The history of the Manyika has its decisive moments which enable us to divide its course into a number of distinctive periods. One of these moments was the loss of Manyika independence to colonial rule. Although we might pin-point a precise and definite year (1891) we have to be aware that change (and only change can be made the basis for this moment) does not take place suddenly, but is rather in the nature of more or less slow process. The change which led to loss of independence by the Manyika culminated in the events of the early 1890's - and it is one of the purposes of this paper to plot the course of these events.

The end of 1890 saw the end of the British South Africa Company in firm possession of Manicaland.1 This statement does not portray the true picture of the events between 1890 and 1895 in Manyika and this paper will also attempt to analyse the events taking place between these years, which may be described as the 'dual' over Manyika between the British South Africa Company and the African Portuguese Syndicate - with Mutasa in the centre of it all. It is true that Manyika was certainly guaranteed to the British South Africa Company by the Mutasa-Colombohoun Treaty of the 14th September 1890 but the British South Africa Company's firm possession of Manyika was not effectively executed until after 1894, when the rival African Portuguese Syndicate men in Manyika gave way.

It was only then that the British South Africa Company 'began to formulate philosophies and policies, land policies and labour policies'.2 The B.S.A. Co. acknowledged this fact when Secretary Harris said 'They (the Syndicate) are weakening the authority of the B.S.A. Co.'3

In June 1888 George Wise, Herbert Perry and T. Madden (all prospectors of long experience) travelled from Johannesburg to Manyika country to seek for a mineral concession. They went up to Manyika under the employ of J.J. Grice and A. Lewley4 who had learnt of the presence of gold in Manyika from some Africans staying in Johannesburg.5 One of these Africans was a subject of Mutasa and the other one was a Gaza-Nguni of Ungunyana. The two Africans offered their services to George Wise and Company and they travelled together overland from South Africa to as far north as the Odzi River, where the two Africans left - probably for their respective homes. From Odzi river the Wise group could easily find their way to Mutasa's Kraal. They were however forced to stop at a place eight days journey away from Mutasa's kraal because

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1 P.R. Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations in S. Central Africa (1890-1930), (London 1962), Longmans, 44.
3 CT/1/2/1, R. Harris' reply to Messrs Graham, Vigne and Mallet, 10 January 1891.
4 CT/1/2/3, Graham, Vigne and Mallet to High Commissioner, 30th June 1894.
5 These were probably migrant workers who had gone to work in the gold mines from Southern Zambezia.
many of their cattle had died from the fly and they had an insufficient number left to pull their wagons. Thus Wise and a native interpreter, whom they had picked in the Manyika country, proceeded to Mutasa's stronghold — leaving the rest of the group with the wagon. Wise spoke Zulu fluently and the African interpreter translated from Zulu to Manyika. Mutasa was not difficult and Wise returned to the wagon a few days later to announce that Mutasa was willing to give them the mineral concession. (Whilst he was away, disaster had struck the small remaining party when Herbert Perry was killed by a lion).

T. Madden was the best writer among them and so, together with Wise, they went back to Mutasa for the concession leaving Ross to take care of the wagon. Wise had brought Mutasa's men to carry the blankets to the Kraal and the Wise-Mutasa concession was signed after Mutasa had shown them where the gold was, along the Revue River. The concession was written by T. Madden and was signed on 1st November 1888 with Chimbadzwa (Mutasa's son and heir) present.

On their return to the wagon they found Ross had died in the interim and had been buried. The wagon driver was down with serious fever. The remaining few cattle had also died. The remaining party went to Johannesburg on foot leaving the wagon in the custody of a certain chief. Once in Johannesburg, Wise and Madden could not find the concession and it was concluded they had left it in the wagon.

The Grice and Lawley group was not the only group interested in a mineral concession in Manyika. There was also the African Portuguese Syndicate (which also later came to be known as the Beningfield Concession). The Syndicate was formed in about 1888 by several men in South Africa with a view to secure a mineral concession from Mutasa, King of Manyika.2 (These men included Reuben Beningfield, G. Bernheim, J. Frankel, F.J. Gardiner, B. Oppenheimer, W.K. Taylor, H.J. Taylor and J.E. Taylor.) Reuben Beningfield3 was connected with Grice by marriage and through this relationship Beningfield learnt about the Wise-Madden mission to Mutasa. Reuben Beningfield had been in South East Africa before i.e. Mozambique, Gazaland and Manyika.4 In fact his

1 Most likely Maramge.
2 CT/1/2/1, Graham, Wigne and Mallet to R. Harris, 30 March 1892.
3 Reuben Beningfield was both a trader and an elephant hunter. He was the son of Samuel Beningfield of Durban. Reuben Beningfield's nationality is not clear. The names Reuben and Samuel are Jewish names and so he might have been a Jew. They be the records of the Jewish Community in Natal would help us here.
4 CT/1/2/1, Reuben Beningfield to High Commissioner, 30 June 1892.
activities in these areas stretch back to 1866 when he first went to
Inhambane on the Mozambique coast and founded a trading station after which
he went inland to establish himself as a good friend of Nzila (King of the
Gaza-Nguni) and settled himself somewhere near the Sabi river to engage in
elephant hunting and trading in that area.1

To establish himself in the African Portuguese Syndicate, which was
Kimberley-based (and managed by a committee of three who were B. Oppenheimer,
F.J. Gardiner (for D. Foxwell) and L. Lutre),2 Beningfield first formed a
Johannesburg Syndicate and when he heard about the Wise-Madden mission he
moved to buy the Mutasa Concession from Grice and Lawley. On hearing that
the Concession had been lost on the way, he summoned Wise and Madden in May
1889 to Natal where it was arranged that Wise, Madden, Reuben Beningfield and
a man named Lloyd return to Mutasa via Chiloane to secure a similar treaty
only this time as a concession of the Johannesburg Syndicate and later to be
transferred to the African Portuguese Syndicate.3 Mutasa agreed to this arrange­
ment and he signed another treaty — the Beningfield Concession. This was on
or about the 5th October 1889. The Concession gave a lease for 99 years,
back-dated to 3rd November 1888.4 Beningfield's experience in these parts of
S.E. Africa had taught him that the Umtali River Valley was more productive
in gold than the Revue Valley which had been granted to Wise and Madden in
1888, thus the 1889 group asked for the Umtali River Valley instead. Mutasa
consented. Musewe and Chimbadzwa were among the signatories to this second
concession.

The Beningfield Concession was sold to the African Portuguese Syndicate
of which Reuben Beningfield became the director and the area under their treaty
comprised of:

... a portion of Manica country covering 240 square miles on
land adjacent to the Odzi which was granted by Umtasa in the
year 1888.5

The portion of country is:

The river Umtali and four miles of country on each side of
it from the sources and down to confluence with the River
Odzi.6

It seems the African Portuguese Syndicate did not carry out any 'follow

1 C.6495/190, Inclosure 3, Erksine to Shepstone, 3 July 1871 and
H. Gelfand, Gubulawayo and Beyond, (London 1968), 329.

2 CT/1/2/3, Graham, Vigne and Mallett to High Commissioner, 30 June 1894.

3 Ibid.

4 Second Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa
ordered by The House of Commons, to be printed, 13 July 1897.

5 CT/1/2/1, Graham, Vigne and Mallett to R. Harris, 10 Jun. 1891.

6 CT/1/2/1, Extract from Letter of Mr. MacGlashan to R. Harris, 9 Nov. 1891.
up operations on the 1889 Concession until 1890 when they heard that the British South Africa Company had been granted the Colquhoun Treaty by Mutasa on the 14th September 1890, which covered the whole of Manyika, including the Syndicate area. This news aroused the Syndicate to action, to defend what was their own. The Syndicate had not paid the yearly tribute of 200 blankets owing to Mutasa as stipulated in the Beningfield Concession for two years. In 1890 Beningfield decided to fulfil this obligation first, before starting the duel with the British South Africa Company for the ownership of the area along the Umtali River.

Thus on the 11th November 1890, Herbert J. Taylor entered into an agreement with Reuben Beningfield at Durban (Reuben acting on behalf or as a representative of the African Portuguese Syndicate) to proceed to Manyika to deliver 1000 blankets as two years tax to Mutasa.

