THE STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF SANCTIONS AS A
DEMOCRATIZING TOOL IN THE THIRD WORLD IN AN
EMERGING MULTI-POLAR WORLD: A CASE STUDY OF
ZIMBABWE

BY

TAMUKA CHARLES CHIRIMAMBOWA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

APRIL 2012
DEDICATION
To my daughter, Luyando Sibusisiwe Chirimambowa.
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people have contributed to the success of this project. These include family
members, friends and colleagues in the MSc IR class of 2012; Captain Phillip Vumba,
Dorothy Hove, Patience Matunja, Tatenda Makoni, Nicolle Chido Manjeya, Aurthur
“Diplomat” Antandika, Muneyi Muchanyuka, Walter Sengai Chirambadare and Gladman
Njanji; for the support and amazing collegiality. Special mention goes to Machinda
“Chartman” Marongwe, Mr. Simon Badza and Blessing Makunike for encouraging me to
enroll, Dr. Charity Manyeruke for the motherly advice and guidance throughout this
course and most profoundly my supervisor Mr. Mhandara for the patience, understanding
and making this work possible.

My parents have been very supportive; they have always been there. This project fulfills
the dreams of my father, Tafirevu Charles Chirimambowa and my mother Catherine
Chirimambowa. To my wife, Mutinta Himunyanga and Daughter Luyando Sibusisiwe
Chirimambowa, for the endurance and patience. My brothers and friends; Maxwell
Saungweme, Showers Mawowa, Godfrey “Vlad” Musvoto, Trevor Chirimambowa,
Takura Zhangazha, Archibald Sifiso Mhlanga, Tinashe Chimedza, Witness Dab Hussain,
Tafadzwa Nyakurwa and Edmore Mhlanga; thank you for the dreams and inspiration that
we shared. Special mention goes to Philani Zamchiya and Ricky Mukonza for their
comments and constructive criticism of my work.
# Table of Contents

DEDICATION ................................................................................................................. i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. ii

ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................ v

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1
  1.2. Statement of the Problem .................................................................................. 2
  1.3. Justification of Study ....................................................................................... 3
  1.4. Objectives ......................................................................................................... 3
  1.5. Research Questions .......................................................................................... 4
  1.6. Delimitation/Scope of Study ............................................................................. 4
  1.7. Limitations ....................................................................................................... 5
  1.8 Methodology ...................................................................................................... 5
    1.8.1 Data Collection Techniques ..................................................................... 5
  1.9. Conceptual Framework and Literature Review .............................................. 6

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUALISING SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS .. 11
  2.1 The Authority to Sanction .................................................................................. 11
  2.2 The History of Sanctions in International Relations ......................................... 11
  2.3 Economic Sanctions .......................................................................................... 15
  2.4 The Shortcomings of the Sanctions Thesis ....................................................... 17
  2.5 From Sanctions to Smart Sanctions ................................................................. 19

CHAPTER 3: GENESIS OF THE SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE AND THE COUNTER- SANCTIONS STRATEGIES ................................................................. 22
  3.1 The Genesis of the Zimbabwe Crisis ................................................................. 22
  3.1 The Genesis of Sanctions and the Zimbabwe Crisis ......................................... 24
  3.3 The Nature of Sanctions .................................................................................... 30
  3.4 Towards Multipolarity: China and the Reshaping of the Global Economic Relations ... 32
  3.5 Zimbabwe’s Counter-Sanctions Strategies ....................................................... 35
    3.5.1 Sino Factor- Political, Economic and Military role .................................. 35
    3.5.2 Ideology .................................................................................................... 36
**ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BICC</td>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community for West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoZ</td>
<td>Government of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC-T</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change Tsvangirayi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitutional Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK DFID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African Union Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZESA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIDERA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUPCO</td>
<td>Zimbabwe United Passenger Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

The increasing use of sanctions as a democratisation tool has elicited many questions regarding their strategic relevance and effectiveness in an emerging multi-polar world. The rise of China, India, Brazil, resurgence of Russia and other emerging economies has meant the reshaping and shift of centers of global economic power relations. This has presented challenges in particular to the Western world in global governance. Given that sanctions have been traditionally used to force perceived recalcitrant states to comply with Western norms of democracy; the effect of multipolarity has meant alternative pressure points for nations slapped with Western sanctions. This study sought to assess the strategic relevance of sanctions as a democratizing tool in an emerging multipolar world, using Zimbabwe as a case study. Qualitative research methodology was adopted in this study. This included the use of a case study, and secondary review of existing literature to obtain information for the study. The study sought to answer the following questions (i) what is the nature and objectives of sanctions on Zimbabwe? (ii) Did the sanctions achieve their objectives? (iii) What were Zimbabwe’s responses? (iv) Were the sanctions effective? Therefore, broadly the study sought to interrogate what lessons or conclusions can we draw from Zimbabwe’s case? The findings of this research established that Zimbabwe is indeed under sanctions. The so-called smart or restrictive measures are real sanctions. The study was inconclusive on whether the sanctions achieved their objectives or not? Similarly, neither could it be argued that the sanctions were ineffective or effective. Zimbabwe’s sanctions case is a complex one with different and conflicting outcomes. Zimbabwe devised five counter sanctions strategy which were (i) The Sino Factor (ii) Ideology (iii) The SADC Lobby (iv) Nexus of Global Players-Local issues: The Case of Diamonds (v) The incorporation of the Movement for Democratic Change into government. These strategies ensured the survival of the Zimbabwe government. It can therefore be concluded that the use of sanctions as democratisation tools needs a careful and thorough study before their imposition. It is also recommended that sanctions need a continuous review, to adjust them to the emerging or obtaining political environment if they are to influence democratic transitions in the Third World.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The debate on the efficacy of sanctions has featured more prominently in the last decade given their widespread use particularly after the invasion of Iraqi by the US and its ‘coalition of the willing’. This debate raises serious questions on the strategic relevance and effectiveness of sanctions as democratisation tools in an emerging multipolar world. Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2000:2) observe that, “It is a reasonable generalization to characterize international economic sanctions as overused, ineffective, and unfair”; and further argue that, “sanctions are overused as demonstrated by the unwieldy number of sanctions episodes currently in force. They are ineffective given the number of seeming failures in sanctions policy”. There is emerging consensus that sanctions as tools of statecraft have generally failed to be effective. This debate is further captured by Pape (1997; 1998), Elliott (1998) and Baldwin (1998 and 2000), where they quiz the utility of sanctions as a tool of statecraft. Therefore, it can thus be argued that despite their continued use, there is an emerging consensus that they are either redundant or need to be revised if ever they are to be effective. Barber (1979:367) and Doxey (1980:9,125) share the same pessimism on the utility of sanctions and argue that they are more dependent on the link between economic pressure and political goals despite that sanctions have goals which may be elusive and at the same time be un-related to the economic stress that sanctions cause.

Taking cognisant of the contrasting schools of thought on the effectiveness of sanctions, this study sought to interrogate Zimbabwe’s sanctions defeating strategy and the continued relevance of sanctions as a democratisation tool in an emerging multipolar world. Whilst it can be totally argued that sanctions are effective or ineffective, the increasing diffusion of global power among different actors as well the gravitation from the state-centric approach to international relations has meant decreasing influence of Western universalism on notions of democracy and international behaviour and norms. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to this study to establish what has this
reconfiguration of international relations meant to the utility of sanctions as democratisation tools based on lessons from Zimbabwe.

Chingono (2010:193) observes that, the most comprehensive study of all time on the effectiveness of sanctions is the one by Hufbauer et al, (1997); which states that 49% of the cases studied revealed that democratisation was the major goal of sanctions. Therefore, the link between sanctions and democratisation in particular whether causality does exist is paramount to this study. However, Pape (1997:92) contends that sanctions are generally ineffective and thus observes that, “my study challenges the emerging optimism about the effectiveness of economic sanctions. The decisive question I ask is whether economic sanctions are an effective tool for achieving international political goals, and if so, under what conditions”. This pessimism of sanctions as effective tools of achieving international goals is shared by Smith-Hohn (2010), Chingono (2010) and Raftopolous (2007) who question the continued relevance of the sanctions regime slapped on Zimbabwe by the West. They argue that instead of leading to democratisation the sanctions regimes on Zimbabwe has acted as an inhibitor or impediment to democratic reforms, thus producing contradictory results. Can it therefore be concluded that Western backed sanctions proved ineffective on Zimbabwe?

1.2. Statement of the Problem
The strategic relevance of sanctions as democratisation tools or tools of statecraft in an emerging multipolar world has increasingly come under question the world over. Similarly, the effectiveness of Western embargoes as a democratisation tool in Zimbabwe has been queried by many. At the present moment, sanctions seem not to have had the desired impact of compelling Zimbabwe to adhere to democratic norms and standards. However there seems to be growing consensus that they are obsolete and only serve as an irritant, despite their continued use. If sanctions are not as effective as argued, this prompts the question, what could have been their motivation in the Zimbabwean case? Were there any other agendas, for the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe, by Britain and her western allies; and why their continued use?
Moreover, the rise of multipolarity and in particular the rise of China as an alternative economic partner has cast in doubt the continued relevance of the Western imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. Therefore, this study sought to investigate the relevance of sanctions as a democratisation tool in an emerging multipolar world.

1.3. Justification of Study

The assumed effectiveness of sanctions on the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa and supposedly in Rhodesia gave credence to the notion of sanctions as a peaceful tool of inducing regime change as opposed to war. Therefore, sanctions were seen as a panacea in dealing with recalcitrant states and coercing them to comply with international norms without the use of force. However emerging literature has questioned the continued relevance of sanctions in influencing state behaviour. This study thus, seeks to ascertain the relationship between sanctions and democratisation. It will seek to examine the relevance of sanctions as a democratising tool, in particular whether sanctions aid or inhibit democratisation. By answering these questions; it is expected that this will lead to an understanding of the politics of sanctions and inform political actors interested in Zimbabwe’s transition to democracy.

Sanctions have been argued to impediments or inhibitors to democratic reform, and this has been mostly so given the rise of China as global economic and political player. This has seen China giving unconditional aid to the developing countries and at the same time creating alternative sources of revenue which has diminished Western influence within the developing world. Furthermore, the formation of the inclusive government has led to a debate on the continued relevance of sanctions. This study will therefore contribute to the debate on whether sanctions have worked and are still necessary. This study will also seek to contribute to the debate on the genesis of sanctions as there two main contending schools of thought, with one pitted in the governance deficit paradigm and the other in the nationalist and anti-imperialist discourse.

1.4. Objectives

The objectives of this study are as follows:
a) To ascertain the relationship between sanctions and democratisation
b) To establish the extent to which sanctions can successfully isolate individuals without any collateral damage to the civilian population.
c) To establish the sanctions fighting strategies adopted by Zimbabwe and how effective they were.
d) To determine impact of multipolarity on the continued use of sanctions as a democratising tool in the Third World.

1.5. Research Questions

This research posed four major questions in an attempt to ascertain the strategic relevance of sanctions as a democratising tool in the Third World, in an emerging multi-polar world.

a) To what extent were the applied sanctions effective in pushing for the democratization of Zimbabwe?
b) Is there a difference between ‘smart sanctions’ and ‘traditional sanctions’?
c) Are sanctions an effective democratization tool in the Third World in an emerging multi-polar world?
d) What were the counter-sanctions strategies adopted by Zimbabwe?

