ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS ON SERVICE DELIVERY IN MUNICIPALITIES: CASE OF CHITUNGWIZA.

BY

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DEDICATIONS

To my late mother, the utmost influence on my life and pillar of my strength.
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The support from the Almighty is always greatly appreciated.
ABSTRACT

The area of centre-local relations in local government is a contemporary and topical debate in Zimbabwe. It was on this background that the research decided to undertake a study on centre-local relations and its implications of service delivery in Chitungwiza municipality. The views of different authorities on centre-local relations were reviewed to further analyse the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery in municipalities. The study triangulated different data collection methods such as key informant interviews, documentary search, in-depth interviews, observation and survey to obtain detailed data on the state of centre-local relations and its implications on service delivery in Chitungwiza municipality. The findings of the study revealed that centre-local relations between the Ministry of Local Government and the Chitungwiza municipality are highly centralised. The parent ministry retains overall powers and control over the municipality. The Minister who is supposed to play a strategic role in policy formulation and implementation is involved in the day to day running of the municipality leaving no room for elected councillors and residents in general to determine their own destiny. It has been established that centre-local relations that are supposed to foster independence and autonomy of the municipality has turned into a master-servant relationship that has negatively affected service delivery. The study concluded that hyper-centralised governance relations are hindering effective service delivery in the municipality. This has been evidenced by erratic water supply, potholed roads, poor refuse collection and bursting of sewer pipes. The study recommends that the central government through the Ministry of Local Government must grant the municipality more autonomy as a measure of improving service delivery.
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## ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIRRA</td>
<td>Chitungwiza Residents and Ratepayers’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Chitungwiza Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLR</td>
<td>Centre-Local Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>Chitungwiza Residents Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>District Administrator</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Consulting Associates</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>Ethiopian Civil Service College</td>
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<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry Of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLGPWNH</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Provincial Administrator</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political and Administrative</td>
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<td>PSIP</td>
<td>Public Sector Investment Programme</td>
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<td>RDCA</td>
<td>Rural District Councils Act</td>
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<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Sciences</td>
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<td>UCA</td>
<td>Urban Councils Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children Emergence Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UZ</td>
<td>University of Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU (PF)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Fund)</td>
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<td>ZINWA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Water Authority</td>
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1.0 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
In this chapter the researcher outlines the entire assessment of the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery in Chitungwiza municipality. The researcher outlines the background of the study and statement of the problem in order to delineate the nature, magnitude and scope of the study. Significance of the study, justification, objectives and research questions are also subjects of the matter under this chapter. Further, delimitations and limitations are also outlined in this chapter.

1.2 Background to the Study
1.2.1 Colonial Era
The study of centre-local relations in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the colonial era. According to Zhou and Madhekeni (2012:20) Zimbabwe was colonised by the British South African Company (BSAC) which settled in the country in 1890 and introduced western type of local government management which was mainly dominated by the whites (then the ruling elites). The local government model introduced was highly centralized and dominated by the colonialists. Major policies and important decisions on local government issues such as land distribution and other services were mainly introduced by the ruling elites without any meaningful participation of the local residents especially in those localities dominated by the blacks. Zhou and Madhekeni (2012:20) note that there was demonstration of central government supremacy in municipalities through ingrained draconian and tribal legal and institutional framework which resulted in strong conflict and opposition by the blacks through the liberation fight. They further postulate that various legislations for instance the Ordinance 2 were enacted to further entrench the expropriation of African lands. Jordan (1983) cited by Zhou and Madhekeni (2012:21) argues that the legislation facilitated the imposition of child-like and centrally defined programmes such that any intention to promote local government autonomy was thwarted by white supremacist policies. Native Councils covering communal farming lands were subjected to central control and district commissioners in these areas were appointed by the central government (Helmsing et al 1994). Generally, centre-local relations in the colonial era were dominated by the central government with local authorities playing a subservient role. It was more of a master-servant relationship.
1.2.2 Post Independence Phase

At independence, the government introduced aggressive strategies to counter the domination of the whites in local government business. Zhou and Madhekeni (2012:21) postulate that the removal of the colonial regime led to a new twist in the local government arena with the installation of new structures, expanded decentralization of local government structures and ZANU PF liberation intervention sowing the seeds for ministerial intervention and control over local authorities. The Economic Consulting Associates (ECA) (2011:13) postulate that after independence, government invariably made efforts to remove the racial connotations imbedded in the laws and practice of local government. This has been done largely through giving more powers to the Minister to be able to intervene appropriately on behalf of the disadvantaged African populations in urban areas. Zhou and Madhekeni (2012:21) note that in the absence of constitutional provisions or policy of decentralization, post independence urban local governments have progressively lost aspects of their autonomy to the Minister of Local Government. They further argue that the dawn of independence in 1980 saw the creation of a single local government ministry and the amalgamation of the African Councils into the District Councils and the establishment of new legislation that is the Rural District Councils Act (RDCA) and the Urban Councils Act (UCA). However, the new setup did not completely hinder the central government from meddling in local government businesses. The UCA (chapter 29:15) gave the Minister of local government too much freedom and unlimited powers to interfere in the affairs of local authorities. According to Zhou and Madhekeni (2012:21) the legislation has been the “Achilles heel” of municipalities as it is the most susceptible piece in the local government management system which confers unrestricted discretion to the Minister over municipalities and boulevard for unquestioned central or ministerial intervention.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

The Chitungwiza municipality has lost its powers and autonomy to run its own business to the central government. Most of the important decisions on service delivery come from the central government as blueprints without consulting councillors, council employees and residents in general. This has negatively affected service delivery in areas such as water supply, refuse collection, road maintenance and sewerage since central government directives will not be responding to ratepayers’ demands but rather to those of the central government which might have political connotations. The UCA (Chapter 29:15) gave the ministry of local government unlimited powers, authority and discretion to intervene in local affairs and this
leaves the municipality at the mercy of the responsible minister who can easily manipulate, whip, politicize and jettison them and still remain intra wires (Zhou and Madhekeni 2012:21). According to the UCA (Chapter 29:15) Section 314 the Minister may reverse, suspend, rescind resolutions and decisions of the council, appoint members of the government board, approve local authority budgets, may appoint commissioners to act as councillors, appoints special interest councillors and approves all subsidiary legislation passed by municipality. The empowerment of the Minister to intervene in the affairs of the municipality when he/she deems it necessary results in the Minister straddling between his functions and those of the municipality to the detriment of service delivery. This has resulted in antagonistic relations and conflict between the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH) and the Chitungwiza Municipality (CM) causing corruption, duplication of function and wastage of resources. Jonga (2012:127) argues that too much interference of the Minister in local affairs replaces the decentralization with recentralization, autocracy and tyranny of the majority against the few democrats. The principles of good governance that include, transparency, participatory decision making and accountability are jeopardized to the detriment of service delivery (ibid).

The Herald (2008) cited by Jonga and Chirisa (2009:172) notes that since the year 2000 uncalled for central government interventions in Chitungwiza municipality have manifested in the form of increased firing of legally elected urban councils by the minister replacing these by appointed district and Provincial Administrators (PA) who report directly to the central government. These appointed officials serve the interests of their masters rather than those of the residents. It is further argued that the allocation of functions between the central government and the municipality is mystified to an extent that it is not clearly defined where the activities of the central government should end and where those of the municipality should start. Resultantly, service delivery is not being prioritized and is sometimes neglected in the process. This has been evidenced by poor refuse collection, erratic water supply which forced more that 80% of the residents to rely on unsafe water and there is garbage in undesignated places caused by poor solid management, a plethora of potholes in the municipal area which compromise the safety of residents and the public in general. Cholera and diarrhoea cases have been recorded claiming lives of many residents. Uncalled for central government intervention in Chitungwiza municipality is also hindering innovation and creativity which are important for effective and efficient service delivery.
1.4 Hypothesis
Hyper-centralised governance relations are hindering effective service delivery in Chitungwiza municipality.

1.5 Objectives
The study seeks to:
1. Examine centre-local relations in local governance.
2. Analyse centre-local relations in different countries.
3. Survey the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery in Chitungwiza municipality.
4. Proffer recommendations on centre-local relations in order to improve service delivery

1.6 Research Questions
1. Examine centre-local relations in local governance?
2. Analyse centre-local relations in different countries?
3. What are the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery in Chitungwiza?
4. What recommendations do you suggest on centre-local relations to improve services delivery?

1.7 Justification
Researches done by several authorities on centre-local relations did not clearly link the concept of centre-local relations to service delivery. For instance a research by Jonga and Chirisa (2009) discussed in detail centre local relations in Zimbabwe centring on ministerial intervention in urban local authorities but did not dwell much on the implications that centre-local relations have on the quality and quantity of service delivery. Madhekeni and Zhou (2012) also researched on centre-local relation with much emphasis on the legal and institutional frameworks without concentrating much on how centre-local relations in Zimbabwe affect service delivery. Therefore this research endeavours to fill-in this knowledge gap by adding literature on the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery. In addition, this study will motivate the Government, civil society organisations and policy planners in general to monitor centre-local relations so as to ensure better service delivery for the people. Overall, it is hoped that findings of this study will provide basis for intervention from various stakeholders and bring more sustainable solutions to the problems associated with centre-local relations in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, to have a detailed understanding of relations between the government and Chitungwiza municipality the
researcher will triangulate qualitative and quantitative techniques of data collection and analysis. This will ensure that the weaknesses of one technique will be compensated by another.

1.8 Limitations
Chitungwiza municipality is a public entity characterized with bureaucratic pathology and this delayed access to data. Some top officials and councillors were not readily available for interviews. To circumvent this limitation, the researcher used electronic mails and the interviewees responded to the questions at the comfort of their homes. More so, some key informants targeted for the study were not available for instance the town clerk of the municipality was on leave when the fieldwork was underway. In addition, because of the Official Secrecy Act, some information was kept secret for security reasons or for the sake of the public interest. To mitigate this, the researcher explained to the interviewees that the findings of this study will only be used for academic purposes. The researcher also produced the letter from the department to assure interviewees that the study is an academic one. This helped to reduce suspicion between the researcher and the interviewee and this enabled the researcher to gain detailed data. Furthermore, data collection in the municipality was done at a time when there was an investigation team from the MLGPWNH investigating issues of illegal structures in the municipality. As a result, some respondents associated the study with the investigations which were under way and were reluctant to participate in the study fearing victimisation. As a mitigating measure, the researcher explained in detail the purpose of the study and triangulated field research with documentary search.

1.9 Delimitations
The main thrust of the study is to assess the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery in Chitungwiza municipality. Much emphasis is on the relationship between the ministry of local government and the Chitungwiza municipality. The study was carried out in Chitungwiza municipality which has a population of about 6000 000 (The Central Statistical Office 2012). The research will focus on the implication of centre-local relations on service delivery between 1990 and 2014.

1.10 Organization of the Study
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter serves as the introduction of the dissertation. It comprises of the background of the study, statement of the problem, hypothesis, objectives and research questions,
justification of the study, limitations and delimitations.

**Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**
Views of different authorities on the areas under study were reviewed in this chapter. The theoretical framework was also discussed in this chapter.

**Chapter 3: Methodology**
This chapter presents different methodologies used in sampling, data collection, presentation and analysis of findings.

**Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Analysis**
Major findings of the study are presented and analysed in this chapter.

**Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations**
Conclusions and recommendations drawn from the study were presented in chapter 5.

**1.1 Conclusion**
In this chapter the researcher provided for the basis for the study on assessing the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery in Chitungwiza municipality. This was done by providing the background to the study, the statement of the problem, hypothesis, research objectives, justification, limitations and delimitations. The next chapter focuses on literature review and theoretical framework.
2.0 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The literature review and theoretical framework used in this study are presented in this chapter.