... for a certain concession granted by him (Mutasa) to a Johannesburg Syndicate and now the property of the African Portuguese Syndicate. Only 400 blankets were due to be paid in fulfilment of the tax requirements for two years. One wonders why 600 more blankets were added. Maybe the extras were to be used for presents to the King, to Chimbadzwa and to some of the head Indunas or they may have been for trade purposes - as the instructions were that H.J. Taylor was to leave the remainder of the blankets with a certain man in Chiloane to be kept for the Syndicate.

Herbert J. Taylor took E.T. Torquis and an African interpreter with him and sailed for the Mozambique coast on the S.S. 'LadyWood' on the same day of the agreement with Beningfield. They arrived at Chiloane on the 20th November, from where they proceeded to Beira, arriving there on the 25th - to continue up the Pungwe River and down to Mutasa's stronghold at Binga Guru. The party were met at a village 20 miles from Mutasa's Binga Guru by an Induna or Headmen from Mutasa who already knew of the coming of his party. The Induna directed them to a village 11 miles further on where the party met Chimbadzwa (Mutasa's elder son).

Zimbazo said, that he had been sent by his father as he had heard that we had come from Umdigindwana (Beningfield) with blankets in payment of rent for concession of land granted to him. From there Taylor went to the Binga Guru with the interpreter, leaving Torquis behind who was ill with fever. Taylor met Mutasa and delivered the rent. After signing the receipt in the presence of his Headmen in Council, Mutasa gave Taylor a large elephant's tusk - the usual thing in exchange for presents which he instructed Taylor to give to Beningfield as a seal of good faith.

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1 He later became CINC of S. Rhodesia in 1913, after being CINC of Matebeleland from 1895. He was born in Greytown (Natal) on the 3rd January 1865. See also Rhodesiana, 36, March 1977, pp.1-15.

2 CT/1/2/3, H.J. Taylor to High Commissioner, 8 September, 1893.

3 Ibid.
at the same time informing me that when he dies his son was to recognise the concession granted by him'.

When Taylor returned to the camp, he found Torquius seriously ill and worse. Taylor had no option, he would have wanted by all means not to let the B.S.A.Co. men in Umtali to know about their movements, but to send a messenger to Umtali for medicines from a friend. The messenger returned accompanied by three B.S.A.Co. police who went on to arrest Taylor and Torquius under a warrant signed by Denis Doyle (the Resident Magistrate and Company Representative in Umtali) on a charge of trying to bribe Mutasa with presents to cancel the 14th September 1890 Treaty between Mutasa and Colquhoun.

Mutasa was not the only one who knew about the coming of the Taylor party from Durban. The British South Africa Company men also knew and they were determined to throttle all attempts by the Syndicate to revive its concession. The main reason sprang from the fact that the area assigned to the African Portuguese a Syndicate by the Beningfield Concession would defeat one of the most important reasons of the B.S.A.Co. presence in Manyika, that is, the Manyika gold-fields along the Umtali River.

Of course the B.S.A.Co. was aware that the Beningfield Concession was authentic - although some individuals in the Company would have wanted to argue that it never existed.

There is a Natal Syndicate claiming to have a concession of 260 square miles on the Odzi River, and signed by Umtasa. I believe they have one ... 2

However, in spite of this acknowledgement, the B.S.A.Co. argued that the Concession had lapsed because the Beningfield group had failed to fulfil their part of the deal, that is, to pay the yearly rent of 200 blankets for two years (1890).

... I believe they have one, but it has lapsed. They are trying to run in sufficient blankets ... to revive their lapsed ... We know you will deal promptly and firmly with them, and either arrest them or turn them out. They are clever and dodgy, but you are forewarned. 3

On the strength of the above communication from Harris (the Company Secretary at Cape Town), Colquhoun, the Administrator of Rhodesia, sent instructions from Salisbury to Denis Doyle to the effect that:

Even if anything in writing was given to Beningfield by Umtasa - it has lapsed, and must not be allowed to revive ... 4

1 Ibid.
2 DT/8/5/3, Inclosure in Colquhoun's letter to Denis Doyle, 17 November 1890.
3 Ibid.
4 DT/8/5/3, Colquhoun to Denis Doyle, 17 November 1890.
However, in spite of all these precautions, Denis Doyle was no match, at least, for the time being, for Taylor and Torquis managed to slip through to deliver the blankets to Mutasa and therefore revive their Syndicate's claim over the area held under the Beningfield Concession and Colquhoun did not hesitate to report this failure to Harris:

I must regret that not withstanding the precautions taken to prevent such an occurrence, Mr. Herbert John Taylor representing the Syndicate has succeeded in getting audience of Umtasa and delivering to him certain stores for which he got acknowledgment of Umtasa.1

The B.S.A.Co. subsequently succeeded in arresting Taylor and Torquis. They were brought before Denis Doyle who informed them that they had committed 'a very serious crime' and would send them to Fort Salisbury - from where they were to be sent to Cape Town. Doyle also took the liberty to explain to them that Manyika was now B.S.A.Co. area and he denounced the receipt from Mutasa for the 400 blankets. Doyle also threatened that he was going to force Mutasa to hand back all blankets he had received from Taylor.

Beningfield had warned Taylor against giving any document to the B.S.A.Co. Once in Manyika, he realised the possibilities of getting arrested and having the receipt confiscated; so he prepared two receipts.2 The real and detailed receipt he kept in a safe place and the other one with blanks (without vital information) he handed over to Doyle on being requested to do so. The nearest that Doyle got to realising that the receipt was a fake was as Colquhoun reported to Harris:

...Mr. Doyle reports elsewhere (21st) that from Taylor's manner he judges it was part of his instructions to get the acknowledgement with blanks.3

Taylor and Torquis were released on 3rd January 1891 by Dr Jameson when he arrived in Umtali from Salisbury.

The fate of the 400 blankets is not clear. The CT files last mention of them as being stored at Mutasa's kraal under the B.S.A.Co.'s custody.4 These were handed over after Colquhoun reprimanded Mutasa for receiving the blankets and issuing out the acknowledgement. Mutasa himself did not brave to tell the truth and he argued that he did not know the meaning of the presents nor what they were for - declining to have anything to do with the blankets.5 The above facts might have been twisted by the B.S.A.Co. (by Colquhoun) because it is difficult to believe that Mutasa disowned the

1 CT/1/1/5, Colquhoun to R. Harris, 30 December 1890.

2 CT/1/2/1, H.J. Taylor to High Commissioner, 8 Sept. 1893.

3 CT/1/1/5. Colquhoun to Harris, 30 December 1890.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.
blankets. Mutasa was only denying the fact that he had received the blankets as a payment on behalf of the Beningfield Concession.

(Mutasa) only admits having received from Taylor, as from many other white men in the country, an occasional present of a few blankets, but absolutely denies that these have anything to do with any concession granted.

On or about the 17th February, Taylor and Torquis left Umtali to return to Durban overland. They arrived in Salisbury in March where they interviewed the Administrator. Taylor told Colquhoun that after talking over the matter with his syndicate, he would apply for compensation for illegal arrest. Colquhoun replied that he was quite willing to compensate them there and then. Taylor mentioned a certain sum, probably £200 each as the syndicate's solicitors later demanded, but Colquhoun could not see his way through to pay such a large sum. He gave Taylor and Torquis £78 between them and a letter to Dr. Harris recommending compensation, and Colquhoun also paid all the expenses to Kimberley.

Dr Harris could not hear of it and he refused to pay Taylor and Torquis any compensation. Taylor and Torquis then continued to Durban where they arrived on the 11th May 1891 and handed back the receipt signed by Mutasa to Beningfield.

On or about the 21st August 1891, H.J. Taylor again went to Mutasa via the coast route with the annual rent and accompanied by Mr Rice Hamilton (an ex-pioneer). They arrived at Binga Guru on the 3rd September 1891, and safely delivered the rent for which they were given a receipt. Mutasa was very pleased to see them and hoped that Taylor would remain in the country. Taylor then went down to Umtali to tell the Chartered Company representative that he was in the area to look over the interests of the African Portuguese Syndicate.

When the Company failed to effectively stop the African Portuguese Syndicate participating in Manyika politics and economy, the Company began putting pressures on Mutasa and his people to give their allegiance to the Company and not to the Syndicate. These pressures sometimes involved organised damage to life and property.

Although Mutasa was sometimes reluctant to discuss the reason for the atrocious treatment that he received from the B.P.A.Co. his reason for the atrocities was:

I refused to give them land...

