Since the Ndebele people arrived in the Shona country in the late 1830s they have been subjected to a process of legend-making that amounts to the creation of a mythology. Much of this concerned the internal history of the kingdom, including its relations with subject peoples. This paper, however, will deal with the reality behind the mythology concerning the relationship between the Shona and the Ndebele.

To describe in detail the origins and development of mythology about the Ndebele would be a study in itself. It can be shown how and why the myths arose by taking examples. Mythology began when the missionary Robert Moffat visited the Ndebele in 1854. He had previously seen them in their home among the Sotho in the 1830s, a period when the wars and disturbances of the mfecane had produced a situation of violence and insecurity in which many African rulers and peoples rivalled those of Europe in their contempt for human life. Moffat assumed from the start that in the fourteen years since the Ndebele had settled down among the Shona that nothing had changed. Continually seeking evidence of Ndebele brutality, he ignored the implications of the Shona raids upon the Ndebele that he described, and produced a picture of the Ndebele as cruel raiders. This not only helped to found the LMS mission to the Ndebele but founded the myth as well. Myths about the Ndebele - and the Shona - flourished because of oral traditions among missionaries, traders and travellers that were repeated to newcomers to the country, believed in implicitly and passed on by word of mouth or writing to others in turn. Many flourish today. For example, Moffat's son John could write confidently that 'Umpanda is the king of the Zulus near Natal, and of his government Moselekatse's is an exact copy' before he had even entered the Ndebele country. It is a fact that until the 1890s not a single European witnessed an Ndebele raid upon the Shona and described it in writing - except for Mauch, and he wrote in German - yet detailed accounts of Ndebele surprise attacks were current in pre-1890 books by writers such as Montagu Kerr, although the Shona country he crossed was profoundly peaceful and untroubled by the Ndebele. Kerr, like Baines before him and Knight-Bruce after him, had been 'briefed' by European residents in the Ndebele country, and very few European travelers managed to shake off the conditioning imposed in this way long enough to draw the correct conclusions from the evidence they recorded. Another myth, that of the
annual raid carried out by the Ndebele on the surrounding peoples, was repeated regularly by writers from Mackenzie onwards, in spite of the fact that there was no evidence for it and a good deal against it. The main reasons for the growth of myths like these lay in the desire of missionaries to gain support for missions to save the souls of the savage Ndebele or the need for travelers to stress the wildness of the country through which they travelled. Later, other motives appeared. The Rudd Concession of 1888 gave both the British government and Rhodes' BSA Company a motive for making the most sweeping interpretations of the extent of Ndebele influence over the Shona, and they went to some lengths to conceal and falsify evidence in order to justify their position. Ndebele raids on the Shona were also of use to excuse Rhodes' conquest of the kingdom in 1893 and the subsequent European domination up to the present. 'I hope they do raid the Barotsees', wrote the Company's secretary in 1892. 'All these raids and deaths and murders ought to be entered into a book, so that we may always be able to prove justification and their being a cruel damnable race.' Finally, the Ndebele themselves as well as the Shona took part in the myth-making process. Many Ndebele seem to have exaggerated the numbers of people they killed and concealed their own losses, thus building up the myth.

On occasions they would claim that their power extended to the Sabi river, which was in fact true for only the upper thirty miles. On the other hand many Shona seem in time to have accepted the mythology of the Europeans as factual, and exaggerated the effect of the Ndebele.