1.6. Delimitation/Scope of Study

This study will confine itself to the study of the effectiveness of sanctions on the democratisation process in Zimbabwe from the period 2000-2011. The scope of the study will be mainly to ascertain the impact of Western imposed embargoes whether they have led to democratic regression or not. In this study the word sanction is used in its generic sense and there is no delineation or any spirited attempt to be locked in the lingo that has beset the sanctions debate in Zimbabwe. This study will adopt Doxey’s view of sanctions as “penalties linked to real or alleged misconduct” (in Nossal 1989:306). Thus all actions meted out on Zimbabwe in the post 2000 era by the Western governments either as a form of punishment or to induce democratic reform will be interpreted as sanctions. This helps to clarify the subject under study and to enable to evaluate the effectiveness of the Western imposed sanctions regime on the democratisation process of Zimbabwe.
1.7. Limitations

This research paper focused more on Zimbabwe’s sanctions fighting strategies and the effectiveness of sanctions. The study relied more on desk research to gather data and this had its own limitations as official information on China and Zimbabwe’s deals is regarded as confidential and not meant for public scrutiny. Furthermore, case studies have generally been viewed to give a more ‘nuanced context and details of the subject under study’ (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005) but it should also be borne in mind that the major weaknesses of a case study as Leedy and Ormrod (2005) note, is that one cannot be sure that the findings are generalizable to other situations. More so, it should be noted that this study will be more reliable on secondary data in particular media, archival documents and journal articles this will limit the generalisations that may emerge from the findings.

1.8 Methodology

The researcher used the case study of Zimbabwe in analyzing the efficacy of sanctions as a democratizing tool in a rising multi-polar world. Since the main purpose of this research was to interrogate the efficacy of sanctions as a democratizing tool in the Third World; the use of a case study helped in giving a detailed contextual evolution of the process of the politics of sanctions and democratization in the Third World. The unique and/or exceptional characteristics which the case study revealed can inform practice or understanding of the sanctions regime upon Zimbabwe and how they have reconfigured its foreign and domestic policies. But it should also be borne in mind that the major weaknesses of a case study as Leedy and Ormrod (2005) note, is that one cannot be sure that the findings are generalisable to other situations.

1.8.1 Data Collection Techniques.

The study relied on the use of secondary data in the form of published literature on the subject of sanctions in general and on Zimbabwe, newspaper and internet reports detailing activities undertaken by the governments in question and any of their representatives. Given the high levels of secrecy on information on Zimbabwe and China and limited official data in the public domain the study relied more on secondary data sources outlined above. Nachmias and Nachmias (1996: 307) contend that, “With the aid
of such secondary sources, we can better understand the historical context; by analysing
data collected in different times on similar issues, we can also describe and explain change”. Therefore the heavy reliance on secondary data analysis in this study helped us
to have a broader understanding and to decipher the patterns of the politics of sanctions
and democratization in Zimbabwe.

1.9. Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

The term democracy indicates both a set of ideals and a political system. Theoretical
democracy is a principle of legitimacy. Bollen (1990:9) defines, “political democracy as
the extent to which the political power of the elites is minimized and that of the non-elites
is maximized. By political power the writer is referring to the ability to control national
governing systems. The elites are those members of society who hold a disproportionate
amount of the political power. These include the members of the executive, judicial,
legislative branches of the government, as well as leaders of political parties, local
governments, business, labour unions, professional associations or religious bodies”. Thus,
democracy maybe interpreted as a system based on competition for public office,
participation of the citizens and accountability of public officials.

Dahl (1971:8) defines democracy as “regimes that have been substantially popularized
and liberalized that is highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation”. Thus
key to this perspective is the ability of a polity to be subjected to highly inclusivity
(citizen participation) and extensive open public contestation (public accountability).
Share (1987:527) also argues that; “More concretely democracies must provide for (1)
Free and contested elections for the selection of political representatives (2) basic civil
rights, and (3) clearly established ‘rules of the game’ that protect these democratic
liberties. The issue of people sovereignty or delegation of power lies key to the theory of
democracy, but nevertheless it is a complex and compound concept. It is a set of ideals
where one concept cannot substitute each other and at the same time more of one concept
and less of the other does not lead a democracy. Mesquita et al (2005:441) contend that
“Democracy is a compound concept whose dimensions are not (or are only partially)
substitutable for each other. That is not only does no single institutional characteristic,
such as the presence of elections or a particular executive constraint denote the existence, but a very high level of participation cannot substitute for the scarcity of fair elections or an absence of openness in the recruitment of candidates”. Therefore democracy is an abstract concept which is an aggregation of many dimensions.

Most definitions of democracy are self-consciously multidimensional. They typically enumerate a number of conceptually distinct properties or characteristics, that must be present before a polity can be declared fully democratic (Mesquita et al; 2005:440). More so, Dahl (1971:3) pontificates that a democracy must have 8 institutional guarantees, while Lasswell (1950:234-235) defines democracy as consisting 7 characteristics, Linz and Stepan (1996:7-15) identify 5 areas that are present in a consolidated democracy, and Mesquita et al, (2005:441) observe that, the commonly used Freedom House index to measure democracy, developed by Gastil (1984, 1988, 1989) relies on a seven point composite score. From Dahl to the Freedom House index there is a common thread of political liberties and rights coming out as prerequisites for political democracy. The table below is a summation of the various characteristics that exhibit the multidimensional nature of democracy as identified by Dahl, Lasswell, Linz and Stepan, and Freedom House Index.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dahl</th>
<th>Lasswell</th>
<th>Linz and Stepan</th>
<th>Freedom House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to join and form organizations</td>
<td>Allocation of power that is inclusive</td>
<td>Free civil society</td>
<td>Freeness and fairness of elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to vote</td>
<td>Scope of power that is liberal</td>
<td>Autonomous and valued political society</td>
<td>Electoral law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
<td>Balanced and dispersed distribution of power</td>
<td>The rule of Law</td>
<td>Campaigning for the executive and legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility for public office</td>
<td>Elite recruitment that is egalitarian and open</td>
<td>Relatively effective bureaucracy</td>
<td>Political competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right of political leaders to compete for support and votes</td>
<td>Sense of widely diffused self-responsibility</td>
<td>An institutionalized economic society</td>
<td>Political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative sources of information</td>
<td>Impartiality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minority protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free and fair elections</td>
<td>Decisions that are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In as much as democracy is about rule by the people and how these people select their leaders and the consequent relation that ensues between them and the selected leadership, as put by Schumpeter (1962:262) that, “the role of the people is to produce a government” and therefore “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”; it can be stated that political democracy is primarily concerned with political and juridical equality. However, in the Marxian sense political democracy has no value in itself, for it is only a superstructure of bourgeois and capitalistic oppression and political democracy is thus reduced to capitalistic democracy.

Modern democracy is based not on participation only but on representation, it presupposes not direct exercise of power but delegation of power, it is not, in short, a system of self-government but a system of control and limitation of government. Thus Lipset (1959:71) observes political democracy as, “a political system which provides regular constitutional opportunities for changing government officials… permits the largest part of the population to influence decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office”. No one should therefore deny that governing for the people is the very purpose of a democratic government; for nobody affirms that democratic structures are an end in themselves. Democracy is not merely a manner of governing; it is a form of government, a political system. It is fair to say, therefore, that the standard provided by a constitutional government that guarantees political rights and liberties is the average standard and that is what democracy theory means.

One of the main goals of sanctions has been regime change agenda and democratisation, most particularly in the Third World. Whilst there are a plethora of reasons for states to
sanction other states; Oechslin pontificates that, “In practice, sanctioning states have indicated a variety of goals but the most frequent by far is to promote democratization by pushing autocratic (or even despotic) regimes out of power (46% of the cases in the 1914—2000 period)” (2011:2).

The role of sanctions as a democratization tool has continuously been questioned in the academic and policy circles. It has been mostly argued that sanctions are not that efficacious in the democratization process of autocratic states but rather worsen the situation. Goldsmith (2007) observes that sanctions have been mostly ineffective in achieving political and economic objectives. He further argues that, “Of all cases examined starting in World War I, only about one third were judged to be even partly successful. These cases included multilateral sanctions and unilateral embargos and boycotts by the United States and other countries, aimed at a variety of economic and political objectives” (Goldsmith, 2007: 4). It can be observed that economic sanctions have been hardly successful or have had minimal impact in influencing governments or states to democratic reform (see, Drury et al, 2010:1-2; Hufbaeur et al, in Oechslin 2011:4, and Oeschlin:2).

Drury et al (2010:1-2), argues that when states are, ‘threatened by and react negatively to coercive external policies, such as economic sanctions… while democracy sanctions tend to be counterproductive by reversing political liberalization’. Thus, sanctions sometimes result in un-intended consequences creating new complexities that reverse democratic transitions in the Third World. For instance, Zimbabwe modified its foreign policy to ‘Look East’ and the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) also contemplated reciprocating the sanctioning Western countries by threatening to appropriate their companies. Addressing delegates at a ZANU PF Party Conference in Mutare in December 2010, President Mugabe proposed a sanctions fighting strategy that entailed taking over companies from sanctioning countries; “this conference must come with a real program, a solid program of how we decide to fight sanctions. What is our anti-sanctions program? We have been too far too good for malicious people for countries which seek to destroy us. Why should we continue to have 400 British companies here operating freely with Britain benefiting from us... We can start with that 51%. In some cases, we must read the riot act to the
British and others and say to them, 'This is only 51% we have taken. Unless you remove sanctions, we will go 100%,' if they insist that the sanctions must remain” (http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-17/world/zimbabwe.mugabe_1_zimbabwean-president-robert-mugabe-mugabe-and-tsvangirai-democratic-change?_s=PM:WORLD).

Preliminary literature pontificates that Sanctions do not necessarily democratize perceived autocratic regimes, but sometimes they induce hostile reception. Oechslin (2011:3), observes that, “Referring to the situation in Iraq, Mueller and Mueller (1999:49) even note that ‘the country’s political leadership sometimes seems more interested in maximizing the nation’s suffering than in relieving it.’ Similar evidence can be found in other target countries. For instance, in February 2002, Zimbabwe’s ruler responded to the threat of sanctions by ‘promising’ to accelerate and broaden the implementation of his disastrous economic policies…” Therefore, the relationship between sanctions and democratisation is complex and difficult one, with different nuances informed by particular political contexts.
CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUALISING SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2.1 The Authority to Sanction
Bowden and Farrall (2007:1) observes that, the mandate to impose sanctions lies with the United Nations and the legal basis of UN sanctions can be found in the UN Charter, Chapter VII, Articles 39-42, which empowers the UN to maintain or restore international peace and security through various enforcement measures, including sanctions and the use of military force. This mandate has gradually been broadened to permit the institution of measures to deal with massive human rights violations, breaches of international humanitarian law, transgressions of democratic rule, and acts of aggression where military forces have crossed national borders (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 374). According to Article 41 of the UN Charter these sanctions may include ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations’ (Bowden and Farrall, 2007:1). However, the application of sanctions in international relations has been in some cases either “unilateral”, or “collective action against a state considered to be violating International Law” designed “to compel that state to confirm [to the law]” (Daoudi and Dajani, 1983:5-8). Furthermore, according to Bowden and Farrall (2007:1), “sanctions can be collective, as in the case of mandatory United Nations (UN) sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council”, or “they can also be bilateral, as in the case of measures currently applied against Zimbabwe and Fiji by the Australian (and other) governments”. Therefore sanctions may be imposed by the UN, a regional organisation or a country to register its displeasure or demand certain behavioural change from the sanctioned state, and this may include a range of measures.

2.2 The History of Sanctions in International Relations
Sanctions have traditionally been used as an instrument to achieve political objectives. Paramount to the use of sanctions has been to exert economic pressure that will lead to compliance from the sanctioned state. Whilst there is some veiled line between political and economic sanctions; it should be noted that this difference is bifurcated. Barber (1979:1) observes that; “Economic sanctions are economic measures directed to political objectives. They are normally supplemented by other measures, such as the severance or
restriction of diplomatic and cultural ties…” More so, Davis and Engerman (2003:187) observe that; “sanctions include the withholding of diplomatic recognition, the boycotting of athletic and cultural events and the sequestering of property of citizens of the targeted country”. This second tier usually pertains to political sanctions. They further contend that; “…the forms of sanctions that attract the most attention and that are likely have the greatest impact are composed of various restrictions on international trade, financial flows or the movement of people” (Davis and Engerman, 2003:187). In assessing the efficacy of sanctions, it is imperative to understand the objectives of sanctions and measure their efficacy as a policy of statecraft within a given realm. Sanctions have three objectives: “primary goals: to encourage democracy, stop human rights violations and suppression of internal opposition; enforce peace agreements; assist in the pursuit of individuals for prosecution before international courts; ensure compliance with treaty obligations; secondary goals: to promote the sanctioned state’s reputation domestically and internationally and tertiary goals: to maintain international structures and norms” (Sitt et al, 2010:24, see also Barber, 1979:368-73). Therefore, in some cases sanctions may be successful in secondary objectives while they are a failure in the primary objectives.