2.2 Centre-local Relations in Local Governance

Bevir (2009:44) defines Centre Local Relations (CLRs) as the political and administrative relationship that exist between a central state and the local governments within its territorial boarders. It is important to note that some analyses of CLRS focus on the spectrum that runs from centralization to decentralization (ibid). He further notes that a state favouring centralization will amass power at the centre: the centre develops a top-down claim command through which to play a prominent role in formulating and implementing policies throughout its territory. Under such systems, local governments are sanctioned by legislation emanating from a superior unit of government and their structures, functions and in most cases even their policy-making processes are a reflection of such a relationship (Chandler 1993:195). Basically, legal and financial arrangements appear to give almost total dominance to central government units and resultantly the higher units of government either the parliament or the relevant ministry of local government maintains the right to determine the structure and funding of local authorities and hence the ability to determine the rules of the bargaining game (ibid). On the other hand, a state favouring decentralization will distribute power to local government and under such circumstances local authorities play an active role in the policy process and service delivery in general (Bevir 2009:44).

In addition, it must be noted that CLRs in local governance vary from country to country depending on form of government system in place that is unitary or federal. Bevir (2009:44) postulates that local authorities in federal states have entrenched constitutional protection in a way those in unitary states do not have. For instance, local authorities in South Africa which is a federal state are constitutionally protected as compared to those in Botswana which is a unitary state. Constitutions in federal states empower local authorities and protect them from uncalled for central intervention. These powers and rights cannot be easily infringed by central government agencies especially the ministry of local government. Local governments in unitary state are lacking such constitutional protection as is the case in Botswana and Zimbabwe (before the introduction of the new constitution) (ibid).
2.3 Forms of Centre-local Relations

Centre-local relations exist in various forms and these forms vary from authority to authority. Alexander (1982:147) categorizes them as follows: constitutional, financial and political. Dukhira (1994:176) classifies them into legislative and administrative. However, in this research the writer will mainly focus on major ones for instance constitutional, legislative, and financial.

2.3.1 Finance

Chandler (1993:21) notes that finance is perhaps the most important of all facets of centre-local relations. The central government has a number of ways of either paying the pipes or exercising a considerable degree of control over the income of local authorities, through regulation of the central grants system, influence over local government pricing policies, the loan sanction process and most recently attempt to restrict the money that can be raised from the hitherto sacrosanct sources of local taxation (ibid). It is therefore, important at this stage to note that in financial terms the role of local authorities is subservient. Alexander (1982:147) argues that the central government has a monopoly of all other forms of direct and indirect taxation in Britain. He further postulates that local expenditures are grant-aided from central taxation. The financial relationship has decreased the decision making autonomy of individual authorities and it is generally believed that it has led to increased and increasing control over local government as a whole.

According to Wilson and Game (2011:157) the central government can control local authorities through regulating the amount of money supplied and scrutinizing the way in which the money is spent. This is done through effectively capping local budgets and closely controlling capital investment and does strictly restrict local spending. They further note that there are countless examples of central government in effect bullying or blackmailing local authorities into doing what it wants. To further strengthen financial controls in local authorities, external auditors were established in various countries for instance in the United Kingdom. External auditors have checked an authority’s account to satisfy themselves that its money has been spent legally and reasonably (ibid).

2.3.2 Constitutional and Legislative

In countries where local government is provided for in the constitution, local authorities are a subordinate tier of government. Local authorities in many countries for instance Britain are circumscribed by the principle of ultra vires that is they must be able to point to a specific
statutory foundation for anything that they do and they must not act without statutory authority (Alexander 1982:147). It is further postulated that local government’s subordinate position ensures that its sphere of activity can be altered at any time. In countries like Botswana the legislation is the most direct instrument of central government control of local authorities. According to Wilson and Game (2011:157) legislations are commonly used in recent years with unprecedented frequency and impact. Resultantly, in most countries (developed and developing) local authorities play a subservient role because of their constitutional and legislative status. National government can through the legislation, create, abolish, restructure and amend the powers of local authorities as and when they determine and local authorities are authorized to provide or secure the provision of certain services but only within the framework of national legislation (ibid).

2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Centre-local Relations

2.4.1 Advantages

Devas (2005:4) argues that centre-local relations play an important role in the prevention of corruption in local authorities. He notes that the central government must continue playing a key role in ensuring that resources are properly used and that corruption is prevented at the local level. The central government has the overriding responsibility of safeguarding all public monies at whatever level that money was collected not just monitoring money transferred from the centre (ibid). This view was also supported by Miller (2002:7) who argues that granting local authorities much autonomy results in misuse of authority by local officials. This may occur due to inadequate supervision and or weak accountability system and this can happen if central government supervision is removed due to a new autonomous status of local government without an alternative accountability system (ibid).

Centre-local relations are also of paramount importance in preventing inter-regional inequalities. It must be noted that inter-regional inequalities may increase and thus widen intra-national poverty gaps and poster politically destabilizing forces if local governments are given total independence (Miller 2002:7). In this case centre-local relations enhance the equitable distribution of resources amongst local authorities with different resource capacities. Since different regions are differently endowed in terms of natural resources, level of economic activities, and land value, some local authorities will generate more revenue than others and afford their citizens more or better quality services than is provided in poorer jurisdictions (ibid). The need for fairness and equality in the distribution of state resources
through the national budget justifies the importance of centre-local relations in local governance.

### 2.4.2 Disadvantages

Devas (2005:5) illustrated that centre-local relations and central controls create delays and frustration that affect the performance of local authorities. He argues that central controls create more problems than they solve including delays, frustrations, additional costs and perverse behaviour. Devas (2005:5) postulates that central approval of budgets in Kenya can take many months and in some cases is not given until after the end of the financial year to which the budget relates. In addition, centrally appointed stuff may become the focus of local political discontent as in Kenya since they are seen as serving the interests of the centre rather than of the local government (Devas 2005:5). Devas (2005:5) notes that, “All too often, central-local relation become mired in political conflict, such that the legitimate objective of performance improvement and accountability are lost”. Therefore, centre local relations may results in political interactions that are harmful to service delivery.

More so, centre-local relations because of their hierarchical nature are associated with bureaucratic pathology and red tape. This hinders innovativeness, creativity, responsiveness and flexibility. Literature review shows that freeing local authorities from excessive central control provides the opportunity for wider innovations, creativity and increase flexibility of the local government in the context of changing circumstances that might arise from the ever-changing milieu (Miller 2002). This is mainly because the vast reservoirs of talent, innovativeness, creativity, problem-solving capacity and leadership qualities which were previously laid dormant due to excessive central control can be applied to the problems, visions and aspirations of the local community. Diversity and flexibility are important pre-requisites for responsiveness and pragmatic change but centre-local relations hinder or suppress them (ibid).

In addition to the above, centralised central-local relations as argued by Miller (2002:4) affect full participation of all citizens especially traditionally marginalized groups such as women and youth in the process of governance. Such participation is stifled by existing over-centralised and authoritarian form of centre-local relations. Such a scenario does not facilitate local self development or provide scope for independent action, out of which comes the ability to take decisions which reflect local conditions, choices or proprieties. Therefore, it is important to note that centre-local relation especially highly centralized ones hinder public
participation since most of the decisions come from the centre as blueprints and directives. This type of centre-local relations is most unlikely to attract meaningful civil society participation as civil society interest groups will find it difficult to influence decisions about matters which affect them, as decisions about such matters reflect central directive (ibid). Thus, centre local relations crowd out public participation which is important for good governance.

2.5 Forms of Service Delivery

2.5.1 Human Services

Human services functions according to Bish and Clemens (2008:137) include education, health services, recreation and amenities and social welfare.

2.5.1.1 Education

According to IDAZIM (2010:48) local authorities oversee primary and secondary school administration. They further illustrated that municipalities provide for school construction and maintenance, libraries and internet cafes. Bish and Clemens (2008:137) note that education provided by local authorities range from elementary cognitive skills such as reading, writing and arithmetic to advanced academic skills or specialised training for employment. Education provided helps with social skills and with non-academic recreational or leisure-time activities such as sport and music (ibid).

2.5.1.2 Health

Local authorities in many country have a department responsible for public health that focuses on health improvement, disease, injury and disability prevention programmes, environmental health and health emergency management programmes (Bish and Clemens 2008:145). It is further illustrated that local authorities are involved in health promotion, health protection, preventive interventions, health assessments and disease surveillance. They also provide prenatal care, nursing, home visits for elderly and disabled people, ensure food safety and security, regulate water and air quality. IDAZIM (2010:48) added that municipalities provide primary care, administrate hospitals and polyclinics and some construction, provide ambulance services and conduct clean-town campaigns.

2.5.1.3 Recreation Facilities and Amenities

Municipalities provide amenities, services related to artistic and cultural performance, sports, recreational facilities and libraries. This was also supported by IDAZIM (2010:48) who
illustrated that local authorities are involved in the maintenance of libraries and provision of internet in community centres. Bish and Clemens (2008:137) postulate that municipal libraries offer a wide range of services and programmes such as public computers with internet access, reference services, interlibrary loan and licensed database access. Services under this form also involves the following activities: provision of swimming pools, parks, open spaces, recreation centres, art galleries, museums, theatres, conservation and improvement of amenities (Chandler 1993:36).

2.5.2 Engineering Services

2.5.2.1 Water Supply
COGTA (2009:43) argues that local governments have the primary constitutional obligation to provide water although they are supported by other levels of government. This involves the management of water facilities such as dams and water supply for residential and industrial use. Bish and Clemens (2008:115) postulate that of the various functions undertaken by local authorities, water supply is the most frequently provided service. Sanitation is important for domestic supply and therefore local authorities have to make sure that water is treated to achieve required standards. Generally, most local authorities provide a domestic, commercial and industrial water supply system (ibid).

2.5.2.2 Waste Management
COGTA (2009:47) notes that local authorities must ensure that households have access to adequate refuse removal services. This involves the management of both liquid and solid wastes. Liquid waste include piped wastewater that has been used for household, commercial and industrial purposes; surface runoff water that has been polluted by chemicals, oils and other contaminants; used chemicals; and other unwanted fluids (Bish and Clemens 2008:119). Wastewater disposal is mainly handled through sewerage systems. It must be noted that households, businesses and industries produce a variety of solid wastes with the potential to cause health problems. Therefore, local authorities must make sure that domestic refuse and toxic chemicals are collected from the waste generating sites and transported to disposal or recycling facilities for processing (ibid).

2.5.2.3 Transportation Systems Management
This involves the provision of public transport and road maintenance (COGTA 2009:47). This is also supported by Bish and Clemens (2008:127) who note that local authorities have a responsibility of managing transportation systems to ensure that the system provides quick,
convenient, comfortable, safe and cost effective access to all parts of the community. Activities under this function include the planning, designing, construction, acquisition, disposition, operation and maintenance of a community’s roads, bridges, traffic signs, road painting, parking facilities, bicycle paths, walkways, street lighting, street signs, street furniture (benches, bus shelters) and street trees.

2.5.3 Protective Services

2.5.3.1 Fire Protection

Bish and Clemens (2008:107) note that it mainly consists of fire protection and fire suppression. Other activities undertaken under fire protection include such other activities as fire prevention education, investigating the causes of fire, emergence planning and responding to other emergencies such as vehicle accidents and incidences involving hazardous materials (ibid). Fire suppression as argued by Bish and Clemens (2008:108) involves the training and equipment of extinguishing unwanted fire. The provision of fire services is mandated for municipalities under Acts of parliament, which require the regular inspection of certain classes of structures such as places of public assembly (ibid).