On the 3rd January 1892 an Induna came to Umtali from Mutasa with message from the King asking Taylor to proceed to Binga Guru as the King wished to see him. The King had also sent for all his headmen and when they had all assembled, the King informed Taylor that some of his subjects' villages had been burnt and pillaged by the Chartered Company and the people had sought refuge with him (Mutasa) as their grain had been destroyed and they had nowhere

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1 CT/1/2/1, Mr Hole to R. Harris, 5 November 1892.
2 CT/1/2/1, R. Beningfield to High Commissioner, 30 June 1892.
Mutasa was upset by this event and he asked H.J. Taylor to inform Beningfield about it, at the same time saying that he looked upon Beningfield to protect him against the Chartered Company as he only recognized the Beningfield Concession which had been granted the area on which the burnt native kraals were. Mutasa wanted Beningfield to lay the matter before 'the white man's Great Chief'. Taylor was also taken around to see the destroyed villages. Taylor reported that they were 6 villages in all belonging to headmen, Mataranyika, Baige, Nyagura, Mazaivana, Marowa and Robainwe. Mataranyika had also been shot and wounded in the leg and Mazaivana's son had been wounded in the arm by the B.S.A. Co. Police. What had happened is that towards the end of 1891 a number of Mutasa's people were compelled, practically at the point of the bayonet, to work, whether they liked it or not, under the Company. But labourers were badly treated and half-starved and, naturally, they deserted to their kraals. For this, the police burnt their kraals and destroyed their property - mainly as a form of punishment and to make them so poor and in want that they would go back to work in order to survive.

H.J. Taylor wrote to Beningfield about this on his return to Umtali and Beningfield informed Mutasa through Taylor that representations were being made.

In May 1892, the Concession area was beaconed off with the consent of Mutasa and Taylor, at the same time, gave the B.S.A. Co. notice to vacate and to forgo any claim they 'illegally' held in that part of the country. The B.S.A. Co. police immediately arrested him for trespass and released him on bail. H.J. Taylor, accompanied by Rice Hamilton, immediately set for Binga Guru to inform Mutasa what had happened. Mutasa was disturbed by this news and, after calling all his headmen in council together, he inquired as to whether there had been any further communication from Beningfield concerning the Company's ill-treatment of Mutasa. When Taylor replied in the negative, Mutasa proposed that he wanted to send some messengers to Beningfield 'with an important message' and he wanted Taylor to suggest how. Taylor suggested that the messengers - Rururmedo (Soumento) and Myou (Shimagavia) - go down to South Africa with Rice Hamilton. They left around the 12th May 1892 and arrived in Durban in the following month returning to Umtali, after visiting the High Commissioner in Cape Town, in September with the annual rent for 1892 - as well as with the High Commissioner's promise that he would send his reply to Mutasa through the Vice Consul at Beira.

Ten days after the departure of the delegation H.J. Taylor appeared before the magistrate in Umtali on charge of trespass and as there appeared to be no-one to prosecute, the case was dismissed. In June printed notices were issued to all residents on the Concession Area by H.J. Taylor on behalf

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1 CT/1/2/3, H.J. Taylor to High Commissioner, 8 September 1893.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 CT/1/2/3, Solicitors (of A.P.S.) to High Commissioner, 30 June 1894.
5 CT/1/2/3, H.J. Taylor to High Commissioner, 8 September 1893.
of the African Portuguese Syndicate informing them that they were trespassing on the land which belonged to the Syndicate. Taylor had informed Captain Graham, representative of the British South Africa Company in Umtali, that they would be held responsible for all loss or damage the African Portuguese Syndicate should sustain by reason of the Company's trespass on their land.

A few days after the issuing of notices by Taylor, a general meeting was called by the residents at Umtali at which the Administrator was present; Taylor also attended. One of the questions asked Dr Jameson was what security the public had in the face of the notice issued by the African Portuguese Syndicate. Dr Jameson replied that Mr Beningfield did obtain a concession some years ago from Mutasa but that there were certain limits to that concession which had lapsed, 'he at the same time informing the meeting that they all knew the way Rhodes had of smoothing the fellows often with a few shares which no doubt they were working for and would in all probably get a few'.

Later on in the year (September 1892) Mutasa was informed that he had better send into Umtali for presents from the British South Africa Company. Fearful of the consequences of a refusal he did so but he was clever - in subsequently sending a gift of equal value (so he believed) in return. A few days later on or about 25th September 1892 Mutasa sent Musewe, his headman and Kondo, also a headman, with a message to Taylor informing him that they had an important message to deliver to the representative of the B.S.A. Co. and requested that Taylor be present when the message was delivered.

Taylor took Logan, his defence counsel, with him to the office of the representative of the Company to hear what the message would be. Taylor and Logan remained outside the office waiting to be called in. Meanwhile Musewe and the other Induna delivered their message but they were ordered out and would have been jailed had not Taylor and Logan remonstrated. ('Captain Graham, on hearing Taylor and Logan arguing with the Police, immediately ordered them to be released'.) Logan later took down the Induna's message and it was to the effect that they were sent by Mutasa to inform the B.S.A. Co. that they were trespassing on the concession granted by Mutasa and now the property of the African Portuguese Syndicate.

Meanwhile the Syndicate's lawyers in South Africa were also active - bringing their case before the High Commissioner and to the notice of the public in the most open possible manner. Notices were published in all the South African papers and the 'Times' clearly stating to the world at large the concession which they held and warning people to refrain from treating with the B.S.A. Co. over the Syndicate's lands in Manyika pending further proceedings. What were these proceedings?

On June 10th, 1891, the High Commissioner had published in the Government Gazette of the Colony a proclamation under the Order in Council of May 9th by which it was declared that no concession would be valid or legal unless approved in such a mode as the High Commissioner appointed and that it would not be recognized by any court of law unless sanctioned by the Secretary of State.

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
A petition was thereupon immediately sent by the Syndicate to the Secretary of State through the High Commissioner for the necessary approval and ratification of their concession.

There was no reply from the High Commissioner until 8th December which did not answer the request of the Syndicate. The Syndicate thereupon pointed out that the question of the ratification of their concession was not dealt with in the reply and suggested that if their rights were disputed, the Syndicate was prepared to submit their rights to a commission of court of arbitration. The Syndicate proposed the Chief Justice of the Colony - Sir Henry De Villiers - as the arbitrator but the Company declined to be moved into such a proposition.

On February 1st, 1892 and 3 March 1892 the High Commissioner informed the Company that the matter had been referred to the Secretary of State and also intimated that a court of enquiry would be appointed from the Colonial Office at an early date to enquire into all concession claims. Relying on these assurances, the Syndicate had taken no further steps to vindicate their position but waited patiently for an opportunity to present their case before the promised court of enquiry. However, no commission was set up; in fact, whilst the Syndicate was surprised to read a statement in the 1892 B.S.A.Co. Annual Report which stated:

The Directors (of the company) have much satisfaction in informing the shareholders that the acquisition of the concession from Mutasa had during the past year received the sanction of Her Majesty's Government. It will be remembered that within the territory covered by the concession are the gold fields of Umtali, the very extensive and the very rich agricultural district of Manica.

It was clear to the African Portuguese Syndicate that it had been lulled into a false security by the promise of a commission to investigate all claims whilst the Chartered Company had been permitted without reference to any rival claims to obtain the ratification of their treaty and thus make their position almost unassailable.

Moreover, the Syndicate could not obtain information respecting the alleged Treaty the company claimed to have obtained from Mutasa. Paradoxically the King was also, at this time, denying that he ever signed a Treaty with the B.S.A.Co. As a matter of fact it was not until about the latter part of 1893 that the Block Book C6495 was placed in the hands of the Syndicate's legal advisers, when the text of the Colquhoun Treaty and the manner in which it was acquired became officially known for the first time to the Syndicate.

On the 9th October 1892, Captain Graham, with an escort of Police, went over to Binga Guru and demanded to see Mutasa. When he could not find him, he

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1 CT/1/2/3, solicitors to High Commissioner, 30 Jun. 1894. (quote from a High Commissioner's communication).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
threatened to search his huts but ultimately contented himself by driving off ten head of cattle and ten goats; and, except for a few instances of annoyances to the King, the King was left alone after this until March 1893.

