In earlier papers for this Conference I have endeavoured to demonstrate that the rebellions of 1896 and 1897 were organised and co-ordinated through the memories and surviving institutions of the Matabele and the Rozwi 'Empires' and through the continuing influence of the Mwari cult and the cult of the Western and Central Mashona Mondoros. It will have been remarked, however, that these papers make no mention of the secular or religious institutions of the most famous of the pre-European state systems of Southern Rhodesia — the 'Empire' of Mwene Mutapa. The rebellions of 1896 and 1897 did not involve the area where that 'Empire' had longest survived; neither the Kore Kore nor the Tavara people took part in them; leadership was not forthcoming from the titular Mutapa, or the officials of the Dz'aguru cult, or the mediums of the northern and eastern Mondoros.

It might be thought, indeed, that this was merely what was to be expected. After all, the Matabele 'Empire' had been destroyed less than three years before the rebellions; the Rozwi 'Empire' had been destroyed less than seventy years before. But the story of the 'Empire' of Mwene Mutapa has recently been summarised by Dr. Roland Oliver in these terms. "In the 17th century the Monomatapas became Portuguese puppets, and their outlying provinces hived away from their allegiance. By the 18th century there was little trace of the former empire; by the 19th, none." (1) In these circumstances, we might reasonably suppose, no appeal to the memory of Mwene Mutapa could be effective; and we might reasonably suggest that this may have been one of the reasons why the Kore Kore and Tavara areas — which had no other pre-European principle of unity to appeal to — were unable to participate in the rebellion.

This would, however, be a mis-reading of the situation. In fact, the Kore Kore and Tavara areas did not enter the rebellion because the pressures which elsewhere produced resistance had not been felt by them before 1896. And when those pressures began to be felt, the memories and surviving institutions of the 'Empire' of Mwene Mutapa did enable resistance to be made. In Southern Rhodesia that resistance took the form of the so-called Mapondera Rising of 1900 to 1903; in Portuguese East Africa it took the form of the turbulence which provoked Coutinho's campaign against Makombe and Chicoo in 1902. In Portuguese East Africa also there was a sort of post-script in the Makombe Rising of 1917. It is with these

Mr. Oliver is certainly right to say that by the 19th century any trace of anything which could reasonably be called an 'Empire' had vanished from the Kore Kore and Tavara areas which had always been the nucleus of the Mwene Mutapa system. At no time during the century was there a single political authority which exercised influence over the whole of the Donde, Chibya and Choma—indeed, at most times in the century there was no 'paramount' authority recognised either by all the Kore Kore or by all the Tavara. For most of the time the titular Mutapa, who in the 1890s was Chioco Dambanupatae, was merely one of a number of authorities in the Tavara area. Moreover, although the influence of the two religious systems of the old 'Empire'—the Dzivaguru cult and the cult of the royal ancestor spirits—was more widespread than that of the titular Mutapa, it was no longer true in the 1890s, as it had been a century before, that one particularly powerful medium could exercise a sort of general political control of the area. Thus even although, as we shall see, the memories and surviving institutions of Mwene Mutapa were not to unite the Tavara people in opposition to the British and Portuguese administrations, they were not able to achieve common action on the part of both Kore Kore and Tavara.

Nevertheless, the influence of the titular Mutapa and of the religious authorities was perhaps greater in the 1890s than than it had been in previous decades or than has normally been assumed. Chioco Dambanupate did not enjoy an uncontested right to the title of Mutapa but he was a man of toughness and ability and as the colonial pressures upon the Tavara increased he came to be looked upon as the leader of the peoples of the Choma area and of the adjacent Pungwi. I have come across a number of evidences of his influence. In August 1898, for instance, when there was unrest in the Rhodesian Tavara and Kore Kore areas, the Native Commissioner, Ngwena, asserted that "Choko (sic.) a powerful chief in Portuguese Territory was at the head of the whole affair. Before the occupation of the country by the British South Africa Company, Choko's country came right down to the border of Mashonaland in this district and in fact until quite lately the natives in Pungwi paid tribute to him ... As far as I can make out he was chief of the Makorikori and for years he has given the Portuguese a lot of trouble and they have been too weak to tackle him."(2) A month or so later Colonel Leveryer, who was at work delimiting the Kafir boundary with the Portuguese reported that he had met hostility from Shiwoko (sic) ... of whom the natives about here stand in great awe ... some well informed people telling me that his territory extended as far south as the Mozee and into the British sphere of influence." Leveryer reported that Chioco was "really hostile" to both British and Portuguese authority and that he had a bodyguard of at least 300 men well armed with modern rifles.(3) In 1899,

(1) For a detailed account of the Makorikor Rising, see: Ranger, Revolt in Portuguese East Africa, in St. Antony's African Studies, Number Two, 1963.
(2) N.C. Edwards, Ngwena, to C.N.C. Mashonaland, 1 Aug. 1898; File MSF 1/2/1.
(3) Leveryer to Secretary, Administrator, 15 Oct. 1898; Colonial Office, Confidential Prints, (Southern Africa), No. 574, pp. 130-2.
when chiefs in the Tovara area refused to pay hut tax, the Administrator told the Resident Commissioner that their disobedience "was the result of the influence of the Chief Chioko who is at present residing in Portuguese territory," and suggested that the Chief Native Commissioner should be sent on a diplomatic mission to Chioko "and endeavour to come to some settlement."(1)

Similar evidence exists on the power of the religious authorities. After two years of experience of the area, for instance, the Native Commissioner, North Mazoe, wrote on May 1st, 1900: "Whilst referring to the Mondoros, in the event of a rising it will be to them all blame must be attached, as there is without doubt a certain secrecy among the Mondoros which has yet to be found out. As we all know in our last rebellion there were, so to say, two heads to the Mondoro following, viz. Kagubi and Nyanda, to whom pretty well all other petty Mondoros were continually communicating with. The Mondoros of this district were Zoba Guru, Nyanewi and Katoto, these being the three principals. ...I have no doubt whatever that in the event of trouble these will be the 3 principal instigators in this district. The importance of such people is so great that I have no hesitation whatever in stating, no matter what other influence was in vogue, could they be captured any time previous to a contemplated rebellion the whole conspiracy would collapse."(2) The influence of the Dzivaguru cult was noted as especially widespread. In 1898 it was remarked in the course of a report on the North and North East of Mashonaland that the Dzivaguru medium "is well known to all the natives in this part, and evidently to those in the Utoke country, and it is rumoured that he is in communication with them and endeavouring to get them to rise again."(3)

Chioko Dumbamutupe and the officials of the Dzivaguru cult, then, were the most influential secular and spiritual authorities in North East Mashonaland. They were based close to each other - Chioko at his kraal not far inside Portuguese East Africa; the Dzivaguru cult, with the medium of Dzivaguru, the two rain 'godsesses', the various acolytes, and the controlling figure, Chigango, was based as it had been for centuries at Muti Muchena grove at the foot of the Mavura Dune mountains in British territory.

Although in the 1890s the international boundary thus divided the main secular from the main religious authority of the Tavara and the Bapungwi, before 1898 this division had very little significance for the people of the area. On their side of the border the Rhodesian authorities had hardly, if at all, extended their administration into North Eastern Mashonaland before the outbreak of the rebellion. They were often urged to do so by individual prospectors in the area. In March 1895,

(1) Administrator to Resident Commissioner, 1 May 1899; ibid., No.574, pp.402-8. Not surprisingly the Resident Commissioner objected to the suggested embassy to the Mutapa in Portuguese territory. "I do not see how he can be treated with directly; apart from the consideration of political obligations, which appear conclusive, your officers could not offer inducements or threaten penalties in such a way as would be likely to affect Chioko's conduct."
(2) N.C.Kenny, N.Mazoe, to C.N.C., 1 May 1900; N3/14/7.

The most recent treatment of the religious authorities of this area is Gelfond, Shona Religion, 1962.
for instance, one Drabble wrote to the acting Administrator from Mount Darwin setting out a list of recent outrages in the area and "the necessity there is for some police supervision in the district," adding that he had "promised the parties justice when the rains were finished as the Government would send out the police then." It was a rash promise to make in 1895; for as the Native Commissioner, Mrewas, found when in the same year he wished to take an expedition to the Fungwi, "there was no police patrol available... There was something bigger in hand, something which, a few months later, startled not only South Africa, but most of the world." Absorbed by gambles like the Jameson Raid, the Rhodesian administration had neither attention nor resources to spare for its outlying districts, and Native Commissioner Edwards was left to raise a private army - "a force of fifty WaZezuru armed with old muzzle loading guns" - for his journey to the northern part of his area. He appeared there not as the bringer of regular administration but as yet another of the raiding parties with which the region was only too familiar. "Every kraal we came to was deserted," he later recalled, "even the grain had been removed in many cases." No contact was made with the BaFungwi on that expedition or at any time before 1896. As the Chief Native Commissioner reported in 1898 the inhabitants of North Eastern Mashonaland "have hitherto had no connection with the officials of the Government; they are perfectly raw and wild and really do not yet understand fully what is required of them."(1)

