The latter half of the 19th century witnessed large-scale emigration from the Indian sub-continent to lands across the seas. A large measure of this outpouring spilt itself into eastern and southern Africa. The two key areas affected were East Africa and South Africa. Rhodesia was very much a state in the South African orbit and was deeply influenced by the Indian influx into Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape Colony. This 19th century exodus was not by any means the only manifestation of India's relationship with the eastern seaboard and interior territories of Africa. Evidence of this relationship stretches back to the beginnings of the Christian era and, to a very great extent, concerns the land now called Rhodesia. The evidence consists of some archaeological material of Indian manufacture unearthed at various sites in Rhodesia.

The evidence unravelled so far is not very conclusive but makes for interesting speculation. The most reliable authority for these early Indian links with Rhodesia is Roger Summers. He bases his theories about the Indian connection on his thorough study of ancient mining methods in Rhodesia as well as on a few archaeological discoveries. He argues that the history of ancient mining in Rhodesia has been a record of systematic exploitation; consequently, 'it seems unreasonable to consider ancient Rhodesian mining as having been locally evolved, rather must we expect to look abroad for its origins'. By means of a comparative examination of ancient mining in Zambia and Katanga, Northern Mozambique and Malawi, East Africa, Sudan and Egypt, and West Africa, Summers concludes that 'since it appears that Rhodesia owes very little, if anything, to African methods for its gold mining techniques, it is necessary to look further afield and to turn to overseas contacts'. Among these overseas models, Summers studies Arabian, Persian and Indian techniques, and it is in the Indian workings that he finds a great similarity to Rhodesian conditions: 'There are a large number of ancient workings all of them in the present state of Mysore, and they are so like Rhodesian workings that it is worthwhile examining them at length.' In addition to the similarity of mining techniques, Summers advances archaeological evidence, admittedly scanty, to support his Indian theory. These archaeological remains, consisting of three coins and a few pieces of Indian brassware, were found at D. Troop Mine and Sally Mine, the former being located on the Angwa River and the latter near Gwanda. The earliest of these coins has been dated back to the fourteenth century. The

2. Ibid., p.115.
3. Ibid., p.116
4. Ibid., p.116
5. Ibid., p.122
archaeological remains are valuable for postulating a more recent Indian connection but do not help much to solve the mysteries of the first millennium A.D. For this period, Summers relies on his comparative mining study as well as on speculation.

He admits that there is no direct evidence as to who the early prospectors in Rhodesia were or when they began their work, but we can deduce their identity. Since ancient Rhodesian mining methods differed from those used elsewhere in Africa but were very close to those used in Southern India, we may postulate a connection. Indian mining was, however, more efficient than Rhodesian, and it began to decline after 300 A.D. Few, if any, mines were worked after 1000 A.D. whereas there was not much Rhodesian mining before 600-700 A.D. We may therefore conclude that Indian preceded Rhodesian mining and that it seems probable that Indian prospectors came to Rhodesia about the sixth or seventh century A.D. to find an alternative source of gold to the then rapidly diminishing ore reserves in Mysore.1

If Summers' theories are valid, then it can be argued that India's connection with Rhodesia has been a long, though often interrupted process stretching over just under two millennia. After the first millennium A.D., the next great period of Indian participation in the economic life of the country was during the Portuguese era, when Indians were again involved in mining. Towards the end of the 17th century an interesting incident apparently occurred in Dambarare. This Portuguese settlement was surprised and attacked by the then Changamire, Dorribo, and its 40-man garrison was destroyed. 'All European and Indian civilians living in the settlement were mercilessly hunted down and their bones subsequently ground up to be used as medicine by the witch-doctors.'2 These unfortunate Indians were presumably Goans. Most of these Indian visitors did not come independently but rather in the wake of Portuguese initiative.

It must be stated that even in the late 17th century the Indian presence was not always welcomed, especially when Indians seemed to be moving towards commercial preponderance. In 1678, for example, the Portuguese captain of Zimbabwe, Antonio Lobo da Silva, urged that Indian traders in his domain be deported and replaced by white Portuguese settlers.3 Indians were tolerated as long as they were useful, but the moment they threatened to become dominant and to deprive Europeans of trade and employment opportunities, calls were made for their expulsion or, at the least, restriction. This theme was to re-surface during Company rule.

The early Indian contacts with Rhodesia were based mainly on commercial intercourse and the need for Indian labour. The early Indians were predominantly transients who came in small numbers; this is what distinguishes them from the later 19th century movement, which evolved into Indian settlement. Although permanent Indian settlements may not have been consciously envisaged, they nevertheless matured. Tentative movements gradually crystallised into permanent settlements.

The motives for the 19th century Indian migration to Africa in general and Rhodesia in particular, were complex and varied. Poor economic

1. Ibid., p.151.
conditions and opportunities in village India, the hope of escaping from domestic and marital crises, the prospect of a higher standard of living in Africa, and, to a limited extent, the desire to expand business operations helped to prompt emigration from India. No universal dominant motive can adequately explain the exodus, and it is more likely that a combination of motives was involved. The establishment of Indian settlements all over the globe in the 19th century was 'prompted by a social and economic revolution in the western world, and helped by certain supporting factors in the Indian situation'. The revolution referred to was the abolition of slavery and the need for efficient, substitute labour in the plantations in the West Indies, the Indian Ocean and South Africa. India was capable of solving the labour shortage. The decline of handicraft industry caused by the introduction of machine-made cotton goods and the steep rise in population resulting from improved medical and sanitation facilities created a mass of unemployed particularly in Bengal and Madras, thereby precipitating emigration from those parts of India.

While it is relatively easy to assess the reasons for the 19th century outward movement from India, it is a much more complicated affair unscrambling the motives for Indian immigration to Rhodesia. There is a lack of evidence to suggest that the early Indians came to Rhodesia solely or even mainly with the intention of entering commerce. The simple fact is that they lacked the capital and know-how, although their cultural background, with its emphasis on planning for the future by saving today, furnished the Indians with the prerequisites for their later penetration of commerce. Dotson and Dotson believe that their motives for coming to Rhodesia were not apparently any different from those of other 'passenger Indians' coming to Africa. They came in the wake of commercial and employment opportunities created by European initiative. The most distinctive feature of the first Indian immigrants who came to Rhodesia mainly in the 1890s and 1900s is the almost total absence of the indentured class. Most of these Indians were "free Indians" from the Gujarat central region of western India and most have had direct ties of kinship, friendship and personal history with other passenger Indians in East and South Africa. Indians settled in South and East Africa earlier than in Central Africa and the former territories thus set the socio-cultural pattern for the latter. This raises the interesting question of Rhodesia's relationship to the Indian questions in East and South Africa. No comprehensive study has yet been made of inter-regional political, social and cultural links among the Indian communities settled in East, Central and South Africa, but, as will be shown later, Rhodesia's white and Indian leaders had close contacts with their respective counterparts in South Africa in the matter of 'Indian policy'. This factor clearly puts Rhodesia in the South African orbit.

The motives of the passenger Indians who came to South Africa were similar to those of the same class of Indians that came to Rhodesia. In Hilda Kuper's view, this migration was 'a selective process in which certain individuals and categories of people, reacting to specific pressures

3. Ibid., p.28. A 'passenger Indian' was one who emigrated to Africa of his own free will and at his own expense; the indentured Indian came to Africa as a contract labourer with provision for his repatriation at the expiry of his contract.
4. Ibid., p.28.
5. Ibid., p.28.
in their homeland, were induced to migrate by the promise of future rewards. Kuper's view differs from the Dotsons' in that she stresses more the negative incentives inherent in the Indian situation while the Dotsons stress the positive incentives arising from the "opening up" of Africa by European pioneers. Both views are valid and are applicable more or less in equal measure in any given situation. Hilda Kuper's "selective process" did not only apply in the decision to leave India; it applied also after the Indians landed in Africa. The Indians preferred to go where there were already established Indian communities. This would rule out Rhodesia as an attraction for Indian immigrants. Why then did Indians come to Rhodesia? The Dotsons believe that most of the Indians who eventually settled in Rhodesia would have gone to South Africa, if permitted to do so. It was as second best that they tried their luck in Rhodesia, a wild and inhospitable country but still open to them. Therefore Indian immigration to Rhodesia is dubbed as 'deflected immigration'.

The South African Indian frontier gradually moved northwards from Natal, through the Transvaal into the little known lands north of the Limpopo. The Indian advance into Rhodesia closely followed the progress of the Pioneer Column. Indians entered Rhodesia in two waves - one across the Limpopo and the other through Umtali. The trans-Limpopo route was important during the 1890s but was soon overtaken in importance by the Umtali route especially after the building of the Beira-Umtali rail connection in 1898. The completion of this line meant that immigrants disembarking at Beira could now travel safely and swiftly to any of the main centres of Rhodesia.