2.6 Case Studies of Centre-local Relations

2.6.1 Botswana

Dipholo and Gumede (2013:1) postulate that in Botswana there is no constitutional provision for local government. Local authorities derive their legitimacy from Acts of parliament in particular the Local Government (District Councils) Act of 1965 and the Township Act of 1965. Implied here is that local governments can only perform such functions and exercise the powers vested on it by these parliamentary statutes (ibid). Hope (2000:519) cited by Dipholo and Gumede (2013:5) notes that local governments merely derive their legal status and power to function from statutes or administrative directives. The fact that local authorities are established by an Act of parliament implies that their spheres of operation are prescribed by the centre and could be amended from time to time either by expanding or contracting its mandates and or by increasing or decreasing financial and administrative support. Rather than becoming relatively autonomous local governments continued to rely on central government for operations and sustenance (ibid).

Furthermore, in Botswana the central government through the state president has powers to dissolve any council if he or she deems fit (Mfundisi 1998:168) cited by Dipholo and Gumede (2013:7). The major problem with such discretionary powers is that the central
government may use them in a negative way as witnessed in other countries and may intervene in the affairs of local authorities to satisfy their self interests to the detriment of service delivery (ibid). Dipholo and Gumede (2013:7) argue that such a scenario create a lot of anxiety and uncertainty since local governments may never know what to expect from the upper tiers because their functions are subject to reform and restructuring by the national government. There is relatively little for which local government has exclusive responsibility. It has limited discretion in carrying out its functions in terms of making decisions about the type and level of service to deliver within the formal statutory and administrative framework for local government service delivery (Dipholo and Gumede (2013:10). Resultantly, municipalities play a subservient role because of the inequalities in the relationship. It must be noted that the central government regulate local spheres to a point where local authorities may be deemed irrelevant and obsolete. Local governments in Botswana operate at the behest of the upper tiers of government. This may frustrate local government and cause them to become increasing frivolous and pathetic (ibid).

2.6.2 Britain

According to Wilson and Game (2011:157) United Kingdom is a highly centralized and even hyper-centralised form of government. This was worsened by the reduction in the number and powers of elected local authorities and its tight control on all elements of local finance (ibid). Alexander (1982:47) postulates that in any unitary state, the power, influence and effectiveness of local authorities will be conditioned by the nature of its relationship with the centre. The central departments conduct a continuous series of bilateral dialogue with the authorities through a stream of communications giving directions on administrative minutiae and policy (Chandler 1993:21). According to Alexander (1982:47) local authorities in Britain are circumscribed by the principle of altra vires, they must be able to point to a specific statutory foundation for anything that they do and they must not act without statutory authority. He further notes that the subordinate position of local authorities ensures that their spheres of activities can be altered at any time. The removal health functions and the supply of water from the control of local government were in no sense the outcome of an agreed or consensus policy, they were imposed by central government upon local authorities, some of which were forced to accept their own demise (ibid).

Wilson and Game (2011:158) argue that there are a number of instruments that are at the disposal of the minister to direct and control local authorities and keep them in their
subordinate position. These include the legislation, finance, circular and guidance and
default, engagement and intervention. First, legislation is the most and direct instrument of
central control of local authorities and one mostly used in recent years with unprecedented
frequency and impact. National government can through legislation create, restructure,
abolish and amend the powers of local authorities as and when determined. The national
government by effectively capping local budgets and closely controlling capital investment
can and do tightly restrict local spending (ibid). They further note that there are countless
eamples of central government in effect bullying or blackmailling local authorities into doing
what it wants.

2.7 Theoretical Framework

2.7.1 Principal-agent theory

Waterman and Meier (1998:173) illustrate that the theory was derived from disciplines such
as law, finance, accounting and economics and it has become the basis for an extensive set of
studies relating bureaucracy to elected officials. According to Meckling (1976:308), an
agency relationship is a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s) engage
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating
some decision-making authority to the agent. Waterman and Meier (1998:174) notes that the
theory makes two assumptions that goal conflict exist between principals and agents and that
agents have more information than their principal which results in an information asymmetry
between them. The theory assumes that the principal-agent relationship will be characterised
by a conflict between the interests of the principal and those of the agent and that the agent
will be motivated to pursue his or her own goals (Caers 2006:26). The theory also assumes
that the agent is not keen on taking risk (the agent is risk averse) and the principal on the
other hand is risk neutral (ibid). When the agent’s behaviour is not controlled or restrained
the goals of the principal are unlikely to be attained. Implied is that the principal must
monitor the behaviour of the principal.

With reference to this study the general public or residence are the principal with the
municipality acting as an agent. Residence in this case expect local governments to provide
them with public goods and services such as water, refuse collection, health, education, fire
protection and houses to mention but a few. However, because residence lack the monitoring
capacity to monitor the behaviour of the agent (local government), they assigned the central
government through the ministry of local government to monitor the activities of local
authorities on their behalf. Information asymmetry exists between the two spheres of government with the municipality possessing more information. This results in the municipality pursuing its self interests at the expense of the public interests and this lead to a principal-agent problem.

Caers (2006:26) argues that to counteract the agency conflict the theory recommends that certain measures must be put in place to help the principal to control the behaviour of the agent and align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. The theory as argued by Coletta (2013:308) recommends that the principal must construct incentive contracts to measure and compensate the performance of the agent. According to Caers (2006:27) there must be performance management in place for the principal to be in a position to monitor the behaviour of the agent. Waterman and Meier (1998:177) argues that after managing performance when the agent’s behaviour stray from the principal’s preferences, the principal can apply sanctions or rewards to bring agents back into line.

2.8 Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion it can be concluded that centre-local relations in many countries are highly centralised. The centre defines the legal framework with which municipalities operate under. The central government in many countries also controls the financial activities of municipalities. This undermines the level of autonomy enjoyed by municipalities. The next chapter presents the methodologies used in data collection.
3.0 CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
The methodology used in this study is discussed in this chapter.

3.2 Overall Methodology of the Study
The study adopted a mixed method approach or triangulation in data collection, presentation and analysis defined by Johnson and Onweugbuzie (2004:17-18) as a class of research where the researcher mixes or combines qualitative and quantitative research methods in a single study. In this case the researcher combined qualitative and quantitative methods and primary and secondary data. This enabled the researcher to overcome innate weaknesses of one methodology and take advantage of inherent strengths. Key informant interviews, documentary search and in-depth interviews were used under qualitative techniques. Surveys were employed under quantitative techniques.

3.3 Study Area
The study was carried out in Chitungwiza municipal area which was selected using judgemental sampling. According to Mhandu and Kazembe (2012:95) Chitungwiza is a satellite town located approximately 30 kilometres to the south of Harare. However, other authorities argue that it is a dormitory town 25 kilometres south of Harare. It is characterised by high density settlements (ibid). It has a population of approximately 6 000 000 (Central Statistics Office, 2012).

3.4 Target Population
Target population according to Babbie (1986:142) are “those units that we initially describe for the ultimate purpose of aggregating their characteristic in order to describe some larger groups or explain some abstract phenomenon”. In this study the target population interviewed as units of analysis included individuals such as directors, councillors, mayor and the public relations manager, groups in the form of organizations for instance the municipality itself, residents associations and the Ministry of Local Government. In addition, social artefacts such as books, newspapers and reports were analysed as units of analysis.

3.5 Sampling Procedure
3.5.1 Purposive Sampling
Purposive sampling is defined by Babbie (2010:193) as a non probability sampling method in which the units are selected on the basis of the researcher’s judgment about which ones will
be most useful or representative. The researcher discovered that information on the various forms of centre-local relations and their implications on service delivery cannot be obtained from the general population and thus purposive sampling was used to select people by virtue of their knowledge and experience on local government management. This method was used in this study because the researcher believed that some respondents are more useful and possess needed data on the area under study. It will be used to select key informants who possess unique and useful information on the forms of centre-local relations and their implications on service delivery. In this case, Chitungwiza municipality officials such as directors, managers, councillors, mayor and officials within the Ministry of Local Government were selected using purposive sampling.

3.5.2 Cluster Sampling
Cluster sampling was utilised in selecting questionnaire respondents. In this case, the researcher divided Chitungwiza into wards. Chitungwiza comprises of 25 wards. Systematic sampling approach was used in selecting 5 wards and the first ward was randomly selected. Every 5th ward was systematically selected. Numbers representing wards were put in a hat and ward four was randomly selected as the starting point and every 5th ward was systematically selected. Resultantly, questionnaires were administered in ward 4, 9, 14, 19 and 24. The researcher distributed eight questionnaires in each of the 5 wards selected. The questionnaires were self administered. Systematic sampling was also used in selecting the houses in which questionnaires were completed. Implied is that the researcher sampled every 5th household from the starting point.

3.6 Methods of Data Collection

3.6.1 Primary Data Collection Methods
3.6.1.1 Semi structured interviews
Kajornboon (2005:2) postulates that semi-structured interviews are non-standardised and the questions can be changed depending on the direction of the interview. Under semi-structured interviews, the researcher used key informant interviews and in-depth interviews.

3.6.1.1.1 Key Informant Interview
USAID (1996:1) defines key informant interviews as “qualitative, in-depth interviews of people selected for their first-hand knowledge about a topic of interest”. This method was used to collect data on the forms of centre-local relations and the implications of centre-local
relations on service delivery. A key informant interview guide was used as a research instrument. In this case, council officials such as directors of various departments, public relations manager, mayor and officials in the MLGPWNH were interviewed using this approach. The academics were also interviewed using key informant interviews. These officials were selected because they have special knowledge with regard to centre-local relations. These key informants helped in explaining complex events using their practical appreciation of local government management.

This methodology was chosen because it has a number of advantages. Peil (1995:125) illustrates that facial expressions, changes of position and other indications of attitudes which give additional information to what is said can be recorded. It offers a better chance for observing other non verbal communications signs that enables the researcher to have detailed data on the subject under scrutiny. Claire (1959:238) alludes that the interviewer will be in a position to obtain comprehensive information by combining what is said with other “facial expressions” shown by the interviewee. Key informant interviews offer an opportunity for greater flexibility in eliciting information (ibid).

However, the approach like any other technique has its own limitations which the researcher must take note of. Peil (1995:122) postulates that key informant interviews are seldom an adequate source of quantitative data. He further illustrates that key informant interviewing requires considerable preparation that is it needs reading and thinking about what questions to ask so that informants can be shown that while you expect to learn, you are not just a novice wasting their time (ibid). Peil (1995:122) further notes that,

“...the information supplied by informants may be unreliable because they are not as knowledgeable as they seem or because they are deliberately misleading you. What is reported may be filtered through the informants’ values, opinions, emotions, and attitudes towards the topic…”

To mitigate these limitations the researcher triangulated KIIIs with other methods such as documentary search. This ensured that the weaknesses of one methodology are compensated by the strength of another.

3.6.1.1.2 In-depth Interviews.

Boyce and Neale (2006:3) defined in-depth interview as a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews in a small number of respondents to
explore their perspective on a particular idea, program or situation. This method was used in order to gain a comprehensive understanding and in-depth perceptions of the people in relation to the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery. The researcher used an in-depth interview guide as a data collection instrument. This approach enabled the researcher to have a clear picture on the impact of centre-local relations on service delivery. In this case residents and council employees were interviewed to obtain their in-depth perceptions on the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery.

This method was chosen because it offers an opportunity for greater flexibility in eliciting information since both the interviewer and interviewee will be present (Claire 1959:238). It offers a chance for rephrasing questions in cases where the interviewee might not have understood the question. Boyce and Neale (2006:3) postulate that the method provides a more relaxed atmosphere in which to collect data. This is because respondents feel more relaxed and comfortable with conversations as opposed to completing questionnaires. However, it has its own disadvantages. It is time consuming and requires trained interviewers. Biased data can be obtained as a result of the interviewer’s influence and is not conducive for sensitive data. To mitigate these limitations, the researcher triangulated it with surveys.