As for the Portuguese, who had, of course, been intermittently in contact with the area for hundreds of years, their renewed colonial vigour had not yet resulted in the establishment of a regular regime on their side of the border. A Rhodesia Herald report on conditions in "the mysterious North" in October 1900 was a fair reflection of the state of affairs in Portuguese RuTavara in the 1890s. "Something very nearly approaching the old feudal system appears to be in existence, the more powerful chiefs simply terrorising the lessor ones and 'commandeering' their crops in the most wholesale manner." Ex-Native Commissioner Jackson explained in the same issue that "the Portuguese authorities levied certain tribute or royalty upon all natives in their territory but finding that the collection was a costly and troublesome affair hit upon the expedient of collecting it by proxy - that is to say extracting a lump sum from the largest and most powerful chiefs, and leaving these latter to collect it in turn from the lessor ones." Even this "pernicious habit of over-lording" was breaking down in the early 90s with the collapse of Gouveia's personal 'empire'.(2)

Thus between 1890 and 1896, the Tavara country and the Fungwi and most of the Kore Kore area enjoyed an almost complete immunity from colonial pressures. The picture we get of the condition of these areas is one which might have been drawn at almost any time in the preceding two centuries - sporadic disorder; the economic link with Tete; the surviving alluvial gold industry. Economically at any rate the area was within the

(1) Drabble to Colonel Rhodes, 6 Mar.1895; A 15/1/1; Reminiscences of 'Wiri' Edwards; ED 5/1/1; Chief Native Commissioner to Acting C.N.C., 4 Aug.1898; LO 5/4/9.
(2) Rhodesia Herald, October 31st 1900.
Portuguese sphere of influence. Two English traders, Gordon and Fraser, were able in 1895 to verify "the accounts they had often heard of the Portuguese trading with the natives in gold dust. On the Gwagwara River, some 30 miles north of Mount Darwin, they saw the huge circular pits in the dry sandy bottom of the River where the natives wash for gold. The usual method employed by the merchants at Tete, such as Martins, Texeira, De Mattos and others, is to employ about a dozen intelligent natives (often half-castes) under the charge of a head-man. The head-man takes down trading goods, perhaps to the value of some hundreds of pounds, mainly consisting of beads, white limbo and guns. The headman selects his quarters and giving his subordinates each a certain complement of goods despatches them to different kraals situated on the gold-bearing parts. At the expiration of the washing season when the heavy rains silt the river beds, the headman collects his men, takes what gold they have traded and returns to Tete. Martinis and his fellow traders have often netted as much as 20 or 30 lbs weight of gold in one season.

All this trading is carried on very quietly and effectively by the Portuguese actually in Chartered Company's territory."(1)

A similar picture of the BaFungwi, drawn by the first relative Commissioner of that area, is worth quoting extensively to reinforce this impression of the continuity of past patterns in North Eastern Mashonaland. "The AbaPungwi were not iron workers. They obtained all their hoes, assegais, beads, etc. from the WaZezuru in exchange for tobacco. A good deal of alluvial gold was washed by the natives from the two rivers, Mazoe and Nyadiri. This gold was put up in quills, each a given weight, and was used for lobola purposes ... it was, I may say, the attraction for the Goanese traders, who annually visited the Fungwi. Each of the different headmen had their own gold washing sites on the rivers Mazoe and Nyadiri. The whole kraal or group of kraals would move to there for two months every year, usually the months of September and October, for gold washing. The women did most of the washing, assisted by the children .... This yearly washing of gold had been going on from time immemorial, hundreds of women were yearly employed, the gold won must have been quite considerable. The greater portion went to Tete ... At the occupation of the country the AbaPungwi were not skin wearers like the WaZezuru. They were dressed in calico, dyed black; they did their own dyeing, and even at the present day most of them adhere to this dress."(2)

In this unchanging world the sort of pressures which produced the rebellions in Matabaloland and Western and Central Mashonaland hardly applied. There was no reason for the Kore Kore, the Tavara and the BaFungwi to join the rebels; and perhaps there were reasons for them not to do so, stemming from the events of the past. Father Devlin, at any rate, speculate to that effect. "Another curious example of continuity is seen in the rival versions of Nehanda. The people of Guru-uswa were jealous from the beginning of Monomatapa's ties with the east. According to their story, Nehanda was forced to commit incest with her brother, Monomatapa, whereupon

(1) Report by Colonel Rhodes, 11 June 1895; 10 5/2/43.
(2) Reminiscences of 'Wiri'Edwards; ED 6/1/1.
she retired in disgust to Guru-uswa. But according to the eastern version the real Nehanda, "the Head of Nehanda", dwells with them and the other is an inferior spirit, 'the Feet of Nehanda'. This divided myth finally worked itself out in the rebellion of 1896. The Head of Nehanda counselled the Kore Koro and Tavara not to take part in the rising. But the other Nehanda... was the chief inciter of the central Mashons to join the Matabele. '(1) Whether or not Father Devlin's suggestion is correct it is certainly true that no active help was given in 1896 and 1897 to the rebels by the inhabitants of North Eastern Mashonaland; and equally true that during the Mapondera rising the Zezuru chiefs happily provided native levies to deal with the Tavara and the BaFungwi. (2)

But the colonial pressures began almost as soon as the rebellion was over. Some of the chief Zezuru mediums and other leaders of the Matabela and Mashona rebellions had taken refuge in the North East; it was in following them up that the Native Department and the Administration first effectively entered the scene there. The Kore Koro chief, Sipolilo, who had reluctantly sheltered the mediums Kagubi and Nehanda, and the 'Mother of Mwari', Wamponga, was arrested and detained for some months; some of the smaller Kore Koro mediums were also picked up. The Lomagundi Native Commissionership, which before 1896 had never effectively extended into Northern Kore Koro country, was now firmly established and supported. The same thing was true of Tavara country. In November 1897 Native Commissioner Kenny took a strong patrol as far as the Mavura Dora mountains in search of the rebel leaders. On June 12th 1898 Kenny was moved from the South Mazoe station of the Native Department and appointed to the new district of North Mazoe, with his headquarters at Mount Darwin. This was followed later in the year by a general patrol of the neighbourhood by Kenny and the Chief Native Commissioner, who visited the main chiefs and proclaimed the establishment of the Company administration in the area. "They informed me that hitherto they had lived in ignorance, not knowing anything of the Government, but that now they had been told all they would obey," reported the Chief Native Commissioner in August 1898. (3)

The Magazine, Rhodesia, reporting this patrol in an area "hitherto very little known", claimed that the natives were "effusively friendly and ostentatious in their tender of hut tax." Around Mount Darwin "everyone was friendly, even affectionately so, and explained to Mr. Taberer that the only mistake they had made was to trust too much to their witch doctors and doctresses." (4) Needless to say, this was much too optimistic a view of the reception given to the new administration by the Kore Koro and Tavara. In fact, there was much unrest in the area at the very arrival of the whites on the scene. In July and August 1898 there was considerable activity in Kore Koro and Tavara country, in which the Dziva Guru medium was prominent, and which appears also to have been associated with the influence of Chioco. The main intention of the movement seems to have been to prevent the

(2) Report for Salisbury District, March 1901; LO 5/5/7.
(4) Rhodesia, October 8th, 1898.
establishment of administration in the area and in particular to prevent disarmament, which was at that time being enforced among the Central Mashonas. "When they heard the Mashonas were being disarmed," wrote Native Commissioner Armstrong of the Kore Kore and Tavara in July 1898, "I firmly believe they thought of fighting to retain their guns and as far as I can learn did not expect us to make a post or native commissionership at Darwin and if we had not done so I believe they intended to rebel as soon as the crops were up. Now if we show a force and act firmly we may I hope nip the whole thing in the bud, and if we don't show a force and strike such men as Mondoros and main plotters at once they may quite possibly fight anytime."(1)

Since the Central Mashonas were not responsive to attempts to bring them once more into rebellion and the Budjila of Ntoko were also unprepared to act on the messages sent them by the Dzivaguru medium, Kenny's patrol proved to be force enough to "nip the whole thing in the bud" and "strike such men as Mondoros and main plotters". Forewarned by their new knowledge of the role of the mediums in the 1896 and 1897 rebellions, the administration moved swiftly in the North East. Late in July 1898 Kenny pounced on the Dzivaguru headquarters at Muti Biuchena and "succeeded in capturing almost all Zeba Guru's following, the witch doctor herself unfortunately escaping through the misrepresentations of a guide." Chigango was among those captured and detained at Kenny's headquarters for some months; the Dziva Guru medium and chief Chirimanyakwa, whose family had ruled the area in which the shrine was situated since the 16th century, both fled into Portuguese East Africa. For the first time the boundary became of significance; the Dzivaguru medium in exile in Portuguese East Africa was cut off from the ancient spiritual centre of the Mwene Mutapa 'Empire'. Other lesser mediums were also tracked down. "The other Mondoro, Katototo, ... is almost a nonentity," wrote the C.N.C. in August, "but I have instructed sub-inspector Moore to bring him in as soon as possible."(2)

Once again official hopes of the good effects of their actions were high. "I feel certain that Ziba Guru now has little or no influence," wrote the C.N.C., "She is now spoken of by every chief as 'Kenny's goat'." "Chimunda, as you are aware," wrote Kenny of one of the Tavara chiefs in December 1898, "has a very bad past history, but judging from the way he is acting at present he seems to have realised that it is better to obey our law instead of those of the Mashona Mondoros."(3)