Yet, although the journey into Rhodesia was now made easier, it was not climaxed by a hospitable reception. The entry of Indians was greeted generally with fear, hostility and suspicion. Even before large numbers of Indians had set foot in the territory, the alarm of the Banyan menace was raised. One such alarm was sounded by the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce in 1895. The sound was echoed by the Bulawayo Chamber which passed a sympathetic resolution to the effect that the body request the Government to oppose as far as possible any application for trading licences by 'Banyans and Arabs' in the territory 'as they trafficked in the lower classes of trade and sent all the money they made out of the country'. The resolution further stated that the Banyans were of no good to the community whatever, and that every effort should be made to prohibit their immigration to and settlement in Rhodesia. The Bulawayo Chronicle backed up this view by describing the Indian as not 'an ornamental or beneficial member of the community'. He undersold his white counterpart in business, hoarded money and sent it to India, spent nothing in the country in which he had made his wealth and made no contribution to the strength of the state. The Indian's proportion of taxes was small and he lived on next to nothing. The newspaper concluded its argument with the hope 'that stringent legislation will be employed to keep them in their proper place, and not to let them overrun the country as they have done in Natal'. This stereotyped argument

2. Dotson and Dotson, p.34.
3. The word "Banyan" (which is the prevailing spelling of "Banian") when correctly used referred to a Hindoo (especially Gujarati) trader. Muslim traders were often called "Arabs". The more common tendency was to describe Indian traders generally as "Banyans".
was to be repeated over and over again in later years and formed in the minds of most Europeans the true image of the Indian. The Indians, unfortunately, suffered from a dearth of educational, financial, technical or institutional means to overcome such prejudice and propaganda, and it was in this unfavourable atmosphere that the Indian made his appearance on the Rhodesian scene.

It would be grossly unfair, however, to overemphasise the opposition to the Indian presence because there were times and circumstances in which Indians were regarded favourably, especially where their labour or services were in demand. For instance, in 1895, the Chairman of the Bulawayo Sanitary Board suggested that instead of employing a European to set up a nursery garden, the Board should consider employing an Asian, 'as he thought the work could be carried on just as well by a coolie, whom there would be no difficulty in getting'. A similar realistic attitude towards Asians was expressed in a press editorial which admitted that 'some Indians are good citizens as some whites are bad'. In one instance, it took a strike in the early 1890s by Indian market gardeners in the Salisbury area to make Europeans realise the value of the Indian presence. The strike was in protest against a £1 levy imposed by the Salisbury Sanitary Board on all garden plots on the banks of the Makabusi. The Indians, who cultivated most of these plots, refused to bring their vegetables to the Salisbury market. The strike did not last long, but the Indians successfully appealed to Cecil John Rhodes 'who insisted that the fee should be brought down lest they /the Indians/ should leave'. This incident supports the view that the Indian market gardener or craftsman was not so objectionable to Europeans as the "Kaffir Truck" trader.

The virulent rhetoric of the early white settlers tends to exaggerate the size of the "Indian problem". Reliable, comprehensive and analytical statistics showing the number, location and occupation of Indians settled in Rhodesia in the early 1890s are probably non-existent, and the only substitute is calculated guesswork; but some statistical evidence exists. For example, it was estimated that in 1895 about 20 huts had been erected in the "Coolie Location" in Bulawayo and that several other Indians had built huts on their garden plots. It is significant to note that the Indian presence in Bulawayo was felt so soon after the defeat of the Mobele state and the occupation of Bulawayo by the Pioneers. More exact figures on the numbers of Indians in Bulawayo at this time are not available, but it is highly likely that most of the early Bulawayo Indians were trans-Limpopo migrants, unlike many of the Salisbury Indians who entered by the Umzali route.

In the case of Salisbury, a reasonably detailed statistical analysis can be made based on the 1897 Salisbury census figures of Salisbury Asians. The 1897 census gives details of birthplace, age, occupation, sex, marital status, religious affiliation and nationality. The figures are presented in the form of tables under various headings. Altogether there were 49 Asians comprising 41 Indians, 4 Chinese and 4 Japanese. Of these 49, 43 were males and 6 females. Thirteen Indians, 10 males and 3 females returned their status as married. The 3 females were living with their

2. The Bulawayo Chronicle, 12.x.1895. Editorial entitled "The Impressionable Arab".
husbands, while the 10 married males were living away from their wives who were probably still in India awaiting the signal to come to Africa to join their spouses. The Salisbury Asians were characterised by two main features: The population was dominated by males and youth; there were only 5 Asians

**TABLE I**

Salisbury Asians in terms of numbers, age, nationality and marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX DISTRIBUTION</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>MARITAL STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Under 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No age given for two males.*

who were over 40 years of age. (See Table 1). They were the pioneers who were to open the way for later waves of immigrants. They felt the sting of European hostility more than their later compatriots, if only because their numbers were comparatively small and because their appearance at the beginnings of European settlement seemed to confirm the worst fears regarding the "Banyan menace". Although their numbers were small, they seemed to represent the vanguard of the Indian "invasion". The fear of being "swamped" was frequently expressed by European leaders and in press editorials.

Many authorities, notably Gann and Tanser, have encouraged the myth that most of Rhodesia's first Indians were traders; this is clearly not so. (See Table II) Tanser states that after the market gardeners' strike, a large number of Banyan traders moved into Salisbury and rigged up wooden and iron shelters on plots which they had bought near the town centre. The Gann-Tanser myth is exploded by Table II, which shows that there were in fact no Indians in commerce in Salisbury in 1897.

**TABLE II**

Occupational Analysis of Salisbury Asians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Gardeners</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhobies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not economically active</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes over...*
The overwhelming majority of Indians were market gardeners, followed by an equal number of dhobies (washermen) and cooks. The fear of brown traders was baseless and the result of information, statistical and hearsay, emanating from South Africa and East Africa, and of built-in prejudice against the presence of "men of colour". Most of the Pioneers were imbued with South African racial attitudes and their importance must not be underestimated 'since there exists at the level of popular culture a whole complex of anti-Indian sentiment which must be seen as simply a cultural import from South or East Africa'. Despite this hostility towards Indians, their presence was tolerated because of their usefulness to the community. Tanser acknowledges that most of the vegetable-growing in Salisbury in the 1890s was becoming 'almost wholly Indian'. The services rendered to the community by the market gardeners, laundrymen and cooks were appreciated although the fact of dependence on the Indians was resented.

So far our statistical analysis has concerned itself mainly with the external factors impinging on the Indian presence; it is now necessary to examine closely the internal composition of the Indian community and take note of the heterogeneous and homogeneous factors governing the "community" in 1897. The word "community" is used very loosely to describe that aggregation of peoples of Indian origin who lived in Salisbury at this time. The two main distinctions within the community were based on birthplace and religious affiliation (see Tables III and IV).

**Table III**

Analysis of Origin by Birthplace and Number

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOUTHERN INDIA</th>
<th>WESTERN INDIA</th>
<th>EASTERN INDIA</th>
<th>NORTHERN INDIA</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>UNSPECIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9  (Madras)</td>
<td>6  (Surat)</td>
<td>5  (Calcutta)</td>
<td>1  (Peshawar)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  (Nellore)</td>
<td>3  (Bombay)</td>
<td>2  (Benares)</td>
<td>1  (Lucknow)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  (Tranquebar)</td>
<td>2  (St. Thomas Monastery)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  (Coimbatore)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  (Chidambaram)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 15  11  7  2  4  4  4  4

Notes from p.6

1. See C 2/1/1 Census; Salisbury Municipality, 1.xi.1897.

1. Dotson and Dotson, p.29.
2. Tanser, p.135.
TABLE IV

Religious Affiliations of Indians Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Moslems</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Salisbury Indians represented a variety of regional origins and religious beliefs.

A majority of Indians were Southern Indians, and this is a very significant and interesting fact. It has been the general view, held by many authorities as well as by the present-day community, that the Western Indian was by far numerically dominant within the Indian community. The statistics (see Table III) clearly shatter this myth. The Southern Indians, or "Madrasis" as they are commonly called, were not only numerically but also politically pre-eminent especially in Bulawayo. The next most important group within the community were the Gujarati-speaking Indians from Western India: the members of this group later dominated the community in size, wealth and political importance. They formed the nucleus of the subsequent large influx of Gujarati-speakers, one of whom was the educated and wealthy Bhimjee R. Naik. The Eastern and Northern Indians were comparatively small in number, as were those from South Africa, and they integrated freely with the rest of the community.

A sense of group consciousness affected the Indians in different degrees. It was probably strongest among the 9 Indians, all Hindus, who came from Madras, the 6 Hindus who came from Surat and 4 Moslems who came from Calcutta. It must be made clear that despite their obvious regional, linguistic and religious differences, the early Indians, like any other small frontier community, felt the need for co-operation and mutual assistance. This is shown by how Indians from varying regional and religious backgrounds roomed together. In one household, there were 3 from Western India and 2 from Southern India; in another, a Moslem from Western India lived with a Hindu also from Southern India. The unfavourable atmosphere created by prevailing anti-Indian prejudice assisted the process of unification of the Indian community. Despite their strong centripetal inclinations, the early Indians realised one thing - that in the eyes of their European rulers and fellow-citizens, they were regarded collectively and individually as Indians.