Collins (2009:71) posits that, “the literary corpus on economic sanctions extends back well over two thousand years, as Thucydides examined in 431 B.C. the role of Athens’ embargo on Megara as a catalyst for the Peloponnesian War”. On the other hand, Davis and Engerman (2003:188) observe that; “in the nineteenth century, economic sanctions consisted primarily of pacific blockades that involved the deployment of a naval force by a country or a coalition of countries to interrupt commercial intercourse with certain ports or coasts of a state with which these countries were not at war. Although most naval blockades involved wars, pacific blockades (a term originated about 1850 to distinguish those blockades within a declared war from those between nations legally on peaceful terms) evolved gradually over time as a coercive tool, short of war, designed to compel recalcitrant nations to pay their debts (often reparations) and to settle other international disputes”. These sanctions episodes were more of bilateral as by then there was no formal platform or world body to institute sanctions and implement them. The formal legal discussion of the legitimacy of pacific blockades, or sanctions more generally, only
occurred with the formation of the League of Nations in the twentieth century, and then later of the United Nations, and for the League of Nations, the power to deploy sanctions was primarily embodied in article 16 of the League's Covenant, which authorized collective economic and military action against a state that resorted to war in disregard of the League's Covenant (Davis and Engerman, 2003: 189).

Thus the subject of sanctions dates long back in history but for the purpose of the study, the focus was more on the sanctions episode from the twentieth century as Collins (2009:72) argues that; “Analysis of economic sanctions employing rigorous social science methodology did not appear, however, until the mid-twentieth century when in 1945, Albert Hirschman penned one of the first rigorous theoretical explorations of economic sanctions in ‘National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade’”. On the hand, Barber (1979:376) traces the subject of sanctions to the aftermath of the First World War and argues that, “…indeed it was the threat rather than the implementation of sanctions that settled a boundary dispute between Albania and Yugoslavia which arose after the First World War...Britain demanded that the League Council be called to consider sanctions and almost immediately Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw to the old line”. Therefore, sanctions have been mostly used as an instrument of coercion in international relations, but they have had varied fortunes in achieving foreign policy goals. As for the League of Nations, it used sanctions in four instances: in 1921 (versus Yugoslavia); 1925 (versus Greece); 1932-1935 (versus both Paraguay and Bolivia, to settle the Chaco War); and, most notably and most unsuccessfully, in conjunction with the United Kingdom against Italy in 1935-1936 after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (Davis and Engerman, 2003:189). Furthermore, the United Nations Security Council was able to apply sanctions in two instances between 1945 and 1990 because of Cold War politics; 1966 Southern Rhodesia and 1977 Apartheid South Africa (Bowden and Farall, 2007:1, Tostensen and Bull 2002:373).

It has been argued that sanctions have been noted as progressive in particular by those opposed to war. Davidsson (2002:2) observes that; “the sanctions imposed on South Africa and the subsequent end of the apartheid regime strengthened the belief, particularly among progressive circles, that economic sanctions constitute a peaceful
alternative to the use of force. Imposing sanctions was therefore seen as morally justifiable as observed by Barber (1979:367) that, “some of those who oppose the use of force argue from the importance of moral factors in international relations, emphasising collective action to sustain prevailing international norm”. However; Hufbauer et al (1990:11) see sanctions as representing something between a “diplomatic slap on the wrist” and “extreme measures such as covert or military measures”. Thus, sanctions can be a pre-cursor to war, as it would justify the use of force after the pursuit of available peaceful means. This is more evident in the provisions of the UN Charter where powers implement and enforce sanctions, with armed forces if necessary, are given in articles 2(4), 39, 41, 42, 43 and 46 of that organization’s charter and in the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950. Article 2(4), as it has come to be interpreted; it imposes no constraint on individual states undertaking coercive measures short of war (Elagab, 1988:200-201; Whiteman, 1971:361; Ziring et al, 1995:358; and Doxey, 1997:1-7).

With the end of history, and the fall of man as articulated by Fukuyama (1992), that meant the emergence of a unipolar world, dominated by the United States. Therefore, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent demise of the Soviet bloc, resulted in a world order dominated and shaped by the United States (Davidsson, 2002:3). This set the United States to taking over the agenda of the United Nations and begins to dictate the agenda in the international arena as it sought to cement its hegemony. With the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990, rose an ample opportunity for the United States and her Western allies to assert their newly found hegemony. The dormant powers of the Security Council were resuscitated, and Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 was passed, marking what Cortright and Lopez term “The Sanctions Decade” (Davidsson, 2002:3). This saw a rise in the use of sanctions by the UN, regional organisations and countries. Davidsson (2002:2) notes that from 1990 to 2000, the U.N. Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Iraq, Haiti, Libya, former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Angola (UNITA), Cambodia and Afghanistan, while several other countries were slapped with non-economic sanctions, particularly arms embargoes and diplomatic sanctions. Furthermore, regional organisations such as; the Organisation of American States (OAS), the European Union and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), imposed economic sanctions, independently from, or in conjunction with UN sanctions

According Sitt et al, (2010:35) traditional sanctions include; “broader economic sanctions, industrial and scientific, political and diplomatic sanctions, and fewer social and cultural exchanges” and they “do not differentiate between the state (i.e. the ruling elite) and broader society”. Traditional forms of comprehensive sanctions were usually based on the fact that isolation will cause civilians to rebel against their leaders, thereby compelling them to change the politics that prompted the sanctions in the first place. Thus, traditional sanctions typically come at the expense of the civilians or at least ignoring the interests of the broader citizenry (Sitt et al, 2010:35). Therefore traditional sanctions were premised, “on what has come to be commonly known as the civilian pain is equal to political gain formula (Civilian pain=Political gain), that is, by inflicting pain or punishment of a population of a given territory it will lead to demands for policy/regime change by the affected populace and lead to compliance in behaviour as per the expectations of the sanctioneer” (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 374, see also; Davidsson, 2002:6 ,Nossal, 1989:309 and Baldwin, 1999:88). Davidson (2002:2) observes that, “scholarly work before 1990 on economic sanctions and related measures, such as boycotts, centred on a handful of disparate cases: The Arab oil boycott, the UN sanctions imposed on Rhodesia, the sanctions imposed on the South African apartheid regime and the COMAC trade restrictions imposed by the West on the Socialist bloc”. In most of these cases, the Western countries have been on the forefront of sanctioning other countries. However, “the most notable sanctions were the Arab oil boycott which may have chilled the enthusiasm of some Western politicians of that period; since this weapon appeared for the first time in the “wrong” hands as reflected by scholarly debate in the United States and moderated by Richard B. Lillich; then reflected the ambivalent attitudes toward economic sanctions prompted by the Arab oil boycott” (Davidsson, 2002:2).

2.3 Economic Sanctions

Davidsson (2002:1) in his definition of sanctions tries to separate economic and general sanctions whereby he defines the former as “coordinated restrictions on trade and/or
financial transactions intended to impair economic life within a given territory’. To the extent that measures intend to impair ‘economic life within a given territory’ through restrictions on trade and/or finance, they constitute, for the purposes of the study, economic sanctions’. Therefore, the purpose or intention becomes paramount in understanding whether measures taken intend to harm the economy of the given territory qualifies them to be called economic sanctions. Any other measures without the primary object of impairing the economy cannot, be qualified as economic sanctions; “Selective or individualized measures, such as restrictions on specific goods (arms, luxury items, some forms of travel), are therefore not considered as economic sanctions. Symbolic economic deprivations, such as partial withholding of aid, do not amount to economic sanctions if their intended effect is primarily to convey displeasure, rather than to affect the economy” (Davidsson, 2002:1). This position rings well with United States’ stance on the Zimbabwe sanctions as outlined in press communiqué published in the Business Day (South Africa); “The US does not maintain sanctions against the people of Zimbabwe or the country of Zimbabwe. The US sanctions target individuals and entities that have undermined democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe. More specifically, the US sanctions target individuals who, among other things, are senior officials of the government, have participated in human rights abuses related to political repression and/or have engaged in activities facilitating public corruption by senior officials. The US sanctions also target entities owned or controlled by the Zimbabwean government or officials of the government. Unless a transaction involves a blocked individual or entity; US citizens may, and are encouraged to, conduct business in, and trade with, Zimbabwe and its people” (http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=125541).

The implied theory of economic sanctions is that “…by crippling the economy within a territory, the authorities of that territory are prevented from satisfying popular needs such as the supply of commodities, services and work. Massive shortages that ensue are supposed to cause popular discontent, which would translate into a call for the removal of the authorities or a pressure on the authorities to comply with external demands. The theory is thus predicated on causing civilian pain to achieve a political gain”, (Davidsson, 2002:6). Sanctions maybe comprehensive, comprising the full gamut of means (trade
boycotts and embargoes across the board), or selective, covering only certain areas. Furthermore, they also may be mandatory by decision of the UN Security Council, or voluntary, leaving their implementation to the respective sanctioning states. Moreover, sanctions may be imposed unilaterally by one state against another, or multilaterally by abroad front of states against a target state (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 374). However, most studies of sanctions have shown that despite the differentiation between ‘economic’, ‘political’, ‘smart’ and ‘targeted’ and all other forms of sanctions there is hardly any evidence showing different impacts. What seems to differ is the degree of acceleration in feeling the impact, but all are premised on the Civilian pain = Political gain formula. This is propounded by Davidsson (2002:7-11) who argues that “the discourse of sanctions is full of euphemism namely; ‘target state’, ‘conflating a population with its leader’, ‘collateral and unintended effects’, and ‘humanitarian exemptions”. Therefore despite an attempt to separate the types of sanctions they still all lead to the same effects.

2.4 The Shortcomings of the Sanctions Thesis

The sanctions thesis has been beset by many challenges and problems ranging from:


Tostensen and Bull (2002: 374) further argue that; “the fundamental flaw in conventional sanctions theory is its assumption that hardships inflicted on the civilian population of a targeted state will lead to grassroots political pressure on that state's leaders to change their behaviour. In other words, a transmission mechanism often referred to as the "pain-gain" formula is presumed to be operative”. Therefore, there is no linear projection to causality between sanctions and desired results. This may vary from case-to-case depending on a number of factors internal and external to the sanctioned state. However, “while a transmission mechanism is operative in some cases, particularly if there is reasonably strong internal opposition to the targeted government, it cannot be assumed that it holds universally. In fact, the consequences of some sanctions regimes make their imposition counter-productive,” (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 374-5). Additionally,
Davidsson (2002:6) cites Cortright and Lopez who also argue that, “there is no direct transmission mechanism by which social suffering is translated into political change”. Sanctions have been observed to give rise to the sanctions paradox or un-intended results. Therefore sanctions may lead to un-intended consequences as observed by Tostensen and Bull (2002: 377) that, “they may produce unexpected changes in the internal political constellations, thus resulting in realignments that may alter the balance of power in favour of the very hardliners the sanctions aim to weaken. Therefore, in authoritarian states in which the government can manipulate information flows for propaganda purposes, this effect may tend to be reinforced”.