Once again the administration was over optimistic. The influence of the mediums continued, as we shall see, and there was much resentment at the disruption of the Dzivaguru cult. Moreover, the inhabitants of the North East had material reasons for disliking the new regime. There was disarmament;

(1) Native Commissioner, Armstrong, South Mazoe, to C.N.C. 7 July 1898; N 1/1/6.
there was the hut tax; and there was a disruption of the economic life of the area at least as drastic as the disruption of its religious life. With the establishment of the Native Department and the policing of the frontier, the old annual journeys of Goan and half-caste traders from Tete were interrupted. At the end of 1899 Native Commissioner Edwards, reporting on the Fungwi area, noted that washing for alluvial gold on the Mazos and the Nyadiri had ceased because the old route to Tete had thus been closed. (1)

The North East rapidly became the main trouble spot of the Native Department in Mashonaland. Writing in August 1898 Native Commissioner Edwards, having expressed the view that nothing was to be feared from the Central Mashons, continued: "With regard to the Makorikor it is different, as they never felt any of the evil effects of the rebellion like the Mazesuru did and a great many of the worst rebels and murderers cleared out of this country at the time the natives surrendered and are now living with the Makorikori on the Portuguese boundary .... They as outlaws have nothing to lose and everything to gain by inciting the natives around them to rebellion." It was men of this type who made up Chioco's bodyguard or who operated under his sub-chiefs to harass the border. With this kind of support at their back it was not surprising that some of the border chiefs refused to pay hut tax and fired on the police in 1899 - a resistance which, as we have seen, inspired the Administrator to propose an embassy to Chioco. "The natives in the eastern portion of Mr. Konny's district," complained the C.N.C. later in the year, "adopt every means to avoid paying tax. They will not go out to work and they flee on the approach of any messengers or police." (2)

In 1900 the situation deteriorated still further. In April the Native Commissioner, North Mazoe, reported that there was serious disorder in his district; tax was generally refused; rumours were being spread that "Salisbury was no longer and that only one old man was living there, and the Boers were everywhere driving the British back"; he was warned "that the native Mondoros are working up feeling among the natives to rise against the Government" and thought the situation serious enough to speculate on what would happen "should the whole of the district rise." The hostile natives, he said, came "into contact with Chioco and many others near who are at all times hostile to their government". In the adjacent Fungwi area the Native Commissioner remarked that it was "wonderful how the news of British reverses in the Colony found its way amongst the natives ... but what they might wish to do and what they can do are very different things." (3)

(1) N.C. Edwards, Mrewas, report for quarter ending 31 Dec. 1899; NS 1/1/1. The gold trade revived later to some extent. In 1908 the C.N.C.'s annual report remarked that natives in the Fungwi "win large quantities of gold and sell it to the Indian traders across the border, thereby sending large sums out of the country without an atom of gain to anyone on this side. This illicit trading in gold should be stopped."

(2) N.C. Edwards to C.N.C., 1 Aug. 1898; NSI 1/1/1; C.N.C. to Chief Secretary, Salisbury, 7 July 1899; CO., C.P., (S.A.), No.574.

(3) North Mazoe report for April 1900; North Mazoe report for the half year ending March 1900; Mrewas report for the half year ending March 1900; LO 5/5/3.
Surprisingly enough in Tavara country and the Fungwi, the enclave where the Mutapas had maintained their influence in the 19th century, desire and performance went together. In 1900 the chiefs and the mediums wanted to repudiate British administration; in 1901 they rose in arms against it, marching in force on the Native Commissioner’s camp at Mount Darwin. The catalyst was the rebel Mapondera, working in conjunction with Chioco, the Dzivaguru cult and the spirit mediums.

We must break the narrative here to introduce Mapondera. Mapondera, whose real name was Kadungure, was neither Kore Kore nor Tavara. He was a Rozvi of the senior line, descended according to Mr. Abraham from both the Mwene Mutapa and the Changamire dynasties. Before the arrival of the whites Mapondera lived in South Mazoe under Chief Negomo. Though not himself a chief he was a famous warrior, who had proved himself both in resistance to Matabele raids and in the many local wars of the Mazoe valley. He was also the medium of the spirit of Muguma, his great great grandfather and a key figure in the Negomo lineage and, moreover, a warrior of renown. This conjunction of military and spiritual gifts had made Mapondera, who was in his middle sixties when the whites arrived, a dominant figure in South Mazoe. His history between 1889 and 1900 will explain why this formidable figure should have sought refuge and revenge in the North East. (1)

Mapondera’s first contact with the British at his kraal on Inyota hill was a rewarding one. As he described it during his trial in 1904 "first of all a man came to his kraal and gave him articles". The man was F.C. Selous, who in September 1889 obtained a mineral concession from Mapondera and from his relative Temaringa in return for a down payment of £100 worth of goods and an annual rent of £100. Selous was looking for an independent claim to Mashonaland which should depend neither on concessions from Lobengula or from the Portuguese, and Mapondera was inaccurately described in the concession as one of the two paramount chiefs of a section of the Makorikori nation. The said chiefs, so the concession continued, "declare themselves to be the chiefs of a free and independent nation, as was their father Negoma before them, paying no tribute, nor being subject in any way, either to Lobengula … or to the Portuguese Government." (2)

On the basis of these claims Mapondera enjoyed a brief inflated reputation in European eyes. The first Administrator of Rhodesia, Colquhoun, thought it important in 1890 that a mission should be sent to him to obtain a concession on the Company’s behalf; and Mapondera was actually

(1) Mr. Solomon Nengubc interviewed Kadungure’s son, Maponduki Gotora Mapondera, and his grandson, Alexander Mapondera, on the 16th and 21st of January 1963. I am very grateful to Mr. Nengubo for making his transcripts of these interviews available to me.

(2) Mapondera’s statement; Rhodesia Herald, 4 May 1904; Agreement between F.C. Selous and Mapondera and Temaringa, 25 Sept. 1889, CT 1/6/8. See also CT 1/11/1/6 for correspondence on the Mapondera concession.
paid the first annual rent of £100 by the Selous Exploration Syndicate in that year. But soon this enjoyable prestige vanished as did Mapondera's chances of playing off the British against the Portuguese. The company rapidly adumbrated the doctrine that it had a right to all Mashonaland through the Rudd Concession and when the Selous Exploration Syndicate wished to send up an expedition in 1891 with the annual rent for Mapondera they were informed by the British South Africa Company that its officers had orders to resist this by force if necessary. The Portuguese abandoned their claims to the area. Mapondera was left to his fate, which was that of all the other chiefs and leading figures of the area to which the company's native administration spread before 1896.(1)

Gradually the world of the warrior and the spirit medium began to change. Mapondera had an early intimation of the change in January 1892 when a strong police patrol took punitive action against one of his followers for the murder of a French trader and visited Mapondera's own kraal to make a show of force.(2) Despite this, Mapondera's reputation as the patron of the militant persisted. In March 1893 police action was necessary against an "impertinent and troublesome" headman at Amanda's in South Mazoe; the headman concerned defying the police, threatening to fire on them, and saying that he "would go to Mapondera's and get him to come and wipe us all out". (3) Later in the same year one of Mapondera's half-brothers, Hwanga, was arrested for the murder of a white man; was jailed and tried to commit suicide three times in a year. The colonial net was closing in around Mapondera and his kinsmen - the men who had been "considered the fighting chiefs and ... always the leaders in any raid, especially Mapondera who gets the name 'Chiboura' from this, meaning a raider".(4) In 1894 the net closed. "This chief, Chibaura alias Mapondera," wrote the Chief Native Commissioner in 1900, "was originally a somewhat powerful chief in the Mazoe district; about the year 1894, when the collection of hut tax and general administration of natives was definitely assumed, this chief gave a great deal of trouble by resisting the authorities and committing various crimes. The Native Commissioner of the District, the late Mr. Pollard, attempted to arrest him, but Chibaura and a small following fled northwards and was not heard of again until this year."(5)

Mapondera spent most of his time between his flight in 1894 and his return to Rhodesian territory in 1900 in the ancient principality of WaBirwe, which was now theoretically part of Portuguese East Africa but was in practice virtually independent of Portuguese control. There he struck up a

(1) Anderson to Rhodes, 26 July 1892; CT 1/5/8; corresp. between Colquhoun and the Kimberley office of the B.S.A.C. 1890-1891, CT 1/2/1 - 6.
(2) Corres. on the Guerolt murder, 1892; CT 1/15/4.
(3) Sub-Inspector Bodle to Captain Nesbitt, 7 Mar. 1893; DS 1/1/1.
(5) Chief Native Commissioner to Chief Secretary, Salisbury, 17 July 1900; C.O., C.P., No. 656, pp. 177-8.
friendship with the Makombe, or paramount, whom he was
doubtless able to assist in the many internal feuds which
existed in Barwe and his resistance to Portuguese pressure.
Mapondera's reputation in Rhodesia suffered no diminution from
this absence; when he returned it was with a reputation for
formidable magical powers as well as military and spiritual
ones. "The magical power of Kadungure was considerable," his
son tells us, "he could fly about and the enemy's bullets
would turn into water or into soft pulp. He had been given
the medicine by Makombe."(1)