Legally, the immigration of Indians to Rhodesia did not become a subject of legislation until 1901 when the Immigration Ordinance of that year sought to provide for and regulate the entry of indentured labourers from India. This law did not, however, in any way affect the immigration of passenger Indians. The 1901 Ordinance was in response to the pressing demand for labour for the mines, which could not be met by local and other African sources. Rhodesian Africans were reluctant to work in the mines and local employers had to face stiff competition for Southern African labour from the Rand mines. The position was worsened when in 1903 the Company failed to impose an effective poll tax. In 1900 the decision was taken,

1. Ibid.
2. Including Dotson and Dotson; see p.38.
3. For example, a leading member of the Bulawayo Indian community in the 1910s was M.S. Pillay. Also, out of the 24 Indian market gardeners in Salisbury, 10 were Southern Indians and 8 from Western India.
after strong pressure from the mining companies such as Globe and Phoenix, to import Asian labourers to Rhodesia. An Ordinance was thereupon framed to regulate the conditions of importation and employment of Asian labour.

First preference was to be given to the importation of Chinese and Japanese labour, but, failing this, an attempt would be made to get Indian workers. Labour from China and Japan could be obtained more easily than from India, in whose case the watchful eye of the Indian Government and of the Secretary of State for India, with their responsibility for guaranteeing equal status for Indian subjects with other British subjects, raised delicate problems for the Rhodesian Administration. Labour from India or any British Dependency could not be procured without the consent of the Secretary of State for the Colonies or Governor or Chief Executive of such Colony or Dependency. Unfortunately for the Rhodesian Administration, the Indian Government was not satisfied with the safeguards in the 1901 Ordinance.

The question of importing Indian labour dragged on into 1905, but the Indian Government was adamant that 'fair treatment' of His Majesty's Indian subjects was not safeguarded by Rhodesian legislation. The Indian Government's caution was justified by the promulgation of the 1903 Immigration Restriction Ordinance, which was evidently aimed at reducing the flow of passenger Indians by providing for a language and means test; Indian languages were not recognised for the purposes of the Ordinance. This Ordinance seriously weakened the Administration's case for the importation of Indian labour. The Indian Government insisted that all Indians, and not only indentured labourers, should be permitted to enter Rhodesia on terms equal to those of other (i.e. European) immigrants. It asked for the literacy test to be amended so as to include Indian languages. In the following year, the Indian Government's attitude hardened even further. The India Office warned that the planned Trade Licensing Ordinance, which was similar to the Natal Dealers' Licences Act of 1897, would make it 'impossible' to expect the Indian Government to agree to labour importation to Rhodesia. It was obvious that the Indian Government, working through the India and Colonial Offices in London, was determined to protect the rights not only of indentured Indians but also of "free" Indians: in the eyes of the Indian Government the two issues were inseparable. All Indians leaving British India were British subjects and therefore entitled to full and equal treatment. In addition, the Indian Government was using the indentured Indian question as a bargaining counter to improve the status of the passenger Indians. The attempt to provide for the importation of indentured workers while simultaneously trying to restrict passenger Indian immigration was seen as inconsistent. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, stated his Government's views: 'The most effectual security for emigrants from India to any other country lies in the constant flow of persons backward and forward between the two countries, which ensures to the classes from which emigrants are drawn a knowledge of the conditions of labour across the sea, and provides an automatic safeguard in the diminution or cessation of supply which follows if these conditions are found to be unsatisfactory.'

1. See A 11/2/8/5, Various Mining Companies to Administrator, 23.iii.1900.
2. See Immigration Ordinance, No.18 of 1901.
4. In 1902 another law was passed. See Immigration Ordinance Amendment Ordinance, No.3 of 1902.
5. See Immigration Restriction Ordinance, No.10 of 1903.
7. See A 11/2/8/8, India Office to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 20.i.1904.
In Curzon's view, then, it was useful and necessary not to cut off the contact between India and the overseas Indians; this contact was best maintained by the unhindered passage of passenger Indians to and from India. The passenger Indians would be 'the eyes and ears' of the indentured Indians. Curzon's view was fully supported by the India Office. In response to a question in the House of Commons, John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, stated that 'the objection of the Government of India to allowing labourers to be recruited in India for labour (not specially labour in mines) in Rhodesia turned not upon the terms of the contract for coolie labour, but more generally upon the disabilities under which other British Indian subjects laboured, and in particular upon the imposition of the literacy test on immigrants, including those acquainted with an Asiatic language'.

Again, the issues of indentured and free Indians were closely linked. Milton's denial of the Indian Government's statements was not enough to allay that Government's fears and suspicions regarding the intentions of the Rhodesian Administration. His position is understandable. He was under settler pressure to introduce Indian labour only under carefully controlled conditions while at the same time to close the door on the immigration of free Indians. For example, in 1903 the Land and Farmers' Association passed a resolution to the effect that the Association 'is distinctly opposed to the introduction of Chinese or Asias under special legislation for their deportation on expiry of service'. The Bulawayo Chronicle advocated the importation of Asian labour on condition that it was made impossible for these Asians, on the completion of their contract, to enter civil or commercial life.

In line with this view, the settlers preferred the importation of Chinese to that of Indian labour on the ground that the Indian, being a British subject, could not be tied down and would 'soon desert the pick and drill for the bench or trowel'. Only gradually and in response to the pressing nature of the labour shortage did the opposition to the introduction of Indian labour diminish slightly. This changing attitude was summed up by a press editorial which conceded that 'it does not matter where they come from provided they are deported at the end of their term and ease the labour market'. Hostility towards the importation of Indians abated as the labour shortage worsened and the difficulties of getting Chinese labour, arising largely from the Chinese labour scandal in the Transvaal at this time, improved the acceptability of the Indian worker, despite all the problems that that would create. The great stumbling-block to the obtaining of Indian labour was still there - the firm opposition of the Indian Government, which insisted on full and equal rights for all Indian immigrants. The Rhodesian Administration's rejection of this demand prevented agreement. Eventually, the Administration solved the labour problem by following the advice of Sir James Marshal Clarke, the Resident Commissioner, who opposed the introduction of Asians, arguing that the situation would improve as the railway moved beyond the Zambezi and Africans in the Northern territories became accustomed to mining. Clarke had strong opinions on the Asian

3. See A 11/2/8/8, Milton to Secretary, B.S.A.C., 5.viii.1903.
9. Gann, p.178; see RC 2/4/4, Marshal Clarke to H.C., 7.i.1904.
labour and immigration question. He argued 'that however the experiment of importing Indian labour is commenced, if successful, it must in the long run involve the introduction of large numbers of Asiatics not only for employment in the mines but to meet the demands of employers in other branches of industry, and will subject the aboriginal native to unfair competition with alien races so specially gifted with the qualities of frugality, thrift and staying power as to make them formidable competitors of white men'. He further contended that as the indentures would last for a few years it would be 'impossible to maintain in content a large industrial army of foreign mercenaries without camp followers of their own race; it seems equally impossible to confine by legislative enactments these camp followers to only providing for the requirements of their own people'. Clarke’s arguments won the day. In 1903 the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau was set up by the Government and had great success recruiting labour from Northern Rhodesia.

As the prospect of obtaining labour from India waned, so did the attitudes towards free Indian immigration harden with calls being made for the exclusion of "undesirable" immigrants. There was now a marked growth in anti-Indian feeling. Publicly, the dangers of Indian immigration were proclaimed through every available media and at every available opportunity, but numerically the Indian community was so small that when the 1904 census was taken and a decision had to be made as to whether to combine or separate the figures for Asians and Coloureds, the statistician commented that 'as the numbers are so small the statistics are not of much value'. Table V shows the total distribution of Asians throughout Rhodesia by province and sex in 1901.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISTRIBUTION OF ASIANS BY PROVINCE AND SEX IN 1901</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MALES</th>
<th>FEMALES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASHONELAND</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATABELELAND</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most striking feature in Table V is the extraordinarily high total of females in Matabeleland. The figure of 290 is clearly an over-estimation. In their more detailed summaries, the censors estimated quite unrealistically that there were 283 females in the township of Bulawayo alone, with 180 over 16 years of age and 103 under 16 years of age. These figures are belied by the 1911 report which, in giving comparative reports for 1904 and 1911, states that in 1904 there were 64 females in the whole of Rhodesia. (See Table VI)

1. Gann, p.178; see RC 2/4/4, Marshal Clarke to H.C., 7.1.1904.
2. Ibid., p.179.
4. See C 1/1/1, Statistician to Chief Secretary, 28.ii.1904.
TABLE VI

COMPARATIVE POPULATION FIGURES OF INDIANS AND CHINESE
FOR THE YEARS 1904, 1907 AND 1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1904</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INDIANS</td>
<td>CHINESE</td>
<td>INDIANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALES</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMALES</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is incredible that the number of females in Rhodesia dropped from 300 in 1901 to 64 in 1904, making 236 females unaccountable. Something clearly went wrong with the 1901 census and there is no evidence that the censors were exaggerating the figures so as to highlight the Indian menace.