H.J. Taylor went to Durban on the 4th October 1892 for a six month's leave. While in Durban, the long awaited for answer from the High Commissioner came on the 27th February 1893 — repudiating the statement made by the delegation sent down by Mutasa in May 1892. The answer stated that Mutasa had never sanctioned the sending down of the two messengers with the message. H.J. Taylor left Durban about 21st April 1893 and arrived in Umtali in May. Soon after his arrival he sent a message to Mutasa informing him about the High Commissioner's message. Mutasa replied that he wanted to see H.J. Taylor together with W.H. Taylor (H.J.'s brother) as he had been acting for the African Portuguese Syndicate during H.J. Taylor's absence. When W.H. Taylor returned, for he had been away in Barwe where he was deeply involved in the internal politics of that area, the Taylors went up to Mutasa on the 23rd June. On the 24th they met Chimbadzwa who took them to the King with his headmen-in-Council. H.J. Taylor told Mutasa the High Commissioner's message. Mutasa wondered where the High Commissioner had got his information that Mutasa had not sanctioned the delegation, to which Taylor's reply was that the High Commissioner claimed to have got his information from a Government official who was said to have received the information from Mutasa himself. It is quite probable that Mutasa had seen the government official but his lie that he had not given his consent to the delegation was an attempt to play the skilful game of diverting local government officials' attention from his intentions in South Africa. Little did he know that the game was a bit complicated for him. Thus he was quite annoyed to find himself defeated at the game and he spontaneously suggested to the Taylors that:

he wished to send his own son and heir Zimbazo and his head Induna Nusewe to see the High Commissioner to substantiate his previous message.

H.J. Taylor and Logan went down with the delegation on the night of the 4th July 1893 — Chimbadzwa leaving Binga Guru at 7 p.m. — to avoid interference from the B.S.A.Co. men in Umtali. On their arrival in Beira, they were informed by one of the officials, Commandant Henze of Massi Kessi of the Mozambique Company, how the B.S.A.Co. had sent six policemen after them to bring them back and how they had applied to him to arrest them, but that it had not been in his power to do so.

Meanwhile, Dr Rutherford Harris also informed Beningfield that immediately Taylor and his companion set foot in Manyika again — especially in the area supposed to be African Portuguese Syndicate land — they would be arrested. To this H.J. Taylor complained to the High Commissioner:

We most respectively protest against this treatment and claim your protection as British subjects, whose sole crime appears to be the desire to do our duty to our employers in protecting rights which they are legally.

2 CT/1/2/3, H.J. Taylor to High Commissioner, 8 September 1893.
entitled to.  

The delegation arrived in Cape Town at the end of August and had two audiences with the High Commissioner in which Chimbadzwa asserted Mutasa's words that 'no Independent or otherwise' had ever visited his father's kraal to investigate on the spot the truth of the alleged outrages; had such a person made any such public enquiry he would have received ample information both from the King, from himself and from the injured natives. In all this Chimbadzwa was confirmed by the Indunas who were present with him.

They also discussed the question of the Syndicate's Concession and Chimbadzwa emphatically denied that any valid concession existed except that granted by Mutasa and witnessed by himself to the Syndicate. As far as Chimbadzwa was concerned this might have been a valid argument for the 14th September 1890 Colquhoun Treaty - does not bear Chimbadzwa's signature.  

Chimbadzwa also begged the High Commissioner on behalf of the King to assist him in relieving the King of the presence of the Chartered Company in Manyika where, he affirmed, they had no right to be. The High Commissioner promised to communicate to the Imperial Secretary, Bower, on the issue and notify Beningfield of the answer in a day or two.

The Imperial Secretary answered to the effect that 'the matter had been enquired into on the spot by an Independent officer of Her Majesty's Government who had ascertained that there was no foundation for the complaint, statements were conflicting, but that even were such statements borne out in full it would not necessarily follow that Mutasa had the right to cede the land claimed without the consent of Gungunyana who claims to be his overlord'. Thus the delegation returned to Manyika without having achieved much. But perhaps the Imperial Secretary's answer needs comment for it introduces another basic argument used by the B.S.A.Co. to refute the validity of the Syndicate's Concession from Mutasa. The argument was that Mutasa had no right to sign the Beningfield Concession without Gungunyana's sanction. In a way the B.S.A.Co. was also, invalidating their own 14th September 1890 Treaty by using this argument but they felt safe because they now had a double-title to Manyika.

... Lord Knutsford has signed the sanction of Her Majesty's Government to the Agreement obtained by this Company from Umtasa dated 14th September 1890; apart from the fact that we subsequently obtained from Gungunyana the mineral rights of the whole territory, who, as Her Majesty's Government is aware, is the overlord of Umtasa.
However, the main stumbling block to the Syndicate was that it could not find a court to prove its case. It was correct that the land and mineral rights of the Syndicate existed under the Concession made by Mutasa, the 'independent Chief' of Manyika.

The Syndicate had also been ready to prove the validity of the Concession before any Court. In addition to the evidence of Mutasa himself, his son and heir, Chimbadzwa, and other African witnesses, the Syndicate could also produce Reuben Widdows Beningfield, a well-known contractor of Natal, George Wise, Lewis Howard Lloyd, and Thomas Madden, all of whom were present when the Concession was granted. Important corroborative evidence could also be given by H.J. Taylor and W.H. Taylor.

The B.S.A.Co. could not brave all this evidence and so they successfully evaded ever going to Court with the Syndicate. There were a lot other touchy issues involved in this duel which could have embarrassed the B.S.A.Co. in Court. For example, the Colquhoun Treaty of 1890 had been signed by Mutasa, Sibangan and Musaiba (in addition to the European signatories), and Chimbadzwa did not sign. The A.P.S lawyers believed that this could invalidate the Colquhoun Treaty. The Beningfield Concession bore both Mutasa's and Chimbadzwa's signatures. Even their argument that Mutasa was a vassal of Gungunyana had a lot of inconsistencies. From the Blue Book C6495, in the correspondence between Great Britain and Portugal in connection with the Bassi Kessi affair (1891), it can be found that Portugal raised the question of Mutasa's independence upheld and confirmed by Lord Salisbury in the strongest terms. 'It would therefore appear that the independence of Mutasa had been established to the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government, and it did not lie in the mouth of the Secretary of the Chartered Company to advance it (vassalage to Gungunyana) in support of their case'.

Continuing on this argument, we find that the Imperial Government on 4 May 1891 pointed out to the B.S.A.Co. that their Concession from Gungunyana was clearly inconsistent with the terms of the Convention then existing between Great Britain and Portugal: the B.S.A.Co. were not justified in concluding the agreement with Gungunyana (Blue Book p.226). It is true that a subsequent treaty between Great Britain and Portugal was ratified in July 1891 but there was no evidence to show that the Government had reversed the repudiation. For these reasons, the African Portuguese Syndicate believed they were correct in arguing that any concession from Gungunyana to the Company could not affect the B.S.A.Co. position vis-a-vis the Syndicate. All the B.S.A.Co. could do was to rely on its support from the British Government. I finally told him that however much they may be advised that their claim is morally right, it is well to remember how little probability there is of getting much on it, it being clear that the British Government will in all logic and common sense feel more justified to give control of native territory to a Company like the B.S.A.Co. which is capable of administering it rather...
than to their Syndicate who would be unable to offer any guarantee of safety, justice and good order. Thus even the High Commissioner's and the Imperial Secretary's promises that they would see to it that the matter was brought before a Court of Inquiry was false and only a gamble to gain time until the ratification of the Colquhoun Treaty by the British Government. After the Manyika country was placed under the British South Africa rule by Proclamation of the Secretary of State, afterwards, ratified by the Privy Council, no court would undo it easily. It was even a paradox that on the day the Imperial Secretary wrote to the Syndicate promising a Court of Inquiry the House of Lords gave a judgement in the case of the Mozambique Company vs the B.S.A.Co. which effectually barred the door to the remedy suggested by the Imperial Secretary; this case decided that English Courts had no power to judge an action for trespass on land situated in a country having no court of adequate jurisdiction. Therefore the position of the Syndicate then (1894) was such that it could neither appeal for justice to the English Courts or to any South African Tribunal; as concerns the latter, it was well known that they were limited by the Charter of Justice to matters arising strictly within their own jurisdiction. Thus the Syndicate argued that:

As a matter of fact the only Court having jurisdiction apart from the British Government is the Court of King Umtassa himself and he has already declared that the African Portuguese Syndicate are the rightful owners of the territory in dispute.

Although one may discuss the above quote as a tactical and typical argument of lawyers, one must not forget that the African Portuguese Syndicate was now clutching at every straw trying to save what they believed truly belonged to them in Manyika.