Mapondera did not return to participate in the re-
bellions of 1896 and 1897. But his animosity to the Rhodesian
administration was sharpened by the events of those years.
"When he left his kraal and lived in the bush," Mapondera was
reported as saying at his trial in 1904, "a Native Commissioner
took all his cattle away. This was before the rinderpest
outbreak and just prior to the fight. He left some of his
relations in charge of his land but they were shot by the
native police. He was asked to return to his land," i.e. to
join in the surrenders being made by the Mazoe chiefs in 1897
and 1898, "but declined because his children and cattle had
been killed." His stock slaughtered in the rinderpest pre-
cautions; his 'children' killed in the engagements of 1896
and 1897; Mapondera felt that he had just cause of complaint.
"During the rebellion of 1896 he was in Portuguese territory,"
the report of his statement continues, "he then went to
Chiutsi's country and said he had been driven from his own
land."(2)

In 1900 Mapondera decided to attempt to recover "his
own land". As he discovered in a brief raid into his home area
in chief Negono's country, which he made in April of that year,
South Mazoe was too close to the centres of white power to make
effective action there possible. Chief Negono would give no
assistance to him and a patrol from Salisbury under the Chief
Native Commissioner easily drove him out of the area, with
nothing achieved but the settling of a few private scores.
"This is simply a small raid," reported the Chief Native Commiss-
ioner, "not likely to have any serious consequences whatever".(3)

What Mapondera needed to make his attack on the
Rhodesian administration effective was an area more remote
from Salisbury and one in which he could command the support
of the traditional authorities, secular and religious. In
1900 the only areas in which these conditions existed were the
Koro Kore and Tavara areas of the old Mvonde Mutapa 'Empire' -
the Bende, Choma, Sungwi. Mapondera therefore established
himself and his following of 'wanted murderers, criminals and

(1) Interview with Mpanduki Gotora Mapondera, 16 Jan.1963.
(2) Mapondera's statement, Rhodesia Herald, 4 May 1904.
It is interesting to note that Mapondera's people were also
under Mission pressure of a kind they must have resented during
their leader's absence. In November 1905 the Anglican Douglas
Pelley wrote that he was worried about "Jacob at Mapondera.
He is not a satisfactory boy at any time and is so very far away
from supervision that it is quite impossible to know what he
does or does not. Lately two natives came into Salisbury to
complain that he was acting the chief and we are afraid trouble
may be brewing." PE 3/1/1.
(3) C.N.C. to Chief Secretary, Salisbury, 24 Apr.1900; N3/14/7.
accoupled from all parts of the country" in the nuclear area of the old 'Empire', first, in early 1900, among the Kore Kore in the Dande, and then among the Tavera in Choria. In both areas he was welcomed by the traditional authorities as a man of impressive reputation able to assist in their opposition to the new administration.

During the first half of 1900, when Mapondera's base was "a few huts" standing in an almost inaccessible basin formed by the natural formation of rock on the hillside" on the banks of the Dande river, his contacts were mainly with the traditional authorities of the Kore Kore. In particular, he was in touch with the senior spirit medium of the southern Kore Kore, and perhaps in 1900 the senior medium of the Kore Kore as a whole, the medium of an important ancestor spirit, Chingoo. According to Lieutenant Colonel Flint in August 1900, the Chingoo medium was the real authority in Sipolilo: "The paramount chief Sipolilo is afraid of this man, and acknowledges him to be chief over him." According to Acting Native Commissioner Monro, the Chingoo medium's influence extended into the Dande also and he believed that "the witch doctor Tshumgobo (sic) had a good deal to do with the unrest caused in this sub-district." Both agreed that 'Chingoo' had "been on very friendly terms with Mapondera all along". (1)

The story as told by Mapondera's son also attributes considerable significance to 'Chingoo'. "The spirit of Chingoo, a Rozwi chief, dwelt in Nhova. When Mapondera arrived, Chingoo told him that it was good he had come since there was going to be fighting at that place. The whites were attacking Nhova." (2) The white "attack" on Nhova was the establishment of Native administration there. During 1900 Mapondera certainly did his best to stimulate opposition to it. Gradually the Native Department, which had at first regarded him as no more than the most dangerous of the bandits who lived near the Portuguese border in the Dande, came to realise that his aims were more ambitious. "Without doubt," wrote Flint in August 1900, "Mapondera had been doing his best to get the natives not to pay hut tax and to join him in defying the Government." "I feel certain that there was some talk of a rising among the natives," wrote Monro in the same month. (3)

The extent of the danger posed by Mapondera became clear in June 1900. On June 7th Acting Native Commissioner Monro, who was at Sipolilo's kraal, heard that Mapondera's men had raided and wounded a rival headman, Mavuri. Monro, as the C.N.C. later reported, "was aware of the reputation enjoyed by Mapondera and sent back to his camp for reinforcements of Mashangaland Native Police... He then set out for Mapondera's stronghold on the Dande river. His plan was to surround the stronghold and to rush it at dawn on the 9th. But the

(2) Interview with Mponduki Gotora Mapondera, 16 Jan.1963.
For the original Chingoo, see Abraham: The Early Political History of the Kingdom of Mwene Mutapa, Historians in Tropical Africa, pp.62 and 63.
(3) Flint's report, 4 Aug.1900; C.O., C.P.,No.656, p.191; Monro's report, 6 Aug.1900; N 3/14/7.
surprised. “It was about 3 a.m. on the 9th,” Monro later reported, “I left to surround Mapondera’s kraal, which I heard was in a valley surrounded by hills. I had just got down to the bottom of the valley when a volley was fired at us from the hill on the right from some holes or caves in the rocks. ... I found I was in a regular trap and decided to retire.” The patrol returned to Sipolilo having lost one African sergeant in the ambush, and a great deal of prestige. (1)

It was at once obvious that strong counter action would have to be taken against Mapondera. For one thing his attack on Monro’s patrol caused something like a panic among the prospectors and other whites in Lomagumdi. The Manager of one mine wrote to the Administrator to complain that totally inadequate protection was available; that “an Officer and perhaps two or three Troopers with a few Native policemen” were incapable of controlling the district; that the road from Salisbury was in a “disgraceful condition” and that there was no telephone line operating; finally that the natives were on the point of rising, the A.N.C. “having had a fight with the kaffirs and narrowly escaping with his life”. (2)

On the other hand, though the Native Department scouted the idea of a general rising, it was obvious that Mapondera already enjoyed wide support and would enjoy more unless he were dealt with. “It appears that natives other than the known following of Chibaura must have joined in the armed resistance,” reported the C.N.C. in July; “There appears to be no doubt that Captain Monro’s movements were reported from kraal to kraal, thus enabling Chibaura and his following to set a trap for his party.” (3)

Since so many of their own police were away fighting in the South, the administration were obliged to call in the 65th Company of the Imperial Yeomanry, which was at that moment in Rhodesia. While the troops were coming up, Monro and Lieutenant Colonel Flint were taking action to ensure that Mapondera did not again receive assistance and intelligence from the Kore Kore. Chief Sipolilo was taken into custody because “he and some of his natives assisted these natives at Mapondera’s kraal”. The Chingoo medium was brought in to the Native Commissioner’s Camp at Sinoia, where he remained until 1905, “on suspicion of having assisted Mapondera and having received presents for doing so”. Flint took out a party to arrest another medium “who is reported as always running away from the native messengers when they go to the kraal ... but found that he had left the kraal the night before.” And on July 5th the great majority of the chiefs and headmen of the area came in for an indaba, during which they expressed their loyalty to the administration. (4)

On July 14th Flint set off for Mapondera’s kraal with a force consisting of 7 officers and 79 men of the Imperial

(1) Monro to Commandant, Salisbury, 16 June 1900; C.N.C. to Chief Secretary, 17 July 1900; C.O., C.P., No.656.
(2) Chief Secretary to Secretary, London Office, 28 Sept.1900; C.N.C. to Chief Secretary, 26 Sept.1900; LO 5/5/5, pp.3-4; 6-8.
(3) C.N.C. to Chief Secretary, 17 July 1900; C.O., C.P., No.656.
(4) Monro report, 6 Aug.1900; N3/14/7; Flint report, 4 Aug.1900; C.O., C.P., No.656. In August 1905 the N.C.Lomagundi requested permission to release the Chingoo medium “principal witch doctor to Sipolilo and ... settled near Sinoia by Monro on account of Mapondera consulting him”, because his presence was required before a new chief Sipolilo could be chosen. Permission was given, 3/1/9.
Yeomanry; 27 white police and 60 black; 9 Native messengers and guides, carriers, etc. Mapondera was certainly not being under-estimated any longer; this was a force such as had not been seen since the hey-day of the Mashona rebellion. Cum­
brously the column moved towards the Bands where no similar British force had ever appeared. "Transport was impossible except by carriers, as the road was exceedingly rough and riding or driving of any kind was out of the question. Stretcher bearer companies were formed and the column proceeded in single file for many miles." But despite this ponderous approach Mapondera, deprived of his southern allies and spies, was taken by surprise. "On the 16th July," reported Flint, "I was fortunate in taking Mapondera by surprise and completely breaking up his party, with a loss to him of four killed and several wounded, besides 13 wives of the party captured, including two of Mapondera's with their children."(1)

The expedition had been a conspicuous success. It marked, indeed, the end of the rather irascible opposition of the Kore Kore. "A patrol of this strength coming into the District," wrote Monro, "will undoubtedly have a very good effect on the natives in this district ... now they have seen what forces we can muster I do not think they will give us any more trouble." Later in the year he reported that "I noticed a great difference in the behaviour of the natives before and after the patrol went to the District and I think it will have a lasting effect."(2)