Another notable feature of the census figures is the preponderance of the males which led the censors to conclude in 1911 that 'it would seem that the Asiatic population does not incline towards family life in Rhodesia' and that a large proportion of menfolk were supporting families elsewhere, 'consequently a relatively small percentage of the profits earned by Indians and Chinese is circulated in Rhodesia'. There is only superficial justification for these statements because the censors failed to appreciate that, given the right conditions, the eventual goal of most immigrants was to call in their wives and families from India; before this could be done, the Indians had to assure themselves that Rhodesia was a safe and permanent abode for Indian settlement. The threat of immigration, trading and employment restrictions was no inducement to the rooting process. In the meantime, the Indians had to support their families, and so part of their earnings was bound to be exported.

The censors were also unfair in their assessment of the Indians' educational standards. Literacy was judged purely in terms of European linguistic criteria and Indians were described as 'the most illiterate class' though the censors admitted that 'a certain number able to read and write their own, but not the English language, were set down as uneducated'. The refusal of the authorities to recognise literacy in an Indian language as valid for purposes of the 1903 Immigration Restriction Ordinance was to cause great resentment amongst the Indian community and fed the feeling that they were living in an unfriendly environment.

Occupationally, 10 Indians were classified as 'professionals' doing work as billiard markers, jockeys and jugglers. Males in domestic

1. Ibid. The figures on which Table VI is based were given in the 1911 census report; it is a more credible Report.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
service worked mostly as waiters, stewards and laundrymen, and female domestic servants worked as cooks, nursemaids and general servants. The commercial category embraced storekeepers, traders and hawkers; the market gardeners and fruit-sellers fell in the "Agriculture" class while under the industrial category there were bootmakers and tailors. The various occupational categories mentioned encompass all Asians and Coloureds, and no exclusive or detailed figures are given for Indians, Chinese and Coloureds. This rules out a thorough and accurate occupational study of Indians and the only substitute at the moment is an appraisal in very general terms of the combined figures. (See Table VII)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORIES OF OCCUPATION</th>
<th>MALES</th>
<th>FEMALES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-productive or Dependants</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>1456</strong></td>
<td><strong>655</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures show the diversity of the employment pattern and the importance of domestic, commercial and agricultural pursuits. The fact that the commercial category is second in importance after the domestic does not justify the fears of a "Banyan" invasion. Occupationally, the Indians were well spread out and far from being an economic threat to the whites, they were playing a useful role in the early development of the country by offering their labour as waiters, laundrymen and domestic servants, and their services as market gardeners and hawkers. Only a minority, albeit a substantial one, were shopkeepers, although later generations of Indians manoeuvred increasingly into commerce; this was largely because of the lack of other outlets rather than of a pre-disposition towards a commercial life.  

Statistically, therefore, the Indians were not in a position, even if they had wished to do so, to dominate the economic life of the country, but this did not prevent settler demands for immigration restrictions against Indians. The 1903 Immigration Restriction Ordinance was a victory for the settlers for although it did not achieve total exclusion, it laid down stringent entry requirements based on educational and income qualifications. In practice, the law severely limited the flow of Indian immigrants. Very few Indians could pass the literacy test. In fact, the Indian population dropped from 793 in 1901 to 703 in 1904. (See Tables V and VI). The Company was not, however, pleased with the 1903 Ordinance: it wanted to

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
satisfy Indian Government requirements in order to secure Indian labour, but once the Company succumbed to strong settler pressure the possibility of importing Indian labour diminished and, with it, the need to be oversensitive to Indian Government opinion.

This is not to suggest that opinion in India over Indian immigration restrictions could be totally ignored. Rhodesia was very much a British territory under close Colonial Office scrutiny, and so Imperial considerations could not easily be brushed aside as was to be witnessed later. In some official quarters it was recognised that overseas Indians had a just claim to civic rights and fair treatment. Milner, the High Commissioner, outlined his view in a speech to the Municipal Congress in Johannesburg on 18 May 1903. He adopted Rhodes' dictum that civilisation and not colour ought to be the test of fitness for civic rights. Milner advised that whatever measures might be found necessary to restrict an indiscriminate influx of Asian traders and settlers, the opposition to such immigration ought to be based on strong social and economic grounds and not on the weak ground of skin pigmentation. 'It is not a question of colour, it is a question of civilisation and it has a material bearing upon the position of Asiatics already here. How can we hope to be regarded as anything but blindly hostile to men of colour, if we are going to deny to the most educated and civilised Asiatic who may be already established amongst us, if we are going to deny him - I don't say political rights; again, it is not a question of political rights - all the other privileges which civilised men enjoy?'

Milner's view was very realistic but contains one basic flaw: he expected that if his suggestion was followed Indians would enjoy all other rights without being able to guarantee those other rights by the only possible means, which were the enjoyment of political rights. The Indians were to be at the mercy of the white settlers and would be unable to do much if their "privileges" were taken away. Admittedly, Milner was trying to be as pragmatic as possible within the Southern African context. He queried whether it was 'justifiable to denounce Asiatics as Asiatics, and to take the view that all of them, whatever their degree of civilisation, must be unwelcome here, or, if they come here, should be treated as niggers'. It is difficult to estimate whether Milner's attitude was governed more by practical (Imperial) considerations or by moral considerations. He was probably trying to formulate a broad-based policy statement with the hope of influencing 'other discussions in other Assemblies' on the Asian question.

It is not easy to assess the impact of Milner's speech although it is worth noting that the terms of the 1904 Immigration Restriction Ordinance ran parallel to Milner's ideas. The Ordinance made no specific reference to "Indian" or "Asiatic" but indeed was couched in non-racial terms. More important in influencing legislation in Rhodesia than Milner's statement were the developments in South Africa and elsewhere regarding Indian immigration; these events had a large bearing on the treatment of the Indian question in Rhodesia. As has been stated earlier, a substantial number of Indians immigrated to Rhodesia in the wake of the indentured and passenger immigrants who came to South Africa. Quite clearly, Rhodesian immigration policy as affecting Indians cannot be properly examined without reference to South African policy. Rhodesian immigration legislation was often modelled on statutes embodied in Cape, Natal and Transvaal law. This was especially

1. See 1926 Census Report, which states that 515 out of 973 economically active Indians were in commerce or commercial service.
so in the 1900s. The settlers were well informed about policy and developmental trends in South Africa through the medium of newspaper reports, especially those dealing with Gandhi’s agitation in the Transvaal in defence of Indian claims. The Rhodesian and the various South African Governments co-operated closely over the question of immigration; in fact, Indian immigration was one of the few issues on which all Southern African Governments saw eye to eye, differing only in degree of strictness. This inter-relationship at governmental level was reflected in the Indian response to official policy. Rhodesian Indian leaders, notably Phimjee R. Naik, probably maintained contact with Gandhi especially over the 1908 Asiatics Ordinance.

Rhodesia was regularly invited to inter-colonial conferences held in South Africa, at which common problems were discussed and resolutions carried. In 1903 the Board of Directors of the British South Africa Company in Cape Town directed the Rhodesian Administrator, Milton, to instruct the Rhodesian representatives at the Inter-Colonial Conference of 1903 in Bloemfontein to support the importation of Asian labourers if the unanimous vote of the Conference was in favour of it. The Conference had been called 'to consider the question of native legislation and the treatment of Asians'. Since the Colonial Office attached much importance to the outcome of the Conference, the Company was careful to stress to the Rhodesian representatives the need for a concerted stand by all southern African Governments. In the Company's view the Rhodesian Government ought not to have followed a distinctly different policy from that of its South African counterparts on Asian questions.

Even on the question of the choice between Chinese and Indian labour, Rhodesian views were influenced by feeling in South Africa. Thus the Company Board in London advised that 'public sentiment both in South Africa and in England would be less hostile to the employment of British Indians than to any other class of Asiatic labour'. This view was supported in a resolution carried by a public meeting in Salisbury on 10th December 1903, urging legislation to prevent the entry into Rhodesia of any Asian other than a British subject. The term "British Asian" would embrace mainly British Indians. The Bulawayo Chamber of Mines in a resolution passed in March 1903, also expressed preference for British Indian labour to "alien Asiatic" labour. The problems created in the South African states over the employment of Chinese labour were beginning to be appreciated in Rhodesia. Trends in South Africa affected developments in Rhodesia.

Events in the Transvaal in 1907 clearly had some impact on settler thinking in Rhodesia. The Indian resistance campaign led by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi against the registration laws in the Transvaal was widely reported in the Rhodesian press, which itself took a very hard line on the Indian immigration question. No special concessions could be made in the treatment of Indian immigrants, either labourers or merchants, to South Africa, where the colour question was quite complicated already. Indians immigrating to South Africa were told quite bluntly that 'they must do so on such terms as suit the views only of the white residents of South Africa'. Widespread support was expressed for restrictions on Asian immigration. Sir Albert Hime, a former Prime Minister of Natal, said in London in 1908 that he understood that the British South Africa Company favoured restrictions and added that the whole of South Africa sympathised with the way the Transvaal was handling Indian immigration.

