solid state base. Naturally such a process would have seen smaller and less significant ethnic groups by the numerical and territorial logic being absorbed into the larger ethnic formations, which would in turn have become stable African states.

Naturally when the African empires collapsed, that process culminated in the emergence of ethnic entities and logically, intra-ethnic fusion and not the colonially engineered non-intra-ethnic fusion should have become the basic socio-political norm in state formation on the African continent consolidated by or rooted in the concept of cultural community.

The complementarity of Kambudzi A.M (1998) and Lundini I.B (1994) on the essence of cultural community as the fundamental point of departure in Africa state – system formation remains logical in the manner that the existing imported model of state in Africa remains a potential setback in as far as development of Africa is concerned. It remains so as well to the extent that it was reinforced and forcibly instituted on the African continent based literally on alien non-intra-ethnic fusion as the basic socio-political norm.

Emerging from the above discussion, the post – independence era in Africa therefore hardly saw the rise of a real African state but the rise and re-institution of a neo-colonial state basically characterized by domination of the minorities over the majority, foreign domination, external financial control, networks of corruption and external financial control, continued accumulation of capital by
foreign companies and none indigenous, political instability, economic maginalisation of the indigenous majority and tribalism, etc. Indeed as correctly observed by Kambudzi A.M (1998) what were supposed to become nations were summarily labeled tribes before and after independence. This development remains as the fundamental cause to the civil wars that have brought turmoil on the African continent to date. The economic and social costs of these civil wars reflects in the huge flows of displaced refugees, rising levels of poverty, hunger and disease with more than 340 million people or half the population of Africa living on less than 1US$ per day. Infant mortality rates mostly emanating from the effects of civil wars has registered 140 out of every 1000 while life expectancy at birth has remained at less than 54 years, (NEPAD: 2001). Because of the instability generated by civil wars on the African continent resources secured in the form of aid are not effectively utilized or in most instances are not offered because of unpredictable political circumstances. However on one hand the impact of these wars is felt again considering that only 58 percent of the population has access to safe water while again illiteracy rates for people over fifteen (15) is forty-one percent (41) with again among other indices only eighteen (18) mainline telephones per 1000 people in Africa compared with 146 for the world as a whole and 567 for high income countries, (NEPAD, Abuja 2001).

On the other hand, efforts to re-mould and bring these hostilities to an end are being made within the United Nations Conventions on Human rights, Peace and Security arrangements, complemented by the same Conventions of the African Union and Protocols on Security and Peace for regional blocs as the Southern African Development Community, (SADC :2002). While development aid has been in large volumes advanced to Africa by the Donor Community, it again is being competently managed within the new continental economic framework, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which aims to eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and that way halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process.

3. Great Lakes interstate and intra-state conflict and civil wars.

Within the context of both the United Nations and African Union Charters interstate conflict refers to violation, gross interference, abuse of the territorial integrity, sovereignty, peace, human rights and security of one country by another in the form of engaging in armed struggles, sponsorship of armed rebellion or battles. An expression of humanitarian crisis on the African continent, the Great Lakes interstate conflict saw the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda embroiled in an armed conflict which at its height in 2002, on the signing of the Congo Peace Accord had well over 50000 troops from seven different African States fighting on its territory (in the Congo) see tables 1,2 and 3. In a very critical observation by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaga entitled "Crisis in the Great Lakes Region" a more objective qualification of the origins of this humanitarian crisis was identified as being
deeply entrenched in the history of the Great Lakes region and the political inclinations of the deposed Mobutu regime at home in Zaire, in the region as well as on the global scene.

According to Georges Nzongola-Ntalaga, the interstate conflict developed around two major questions, whereby in the first place, there was the problem of whether or not people of Rwandan origin or the Banyarwanda, collectively the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa could claim Zairean citizenship on the backdrop of being native to Zaire as of August 1885, when actually the present Democratic Republic of the Congo became known as the Congo Free State on one hand. If then on that premise the Banyarwanda could claim legally the Zairean citizenship they would thus as other indigenous people not only across the African continent but the world over lay claim to ancestral lands in the Eastern region of Zaire.

Closely related to the above critical problem would be the consequences for Zaire of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict flaring in both Rwanda and Burundi whose populations comprise three social groups traditionally distinguished in the following proportional compositions of Hutus comprising eighty-five (85) percent, Tutsi fourteen (14) percent and the Twa one (1) percent. While such a composition had a developmental advantage for the region, unfortunately it was maliciously exploited to endanger the destiny not only of the region but the rest of Africa.