But if it was the end of Kore Kore resistance, it was not the end of Mapondera. At the end of July it was reported that "Mapondera has been deserted by his following and is now hidden in the bush with his wives." The administration hoped that his defeat had permanently destroyed his prestige. But in fact Mapondera was on his way to Choma and to his greatest exploits; on his way to see if Chioco and Drivaguru would give more vigorous support than Sipolilo and Chingoo.(3)

Mapondera's first overture to Chioco is recorded for us by Native Commissioner Kenny in his "Short History of the Outlaw Chief Mapondera", compiled in 1904. "Mapondera after the attack on his kraal went into Portuguese Territory where he had hardly been more than a month when a rising was reported in that part and Mapondera assisting in the murder of the Portug­
uese trader 'Gomi'. There is clear proof that Mapondera actually had a hand in this murder, and to show that he was able to make his importance felt he personally took over all the loot which we hear he sent to Chioko." Chioco's response is recorded for us by Mapondera's son. "Kadungure went round until he came to Mount Darwin where he found the chiefs Chioko, Rusambo and Chiutsi waiting for him and needing his aid .... Kadungure was given three gifts, Chioko giving him a red hat." Mapondera had found his patron; Chioco had found his man. (4)

(2) Monro's report, 6 Aug.1900; N 3/14/7; Report for July 1900, N.C. Lomagundi; LO 5/5/3. A strong force of police was stationed at Sipolilo's kraal in the event of Mapondera's "returning to his old haunts".
(3) N.C. Kenny to C.N.C., 30 July 1900; N 3/14/7.
(4) "A Short history of the outlaw chief Mapondera", 1901; LO4/1/3; Interview with Mbanduki Gatora Mapondera, 16 Jan.1963.
Mapondera's presence in Tavera country caused the administration considerable and justified alarm. "Along the Portuguese border of the North Mazoe district some of the natives appear to be unsettled owing to the evil influence exercised over them by two chiefs named Kashidza and Chioko who are in Portuguese Territory close to the border," wrote the C.N.C. in September 1900, "The latest reports received were to the effect that Mapondera was making his way to join Kashidza and Chioko and it is quite possible that he has joined these chiefs which will account for reports recently received concerning the attitude of natives living in the vicinity and under the influence of these men." "Being on the boundary," he wrote in October, "his presence will cause no end of trouble among the natives of the northern Mazoe district." (1)

The state of that district was, indeed, disturbed. There was, for instance, a dispute on foot over the Rusambo paramountcy - it was the pretender to the chieftainship, rather than the British-supported paramount who had sent Mapondera presents and requested his aid. In October the pretender, Manyozi, who had refused to pay hut tax since 1898 and generally flouted authority, fired on native messengers near the border. Manyozi, as well as enjoying the alliance of Mapondera, enjoyed the patronage of Chioko. "It appears that the chief Chioko, who is resident in Portuguese territory on our north east border requires to be immediately dealt with," wrote the C.N.C. (2)

In November Kenny had to report that refusal to pay hut tax was now general in "the Northern portions of the district ... Chioko and his following in the North undoubtedly influenced this." A month later E.C. Edwards reported that "the natives in the north end of the Fungwi district have not up to the present paid for a single hut and in fact have absolutely refused to do so." Both Native Commissioners demanded that either a patrol be taken up to deal with Chioko and his sub-chiefs, Kashidza, Chiutsi and the rest, or else that pressure be put upon the Portuguese Government to act against them. (3)

The Chief Native Commissioner agreed. The whole of eastern and north eastern Mazoe, he told the Administrator, was in disorder because of the attitude of "such men as Kashidza and Chioko who are living on our borders and whose evil influences I feel assured have been recently inflamed by the arrival in their midst of the outlaw Mapondera ... . . . I would urge that the Portuguese Government be approached and if possible that these Natives be dealt with by combined forces from North and South." The Administrator agreed also. "I propose before next dry season," he told the Resident Commissioner on November 16th 1900, "to endeavour to arrange with the Portuguese authorities at Tete that some joint action be taken with regard to Chioko whose present independent attitude is,

(1) C.N.C.'s report for half year ending September 1900; LO 5/5/5; C.N.C. to Chief Secretary, 6 Oct. 1900; N 3/14/1.
(2) For the Rusambo affair see File N 3/14/7; C.C.P., No.659, pp.103-106.
(3) Report for North Mazoe, November 1900; Report for Krewa for quarter ending December 1900; LO 5/5/6.
in my opinion, the principal cause of the unrest." On November 20th the Administrator wrote to the Commandant at Tete suggesting such co-operation. (1)

But determined as they were to deal with the last titular Mutapa, the Rhodesian authorities still underestimated the dangers. They believed that they were facing frontier disturbances and raids only; they did not realise that Mapondera's presence on the border, together with the backing he was being given by Chioco and the Dzivaguru cult, threatened a rising throughout Rhodesian Tavara country and the Fungwi. For one thing they did not believe a co-ordinated rising was possible - "the Natives have not sufficient unity among themselves". For another, they did not believe that Mapondera could appeal to Tavara sentiment. "Mapondera can never, except under very exceptional circumstances, influence any of the natives of this district to show a hostile attitude to us... It is from another view that his presence is such a danger in that he may at any time raid our people."(2)

Even when Mapondera did march on Mount Darwin, Kenny still believed that the Tavara who joined him had done so unwillingly, intimidated by his military and supernatural powers. But subsequent investigation convinced him of what was indeed the case - that Mapondera merely provided leadership for a fundamentally Tavara resistance movement. "In referring to my yearly report," Kenny wrote in June 1901, "at the time I wrote it there existed a doubt as to whether the natives in the majority of cases who joined Mapondera had done so by force or not. I am in a position to positively state now that the majority of them did not do so by force but willingly did so. In fact all information I have received since my yearly report goes very forcibly to show that these natives only waited the first opportunity, and in getting such a leader as Mapondera a better opportunity, when the time is considered that this occurred, could not have arisen. Crops at the time were abundant, a small garrison at Darwin, everything was in their favour and the step was willingly taken, with one or two exceptions, by all who followed Mapondera."(3)

At Mapondera's trial in 1904 there was some dispute as to whether Mapondera had suggested than an armed attempt be made to overthrow administration in North Mazoe, or whether he had merely agreed to such a suggestion from Tavara exiles like Chiutsi, or the pretender to the Rusaro paramountcy, Manyoni. The truth of the matter is probably contained in the evidence given by M'Changi, one of Mapondera's sons: "All the leaders," he said, "agreed to join in the rebellion the object of which was to regain their country and women who had been taken from them." In short, it was a rebellion powered by the resentment of the Rhodesian Tavara and of Mapondera, but supported both morally and practically by Chioco and the Portuguese Tavara.(4)

(1) C.W.C. to Chief Secretary, 24 Oct.1900; N 3/14/7; Administrator's minute, 16 Nov.1900; G.C.C.P., No.65; p.106.
(2) Report for North Mazoe, April 1900; L05/5/3; Report for North Mazoe, Jan.1901; L0 5/5/6.
(3) Report for North Mazoe, quarter ending June 1901; L0 5/5/8.
(4) M'Changi's evidence, Rhodesia Herald, 4 May 1904; see also the preliminary inquiry into the charges against Mapondera, D 3/5/10.
The plan of the leaders was that a force should be raised to march on the Native Commissioner's camp at Mount Darwin; to destroy it; to kill or drive out all other whites in the district and to attack 'loyalist' chiefs or those who owed their position to the administration; and, if all this succeeded, to carry the rising into Central Mashonaland. Messages were sent out to the Fungwi, to Maramba, and to the Rhodesian Tavara calling upon them to join the force or to support it when it arrived in their area. These messages were sent out partly in Mapondera's name; partly in the name of Chioco and his sub-chiefs; partly in the name of Tavara spirit mediums, among whom the medium of Mtsegozi was particularly prominent. Mapondera contributed not only his military reputation but also his magical; as we have seen, it was believed that he had the power to turn bullets into water and this he now promised to do. (1)

These messages were successful in attracting a great deal of support. The final estimate of the size of Mapondera's impi put it at 800 to 1,000 strong. It was made up in roughly these proportions. There were some 200 Tavara from Portuguese territory, including some of Chioco's men. There were some 300 Tavara from Rhodesian territory. These were reinforced by fighting men from the Fungwi, which had "never wholly accepted our rule or paid hut tax". "The Fungwi natives without exception," the Native Commissioner, Mrewa, commented later, "were in favour of Mapondera and sent a large number of natives into the Darwin district to help him against the Government." This Fungwi force, which contained representatives of paramount Chinyerere and all the Fungwi chiefs, numbered some 500. In addition the paramount and sub-chiefs of Maramba sent men to join the impi but these arrived too late and turned back when they met "the Fungwi natives fleeing from Captain Gilson's force on the Mazoe river." No assistance was given by the Zezuru or the Budjla. "The MaZezuru have nothing in common with the Northern Mazoe natives," wrote the Native Commissioner, Mrewa, "and I am certain would never rise at the instigation of a native of that district unless he showed his power in some very marked way." The rising mobilised the nuclear area of the old 'Empire' and that alone. (2)