1. See A 11/2/8/8, BSAC, Cape Town, to Administrator, 18.iii.1903.
4. See A 11/2/8/8, Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, 11.xii.1903.
For Southern Africa, the Indian immigration question was a burning issue in 1908, most of the heat emanating from the intense controversy in the Transvaal. It was also a time when some prominent personalities suggested grandiose, long-term solutions of the 'Indian problem'. Churchill, on his return from his African journey, addressed a London dinner in his honour. He proposed that equatorial Africa would supply a 'compensating field' for Indians. He regarded East Africa as the African homeland of Indian emigrants and envisaged the evolution of East Africa into a 'granddaughter state' of India. This would relieve the difficulties of both South Africa and Rhodesia in disposing of new Indian immigrants. He did not go so far as to suggest expatriation of all overseas Indians to East Africa; all he was looking for was an effective pressure-relief mechanism. Although Churchill's idea was praised as 'eminently sensible', it was just not within the realms of practical politics. Apart from the obvious difficulties, the nationalists in India, backed by the Indian Government, insisted on the free movement of all British Indians to all parts of the Empire.

Indian opinion viewed the whole overseas Indian question from the moral and legal angles. It was argued that all British citizens, regardless of colour, were entitled to the full rights of British citizenship. If these rights were to be granted selectively, especially on a basis of racial favouritism, then the very foundations of the British Empire were endangered, and sooner or later the Empire as an association of free and equal individuals and nations would not stand the test of time. At the meeting of the Indian National Congress in December 1906 a resolution on the Transvaal Indian question was passed which declared its indignation at the 'degrading' restrictions placed on Indians in the colonies generally, and stated that 'such a policy is fraught with serious danger to the best interests of the Empire'. The seconder of the resolution, H.A. Vadia of Rajkot, decried 'this new principle of imperialism that the white man has a sort of "divine right" to rule over the coloured man. We must say, and say in no equivocal terms that this principle is abhorrent to us, Indians, and that it is abhorrent to God's own laws. It is a principle which has degraded the white man in the beginning, it will dismember and disintegrate and destroy the empire itself in the end. /Hear, hear/.' Feelings regarding the overseas Indian question ran very high. Nationalist opinion would brook no exceptions to the moral-legal basis of its argument. The Imperial Government was sensitive to nationalist opinion and did its best to pacify emotions in India.

Although the nationalists were concerned mainly with the Indian questions in East and South Africa, where there were sizeable Indian populations amidst large white communities, the fact that the Indian leaders viewed the question from an Imperial-international standpoint meant that Rhodesia, though a very junior member of the Empire, could not ignore the logic and implications of the nationalist argument. Rhodesia's close relationship with the rest of Southern Africa involved her, no matter how indirectly, in the South African Indian controversy. Most of Rhodesia's white Pioneers originated from or were nurtured in South Africa and imbued much of the racial outlook and prejudice of their South African background. Although Rhodesia had a strong British flavour because of the large English

/notes contd. from previous page:

5. See A 11/2/8/8, Chief Secretary, Salisbury, to Private Secretary, Administrator (Bloemfontein), 14.i.1903.
element in its white population, its racial outlook at this time differed only in degree from that prevailing south of the Limpopo. An editorial in *The Bulawayo Chronicle* pointed to this similarity in approach: 'If the different States [of Southern Africa] are today thoroughly united and agreed on any single question, it is in the conviction, common to them all, that a severe restriction must be put upon Asiatic immigration and competition.'

The 1908 elections for the Legislative Council gave Rhodesian politicians a chance to air their views on Indian immigration. Some of these men were more cautious and realistic in their outlook than their electorate. They appreciated the limitations on their power to restrict Indian immigration; at the same time they could not altogether resist pressures from below. Robert A. Fletcher, at an election meeting at Paynton in support of his candidacy, replied to a question as to whether he favoured a reduction and restriction on Asian immigration in moderate terms: 'We must be careful not to do anything that is unfair. We cannot take away, in this case, what has been given in the past. As long as the Imperial Government have control here it is absolutely useless tackling that question. But what I intend to do is to urge the Government to follow the footsteps of the other responsible governments of South Africa, particularly that of the Transvaal [applause].' To Fletcher, as to other politicians, the Imperial element was seen as the biggest stumbling-block to tough anti-Indian measures.

Gordon S. Forbes, another famous Rhodesian politician, rationalised the settler case for circumscribing Asian immigration. He argued that the preservation of the white race in Rhodesia necessitated such legislation and that some protective steps were needed immediately. He did not suggest that injustice be done to those Indians already in the country. He believed firmly that every Asian should be compelled to register; by such registration no hardship would be inflicted on anybody. Regarding the Imperial stand that Indians were British subjects and as such entitled to full British rights, Forbes thought that Rhodesian whites were quite justified in replying that when the Imperial Government allowed the natives of India to elect their own representatives to the Governing Council of India, it would be time for white Rhodesians to consider the advisability of allowing Indians a say in Imperial political affairs. In Forbes' view, that time had not yet arrived. A similar, tough line was proposed by Charles P. Coghlan, a leading Rhodesian politician, who agreed with the view that 'drastic legislation was necessary to restrict Asiatic immigration'.

Coghlan and Forbes adopted a tougher stance than Fletcher on the Indian immigration question. The former were merely articulating the views generally held by the white artisans and businessmen, who were united in their desire for immigration controls. The artisans, for instance, were becoming increasingly alarmed at the number of Indians employed as engine-drivers in the mines. At an election meeting held by Forbes, artisan spokesmen asked pointed questions as to whether Forbes favoured the employment of "Coolies" as engine-drivers. He replied rather to the disappointment of his questioner that he would advocate legislation demanding that all engine-drivers must possess certificates of qualification.

Mercantile opposition to the presence and continuing inflow of Indians was voiced by William H. Haddon, the newly-elected President of the Bulawayo Chamber of Commerce, in April 1908, when he stated that there was 'one thing which they had to make a feature of in their work in the ensuing year, and he should do all that he could to facilitate a solution of the problem. That was in regard to the Asiatic question.' It was essential to restrict the influx of Asians into Rhodesia and also regulate the trading of those already in the country. The Asian trader had ousted the white man from Maceque and had a good footing in Salisbury 'and he would be in Bulawayo if they were not careful'. Haddon's statement linked the questions of Asian trading and immigration. His warning that Asian traders would soon be in Bulawayo 'if they were not careful' is an implied admission that, in the case of Bulawayo at least, the Asian trader was not yet a threat. Haddon was contemplating prophylactic legislation in the form of restriction of Asian immigration generally: if the Asians could not be totally prevented from making further inroads into commerce, they could at least be limited in overall numbers; this limitation would lessen the Asian impact in succeeding years. Haddon, who had also been a member of the Legislative Council in 1907, was in favour of a law similar to that of the Transvaal to control 'the pressure of the undesirable alien'.

Despite the pressures that had been building up over the years, the Administration was not to be precipitated into action. Francis J. Newton, the Treasurer, stated the Administration's case in the Legislative Council in 1907. He believed that the Council saw 'with a single view on this matter' but that the Government wished to see how the other states in Southern Africa dealt with the matter, especially the Transvaal, 'which was in rather great straits upon the subject, and then come into conformity'. The Treasurer noted that the Secretary of State had ratified the Transvaal legislation only a week before the Rhodesian Legislative Council met. Newton assured the House that the Administration felt obliged to deal with the subject at the next session of the Council, and advised that although it was 'a very difficult subject', they would have 'the example of the Transvaal and very possibly the Orange River Colony in legislating this time next year'. Then, in the following year, the promised legislation was introduced to the Legislative Council, Clarkson H. Tredgold, the Attorney General, remarked that 'he had a subject to deal with of considerable delicacy and fraught with some danger if not properly handled'. It is important to notice the sound of caution in the approach of both Newton and Tredgold, who, as leading members of the Administration, were heedful of Imperial considerations. Truly, the Imperial factor was the great umbrella that cast its mighty protective shadow over the whole racial decision-making process in Rhodesia.

Once the Asiatics Ordinance 1908 was introduced it galvanised the Indian leaders into political activity, which aimed at securing the repeal or at least drastic modification of the Ordinance. The publication of the draft Ordinance gave reality to Indian fears of immigration control and economic confinement. The local and Empire-wide agitation against the draft Ordinance dragged Rhodesia into the Imperial arena of the Indian immigration controversy. The fact that Rhodesia, unlike the states of South Africa, was not a self-governing colony left the Rhodesian Ordinance wide open to the Imperial assault.