Historically, immigration and settlement in eastern Zaire by the Banyarwanda occurred at different stages under the influence of a series of factors while concurrently the legal distinction between them and other Zaireans/Congolese became very technical if not academic (as with all other ethnic groups living as divided entities in bordering states) when Belgium took over Rwanda and Burundi in 1920 as the League of Nations mandatory power and further again in 1945 under the United Nations trusteeship authority. Thus over this period the imperial Belgium literarily governed Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi as a single colonial entity then known as Le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi with a single army Force Publique then commandeered by a single governor general in Kinshasa complemented by two lieutenant governor generals in Lubumbashi and Bunjumbura. Such a state of affairs, inherently contradictory essentially constitutes one of the major causes of the Great Lakes region crisis in that initially the imperial Belgium as the former architect is in the main not well positioned to resolve the crisis on one hand. Yet again on the other hand not only as neighbours but as African people sharing a common Bantu origin living within a single colonial entity the Banyarwanda and Zaireans developed mutually distrustful and antagonistic relations instead of being fully united over the period of Belgian domination. During the Belgian colonial era most Banyarwanda peasants were in their thousands for reasons known to the colonial regime relocated to the eastern Zaire districts in efforts to decongest the then heavily populated Rwanda. Most of the relocated peasants were made to work in transport, mining and agricultural enterprises in Shaba, Maniema and South Kivu provinces during the whole colonial epoch. Under such circumstances the Banyarwanda, literally became citizens of the colonial Zaire where they even voted in the first municipal elections of 1957 and 1958 and after the struggle for
liberation in which Belgium was defeated, the Banyarwanda also voted in the
general elections for the independence of Zaire, a process which subsequently
saw very few of their representatives being elected to the Zaire government
public office. Inherently such an untenable status quo would have unilaterally led
to deepening antagonism and mistrust between the Banyarwanda and the
Zaireans as the contradiction had colonial origins but now in the independence
phase the Zairean national government instead of reconciling this colonially
institutionalized setback gave it yet another new but discriminative dimension in
which representatives of the Banyarwanda communities in very few numbers
were elected to the public offices. This position was well articulated by Kambudzi
where examining the causes as to why peace failed in Africa, in explaining the
diplomacy-tribal recruitment as one out of the series of factors, observed that “at
independence the broad anti-colonial nationalist alliance was abandoned by the
aspiring incumbents to power and state offices, with new missions being defined
rather ambiguously: that of national security, national identity and nation
building... what is obvious in the absence of a constitutional blueprint and without
authentic nationalism, is that new rulers were insecure, suspicious and
uncomfortable. In the past, nationalist revolutions and struggles recruited from
the broadest possible front of the society, but post-independence rulers recruited
around clansmen and tribal henchmen”. This actually turns out to be the
dilemma not only of the Banyarwanda but many other post- independence
conflicts on the African continent. Indeed the dilemma becomes very acute
considering that the purportedly discriminated local communities who most likely
would now perform in the capacity of neo-colonials will sooner operate in cahoots
with the former imperial masters to exploit this window in contra-revolutionary
operations along tribal and ethnicity lines.

But again the continued influx generated by the fleeing Banyarwanda mostly the
Tutsi who were now political refugees over the 1950-61 period into Zaire due to
the Rwandan revolution was naturally welcome as the government of Zaire
further accepted them not sooner, because of the United Nations Conventions
on refugees, than the natural affinity enjoyed by communities belonging to the same
Bantu family. However the developing political circumstances in Zaire saw in
January 1972 the Tutsi traditional chief of staff Bisengimana Rwema as was
concisely observed by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaga, use his influence to ensure
that Mobutu Seseko, the then Zairean President institutionalize a decree that
gave Zairean citizenship to all Rwandese and Burundese who had settled in
Zaire before 1950. With the Banyarwanda in general and the Tutsi in particular
naturally excelling in the nation building mission in various professions and
businesses, they thus became very influential in politics and this became
apparent with their closeness to Mobutu after the Tutsi chief of staff had
influenced Mobutu to sign a decree which automatically gave citizenship status to
Rwandese and Burundese who had settled in eastern Zaire before 1950.
Apparently in real developmental terms this situation was and remains
acceptable as long as the principles of equality of citizens, security of basic
human rights and liberties before the law prevails without any reservations as all
citizens irrespective of their origin will be in various forms be contributing to the cause for national development whereby both material, spiritual and cultural wealth will simultaneously be created in that process. Consequently as the Banyarwanda, in particular the Tutsi progressed to contribute to the national development cause in their various professions and businesses their political influence also increased and thus began to acquire more land in the densely populated provinces of both Northern and Southern Kivu. Along with this process there were also traditional Zairean indigenous chiefs who were prepared to trade their ancestral land for money or for political favors as the case could be. Under circumstances of an incompetent Mobutu led Zairean government, these developments were not well regulated and catered for in the administrative machinery which had to ensure an equal and equitable access to and distribution of wealth amongst all Zairean citizens, including the Banyarwanda without prejudice. Consequently, there was increased resentment by other Zaireans for the Banyarwanda notably the Tustis who again the Zaireans had generally criticized for their tendencies towards social exclusivity. With the resentment thus mounting, the unpopular 1972 decree signed by Mobutu earlier on was through Mobutus single party-parliament invalidated by the June 1981 decree which now defined the Zairean nationality and citizenship on the basis of membership to an ethnic group that was known to exist within the borders of Zaire as defined in August 1885. This unpopular decree or law was so controversial and at the same time negatively explosive by virtue of its violation of the principle of basic human rights and freedom of choice by citizens of Zaire who had for centuries and decades as the case was, lived on this territory and thus naturally considered it as their homeland. A gross violation it was that it sooner more deeply divided the various Zairean tribal communities as it meant that only the Banyarwanda who had solicited and obtained naturalization in Zaire could thus be declared citizens on one hand, while those who claimed to be citizens by virtue of being the descendants of the pre-1885 settlements, the 1910 boundary changes and of the pre 1950 migratory movements were forthwith deprived of their Zairean citizenship on the other hand. Not only naturally, morally but also by virtue of the Human Rights Conventions of the United Nations and the African Union Charter could this development be acceptable as it sooner brewed conditions for ethnic and tribal based conflicts which again the embittered and defeated former colonial powers could clandestinely and maliciously exploit on behalf of Zairean neo-colonials, for the purported smoke-screened democratic rights which in the final analysis would again essentially perpetuate the self enslaving western democratic value system.