The first rumours of these preparations reached Kenny at the end of January, 1901. In February he sent his head messenger, Charlie, and 9 others to the camp at Chimanda's kraal "to prevent any trouble should a raid be in contemplation." Charlie and his party ran into considerable trouble themselves. At dawn on February 15th 1901 some 120 of Mapondera's men attacked the camp. They surrounded the camp and shouted to us that they were Mapondera's impi," one of the messengers testified later. "They shouted that the whites had killed one of Mapondera's sons and that they were going to drive the whites out of the country. ...Our assailants were armed with guns and assegais." The messengers managed to fight their
way out of the camp and to return to Mount Darwin to report; chief Chimanda, perhaps not now so convinced that it was better to obey the white man than the spirit mediums, took refuge in the bush; Mapondera’s impi fell back to Rusambo’s, where the pretender had been installed as chief and where the British backed chief was hiding in the bush also. “As far as I can gather,” wrote Kenny after the attack, “these people under Mapondera and Chiutsi are in an organised body about 30 or so miles from here. This would seem as if we are likely to have some fighting with them, but I really do not think that they will offer such resistance as will alarm the Government, as a more cowardly lot of natives could hardly be met with.”(1)

The Government, which had come to know the danger of under-estimating Mapondera, was alarmed already. As soon as reports of the attack reached Salisbury hasty preparations were made to raise a force for the protection of Mount Darwin. It was not easy to do so since the Imperial Yeomanry were no longer in Rhodesia and most of the Police were still engaged in the South African campaign. What white police there were were scraped together; special additional native police were raised in the Salisbury, Charter and Mrewa districts, where the Zezuru showed some eagerness to repay the Tavara for their aloofness in 1896 and 1897. Then Captain Gilson, with his motley force, moved north to Darwin as Mapondera moved south.(2)

On February 19th Mapondera and his impi once again reached Chimanda’s. A few days later the unfortunate Chimanda was captured and brought before Mapondera. As Chimanda later recalled it, Mapondera informed him that “he would kill all the whites and take up southern M 조회 as his headquarters” — his ambition was still the recovery of his “own country”. “I am glad to see you, Chimanda,” Mapondera continued alarmingly, “I will kill you the day I kill Kenny, placing Kenny’s body on top of yours.” At about the same moment, Kenny was cabling the news of Mapondera’s movements to Salisbury. “Are we to leave the natives to the mercy of these people?” he asked. “Something must be done at once. We cannot wait for the patrol. Chimanda’s was attacked only twenty miles from here. I am perfectly willing to go out with thirty men.” Fortunately for Kenny, and for Chimanda also, the Chief Native Commissioner, at once wired back: “You are not to move from Mount Darwin until reinforcements reach Darwin from Salisbury.”(3)

This was the last time that Kenny underestimated Mapondera. On February 23rd he cabled that his most trusted native informant had “sent me in warning to expect an attack on Darwin; further that we must not consider that it is only Mapondera; insurrection is general according to Chimango. Government must view the whole situation as serious.” On the next day Kenny cabled that Mapondera and his impi were only some 10 miles north of Mount Darwin.(4)

(1) Evidence of Chikwa, 28 Mar.1904; D 3/5/10; Report for North M 조회, Feb.1901; L0 5/5/7.
(2) Administrator to Secretary, London Office, 23 Feb.1901; A 11/2/12/13.
(3) Evidence of Chimanda, 18 Mar.1901; Kenny to C.N.C., 21 Feb. 1901; N 3/14/7.
(4) Kenny to C.N.C., 23 and 24 Feb.1901; N 3/14/7.
At this point Gilson's reinforcements were still four days away — an immediate attack on Mount Darwin must have been successful. But Mapondera's impi moved slowly; the Fungwi levies were just coming in; the Nambwa forces had not yet arrived; there were meanwhile many private scores to settle with 'loyalist' chiefs. On February 28th Gilson arrived at Darwin and Mapondera's opportunity to inflict a humiliating defeat on his enemy was lost.

Even then, however, the issue was not to be decided without one of the fiercest and most even fights ever to take place in Rhodesia between an African force and the forces of the administration. On March 1st Gilson and Kenny set off to meet Mapondera's impi on its way south; on the 3rd they came across signs of its movement on Darwin; at dawn on the 4th they launched a surprise attack on the enemy camp at Nyemo's kraal. The two best brief accounts of what followed are by Kenny at Mapondera's trial in 1904, and by Mapondera's son. "We attacked the impi at dawn," testified Kenny. "They were sheltered in scherma. We fired on the impi which returned the fire. Fight lasted about two hours. We retreated about 1/2 miles followed by the impi; we there took up a position and drove enemy off .... I heard several cries, among others 'We are Mapondera's people'. They were singing the praises of their leader." "When the first shot was fired," remembers Mbanguki Gotora Mapondera, "some ran away. But the fighting soon started in earnest. I saw Chiutsi fall and I myself fired and the bullet hit a rock, the chip from which flew and cut Kenny on the nose. There was fierce fighting there on that day and even today bones lie scattered about."(1)

There were moments during the fight when it seemed as if the administration's force must be overwhelmed. At the very beginning it was taken in the rear by Mapondera himself and something of a panic ensued. "The Mashonaland Native Police being themselves practically surrounded," reported Gilson, "commenced to retire without orders and the natives, seeing our check and strengthened by the impi that had attacked our rear-guard commenced advancing. It was then that our casualties occurred and we were obliged to retire in some disorder. The efforts made ... to rally the men were useless ... and as the natives were closing in and firing at a range of about 30 yards we were obliged to make a hasty retreat to about 600 yards distance. I again tried to rally the men with no success; the fire from the natives during this period was very hot." The 'Empire' of Mwene-Mutapa was certainly dying hard. But in the end Gilson was able to rally his men and to launch a successful counter-attack. Mapondera fled; Chiutsi was killed and 100 or so other rebels were left on the field. "I feel sure that Gilson's luckily successful fight," wrote the C.N.C., "will do a great deal of harm to Mapondera and his cause."(2)

(2) Gilson's report, 6 Mar.1901; C.N.C. to Administrator, 10 Mar.1901; A 11/2/12/13. Kenny, in a report of March 6th, commented that "had Captain Gilson not been able to rally his men, after many fruitless attempts, a disaster to a portion of our force was almost certain."
The "luckily successful fight" was, indeed, the end of any serious threat to the Rhodesian administration in their part of the old 'Empire' but it was not the end of Tavara resistance to colonial pressure, nor to Mapondera's contribution to it. For Mapondera's raid on Darwin has to be seen in the context of a wider Tavara resistance movement. In December 1900 Kenny had confirmed rumours that the Tavara in Portuguese East Africa were in revolt "due to over-taxation" and shortage of food. In March 1901, while Mapondera was leading his raid, the British Ambassador in Lisbon was relaying to his Government "very disquieting" reports "of the position of affairs in the District of Tete where a revolt has taken place extending as far as Zumbo. The fort of Cacheucha has been invested, all communications with Tete cut off and an employee of the Zambezi Company assassinated." Chioco played his full part in this opposition to the Portuguese administration, as, indeed, did Mapondera's old patron, Makombe of Barwe. There was plenty of work for the old warrior to do in assisting them, and plenty of opportunities still for him to make sporadic raids into Rhodesian territory from his bases in Portuguese HuTavara. (1)

Though the Rhodesian administration were desperately concerned to apprehend Mapondera and set on foot several expeditions for that purpose, their attention increasingly and realistically came to focus more upon Chioco and the whole problem of Tavara country. On March 6th, two days after the battle, the Chief Native Commissioner was writing that there was no doubt that Mapondera enjoyed Chioco's support and that "should the forces which have been operating in Portuguese territory against recalcitrant natives not have extended their operations as far as Chioko's, Mapondera will possibly retire on Chioko's and there await opportunities for further raiding." Alternatively he might go to Makombe's. On March 15th it was reported that Chioco and Makombe were co-operating against the Portuguese; that Makombe had sent 5 barrels of gunpowder to Chioco and Mapondera and had "assured his assistance if required." (2)

Once again the Rhodesian administration reviewed the two possibilities of doing a deal with Chioco or of procuring his military defeat. Something certainly had to be done, for quite apart from his support for Mapondera, it was feared that the Fungwi natives were still determined to resist any patrol sent to their territory and that they depended upon their alliance with Chioco. In April 1901 an attempt was made to do a deal with the Mutapa. It was made in great secrecy so that neither the Portuguese nor the scrupulous Resident Commissioner should know of it. An envoy, Kanyandoro, was sent by Kenny with gifts for the Mutapa and with the proposal that he should betray Mapondera to the British. "Kanyandoro . . . has returned from Chioco," wired Gilson on 23rd April, "and reports successful mission. Chioko sent present and states he will render us all assistance. Mapondera at Chiutsi's kraal. Kenny is confident Chioko will either catch Mapondera or give us guides and requests us to arrange with Government for reward of at least £40 for the capture of this man. Chioko says he does not want cattle but substantial

(2) C.N.C. to Secretary, Administrator, 6 Mar.1901; F.C.O., Mtoko, to Flint, 15 Mar.1901; A 11/2/12/13.
money reward." "If Chioko be in earnest," commented the C.N.C., "he is just the man who will do it as he is not likely to be influenced by a conscience." But Chioko was not in earnest; the reward was offered but never claimed; Chioko's co-operation with Mapondera continued.(1)