3.6.1.2 Structured Interviews

Structured interview is a standardised form of an interview in which all respondents are asked the same questions with the same wording and in the same sequence (Corbetta 2003:107). This method will be used to collect quantitative data on the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery.

3.6.1.2.1 Survey

Punch (1998:102) argues that survey questionnaires seek a wide range of information and with some conceptual framework of independent, control and dependent variables. Questionnaires were used as research instruments. It was used to collect quantitative data to determine the magnitude of the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery. This method was used to survey the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery in Chitungwiza. The questionnaires were distributed to 40 respondents and were self administered.

This technique was selected because it is less expensive as compared to interviewing. Claire (1959:238) illustrated that it requires much less skill to administer. Further, they can be
administered to a large number of individuals simultaneously and with considerable funds it is usually possible to cover a wider area and obtain more information (ibid). More so, Claire (1959:238) postulates that the impersonal nature of a questionnaire, its standardised wording, its standardised order of questions, its standardised instructions for recording responses ensures uniformity from one measurement situation to another. The respondents may have greater confidence in their anonymity and thus feel freer to express their views (ibid). This helped the researcher to obtain detailed and objective data.

However, surveys have their own disadvantages. Claire (1959:240) notes that questionnaires are not suitable for illiterate people. Complicated questionnaires requiring extended written responses can be used only with a very small percentage of the population (ibid). Hence questionnaires are not an appropriate method for large segments of the population. Cohen et al (2000:173) argue that respondents in most cases will be aware that they are being studied and this can result in biased data. They further postulate that sometimes the data collected tends to be relatively superficial because survey questionnaires rarely probe deeply into complexities such as contradictions on human behaviour and feelings (ibid). To mitigate the disadvantages of this method the researcher triangulated it with other methods discussed above.

3.6.1.3 Observation
Observation is a systematic way of gathering data by watching behaviour, events and noting physical events in their natural setting (ETA 2008:1). The researcher used this technique to obtain data on the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery. The researcher observed the state of service delivery in the municipal area. In this case the researcher mainly used non participant observation.

This approach has been chosen because it enables the researcher to collect primary data when the activity is taking place. ETA (2008:1) notes that the researcher does not have to rely on the willingness or ability of respondents to provide data and this method enabled the researcher to directly see what is happening on the ground rather than relying on what people say. In this case the researcher did not only rely of the subjective accounts of people which may be inaccurate because other respondents may try to protect their embedded interests in the area under study. It is worth emphasising that through key informant interviews filtered data can be provided to protect the image of the organisation. Therefore, observations helped
circumvent the limitations of other primary data collection tools such as interviews and surveys.

However, this method has its own limitations which the researcher took note of. ETA (2008:1) postulates that observations are susceptible to observer bias. Implied is that the data collected may be filtered to suit the needs of the observer. Slack (2001:38) argues that observations may be selective and subjective, unless the types of actions to be noted are carefully specified in advance and it is likely that note keeping may be somewhat random because it is difficult to distinguish key activities. Cognitive information such as attitudes, beliefs, motivations and perceptions cannot be observed (ibid). The researcher circumvented the last limitation by asking participants questions where the researcher needed additional data as to why events are happening the way they are. The researcher also used other data collection methods such as interviews and surveys to mitigate the limitations of this method.

3.6.2 Secondary Data Collection
3.6.2.1 Documentary Search
Documentary search according to Mogalakwe (2006:221) refers to the analysis of documents that contain information about the phenomenon one wishes to study. This data collection method was used to gather secondary data on the forms of service delivery, forms of centre-local relations, implications of centre-local relations on service delivery and centre-local relations in different countries. The range of documents used included publications such as books, newspapers, and government publications such as Acts of parliament, reports of commissions of inquiry and ministerial publications. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:173) argue that documentary products are especially important for providing a rich vein for analysis.

3.7 Data Analysis Techniques
Polit and Hungler (1995:639) define data analysis as the systematic organisation and synthesis of the research data and the testing of the research hypothesis in order to validate or falsify it using the data collected.

3.7.1 Qualitative Data Analysis
3.7.1.1 Thematic Analysis
Data gathered from key informant interviews and in-depth interviews were analysed thematically using thematic analysis. Rice and Ezzy (1999:258) postulate that thematic
analysis involves the identification of themes through careful reading and re-reading of data. In this case narrations of interviewees were categorised into themes and sub-themes concentrating on issues which include centre-local relations in Chitungwiza municipality, implications of centre-local relations and the state of dilapidating state of service delivery in Chitungwiza.

3.7.2 Quantitative data Analysis

3.7.2.1 Descriptive Statistics

Quantitative data drawn from survey questionnaires were analysed using descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics as argued by Babbie (2010:467) is a medium for describing large amounts of data in a way that is manageable and understandable to make the data useful in answering a research objective. Jaggi (2012:18) echoes that descriptive statistics gives numerical and graphic procedures to summarise a collection of data into a clear and understandable way. The study used numerical and graphical presentations under descriptive statistics. Pie charts and other types of graphs such as simple bar graphs and histograms were used under graphical presentations. This was made easier through the use of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). It was also used to construct diagrams that helped in analysing quantitative data. The main advantage of this technique is that it is accurate and fast. However, the method is technically challenging. This problem was mitigated through triangulation, consultations and assistance from colleagues.

3.7.3 Secondary Data Analysis

3.7.3.1 Content Analysis

Secondary data was analysed using content analysis. This method was used to analyse data drawn from documents such as books, reports, Acts of parliament and newspapers. Berg (1989:106) argues that content analysis is any technique for making inference by systematic and objective identifying special characteristics of messages. It is important to triangulate data in analysing it to ensure elucidation of quantitative findings with qualitative narrations.

3.8 Ethical Issues

3.8.1 Permission to Conduct the Research.

The researcher first got authorization from the University of Zimbabwe through the department of Political and Administrative Studies. This letter helped the researcher to access entry into organization like the Ministry of Local Government and the Chitungwiza
municipality. In addition, the researcher seeks authorization to carry out the study from relevant organizations before the commencement of data collection.

3.8.2 Informed Consent.
To ensure that respondents make informed decisions on whether to participate or not, the researcher explained in detail the purpose of the study in a language that respondents were more familiar with. Respondents were also assured that participation in the research was voluntary and they can withdraw at any time if they are no longer interested in the study. In addition, after giving a detailed account of the study the researcher gave respondents a chance to ask questions to make sure that they have understood the purpose of the research and the risks and benefits associated. At the end, respondents were given room to decide for themselves on whether to participate or not.

3.8.3 Respect for Anonymity and Confidentiality.
The researcher avoided putting any identifying information on the questionnaire or key informant interview guide. When analysing data, respondents were not directly linked with their responses to enhance anonymity and confidentiality. The researcher also informed respondents on how anonymity and confidentiality will be protected for instance through the use of numbers rather than names.

3.9 Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that every data collection and data analysis technique has its own advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, it is important to triangulate different methods for instance qualitative and quantitative so as to mitigate the weaknesses of each technique. This enables the research to develop a comprehensive understanding on the area under study. The next chapter will present the findings of the study obtained using the above discussed methods.
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction
In this chapter major findings were presented and analysed.

4.2 Demographic characteristics of Participants
Respondents to the study were categorised into key informants and respondents to the questionnaires. Key informants who were interviewed include two academics, three MLGPWNH, three residents’ association members, six top officials in CM, five councillors and the District Administrator (DA). In addition, 40 respondents responded to the questionnaires. Amongst top officials in the CM were two directors, two managers, chamber secretary, and the mayor. Three councillors were from the MDC party whilst the other two were from the ZANU (PF) wing. Questionnaires were distributed to 40 respondents and 23 were male while 17 were female. Most of the respondents (34) were between the age of 20 and 40 while six of them were between the age of 41 and 60. The respondents of the research are tabulated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Local Government officials</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents Associations Members</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Directors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Administrator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Managers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3 Presentation of Findings
4.3.1 Conceptualising Centre-Local Relations in Local Governance
Inquiries from a lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe in the Department of Political and Administrative studies (POLAD) revealed that centre-local relations in local government refer to the interaction between two spheres or tiers of government that are the central government through the MLGPWNH and various local government entities. A key informant
who was a director in the CM related centre-local relations to the concept of intergovernmental relations arguing that the concept mainly focuses on the relationship between three separate tiers of government that are national government, provincial government and various local government entities. An official in the MLGPWNH established that centre-local relations consider the institutional associations that exist between the MLGPWNH and various local authorities. He further added that the ministry acts as the master, formulator, creator, monitor and supervisor of policies which will be implemented by municipalities.

4.3.2 Centre-local Relations in CM
Concerning the clarity of the relationship between the CM and the MLGPWNH, it was established that the balance of power between the two is mystified. A director in the municipality was of the view that the balance of power is highly tilted in favour of the ministry which plays an active role in the running of the CM. One councillor in the municipality opined that,

“The Minister has a tendency of controlling in detail the activities undertaken by the municipality. He is controlling the operations of the municipality using a remote control through appointing commissions and special interest councillors who are disturbing our responsibilities as representatives of the people.”

Inquiries from top officials in the municipality revealed that the MLGPWNH is interfering in the activities of the municipality using its financial and legislative powers. They were against ministerial dominance in the planning and budgeting process of the CM. Findings indicated that the centre-local relationship that is suppose to foster independence and autonomy of the municipality in the provision of goods and services has turned into a master-servant relationship that has negatively affected service delivery in the municipal area. A top official in the department of finance revealed that the relationship has resulted in delays, frustrations, additional costs, corruption and pervasive behaviour leading to poor service delivery.

In-depth interviews with councillors established that the Minister is refusing to detach himself from the business of the municipality. They argued that the Minister who is supposed to play a strategic role in policy formulation in now involved in the day to day running of the municipality leaving no room for elected councillors and residents in general to determine their own destiny. It was further established that the centralisation of power by the MLGPWNH has greatly limited citizen participation and autonomy of the municipality in
decision making. One resident illustrated that they are not given chances to participate in the activities of the municipality and they argued that they only participated through electing councillors and it ended there. Inquiries from the Mayor revealed that the MLGPWNH retains overall powers and control over the CM. A manager in the municipality complained that,

“Over the years the municipality continued to depend heavily on the MLGPWNH for most of its operations and general sustenance rather than becoming a relatively autonomous entity. The Minister even controls the routine decisions that are supposed to be executed by the municipality to enhance responsiveness to the needs of the electorate. This in my opinion has greatly contributed to the demise of service delivery in the municipality.”

Chitungwiza Residents and Ratepayers Association (CHIRRA) chairperson opined that ministerial dominance has exposed the municipality to the caprice of the MLGPWNH in that the ministry determines the activities and functions of the municipality. A survey carried out revealed that 70% of respondents were of the view that the Minister plays an influential role in the running of the municipality, 25% indicated that it is the town clerk who plays an influential role and 5% illustrated that councillors are the ones who play a pivotal role as diagrammatically presented below

**Figure 4.1 Actors in Decision-Making in Chitungwiza**

Source: Fieldwork
Inquiries from a CHIRRA member indicated that councillors are playing a mere rubber stamping role rubber stamping the directive and decisions of the Minister and top officials in the council. CHIRRA members described the relations between the parent ministry and the CM as a master-servant relationship with the parent ministry being the master and the municipality being the servant. A lecturer at the Ethiopian Civil Service College (ECSC) revealed that the municipality has become a mere appendage of the centre to the detriment of effective and efficient service delivery. This greatly undermines the rationale behind decentralisation.