Thus with their citizenship withdrawn the Banyarwanda peasants also lost their land rights since the land they occupy is currently being claimed as ancestral land by those Zairean indigenous groups among whom the Banyarwanda live. It is this very volatile situation firmly grounded in the land question that occupies the center of the Great Lakes region crisis and with various domestic, regional and international interests exploiting it appropriately at any given time. Before the French engineered genocide in Rwanda where the French did support the Habyarimana regime and trained its genocidal machinery which still included the
Hutu Interahamwe militia, thousands of innocent people had died in inter-ethnic conflicts over the 1992-1993 period in both the Northern and Southern Kivu of Zaire. This whole development in which inter-ethnic conflicts flared up was exacerbated by some incompetent Zairean authorities who instead of cooperating and getting viable and progressive human-centered solutions to the crisis, went further to pronounce xenophobic appeals while again the soldiers and military in both Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi were implicated in arms trafficking on both sides. Authenticating these xenophobic pronouncements on part of the then incompetent Zairean authorities from the North and South Kivu was the observation made by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaga whereupon in September 1996 the then Deputy Governor of South Kivu, Lwasi Ngabo Lwabangi in a radio broadcast statement made it clear that if the Tutsi Banyamulenge did not leave Zaire within a week they clearly stood the risk of being interned in camps and extermination. To the extent that this statement was essentially inciting national discord and deepening animosity among the tribal communities of Zaire, the Banyamulenges reply was also clearly stated by a Tutsi Banyamulenge young fighter who in a news report told Chris McGreal of the Mail and Guardian that “we do not come from Rwanda and they cannot force us to go because we know how to fight and the army does not”. With the Mobutu army being characteristically a Praetorian Guard, the Tutsi and their allies advanced decisively to route it out and thus took control of Uvira, Bukavu and Goma the major cities of the Kivu region within a short spell of time.

With these observations on the development of the Great Lakes crisis, it becomes clear that the marked incompetences of the Mobutu regime greatly contributed to escalation of events especially considering that Mobutu had even allowed the French through the so called Operation Turquoise to give assistance to the Rwandan Habyarimana army and the Interahamwe Hutu Extremists to remobilize in Zaire specifically for the invasion of the Rwandese in a bid to reconquer Rwanda. These Interahamwe-Hutu extremists, insurgents effectively proceeded to use the Zairean refugee camps in the eastern region to raid Rwanda and at the same time slaughtering the Tutsis in Zaire. This tragic situation had thus progressed for almost two and a half years with both the moribund Mobutu regime and the international community watching helplessly. Under such controversial circumstances it would appear naturally again that the plight of the Banyarwanda in Zaire was very much linked to the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi and in fact during the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (PRF) from Uganda the Banyarwanda of Zaire, notably Tutsis raised funds for the RPF and in a patriotic venture recruited their young people participate in the struggle against the Habyarimana army and regime which, with the assistance of the French were also making insurrection operations together with the Interahamwe-Hutu extremists from the Zairean refugee camps and mercilessly killing the Tutsis of Zaire. In efforts to put an end to the Hutu extremists who were conducting genocidal raids in both Rwanda and in Zaire against the Tutsis of Zaire, the Rwandan government of President Kagame and Yowere Museveni of Uganda were compelled to give military support to the Tutsis of Zaire in the absence of a meaningful diplomatic dialogue.
with the Mobutu regime, afterall Mobutu regime was harboring the Lord’s Resistance Army committing to date atrocities in Northern Uganda.

Due to the fact that the Mobutu regime and the international community had watched on the Great Lakes humanitarian crisis for too long the rebel alliance spearheaded by the Tutsis of Zaire, but again joined by many other non-Tutsi groups of rebels who had for many years waged insignificant and sporadic campaigns of armed struggle against the Mobutu regime proceeded to wage a more decisive armed struggle against the same regime. Among the rebel groups of the alliance the best known group was the Parti de la Revolution Populaire (PRP) dubbed a remnant of the 1964 second independence movement led by Laurent Kabila. But otherwise the hitherto little known Laurent Desire Kabila in May 1997 led the Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire ADFL in the operation to overthrow the fragile Mobutu regime. This revolutionary operation was accomplished with the aid of the neighboring countries Rwanda and Uganda, notably. In a further examination of the parties, interests, positions and goals on which the inter-state conflict in the Great Lakes region, Mwesiga Baregu noted that the effect of multiple interests was visibly compounded by the geographic spread and regionalisation of the conflict. This multiplicity of sharply contradictory interests as observed by Mwesiga Baregu was confirmed by the break of the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on August 2 1998 in the eastern border town of Goma to which already six countries had committed their troops namely Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. According to Bangura Yusuf, and apart from the six countries which had already committed their troops to the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, rebel groups in Angola, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi had also been drawn into the war but again there were reports that private security firms and mercenaries from South Africa had also been enlisted by the warring rebel groups and countries, making the conflict more and more complicated to date. The process of the interstate conflict resolution saw the main provocateurs in the conflict making their demands clear as a principle of adopting viable resolutions. In the first instance the Kabila government stated that foreign countries, that is Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi had invaded its territory and therefore expulsion of the invaders, the rebels was its priority as there was need to secure the borders and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the invading forces. But again on the other end the rebels as the Le Rassemblement Congolese pour la Democratie (RCD) composed of the ethnic Tutsis, ex-Mobutu army, Rwandians and Ugandans claimed that Kabila was corrupt, undemocratic, despotic, and a nepotist who was entrenching himself in power at the expense of democracy. Equally the rebels claimed that the Democratic Republic of the Congo was also fanning the flames of xenophobia by advocating genocide with Kabila being accused subsequently of advancing Mobutuism long after Mobutu’s overthrow. Thus to this end the RCD demanded the removal of Kabila and the subsequent institution of a democratically elected and more fully representative government.