The draft 1908 Asiatics Ordinance was based on similar Transvaal legislation and was supported by the High Commissioner, Lord Selborne. The objects of the legislation were proclaimed as 'an Ordinance to restrict the Immigration of Asiatics into this Territory, and to provide for the Registration of such Asiatics as are already resident therein'. The Ordinance was to apply not only to Indians but 'to any of the native races of Asia, including the so-called Coolies, Arabs, Malays, and Mohammedan subjects of the Turkish dominions'. Asian entry and residence in Rhodesia was to be controlled by a system of registration whereby each Asian resident above 16 years of age and Asian guardians of minors were required to possess on their persons at all times a Registration Certificate issued by the Registrar of Asiatics, the kingpin of the whole registration and immigration system. Heavy penalties including stiff fines and long terms of imprisonment were provided for defaulters, and the ultimate weapon in the Government's hands was the power of expulsion. For example, a person who failed to turn in a lost Registration Certificate to the authorities could be fined up to £50.

The registration system was to be used not only to control Asians already in the country but also amongst other things to give the Administrator discretionary power over intending Indian immigrants. He was authorised to issue a Registration Certificate to permit any Asian to enter and reside in Rhodesia. Except for this loophole, further Indian immigration was specifically prohibited in terms of Section Three. Equally significant for the Indians was the provision that all Asians temporarily absent from Rhodesia, and who immediately prior to their departure resided in the country for a continuous period of three years and would have returned to Rhodesia within 12 months of the promulgation of the Ordinance, were entitled to a Registration Certificate. It was clearly laid down that 'the fact of such previous residence shall be proved to the satisfaction of the Registrar'. It will be noticed that the successful operation of the Ordinance hinged on the system of registration.

Indian reaction to the immigration laws and regulations in general and to the 1908 Ordinance in particular manifested itself throughout 1908. Indian leaders had been in contact with the Administration since April of that year. They objected to the Ordinance not so much because it aimed at severely reducing further Indian immigration but more because the Ordinance seemed to offend the dignity of Asians. In the Indian view, the Ordinance also undermined their security. They objected to two main features of the Ordinance: firstly, they vigorously opposed the indignity of registration involving as it did the provision of fingerprint; secondly, they objected to the wide discretionary powers regarding the registration of returning Asian residents.

Regarding this second point, they were particularly indignant that Indians going to India were not given certificates 'of some kind' when departing for India. The prominent Indian leader, Bhimjee R. Naik, claimed that the Government had given an assurance to this effect at a meeting between the Administrator and an Indian deputation on 29 April 1908. Such a certificate would have enabled returning Indian residents to prove their previous residence, as was to be required by the new Ordinance. At that meeting between the all-Indian deputation headed by Naik (and including

2. See The Asiatic Ordinance, 1908, No. 4 of 1908.
3. Ibid., section 2.
4. Ibid., section 12.
5. Ibid., section 8.
6. See A 11/2/18/30, Bhimjee R. Naik to Administrator, 18.v.1908.
Indian leaders from Gwelo, Selukwe, Salisbury and Umtali) and the Administrator, Naik had complained that no certificates were issued to departing residents with the result that they were 'unable in many cases to furnish the necessary proof on their return of previous residence in Southern Rhodesia'. Naik cited the case of Ibrahim Hasim, the manager of an Indian import firm in Umtali, who was being refused 'a mere domiciled certificate' before his departure for India. He appealed to the Administration to regulate the law in such a way as would 'save my community from unnecessary hardships and in many cases economical losses'. He claimed that the immigration laws of other colonies gave full rights to domiciled persons.

The April meeting, which was a month before the draft 1908 Ordinance was published, was occasion for a full discussion of existing immigration policy, and Naik as well as the other leaders had sensed that immigration exclusion was in the offing. Naik stated that the Indians were well aware that 'there was some prejudice against them, and sooner or later immigration would be stopped'. He declared that Indians were not happy with the extraordinary stringency with which employment and educational tests were applied to Indians. Naik conceded that the Indians 'did not wish to see an influx of Asiatics without any semblance of control, but they thought the present regulations somewhat harsh, and hoped they would not be too rigidly enforced. They recognised that such measures were necessary to the Transvaal, but thought the time had not yet come for them to be brought into force in Rhodesia'. Naik was anticipating new, tough laws and regulations, but he probably underestimated their far-reaching possibilities.

In view of the various assurances given to the Asian deputation in April that 'the law here is no more restrictive or oppressive than in the Cape Colony', the 1908 Asiatics Ordinance came as a severe shock to the Indian community. It was not now a question of challenging the rigid application of the overtly non-racial language and employment tests but of confronting legislation that was explicitly anti-Indian in content. The criteria for entry and residence were no longer based on educational and economic qualifications applicable to all, but on racial considerations. The earlier differentiation between 'the intellectual Indian and the humble coolie', a distinction drawn by Lord Milner in a speech to the Royal Colonial Institute in London, was now overshadowed by the possibility of total exclusion.

The Indian community reacted promptly to the publication of the Ordinance. In June 1908 the British Indian Association of Southern Rhodesia submitted a petition to the Legislative Council protesting against the Asiatics Ordinance. It complained that the Bill was 'calculated to provoke intense bitterness and irritation' among the Indian community 'and to wound its susceptibilities to an extent which it is difficult to gauge'. The Ordinance was 'a complete reversal' of the principles and statements governing British Imperial policy. Far from conferring any privileges upon

2. See A 11/2/18/30. B.R. Naik to Administrator, 18.v.1908.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
the Indians the Bill 'robs them of many primary ones that they already possess, and this too, in a manner which ... puts an unnecessary affront upon British Indian Settlers in Rhodesia'. It deplored the 'arbitrary power' given to the Registrar of Asiatics over the actions and movements of all resident Indians. This particular complaint is justified because too much power was vested in one official. For example, Section Eight provided that all Asians whose guardians had failed to register them on their sixteenth birthday would have to apply within a month of that birthday, and that in such a case it was in the Registrar's discretion to grant or refuse a Registration Certificate. Heavy penalties were imposed for contravening this particular provision.

The petition also objected to the use of 'the objectional term "coolies"' of whom there are none resident in this Territory'. Here the Indian complaint was not entirely valid. The Ordinance had as one of its aims the exclusion of "Coolies", but with no implication that the word "coolies" (a word to describe menial Asian labourers) was being used to refer to the Rhodesian Indian community as a whole. The Indian sensitivity on this score is, however, understandable because the word "coolie" was used by certain settlers as a derogatory term to refer to Indians generally. The dignity of the Indian community was at stake.

The petition did not stop there. In line with Naik's letter to the Administrator in May, the petition objected to clause six, which provided for 'a degrading and entirely unnecessary proceeding: evidence as to previous residence having to be furnished to an official, probably ignorant of local conditions, and acting in an arbitrary capacity'. Rightly or wrongly, the Indians were not confident that all immigration officers as well as the Registrar would accept their proof of previous residence. The Indians also objected most vehemently to Section Eight, which stipulated male and female registration, and described it as a violation of female modesty. The draft Ordinance, if enforced, would mean that the Rhodesian and Imperial Governments 'would condemn every British Indian as criminal'.

Although the petition raised specific points, it was basically a broad attack on the letter and spirit of the proposed Asiatics Ordinance. The draft Ordinance contemplated racial distinctions of a kind unacceptable to the petitioners. 'Indignity and restriction are heaped upon them by a measure which presupposes a vast immigration of British Indians into this Territory, an assumption which by virtue of the presently extremely small numbers of the British Indian population of Southern Rhodesia, and the known conditions of financial depression suffered by all classes of the population, your petitioners venture to characterise as absolutely false.' This statement was aimed at countering the understandable white fears of a big influx of Asians from South Africa and India, the two main sources of Indian immigrants to Rhodesia. These fears were heightened in official and settler circles by developments emanating from South Africa. Because of the tightening up of immigration controls in South Africa generally just before Union, many South African Indians were enquiring about the immigration laws of Rhodesia with a view to immigrating.

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1. See RC 3/3/18, Adm. 86 Petition of B.I.A. presented to Legislative Council on 15.vi.1908, signed by 57 signatories with B.R.Naik named as Chairman of B.I.A.
2. See The Asiatics Ordinance 1908, No.4 of 1908.
4. See A 2/1/21. (a) Secretary to the Department of the Administrator to C.B. Desai, Durban, 22.iv.1908; (b) Secretary to Department of the Administrator to Mallett and Thompson, Durban, 19.vi.1908.
the spectre of a large inflow of prohibited immigrants from the Transvaal and other South African states into Rhodesia. As early as January 1908 Herbert T. Longden, a Member of the Legislative Council, warned of 'a gang of some fifty' Indians on their way to Rhodesia from the Transvaal. He feared that the new Transvaal laws 'will drive a number of Asiatics into this country'.

Meanwhile, the petitioners warned the Government of the ill-fate of the Transvaal Ordinance, which they claimed was less drastic than the Rhodesian Ordinance. They reminded the Administration of how the constitutional agitation against the Transvaal measure made it virtually a dead letter and its repeal imminent. Evidently the petitioners felt encouraged by the successful agitation, led by Gandhi, in the Transvaal and by the fact that Gandhi himself was unaware of developments in Rhodesia at this time.