4.3.2.1 Financial Relationship
Research participants suggested that the financial relationship between the MLGPWNH and the CM is the most significant component of centre-local relations. Key informants in the department of finance noted that the central government through the MLGPWNH provide funds to the municipality under the Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) although there has been a marked decrease in the amount of money provided due to economic hardships which saw the central government failing the fund local authorities. They also revealed that the parent ministry controls the borrowing powers of the municipality. Key informant interviews with the director of finance revealed that the MLGPWNH approves the budget of the municipality to ensure that the needs of the residents are prioritised in the budget and to ensure adherence to stipulated wage-service bill ratio of 30% to 70%. An official in the District Administrator’s office illustrated that this prevents council officials from awarding themselves unjustifiably high salaries at the expense of service delivery.

4.3.2.2 Legal Relationship
A lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) in the POLAD department revealed that in Zimbabwe the UCA (Chapter 29:15) is the most important legal framework that governs the relationship between the municipalities and the MLGPWNH. He further illustrated that the Act provides for the establishment of local government entities and also defines the powers and functions of such entities. Inquiries from the MLGPWNH top official established that the Act designates the MLGPWNH as the supervisor of local authorities in Zimbabwe. Key informants expressed different views with regard to the importance of the legal framework governing centre-local relations in Zimbabwe. Officials in the MLGPWNH regarded the UCA as an important and useful tool for enhancing accountability, transparency and sound corporate governance in general. In-depth interviews with the CHIRRA chairperson revealed
that the UCA gives the Minister a blank cheque to intervene and interfere in the operations of the municipality to the detriment of effective service delivery. They regarded the Act as a draconian piece of legislation which is retrogressive in as far as effective and efficient provision of goods and services by the municipality is concerned. Councillors complained that the Act gave the Minister excessive powers that have resulted in the Minister interfering in the affairs of the municipality through the appointment of special interest councillors, commissions and caretaker council that jeopardised service delivery. A lecturer at the ECSC established that in legal terms centre-local relations are based on a ‘delegatee and delegator’ relationship, with the MLGPWNH wilding many powers to intervene in the affairs of the municipality whenever it deems it necessary in the so called public interests. The findings of the study revealed that centre-local relations in Zimbabwe are hyper-centralised with the MLGPWNH determining the rules and regulations of the game.

4.3.3 Implications of Centre-Local Relations on Service Delivery

4.3.3.1 Negative Implications

The study revealed that centre-local relations are to a greater extent responsible for the dilapidating state of service delivery in CM. A CHIRRA official established that activities of the MLGPWNH are responsible for the deterioration of service delivery in Chitungwiza. A survey carried out revealed that ministerial interference is to a greater extent responsible for the poor state of service delivery in CM. The findings are illustrated in the table below.

4.2 Level of Ministerial Interference
The above diagram shows that 62.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that ministerial interference contributed to poor service delivery and 17.5% agreed. The cumulative percentage of those who agreed that ministerial interference contributed to the decline of service delivery in Chitungwiza stands at 80%. This illustrates that there is high ministerial interference in CM which jeopardised service delivery.

4.3.3.1.1 Effects of Directives

Officials in the department of finance revealed that ministerial directives have greatly affected revenue inflows in the municipality. They illustrated that the transfer of water management to ZINWA in 2006 greatly affected their revenue inflows. In addition, in-depth interviews with members of CHIRRA established that the taskforce or resuscitation teams and investigation teams from the MLGPWNH are sucking out the much needed cash for service delivery. This in their view greatly undermines effective service delivery since money is regarded as the oil of administration. A key informant in the Mayor’s office illustrated that each member of the investigation team tasked to investigate issues of illegal structures in Chitungwiza was pocketing $900 a day meaning that by the end of the 20 days investigation each got a total of $15 000. They also received $4 600 to share amongst themselves and they were given a full tank of petrol every morning. He further illustrated that the Minister directed the municipality to meet all the expenses meaning that the much needed money for service delivery was diverted leaving the municipality bankrupt.

A director in the municipality postulated that the MLGPWNH directed the municipality in 2013 to cancel all debts owed by residents. He illustrated that the cancelation assisted residents but it put a serious financial strain on council operations. An academic at the ECSC regarded the directive as autocracy that goes against the principles of good governance and create shortages of council finances. He further notes that they are vindictive but not productive in terms of service delivery. An official in the department of finance described the directive as an unfortunate move that resulted in the dwindling of revenue in an already fiscally constrained municipality. However, a lecturer at UZ in the POLAD department was in support of ministerial directives arguing that they are in line with global trends but blame them on the fact that in Zimbabwe they are violating the principle of natural justice. He illustrated that the municipality was not given a chance to be heard before the decision to cancel debts was reached yet it was supposed to be consulted.
4.3.3.1.2 Tedious Procedures

Enquiries from a top official in the CM established that highly centralised centre-local relations are undermining efficient and effective provision of goods and services. They illustrated that the relationship is accompanied by tedious and tiresome procedures that jeopardise service delivery. A key informant in the department of finance opined that the centre controls the borrowing and billing system of the municipality. He added that the municipality cannot borrow or increase tariffs without the consent of the relevant ministry. Key informants who are top officials in the municipality complained that such a setup makes it difficult to adapt to the changing environment especially under hyper inflationary environments. They further illustrated that approval by the minister may take time due to bureaucratic pathology. An official in the finance department of finance complained that the municipality is not using a cost recovery system in billing and this has resulted in the council failing to recover costs incurred. Top officials in the municipality established that tedious procedures constitute a major cause of poor service in the municipality and affects responses to residents’ demands and needs.

4.3.3.1.3 Appointment of Commissions, Top Management and Special Interest Councillors

The MLGPWNH has also been heavily criticised for appointing top management, commissions and dismissing elected councillors replacing them with special interest councillors. A CHIRRA member revealed that the Commissioners were handpicked on political basis and were found wanting when it comes to good local government management and service delivery. He further postulated that most people appointed by the Minister lacked basic qualification in local government management. This has resulted in poor service delivery since those appointed officials will mainly concentrate on pleasing their masters rather that the residents. The chairperson of CHIRRA opined that the interests of the MLGPWNH have dominated CM policies and practices through the appointment of top officials and special interest councillors neglecting the demands of the residents. More so, the hierarchical nature of centre-local relations in the context of CM is associated with bureaucratic pathology and red tape that hinder innovativeness, creativity, responsiveness and flexibility. Resultantly, the day to day running of the municipality has been disturbed to the detriment of service delivery.
4.3.3.1.4 Defeat of Democracy in the Municipality

A CHIRRA official established that high levels of ministerial influence resulted in the defeat of democracy in the operations of the municipality. Top council officials revealed that freeing the municipality from excessive ministerial control provides the opportunity for wider resident participation, innovation, adaptation, creativity, responsiveness and increase flexibility of the municipality in an ever-changing milieu. The diagram below shows the level of ministerial influence, councillors’ freedom in council affairs, level of consultation, residents’ participation and encouragement of initiatives. In response to the question on the level of ministerial influence in council affairs, 65% of the respondents felt that the level of ministerial interference was very high as opposed to 10% who illustrated that the level is low. On the issue of councillors’ freedom, 50% were of the view that it is low whilst 10% regarded it as high, 7.5% indicated that its moderate and 32.5% shows that it is poor. On residents’ participation, 70% felt that it is low, 22.5% indicated that it is poor and 7.5% regarded it to be moderate. About 62% of the respondents felt that encouragement of initiative in the municipality is low with 12% viewing it as moderate and 25% indicated that it is poor. The level of consultation was regarded by 67% of the respondents to be low, 3% illustrated that it is high, while 25% were of the view that it is poor and 15% indicated that it is moderate as illustrated in the diagram below.

4.3 Democracy in Municipal Operations
4.3.3.2 Positive Implications

Key informants from the DA’s office and the MLGPWNH generally agreed that the municipality cannot be left operating on its own. They were of the view that giving the municipality much autonomy will result in rampant corruption, misappropriation of funds, and negation of service delivery. Officials in the MLGPWNH complained of the level of qualifications held by councillors and argued that the ministry cannot trust people who do not have five ‘O’ level subjects to run the municipality. They advocated for an active role of the MLGPWNH in the daily activities of the municipality to avoid such cases. A key informant in the MLGPWNH revealed that,

“The centre must amass power and authority at the centre and develop a top-bottom approach in decision making through which it plays a famous role in policy formulation and implementation. This will go a long way in avoiding corruption by top council officials who have a tendency of awarding themselves exorbitant salaries and luxurious vehicles at the expense of service delivery”

4.3.4 Dilapidating state of Service Delivery in Chitungwiza

4.3.4.1 Water Provision

Inquiries from the residents and members of residents’ associations revealed that the municipality is struggling to ensure regular supply of water. A survey conducted reviewed that Chitungwiza residents receive water supplies erratically. Respondents from the survey perceived the supplied water to be of poor quality. They complained that sometimes the supplied water has some odours, sometimes contains visible substances and can be dark in colour. In-depth interview with residents established that residents in Chitungwiza have resorted to wells which are unprotected as a coping measure to the water problem. Observations carried out demonstrated that some residents have installed water tanks at their respective homes while others use boreholes sunk by UNICEF. One key informant in the department of health illustrated that between the period July 2012 and June 2013 around 690 cases of typhoid were recorded with 2 cases of death. In-depth interviews with residents associations revealed that the MLGPWNH should intervene to avoid another outbreak of cholera since the municipality is struggling to provide adequate water.

4.3.4.2 Waste Management

Residents interviewed in the survey were complaining that refuse collection by the municipality is inconsistent. When asked on the reliability of refuse collection 10% were of
the view that refuse collection is reliable, 32.5% note that it is somehow reliable, 40% regarded it as not reliable and 17.5% of the respondents view it as extremely reliable as illustrated in the table below.

Figure 4.4 Reliability of Refuse Collection

Source: Fieldwork

The chairperson of the CHIRRA illustrated that residents were paying for refuse every month but the municipality is not playing its part in as far as refuse collection is concerned. Residents in various places of Chitungwiza were complaining of heaps of garbage at street corners and other public places. Photos that were captured during observations show widespread dumping places in Chitungwiza.
4.5 Undesignated Dumping Cites

Source: Fieldwork

The director of works illustrated that the municipality is involved in wastewater collection which is handled through sewerage systems. The municipal engineers pointed out that the municipality is facing challenges in as far as sewerage maintenance is concerned. They pointed to the issue of aging infrastructure as a major problem leading to continuous bursting of sewer pipes. An official in the department of works opined that, “the sewer system in place is too old and was designed to cater for a small population, it cannot sustain the current population which is standing at around 1 000 000.” When asked on the reliability of sewerage maintenance by the municipality, 27.5% regarded it as somehow reliable whilst 30% noted that it is not reliable and 42.5 were of the view that it’s extremely unreliable.

4.3.4.3 Transportation Systems Management

CHIRRA chairperson was dissatisfied with the way the municipality was fulfilling its mandate of making sure that access to all parts of the community is ensured. He illustrated that road maintenance in Chitungwiza leaves a lot to be desired, the roads linking various places (residential and industrial) within the municipality are characterised with potholes. In general, residents illustrated that they were not satisfied with the overall state of service delivery.
4.4 Data Analysis

4.4.1 Centre-local Relations in Chitungwiza

Findings from the study established that the relationship between the MLGPWNH and the CM is highly centralised. The study revealed that the balance of power is highly tilted in favour of MLGPWNH which plays an active role in the running of the CM. One councillor opined that the Minister has a tendency of controlling in detail the activities undertaken by the municipality. This concurs with the view of Chipangura (2014:11) who argues that the Minister cannot simply leave local authorities to run their business. This is also in agreement with Golola (2003) who stated that politicians at the centre have little wish to cede power to the local government. Centralisation of power is not peculiar to Zimbabwe, it is also bedevilling service delivery in other African countries. Olowu (2009:4) postulates that the major challenge facing decentralisation in Africa is that the national leaders fear that the transfer of power to local levels represents a zero-sum game in which local leaders (who might be politicians in a different party) gain power and resources at their expense. The figure below shows the level of ministerial influence in CM

**Figure 4.6 Level of Ministerial Influence**

Key: 1.00 high 2.00 moderate 3.00 low 4.00 poor
The above diagram shows that the distribution is positively skewed because the long tail is on the positive side. Implied is that there is high ministerial intervention. This is largely because the responses are heavily skewed to high ministerial influence in Chitungwiza. About 65% of the respondents were of the view that there is high ministerial interference. Implied is that there is centralised governance in CM.