Behind this myth was a reality. The Ndebele did raid the Shona and other peoples, but not out of sheer bloodlust or even because it was essential to their economic system, as has been incorrectly suggested. Ndebele raids were made for a variety of reasons. Sometimes these reasons lay in internal factors within the Ndebele state itself, such as the losses caused to their herds by the lungsickness epidemic of the early 1860s - although even this was not the main reason for the campaigns of this period. Another internal reason for raiding was the practice common to many African societies of small communities banding together to raid others for women and livestock for their own immediate profit. It will be seen that the Shona were not backward in this respect, and raided the Ndebele as well as each other. But this form of raiding was not a consequence of the nature of the Ndebele state. On the contrary, both Mzilikazi and Lobengula made it clear that it was to be discouraged because it attracted reprisals. In 1860 Mzilikazi told his Machaha they are "making spears" for him by doing so", and indeed it was this kind of cross-raiding between Shona and Ndebele that precipitated the fall of the Ndebele state. European observers noted an increase in this kind of unofficial raiding during the 1868 - 72 succession crisis,
when the royal authority was weaker. Such raiding was a serious annoyance to the victims, although the fortunes of individual polities varied considerably. In the area between the Tokwe and the Nuanetsi, which was subjected to Nguni, Gaza and Ndebele raids, one group survived the entire nineteenth century with a total loss to the Maseko Ngoni and Ndebele of two men killed, six women captured and some stock lost.

The real basis of the myth, however, was the number of major raids made upon the Shona and other peoples by the order of the king, and the consequent extent of Ndebele power and influence. Again, behind this myth was a reality, and this paper will concentrate upon this reality. But the overall history of the establishment of the Ndebele kingdom and its expansion and influence among the Shona can only be properly understood if the Shona factor is taken into account. Firstly, the Shona provided the very basis of the state itself, in that it was from the first a Shona state dominated by an Nguni-speaking minority. Secondly, it operated within a long-established and well-developed Shona economic and political spectrum in which Shona factors, interests and initiatives dictated not only the initial expansion of the Ndebele state but also the direction it took. In many cases Ndebele power on the frontier depended upon alliances with the Shona, and as the economic power of the Shona began to finance re-armament the Ndebele were forced into increasingly unsuccessful attempts to counter the revival of Shona power.

Many accounts put the background of the Ndebele in the Nguni country of South Africa, with the economic and political developments of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This account puts it in modern Matabeleland from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries. This period saw the establishment of the northern branch of the Leopards Kopje people, one of a number of Later Iron Age peasant peoples that can be identified with confidence as the ancestors of the Shona. Recent research has identified the northern Leopards Kopje people with the speakers of the Kalanga dialect. Their environment, which they inherited from the Early Iron Age Zhizo people, was notably drier than that of the rest of the plateau to the north-east, and therefore, although they, like all their successors including the Ndebele, were an agricultural people with a basic economy rooted in the growing of grains, their environment encouraged a strong emphasis on cattle-raising. The Kalanga, the Rozvi, the Ndebele and the Europeans of that region were all heavily involved in cattle-raising. Imports suggest that the Kalanga took part in the trading activities of the Shona as a whole, activities that involved the mining of gold and copper and the hunting of elephants for ivory, to be exported to the Indian Ocean economy in return for cloth and beads. It is probable that trade routes to the coast and especially to the Zambezi were well-defined comparatively early.