Sanctions have generally been criticized for their indiscriminate nature, for it has been observed that there is no clear separation between those that it seeks to protect and inflict punishment. Tostensen and Bull (2002: 377) argue that, “Comprehensive, conventional sanctions also have been subjected to much criticism on grounds of political ineffectiveness and humanitarian bluntness”. This position is further reinforced by Davidsson (2002:11) who observes that, “The weapon of economic sanctions is incapable of discriminating between combatants and civilians. It is levelled at the (national) economy composed mainly by the civilian population”. Therefore, most criticism or limitations of sanctions as an instrument of coercion has been its blindness in terms of the damage that it inflicts even on innocent civilians. On the other hand, sanctions require international cooperation for them to be effective, and in certain cases nation interest prevail over the collective interest and consequently weaken the potential impact of sanctions on a recalcitrant state. Therefore, in situations where “the costs of sanctions are high to neighbouring countries there would be greater likelihood of "leakage" in sanctions implementation. This creates an environment in which the target state has ample opportunities for circumvention; ultimately weakening the pressure brought to bear by the sanctioners,” (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 378). In some cases nations have resisted sanctions despite the huge cost associated with non-compliance in particular where it threatened the sovereignty of a state. This was the case with the US grain embargo on Russia of 1980. Davis and Engerman (2003:195) contend that, “the embargo did raise the price of grain to the Russians by an estimated $225 million, but the Soviets were able to turn to other sources, and the price increases did not dissuade them from their
Afghanistan adventure. The direct cost of the sanctions to the United States has been estimated at $2.3 billion, but the total costs were arguably much higher. American farmers lost their dominant market share in grain export to the USSR, and due in part to Russian fears of becoming dependent on producers subject to the political whims of the US government…” Thus, this perceived failure of sanctions to achieve desired results led to calls for revision of the use of sanctions as an instrument of achieving policy goals. Eventually this led to “think tanks, research institutions, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) alike engaging in policy processes that eventually led to the creation of the ‘smart sanctions’, which are considered to be a refinement of the conventional sanctions tool” (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 373).

2.5 From Sanctions to Smart Sanctions
The reported deficiencies of traditional sanctions gave rise to concerted efforts of research and study to make sanctions more effective. There were several conferences on the use and efficacy of sanctions but of “…particular importance were the; (i) Interlaken Process (1998 and 1999), (ii) UK DFID hosted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 1998 and (iii) Federal Republic of Germany in Bonn and Berlin in 1999 and 2000 respectively and hosted by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC)”, (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 379). These processes set in motion the discussion and debate on sanctions towards ‘smart’ sanctions regimes. Therefore, it was perceived that, “the strategic underpinnings of targeted sanctions was to put political and economic pressure on selected individuals (and entities) holding political decision-making power in governments and groups engaged in local armed conflicts, terrorism and political violence” (Sitt et al, 2010:46). Thus, the discourse of targeted sanctions emerged and it was argued that these instruments will avoid harming the civilians. The smart sanctions approaches developed at these conferences, by policy makers, and in the literature, “…comprised of two strands: (i) limiting negative humanitarian impact in sanctions regimes by establishing better criteria for exemption and monitoring humanitarian impacts; and (ii) targeting sanctions measures directly at the elites in power (and their supportive constituencies) who violate accepted international standards of behaviour. Therefore, these two strands had the common goal: To enhance the effectiveness of sanctions regimes by applying maximum pressure on the culpable actors while at the
same time minimizing the adverse humanitarian impacts (euphemistically referred to as "collateral damage") on innocent internal groups as well as on neighbouring states. This was the quintessence of "smart" or "designer" sanctions—they are tailored to the situation at hand” (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 380).

It is argued that targeted sanctions avoid inflicting harm on the broader civilian population. Henceforth, “the distinct goal of such measures are to influence decision-makers through engaging or isolating them, for example by subjecting them to targeted financial and travel bans and other measures. Moreover, targeted sanctions are also imposed against organisations, companies and commodities, and these also include arms embargoes” (Sitt et al, 2010:46-47). Therefore, “smart sanctions or ‘targeted sanctions’, in theory, differ from conventional sanctions in two major ways: (i) they more effectively target and penalize—via arms embargoes, financial sanctions, and travel restrictions—the political elites espousing policies and committing actions deemed reprehensible by the international community and (ii) they protect vulnerable social groups (for example, children, women, and the elderly) from so-called collateral damage by exempting specified commodities such as food and medical supplies) from the embargo” (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 373-4).

The discourse of targeted sanctions, thus, “involves a variety of political and economic tactics, but in principle pressure is exercised by a combination of punitive measures, incentives and conditionality to entice or coerce designated targets to a change in behaviour. It is therefore expected that by engaging on this suggested two-pronged sanctions approach it would hit the real perpetrators harder and spare potential innocent victims, leading to speedier change of sanctionee behaviour” (Sitt et al, 2010:47). Bowden and Farrall (2007:2) observe that; “these measures can target particular goods or commodities, such as arms (South Africa), oil (Southern Rhodesia and Haiti before comprehensive sanctions are applied), timber (Liberia) or diamonds (Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia). They can also take the form of assets freezes and travel bans targeting the finances and movement of individuals and groups posing a threat to international peace and security (Taliban and Al Qaida).
Despite the optimism associated with ‘targeted’ or ‘smart sanctions’, there has been reservations on the effectiveness of these measures. The term ‘target state’ removes the human being from the center of analysis thus creating an abstract autonomous state that is recalcitrant and needs to be punished. This is aptly captured by Davidsson’s (2002:8) observation that; “one variant of the expression “target state” is “offending nation”, an expression which imputes collective culpability and provides indirect justification for imposing collective injury”, and further argues that “By treating states as entities that possess an autonomous will and existence, rather than the mere symbolic representation for the individual human beings who live within the given area, perpetrators of the most odious crimes against humanity could in the past insulate themselves against pangs of conscience”. Moreover, Drezner (2003:109) in a review article of Cortright and Lopez’s “Targeting Economic Statecraft”, observe that; “even with smart sanctions, a target regime may shift the costs to its domestic opponents” and that “embargoes targeting a coterie of the regime's supporters may merely reinforce group cohesion rather than weaken support for the government”. Therefore, by shifting the costs of the sanctions to the population, the regime insulates itself and renders targeted sanctions futile. Therefore, the talk of smartening sanctions is a façade meant to ignore the reality of sanctions. Evidence is abounding that little if not, or no difference exists on the impact of both targeted and comprehensive sanctions. Craven (2002:59) argues that “…it would suggest that one should maintain agnosticism as to the legitimacy to the recourse of sanctions, and focus rather upon refining them as an institution in order to minimise the collateral damage. This, in a sense, is exactly what ‘targeting’ sanctions and introducing sufficient humanitarian exemptions is all about”. Therefore whether ‘targeted’ or not there is no much difference, it is like the story of ‘old wine’ in ‘new wine skins’, as the shift from ‘traditional sanctions’ to ‘targeted sanctions’ is only an attempt to sugarcoat the venomous effect of ‘targeted sanctions’ on civilians yet they remain equally deleterious.
CHAPTER 3: GENESIS OF THE SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE AND THE COUNTER-SANCTIONS STRATEGIES

3.1 The Genesis of the Zimbabwe Crisis

The genesis of the Zimbabwe crisis has generally been argued to have started with the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP). It is believed that ESAP laid the foundation/framework of the Zimbabwean economic crisis. Chimhowu (2009:16) observes that “Up to the introduction of the ESAP in 1991, Zimbabwe had a fairly diversified economy in which manufacturing played a much bigger role than in other African economies. With the implementation of ESAP average real GDP declined, and the growth of which averaged 1.7 per cent between 1991 and 1996 while per capita income actually contracted by -1.9 per cent to Z$1,992 compared to Z$2,998 just before ESAP (Chimhowu, 2009:17). Furthermore, Chimhowu, (2009:17) cites Moore (2003) who observes that average inflation rose from 15 per cent to 25 per cent, while interest rates trebled. The effects of ESAP on Zimbabwe’s economy were quite telling.

According to Carmody (1998:324), “From 1994 onward, Zimbabwe's textile, clothing, and footwear industries began to collapse. In late 1994, Cone Textiles, one of the two largest textile producers in Southern Africa, closed, with the loss of over 6,000 jobs”, and further to this, “Textile employment fell from 25,320 to 12,427 between 1990 and 1995. Output contracted by 61 percent in 1995. The decline in clothing and footwear was less dramatic, with clothing employment falling from 24,000 to 21,265 from 1991 to 1995. In 1995 clothing and footwear output fell by only 20 percent. However, deindustrialization accelerated thereafter, as evidenced by large-scale closures in 1996”. The ESAP reforms culminated in deteriorating social and economic conditions that led to the so called ‘IMF’ riots of 1994/95 within Zimbabwe’s urban centers. Persistent inflation and price increase became the norm under ESAP. Dansereau and Zamponi, (2005:13) cite Dansereau who observed that, “Food prices rose by 516%, medical care, transport and education by 300%, between 1990 and 1995 at which time 62% of households could no longer afford all the basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter and transport. Real wages declined by 36% between 1990 and 1996 and unemployment rose by 35 to 45%”. From the adoption of ESAP up to the present Zimbabwe experienced social and economic decline and with
the suspension of aid and support from the Breton Woods institutions, she experienced a downward economic spiral. See graph overleaf for the decline of Zimbabwe’s economic trends.

**Figure 4.2.1: Key economic trends, 1980-2005.**

![Graph showing key economic trends, 1980-2005.](image)

Source: Chimhowu (2010:16)

According to Chimhowu (2009:17) the World Bank (1995) observed that, the implementing of ESAP reforms required US$3.5 billion in new foreign loans over five years, which added to the existing debt of US$2.5 billion. Even worse, during the 1992/93 fiscal year, interest payments on both foreign and domestic debt increased 15 per cent more than projected due to interest and exchange rate volatility. This meant that Zimbabwe’s economy was heavily exposed to the International Financial Institutions, and with their withdrawal of aid, it meant she could no longer meet her balance of payment support and henceforth brewing an economic crisis.

Whilst, the implementation of ESAP and its subsequent negative social and economic effects on Zimbabwe are seen as the foundation of the crisis; for Bond and Manyanya (2002:38), 1997 marks the year Zimbabwe’s economy went into a free fall. They argue that, “the precise moment that the Zimbabwe economy began its generalised plunge was probably the late morning of 14 November 1997, when over a four-hour period, the
Zimbabwe dollar lost 74% of its value…” This saw the Zimbabwe dollar’s value falling from US$0.09 to US$0.025 for over a year, inflation rising from pre-September 1997 level of 15% to 45% eighteen months later, recording high food increases and consequently urban riots in January and October 1998 (Bond and Manyanya, 2002:38). According to Moore (2003) and Gopinant (1998) (cited in Chimhowu, 2009:17), two major economic decisions by the state were responsible for the trigger of ‘Black Friday’: namely payments made to veterans of the liberation struggle and the country’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo war, which were all both unbudgeted expenditure. Thus it can be observed that Zimbabwe’s economy went into an overdrive of downward spiral from 1997, and according to fig 4.2.1 it is clear that as of 1997 the economy was already in a free-fall. Facing an economic meltdown, Zimbabwe imposed price controls on the staple goods and increased tariffs on luxury goods and this led to a standoff with the IMF and stalled a bailout plan, which resultantly led to shortage of foreign currency and fuel (Bond and Manyanya, 2002:40). By this time the Zimbabwe government faced a discontented coalition of labour, churches, student and civil society organisations demanding reforms to the state. This coalition culminated in the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly and eventually the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, and henceforth a change to Zimbabwe’s political terrain.

3.1 The Genesis of Sanctions and the Zimbabwe Crisis

The genesis of the Western backed sanctions on Zimbabwe by Britain and her allies are a contested question. Two contending schools emerge; (i) the Western world, domestic civil society and opposition parties arguing that sanctions were placed on Zimbabwe due to a deteriorating human rights records, and mal-governance; and (ii) ZANU PF and her allies arguing that sanctions are a neo-colonialist agenda by Britain and her allies conspiring with the Movement for Democratic Change to effect a regime change in Zimbabwe in attempt to reverse the land reform. Chingono (2010:67) argues that, “undoubtedly, the reasons why Zimbabwe is under the bond of sanctions have been marred with controversy from both the perspective of the sanctioners and the sanctionees. Reasons range from, the need to democratize and political emancipation of the people (Western view), to a renewed form of colonialism (as leveled by ZANU PF)”.