Mutasa had been left alone for a while towards the end of 1892 but in 1893 came renewed B.S.A.Co. pressures to submit himself and his people totally under Company rule.

This time a prisoner, a convicted thief, escaped from jail in Umtali and was suspected by the B.S.A. police to have hidden himself in Mutasa's country. Mutasa denied information of the whereabouts of the thief, whereupon the officer in command of the police gave him 3 days notice to produce the thief - falling which his kraal was going to be burnt. Mutasa was frightened and he ordered a thorough search to be made. In the end the thief was found and escorted to Umtali by two of Mutasa's chief Indunas. On their arrival the escort was also put in jail in the same cell with the prisoner. However, they were released on the next day after representations were made by the representative of the Syndicate.

A few days later Mutasa was ordered by the Company's Civil Commissioner to go and see Jameson, the Administrator, who was in the neighbourhood. Mutasa refused saying he did not know who Jameson was, neither did he acknowledge his authority. Thereupon Captain Heyman arrived at Binga Guru with some

1 CT/1/2/1, Berheim to Rhodesia, 11 Mar. 1893.
2 CT/1/2/3, Solicitors Graham, Vigne and Mallett to High Commissioner, 30 Jun. 1894.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
police and endeavoured by threats to get the King to sign a document acknowledg­
ing the 'Great White Chief' at Salisbury and this, likewise, Mutasa refused to do. (It was after this that the Syndicate received a communication on the 27th February 1893 which informed them that with reference to Mutasa's complaints an enquiry had been held on the spot by an 'independent officer', who ascertained that there was no foundation for them whatever and also that the Indunas who had been sent down by Mutasa were unknown by Mutasa who had denied having sent any message by them).

On the 6th January 1894 Queen Chikanga refused to recognize the Company in any way and declined to furnish labour for them on compulsion. On the 9th January George Fort (acting Resident Magistrate of Umtali) accompanied by certain policemen armed with revolvers proceeded to her kraal for the avowed purpose of compelling Chikanga to supply the required labour. The immediate cause can be traced back to the Saturday 6th January 1894. On that day a man named Brown asked Fort to hire him the African prisoners as he was unable to perform a certain piece of work he had undertaken owing to the scarcity of labour. Fort could not hire the African prisoners but he promised to obtain African labour from the kraals for him. On that afternoon Fort sent Jim, the African interpreter, to the Queen Chikanga's kraal (5-6 miles from Umtali) to command her to send in boys to work. The interpreter returned that evening and reported that he had given the Queen the message but she had asked him from which 'kose or chief' he had come - as she only knew the 'kose or chief' in Umtali who was 'Molongo George', this being the African name for William Moncroft Taylor. This affront made Fort, accompanied by Sergeant Palmer, Jim and Constable Hendrik, to ride out to Chikanga's kraal. Hendrik was left at the foot of the hill on which Chikanga lived, partly to look after the horses and partly to look after the goats and cattle belonging to the Africans which Fort had ordered to be seized. The excuse was that some farmer's cattle (7 of them) had been recently lost in the district and had been traced in the direction of Chikanga's kraal.

Once they reached the kraal they were met by several men, one man - Fambisa or Mufandaedza - was their spokesman. Fort later described Fambisa as 'very impudent in manner'. Fort commanded Fambisa to take him to the Queen. As Fambisa refused to do this, Fort told Sergeant Palmer to seize Fambisa - 'either to compel him to show me the Queen's hut - or else to take him prisoner into Umtali'. Fambisa however struggled free and escaped only to appear a few minutes later with a Martini Henry rifle, bandolier and cartridges. Shortly afterwards, 25 to 30 other Africans, mostly armed with muskets surrounded the three B.S.A. Co. men. The B.S.A. Co. men retreated in the face of this show of force. Before descending the hill, Fort and his party reconnoitred the ground near the kraal and whilst doing so, they saw a number of Africans running down in the direction of Constable Hendrik who was with the cattle. Before Fort and his men could come to his rescue, the Africans managed to disarm Hendrik but in the process Hendrik was injured in the hand in his attempt to resist. Fambisa and the other men then tried to drive their cattle to safety but Fort and Sergeant Palmer followed and, between

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1 CT/1/2/3, Report by B.S.- Fort, 9 Jan. 1894.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

* How could he direct a hideous looking party to his wife?
them, shot Fambisa with six bullets; he fell mortally wounded. After this Fort and his men drove away the cattle with them to Umtali. They were in all about 8 head of cattle.

When Fambisa was shot down, the other Africans fled for a short distance but they soon came charging after the retreating B.S.A.Co. men. The B.S.A.Co. men fired several shots but the Africans only fired one shot - and the B.S.A.Co. men managed to make a safe retreat to Umtali.

However, Fambisa had not died without struggle. He had tried to bring his rifle up to his shoulder to stop the charging B.S.A.Co. men. He also tried to fire the revolver from behind as he ran but, as the white men were on horseback and in the open, he had no chance.

On his return to Umtali, Fort issued a warrant for the arrest of William Monoroft Taylor whom Fort considered as directly responsible for the attitudes and behaviour of both Chikanga and Mufandaedza (Fambisa). Fort also sent an African messenger back to Chikanga to tell her that if she did not send in five boys to work for two months by noon on Thursday the 11th, he would be her enemy. (Fort inserted that the boys would be paid).

If Chichonga does not send in the 5 boys it will be a sign that she is still rebellious and I consider it necessary in the interest of public safety to attack and burn her kraal which is very close to the road from the bodges - and there is no white man's hut or dwelling for a distance of about 5 miles .... I shall of course be present myself and shall give Mr. Snodgrass strict orders to prevent bloodshed if possible. The object of the attack will be to burn the kraal and if possible take prisoners.¹

However, Chikanga herself found it wise to avert this impending doom and she conceded to Fort's demand.

Chichonga has sent in 6 boys to work and as hostages with a very humble message. I have seen Mr. Snodgrass and have informed him that there is to be no expedition against her - and that she is to be respected and treated properly. She has sent me a long statement saying she was away from the kraal when the incident happened and asking if she may have her cattle back.

I would suggest that half of the cattle be returned. There can be no doubt that the Induna who was shot was the cause of all the trouble.²

Why then did Fort order the arrest of W.H. Taylor if Fambisa was the cause of the trouble? The fact is that when Fort was making preparations to destroy Chikanga's kraal, H.J. Taylor remonstrated since Chikanga's kraal was within the limit of the Syndicate's Concession and on receipt of this Fort immediately arrested W.H. Taylor on a charge of inciting natives to rebel against his lawful authority.

¹ Ibid.
² CT/1/2/3, G.S., Fort to Duncan, 11 Jan. 1894.
Mr. W. M. Taylor was not present at the kraal during the disturbances, nor was it subsequently proved that he had ever visited the kraal, or indeed exercised any influence whatever over the natives either for or against the Company. Nevertheless the Magistrate, Fort, adjourned the case from time to time and subsequently convicted both W. M. Taylor and his brother, H. J. Taylor. They were found not guilty on charges of gun-running and trading guns with natives but they were found guilty on bringing the B.S.A. Co. Government into contempt and promoting disaffection and ill-will among the different classes of subjects under that government.

The Court find that you William Moncroft Taylor and you Herbert John Taylor are both guilty of... on all occasions it is before all things necessary that the authority and dignity of any existing government be maintained and this not in the interest of any particular government but in the interest of peace and safety of the whole Commonwealth—more especially is this the case in a pioneer community in which a small white population finds itself surrounded by native tribes. Under these circumstances any attempt to create confusion in the minds of the natives as to the source of authority and any attempt to lessen the dignity and authority of the Queen in the eyes of these natives acquires a grave significance...and the sentence of this Court is that you W. M. Taylor and H. J. Taylor do find two sureties of £100 each, that for the space of the next twelve calendar months from date hereof—you neither of you do approach within one mile radius of Umtassa's kraal—neither for the same period hold any communication whatever with Umtassa, Chimbadzwa and Matika.

Although this judgement was subsequently quashed by a Court of Appeal (Company's own Court of Appeal), W. M. Taylor was so disillusioned and decided to quit the country and this year (1994) saw the battle decisively swing in favour of the B.S.A. Co. and the voice of the African Portuguese Syndicate almost died out in Manyika to remain fighting for a while, at least up to 1897, in Britain.

In dealing with the African Portuguese Syndicate, the Company mixed desperation with bribery. In the early years of their duel over Manyika, the Company showed signs of real desperation to get the Taylors, and therefore the African Portuguese Syndicate, out of Manyika. This is also evident in statements made when W. M. Taylor was arrested in connection with the Chikanga Affair in January 1894.