At some time after 1500 the Kalanga experienced the first of a
series of influxes by elite groups when the Shona-speaking members of the Zimbabwe culture began to move into the area. They were able to divert the surplus wealth of the region into the construction of prestige stone buildings such as Chamabvefva, probably built in the mid-sixteenth century, and Khami, probably built by the end of the same century. The new elite – known as Rozvi from the end of the seventeenth century ruled over a basic peasant population of Kalanga and were known to the Portuguese as the Torwa dynasty and associates, rulers of the state of Butua. In the 1640s the state was shaken by civil wars and economic troubles, and by the 1680s it has succumbed in its turn to a new movement of related Rozvi from the edges of the Mwene Mutapa empire, the Changamire dynasty, as the Portuguese called it. Like all Shona states, Butua was ruled by a number of families of different totems with both ritual and territorial responsibilities, many of them related by blood or marriage to the supreme Mambo of the moyo clan. Archaeologists now believe that Khami, like all Iron Age major settlements which were liable to put a strain on their immediate environment, was abandoned during the overall Rozvi period, c.1500 - 1800. The bulk of tradition agrees with this, and states that during the Changamire period the political heart of the state was placed east of the Bembesi, especially around the stone buildings of Danangombi and Manyanga. The area west of the Bembesi was under a Kalanga sub-ruler, Ndumba. Essentially the Changamire state fell within the political and economic spectrum of the greatest Shona states, including the Zimbabwe, Torwa and Mwene Mutapa states, taking part in the gold and ivory trade with the Zambezi and the sea bearing a close resemblance to the other states in social matters. Dr Stan Mudenge, however, has pointed out that in many ways the Changamire state foreshadowed the Ndebele state of the next century. Firstly, there was from the beginning a strong emphasis on cattle, not only among the Kalanga but among the ruling Rozvi as well. Secondly, the Rozvi – and indeed the Shona and Sena people as a whole – had pioneered the 'Chest and horns' fighting technique long before it appeared among the Nguni in the nineteenth century. Other pieces of evidence support this extremely important observation. The ruling Rozvi apparently favoured skins for clothing, like the Nguni, rather than the traditional Shona cloth. They also made use of the Ndebele technique of moving a subordinate people by force into a position to guard the state's frontiers, as when in the last decades of their empire they attacked the Hera under Nyashanu Matema and removed many people, to be resettled on the Lundi under Matenda. They also appeared sufficiently different from ordinary Shona to figure in Shona religion as the originators of shaven spirits, as did the Nguni people – and the Europeans.
In short, we have a continuous occupation of the area that was to form the core of the Ndebele kingdom from the eleventh to the early nineteenth centuries by Shona-speaking people. It is estimated that only about forty percent of the current Ndebele-speaking people are descended from Nguni or Sotho immigrants. It will be shown that the Ndebele state was keen to acquire more people and to absorb them into its culture, and that the Shona people most affected by this, especially before c.1855, were the Kalanga and Rozvi. Therefore, unless it can be shown that after 1838-40 the Ndebele under Mzilikazi killed even a large part of the Kalanga and Rozvi in the area in which they settled and then repopulated the area with captives from other Shona areas — an illogical theory that does not accord with the facts — it must be assumed that the Nguni-speaking Ndebele were simply the third group — after the Torwa and Changamire dynasties — to dominate the same basic Kalanga people. In other words a majority of the historical Ndebele were and are the original Shona residents of the country who have simply acquired a new language and culture from the large and powerful minority which has settled among them. In view of this, therefore, just as the major questions in the history of Rhodesia since 1890 are not those confined to the minority of Europeans, so the major questions of Ndebele history are not necessarily those of the minority of Nguni — and Sotho — descended Ndebele, such as the extent to which they absorbed Shona culture, but those of the majority of Shona-descended Ndebele, such as the remarkable extent to which they absorbed Nguni culture.

If the Ndebele were from their arrival influenced by the physical environment, the economic structure, the trade system with the coast and other factors of the Shona world, they were even more influenced by the politics of the Changamire state. They were from the beginning a vigorous and active political force, but they were by no means as overwhelmingly powerful as they have been depicted, and the way in which they established themselves and extended their power depended to a great extent on the politics of the Changamire and other Shona dynasties and the way in which their common economic system was laid out. We know very little of the internal politics of the Changamire state until 1768, when after a civil war a usurper was killed. By 1788 Rupandamananga was ruling, and to add to the natural disasters of droughts he faced the rapidly-expanding Mhari in the Lundi and Tokwe valleys. His internal policies led to a conspiracy, and he was lured into a fatal trap by his internal and external enemies at some time between 1795 and 1802. Gumboremvura his successor apparently relied to some extent on Mhari support, and although he ruled for a long time from Manyanga he had to face an unsuccessful revolt by his son Mutinhima
and two important holders of ritual positions, Mavudii and Nerwande. This civil war ultimately led to the total estrangement of the main Rozvi dynasty between the Jiri and Gumunyu houses, but in spite of their differences the two factions were able to co-operate on two occasions, in the 1840s or early 1850s and in 1896. Gumboremvura's successor, known only by the Rozvi praise-name Dlembeu, reigned for a short time before his deposition by Chirisamhuru, who may have been a son of Gumboremvura. During Chirisamhuru's reign the political geography of the state was as follows: the Mambo himself held the capital sites of Danangombi and Manyanga, while around him in a circle were ranged various sub-rulers. Some, like Mavudzi and Nerwande near the Bubi river, were the holders of ritual positions. Others, such as Ndumba in the Khama area west of the Bembesi, were related to the main dynasty by marriage. In the Mulungwane hills lived the Mutinhuwa factions, which was also influential in a wide area east of the upper Lundi and on the Kwe Kwe river. Other sub-rulers were members of the main dynasty, descended from various Mambos, who like many members of the Shona dynasties, had withdrawn or been forced from the scene of central politics and had assumed local territorial responsibilities. These included Lukuluba, ruler of the Choko hills, descendant of Washaya, a brother of a Mambo; Rozani of the Vungu river; Swabasvi of the Somabula forest, descendant of Changamire Dombu; a ruler of the Mpopoti range with the praise-name Dlembeu and a number of others. These sub-rulers played a great part in the Ndebele conquest of the Rozvi state.