By the end of May 1901 the administration's thoughts had turned once again to military action. Flint had advocated this from the beginning. "I sincerely hope you will give me a free hand against Nyomwi district and Fungwi people," he had cabled to the Administrator in March, "I do not believe in kindness till after very severe measures. ... If I only had a free hand I guarantee you getting hut tax and that everyone will be only too glad to live in peace with us in the future as well as look to us for protection. We have a chance of doing the needful now. Could we not write to the Portuguese and get them to work with us and permission to knock out Chioko?"(2)

On May 23rd the Administrator told the Resident Commissioner that this policy, with some necessary modifications, was being adopted; Flint was being sent with a patrol to the Fungwi and Captain Moore with a patrol to Chimanda's. But it had not been possible to establish contact with the Portuguese authorities, although it was reported that "Portuguese forces have dispersed the natives who were blocking the road to Tete at a point on the Kazoe river ... and that the road is now open." Without Portuguese co-operation Flint's severe lesson was impossible to administer since any attack could be avoided by flight into Portuguese East Africa; the Chief Native Commissioner was sent with the patrol to see what could be achieved instead by diplomacy.(3)

The two patrols went out in June, and both achieved a measure of success. Flint was not resisted in the Fungwi and surrenders were made; a police post was established and disarmament begun. Although none of the rebel chiefs had been arrested and many guns were still in African hands, the Resident Commissioner thought that the Chief Native Commissioner had done well "taking into consideration that previous to the patrol no steps had been taken by the administration to assert its authority over the natives of the Fungwi district, who appear to have thought themselves independent of European control." He might have added, taking into consideration also the propinquity of the frontier with Portuguese East Africa.(4)

Moore's patrol had a livelier time. Mapondera had been located by spies 40 miles north east of Chimanda's, just inside Rhodesian territory. Moore planned a surprise dawn attack but was led astray by his guide so that the patrol arrived after daybreak and was immediately seen by the women working in Mapondera's gardens, "causing the immediate vacation, with surprising alacrity, of the inmates of the kraal". Mapondera and all his men escaped. "His kraal and all his

(1) Gilson to Flint, 22 Apr.1901; Minute by C.N.C.; Flint to Administrator, 25 Apr.1901; A 11/2/12/13.
(2) Flint to Administrator, 10 Mar.1901; A 11/2/12/13.
(3) Administrator to Resident Commissioner, 23 May 1901; C.O., C.P., No.694 p.16.
(4) Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, 4 July, 1901; ibid., p.58.
crops were destroyed. He is now reported to be in Portuguese Territory," wrote the Chief Native Commissioner, "and after the severe manner in which he has been dealt with it is doubtful if he will venture into these territories again."(1)

The men on the spot were less confident. To Kenny and Edwards the successes of the patrols seemed illusory while Mapondera was at large and while it was possible for him and Chioco to encourage resistance from behind the Portuguese border. In his June report Kenny suggested that the Rhodesian Tavara were still ready to revolt if they were given another opportunity and stressed that unless Mapondera and Chioco were dealt with "I can foresee a much more serious situation than we have just passed through." In September, he noted that "there will of course be a large decrease" in the hut tax "this year owing to the great majority of my natives in the north being rebels." His view was that more decisive steps should have been taken. "The policy in my opinion has been an extraordinary weak one and likely to be a most serious one." At the same time Edwards was reporting of the Fungwi that "although the natives in the north have not openly rebelled they have no desire to have anything to do with Europeans or government officials. They have never paid tax since the hut tax regulations came into force."(2)

On September 21st these warnings were given point when Mapondera's brother, at the head of a force composed of Chioco's people, Rhodesian Tavara exiles, and BaFungwi raided a prospector's camp at the junction of the Mazoe and Nyadiri rivers, the whites escaping only "by a series of miraculous incidents." "What proceedings you and the Government take," wrote the shaken prospector to the Native Commissioner, "rests with yourselves. I trust there will be no more self deceiving expeditions like the last. When they thought they had us sure they jeered and shouted out insulting epithets to Mr. H.K. Taberer, C.N.C."(3)

The Government were, in fact, once again driven to the realisation that the root of the trouble lay in conditions inside Portuguese HuTavara. "The Portuguese Government has no control over these people," complained the Resident Commissioner on September 21st, "and their Chiefs living near the Southern Rhodesian border are practically independent: the most powerful, Makombe, has defied them. I learn ... that an expedition against Makombe proposed by the Mozambique Company is not to take the field before the next dry season, and as it was intended to take similar action in 1899 and nothing came of it there seems reason to doubt whether anything will be done now; in the meantime Portuguese Territory in the North East of Rhodesia offers a safe refuge for malcontents."(4)

There was nothing to be done, however, but to approach the Portuguese. On October 7th 1901 the Administrator wrote to the Governor of Tete informing him of Mapondera's latest raid. "He is stated now to be at his kraal on Ruia near

(3) Newman Smith to M.C.Morris, 23 Sept. 1901; N 3/14/7.
Chioko’s in Portuguese Territory. This Administration proposes to send in a few days patrols from the east and south up to the boundary, but I fear little good will result unless Your Excellency could co-operate with a force from Tete. The chief Chioko has assisted Mapondora in this and other raids.” No satisfactory reply was received in October but Portuguese preparations really were under way at last. 1902 was to be the last year of the Mutapa paramountcy.(1)

The Rhodesian administration waited with some impatience while the Coutinho expedition of 1902 was prepared. On the Portuguese side it was bedevilled by hostility between the Portuguese Government and the Mozambique Company, each of whom blamed the other for conditions along the border, while co-ordination between the Portuguese and the Rhodesian authorities was made difficult by the appointment of the “anti-English” Coutinho, and by Portuguese suspicions that the British South Africa Company were supplying Makombe with arms and that much of the border country disorder was being artificially stimulated by the Rhodesians themselves. There was also a real difference of interests and emphasis – the Rhodesians regarded Makombe as a friendly chief and Chioko as the main enemy; the Portuguese saw Chioko as of secondary importance.

In the months before the Coutinho expedition marched, Chioko and Mapondora made the most of their last days of opportunity. In November Mapondora’s men again raided the unfortunate Chimanda; in January 1902 Mapondora once again evaded capture by a patrol, this time on the Ruia river, escaping once more into Portuguese territory. Kenny’s successor, Fynn, predicted gloomily that “the rebellious spirit which has existed for the last two years will multiply and extend to other parts and the result may be disastrous.”(2)

But in May 1902 Portuguese pressure had drawn the armed bands away from the border to defend HuTavnra from attack from the east. In June the Administrator was at last able to set out his plans for co-operation with the Portuguese attack. Police posts were to be set up “to prevent natives from our side aiding those living in Portuguese territory,” one opposite Chioko’s kraal; a flying column was in readiness on the Inyanga Tete road; no difficulty would be made over the handing over of escaping rebels to the Portuguese. The Administrator went on to point out that Mapondora had been operating in Portuguese territory and asked “for his delivery up to this Administration”. Finally he asked the Resident Commissioner to press for the punishment of Chiefs Chiutsi and Chioko who live on and inside the Portuguese boundary east of Mount Darwin .... As we are supporting the Portuguese Government from our side, I submit that the Portuguese Government should meet our wishes.” (3)

(1) Administrator to Governor, Tete, 9 Oct.1901; ibid., pp.216-7.
(2) Fynn’s report, 24 Jan.1902; N 3/14/7.
(3) Acting Administrator to Resident Commissioner, 30 June, 1902; C.O., C.P., No.702; p.289.
The main Portuguese attack was, in fact, directed against Makombe, and there in June 1902 Mapondera made his way to help his old ally. "After that," his son tells us, "Kadungure was invited by Makombe who needed his help. Kadungure and Makombe fought against Guveya," i.e. the Portuguese. But although the Resident Commissioner commented on July 1st that an attack on Chioco "would entail in fact a second expedition," the Portuguese had at last resolved to deal with the titular Mutapa. "I will send a column from Tete to cut Chioco from Makombe," wrote Coutinho to the Acting Administrator on July 14th, "and will inform your Excellency when operations begin."(1)

In the event the Portuguese attack was something of an anti-climax to years of resistance. Makombe and Chioco were rapidly overwhelmed. Makombe fled into exile in Southern Rhodesia; Coutinho's forces found Mutapa Dambamutupe Chioco dead in his hut - dead, it was said, of heart failure on learning the news of the Portuguese approach. "With him," Mr. Abraham tells us, "the Mutapa dynasty became formally extinguished." Mapondera disappeared from sight, fleeing away from the border deeper into Portuguese East Africa.(2)

There remain a few more incidents to recount to complete the story of Chioco and Mapondera. Although Dambamutupe was dead, a nephew had succeeded him as the Chioco paramount and fled before the advancing Portuguese into Rhodesia. In October the Administrator reported that "a native chief named Chioko and his brother have been captured by Lt. Lidderdale of the S.S.A.P. and have been brought into Salisbury ... I am informed that the original Chioko is known to have supported Mapondera. This Chioko, I am advised, died a few months ago and the present Chief of the same name is said to be his nephew." The Resident Commissioner replied on October 14th that "as the Portuguese authorities seem to have taken the option we requested and scattered the followings of Chiutsi and Chioko ... I think the courtesy might be done of offering to surrender them Chioko and his following." The courtesy was done and on February 16th 1903 the Administrator reported that "Chief Chioko and his followers have been duly handed over to the Portuguese military authorities at Zinto and an acknowledgement obtained for their delivery."(3)