24
causality of Zimbabwe’s sanction is a disputed subject and this is evident in the lingo describing Zimbabwe’s sanctions. Chingono (2010:67) observes that, “according to a majority of Western policy documents on Zimbabwe sanctions, the embargo imposed on Zimbabwe are either ‘targeted’, ‘smart’ or ‘restrictive’ in nature, destined to directly oppose ZANU PF rule whilst the Zimbabwean government argues they are ‘economic’ in nature since the impact of these sanctions has stretched to infinite hurting an unintended audience”. These two entrenched positions on the genesis of sanctions reduce the Zimbabwe crisis to the land versus governance discourses. Masunungure and Badza (2010:211) observe that, “in this perspective, the crisis was precipitated by Zimbabwe’s efforts to redress the problem by embarking on a comprehensive and ‘revolutionary’ land reform programme that displaced a tiny but powerful domestic constituency that had powerful allies and enjoyed racial affinity to the British and the White global community… the crisis in the country is rooted in a governance crisis, and therefore, resolving the governance problem also solves the other attendant problems. In other words, bad governance or ‘failure of governance’ is the primary or core issue and other problems – including the land issue – are secondary matters”.

For ZANU PF, the Zimbabwean crisis is about land and that explains why Zimbabwe is under Western sanctions, and governance is not the issue. Chingono (2010:66) observes that “On the contrary, the Zimbabwean government perceives the use of economic sanctions as an illegal tool meant to destabilize the internal political affairs of the country (particularly the land reform exercise)…” Therefore, for ZANU PF sanctions are a result of the conspiracy of the Western countries and MDC’s call for sanctions. Before the SADC Summit held on the 14th of January 2002 in a BBC interview, Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC president) called on South Africa to impose direct sanctions on Zimbabwe. He said that, “the threat to undermine the elections by the military, by Mugabe himself, should actually send shock waves to South Africa and say, 'under those circumstances, we are going to cut fuel, we are going to cut transport links…Those kind of measures, even if they are implemented at a lowly level, send the right signals”, (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1758796.stm). It is these calls for sanctions that give credence to ZANU PF accusations of the MDC calling for sanctions in an attempt to bolster its regime change agenda.
The disclosure by the UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband in the House of Commons further gave credence to this school. David Miliband is reported to have said that, “in respect of sanctions, we have made it clear that they can be lifted only in a calibrated way, as progress is made. I do not think that it is right to say that the choice is between lifting all sanctions and lifting none at all. We have to calibrate our response to the progress on the ground, and, above all, to be guided by what the MDC says to us about the conditions under which it is working and leading the country” (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100119/debtext/100119-0001.htm). Despite spirited denials by the MDC and later attempts by the UK government to distance itself from its Foreign Secretary, ZANU PF was vindicated that sanctions were an MDC and Western nations’ baby. Alden (2010:9) also concurs and observe that “The application of sanctions by the IMF – a largely meaningless act in light of Zimbabwe’s inability to meet its interest payments – coupled to targeted sanctions against top Zanu-PF officials and their families by Washington, Brussels and their allies, provided the necessary ‘proof’ of Western complicity in a conspiracy to overturn the liberation struggle”.

Tendi (2012) argues that “The MDC denies that it campaigned for the imposition of sanctions but its retort has never been as cogent and consistent as that of Zanu PF”, and further asserts that, “For instance, former MDC MP Gabriel Chaibva on 22 September 2009 stated that in 2000 the MDC met in Nyanga to draft ZIDERA. Chaibva’s revelation has not been effectively rebutted by the MDC to date. Moreover, after the 2000 parliamentary election, David Coltart advanced the following rationale as one of the causal factors for the MDC’s choice not to enlist mass action or civil disobedience: “the international community pleaded with us to hold off on the use of mass action, promising at the same time that if we backed off, they would do all they could to increase pressure on Mugabe”. Such declarations allowed Zanu PF to infer that by “pressure” the MDC meant sanctions. It did not help those opposition members such as Trudy Stevenson who publicly boasted that “we [MDC] have good contacts with the international community and Mugabe is going to have to negotiate with us”, (http://www.newzimbabwe.com/opinion-7514-Some+home+truths+about+sanctions+debate/opinion.aspx). Chaibva’s claims may be
dismissed as a political turncoat seeking relevance, but claims by Coltart and Stevenson and Tsvangirayi’s call for South Africa to switch off Zimbabwe still stand unchallenged.

For the MDC, domestic civil society and Western countries, poor governance is the core issue in Zimbabwe. This notion is aptly captured by sentiments of a member of the European delegation that visited Zimbabwe in 2010; “the restrictive measures were there because of (human rights) violations. We cannot fully re-engage until we see that the global political agreement is being implemented fully. There’s more that needs to be done here. We had reasons to raise very serious concerns, for example on media freedom and constitutional reforms. We still have a lot of reports of human rights violations, which are unacceptable” (Masunungure and Badza; 2010:227). Restrictive measures/sanctions are therefore a result of bad governance. “Consensus prevails among the Western states that the fundamental objectives of the Zimbabwe sanctions are to restore democracy and normalcy as per Western modern standards of democracy” (Chingono, 2010:66).

More so, Smith-Hohn (2010:1) observes that; “the MDC-T, on the other hand, insists that the responsibility for these sanctions rests squarely upon ZANUPF, whose continued refusal to act in a democratic and accountable manner is to blame for the persistence of the sanctions regime. Governments, such as those of the US and UK, have made it clear that they would consider lifting the restrictive measures only once there is visible evidence of reform on the ground”. Thus, the question of sanctions is a ZANU PF problem that needs to be addressed by embracing democratic reforms.

Sarah Hudson-Dean the US Embassy spokesperson states that; “the US welcomes the opportunity to modify the targeted sanctions regime when blocked Zimbabwean officials demonstrate a clear commitment to respect the rule of law, democracy and human rights...” (http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=125541). Therefore, according to the US, addressing democratic deficiency resolves the sanctions question. In a House of Assembly debates over the origins of sanctions in March 2001 MDC-T legislator Tendai Biti argued that, “under such circumstances where a country like Zimbabwe, through its own actions, disrespects the provisions of the institutions such as the United Nations Human Rights Charter, instruments of the Organisation of African
Union (OAU), ignores its very Constitution and its own laws, then that country does not deserve to be treated as part of the international community”, and Biti further pontificate that “Western countries wanted to impose smart sanctions on Zimbabwe because the ZANU PF government was oppressing its own people”, (Zimbabwe Hansard Report, 2001: 6142).

However, this position has been contested and sanctions are viewed as punitive actions meted on Zimbabwe by the West for forcibly taking over white owned commercial farms. On the contrary, for the governance school, the breakdown of rule of law, violation of human rights, electoral fraud and violence, suppression of the opposition and media clampdown are the primary cause of sanctions. “Interesting to note is that by the time the United States, Britain and European Union instituted sanctions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) had already suspended funding to Zimbabwe over failure to pay debt arrears and this need not to be confused with sanctions” (Smith-Hohn, 2010:2) Thus, the international isolation of Zimbabwe had already started by then. Therefore, the genesis of sanctions on Zimbabwe is represented by two diametrically opposed schools and it is the position of this paper that both schools have semblance in them and it is difficult to locate the exact genesis of sanctions in one school. However, it may be concluded that the genesis of Zimbabwe’s sanction is a narrative of coincidence and opportunity. It is clear from the evidence presented in this study that the MDC called for sanctions and worked with Western nations within that regard as party of its strategies to weaken ZANU PF and assume state power. This presented a coincidence of interests for the MDC and Western nations to isolate ZANU PF and the same time an opportunity to weaken it. However, what is not clear is to what extend did the MDC’s call for sanctions influence the process of sanctioning Zimbabwe by Britain and her allies. Furthermore, by the time that the MDC started to call for sanctions, Zimbabwe was already beginning to be under international isolation in particular from IMF and World Bank (see Smith-Hohn, 2010:2). On the other hand, the allegations of democratic deficit and human rights violations against Zimbabwe were real, and this may have opportunistically provided grounds for Britain and her allies to sanction Zimbabwe.
Allegations of human rights abuse, increasing suppression of the opposition, and the ‘timing and execution of the fast track land reform’ pulled the immediate trigger of the full blown political and economic crisis (Chimhowu, 2009:18). This precipice to some marked the genesis of the Zimbabwe crisis as the West sought to reverse the land reform programme in Zimbabwe (See Mamdani, 2008, Moyo and Yeros, 2007). This analogy prima facie has resonance in the fact that the democratic deficiency touted as the reason by the sanctionee raised questions of why now? What special circumstances or new political phenomenon had ensued in Zimbabwe for the West to institute sanctions? Mamdani (2008) quoting Gideon Gono the Reserve Bank Governor observes that, “the country’s foreign exchange reserves had declined from $830 million, representing three months’ import cover in 1996, to less than one month’s cover by 2006. Total foreign payments arrears increased from $109 million at the end of 1999 to $2.5 billion at the end of 2006. Foreign direct investment had shrunk from $444.3 million in 1998 to $50 million in 2006. Donor support, even to sectors vital to popular welfare, such as health and education, was at an all-time low. Danish support for the health sector, $29.7 million in 2000, was suspended”, and in addition to this, “Swedish support for education was also suspended. The US issued travel warnings, blocked food aid during the heyday of land reform and opposed Zimbabwe’s application to the Global Fund to Fight Aids – the country has the fourth highest infection rate in the world. Though it was renewed in 2005, the Zimbabwe grant is meagre…” Therefore, this had severe economic consequences for Zimbabwe’s economy as according to Sims et al (2011) Foreign aid accounted for 15 per cent of Zimbabwe’s GDP by 1999, and helped the country achieve significant progress in key social indicators. Thus the debilitating effects of the sanctions on Zimbabwe’s economy are irrefutable. Indeed Zimbabwe’s economy had been annihilated and ‘screamed’ to borrow the words of Chester Crocker (former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) as evidenced in the demise of the social and economic sectors that was characterized by shortage of goods on the shelves and rampant cholera epidemic that gripped the nation in 2008.

It can therefore be argued that the Zimbabwe crisis was neither a result of the sanctions nor was malgovernance the precursor to sanctions but it was an admixture of competing multivariate reasons accounting for the crisis. However, this paper contends that
sanctions heightened a political and economic crisis that had already imploded in 2000 after the implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform, but had its genesis in the failure of ESAP. The consummation of the ‘inclusive government’ in Zimbabwe, a result of the SADC brokered talks managed to arrest the inflation and restore economic normalcy to a country that had seen two decades of sustained crisis. Ploch (2011:4) observes that “The adoption of hard currencies (predominantly the U.S. dollar and the South African rand) stabilized prices in 2009 and stemmed a previously rampant inflation rate”. More so, the adoption of the inclusive government has called for a revision of sanctions regime on Zimbabwe (see Hohn-Smith, 2010; Ploch, 2011; Jan, 2010 and Raftopolous, 2007)

3.3 The Nature of Sanctions

The nature of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe is a subject of contested interpretation and Chingono (2009:67) argues that “…there has been an ongoing battle concerning the terminology used in addressing Zimbabwe sanctions”. This battle of lingo on Zimbabwe’s sanctions pits the MDC and ZANU PF with the former calling them ‘restrictive, targeted measures’ and the latter ‘illegal economic sanctions’. In an inaugural address to parliament, Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T President; now Prime Minister of Zimbabwe) avoided the word sanctions and called them restrictive measures. “I therefore, urge the international community to recognize our efforts, and to note the progress that we make in this regard, and to match our progress by moving towards the removal of restrictive measures”, (http://www.zimeye.org/?p=2617). Raftopolous (2007:1) concurs with Tsvangirayi and argues that “beyond these restrictions, there are at present no UN Sanctions against Zimbabwe, and therefore the punitive actions remain at the ‘Smart Sanctions’ level”. However, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2000:2) observe that, “…sanctioners are no longer limited to sovereign nations and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States…”. Therefore, this paper disputes that ‘smart/targeted sanctions’ or ‘restrictive measures’ are not sanctions.