The much-cited Nguni migrations, the mfecane, only confirmed a general trend of economic and political disaster as far as the Shona were concerned, and were neither as damaging nor as final as has been supposed. To the droughts, civil wars among the Rozvi, wars between the various Shona peoples, strife between the Changamire dynasty and the Mwari cult and a tendency towards economic depression were added two substantial and permanent losses of territory. The south-west from the Shoshong hills to the Shashi river fell to the expanding Tswana, and even the death of Kgadi in 1826 at the hands of the Shona did not shake their hold. To the south-east the Tsonga Hlengwe were advancing slowly across the lowveld in the first half of the nineteenth century, taking up territory that had previously been Shona. As far as the Rozvi were concerned the mfecane took the form of several successive blows as small groups of Nguni and Sotho crossed their land. Mpanga, Ngwana Maseko and Zwangendaba all invaded the Changamire state before 1835 and were expelled with some difficulty, while a fourth force under Nyamazana even succeeded in killing Chirisamhuru the Mambo. The Nguni did a great deal of damage, taking grain and cattle, yet it is a measure of the
strength of the Changamire state that, weakened as it was, it did not break up. It seems likely that no Mambo was installed immediately after Chirisamhuru's death, but at some point well before 1854 his son Tohwechipi succeeded him, and as in this case he received the support of the Mutinhima house he can fairly be said to have been the next Mambo.  

The Ndebele invasion differed from those of the Nguni in several ways. Firstly, Mzilikazi's people made no attempt to attack the central part of the Changamire state, but settled in the western province of Ndumba, west of the Bembesi. Secondly, they consolidated their power by exploiting the splits between the Rozvi, and by entering into an economic relationship with them. The main body of Ndebele under Gundwane arrived from the Umgungwane valley in 1838-9. Ndumba's dynasty vanished from the scene relatively early, and the main resistance in the immediate area was led by Mutinhima from the Mulungwane hills. Mutinhima, nicknamed mafuta, was at first successful in his defence, and may not have been pushed out of the hills until after Mzilikazi arrived. The Ndebele succession crisis undoubtedly delayed the impact of the Ndebele upon the Shona, but even so it seems to have been surprisingly mild. There are reports of some raids made upon the local people in the first year, but tradition from the Kalanga pointed out that although 'they killed a lot of people... none of my family were killed. We did not regard the Matabele as bad people. The only thing they fought over was grain ... There was no trouble when the Matabele came.' This was contrasted with the rapacity of the Ngoni during previous invasions. On the Manzamnyama river the local Kalanga fled briefly and then returned as tributaries of the new overlords. In short, what had happened west of the Bembesi was that the place of the Ndumba dynasty had been taken by Mzilikazi and his followers, who had settled down among the Kalanga as the Rozvi had done before them. It was thus logical that the Ndebele should not remain on hostile terms with the local Shona because they needed supplies of grain, which would not be forthcoming if raiding was continued for a long time. In 1854 Moffat noted the Ndebele prosperity in terms of grain, and in 1858 he confirmed that the Shona were continuing to live inside the Ndebele-settled area in their own villages.  