Together with other players in the inter-state conflict, Rwanda on its part accused Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, of collaborating with the ex-
FAR, that is the former conscripts in the Forces Armes Rwandese. Rwanda actually harbored the sentiments that the Interahamwe- HUtut Extremists and ex-FAR that were grouped in the eastern Congo posed a great security threat to Rwanda and thus Rwanda was determined to violate the territorial integrity of Zaire in a bid to wipe out the eastern Zaire refugee camps. It would appear again that Uganda harbored the same sentiments as it sought security of Ugandan borders from dissidents of the Allied Democratic Forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army and consequently there was need to create a buffer zone against insurgents from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to the rebels such a position could only be achieved after the removal of Kabila and the installation of a more compliant government in the DRC. Again according to the Mwesiga Baregu observations Angola’s concerns in the interstate conflict involved cutting off the supply lines to the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) forces, through the DRC then, that way the chances of political alliance between the DRC and UNITA would have been pre-empted in which case Angola would have its hopes of establishing good relations with the Kabila Government confirmed.

Claiming the need for Africans to settle their own problems, the Southern Africa Development Community Allied forces, SADC stated that according to their regional protocols, peace and security, non-aggression among neighbours was their primary if not ultimate moral duty and concern. This was a noble humanitarian exercise for which consistence and coherence in solidarity interventions was and should always be a major concern not only in the region but on the African continent as a whole.

Equally cognizant of the need for peace and development in order to register higher development scores the East African Community argued for an immediate ceasefire for the region and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force. They as Mwesiga Baregu rightly observed feared the refugee movements, social dislocation and economic hardships as the community was already strained by Uganda’s involvement in the conflict which by already available diplomatic channels cold have been competently settled with very minimum human, material and financial resources. As for the Developed Western World, who judging from the divisive role performed by France in the crafting of the Operation Turquoise that was meant to assist the Habyarimana army and the Interahamwe Hutu-extremists, its responses were far from being harmonious as they harbored concerns over Kabila’s demands on the mining concessions and had thus made attempts to propagate the buffoon theory. At the same time efforts to strengthen and legitimize the more aggressive rebel groups by securing support from the United States was not much welcomed by the US Government, but otherwise was hostile with Kabila while it rendered support to Uganda and Rwanda who had supported the rebels to ensure the security of their boundaries. France and Belgium remained critical of Kabila but again were not confident of the rebels, and thus adopted a quiet peace diplomacy which would mean in the long run that they were ready to accommodate and rehabilitate Kabila in the event that an Accord was signed.
4. Impact of the intra and inter-state conflicts on overall development of belligerant Great Lakes nations and SADC Allied forces.

However, while the Great Lakes region interstate conflict remained a major concern for many sharply contrasting interests and goals due to the multiplicity of both the internal and external players in this very region, the outcome since 1998 to date, though welcome remained tragically retrogressive in humanitarian terms yet again posing a considerable potential for development if a common vision and expectations are shared as articulated in the United Nations, African Union and Regional Conventions on the Basic Human Liberties. The retrogressive impact of the interstate Great Lakes conflict over the 1998-2002 period were devastating in socio-economic, cultural and political terms, see tables 1, 2 and 3.

With the exception of Zimbabwe and Namibia the socio-economic plight of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda and Chad have otherwise remained heavily depressed as all these countries continue categorized among the now thirty-eight (38) Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC’s), which countries have economies that are not self sustaining but are heavily indebted with thirty-two (32) of them being African states. Infact the same countries are further crippled by these very conflicts most likely or otherwise financed from borrowed resources which could have been invested in their respective national economies. But again not only do these same countries remain part of the heavily indebted poor countries, they are otherwise, again part of the now fifty (50) Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which by the World Trade Organization(WTO) yardstick, still remain very low income countries with a GDP per capita far less than 900 US$, pronounced human resources weaknesses and highly vulnerable in economic terms and twenty-seven (27) of them are again African states. Such a state of affairs is among all a clear indication on the absence of not only peace, but national development plans, commonly shared national vision and mission not only in these states involved in inter-state conflict but others which are equally cited under these two categories, that is the HIPC’s and LDCs.