“The argument that EU sanctions are targeted is a façade, for travel restrictions on senior government officials negatively affects government business operations and ultimately cause hardships on ordinary people who are not targeted” (Ndakaripa, 2011:13). This semantic brinksmanship obfuscates the nature of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe.
“Another obfuscation used to imbue economic sanctions with an ethical veneer, is to imply that they target a particular loathsome individual rather than a population” (Davidson, 2003:9). The assertion of ‘targeted’, ‘smart’ and ‘restrictive measures’ are mere smokescreens.

The Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act speak against the accessing of foreign exchange and instruct organs or any representative of the American government to vote against extension of aid or credit lines to Zimbabwe. “The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to oppose and vote against– (1) any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the Government of Zimbabwe; or (2) any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution” (US Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi). It is quite clear from this excerpt of ZIDERA that the sanctions slapped on Zimbabwe were not only restrictive but also economic as the term “International Financial Institutions”, meant the multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund thus having potential collateral harm to Zimbabwean citizens. However, to also argue that, “Zimbabwe was under comprehensive economic sanctions as put forward by ZANU PF” (Hansard Report, 2006:61), would be total disingenuous. Smith-Hohn (2010:2-3) observes that “The IMF, for instance, had severed ties with Zimbabwe for over a decade because of its failure to pay its debt arrears, which currently stand at US$ 144 million. Similarly, the World Bank (WB), which had provided a total of US$1.6 billion in assistance between 1980 and 2000, suspended its lending to Zimbabwe in 2000 when the country went into arrears”. Therefore, by the time that ZIDERA spoke of voting against any financial assistance to Zimbabwe, ties had already been severed with the financial institution in question.

It would be fair to characterise the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by Britain and her allies as a cocktail of economic and political sanctions for they tended to have both elements at limited degrees which never assumed the comprehensive level. On a similar note, this paper would characterise the so called ‘restrictive measures’, ‘smart’ and ‘targeted sanctions’, as sanctions in their generic use as the terms tend to obfuscate the
subject at stake or lead to denialism. In discussion of political euphemism Cohen (1996:527) argues that, “the most familiar form of reinterpretation is the use of euphemistic labels and jargon. These are everyday devices for masking, sanitising, and conferring respectability by using palliative terms that deny or misrepresent cruelty or harm, giving them neutral or respectable status. Orwell’s original account of the anesthetic function of political language - how words insulate their users and listeners from experiencing fully the meaning of what they are doing - remains the classic source on the subject”. Similarly the terms ‘restrictive measures’ ‘smart and targeted measures’ and ‘travel bans’ potentially masks or misrepresents the nature of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe.

3.4 Towards Multipolarity: China and the Reshaping of the Global Economic Relations

With the fall of the Berlin wall, there emerged a world order under the hegemony of the United States and this saw the United Security Council (UNSC) powers being resurrected and flexed upon perceived recalcitrant states that failed to abide by ‘agreed’ and ‘universal’ ‘norms’ and ‘standards’. However, there seems to be gravitation towards a new world order of multipolarity. Balaban (2008:58) observes that “the United States, as the only global superpower, is increasingly confronted by the growing influence of Asia, with a clear dominance of China and the mounting importance of India. After the chaos of the first post-Soviet decade, Russia is resuming its role as an important, influential actor in international relations; while determined regional powers, such as Indonesia, Iran and Brazil – which will want to significantly influence developments in Latin America – are emerging in the world political arena”. Therefore, there has been a steady rise of other powers emerging within the world and posing challenges to ‘Western Universalism’ (Balaban, 2008: 60). According to Lukyanov (2010:24), “Multipolarity may now be understood as a way of structuring the global international system where the basic constituent parts are no longer individual states but instead conglomerations of economic interests, united around the most powerful centers of attraction and economic growth”. Furthermore, Zemenides (2011:1) boldly asserts that, “Those who wished for multipolarity now have it”. Thus, there is emerging consensus on the emergence or existence
of a multipolar world. More so, there has been a shift within global politics moving towards multiple actors and thus shifting the center of global politics from the West to other parts of the world. Barma et al, (2007:23-34) observe that “while connectivity for the globe as a whole has increased in the last twenty years, it is increasing at a much faster rate among countries outside the Western bloc. The World without the West is becoming preferentially and densely interconnected. This creates the foundation for the development of a new, parallel international system, with its own distinctive set of rules, institutions, ways of doing things—and currencies of power (in Lukyanov, 2010:25).

The gravitation of power from the West to various dispersed parts along the globe has meant the diffusion of power to different actors. Higgott (2010:4) argues that, “the reemergence of Russia and the rise of China and India especially are dramatically changing our understandings of global power. But while the enhanced power of the new actors is real, this power shift has changed perceptions much faster than it has changed in statistical and political reality”. Despite the fact that the shift in this power has been more of perceptual rather than statistical reality, it is important to note that perceptions do matter in international relations. Castano et al (2003:452) contend that “the perception of the existence of the other should not be taken for granted or perceived as an issue of either/or…Existence, on the other hand, would simply be a necessary condition for any expectations to emerge, and the quality of the other image held by the perceiver would suffice to make predictions about the other’s behaviour”. Therefore, whether the other presumed/emerging poles have equaled or paralleled the economic and military hegemony of the US is another subject as perception is a sufficient basis for behaviour and within that framework it may be argued that we are experiencing or headed towards multipolarity.

The rise of China has created hope of possible alternative sources of development finance in the world and hence the reconfiguration of global economic relations. According to the BBC report of 14 February 2011 China has become the second largest economy in the world, after the United States, overtaking Japan (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321). The rise of multipolarity has been accompanied by economic dimensions that have established various economic centers, hence different influences. Balaban (2008:76)
reinforces this position and observes that, “the China Central Bank’s 1.2 billion dollar portfolio helps to finance the US federal debt by purchasing US government bonds. In real terms, China owns about 10% of the US federal debt. This boosts China’s global political influence more than any other foreign policy instrument. It also shows that the transition to multipolarity has a strong economic dimension, with the world progressing from the era of geographically concentrated economic power to an era symbolized by the existence of many centres of economic and trade activity. This has presented challenges to the Western centered development models that are full of conditionalities. This is aptly captured in the Sierra Leone’s ambassador to Beijing who describes the advantages of the Chinese approach vividly, “If a G8 country had wanted to build the stadium we would still be holding consultations. The Chinese, however, simply come and do it. They don’t need any meetings to investigate the possible effects on the environment, human rights, or good and bad governance. I’m not saying that it’s correct, but only that China’s approach is successful as a result” (Hofmann et al, 2007:78). Thus, China’s approach has endeared it with many governments particularly from the developing world that has faced ostracism from Western countries.

The increasing importance of China and other emerging economies, especially with the increasing calls for South-South cooperation has become difficult to ignore. Kynge (2010:27) observes that, “…trade with South-East Asia and the ‘newly-rising economies’ of Brazil, Africa and India. Although Chinese trade with these places has historically been limited, it has grown so fast in the past five years that a robust performance in 2010 may be enough to offset any moderate weakness in China’s trade with the United States”. Existing, emerging data and information; point to increased cooperation and integration among countries of the South. This is quite significant and has offset the traditional balance of power within the global economic relations realm. Okpeh (2009:2) contends that; “China has continued to expand her economic tentacles to other developing countries, especially those in the African continent, much to the chagrin of the developed countries of North America and Europe, since this is gradually but radically altering traditional bases and contexts of cooperation in the global economic system”. This position is reinforced in President Mugabe’s address to Zimbabweans at the 25th Independence anniversary on the 18th of April 2005, “We have turned East, where the sun
rises, and given our back to the West, where the sun sets” (Meldrum, 2005). More so, Hofmann et al. (2007:76) observes that; “since the establishment of FOCAC in 2000 China has become one of the most significant actors on the African continent. The volume of trade has increased more than fourfold since 2000 and it is estimated to exceed the 50 billion US dollar mark for the first time. China is already Africa’s third most important trade partner, after the USA and France. The importance of China is a dawning reality within Western circles and even the World Bank postulates that by 2020, China would be the second largest world trader, accounting for some 10 per cent of world exports, just behind the US. If its recent trade growth is sustained, it will certainly become an important influence on overall world trade growth (Harris, 2003:14).

3.5 Zimbabwe’s Counter-Sanctions Strategies

Zimbabwe employed a number of strategies to fight sanctions, which were mainly the manipulation of multi-polarity and adopting the ‘Look East Policy’, use of ideology of neo-imperialism to rally the developing world behind it, appealed to SADC and AU solidarity, tapping into local resources such as diamonds and finally entering into a coalition government with the MDC. It was the juggling and a mix of the above factors, that made Zimbabwe manage to navigate the murky waters of international relations amid mounting Western hostility.

3.5.1 Sino Factor- Political, Economic and Military role

The Sino factor was very critical in Zimbabwe’s sanctions defeating strategy in particular, defraying any potential vote on Zimbabwe within the UNSC. Hager (2007:259) observes that, “perhaps Mugabe’s strongest weapon in his relationship with China is its position as one of the five permanent UN Security Council members, providing veto power to any resolutions targeting Zimbabwe. China made clear that it would exercise this veto”. To be more precise Beijing in collaboration with Moscow prevented a UN resolution on Zimbabwe in 2008. Beijing’s ambassador to the UN argued that, “the way to improve the situation in Zimbabwe was not by securitizing it and interfering in this country’s internal affairs, but rather by committing to dialogue and mediation”, (Lynch, 2009:24). Therefore, Zimbabwe-particularly ZANU PF reaped
support from its ‘Look East Policy’ despite criticism that the policy was yielding no results. Beijing also acted as principal arms suppliers to Zimbabwe following Western arms embargo. Ratner (2011:32) observes that, “Beijing already supplies arms to four of the top five countries in Foreign Policy magazine’s 2010 ‘Failed States Index’—Chad, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is despite that Zimbabwe is under EU and US arms embargo, thus reducing the potential effect of sanctions.

China played an important role in providing Zimbabwe with loans and development financing. A number of cooperative agreements were entered into and signed between Zimbabwe and China. Chigora and Dewa (2009:95) observe that, “In the transport sector, Air Zimbabwe acquired two MA-60 aircraft from China, bringing the number of its fleet to eight. This has enabled the national airline to expand its domestic, regional and international routes. Public transport operator, ZUPCO (Zimbabwe United Passenger Company) also managed to acquire 135 conventional buses and 41 mini-buses from China”. They further observe that “China and India played a major role in supplying the country with essential equipment for rural electrification, and by 2005, 4229 projects had been completed and 1157 were at various stages of completion, …China Aero-technology Import and Export Corporation have entered into investment deals with the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) for the refurbishment of power plants, and Bayano observes that, “The Corporation pledged in 2005 that it would invest US$400 million in mining” (Chigora and Dewa, 2009:95). Zimbabwe signed a number of bilateral agreements with China. Therefore, China provided critical economic and political life support to Zimbabwe, mitigating the potential impact of Western isolation, thus the observation that China is an ‘all weather friend’.

3.5.2 Ideology

Using the ideology of neo-imperialism had a twofold effect; rallying domestic forces against sanctions, and undermining the ability of the opposition, MDC, to take full advantage of the situation. The MDC was found in a predicament where they could not justify sanctions. Hove (2012:4) observes that, “the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) believes that, sanctions were imposed as part of the overall
United States (US) strategy against intolerable behaviour of foreign governments”, and “concludes that the MDC politicians lobbied for sanctions in a drive to manipulate Zimbabweans for the furtherance of their objective of regime change, against a justified Land Reform Programme meant to correct the colonial imbalances”. Rugare Gumbo (ZANU PF Spokesperson) vividly captures this position: “we want all people to be removed from the list because the sanctions are racist and illegal as they were not approved by the United Nations”, (http://allafrica.com/stories/201202190112.html).