Gandhi's news mouthpiece, Indian Opinion, expressed concern lest the Rhodesian legislation be sanctioned by the Secretary of State although it doubted that the law would be approved. It noted the strong fight put up by the South African British Indian Committee and praised the Rhodesian Indians for presenting their petition. The efforts of Bhimjee R. Naik were given special mention. 'Since they are scattered all over the Colony, they have not been able to do much. Bhimji Nayak appears to have taken great pains.' Gandhi admitted that a satyagraha (civil disobedience) campaign was not immediately possible in Rhodesia. He was cynical of the Reuter report that the British South Africa Company in London had stated that no insult or exclusion policy were intended against the Indians by the Ordinance and that the fingerprint system would not be adopted: 'As if it was only the fingerprint system to which exception was taken! What does it matter if, after imposing slavery on the community in the form of the law, they do or do not ask for finger prints? The important thing is that this law should go, instead of which they want to retain the law and add that the finger-prints would not be insisted upon.' Gandhi did not see the dropping of finger prints as a concession but as a sugar to coat the bitter pill of the Ordinance. The Indians were advised to await the Imperial Government's response which, if it turned out to be unfavourable, should be replied to by a satyagraha campaign and a refusal to submit to the law. In addition, a petition should be forwarded to England. It is not clear whether this referred to the June petition or to a new, more wide-ranging document.

It has not been possible to establish just how influential Gandhi was in Rhodesian Indian politics, but what is clear is that many Rhodesian Indians read Indian Opinion, which was written in Gujarati and English, and were aware of developments affecting Indians in the Transvaal and elsewhere in South Africa. The advice of Gandhi could not have escaped the eyes of Bhimjee R. Naik and his colleagues. Had the Rhodesian Ordinance received Imperial sanction, it would be interesting to speculate if, and to what extent, Gandhi would have played a part in directing and coordinating a Rhodesian satyagraha campaign. As things turned out, Gandhi advocated a cautious but firm line.

1. See A 11/2/18/30, Longden, Cwelo, to Administrator, 15.1.1908.
2. See PC 3/3/18, Adm.86. Petition of British Indian Association presented to Legislative Council.
3. This is referred to later in more detail.
Opposition to the Ordinance was not only confined to Rhodesia and South Africa: it extended to the Imperial arena, especially to Britain and India. Although the law was framed with the greatest care and accompanied by various assurances to the Colonial Office, as well as to the local Indian community, it was quickly challenged. The South African British Indian Committee (SABIC) in London immediately made representations to the Colonial and India Offices against the 1908 Ordinance. The Committee stated that it would deplore a repetition of the Transvaal trouble, when a similar measure was mooted. SABIC was formed in 1906 with the aim of presenting the grievances of South African Indians to the Imperial Government by co-ordinating agitation and lobbying for support. The President of the Committee was Lord Ananthill and the Secretary was L.W. Pitch, a South African white who had been articled to Gandhi in the Transvaal at an earlier date and who was at this time a student for the bar in London.

The strength of the Indian lobby in Britain was due largely to the efforts of SABIC. The London correspondent of The Bulawayo Chronicle warned of the great influence of this lobby in London. "People at home are beginning to get not a little anxious about Indian affairs. The amount of sedition and agitation in India is believed to be enormous, and finds frequent expression in acts of violence, as also in highly treasonable articles in the native press... The South African Indians seem inclined to take advantage of this unfortunate state of affairs in order to air their own real or imaginary grievances." The writer warned that the timing of the Rhodesian law "was bound to attract attention in Great Britain".

He reported on the activities of SABIC and the opposition it was conjuring against the Asiatics Ordinance. The press in the provinces was being circularised with letters from the Secretary of SABIC, L.W. Pitch, pointing out the alleged harshness of the Rhodesian legislation and asserting its "racial" character. Knowing the sympathy for any coloured skin that exists in the hearts of the British public, the committee proceeds to bring tears to the eyes of these ignorant and muddle-pated noodles by asserting that not only is the new legislation accompanied by "the sting of compulsion" but it is made to apply to the female as well as to the male sex. Again, it has not been possible fully to assess the relationship between the agitation against the Ordinance in Rhodesia, South Africa and Britain. It is very probable, however, that Gandhi, through his keeping of close contact with SABIC in London over the position of Indians in the Transvaal, urged the committee to take up the cudgels on behalf of the Rhodesian Indian struggle against the 1908 Ordinance. No evidence has yet been found of any direct contact between Rhodesian Indian leaders and SABIC. The intermediacy of Gandhi was the most likely channel of communication.

The attitudes of the Imperial Government have yet to be considered, but since Imperial policy was stated in detail only after the disallowance it would be more fitting now to examine official and settler reactions to the storm of local and Imperial agitation. The Rhodesian Government was clearly perturbed by the local and Imperial response. Clarkson H. Tredgold, the Attorney-General, claimed that at the April meeting Naik had agreed to

4. Ibid.
the principle of registration but had now rejected it because of encouragement from 'a neighbouring territory'. He stoutly defended the Administration's policy in the Legislative Council and referred to a letter Naik had written to the Swelo Times. Tredgold denied that the Asiatics Ordinance was 'a law in the nature of oppression of any subject race: it was a law brought in for their own self-preservation'. The Ordinance was necessary to complete the South African "chain" against Asian immigration. 'The strength of that chain was its weakest link and if they failed in their duty they were leaving a breaking point in that chain; leaving the door open to any influx of undesirable persons.'

The Attorney-General did acknowledge, however, that the Indian presence in Africa had some value because 'in many cases the Asiaties had been extremely useful, but there was nothing which the Indian had done which could not be done by white men'. That the Attorney-General ought to have realised was that the Indians would have been even more "useful" had they been given a full and fair chance to prove themselves: closing the door on further immigration was not going to help Indians to maintain and expand their close cultural and family links with India, the very condition that would make them useful and law-abiding. If Indians were not permitted to bring in wives, members of their extended families and teachers, the Indian social structure might collapse, leading to a lowering of moral, material and cultural standards.

The Attorney-General claimed that had the Indians 'kept themselves to that calling which seemed best suited to the Indian at home, the cultivator, there would have been little of this outcry against them'. To Tredgold, apparently, the Indians were useful when they did not compete with the whites, especially in commerce and employment. Competition from Indians was "unfair" because 'they were able to adopt manners and use methods which were quite unacceptable to the scale of civilisation of the European'. Thus, whenever the Indian was a successful competitor at the expense of his white counterpart in business, it was because Indian competition was unfair! His efficiency, capacity to save, and service to the general community counted for very little in the Attorney-General's opinion. He failed to realise that if Indians were able to undersell their white fellow-businessmen because of their overcrowded and unhygienic living conditions and cheaper food bills, then surely this could have been solved by proper enforcement of sanitary laws and by sound health education programmes. The positive approach was scarcely suggested, let alone tried out - what was desired was a blanket ban on Asian immigration.

Naik's presentation of the Indian position was described by Tredgold as one of 'absolute antagonism' to the draft Ordinance. He claimed that Naik and his colleagues in the Indian deputation of April 1908 had agreed to registration 'as long as the system of registration was without the element of degradation'. Regarding future immigration, the deputation 'were just as strong as the Government in preventing it'. These two claims patently misrepresent the proceedings of the April meeting. At this meeting the question of registration was not specifically discussed and Naik, far from agreeing to a halt to further Indian immigration, expressed the hope that Indians established in Rhodesia would be allowed to bring in assistants 'any time they wanted them'. Further, it is unlikely that

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Raik would agree to registration, except a voluntary system, when he was fully aware of the Transvaal Indian campaign against compulsory registration. The Attorney-General claimed that Raik had hardened his attitude towards registration following external encouragement. 'It might be taken for granted that as soon as the Ordinance had been published a little hint of resistance was given from a neighbouring territory. They all knew how very amenable this class of person was to the influence of the agitator.' By "agitator" was probably meant Gandhi and his associates in the Transvaal, although Gandhi's name was not specified.

Longden, the MLC for Midlands District, and a fervent supporter of the Ordinance, informed the Legislative Council that in a 'conversation with one of the most intelligent and influential Indians of the Country', he was told that the Indians would not look with favour on registration, especially if it involved finger prints. The Indian informant had also asked that, under certain conditions, Indians be allowed to replace servants and assistants who might from time to time return to India. The Attorney-General conceded that higher class Indians would be treated differently from lower class Indians; the Government realised 'that there were Indians and "Indians" and they hoped to be able to deal with the higher class in a different manner than the lower class'. Although the Ordinance was necessary and would not be fundamentally altered in the letter, its practical application would be flexible, allowing for discrimination in favour of the higher class Indians. If the aim of such discrimination was to split Indian society on class lines, it failed because the Indian community was closely knit by political necessity and cultural and religious ties, all aided by smallness in numbers. This is a remarkable feature of Rhodesia's early Indian community despite its tremendous heterogeneity in language and regional origin. The Indians have at most times, especially at critical junctures, possessed political cohesion and unity: this gave them strength in the struggle against the 1908 Ordinance.