The Ndebele had thus become rivals of the Rozvi as rulers of the Kalanga and other Shona peoples, and in the period when the Changamire dynasty was weakened by the death of Chirisamhuru, Mzilikazi actually took his place as overlord of certain Rozvi families of the main dynasty. These, including Swaba, Lukuluba and Rozani, may have been motivated by internal political jealousies among the Rozvi such as their exclusion from the centre of power and the succession, but they also had an economic motive. The Ngoni invasions had resulted in the loss of a great number of the prized cattle of the Rozvi, so that there was a
felt shortage. The Ndebele, on the other hand, had plenty of cattle — currently Africa's most easily-transferred asset — but desperately needed more people. The result was that an exchange took place, in which Mzilikazi distributed cattle to the Rozvi mentioned above in return for young people who were incorporated into the Ndebele state and society. This state of affairs extended over the eastern half of the Changamire state and even as far as Tsunga, the land between the upper Umniati and the Mwanesi range. There, the Nyandoro dynasty had acted as intermediary rulers between the main Rozvi dynasty and the peoples north-east of them. At some time before the great campaigns in that direction in the 1850s and 1860s Ndebele cattle were distributed there as well.

It was not likely that this situation would endure for long without serious trouble. Firstly, there was the problem of the main Rozvi dynasty, which had withdrawn into the hills that fringed the Changamire state to the east. They were hardly likely to accept the loss of their position without making some attempt to regain it. Secondly, the economic exchange created by the Ndebele was in the long run extremely disadvantageous to the Rozvi and other Shona who took part in it. The Ndebele appear to have retained ultimate ownership of the cattle that they distributed, although the milk and limited slaughter rights would presumably have been accorded to the herders, but the young people who were levied by the Ndebele were not allowed to return to their own societies. As Moffat noted in 1854, that 'there is nothing they deplore so much as their children being taken from them just at a time when they become useful to their parents', this practice, taken to excess, could ruin society. Later the Ndebele did not need to recruit so many from their tributaries, and so caused less damage and created less resentment. But the combination of a serious grievance and the existing organisation of the Rozvi state led to the first serious Shona resistance to Ndebele rule.

A point should first be made about the character of war between the Shona and the Ndebele. The Ndebele did not believe in total war any more than the Shona believed in total peace. During the warfare between the Chirumanzu dynasty and the Ndebele in the 1850s Moffat was able to note that between the fighting in 1854-5 and the surrender of Chirumanzu in 1857 there had been no further fighting. In 1866 the Ndebele, having attacked Mashayamombe's people earlier in the year, attempted to trade with them in August. As for the Shona, even the Njanja, whose exploitation of the Wedza ironfield and wide-ranging hoe-selling network was one of the great economic success-stories of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and who depended for their sales on good relations with the surrounding peoples, did not hesitate to rob 'Portuguese' zungu traders passing through their territory, even though this would hardly
endear them to the peoples who had expected to receive the trade goods that the zungu were importing.70 Another point to be noted is that even when Ndebele raids were major ones, directed against specific targets on the orders of the king, there was a tendency for other people in the area to suffer as well. This was because the Ndebele, whose famed military discipline existed far more in the minds of European writers than it ever did in reality, were prone to scattering across a wide area in search of cattle and women. This emerges clearly from all detailed accounts from Europeans living among the Shona, such as Mauch in 1872, who gives a picture, quite unlike Montagu Kerr's fictitious stereotype of a surprise attack on a surrounded village, of a series of raids over a very wide front, from the western Duma on the Mtilikwe-Pokoteke confluence to the upper Pokoteke, some forty miles, over a period of about three weeks. The Shona, who had at least three days' warning, suffered various losses but were rarely taken completely by surprise.71 The same picture emerged from accounts of the 1892 raids on the country from Chivi to Gutu and from those of the 1893 raid on Zimuto.72 Ndebele raiders also tended to follow up their intended targets if they fled, as when they pursued people from the Chaminuka medium's base near the Umfuli to the northern Shawasha country beyond the Umwindsi in 1883.73 Even Ndebele on a peaceful mission, such as the delivery of a message, would sometimes cover their expenses by raiding.74