As to Taylor's arrest, the main thing now is to carry the affair off to the successful issue of a conviction. A failure of justice would be a serious affair and lead to complications. The evidence you have sent me is not sufficient to justify me in ordering a prosecution. You must get evidence from the Queen (Chikanga) or from the natives themselves to the effect that Taylor told...
them not to regard you or the Company and that he represented himself as a person in authority over the district. This is absolutely necessary. You simply must get it...

...Caldecott has instructed Fort to remand Taylor for evidence but in view of improbability of getting it, I suggest that the High Commissioner's warrant for removal from country should be obtained.

But this desperation was also mixed with bribery, as when Bernheim wrote to Rhodes saying:

I made an unofficial offer to them that they would get some claims and land from you if they compromised and stopped fighting against the B.S.A. Company...

Rhodes strongly objected to such an offer as he was quite confident that the African Portuguese Syndicate would not last long. Even Colquhoun had discovered this indomitable confidence in the B.S.A. Co. (chiefs) in 1891 when he proposed that H.J. Taylor and Hamilton Torquis be compensated for the inconveniences they suffered whilst they were under arrest in Umtali.

...Colquhoun knows nothing about the case and his premature opinion on compensation should not be considered.

The self-confidence of the B.S.A. Company was also mingled with caution as when Harris promised Taylor and Torquis that if they returned to Mashonaland, they would be given pioneer rights in compensation for being arrested. (Torquis was the first to accept this offer!) There was also Jameson's assurance to the Umtali residents who had acquired stakes on the concession land that Rhodes would buy the Syndicate men with favours. These moves by the B.S.A. Co. on Syndicate men did not go down the drain:

...Finally as bearing indirectly upon the question, the individuals primarily interested in these allegations of misconduct have quite recently left the service of the Syndicate and we understand that one (W.M. Taylor) has entered the service of the B.S.A. Company and the other (H.J. Taylor) has applied for and obtained permission to enter the service of the B.S.A. police force. We are informed that in the latter case the reason for so doing has been inability to obtain payment of his salary (by Syndicate) amounting to a not inconsiderable sum.

1 CT/1/2/3, Caldecott to Fort, 14 Jan. 1894.
2 CT/1/2/3, (Telegram) Dunca to Dr Harris.
3 CT/1/2/1, Bernheim to Rhodes, 11 Mar. 1893.
4 CT/1/2/1, Jameson to Harris, 23 Mar. 1891.
5 CT/1/2/1.
6 CT/1/2/3, Secretary of B.S.A. Co. (comment on the letter from the Syndicate Solicitors) to High Commissioner, 4 August 1894.
Eventually even W.H. Taylor also ends up in the services of the B.S.A. Company and Pasipanodya asserts that:

In the end the holders of the Beningfield Concession offered their claims to the B.S.A. Company which Rhodes bought up not because of their validity but as a token of consideration to an old friend.¹

However, although the African Portuguese Syndicate seems to have lost their local bid for control of their concession area in Manyika in 1894; the fight continued in Britain through people like Julius Pam and advocate Forster.

The fact that the A.P.S. lost their duel over Manyika with the B.S.A.Co. left Mutasa with no option but to change his attitude towards the Company. The sullen opposition to the B.S.A.Co. gave way to submission and obedience. Mutasa had tacitly supported the A.P.S.:

... Umtassa's professions that he wishes Taylor out of his country are lies.²

He had refused to do business with the B.S.A.Co. without consulting Taylor first:

... Mutasa is refusing to sign any more letters with the Company unless Taylor is present.³

He even refused to accept rent from the Company.⁴ But from 1894, Mutasa's attitude changes: he even later went out of his stronghold to travel for a long distance (for the first time in his life), in order to confer with a B.S.A.Co. official:

An interesting meeting took place last Tuesday on the banks of the Odzani River between Umtasa and A.R.M. Fort, W. Knight of the Times and Mr. Herbert Taylor. At the outset Umtassa who was encamped on the northern bank declared he was prohibited by custom under penalty of death from crossing the river. Eventually, however, Mr H.J. Taylor succeeded in overcoming his superstition on this point and he was carried across accompanied by some 300 followers fully armed.

Umtassa complained about some huts that had been burnt but stated he was willing to pay Hut Tax and wished to cooperate with the Company in every way ... (He believed this is the first time Umtassa has come to meet any white men).⁵

² CT/1/2/1, Representative at Umtali to Dr Jameson, 21 Mar. 1893.
³ Ibid.
⁴ CT/1/2/3, H.J. Taylor to Acting Civil Commissioner, Umtali, 20 November, 1893.
⁵ The Umtali Advertiser, 2 June 1894.
This change of attitude came as a result of the realisation of the hollowness of the Syndicate's pretensions that they had the power and ability to fight against the B.S.A.Co. and the 'recognition' of the undisputed power and authority of the Company. The shooting of Hufandacza (Fambisa), the arrests and trials of the Taylors, and many other instances of 'show of power' had removed the 'doubt' existing in the minds of Mutasa and his people as to the Company's power. Besides the Taylors, Torquis and others helped strengthen this attitude in Mutasa by themselves defecting from the African Portuguese Syndicate.

One would be tempted to argue that the glamour of the presents from Natal (from Syndicate) had by 1894 faded off. However, this idea should not be stretched too far to argue the case of the change of attitude in Mutasa because, basically, Mutasa did not accept the presents (from both the Company and the Syndicate) as an end in itself as G.S. Fort said:

A brief examination will however show that Umtassa has throughout been greedy, venal, double-dealing, and untruthful, that he had knowingly granted the same concession to two parties, that he received presents from each and always leaned to the side he thought for the moment the stronger, or which more constantly plied him with presents and soft speeches. From the above facts it is evident that Umtassa and his Indunas have a supreme disregard for veracity in any form and never allow it to stand in the light of their immediate interests ...

The question of presents should be viewed in the context of politics. Mutasa had no option but to ally with the strongest European party in the hope of retaining and guaranteeing peace and relative independence to his people.

It can be said with all justification that the Syndicate had been a strong menace to B.S.A.Co. activities and well-being in Manyika. I cannot find any easy way out for such a sweeping statement as made by Pasipanodya:

All that can be said about the Taylors as the representatives of the Beningfield Concession is that they functioned as a nuisance value which did affect Mutasa-B.S.A.Co. relations towards the mid-nineties.

Although at the outset (1890-1891) the African Portuguese Syndicate did not seem to hold any important 'effect' on the course and pace of development in Manyika, the opposition happened between 1891 and 1894. They were quite a powerful force and the B.S.A.Co. men on the spot in Manyika acknowledged this, for example G.S. Fort when he said:

I have endeavoured in this report to show what a powerful

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1 CT/1/2/3, Comments on Messrs Graham, Vigne and Mallett's letter thereon to His Excellency the High Commissioner of June 30th 1894, by G.S. Fort.

2 Pasipanodya, 30, quoting CT1/2/2, B.S.A.Co. Agent (Umtali) to Jameson, 21 Mar. 1893.
influence the Syndicate exercises over Mutasa, and that they have used this influence in the past to arouse in him and his people a sullen opposition to the Company. As Umtassa is the most powerful influential chief in this district it is clear that so long as the Syndicate are allowed to have unchecked communication with him that they must be source of danger to the maintenance.1

The African-Portuguese Syndicate and the British South Africa Company were not the only concession hunters who appeared in Manyika. Quite a number of individuals and groups had drifted in Manyika, most of them operating under the wings of the Mozambique Company, and had engaged in mining until the appearance of the B.S.A.Co. which absorbed them. Most of these concession hunters were happy to work under British rule - although some would have preferred the mining laws of the Mozambique Company which were more lenient, for example, where the Mozambique Company required 20 percent of the net profit to be paid to it, the B.S.A.Co. required 50 percent. That the paper has mainly dealt with the African Portuguese Syndicate, following the defeat of the Portuguese (Mozambique Company) by the B.S.A.Co. in Manyika, is because it refused to be subservient to the B.S.A.Co.'s wish that it liquidate. But the B.S.A.Co. was determined to have no competition in Manyika, especially as the African Portuguese Syndicate was demanding to have autonomy over an area,2 which Rhodes was very much interested in:

Rhodes was strengthened in his determination to keep Manica by reports that the gold reef probably ran, not north-south as previously accepted, but west-east from Matabeleland, south of Mount Wedza, across the Sabi into Manica. He gave orders for Manica to be occupied.3

Besides the B.S.A.Co. also wanted Manyika for securing a passage to the seaboard and for white settlement.4 Mutasa tried to manipulate the situation existing between the Syndicate and the Company to his advantage, that is, to get rid of the Company colonial yoke, but the victory of the Company over the Syndicate upset this. It is when the B.S.A.Co. secured this victory that one can say the B.S.A.Co. secured firm possession of Manyika.