The Minister who is supposed to play a strategic role in policy formulation and implementation is now involved in the day to day running of the municipality leaving no room for elected councillors and residents in general to determine their own destiny. The Ministry has also been involved in routine decision making which in actual fact is a responsibility of the municipality. According to Madzivanyika (2011:33) efficient and effective provision of goods and services is compromised by a high level of central interference in the decision-making processes of local authorities. Findings indicated that the centre-local relationship that is supposed to foster independence and autonomy of the municipality in the provision of goods and services has turned into a master-servant relationship that has negatively affected service delivery in CM.

The MLGPWNH controls most important financial activities of the municipality for instance budgeting, borrowing and the billing system. The UCA Chapter 29:15 Section 290 Subsection (4) reveals that:

“On receipt of an application in terms of paragraph (c) of subsection (3) the Minister may approve the project in whole or in part and grant the authority to borrow the moneys applied for, either in whole or in part, subject to such conditions as he may impose....”

This scenario is similar to that in Britain. Chandler (1993:21) argues that in Britain the central government has a number of ways of either paying the pipes or exercising a considerable degree of control over the income of local authorities through regulation of the central grant system, influence over local government pricing policies and most importantly attempt to restrict the money that can be raised from the hitherto sacrosanct source of local taxation. Key informants in the department of finance noted that the central government through the MLGPWNH provide funds to the municipality under the PSIP although there is a marked decrease in the amount of money provided due to economic hardships which saw the central government failing to fund local authorities.
Key informant interviews with the director of finance also revealed that the MLGPWHN approves the budget of the municipality to ensure that the needs of the residents are prioritised in the budget. This is in agreement with the view of Marumahoko (2011:52) who opined that consistent with the national best practice, the MLGPWNH also enforces a wage-service bill ratio of 30% to 70%. This ratio provides a formula for managing the budget of the municipality making sure that 70% of the budget is used for service delivery such as refuse collection, sewerage maintenance, water supply, road maintenance and health service provision (ibid). This prevents council officials from awarding themselves unjustified salaries. However, in the case of the CM the opposite is true because 70% of the revenue in gobbled by the wage bill.

Officials in the MLGPWNH and those in the municipality generally agreed that the central government through the MLGPWNH controls the billing policy of local authorities in Zimbabwe. This was also supported with documentary search which revealed that,

“Urban councils’ capacity to raise revenue from fees is further limited by the fact that they have to seek the Minister of Local Government’s approval for any tariff imposed in suburbs where the poor people live...... the Act compels an urban local authority to seek the Minister’s approval before executing a tariff in a poor suburb.” (Murumahoko 2011:49)

Key informants in the DA’s office were of the view that the objective of such a billing policy is to ensure that the poor are not marginalised from municipal goods and services because of their incapacity to pay for the services rendered. In this case the central government will be trying to take into account the problems of the unfortunate and create equality in society. Therefore, administrative controls exerted on the municipality by the MLGPWNH are quite extensive especially in financial terms. Centralisation of financial powers further entrenches the subordinate role of the municipality in that the revenue powers, expending and borrowing powers are being validated by the ministry.

Top officials in CM were of the view that the parent ministry retains overall powers and control over the municipality. Over the years the municipality continued to depend heavily on the MLGPWNH for most of its operations and general sustenance rather than becoming a relatively autonomous organisation. Central government domination in the affairs of municipalities is not peculiar to Zimbabwe. Dipholo and Gumede (2013:1) illustrated that in Botswana local authorities are simply an extension of the central government responsible for the implementation of central government policies at lower levels. They added that the nature
of centre-local relations in Botswana subject local authorities to torturous control by the central government in a way that significantly compromise service delivery and local autonomy. Centre-local relations between the MLGPWNH and CM mean that the later is more or less an extension of the former responsible for the implementation of ministerial directive at the lower level of government. This shows that centre-local relations between the two spheres of government are highly centralised with the MLGPWNH having supreme powers over the management of the CM. Resultantly, the municipality has been reduced to a mere implementing agent of the ministry and has been left vulnerable to torturous control by the parent ministry in a manner that greatly undermines its operational autonomy and service delivery in general.

4.4.2 Implications of Centre-Local Relations on Service Delivery

4.4.2.1 Negative Implications

4.4.2.1.1 Effects of Ministerial Directives on Council Operations

The study revealed that centre-local relations are to a greater extent responsible for the deterioration of service delivery in CM. Key informants who are council officials cited ministerial directive as an important weapon at the disposal of the MLGPWNH to meddle in the affairs of the municipality to the detriment of service delivery. Jonga and Chirisa (2009:173) argue that directives traded good governance for political advantage and because of this the MLGPWNH therefore came heavily on urban councils thereby thwarting any remaining elements of freedom, good governance, commitment and initiative amongst councillors and council employees. For instance, in 2006 the MLGPWNH directed ZINWA to take over the management of water and sewer from municipalities citing the incapacity of municipalities to provide these services. However, documentary search revealed that when the management of water and sewer was under ZINWA there were no significant improvements in the service delivery situation (Mushamba 2010 and Jonga and Chirisa 2009). They further argue that in the period between 2000 and 2008 the water delivery situation worsened. This was evidenced by erratic water supply and constant bursting of main pipes. Officials in the department of finance argue that the transfer of water management to ZINWA greatly affected revenue inflows. This was supported by Mushamba (2010:109) who postulates that local authorities viewed this as a planned move to deprive them of their traditional source of revenue. Therefore, hyper-centralised centre-local relations hinder effective service delivery.
In addition, the taskforce or resuscitation teams and investigation teams from the MLGPWNH are sucking out the much needed cash for service delivery from the municipality. This greatly undermines effective service delivery since money is regarded as the oil of administration. This was supported by Sibanda (2013) who revealed that the MLGPWNH directed the CM to pay $300 000 in allowances to the 16 member commission which was set to investigate the issue of illegal structures in Chitungwiza. One key informant in the department of finance notes that each member of the team was pocketing $900 a day meaning that by the end of the 20 days investigation each got a total of $15 000, they also received $4 600 to share amongst themselves and they were given a full tank of petrol every morning (Matenga 2013). In 2012 the Minister also set a resuscitation team which was led by Mbetsa. Chipangura (2014:11) notes that the team instead of resuscitating service delivery in CM was itself milking the municipality of thousands of dollars in obscene allowances. It was unearthed that the leader of the team was getting a total of $26 525 salary per month, his deputy was paid $14 500 and the other five members got $13 500 each. The leader of the team’s excuse on these high allowances was that, “The fees were fixed by the Minister of Local Government for a team of professionals who are not volunteers...” (ibid). The MLGPWNH directed the bleeding municipality to meet the hefty allowances. This scenario greatly affected service delivery since the money eye marked for service delivery was diverted to meet the allowances of the teams set by the Minister.

The directives were issued at a time when the municipality was struggling to pay employees their 10 month salary arrears and provide services. Members of the CRT criticised the Minister for being insensitive to the problems of the municipality and the residents in general. The Chitungwiza mayor was surprised by these high allowances which were incurred at a time when the municipality was operating in an environment of limited fiscal space. A key informant in the department of finance opines that the major problem with ministerial directives is that they are not followed with funding. This has been worsened by the fact that the central government in no longer providing fiscal transfers to local authorities. As a result, the cash-strapped municipality was forced to meet the expenses of such directives at the expense of service delivery. Such a scenario resulted in services such as waste management and water provision and sanitation grinding to a halt. Thus the relationship between the CM and the parent ministry is detrimental to service delivery as it has resulted in misuse of ratepayers’ money.
Furthermore, the MLGPWNH directed the municipality in 2013 to cancel all debts owed by residents. The cancellation of debts became a highly contestable arena mainly because various standpoints emerged from diverse constituencies in trying to explain its implications on service delivery. Residents appreciated the initiative but however the cancelation put serious financial strain on council operations. A lecturer at the ECSC notes that the directive created shortages of council finances. An official in the department of finance describe the directive as an unfortunate move that resulted in the dwindling of revenue in an already fiscally constrained municipality. The situation was worsened by the fact the government has no plans to financial support the municipality. This view was supported by Tafirenyika (2013) who revealed that in the aftermath of debts write-off revenue inflows in the municipality plummeted with council collecting an average of $7 000 per day compared to the usual $50 000. Salary problems in the municipality persisted with employees going for more than 10 months without pay. This led to employee dissatisfaction resulting in poor service delivery. However, a lecturer at UZ in the POLAD department was in support of ministerial directives arguing that they are in line with global trends but blame them on the fact that in Zimbabwe they are violating the principle of natural justice. The municipality was not given a chance to be heard before the decision to cancel debts was reached. These findings support the hypothesis that hyper-centralised centre-local relations hinder effective service delivery.

4.4.2.1.2 Lack of Fiscal Autonomy

Madzivanyika (2011:33) alleges that efficient and effective provision of services is undermined by a high level of central interference in the decisions of municipalities. The UCA empowers the Minister to approve budgets of local authorities and the Minister is also in control of the billing system by the municipality. Madzivanyika (2011:35) revealed that the design of the UCA limits the capacity of urban councils to raise taxes or tariffs. He further illustrated that urban councils can only raise taxes, surcharges or borrow within limits set by the minister. Lack of fiscal autonomy on the part of the municipality greatly compromises the final outcomes with regard to service delivery. The UCA section 314 notes that the Minister may reverse, suspend and rescind resolutions and decisions of the municipality. The ECA (2011:17) argues that this is seriously undermining any tariff structures agreed to between the municipality and their residents. This is because the Minister is the one with the final say on the changes and because of the powers of the Minister, some decisions of the council can be set aside. A key informant in the municipality complained that the municipality is not using a
cost recovery system in billing and this has resulted in the council failing to recover costs incurred. This concurs with the view of Marumahoko (2011:38) who argues that, “The lack of adequate fiscal autonomy, they argue, explains not only the obsolete infrastructure that characterises urban areas but also the poor delivery of social goods and services to ratepayers. The overall degradation is evidenced by poor roads, lack of clean water and a lack of capacity to collect refuse.”

Marumahoko (2011:52) further illustrates that, “...the Minister of Local Government can disrupt council priorities on expenditure even where they were subjected to legitimate public engagement process. In addition, urban councils refrain from exercising full expenditure powers out of fear of the consequences of the oversight role of central government. Central government controls on the use of finances necessarily weakens the expenditure discretion of urban councils. The end result is that they are constrained in their responses to the express demands and preferences of residents and are left to battle service delivery backlogs with little or no assistance from the other spheres of government, yet are often blamed by residents for not being proactive.”

Limited fiscal space of the part of the municipality inevitably leads to laughable services. In addition, responses to residents’ demands and needs will be compromised in the process. Thus, centralised centre-local relations are detrimental to effective service delivery in local authorities.