If the main stimulus behind the great Ndebele campaigns of the 1850s and 1860s was the political threat of the Rozvi dynasty, the economic stimulus of the Shona trade system was extremely important. Indeed, it appears to have provoked the first important expansion of Ndebele power. In inheriting the Changamire state, the Ndebele had inherited its basic economic framework, which in spite of a regional emphasis on cattle was still aligned to the traditional exchange of gold and ivory for cloth and beads. As mentioned above, warfare between the Shona and the Ndebele was not total, and it is clear that even during the fighting of 1854-5 the trade system linking the Ndebele with the Zambezi and the coast through the Shona country to the east was still functioning.75 Nevertheless, by the 1850s it had become clear to Mzilikazi that the Shona were difficult to dislodge from their mountain strongholds.76 At this point neither side had guns in quantity, although the Shona had been importing a certain number of guns for a very long time.77 The Ndebele had learned from their experiences south of the Limpopo that guns were useful, and in 1850s and 1860s they did their best to acquire them.78 The basic Kalanga population of the Changamire state had been accustomed to import cloth, and their needs also had to be supplied. Although supplies of both guns and cloth were
available through the variously friendly, neutral or hostile Shona dominions to the east, it would obviously be desirable for the Ndebele to control the trade routes to a greater extent.

The first expansion of the Ndebele was to the north-west, however. One reason for this was probably that the Ndebele state was too weak in the 1840s to attempt the more hazardous - because more heavily populated and thus better defended - route to the north-east. The badly-watered sand country to the north-west was almost uninhabited and thus offered no resistance to raiders who could easily cross it to strike at the Shona under Hwange, Pashu and Saba on the Deka, Gwai and Zambezi rivers. These people were not only vulnerable but also offered access to one of the trade routes to the sea. This route was along the Zambezi through the Tonga country to Zumbo, Tete, Sena and the sea, and was economically viable in spite of the distances involved because nearly all the distance could be covered by some sort of water transport. Water transport, as Selous noted, made goods from the Portuguese ports mentioned above much more competitive than those hauled by wagon from the South African ports, and in the 1860s 'Portuguese' traders were operating near the Victoria Falls. By the early 1850s the Ndebele appear to have established their authority over these Zambezian polities, especially after the death of the Hwange in 1853, although intermittent raids on the area occurred for various reasons as long as the Ndebele state survived.

A Rozvi tradition from the Insize area suggested that Mzilikazi extended his policy of co-operation with the Rozvi to the point of requesting Chirismhuru's son Tohwechipi to return from his exile in the direction of the Eastern Highlands and settle down in his own country, and that it actually worked for a few years before Tohwechipi broke away. It seems certain that the Ndebele tried to get the Mutinhima house to join them, but that they refused. The 1850s saw a rapid revival of the Rozvi power, and as mentioned above they seem to have sunk their differences sufficiently for the Mutinhima group to recognise the paramountcy of Tohwechipi. Even the Swabasvi house broke away from the Ndebele and joined the Mambo's Rozvi. But it does not seem that there was a single command over the rest of the Shona. Even some of the Rozvi under Kukuluwa and Rozani remained under the Ndebele, and accounts of the period are full of stories of quarrels and warfare between the Rozvi and rulers such as Hwata, Gutu and the people of the upper Sabi valley. Shona rulers did attack the Ndebele at the same time as the Rozvi, but it appears to have been on their own initiative.