This last part of the paper will look at 'party politics' at Binga Guru in the early 1890's. This section will consider what Pasipanodya has summed up as:

1 CT/1/2/3, G.S. Fort to High Commissioner, 30 June 1894.
2 It should be noted that the Syndicate only wanted the B.S.A.Co. to acknowledge that the Syndicate owned the area along the Umtali River (not the whole of Manyika). Thus the activities of the Syndicate men connected with their duel with the B.S.A.Co. were geared towards achieving this.
3 Warhurst, 26.
4 CT/1/1/3, (Telegram), Colquhoun to Harris, 15 Nov. 1890; Colquhoun to Rhodes, 27 Sept. 1890.
The presence of European forces in the late eighties and early nineties produced political factions within the Mutasa dynasty with the result that they had no consistent policy to pursue against these European forces.1

Although Pasipanodya argues that the Beningfield Concession functioned only as a nuisance value in Manyika - B.S.A.Co. relations, he goes on to assert that:

That influence of the Taylors (Beningfield agents) was so much that their court party later carried the day pressing Mutasa to disown his previous treaty with the B.S.A.Co.2

In other words Pasipanodya sees the presence of the African Portuguese Syndicate in Manyika as important only in connection with the court factions which arose at this time with Mutasa cherishing such developments because of the advantages involved:

In this sense it can be said that agents of this concession functioned in Manyika as an alternative force upon which Mutasa could depend for pressure to wring out more favourable treatment from the more powerful B.S.A.Co.3

In the early stages of the Beningfield - B.S.A.Co. struggle, Mutasa stood by his treaty with Colquhoun, and two factors must have been instrumental to induce Mutasa to pursue this policy of close alliance with the B.S.A.Co. The Company had impressed Mutasa as a body with enormous manpower and capital resources, and the fear of the Portuguese menace had not yet completely faded from the mind of Mutasa. Even then Mutasa did not outrightly rebuff the small Beningfield group; he welcomed Beningfield's agents, and kept them interested. In his dealings with the B.S.A.Co. and Beningfield group, Mutasa was not just toeing the B.S.A.Co. Line, but calculating the immediate interests of his dynasty and pursuing a policy to secure these. The interests of the Mutasa dynasty around 1890-91 happened to demand a policy of alliance with a more powerful of the English-speaking groups in Manyika. However, when events changed in such a way that the Portuguese threat was removed (from 1892 there was enough security from the Portuguese) Mutasa changed policy to that of alliance with the Beningfield agents in Manyika. When it comes to this point Pasipanodya asserts that:

... Mutasa had also to consider the strength of the court parties at any one moment, the pro-Beningfield party under Chimbadwa, and the pro-B.S.A.Co. under Matika ... 4

Pasipanodya also describes how the Beningfield agents were also very busy (from 1890) at Mutasa's court gaining influence with the court parties with such effort that the Taylors (William and Herbert), Torquis and Hamilton built up the Chimbadwa party, saying the height of its success came around 1892-4 when Mutasa switched rules from the pro-B.S.A.Co camp to the pro-Beningfield camp. He also says Matika headed the pro-B.S.A.Co camp until he was eventually forced to flee to B.S.A.Co agents at Umali for protection.

adding that even the B.S.A. Co agents in Manyika admitted this triumph of the pro-Beningfield-party in formulating Mutasa's policies.1

To Pasipanodya, these power struggles which occurred at Mutasa's court succinctly sum up the motives for the apparently vacillating policies of Mutasa, Tendai.

However, students of Manyika history in this period must be careful to guard against possible gross misrepresentation of what was happening at Binga Guru. In fact it might be that the idea of factions at Binga Guru was a B.S.A. Co. creation - for they sought to explain the seeming lack of a consistent policy at Binga Guru 'to pursue against European forces'.2 Little did they know that this seeming lack of consistent policy may actually have been Mutasa's policy of survival and had roots in tradition.3

To the B.S.A. Co. Mutasa appeared to be an untrustworthy, greedy and powerless chief always held at ransom in decision - making by the Chimbadzwa and Matika court parties:

It is difficult to learn what takes place in the councils of Untassa with his Indunas. Although this chief is nominally the sovereign in his kingdom yet he can do nothing without the advice and consent of his Indunas. These constitute a government carried on by an elaborate system of intrigue.4

Untassa had throughout been greedy, venal double-dealing and untrustful - he knowingly (received) presents from each, and always leaned on the side he thought for the moment stronger or which more constantly plied him with presents and soft speeches.5

These quotes serve to show what confusion there was in the minds of some or most of the B.S.A. Co. men about what was happening - as regards Mutasa's policy and Binga Guru politics. One indeed wonders whether the Company was being truthful in attributing Mutasa's rejection of them to political factions at Binga Guru. The Company was not here interested in giving the true picture of what was happening: all they wanted was an excuse to chuck out the Taylors (and therefore the A.P.S.) from Manyika:

... faction of (Mutasa's) people under Zimbazo support Taylor and his group. (Mutasa) has little control over his people, the majority following Zimbazo. And yet (Mutasa) also fears the Company. Thus there is no doubt that Taylor has a great influence over (Mutasa) and is rapidly undermining the Company's authority. Thus Taylor must be chucked out of the country especially as he is bound to find out that we were unable to secure

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1 Ibid.  
2 Ibid, 19.  
4 Pasipanodya, 32.  
5 Ibid.
As far as Mutasa's policy was concerned towards the B.S.A.Co. and the A.P.S. there should be no mystery about it; his was a vacillating policy of friendship and hostility to the B.S.A.Co. The looming Portuguese threat in the late eighties and early nineties dictated a policy of alliance with the B.S.A.Co. to secure help in the event of a Portuguese attack. The disappearance of the Portuguese menace through the efforts of the B.S.A.Co. left Mutasa free to flirt with the A.P.S. whose value would be to checkmate the powerful B.S.A.Co. at least, especially as the B.S.A.Co. now not only showed signs of staying for good in Manyika, but were rudely interfering in Manyika life on an increasing scale. For example, the Company expected Mutasa's headmen to supply abundant labour each time it was wanted by white men and then this was not forthcoming there was no thought of offering inducements (favourable) to work - but the Company resorted to destruction of Manyika lives and villages, intimidation and arrests, e.g. their punitive expedition against Chikanga and the shooting of Mufandaedza, an important Manyika man. The B.S.A.Co. was also falling into the Portuguese blunders which had contributed to the disappearance of the Portuguese from Mutasa's court: they were making themselves unpopular with Mutasa by their claims that occupation of Manyika was also based upon a treaty entered into with Gungunyana, who claimed that Mutasa was his vassal. Yet Mutasa wanted to be taken very seriously and to be accepted as the chief of Manyika not subject in any way to Lobengula or Gungunyana.

Thus political philosophy and circumstances in Manyika in the early nineties dictated a policy to snub the B.S.A.Co., but not because a pro-syndicate group had won over a pro-B.S.A.Co. group.

That an anti-B.S.A.Co. group existed is not questionable and it included Chimbadzwa, Mutasa's son and 'heir'. But that another group, pro-B.S.A.Co., existed was led by Matika is doubtful and evidence for it can easily be dismantled. If anybody ever showed a favourable attitude to the B.S.A.Co. it was Mutasa himself. Chimbadzwa was anti-B.S.A.Co. right from the start and Matika did not appear in any different mood either.

Caldecott and myself visited the kraal - not even an Induna came to see us (not even Matika). We not only failed to see the King or an Induna but were treated with scant civility and scarce restrained insolence.

That the A.P.S. did not eventually carry the day was because they failed to get the support of the British Government who were inclined to support the more powerful and resourceful B.S.A.Co. because it could administer over and provide security to the British sphere in Manyika.