Otherwise the impact of retrogressive effects of both intra and inter-state conflict in the Great Lakes region has also led to progressively declining per capita GDP levels in almost all countries involved in the conflict with the exception of Angola and Namibia where the per capita again marginally expanded from 350US$ to 500US$ and 1940 US$ to 1960US$ respectively over the 1998 – 2001, see table 1. As for the rest, the DRC just registered a meager per capita GDP of 110 US$, in Burundi declined from 140 US$ to 100US$; Rwanda declined from 230 US$ to 220US$; in Uganda it declined from 310 US$ to 280US$; Zimbabwe declined in per capita GDP from 620US$ to 480US$ while in Chad it still declined from 300US$ to 270US$ over the 1998-2001 period, see table 1. Over the same period the annual growth rates of debt in these same countries entangled in the Great Lakes humanitarian crisis remained alarmingly high with the figures ranging from –7.0 (denoting a higher gravity of dependency on borrowed money) percent for Namibia to 10.7 percent for Chad annual average external debt growth rate, see table 1. In circumstances
of low domestic savings and investments such high levels on annual growth rates of debt as a percentage of GDP reflects sooner mounting poverty, diseases than prosperity, which condition on its own incites the population in these very conflicting states to mutual hatred again, especially along tribal lines which once exploited by local and international neo-colonials, it inevitably leads to yet another cycle of interstate conflicts, see table 1. Over the 1999-2002 period although the average annual growth rates of GDP improved marginally in just a few cases Rwanda 2.6 to 3.5 percent, Angola 0.5 to 2.6 percent, Namibia 3.7 to 4.0 percent and Chad 3 to 4.1 percent respectively, there was a visibly declining trend in the annual growth rates of the GDP in the DRC 5.8 to −4.6 percent; Burundi −2.1 to −0.9 percent; Zimbabwe 2.2 to −0.2 percent and the impact could be immense considering that some of these countries were registering negative average annual growth rates for their external debts, see table 1. Otherwise over the 1999-2002 period, the terms of trade for all the conflicting states remained considerably low, the unfolding dilemma being that in most of the conflicting states, the average annual growth rates of external debt by far surpassed annual average growth rates of trade indicating not only mounting deficits but rising levels of poverty again, see table 1. Progressively rising levels of population in the countries embroiled in the conflict, though under normal circumstances, this would have meant an increase in productive labour force, remains equally disturbing as in most of them population growth rates over the 1999-2002 period by far surpassed the average annual GDP growth rates, see table 2. In other words most of these economies were and are still not in a position to feed their own people thus creating a recipe for yet other intra as well as inter state conflicts in the Great Lakes region. (INSERT TABLE 2 please). Combined with the impact of HIV / AIDS life expectancy at birth in all states that were involved in the Great Lakes crisis remained visibly low ranging between forty-one (41) to seventy (70) years for Rwanda and Angola over the 1998 period respectively with the rest spread in between, see table 2. Equally depressed were the even lower life expectancy levels for 2002 ranging between thirty-five (35) and seventy (70) years for Namibia and Angola respectively, while the rest were spread in between, see table 2. Prevailing infant mortality levels in the conflicting states remained alarmingly high over the 1999-2002 period ranging between 40 and 119/1000, and 43 and 119/1000 live births respectively, indicating that the economies were highly debt ridden and would best perform in conditions of peace, see table 2.

Overall the depressed picture generated by the crisis, which was depicted by these figures a much clearer definition as illustrated in table 3, where over a two decade period 1981 - 2002 when the crisis was gradually gaining momentum which exploded in August 2. 1998, with the SADC Allied forces coming on the scene to uphold an overarching humanitarian cause. If over the 1981-2002 period the Democratic Republic of the Congo had accumulated an external debt to the tune of 37401.4 US$bln and over the same period managed to pay back only 4780.9US$bln remaining with an outstanding debt to the tune of 32620.5 US$bln in 2002, the chances of aid transforming the lives of the generality of the Congolese population became considerably remote. In fact by 2002 the per
capita debt in the DRC was 600.7US$ against an equally meager per capita GDP of 110 US$ for the same period see table 3. (INSERT TABLE 3 please). Infact the devastating effect of the Great Lakes inter-state conflict for the four states that is the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda over the 1981-2002 period was that their total external debt swelled phenomenally to 70302.6 US$ bln and because of the war only honored that huge debt to the insignificant tune of 5604.0 US$bln remaining with an outstanding debt of 54698.6 bln by 2002. Collectively the per capita debt of these four conflicting states was 485.8 US$ by 2002 although none of them had a per capita GDP exceeding 284 US$, see tables 1 and 3. However notwithstanding the humanitarian cause the SADC Allied Forces were upholding they over the 1981 –2002 period had an external debt of 68503.3 US$bln which mainly because of commitment to the crisis only collectively managed to honor to the tune of 9640.8 US$bln. The SADC Allied forces in 2002 emerged from the Great Lakes crisis with a much huge outstanding debt to the tune of 58662.5 US$bln and per capita debt of 1562.1 US$ bln, see table 3. Certainly with the exception of Namibia the per capita debt of the post Great Lakes crisis for Zimbabwe and Angola by far exceeded the per capita GDP for these countries, denoting a steeply declining economic development and growth trend, see table 3. But again with Chad included, the per capita debt after the Great Lakes crisis for the Allied Forces was 561.8US$ which only with the exception of Namibia was far higher than the per capita GDP of Zimbabwe, Angola and Chad, see tables 1 and 3. Taken together the total external debt of all the Allied Forces over the 1981-2002 period was 72393.5US$bln which they only honored to the tune of 9747.2US$bln remaining with an outstanding balance of 66646.3US$bln and a per capita debt of 561.8US$, see table 3.

In the final analysis, the total external debt of the Allies and the four Great Lakes states over the 1981-2002 was very enormous registering 142696.1US$bln, see table 3. Underperformance of their economies overall was indicated by their very limited capacity and in most cases inability to repay the debt which they by 2002 had only honored to the tune of 15351.2US$bln with again a considerably huge balance of 127344.9 US$bln remaining by 2002. At the signing of the DRC Accord in December 2002 a total area of 6.386 Th/ square kilometers, comprising a population of 131.7 mln was embroiled in the Great Lakes crisis remaining with an average post crisis per capita debt of 966.9US$, see tables 2 and 3. The dilemma of the post Great Lakes crisis is that each citizen of the conflicting states, both Great Lakes and the Allies owed the Donor community an average of 966.9US$. This is literally devastating and crippling for economies which were and are still not only classified as Highly Indebted but again Least Developed with even progressively declining per capita GDP and highly depressed annual average trade terms, see tables 1 and 3.