If the Ndebele exactions of young people provided the basic motive for the Shona resistance to Ndebele rule in the early 1850s, and the
revival of the Changamire dynasty gave an example to be followed, the resistance took a thoroughly traditional form, Shona raiders penetrated deep into the country of the Ndebele, stealing cattle and — according to the Ndebele — committing atrocities on women. The most prominent of the raiders were the Mambo, Tohwechipi, his relative Mutinhima, and Chizema the son of the Govera ruler Chirumanzu on the Shashe. But these raids provoked an Ndebele response that proved too strong for the Shona. Battles were fought in the mountains to the east of the Ndebele state: at the Mpopoti range against the Rozvi ruler 'Dlembeu Kupengobuta', at Umgulugulu (Guruguru) mountain, and against the Mhari ruler Zingwe, who was killed for refusing to supply young people as tribute. Tohwechipi was forced to retreat through Chivi past Nyaningwe hill in the direction of Zimbabwe, and it may be near there that he won the defensive battle of Chikato. By employing zvitunya — strong people who came from the Zambezi to trade and who possessed guns, he was able to defeat the Ndebele, winning himself the name of Chibambamu in the process, some time before 1854. The fighting continued into 1854, and then there was lull. But by 1857 the situation had resolved itself in Mzilikazi's favour, partly because of divisions among the Shona.

The Chirumanzu dynasty surrendered early in 1857, and from then until 1889 became a strong ally of the Ndebele. Indeed, Chizema, who had been so prominent in raids on the Ndebele, was aided by them in his unsuccessful attempt to win a new land for himself in southern Buhera in the years that followed. As for the Rozvi, they suffered once more from the lack of unity among the Shona peoples. In July 1857 it was noted that 'the rulers holding these lands (goldfields in the central Shona country) were tributary to the emperor Changamire, but today, by a betrayal, the Hwata 'Mezirose' has taken possession of them from the said Changamire, who lives as a refugee in Njanja, land of the ruler Gambiza, in the district of the Hera, on the edges of his vast domains.'

We do not yet know what this betrayal was, but it is possible to say why Hwata's attitude was important. Hwata was the ruler of a comparatively small Hera polity at the head of the Mazoe valley, but if his territory was small his economic influence was considerable. Not only did he control the goldfields in the northern Shawasha country to the east of him, but also the locality of the old Portuguese feira of Dambarare. This strategic position — probably of importance far back into early Shona history — enabled Hwata to dominate much of the trade of the central Shona country, buying ivory and reselling it to the 'Portuguese' traders, whose houses were to be found in the upper Mazoe valley. Hwata guarded this economic advantage jealously, and when the people near the old feira of Maramuca — probably the Devera group that owned the
Shurushuru goldfield\textsuperscript{108} attempted to re-open it to 'Portuguese' trade in c.1830 - 50, he attacked both them and the 'Portuguese'. He lost the battle but won the war, for the feira was not re-opened.\textsuperscript{109} Hwata's betrayal of Tohwechipi probably involved the prevention of economic aid - and perhaps the essential guns - from reaching him. It certainly would not have involved the Ndebele, since Mzilikazi devoted as much effort to the defeat of Hwata as he did to Tohwechipi, and the continued subjection of Hwata to Ndebele rule until 1889 suggests that Mzilikazi was fully aware of the economic importance of Hwata's area and intended to profit by it.

There seems to have been a period of peace from 1854 to 1860, but from the latter date to 1873 the Ndebele made what was probably their greatest concerted effort to dominate the Shona. They raided over a wide front from Chivi in the east to Mangwende in the north-east and Hwata in the north, and in the northern areas in particular the relatively few raids mentioned in traditions most probably occurred during this period. Even so it does not seem likely that the Ndebele were numerous enough to affect all these areas at once, and in one year, 1863, when the main strength of the kingdom was turned against the Ngwato to the south-west, the only noted effort to the north-west was a raid by associates of the Ndebele on the Deka river area,\textsuperscript{110} while one force raided Hwata's associate Chiweshe in the upper Masoe valley.\textsuperscript{111} It should be remembered that even during this period of intense activity total war did not exist, and the Ndebele both raided and traded with Mashayamombe in 1866.\textsuperscript{112}