Perhaps the above argument on political factions at Binga Guru would be incomplete without discussing Chimbadzwa and Matika as individuals in Manyika politics. Let us look at Matika first. Was Matika really pro-B.S.A.Co.?
When George Fort set out for Binga Guru for the purpose of paying to Mutasa the £100 annual grant from the Chartered Company on the 27th October 1895, Mutasa diplomatically refused to accept it by pretending to be absent from Binga Guru. Matika was party to this deception:

Matika informed us (after some delay) that Mutasa was living at another kraal 2 days away... Taylor was in a tent there and Matika and the other Indunas always went in that direction and returned from Taylor's tent before replying to my questions... It is my belief that Mutasa was in the kraal.

On the 18th November, W. Caldecott (the Public Prosecutor), Little and George Fort again visited Mutasa's kraal for the same purpose of paying Mutasa the £100 rent. Again they were informed that Mutasa and Matika were away.

Matika was not even as big an Induna as the B.S.A.Co. officials in Manyika would have us believe. Looking at the order of rank of Indunas (under Mutasa) who signed Mutasa's petition to the Secretary of State for Colonies on 2nd November 1893, Zimbazo, as son and 'heir', is on top, followed by Musewe before the name Matika appears. Musewe seems to have been the most important head Induna. For example, he was sent down by Mutasa together with Chimbadza on an important mission to see the High Commissioner in South Africa in 1893.

The affidavit by Matika denying any credence to the authority of the above delegation was just in line with Mutasa's policy and diplomacy. Mutasa himself also denied ever sending down this delegation.

On matters concerning African Portuguese Syndicate affairs Matika was always involved favourably. For example, the solicitors of the Syndicate wrote to the High Commissioner:

... the Syndicate up to the present time had succeeded in conveying to Umtassa his yearly tribute... expressing cordial good-will towards the Syndicate and his fear and distrust of the Chartered Company... every payment was duly received by the King and the receipts were counter-signed by his son Zimbazo and his Indunas (including) Matika.

John N. Wilson (the District Surgeon) being cross-examined on the Taylor's appeal trial in 1894 divulged some very interesting detail on the trip to Mutasa.

1. CT1/2/3, Acting Res. Commissioner and Civil Commissioner to George Fort reporting on trip to Mutasa.
2. Ibid.
3. CT/1/2/3, Mutasa's Petition to the Sec. of State, 2 Nov. 1893.
4. CT/1/2/1, H.J. Taylor to High Commissioner, 8 Sept. 1893.
5. CT/1/2/1, Affidavit by Matika.
6. CT/1/2/1, Marshall Htle (Acting Sec. in Sby) to R. Harris, 13 Aug. 1892.
7. CT/1/2/3, Solicitors to High Commissioner, 30 Jun. 1894.
on which he had accompanied Mr Fort to pay the £100 rent. He said:

I asked the native interpreter Jim to ask Matika if he would give us a drink of native beer as we felt hot and thirsty after our journey. It was only after a great deal of trouble that we could get a drink of water, and Matika told the interpreter and said that they had no food, no beer and that he was himself dying from starvation.

The Magistrate Fort, seals our quest to define the position of Matika when he equated Matika with Chimbadzwa and Mutasa in his verdict on the first trial of the Taylors:

... and the sentence of this court is that you W.H. Taylor and H.J. Taylor be fined two sureties of £100 each that for the space of the next 12 calendar months from date hereof - you neither of you do approach within 1 mile radius of Umtassa's kraal - nor for the same period hold any communication whatsoever with Umtassa, Chimbezo or Matika.

That on 21 August 1894 Matika appeared before Henry Scott Turner (the Resident Magistrate of Umtali) asking for protection for himself and his family against Chimbadzwa because Chimbadzwa had threatened to kill him in consequence of his friendly attitude towards the B.S.A. Co. leaves much to be explained. This is the picture the B.S.A. Co. seem to have wanted to create, i.e. to show that they had sympathisers and supporters as opposed to Chimbadzwa and his group who were being influenced by the Taylors.

More research is needed to clarify this move by Matika. Matika had nothing to gain by supporting the B.S.A. Co. except, perhaps, if he was Chiohvu's representative at Binga Guru. Chiohvu (Chakanyuka) was a contender to the throne of Manyika opposed to Chimbadzwa being the next Mutasa (as we shall see in the next few lines). Thus any discussion of a pro-Syndicate groups at Binga Guru must be connected with Chiohvu - a thing which the sources do not show. Further research may clarify this confusion.

It is also worth noting that Matika was a headman under Zimunya by 1900.

Chimbadzwa had reason to support the African Portuguese Syndicate. His heirship to the Manyika crown was an issue of contention in Manyika. Chiohvu, Tendai Mutasa's second son, refused to endorse Chimbadzwa's heirship. His argument was that Chimbadzwa was born before Tendai became King - and as Tendai was not an heir to the kingship but an unsurper - therefore, all children born before he became King were not of royal blood in matters of succession.

Chimbadzwa knew that if his father were to die, the B.S.A. Co. would not

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1 CT/1/2/3, John Wilson (cross-examined on trip to Mutasa Kraal on Appeal Trial of the Taylors), Aug. 1894.
2 CT/1/2/3, Judgement - Inclosure in Imperial Secretary (Graham Bower) to Company Secretary (Harris), 19 March 1894.
3 NUA/2/1/3, NC (Umtali) to CMC, 26 Feb. 1900.
4 N/1/1/11, NC Hartley to CMC, 21 Dec. 1896.
help him or support his attempts to usurp the kingship from the supposed right-
ful heir - Chiobvu (Chakanyuka). But the African Portuguese Syndicate would
sure see to it that he got the Crown.

Chimbadzwa's fears were substantiated by the role the B.S.A. Co. played
in the struggle between Chimbadzwa and Chiobvu in 1895 - when a quarrel between
the two brothers resulted in the death of one of Chiobvu's men and the wounding
of another, besides the capturing of a number of cattle, sheep and goats. The
Chief Native Commissioner tried the case and found Chimbadzwa guilty - and
ordered him to pay back all the animals to Chiobvu as well as handing over all
his cattle and arms to the Company.¹

After this humiliation, which coincided with his realisation that the
A.P.S. was powerless against the mighty Company, Chimbadzwa decided to trek out
of Manyika to Barwe. This was soon after the 1895/96 harvest and he took with
him two of his sisters and at least 500 other people

Mutasa himself was helpless in the struggle for power between his two
sons. He would have certainly wanted to see Chimbadzwa succeed him on the
throne.

... Mutasa says Chimbadzwa is his chief son ...²

Mutasa even gave a free hand to Chimbadzwa over Manyika affairs as the N.C.
(Umtali) observed:

Chimbadzwa is virtually the chief.³

Besides, Mutasa was deeply affected in his heart by the loss of his 'beloved'
men when Chimbadzwa went to Barwe.⁴

But popular opinion in Manyika seemed to suggest that Chiobvu was the
rightful heir - may be for reasons of wanting to uphold the pretence of the
tradition of succession principles.

However, other reasons are also given to explain Chimbadzwa's exodus to
Barwe, that is, scarcity of food in Manyika and that Chimbadzwa's (as well as
the two sisters') mother had recently died having been bewitched, so Chimbadzwa
and the sisters believed, by Chiobvu's mother. The sources say Chimbadzwa and
the sisters then requested Mutasa to banish Chiobvu's mother or to kill her,
thing which Mutasa refused to carry out. Chimbadzwa and sisters therefore
decided to move from Manyika for fear of being bewitched also.

Chimbadzwa and his followers came back to Manyika in 1897 having found
life in Barwe unbearable, for Makombe (the King of Barwe) was outrightly opposed
to Chimbadzwa's attempt to establish an independent dynasty in Barwe. On arrival
in Manyika, he found that the B.S.A. Co. had endorsed that Chiobvu was the heir

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
³ N/1/1/11, NC Nesbitt to CNC, 6 April, 1896.
⁴ N/1/1/11, NC Hulley to CNC, 21 Dec. 1896.
by giving him an allowance of £5 a month.¹

What would have happened in Manyika had Chimbadzwa not died in 1901 (before Tendai's death in 1902) can only be speculated on. Perhaps one would not be far wrong to suggest that Chimbadzwa's death before his father probably saved Manyika from another fierce civil war (as these which occurred between 1795 and 1870).

When Chakanyuka succeeded his father in 1902 he made sure that the Chiobvu title became institutionalised as the title of the heir to Manyika's kingship, thus making sure that none from the Chimbadzwa line would ever succeed to the throne.

¹ NUA/2/1/4, NC to GNC, 21 Dec. 1896.