4.4.2.1.3 Appointment of Commissions, Top Management and Special Interest Councillors

The MLGPWNH has also been heavily criticised for appointing top management, commissions and dismissing elected councillors replacing them with special interest councillors. A lecturer at the ECSC revealed that commissions are appointed on political basis without considering their academic and professional background. This concurs with the view of Jonga and Chirisa (2009:177) who illustrated that a big number of the appointed commissioners were not experts in local government issues since they were appointed on patronage bases. ZESN (2008:2) notes that the operations of municipalities were paralyzed because no tangible cause has been provided and the dismissal of councillors and replacing them with commissions was prevalent in most urban areas. Resultantly, the day to day running of the municipality has been disturbed to the detriment of service delivery.
Documentary search revealed that citizens now view the municipality as not their institution but as an organ of the centre. This has negatively affected residents’ participation.

4.4.2.1.4 Tedious Procedures

More so, the hierarchical nature of centre-local relations in the context of CM is associated with bureaucratic pathology and tedious procedures that hinder innovativeness, creativity, responsiveness and flexibility. For the municipality to raise fees and borrow money it must seek approval from the Minister first. In addition, the MLGPWNH also approves the budgets of the municipality and according to one key informant in the department of finance the response of the Minister may take some time. This is also the case in Kenya. Lewa et al cited by Devas (2005:5) postulate that in Kenya budget approval can take many months and in some cases is not given until after the end of the financial year to which the budget relates. The procedures stipulated are too tedious and this makes it difficult for the municipality to adapt to changes in the environment especially under inflationary conditions. This supports the views of Fjeldstad (2001) who opined that in practice the supervision of local authorities by the central government is weak and too often central control create more problems than they solve. These problems include delays, frustrations, additional costs, corruption and pervasive behaviour leading to poor service delivery. Edwards (1980) note that there are too many agencies, doing too many things, overlapping too often, coordinating too rarely, wasting too much money and doing too little to solve real problems. This is also the situation in CM where the municipality is required to report to the MLGPWNH, PA, DA and also to the President’s office. To improve service delivery in the municipality the procedures and processes must be more flexible and speedily to enhance responsiveness to the demands of the electorates.

4.4.2.1.5 Democracy in Municipal Operations

High ministerial intervention affected the level of residents’ participation, consultation and creativity in the municipality to the detriment of service delivery. Freeing the municipality from excessive ministerial control provides the opportunity for wider resident participation, innovation, adaptation, creativity, responsiveness and increase flexibility of the municipality in an ever-changing milieu. A survey carried out revealed that the level of ministerial influence in CM is high. Respondents felt that high ministerial influence was stifling creativity and innovativeness in council decision making. In response to the question on the level of ministerial influence in council affairs, 65% of the respondents felt that the level of
ministerial interference was very high as opposed to 10% who illustrated that the level is low. On the issue of councillors’ freedom, 50% were of the view that it is low whilst 10% regarded it as high, 7.5% indicated that its moderate and 32.5% shows that it’s poor. On residents’ participation, 70% felt that its low, 22.5% indicated that it’s poor and 7.5% regarded it to be moderate. About 62.5% of the respondents felt that encouragement of initiative in the municipality is low with 12% viewing it as moderate and 25% indicated that it’s poor. The level of consultation was regarded by 67.5% of the respondents to be low, 2.5% illustrated that its high, while 25% were of the view that its poor and 15% indicated that its moderate. As illustrated above, high ministerial influence in the operations of the municipality has directly affected the freedom of councillors, citizen participation, encouragement of initiative and level of consultation. Most important decisions in CM emanate from the Minister as directives and this leaves no room for councillors and other stakeholders to participate in decision-making process. The low level of councillors’ freedom may be as a result of the fact that the municipality is dominated by councillors from the MDC part yet the Minister is from the ZANU (PF) wing.

4.4.2.1.6 Central Government Silence on the Qualification of Councillors
Councillors as non executive directors for the municipality are suppose to meaningfully participate in the boards and various meetings. It is of paramount importance that councillors must have academic and professional qualifications for them to spear head development of the municipality. Malin (2007:134) illustrated that the value may come from different facets for instance appropriate professional background, work experience, functional specialism and the ability to have insights into the issues discussed in the board and to ask searching questions. However, the UCA is quiet in as far as the minimum expected qualifications of councillors are concerned. The Act does not deter those individuals with mediocre qualifications to contest as councillors. Such a scenario greatly affects service delivery. This was supported by Mutema (2012:2087) who argues that low qualifications on the part of councillors stifle councillors’ ability to meaningfully participate in council meetings. The situation results in unproductive councils that are useless in adjudicating knotty tactical issues to the detriment of service delivery. Resultantly, councils end up rubber stamping the decisions of top management and those of their respective parties.

A lecturer at UZ in the POLAD department revealed that poor academic qualifications of councillors create mistrust between councillors and the Minister. He added that the Minister
cannot trust unqualified councillors to run the municipality. Resultantly, the Minister maintained a close look at the operations of the municipality through directives and interventions. This resulted in the Minister playing an active role in the decision making process of the CM. The survey carried out supports this view. The survey revealed that the Minister plays an influential role in the decision making process followed by the town clerk and very few demonstrated that the councillors play an influential role as diagrammatically presented below.

**Figure 4.7 Decision-Making in Chitungwiza**

The above diagram shows that 62.5% of the respondents were of the view that the minister of local government plays an active role in the decision making process and only 12.5% of the respondents were arguing that elected councillors play an active role. Considering the fact that top council officials are appointed by the Minister it can be argued that the interests of the central government dominate in the running of the municipality. This shows that in most cases the councillors are playing a mere rubber stamping role. Therefore, centre-local relations between the parent ministry and the CM can best be explained as a master-servant relationship with the parent ministry being the master and the municipality being the servant. The municipality has become a mere appendage of the centre. Such a scenario is detrimental to effective and efficient service delivery and greatly undermines the rationale behind decentralisation. However, key informants from the DA’s office and the MLGPWNH
revealed that the municipality cannot be left operating on its own. They were of the view that giving the municipality much autonomy will result in rampant corruption, misappropriation of funds negation of service delivery. They advocated for an active role of the MOLG in the daily activities of the municipality to avoid such cases.

4.4.2.2 Positive Implications

4.4.2.2.1 Reduction of Corruption

Top officials in the MLGPWNH supported central control of municipalities citing issues of rampant corruption and misuse of funds. They were arguing that local authorities cannot be left on their own giving evidence of cases of corruption and misuse of taxpayers’ money in Chitungwiza municipality. Documentary search revealed that corruption is rampant and footloose in Chitungwiza municipality (Mukonza 2013:45). Cases of corruption in Chitungwiza municipality include illegal selling and allocation of stands. In-depth interviews with residents illustrated that stands were sold and allocated in a way riddled with corruption without following the waiting list. Members of CHIRRA were of the view that top management in the municipality award themselves high salaries and allowances at the expense of service delivery. They were calling for an active role of the central government in monitoring and supervising the activities of the municipality to avoid corruption and misuse of public monies. Documentary search revealed that the centre should safeguard all public monies collected at various levels of government. Devas (2005:4) postulates that, “Indeed the distinction between ‘central government money’ and ‘local government money’ is quite arbitrary: all public money is contributed by taxpayers, and it is a matter of administrative convenience which level of government collect which revenue.” Implied is that the MLGPWNH must play an important role in making sure that ratepayers’ is used for the intended purpose. In this case centre-local relation is important in as far as service delivery is concerned.

4.4.2.2.2 Minimisation of Inter-regional Inequalities

Documentary search revealed that centre-local relations are of supreme importance in the avoidance of inter-regional inequalities. Miller (2002:7) opines that giving local authorities autonomy may lead to an increase in inter-regional inequalities and thus widen intra-national poverty gaps and poster politically destabilizing forces if local governments. Key informants in the MLGPWNH revealed that centre-local relations ensure unbiased allocation of national resources amongst municipalities with unlike resource capacities. Different regions are
differently endowed in terms of natural resources, level of economic activities, and land value, some local authorities will generate more revenue than others and afford their citizens more or better quality services than is provided in poorer jurisdictions (ibid). The need for fairness and equality in the distribution of scarce resources through the national budget justifies the importance of centre local relations in local governance.

4.4.3 Dilapidating State of Service Delivery in Chitungwiza

The municipality is struggling to provide basic goods and services to the residents. According to Madzivanyika (2011:14) “Basic services must, be available, accessible, culturally acceptable, and affordable, of good quality and provided on a non-discriminatory basis.” However, the situation in Chitungwiza shows the opposite as residents have witnessed a plethora of service delivery problems for instance erratic water supplies, accumulation of uncollected refuse, potholed roads and bursting sewer pipes.

Observations carried out revealed that the road network in CM is in a horrendous state. This concurs with the findings of the Parliamentary Report (2010:26) which revealed that the roads in Chitungwiza are characterised with potholes that had developed into small ponds, making roads impassable and some areas inaccessible especially during the rainy season. There is also accumulation of garbage and refuse at undesignated areas in the municipal area. The uncollected garbage had become breeding place for flies and mosquitoes and are sources of airborne diseases thus creating a health hazard (ibid). Residents in Chitungwiza were complaining about erratic supply of water by the municipality. The study revealed that the municipality is struggling to ensure 24 hour supply of water. This concurs with the view of Young (2006:6) who revealed that in many developing countries the provision of water is unsatisfactory. In-depth interviews with residents revealed that residents have resorted to unprotected wells as a coping measure to the water problem. Respondents to the questionnaires showed dissatisfaction with the state of service delivery in CM as illustrated in the table below.
4.8 State of Service Delivery

Key: 1.00-Excellent 2.00-Good 3.00-Fair 4.00-Poor 5.00-Very Poor

The above graph shows negative skewness because the distribution tails to the negative. Implied is that the responses are heavily skewed to poor delivery in the municipality. This clearly shows that there is poor service delivery in CM. From the graph above, it can be deduced that 92.5% of the respondents regarded service delivery in CM to be poor. Only 7.5% of the respondents were satisfied with the state of service delivery in Chitungwiza. These people might be top officials in the municipality who were trying to protect the image of their organisation. They might also be from low density suburbs where there is regular refuse collection and there are also very few cases of sewerage burst.

4.4 Hypothesis Testing

The findings of the research validated the hypothesis that hyper-centralised governance relations are hinder effective service delivery in municipalities. This is largely because information from various sources generally point to the fact that highly centralised governance is detrimental to effective service delivery. The MLGPWNH is interfering in the management of the municipality through directives, appointment of key officials and firing elected councillors in the process jeopardising service delivery. This has been evidenced by erratic water supply, undesignated dumping sites, potholed roads and bursting sewer pipes.
5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction
Conclusions and recommendations will be presented in this chapter.

5.2 Conclusions
From the foregoing analysis, it can be drawn that centre-local relations between the MLGPWNH and the CM are hyper-centralised. The parent ministry retains overall powers and control over the municipality. Over the years the municipality continued to depend heavily on the MLGPWNH for most of its operations and general sustenance rather than becoming a relatively autonomous organisation. The Minister who is suppose to play a strategic role in policy formulation and implementation is involved in the day to day running of the municipality leaving no room for elected councillors and residents in general to determine their own destiny. Findings indicated that the centre-local relationship that is suppose to foster independence and autonomy of the municipality in the provision of goods and services has turned into a master-servant relationship that has negatively affected service delivery in CM. The Minister is meddling in the affairs of the municipality through manipulation of the UCA, issuing directives and dismissing elected councillors replacing them with commissions and special interest councillors to the detriment of service delivery.

Ministerial interference in the management of the CM has negatively impacted service delivery. Effective service delivery is hampered by a high level of ministerial interference in the decisions of the municipality. Some ministerial directives for instance the ordering of the municipality by the Minister to pay high salaries and allowances to commissions and investigation teams have milked the cash-strapped municipality of the much needed money for service delivery. Such directives left the municipality bankrupt to the detriment of service delivery. High ministerial interference explains obsolete infrastructure and poor service delivery to ratepayers that characterise Chitungwiza.