Thus, the emphasis on the United Nations and illegality of the sanctions was to show their unjustifiable nature. Zimbabwe thus maintained a consistent and coherent message, casting sanctions as racists and imperialist, both at domestic and international fora. This was aided by policy ambiguity on sanctions by the MDC, with its officials either denying supporting sanctions on Zimbabwe (Ndakaripa, 2010; Raftopolous, 2007; Masunungure and Badza, 2010 and Hove, 2012), or denying that Zimbabwe is under sanctions arguing that it is a set of targeted/restrictive measures imposed on selected ZANU PF individuals despite glaring evidence from sanctions instruments like ZIDERA that sanctions went beyond individuals. The MDC was therefore out-maneuvered by ZANU PF on the domestic front.

Secondly, it rallied regional and international solidarity towards Zimbabwe, thus creating a paralysis of any possible international action on Zimbabwe. This is heightened in Mahmood Mamdani (2008) essay, “Lessons on Zimbabwe”, which argued that, “The people of Zimbabwe are likely to remember 2000-3 as the end of the settler colonial era. Any assessment of contemporary Zimbabwe needs to begin with this sobering fact”, and “nationalists have been able to withstand civil society-based opposition, reinforced by Western sanctions, because they are supported by large numbers of peasants”. Henceforth Zimbabwe had international solidarity from a number of leading intellectuals and President Mugabe enjoyed standing ovations and rapturous applauses from the developing world for managing to dare the West. The World Social Summit on Sustainable Development of 2002, the Rome Food Summit of June 2008, 64th and 66th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) are cases in point where President Mugabe has maintained a consistent and cogent message of anti-imperialism, becoming the face
of the oppressed masses in the developing world reeling under Western dominated and constructed World order. South Africa’s ambassador to the UN, Dumisani Khumalo justified voting against a British sponsored resolution for UNSC action on Zimbabwe on the basis that, “the British wanted to discuss it because they were former colonial masters and they supported [Morgan] Tsvangirai. You have to understand that the big countries; the permanent countries like the UK and US, have their national interests” (http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/south-africas-ambassador-to-the-united-nations-dumisani-kumalo-defends-mugabe/). Therefore, with such streaming solidarity Zimbabwe managed to avert possible action from the UNSC, and consequently limiting the options available to Western countries to force capitulation.

3.5.3 The SADC Lobby

The SADC and the AU played a critical role in avoiding the isolation of Zimbabwe; insisting on dialogue or pursuing an African solution epitomised in South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy’. This worked well for Zimbabwe as it managed to stymie the tide of sanctions coming from the West. Commenting on the failure of a UNSC resolution on Zimbabwe in 2008, after the hotly disputed March presidential elections, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya said, that adopting the resolution would have been “counterproductive to the initiatives and efforts now underway by the Africans to find a solution to the problem in Zimbabwe,” adding that negotiations are under way in South Africa”, and Ambassador Dumisani Khumalo of South Africa said that his delegation voted against the draft given his country's membership in the African Union (AU) and the South African Development Community (SADC), and that the AU Summit, held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, rather than call for sanctions on Zimbabwe encouraged, Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Tsvangirai to honour their commitments to initiate dialogue with a view to promoting peace, stability, democracy and reconciliation of the Zimbabwean people (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27358&Cr=Zimbabwe&Cr1). The strong emphasis on the SADC ongoing talks meant that any action outside the SADC and AU framework would not have been welcome by other UN member states in particular from the developing world. In its Communiqué of the 30th Jubilee Summit of SADC
Heads of State and Government held in Namibia from the 16-17\textsuperscript{th} of August 2010, SADC called for the lifting of sanctions, and tasked its chairperson, chairperson on the Organ on Defence and Security and the Facilitator to engage the international community on Zimbabwe’s sanctions issue. The call for the removal of sanctions on Zimbabwe by SADC was a diplomatic coup by Zimbabwe, for it reinforced the ideology of anti-imperialism.

3.5.4 Diamonds as Sources of Alternative Revenue

The discovery of alluvial diamonds in Marange and its vast mineral resources provided Zimbabwe with alternative sources revenue to mitigate the impact of the sanctions. Mawowa (2007:91) observes that the ruling elite in particular aligned to ZANU PF established syndicates involved in Gold illegal mining in Torotoro, and benefited from handsome royalties for providing protection. “In 2009, the BBC unearthed a scheme by Vice President Joyce Mujuru’s daughter (Nyasha Del Campo) to sell 3.7 tons of Gold of Congolese Gold to German based (registered in the UK) Firstar Europe Ltd. However, the deal fell through when Firstar realised who she was, but what is interesting is that Del Campo is not specified” (Sims et al, 2011:15). Celia, W, Dugger (2010) quotes an unnamed close source to Mugabe stating that “this is ZANU PF’s salvation” in apparent reference to the discovery of diamonds in Marange (in Sims, et al, 2011:15). According to the American Enterprise Institute fake provenance documents have been used particularly by Indian traders to smuggle the Marange diamonds despite EU, US sanctions, and Kimberley prohibitions. It is reported that in May 2011; two Indian traders were arrested for smuggling a cache of illegal Marange diamonds, which came via Nigeria and with a market value of about $1.5m. In 2010 in a previous case, two diamond traders were sentenced to four years each for their role in selling $880,000 of illegal Marange diamonds (http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/subsaharan-africa/diamonds-fake-provenance--another-disaster-for-zimbabwe/). Given the opaqueness and secrecy of the mining of diamonds in Marange, there are high possibilities that the state in particular those aligned to ZANU PF benefited from the trade of diamonds, thus evading the sanctions? According to Muleya (2011), “the Chinese offered a US$3billion deal to Zimbabwe in return for Platinum reserves,
valued at US$40billion, revenues from Chiadzwa diamond activities and tollgate fees”. Despite the crumbling of the deal, this highlights mortgaging of resources to access development finance from alternative non-hostile sources.

3.5.6 The Inclusive Government

The entering into a governing coalition by ZANU PF and the two MDCs reduced the former’s vulnerability to sanctions; as it removed the moral basis and logic for continued sanctions on Zimbabwe. “The Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe; made sanctions perceived to be irritants that were overtaken by events on the ground and henceforth the call for revision” (Smith-Hohn, 2010 and see also Raftopolous, 2007, Hove, 2012 and Sims et al, 2011). Sanctions were perceived to be inhibitors to democratisation as they were viewed to be providing ZANU PF with firepower to undermine the GNU (Smith-Hohn, 2010; Raftopolous, 2007, Hove, 2012 and Sims et al, 2011). More so, the GNU has made it difficult for the Western world to effectively enforce sanctions on ZANU PF as (i) there is no more any opposition to talk off, (ii) MDC calling for the removal of sanctions and (iii) growing call for supporting the success of the ‘unity government’. Therefore, the result is the stalling of any possible international action on Zimbabwe. The impact of the GNU in mitigating sanctions on ZANU PF is highlighted in the observations of the Chinese ambassador. He stated that “China had been in close consultation with the African Union summit and encouraged dialogue with Zimbabwe and the establishment of a GNU, and reiterated that the African position was for more time to be allotted to diplomatic efforts, and China felt that the Council should respect that position. Moreover, China ‘had long believed that negotiations and dialogue were the best approach to solving problems’ and that ‘a threat of sanctions was not conducive to that goal (Lynch, 2009:24). Therefore, the GNU undermined any further basis of sanctions on Zimbabwe and consequently got the economy stabilized; and opened channels for re-engagement with the West.
CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE

4.1 The Effectiveness of the Sanctions as a Democratisation Tool

The link between democratisation and sanctions has been a grey area, but most literature points to a disjuncture or contradictory evidence. According to Tostensen and Bull (2002: 378); “There is thus broad agreement that due to their complexity, sanctions are problematic and have often produced paradoxical and contradictory effects”. In some cases sanctions may produce result contradictory to the set goals and creating further complexities that may undermine democracy. There is a tendency that sanctions may create a rally around the flag effect, buttressing the perceived autocratic regime and undermine ‘democratic forces. Brooks (2002:3) argues that “comprehensive sanctions are likely to be effective in democracies, but not in authoritarian regimes, where they may trigger a rally effect or merely impoverish the masses”. This was almost evident in Zimbabwe’s sanctions case, as a coalition of forces grew within Zimbabwe, i.e. in business and industry, some sections of civil society and ZANU PF culminating in the anti-sanctions campaign. Despite criticism of being aligned to ZANU PF, a broad sectored coalition emerged in Zimbabwe as evidenced by the following statements from business and church leaders:

(i) These are critical in boosting the country's current account, which in turn results in an increase in capital funding to kick-start the economy, (Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce president Mr. Trust Chikohora)

(ii) I am going to sign the anti-sanctions petition voluntarily, willingly and based on conviction as sanctions are not appropriate for Zimbabwe. (Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries President Mr. Joseph Kanyekanye).

(iii) As the church we are fully behind Cde Mugabe’s call for the lifting of sanctions as these have affected everything in this country, (Bishop Manhanga).

(iv) We are fully behind the efforts by President Mugabe for the removal of sanctions. Our President has been all over calling for the removal of sanctions and this Wednesday will be a landmark development (Dr. Pashapa).
We are trying to send a very clear message to the global bullies that their arrogance and domination over weaker nations is not acceptable in Zimbabwe and the sanctions must be removed,” (Madzibaba Manuwere).


Kurebwa (2000:3) reiterates that, “the history of sanctions has demonstrated that sanctions have serious shortcomings as an instrument of maintaining order in the world system. In most circumstances sanctions evolve into a protracted and costly low-intensive campaign whose impact is serious attrition on the economies of both the imposer state and the targeted state”. Therefore sanctions have generally proved that it is difficult to deduce causality to their application. There are a lot of factors that may result in different constellations that originally planned. For sanctions to be effective there requires various mix of favourable factors. The politics of sanctions is a complicated and intricate phenomenon that requires crafty statecraft and sometimes the convergence of interests amongst states which is usually an elusive phenomenon in international relations. The high politicisation of the UN Security Council has made it difficult to achieve consensus on the use of sanctions as noted by Tostensen and Bull (2002: 384) that, “…the Security Council is a highly politicized body that deliberates and makes decisions more often for political reasons than to uphold norms of international peace and security. Thus, a selective response to situations in which governments fail to observe international standards is unavoidable; voting patterns are dictated by the prevailing interests of each nation”. This lack of coincidence is by no means an accident but a result of the prevailing counteracting interests and the choices that states have to make in terms of their national interest. Higgott observes that, “The moral authority of ‘the West’ of the late 20th century has been further constrained by the manner in which it has played fast and loose with the concepts of accountability and sovereignty. For example, humanitarian intervention is seen in many developing countries as but a smokescreen for the pursuit of other interests by military means. The West is seen to intervene when there are hard material gains to be made, but ignores supposed standards of humanity, civilization and rights when there are not (2010:8). He further argues that, “Perceived double standards in the enforcement of
UN resolutions (for example, relating to Israel on one hand and Iran on the other) and the bypassing of the Security Council when it ‘gets in the way’ (for example, over intervention in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq) cast further doubt on the moral and ethical basis of the foreign policy of Western states” (2010:8). It is these observations that make it nigh impossible for states to cooperate on perceived problems in international affairs, hence rendering instruments such as sanctions futile in capitulating ‘authoritarian regimes’ to democratic reforms, as there will always be pressure points.

Therefore, “Johan Galtung criticized the pain-gain notion as ‘naive,’ suggesting that no ‘transmission mechanism’ exists to convert civilian pain into political gain, and thirty years later, Robert A. Pape, also argued convincingly against what he considered unfounded optimism about the efficacy of sanctions (Bull and Tostensen, 2002:377). Tostensen and Bull (2002: 377) further argue along the same lines, if civilian "pain" cannot be translated into votes at the ballot box, the transmission mechanism is ultimately unlikely to work”.