The Government was not prepared to relax the provisions of Section Two so as to exclude women from the operation of the Ordinance. Colonel Grey, the member representing the Northern District, explained to the Legislative Council that representations were made to him by 'important Indians' deploiring the fact that 'the proposed operation of the Ordinance as against females was violently opposed to, both for reasons of caste and religion', and would be a 'specific indignity on the women of their race'. The Attorney-General was, however, adamant in not altering this provision on the grounds that 'he did not know that an influx of Indian women might not be just as dangerous to the community as of men', but he did agree to amend Section Three so as to give the Administrator discretionary power to allow in Indian immigrants. He did this not out of humanitarian considerations but for fear that 'unless they put in some such provision the whole passage of the Ordinance might be jeopardised'. He was echoing the Administration's awareness that Imperial considerations could not be overlooked. Longden agreed that 'unless a provision of that kind was inserted the bill might be endangered'.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
Another point of consensus - this time a progressive one - among the official and settler members of the Council was that once the resident Asians were accepted as citizens of Rhodesia, the whites should not only treat them fairly but also 'they must try and raise them to the highest points of the Western civilisation and not put them in a position to say: "You have by the aid of your laws placed us in such a position that you treat us in a way you treat the raw native from the kraals, whose evolution has only just commenced" / Hear, hear/'. Members were insistent on not putting the treatment of Indians on the same level as that of Africans; for this reason, members such as Coghlan and Grey wished it to be made clear that no African policeman would have the right to demand a Registration Certificate from an Indian. Coghlan declared that 'it seemed to him a bad principle to give the right in the case of Native policeman to ask for their passes the members of a race who were socially their superiors'.

In the European view, Indians were regarded as superior to the Africans but inferior to the whites. The cautiousness of council members in dealing with the problems of Indian immigration reflected some awareness, generally limited, of the Imperial element, linked as this was in the case of the Indians with the rise of nationalism in India.

Although white leaders felt triumphant in overriding local Indian resistance to the 1908 Asiatics Ordinance, which was passed by the Legislative Council on 22 June 1908, only seven days after its first reading, they were reckoning without the formidable might of Imperial opinion. It is interesting that the Imperial power of disallowance was used only three times between 1898 and 1923. The major instance of its use was in the case of the 1908 Asiatics Ordinance. 'The disallowance involved the fundamental question of Imperial policy towards Asian immigration into British possessions.' The disallowance obviously came as a surprise to many. As Claire Palley puts it: 'Despite earlier Colonial Office hesitancy to overrule the decision of a Council with a majority of the members elected by the people of Southern Rhodesia, the Colonial Secretary was prepared to take a firm stand on such a question.' In the eyes of the Imperial Government, then, the decision to disallow was the 'result of long and careful consideration of all the circumstances affecting the Asiatic question'.

The High Commissioner, Lord Selborne, although sympathetic to the ratification of the Ordinance, was mindful of the Imperial element. He compared the Rhodesian Ordinance with the similar law in the Transvaal and although he believed the Rhodesian measure was 'less stringent than the Transvaal Act, ... it may be remarked that as there has hitherto been no restriction on Asiatic immigration into Southern Rhodesia, it would obviously be impossible to require in the case of Southern Rhodesia qualifications for registration similar to those required in the Transvaal'.

The Rhodesian Ordinance required all Asians, males and females, above 16 years of age to register. Although this provision was less strict than the law in the Transvaal, which required all Indian men, women and children of eight years of age to register their names with the Registrar of Asiatics and to take out certificates of registration, it was a far-reaching measure in view of Rhodesia's very junior constitutional position within the Empire.

2. Ibid.
5. The Transvaal Asiatic Law Amendment Act, No. 2 of 1907.
and the size of the "Indian problem". Rhodesia was only unnecessarily inviting a storm of Imperial protest upon itself and ignoring the dangerous situation in the Transvaal arising from that territory's anti-Indian legislation. Selborne criticised the fact that no appeal from the decision of the Registrar, in the case of Asians temporarily absent from Rhodesia who could not prove three previous years of residence in Rhodesia, was provided for. He desired the Administrator to remove all these 'objectionable' features before he would recommend the Ordinance for assent. 1 This should not suggest that the High Commissioner was opposed to all these provisions in principle; on the contrary, he supported the measure wholeheartedly, and when it was eventually disallowed he wrote a private letter to Milton expressing his disbelief that the Secretary of State 'would be afraid of the mischievous lunatics of his left-wing'; Selborne apologised to Milton if he had misled him on the chances of the Ordinance's ratification. 2

Milton concurred with Selborne that the Ordinance was not as harsh as the Transvaal law. He was convinced that since the Asiatics Ordinance was aimed specifically at all Asians, 1 it follows that women, unless registered, would be prohibited from entering the territory. He clarified the Administrator's policy in the case of females failing to register. He said female registration was to be voluntary, a concession that was mocked at by Gandhi, and females were not to be prosecuted. 'Prosecution for non-performance of a voluntary act does not appear to be within the powers given by law.' Regarding the powers of the Registrar, his failure to register an applicant could be challenged in the High Court. 3 Such recourse to the law was not, however, written into the Ordinance, which provided for an appeal to the High Court only in respect of an expulsion order. 4 This omission does not really invalidate Milton's assurance because the High Court 'under its "full jurisdiction over all matters and persons" in this Territory would remedy any wrong brought to its notice, and if registration were unreasonably withheld, order registration'. Milton failed to appreciate that only if such guarantees had been embodied in the Ordinance itself would it have reduced one more "objectionable" feature.

Milton's letter may have impressed Selborne but did not make an adequate impact on the ultimate Imperial authority responsible for Rhodesia, the Secretary of State, Lord Crewe, who outlined the Imperial Government's reasons for its disallowance in December 1908. The Secretary of State treated the whole matter in terms of principle rather than by comparing its merits and demerits vis-à-vis the Transvaal enactment. 'The principle underlying the legislation is obviously the same in both cases and it is on the question of principle that the main difficulty arises.' To the Rhodesian argument that Rhodesia was bound by the Pretoria Conference of May 1904, which declared itself strongly against Asian immigration into Southern Africa and resolved that members of the Customs Union should introduce prohibitory legislation if they had not already done so, the Secretary of State replied that Natal and the Cape Colony, who were equally bound by that resolution, had not introduced fresh prohibitory legislation. There was no sufficient reason why Rhodesia should follow the example of the Transvaal and not that of Natal and the Cape Colony.

Lord Crewe emphasised that the Transvaal law had only been sanctioned because Transvaal was a self-governing colony, although the Imperial Government 'have never concealed their opinion that this legislation was a matter

1. Ibid.
4. See The Asiatics Ordinance 1908, No.4 of 1908, Section 23.
for regret'. He stressed the difficulties encountered by the Transvaal legislation and the very pertinent fact that 'public opinion in India has been deeply stirred by the controversy and that there is much feeling on the subject in this country'. The Imperial Government felt it undesirable that this delicate position should be exacerbated by the extension of similar legislation to Rhodesia. The Secretary of State noted that in April 1908, the Indians did not appear to have seriously objected to prohibitory legislation, but that later developments and the Indian petition, a copy of which was sent to Lord Crewe on 4 February 1909, had changed things. He refused his assent to 'an Ordinance which is open to grave objection in principle, which is likely to lead to serious complications, and which, so far as I can judge, is not imperatively required by the position in Southern Rhodesia'. It is to be noticed how the immense problems arising from the Transvaal Ordinance played such a crucial role in the Imperial decision to disallow the Rhodesian measure. As a matter of principle, the Imperial Government could not be party to any policy based on racial differentiation affecting inter-territorial movement within the Empire. The Indian nationalist argument that such a policy would rock the very foundations of the Empire was implicitly accepted by the Imperial authorities.

The news of the disallowance was not well received by Milton or other white leaders. Milton felt 'left in the lurch' by the Cape Colony and Natal, who failed to introduce legislation on lines laid down at the Pretoria conference. He was irritated by local Indian agitation against the Ordinance. Milton believed that the Indian petition was 'engineered in the Transvaal as before the Ordinance was introduced he received a deputation of Asians here who were quite willing to accept the proposed conditions'. Although there is no substantial evidence yet of direct interference by Transvaal Indians in Rhodesian Indian politics, such involvement is very probable in view of Gandhi's awareness of developments in Rhodesia as evinced by articles on Rhodesia in Indian Opinion. No evidence has yet been found of Gandhian correspondence with Bhimjee R. Naik or other Indian leaders over the 1908 Ordinance, although such correspondence does exist regarding the 1899-1900 Utalii Incident.

The Indians were obviously encouraged by the Transvaal agitation and greatly relieved by the Imperial disallowance of the 1908 Asiatics Ordinance. Their faith in Imperial protection of their rights was confirmed, although their difficulties did not end. The Indians continued to struggle against existing immigration laws with their two main barriers - the language and means tests. At the same time, official policy softened slightly owing to the realisation that Indian immigration would continue, albeit on a small scale, and that Indians would have to be treated as a permanent and useful element of the general population. Although talk of immigration prohibition was not buried for all time, it went into brief hibernation until 1914.

2. See RC 3/3/18, Adm.86, Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 12.xii.1908.