Service delivery in CM is in a dilapidated state. Residents have witnessed a plethora of service delivery problems for instance erratic water supplies, accumulation of uncollected refuse, potholed roads, poor health provision, inadequate housing and bursting sewer pipes. The road network in the municipality is in a horrendous state because the roads are heavily potholed creating a nightmare for motorists. There is also accumulation of garbage and refuse at undesignated areas in the municipal area. The uncollected garbage had developed into
reproduction grounds for flies and mosquitoes and in the process creating health risk for residents. Residents in Chitungwiza were complaining about erratic supply of water by the municipality. The municipality is also struggling to ensure adequate supply of water. Residents have been forced to use unprotected sources of water as a measure of dealing with water challenges. The scenario has resulted in cholera and diarrhoea outbreaks claiming lives of people.

5.3 Recommendations

The study recommends that the MLGPWNH must create a favourable environment for stakeholder participation in the operation of municipalities. This is in line with the view of Olowu (2009) who advocated for collective decision making. He argued that a substantial number of residents within local authorities must be involved in formulating the rules services needed within their respective municipalities. This concurs with the view of IDAZIM (2010:59) which illustrated that it is important that during any reconstruction process local authorities and residents are encouraged on all fronts to connect. Service delivery or infrastructure investment priorities should be developed in concert with communities and their representatives (ibid). The budget process for instance must be participatory to ensure that available finances are linked to the demands of the people. In CM provisions for residents’ involvement in the business of the municipality are very weak. This greatly undermines effective service delivery. Therefore, residents must be seriously engaged in matters impacting them in their living for instance water provision, health provision, sewerage maintenance and housing provision.

The central government should grant the municipality more autonomy. The municipality must function as an autonomous organisation and the parent ministry must cease interfering in the business of the municipality. Layman (2003) illustrated that in the case of South Africa, local authorities are treated as distinctive sphere of government and the distinctive element reflects that municipalities exist in their own right and is the final decision-maker on a defined range of functions. This scenario greatly improved service delivery and protected local authorities from uncalled for central government interference. The Zimbabwean local government system is hyper-centralised with the Minister having excessive powers. Thus, there is need to revise the UCA and align it with the 2013 constitution. The MLGPWNH must strive to make sure that decentralisation (political and fiscal) is fully implemented in urban councils. Marumahoko (2011:38) argues that the lack of adequate fiscal autonomy
explains not only the obsolete infrastructure that characterises urban areas but also the poor delivery of social goods and services to ratepayers. Freeing the municipality will enhance wider citizen participation, innovation, adaptation, responsiveness and increase flexibility of the municipality in an ever changing environment. This recommendation is in line with Young (1996:161) who stresses that local government could play a greater role if allowed more autonomy and regular, independent sources of revenue.

In line with the principal-agent theory the introduction of objective and systematic performance management will go a long way in improving service delivery. According to Waterman and Meier (1998:176) note that the principal-agent theory recommends that given information asymmetry the principal (MLGPWNH) must control the agent (Chitungwiza municipality) to achieve the intended goals. Implied is that the MLGPWNH must design incentive structures to monitor the performance of the municipality. The performance management system in the country is too political and is mainly determined by the minister to the detriment of service delivery. This has resulted in biased dismissals of councillors and mayors in the municipality. A balance score card must be used to measure the performance of mayors, councillors, top council officials and even the minister. Effective implementation of performance management will help improve the performance of various stakeholders in the management of local authorities. After managing performance, good performers must be rewarded and non-performers must be sanctioned accordingly.

The MLGPWNH must introduce capacity building programmes for councillors, mayors and other council employees. The centre must introduce training programmes in policy formulation, implementation and analysis such that councillors and mayors can make informed contributions to the development of municipalities. This recommendation is also supported by the Zimbabwe Institute (2005:20) which revealed that the central government must introduce a policy which insists on the training of councillors on the value and importance of shared leadership and general qualities of a good and effective leader. The study revealed that most councillors and mayors lack knowledge and competences in the field of local government management. Therefore the introduction of training programmes for councillors will help improve their participation in council affairs and may result in improved service delivery. IDAZIM (2010:59) postulates that local councillors badly need training in the skills necessary to work effectively in the council.
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE

University of Zimbabwe

Faculty of Social Science

Department of Political and Administrative Studies

Questionnaire on the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery in Chitungwiza municipality

Section A

Dear Sir/Madam

My name is Tawanda Nyikadzino and I am postgraduate student at the University of Zimbabwe in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies. I am doing my dissertation research for my Masters in Public Administration. My topic is: Assessing the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery in municipalities: Case of Chitungwiza. It endeavours to understand whether the relationship aids or hinders effective service delivery. The information obtained from this research will be used purely for academic purposes and is highly confidential. Your responses will be greatly appreciated.

SECTION B: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

1. Profile of the Respondent:
   (i) Age.................................................................

   (ii) Gender............................................................

3. How long have you resided in this area
   (i) less than 5 years          (ii) 6-10 years          (iii) 11-15 years          (iv) More than 15

2. (i) Residential Area......................................................
   (ii) Low density          (iii) Medium density          (iv) High density
SECTION C: Research Questions

1. What are the most important services the council is providing to the community?
   a) ............................................................................................................
   b) ............................................................................................................
   c) ............................................................................................................
   d) ............................................................................................................
   e) ............................................................................................................
   f) ............................................................................................................
   g) ............................................................................................................

2. How reliable are the services provided by the municipality in relation to the following attributes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Very reliable</th>
<th>Somehow reliable</th>
<th>Not reliable</th>
<th>Extremely unreliable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refuse collection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewerage maintenance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road maintenance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health service provision</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Protection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House provision</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Provision</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. In general, how would you describe the state of service delivery today?

   a) Excellent  1
   b) Good       2
   c) Fair       3
   d) Poor       4
   e) Very poor  5

4. In your view, what do you see as the most pressing challenges facing the municipality in providing basic goods and services?
   a) ............................................................................................................
   b) ............................................................................................................
   c) ............................................................................................................
   d) ............................................................................................................
5. Please tell whether you agree or disagree with the way the following factors affected service delivery in Chitungwiza?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) political interference</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) poor management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) corruption</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) poor revenue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. What do you think must be done to improve service delivery in the municipality?


7. In general, how would you describe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Fairly good</th>
<th>Neither good nor bad</th>
<th>Fairly bad</th>
<th>Very bad</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) ministerial intervention in Chitungwiza municipality</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) the council’s relationship with the ministry of local government</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Over the past year how often do you interact with the ministry of local government in terms of the following attributes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) grants</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Just once or twice</th>
<th>Several times</th>
<th>Many times</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) loans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) advice</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) audits</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) directives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. How would you best describe intergovernmental fiscal transfers received by the municipality from the central government?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Fiscal transfers are sufficient</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Fiscal transfers are inadequate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>We do not receive significant fiscal transfers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>We do not receive fiscal transfers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. What about the overall direction of the relationship between the council and the relevant ministry? Would you say the relationship is going in the wrong or right direction?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Going in the wrong direction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Going in the right direction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. How important is the relationship between the council and the ministry of Local Government in service delivery?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Fairly important</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Fairly unimportant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. What do you think is the main cause of ministerial intervention in Chitungwiza municipality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Poor service delivery</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Misuse of funds</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Political considerations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. In your view who plays an important role in decision making in Chitungwiza?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Ministry of local government</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Residents</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Town Clerk</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. How do you rate the level of ministerial intervention in Chitungwiza?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Not serious</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Somewhat serious</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Very serious</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Overall how satisfied are you with ministerial intervention in Chitungwiza?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) very satisfied</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) fairly satisfied</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) not satisfied</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) not at all satisfied</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. How would you rate the following attributes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>high</th>
<th>moderate</th>
<th>low</th>
<th>Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) freedom of councillors in council affairs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) residents’ participation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) level of ministerial influence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) level of consultation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) encouragement of initiatives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. How free are residents in influencing decisions on service delivery?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) not free at all</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) fairly free</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) free</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) very free</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. How would you describe overall autonomy enjoyed by the municipality in conducting its business

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Autonomous</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Semi-autonomous</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Not autonomous</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

END! THANK YOU FOR YOUR PRECIOUS TIME
APPENDIX 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

SECTION A

Dear Sir/Madam

My name is Tawanda Nyikadzino and I am a postgraduate student at the University of Zimbabwe in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies. I am doing my dissertation research for my Masters in Public Administration. My topic is: Assessing the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery in municipalities: Case of Chitungwiza. The in-depth interview guide has been prepared to assess the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery. This is mainly intended to unravel in-depth perceptions of the respondents with regard to the implications of centre-local relations on service delivery. It endeavours to gain an understanding on whether the relationship between the municipality and the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) aids or hinders effective service delivery. The information obtained from this research will be used purely for academic purposes and is highly confidential. Your responses will be greatly appreciated.

SECTION B: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

3. Profile of the Respondent:
   (i) Age .................................................................
   (ii) Gender .............................................................

3. How long have you resided in this area
   (i) less than 5 years
   (ii) 6-10 years
   (iii) 11-15 years
   (iv) More than 15

4. (i) Residential Area ..............................................................
   (ii) Low density
   (iii) Medium density
   (iv) High density
SECTION C: RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Basically, what services do you receive from the municipal council?

2. Are you really satisfied with the services being provided by the municipality today? Explain why?

3. In your view, what are the factors contributing to the current state of service delivery?

4. What do you think the central government should do to improve the situation?

5. Generally, how do you view the relationship between the municipality and the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG)?

6. As residents how do you view the participation of the minister of local government in the affairs of the municipality?

7. In your own opinion what do you think are the implications of ministerial participation in Chitungwiza in as far as service delivery is concerned?

8. Under what circumstances do you regard ministerial intervention as important and useful in as far as the activities of the municipality are concerned?

9. It is alleged that most important decisions come from the Minister of local government as directives. How then do you participate in the decision making process of the municipality?

10. Are councillors as representatives of residents enjoying freedom in running the council? Explain why?

11. What do you think are the effects of excessive ministerial intervention in council affairs?

12. With regard to the relationship between the municipality and the Ministry of local government, what do you think must be done to improve service delivery?

END! THANK YOU. YOUR SUPPORT IS GREATLY APPRECIATED
APPENDIX 3: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. To start with, which services local authorities are suppose to provide to the residents?

2. In relation to the above, which of these services does Chitungwiza municipality provide?

3. a) How does the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) intervene in the provision of these services?

b) Is its participation aiding or hindering effective service delivery in Chitungwiza municipality

4. a) How are you financing service delivery?

b) Are the internal sources of revenues enough to sustain service delivery?

c) With regard to financing service delivery, what is the central government doing?

d) How would you describe intergovernmental fiscal transfers to the municipality? Are they enough to sustain service delivery in the municipality?

5. How autonomous are you from the central government in as far as service delivery is concerned

6. Which measures are in place to improve service delivery in relation to water provision, refuse collection, sewerage maintenance and health provision to mention but a few?

7. What challenges are you facing in the provision of services?

8. What recommendations do you proffer for improved service delivery?

Forms of centre-local relations and their implications on service delivery.

1. What do you understand by the notion of centre-local relations in local government?

2. How do you view the relationship between the municipality and the parent ministry?

3. In what ways does the ministry of local government relate to Chitungwiza municipality?

4. Which form is mainly being used by the MOLG to intervene in the affairs of the municipality?

5. What in your view are the advantages and disadvantages of ministerial intervention in the management of the municipality?

6. What do you think should be done to improve the relationship between the ministry of local government and the Chitungwiza municipality to enhance effective service delivery?