However, observations into Zimbabwe’s sanctions impacts tend to contradict Tostensen and Bull’s observation. Despite failing to unseat the ZANU PF led government, the impact of the sanctions regime had some seismic shifts in Zimbabwe’s politics. For the first time in Zimbabwe’s elections history ZANU PF lost elections in parts of Mashonaland provinces which had been its traditional strongholds and the MDC since its formation in 1999 managed to claim a significant stake in Mashonaland provinces. Though credit is alluded to the minimal reforms before the March 2008 elections initiated by SADC, it should be noted that the February 2000 constitutional referendum which ZANU PF lost was to some extend free and fair, ZANU PF dominated the rural constituencies, whilst the NCA-MDC alliance claimed a large stake in the Urban and peri-urban constituencies (see appendix 1), which became a characterisation of Zimbabwe’s politics into Urban vs. Rural dichotomy with the former in favour of MDC and the later ZANU PF (see Mamdani 2008; Moyo and Yeros, 2007 and Moyo and Yeros, 2009). However despite these almost isolated incidents ZANU PF managed to survive and defied the demands of the sanctions as seen in the table above. However, a number of reforms have been instituted in particularly after the formation of the
Government of National Unity, but these cannot be credited to the sanctions regime, as there a number of factors included in particular the SADC facilitated inter-party talks.

**Fig 4.1.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions instrument</th>
<th>Stated objectives/demands</th>
<th>Zimbabwe’s response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ZIDERA European Union, Commonwealth, New Zealand, Australia, Britain and Canada | - Restoration of the rule of law  
- Presidential Election widely viewed as free and fair according to international norms and standards  
- Commitment to equitable, legal and transparent land reform, consistent with the International Donors' Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1998  
- Fulfillment of Agreement Ending War in Democratic Republic of Congo  
- Military and national Police to subordinate to civilian rule.  
An end to:  
- political violence,  
- serious violations of human rights  
- restrictions on the media, and  
- demanded a free and fair election | - The Zimbabwe government labeled these sanctions instruments as racist and interference with its sovereignty  
- The government passed the Public Order and Security Act, Access to information and Privacy Act, and continuously defended them Even reforms on these pieces of legislation have been frustrated by ZANU PF  
- Obtained radio jamming equipment from China  
- Continued electoral violence in particular the June 2008 presidential run-off  
- Restricted airwaves. Licences awarded to perceived sympathisers of ZANU PF  
- Land adjudication taken away from courts and declared irreversible.  
- Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth  
Zimbabwe adopted Look East policy.  
- Enacted and implemented Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act |

*Source: Various media sources*
It has been observed that sanctions as democratising tools are very limited by a number of factors. The emerging multipolarity has diminished the influence of Western states to dictate rules of engagement in the international sphere as they did within the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. Therefore Drezner (1999) observes that, “International cooperation not only reduces the political costs of applying sanctions, but, in a global economy, sanctions will be much more effective if a formal or informal coalition controls enough of the supply of a good to influence the terms of trade significantly. More so, growing globalisation and the financial interconnectedness of the world, aided with technology assets can be easily moved anywhere with the click of a button. Further to this Tostensen and Bull (2002: 389) pontificates that, “Yet, the most intractable problem Elites and members of the targeted regime must have assets abroad of a magnitude that their freezing or seizure would cause them serious problems. Sims et al (2011:14) concur with this position and argue that “First, the amount of money or assets belonging to targeted Zanu-PF leaders and their allies seized abroad to date has been negligible”, and “By August 2005, for instance, reports from the EU were that assets worth €825,000 had been seized and frozen by EU member states”, with, “The UK on its own had managed to freeze a paltry £160,000 by 2006; an amount so small that even the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs conceded that “both in absolute terms and relative to the probable resources of the targets it is doubtful whether asset freezes are effective as a means of inhibiting or changing the behaviour of those who are targeted”.

Further compounding the use of sanctions as a democratisation tool is the politics of sanctions. States rarely do have converging interests and in most cases they are in perpetual competition and struggle for supremacy as observed by Meersheimer. Therefore, it is argued that “Yet, the most intractable problem stems not from the technical difficulties of establishing and enforcing a smart sanctions regime, but from the politics of doing so” (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 394). More so, relatively few sanctions have imposed major costs, and even fewer cases have sufficed to induce target countries to change their ways. Systematic studies of the use of economic sanctions over the twentieth century do suggest, consistent with theory, that sanctions are more successful in securing the desired changes when they cost the sender relatively little and the damage to
the target is large relative to the cost of complying (Drezner, 1999, p. 308; Eaton and Engers, 1999; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990, pp. 101-103).

The emergence of China and other countries such as Brazil, India and resurgence of Russia after the fall of the soviet has created alternative centers of power and influence that has challenged Western hegemony in international affairs. The Chinese ambassador to the UN argues that, “We have our own approach to doing things and that is something like the South African government’s quiet diplomacy. We do not, like western countries, have a habit of interfering in other countries internal affairs and there is no example of us imposing our ideology on Africa nowadays . . . . From our own bitter experience, China favours negotiation, talking and does not resort to sanctions and embargoes (Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, 2005). This has endeared China with governments particularly in Africa and making them move away from the West towards the East. This is more profound in Okpeh’s (2009:16) observation that, “China’s policies towards the continent which have caught the fancy of some ruling elites in Africa is its principle of “non-interference in domestic Affairs,” and its rereading of rights-based issues and democracy. For example, China says that the Global Democracy Project has a neoliberal foundation that links it to western imperialism; that all countries of the world reserve the right to choose the type of government and leadership they want; and that the good governance conditionality attached to foreign assistance which integrates rule of law, accountability and other human rights issues, constitute a violation of recipient country’s sovereignty. The increasing importance of China is underlined in Hager’s (2007:260) observation; “China is increasingly, because of its economic weight and its presence on the Security Council, a key player in challenges that the international community faces around the world . . . . and our view is we should have a dialogue with China that’s strategic about what that role should be because many people question, for example, why the leader of Zimbabwe or other leaders who are not moving in the direction the international community is calling for, have such access to Beijing”.

46
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion
The genesis of the Zimbabwe sanctions is difficult to locate in any of the two contending schools; poor governance and land issues. This research established that the emphasis of Land reform as per the 1998 Donor’s Conference in ZIDER A gives credence to the argument that land is the core issue and the sanctions were a form of punishment. On the other hand, the poor governance record by Zimbabwe is undeniable and this corroborated the reasons advanced by the Western countries for instituting sanctions against Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the MDC in some instances, in particular its leadership did call for or supported sanctions, albeit that the grounds to sanction Zimbabwe were there. Therefore, it is concluded that the genesis of the Zimbabwe sanctions is a complex matter that cannot be accounted by a single narrative of these two contending schools. It can be explained as a narrative of coincidence and opportunity. Whilst there has been debates on the nature of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe, this study has established that the sanctions are a cocktail of economic and political at the same time. However the sanctions are neither comprehensive nor 100% economic. On the other hand, the study also established that the sanctions did not cause the Zimbabwe crisis as argued. The Zimbabwe Crisis is traced back to the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes and its negative socio-economic impact on the Economy as identified by Chimhowu (2009) and Dansereau (2005). This crisis is further located in the argument by Bond and Manyanya 2002, pinning the Black Friday in Late 1997 as the trigger of the Zimbabwe crisis. Therefore, by the time that Zimbabwe was slapped with sanctions its economy was already on a downward spiral. At best, the sanctions acted as a catalyst and heightened the crisis, thus they worsened an already worse situation.

The rise of China and other emerging countries has resulted in the diffusion of global power and at the same time created alternative avenues or pressure points for nations reeling under US and Western embargoes. The Chinese Foreign Policy of non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign states and paying less or no attention to governance issues has undermined liberal international norms and at the same time reduced the impact of Western sanctions on countries such as Zimbabwe. Whilst the
general theory of sanctions argues that they are an ineffective democratisation tool, it has to be appreciated that sanctions effectiveness is dependent upon the goals that they are set for. There are primary, secondary, and tertiary goals of sanctions and as such they ought to be evaluated against these criterions. There is general tendency to dismiss sanctions as an effective democratizing tool but a closer analysis of the Zimbabwean case tend to corroborate this thesis but at the same time also point to their potential effectiveness. It cannot be doubted that the US and EU sanctions regime on Zimbabwe contributed in shaping political events in Zimbabwe, although with mixed fortunes. They neither can be completely regarded as a failure nor a success, but it can be safely argued that the answer lies between the two extremes. It has been a cocktail of failure and success. On the other hand, Zimbabwe resorted to five sanctions fighting strategies: manipulation of multipolarity and adopting the look East policy and dumping the West; the use of ideology of neo-imperialism to rally the developing world behind it; appealed to SADC as an interlocutor to the Zimbabwe crisis; tapping into local resources such as diamonds to meet its obligations and finally the entering into a coalition government with the MDC. These strategies ensured the survival of the Zimbabwe government from the regime change onslaught from the Western nations and as well local (Zimbabwean) political actors. It can therefore be concluded that the use of sanctions as democratisation tools needs a careful and thorough study before their imposition and as well a continuous review, to adjust them to the emerging or obtaining political environment if they are to make sense. In the case of Zimbabwe, sanctions undermined the capacity of the state, leading to an almost collapse of government and agreement towards reforms to be implemented through a government of national unity. However, the sanctions were eventually overtaken by political events on the ground, rendering them obsolete in particular after the formation of the inclusive government as former proponents of sanctions started distance themselves against them.

5.1 Recommendations
The study, based on the case studies analyzed, could not establish a linear link between sanctions and democratisation. Sanctions were found not to be necessarily democratisation instruments as the politics of sanctions is mired in multiple complexity and as well due to emerging multipolarity which required cooperation when it came to the instituting and enforcement of international
norms and standards. Even in cases where they seem to work, they are sometimes overtaken by events and it may be difficult for the sanctioning countries to adjust sanctions regimes to respond to the new political context as was the case in Zimbabwe. Britain and her allies’ sanctions on Zimbabwe were rendered obsolete by the politics of the inclusive government which questioned the morality of continuing sanctioning Zimbabwe.

The study recommends that the discourse of sanctions needs revision and a collective approach within the international community if it is to be effective in enforcing international norms and standards on democracy among states. This is quite so, in particular reference to the members of the UNSC. Furthermore, sanctions need to be cognisant of the increasing role of regional bodies and African solidarity; at the same time seek their consensus before sanctioning perceived undemocratic countries to ensuring their compliance with democratic norms. In addition the study also recommends that for sanctions to be an effective democratisation tool there is need for their constant revision and sometimes adopt a carrot approach than the stick approach when there are signs of reforms. The formation of the inclusive government required Western nations to relax or temporarily suspend the sanctions as an incentive towards reforms, but this was not the case and sanctions remain a red herring in Zimbabwe’s reform process brokered by SADC.

Whilst the study tried to be exhaustive; there still remains scope for interrogation in particular when it comes to quantifying the value of the effect of sanctions on targeted individuals and companies, and the Zimbabwean economy. Another area to consider would be to investigate the deals in mining between Zimbabwe and China especially around diamond mining and how they mitigated sanctions. There is also room to further investigate the role of institutions such as the RBZ and Security apparatus in fighting sanctions.
Bibliography

Books


Journals


Reports, Conference Papers and Working Papers


54


Chimhowu A. (2009), “Moving Forward in Zimbabwe: Reducing Poverty and Promoting Growth”, University of Manchester, Brooks World Poverty Institute,


**Primary Sources**
Hansard Report, Parliamentary Debates, Zimbabwe, (2001), Vol. 27, No. 59,


SADC. (2010), Communiqué of the 30th Jubilee Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government.


**Thesis**

Newspapers and Internet Sources


http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/Column.1262.html, Accessed on 08/02/12