On another plane the impact of intra and interstate conflicts devastating social dimensions, for instance in Rwanda from 1990 out of a population of 7.9 million people, approximately 800000 were murdered, while some two (2) million fled to other countries with again nearly two (2) million internally displaced, (UN 2004. p 84). As for Burundi, since the 1990s again because of the longstanding internal
conflict, the first democratically elected President, a Hutu and six ministers were
killed and this ignited factional fighting in which 150000 people were killed while
as the fighting intensified between the largely Tutsi army and Hutu rebels, some
500000 people were forcibly transferred to "re-groupment camps" with again
more than 300000 fleeing to Tanzania. Overall the civil strife in Burundi left
between 250000 and 300000 people dead while again the African Mission in
Burundi (AMIB) performed a key role in providing an atmosphere of security and
assisting the parties to achieve progress in the disarmament process. As for the
DRC, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda saw 1.2 million Rwandese Hutus flee to the
Kivu provinces of eastern Zaire (DRC), an area inhabited by ethnic Tutsis. Within
the DRC the civil war resulted in 450000 refugees and internally displaced
persons. (UN 2004: p 87). At the same time the new inter-ethnic fighting that had
erupted in the South Kivu region sent 8,500 Congolese refugees into neighboring
Burundi over a twelve- day period at the end of 2002 and January 2003.
Following the withdrawal of the Ugandan army in May 2003 after initiation of the
Congolese dialogue, brutal inter ethnic violence between the Lendu and the
Hema erupted in Bunia, the chief town in the resource rich Ituri district of the
DRC - Oriental province, for the control of the province, claiming 400 lives and
was marked by systematic rape, murder and witnessed cannibalism as a form of
psychological torture.

So as indicated above on the impact and link of intra and inter state conflict
basically owes its origin to the colonial boundary demarcations whereby, one and
the same ethnic by virtue of boundaries became citizens of neighboring states. In
the case of the Great Lakes this naturally created conducive conditions for
endangered ethnic groups to seek refuge with their clansmen who were safe on
the bordering nation on one hand. On the other hand this created conducive
conditions for giving military training to armed bandits and rebels who would
cross to either side launching attacks on perceived targets from the other ethnic
groups and infrastructure. In both cases of inter and intra state conflict, the same
negative processes are vividly reflected, namely refugee flows, rape, murder,
abduction and etc. Disruption of economic activities and destruction of
infrastructure (hospitals, schools, power stations, roads, bridges, houses, etc) are
all negative developments which are part and parcel of the civil strife and wars

5. The positive and negative role of development aid in conflict regions and
alternatives.

The retrogressive nature of civil strife and wars such as the Great Lakes crisis
could be well addressed and redressed once the crisis has been effectively
terminated, with the rival parties conceeding to cooperate for the sake of mutual
progress. In 2006, the estimated Global Foreign Direct Investment has been
estimated at 661US$ billion with nearly 3.6 US$ billion earmarked for investment
African countries could stand to benefit if at all peace and security prevailed
within most of them, without corruption in both the public and private sectors.
Considering the fact that most priority sectors for Donors are
production/manufacturing, agriculture, mining, environmental sustainability, health, administration, tourism, roads, energy, housing, science and technology, etc, post conflict African nations could compile detailed project proposals to be submitted, with requisite strategic plans and action plans logically blending into 3 - 5 year Integral National Socio-Economic Development plans complemented by quarterly implementation, monitoring and evaluation programs. Such an approach would ensure an effective utilization of aid by recipient states. This would be complemented by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) whose goal is to achieve and sustain an average domestic product growth rate of above seven (7) percent per annum for the next fifteen years.

Against the backdrop of reformatory NEPAD complemented by the efforts on economic integration officially adopted at the 1991 Abuja Treaty on establishing the African Economic Community, recipient post conflict African states would have to essentially remain accountable promoting good governance, to ensure securing maximum benefits from positive inbuilt quality of aid as an important factor for real economic development and growth of investment.

This position was reiterated by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (1998), who emphasized the need for good governance noting that UN programs now targeted good governance, safeguarding the rule of law, verifying elections, training police, monitoring human rights, fostering investments, and promoting accountable investment. Without good governance, no amount of funding, no amount of charity will set the developing world on a path to prosperity.

One other advantage of aid is that, it enables citizens to articulate their aspirations and a shared vision of good governance through interventions by the civil society organizations (CSO), which perform the intermediary role of receiving and utilizing aid to help meet the needs of society, (ROA 2002: p 37).

Other critical issues as gender awareness, voter education, environmental preservation, civil society organization, human rights and racism against Africa which opened political space had been put on the agenda through aid.

Aid has also made visible scores to the processes of decentralization by improving participation of grassroots organizations and NGOs as the spin-off effects created an agenda for civil society and heightened the role of NGOs in the provision of social services and advocacy.

However notwithstanding the above outlined advantages of aid, there is also a contradictory theory, that aid has failed to work for the benefit of Africa as it has been sooner used as a tool for the imposition of development paradigms, expenditure and investment patterns and even forms and concepts of governance that have left Africa trapped in an aid syndrome which only gravitates towards more development aid, (ROA 2002: p 30).