As for Mapondera, there was no room left in the new world for the old warrior. "Kadungure then was running away from Rhodesia," his grandson tells us. "He went on and one day he walked a whole day without covering an inch of ground. He was still in one place and when he thought he had sighted a place where to spend the night it was only to discover that it was the same place where he started." This broad hint that he had fled far enough was given to Kadungure-Mapondera by a local spirit, presumably through its medium. This spirit "then ordered Kadungure to go no further ... Kadungure then told his son that he was going back to die." The magazine

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(1) R.C. to High Commissioner, 1 July 1902; Coutinho to Acting Administrator, 4 July 1902; ibid., p.314.
(2) Abraham, A History of the Empire of Nyens-Mutapa.
African Review gave a more material account of Mapondera's decision to surrender. "He was absolutely tired of being chased, first by the British South Africa Company and then by the Portuguese authorities... Another reason was that he, his wives, and numerous family, were starving."(1)

Ironically enough, at this point when Mapondera was about to give up in desperation, the people of South Mazoe, who had proved so unresponsive to his leadership in 1900, were manifesting signs of unrest. One of Mapondera's brothers was protecting a spirit medium at his kraal whose prophecies were causing excitement - the affair led to a patrol and the establishing of a police post at chief Negomo's. It was to those police that Mapondera's capture was finally due. On 30th August Mapondera sent in to the Native Commissioner South Mazoe offering to surrender. On his way to Mazoe to give himself up, he stopped for the night at Makopi's kraal. From there word was sent to the police at Negomo's. The police arrived on the night of August 30th, and surrounded the hut where Mapondera was resting. "Kadungure was taken out," his grandson tells us, "whereupon he flew all over the place until he was tired and gave himself up." The police report is more prosaic. "Surrounding the place as much as my party would permit, on entering I found Mapondera at the fire and arrested him. By his manner he seemed surprised. The following appeared to be his sixteen wives. He had a Martini Henry rifle laying across his knee and four rounds of ammunition in an old stocking."(2)

So ended the career of Mapondera. In May 1904 he was put on trial in Salisbury, charged with murder and sedition. The murder charge being withdrawn, Mapondera was found guilty of sedition. It had been, said the judge, "the prisoner's intention to wipe out the white population in the neighbourhood of Mount Darwin. That was a serious offence and he would have to pass such a sentence as would prevent the recurrence of such acts. The prisoner was an old man and he would take that into consideration... it was improbable that even in view of the sentence that was to be passed upon him he would come out of gaol again. The sentence of the court was seven years hard labour." This outcome at first pleased the indomitable old man "for after he left court he danced like a child and said he fully expected to have been hanged." The judge was right, however; Mapondera never left prison, but died there after a hunger strike.(3)

The surrender of Mapondera may conveniently be taken as marking the point at which the Rhodesian administration finally asserted its control over its share of the old 'Empire'. The Native Commissioner's reports for the next two or three years are full of the surrender of Mapondera's followers; the increasing readiness to pay hut tax; the acceptance of disarmament and so on. However, Coutinho's campaign of 1902 did not constitute a similar landmark in Portuguese East Africa. The Portuguese Tavara still resisted the imposition of Portuguese rule; or rather the imposition of the old system of...

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(3) Rhodesia Herald, 4 May 1904.
prazo exploitation and tribute levying. By 1904 Tavara—
resistance had once again reduced Portuguese authority in
the Chioco area to almost nothing. The main Tavara leader
was DambaKashamba, who had been one of Chioco's sub-chiefs
and an ally of Mapondera. In January 1904 he raided the
Anglo-Portuguese boundary commission; by June 1904 the
Native Commissioner, North Mazoe, was reporting that "all
the natives living on the Chioco prazo are armed. Those
I met informed me that it was with the object of defending
themselves against the rebel DambaKashamba ... all the
kraals on the banks of the Ruia are either deserted or fortifi
d ... in the meantime the administration of the prazo
is practically in the hands of the natives."

In September 1904 the Governor of Tete admitted
that "a certain amount of unrest is spreading amongst the
natives of the Portuguese territory of Changara and Chioco", the
leader of which was DambaKashamba. In October troops
were sent "to establish order". But even this expedition
did not end matters and in December 1904 "the unsettled
state of affairs in Portuguese territory between Southern
Rhodesia and the Zambesi" compelled the postponement of
the Barwa boundary commission. In January 1905 the Native
Commissioner, North Mazoe, reported that "in consequence of
the rebel DambaKashamba and his followers still being under
arms the Portuguese have temporarily abandoned the collection
of hut tax in the Chioco prazo." And so the story of Tavara
resistance goes on. Even when Portuguese military rule at
last replaced the old prazo system and DambaKashamba was
dealt with, the Portuguese administration did not gain the
acquiescence won by the Rhodesian. As we shall see, in 1917
the Tavara were once again to rise in arms - and once again
to call upon the memories of the old 'Empire'.

This Portuguese story is an important one and would
merit telling in detail. Here I shall confine myself to
describing its echoes in Rhodesia. After the death of Mutapa
Chioco and the surrender to the Portuguese of his nephew, both
the Mutapa ships and the Chioco paramountcy fell vacant. Under
these circumstances, as we should expect, the Dzivaguru cult
and the Tavara mediums assumed a more prominent position in
the leadership of opposition to colonial rule. As far as
Rhodesian HuTavara is concerned the most important figure was
the medium of the Kanota spirit. Kanota had been Mutapa for
a brief period in the Eighteenth Century, being killed in 1762.
He had lived at Gungwa hill, very close to the Dzivaguru shrine
at Muti Muchena, and his mediums had come to be more closely
associated with the cult than any other of the royal spirit
mediums.

Despite all the disturbances recorded above, the
Dzivaguru cult continued to operate at Muti Muchena through­
out the period between 1898 and 1923, when the sensational
'Rain Goddess' ritual murder case at last revealed to the
Rhodesian administration the character and power of the cult.

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(1) Report for North Mazoe, June 1904; LO 5/5/27.
(2) Governor, Tete, to Administrator, 19 Sept., 1904; 19 Oct.
1904; C.C., C.P., No. 717, p. 520; Chief Secretary to Secretary,
1905; LO 5/5/29.
During that period the cult was regarded as the supreme rain-making agency not only among the Tavara and the Kore Kora but also among the Budjla of Mtoko; during that period there had been at least four undiscovered ritual deaths by burning before the case of 1923. The Kamota medium's connection with the cult therefore meant power. But to power was added frustration because of the limitations placed on the cult by colonial administration and the border. 'Kamota's' ambition was to 'liberate' Muti Muchena so that the Dzivaguru medium could return to the grove and the old glories be restored.(1)

'Kamota' made a number of forays into Rhodesian territory before 1917. In 1910 he entered the Fungwi district - "It has come to my knowledge," wrote one MacAndrew to the C.N.C., "that a 'God' has appeared in the Mrewa district to put his people right ... Natives at present quiet but preaching going on. Use only your best spies." Native Commissioner Edwards had 'Kamota' arrested and found that he claimed to "have the spirit of Zibaguru and that he had come to the district to bring rain". In his capacity as rain-maker he had received presents from the senior spirit medium of Mtoko. He had also, however, been sent a present by the senior medium of the Bafungwi who "asked him to use his power to prevent the white people coming into Fungwi". Native Commissioner Edwards "could get no evidence that would justify a charge against Kamota" but as he "considered Kamota an undesirable character to have amongst the people" he "cleared him out".(2)

The coming of the Great War brought an obvious opportunity for those who were committed to opposition to colonial rule. Just as the Boer War had provided the setting for Mapondera's attempt to regain his own land, so now the Great war stimulated 'Kamota's' dreams. In July 1915 he entered Rhodesian Tavara and instructed the mediums there, prominent among them once again the Mtsgedi medium, "to buy guns and hide food in the rocks as he was coming across with an impi". The Native Commissioner chased Kamota back into Portuguese territory and prosecuted 'Mtsgedi' under the Witch-Craft Ordinance. But two years later 'Kamota' had a more spectacular opportunity.(3)

In March 1917 Portuguese administration between the Zambezi and the Rhodesian border was menaced by the Makonde rising, the story of which I have told fully in another paper. The rising rapidly spread to Tavara territory - and it did so, as we might expect, through the spirit mediums. On April 24th, for instance, the Native Commissioner, Darwin, reported that Wabarwe impis had arrived in Portuguese HuTavara where command of them had been assumed by the mediums 'Kamota' and 'Dzivaguru'. 'Portuguese officials and native officials reported to have escaped from Chicocho and all other stations. Monitors have given orders that all pigs are to be destroyed; no guns to be used; spears only at stations." On the 26th it was reported that either influential mediums were calling on the Tavara "to destroy Portuguese officials". (4)

(1) File N 3/31/2 contains much material of great interest on the Dzivaguru cult.
(2) MacAndrew to C.N.C., 16 Mar.1910; Edwards to Superintendent of Natives, Salisbury; 5 Apr.1910; N 3/31/1; Same to same, 26 Feb.1923; N 3/31/2.