In fact the major disadvantage is that aid becomes problematic in that it is used for loan repayment or refinancing old debts through the channels of budgetary support aimed at debt service. This argument remains so considering the fact that over the 1980 – 2002 period the total external debt of Africa expanded to 1913602.5 US$b in while it remained with a total debt balance of 1657623.4US$b after effecting a total debt service of 255979.1US$b as at 2005 standards, (Africa Development Report: 2002;2003). Under circumstances of low value addition to
African products from which foreign currency for debt repayment could be recovered, it remains quite certain that the remaining huge debt balance would be accounted for through loans secured from donors. Since the 1990s it has been observed that the relationship between aid and debt confirmed the fact that:

- multilateral debt payment problems have been largely met by refinancing of old loans;
- aid inflows into many African countries have followed the path of debt service, etc.

The outcome would be that aid is inherently used to maintain loans that would otherwise not be on the books, rendering them unpayable having to be written off at the end of the day, which in itself would prove the argument that international aid is used to maintain the indebtedness of African countries. Again aid used for loan repayments undermines the purpose of aid as development assistance on one hand while again on the other hand it exonerates creditors from the blame for failures of their development interventions and firmly holds the debtors responsible, (ROA 2002: p 30). That grassroots participation through aid generated decentralization when at the same time state constitutions guarantee the basic liberties of every citizen cannot be seriously considered as an advantage of aid if juxtaposed with the proven position that aid has mostly been used for debt service and loan repayments to donor nations, thus ensuring that Africa remains under the grip of exploitation by the Developed world.

However as an alternative aid given with no conditionalities attached leaves the recipient post crisis African nation with an option to prioritize its development projects and sectors and therefore fully accountable in the final analysis. Aid use should translate the economic technical base of underdeveloped nations into a stable mode rather than the unstable mode which continually impoverishes a majority of the African sovereign states.

6. African Initiatives and approaches to conflict prevention, management, peaceful resolutions and alternatives.

Through series of African Initiatives that fall within the United Nations international treaty which obligates member states to settle their disputes by peaceful means, such that international peace, security and justice are not endangered positive results are being registered by way of adopting and implementing various programs. These initiatives included conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, enforcement measures, sanctions, authorization of military action, peace building, electoral assistance, peace - building through development, collective intervention, eminent persons, regional security initiatives, etc., (UN 2004: p 69-80), (Kambudzi A.M :1988 : p 3-5). Recent developments which have seen the institutionalization of Peace and Security Councils in the SADC and the African Union subsequently consolidated by respective Peace and Security protocols gave impetus to African peacemaking efforts. African efforts saw the United Nations adopt an Action Peace Plan for Africa end of 1980 with the waning of the cold war. With the collective intervention of Southern African states in 1988, South Africa was compelled to
cooperate with the UN Secretary General to ensure independence of Namibia, while through the same effort by African Heads of state and government the government of Mozambique and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) signed a peace agreement in 1992 which subsequently led to a ceasefire, demobilization of forces and country’s first multiparty elections held in 1994. Again the devastating civil war in Angola between the government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) through efforts by African heads of state and government resulted in the 1994 Lusaka Protocol though peace remained fragile. But again the protocol provided for a ceasefire and for UNITA’s integration into the government and the armed forces. These African initiatives with the backing of the United Nations thus effectively led to an atmosphere of peace, stability and hope in Southern Africa.

Again in Central Africa the African Initiatives led to the formation of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) after the request by Rwanda and Uganda to deploy military observers along their common border to prevent military use of the area by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). But because of continued fighting in Rwanda between the main Hutu government and the Tutsi led RPF operating from Uganda African efforts complemented by the United Nations saw in 1994 a peace agreement being signed which provided for a transitional government and for elections. This was again to be cemented by a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) which unfortunately could not last because in 1994 the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi crashed in a plane after a rocket attack which ignited a genocidal phase in which Tutsis and moderate Hutus were targeted by the rebellious Hutu dominated army and militias. This anti-human development saw African initiatives again through the United Nations Security Council establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute those who were responsible for the genocide and war crimes. However the slowness in implementation of peacekeeping programs proved costly as 800000 people were murdered. Again in Burundi the long standing internal conflict saw Eminent Persons offices successfully intervene with the former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere mediating in 1998 and there after a transitional national assembly was inaugurated and ceasefire agreement with parties to the conflict was signed, a new transitional constitution based on political partnership Hutus and Tutsis was adopted. After the death of President Julius Nyerere, the former South African President Nelson Mandela succeeded him as the facilitator of a peace process which led to the signing of a Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Arusha Tanzania in 2000. These efforts saw the African Union deploy an African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003 comprising of 3,500 troops and 120 military observers. This was again complemented by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) whose mandate was to use all means necessary to ensure respect for the ceasefire agreements and contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process by securing a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections, (UN 2004: p 87). Again the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) crisis following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and subsequently the rebellion in the Kivu province in 1996 in which rebel forces led by Laurent
Desire Kabila fought the army of President Mobutu Sese Seko which in 1998 further mutated into a rebellion against the Kabila government again from the same Kivu province, by the rebel movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) saw diplomatic intervention by the UN Secretary General, the African Union and the SADC, culminate in July 1999, in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. This was signed by the DRC together with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, thus providing and end to hostilities and the holding of an inter- Congolese dialogue. This positive development again culminated in the establishment of a United Nations Mission in the Democratic of the Congo (MONUC) in November 1999 with a mandate to maintain liaison with the parties, assist in the implementation of the agreement and ensuring security in the country.

Following the mutinies staged by soldiers in the Central African Republic in the mid 1990s after intervention by French forces an African multinational force (MISAB) subsequently led to the establishment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) then mandated to help improve peace and security in the capital Bangui, though this was later replaced by the United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA).

Again African initiatives complemented by the United Nations have seen the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) playing a key role in the maintenance of peace and a return to civilian rule in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, though now and again conflicts continue but the role of ECOWAS cannot be under estimated. Again in Guinea-Bissau following a conflict and through the subsequent intervention of the African Union and appeal to the United Nations the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) was established in 1999 with the mandate to help create an enabling environment for restoring and consolidating peace, democracy, rule of law and to facilitate the organization of free and transparent elections. Following the fighting which broke between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998, over the disputed border area, the African Union then OAU took the lead in 2000 in the mediation process, after which although the UN Security Council imposed an embargo and sanctions on both Ethiopia and Eritrea, again under the auspices of the African Union a cessation of hostilities agreement was reached in Algiers in which a temporary security zone was created while a United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established, with a mandate to monitor the cessation of hostilities and assist in the observance of security commitments agreed by Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Generally, the responses to conflicts and wars on the African continent by Africans has improved greatly but with limitations induced by lack of financial resources to finance the peacekeeping operations. However the capacity of the African Union to undertake peace-keeping operations in some cases on its own on one hand while on the other hand capable of convincing the United Nations to adopt Action Peace Plans for Africa to complement its efforts creates conditions for the democracy that is critical an effective use of aid for development and transformation on the continent.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it would be crucial to note that the opportunities for development and transformation not only in the Great Lakes region but for the rest of the African continent remain abounding if:

- The present African colonial territory that conforms to a socio-political pattern alien to the African form of existence was to be terminated and effectively replaced by a socio-economic pattern that is founded on the principle of the African cultural community in which there would be a mutual or multi lateral consent among African ethnic groups, tribes and clans in each African state;
- Consideration of the essence and principle of cultural communities on the African continent by stakeholders (African Union, regional blocs as the SADC, ECOWAS, Civil Society, NGOs, United Nations, UN Security Council, Eminent Persons, Governments, etc) to the arrangements and efforts on finding viable solutions to the long standing problems of civil wars and conflicts on the continent;
- All stakeholders observed the letter and spirit of the unity and cooperation of purpose advocated for by the African Union Charter, Abuja Treaty, etc, not only relative civil wars but other related critical issues of development in Africa, as such an approach would show resolve and determination for peace, prosperity and transformation on the African continent;
- Development aid was to be productively invested in key priority sectors and critical areas that are identified within frameworks of integral Homegrown National Development Indicative and Results Based programs or plans for both short term, medium and long term;
- The extensively retrogressive impact of intra and inter-state conflicts was to be considered a major hurdle to Millennium Development Targets by stakeholders, in which case targeted approaches and expected results in a given time would thus be mutually adopted as a Millennium African Action Plan for a decade;
- African initiatives on resolving civil wars were to be founded on the principle of unity of purpose and cooperation with the African Union in the avanguard, as Africans make efforts to find everlasting solutions through the complementary efforts of the United Nations, the civil society, NGOs and other critical stakeholders;
- Consolidation of the SADC and the African Union Peace and Security Councils and their requisite Protocols would be achieved as official frameworks for securing peace and development in Africa, etc.

ENDNOTES

1 The new brand of nationalist governmental elite instead of building the new independent African state on the basis of a socio-economic pattern that suited the African territory matching the cultural community and not the colonial territory on the African continent, they mistakenly proceeded to consolidate the colonial
socio-economic pattern which forced various ethnic groups or clans to form a state within one boundary without entering any mutual agreement. Lundini I.B., Local governance. 1994.


3 This is actually an anti-thesis of the International Peace and Security Conventions contained in the United Nations Charter which among other elements seeks to promote the peaceful relations within and among nation states, Department of Public Information. Basic Facts About the United Nations. p 25–33.

4 Politics: Congo’s belligerents to sign power-sharing accord. URL.

5 This notation serves to accentuate the oppressive and divisive essence of Belgian imperialism in the Great Lakes region which has led to one of the continental millennium humanitarian crisis in Africa, which again Belgium is literally not in a position to competently settle. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaga 1999. Crisis in the Great Lakes region. Reflections on the Crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Edited by Ibbu Mandaza. Sarips Series 4. p3.


7 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaga makes an observation of one other factor which could have been well exploited for the development of the Zaire economy if at all the Mobutu government had been competent on one hand, yet due to the incompetence of the Zaire government to progressively exploit this factor by allowing all citizens to equally venture where they were competent the very same factor antagonized with time the Banyarwanda and their Zairean fellow citizens. ibid. p5.

8 Again this accurate observation in which ethnic relations had assumed such levels of antagonism due to the administrative incompetences of the then Mobutu led Zairean government point a lot to the fact that nation building perceived along tribal or ethnic lines sooner leads to feelings of defensiveness by smaller tribes and if not well guarded to armed conflicts. ibid. p6.

9 Again this accurate observation in which ethnic relations had assumed such levels of antagonism due to the administrative incompetences of the then Mobutu led Zairean government point a lot to the fact that nation building perceived along tribal or ethnic lines sooner leads to feelings of defensiveness by smaller tribes and if not well guarded to armed conflicts. ibid. p6.


11 URL: www/http.hipc.org/English/infor.html. 02.06.05 : 20:00hrs.

12 URL: www/http.wto.org/english/infor.html. Undertaking the WTO: Least Developed Countries. 04.06.05: 10:00hrs.

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