The Ndebele effort of 1860 was confined to a small raid to the north-east and another to the south-east.\textsuperscript{113} After this, it is possible to make some estimate of the sequence of events in each area affected by the surge of Ndebele activity. In the east the peoples of Chivi,\textsuperscript{114} Bere,\textsuperscript{115} Zimuto,\textsuperscript{116} and the Njanja\textsuperscript{117} were attacked in 1861. Bere's Mhari bore the brunt of the attack,\textsuperscript{118} and were severely weakened in consequence,\textsuperscript{119} while Chivi's Mhari appear to have succumbed to the power of the newly-imported guns\textsuperscript{120} and became tributary to the Ndebele. A combination of ambition on the part of Chivi Matweru's son Makonese and the Ndebele expansion led to the deaths of both Chivi and Bere at about this time.\textsuperscript{120}

The attack on the Njanja mentioned above brought the Ndebele back into contact with the Changamire Rozvi, who had arrived in the Hera country - dominated by the two Hera rulers Mutekedza and Nyashamu and the rapidly-expanding Njanja confederacy under Gambiza - by 1857.\textsuperscript{121} The Rozvi, led by the Mambo Tohwechipi Chibambamu and his cousins of the Mutinhima house, occupied hills on the frontier between Nyashamu and Gambiza such as Bedza and the Mavangwe range.\textsuperscript{122} It is stated that the Ndebele made three major attacks in order to rid themselves of the menace
of the remnant of Rozvi imperial power, until in 1866 a prolonged siege forced Tohwechipi to surrender. He was brought to Mzilikazi and later allowed to return. Tradition is emphatic that he left Mavangwe and went to Gutu where he died, but in view of the fact that in 1873 Mtikana Mafu led a major force against the Rozvi in Gutu it seems possible that even the defeat of 1866 did not crush Rozvi resistance to the Ndebele. In view of the tendency of Ndebele raiders to spread across country it seems likely that most of the damage suffered by the Njanja and the Herera of Mutekedza and Nyashanu occurred at this time. Certainly by 1870 the Ndebele had raided Mutekedza, since they had mutilated his sub-ruler Nyoka. This may also be the period of Chizema's attempt to conquer southern Buhera from Nerutanga, which was repulsed by that ruler and the Njanja in spite of his Ndebele backing. The Njanja recall having aided Gutu after this, which may coincide with the 1873 raid there.

The Nhokwe of Mangwende recalled in 1898 that it was in following up the Abarosis that the Matabele first came to know our country, with the result that they commenced killing and raiding through the different districts. The Rozvi were not the only ones responsible, however, because the Ndebele tendency to follow up their enemies applied to Nyandoro of Tsonga as well. Nyandoro had been herding cattle for the Ndebele, but at about this time an Ndebele nduna's murder led to hostilities, and the Ndebele attacked Tsonga, which was flat and nearly indefensible, and was thus one of the very few areas occupied by the Shona that was depopulated by Ndebele action, as the Nyandoro people left en masse in the direction of their old home in Fungwi. They moved to the nearby Nyoka river, and after a year or two raids pushed them further north-east to the Chirume. A few years later more raids drove them to the Matswitswi caves in Samuriwo's land, from which they fled after Nyandoro's death and further raids to Mangwende as refugees. Like the Rozvi, they brought the attention of the Ndebele to those peoples who lived nearby, so that Samuriwo, Chihota, Svosve and Mangwende all suffered. But, as the Mangwende people pointed out in 1898, 'The first time they entered the country very few of Mangwende's tribe were killed, and very few taken prisoners, but they took away with them large numbers of cattle and goats... The Matabele never came back into this district again but every year they were raiding the districts on the sabi river. This marked the farthest point of Ndebele raiding to the north-east.

The pursuit of the Rozvi Mambo and his associate Nyandoro led the Ndebele straight to the north-east up the watershed of the whole country, over open, grassy plains that were of little significance to their economy except as sources for cattle to replenish their herds after the lungsickness of 1861 had so reduced them that the kingdom actually
But the route to the north not only led to the trade routes of the heart of the old Mwene Mutapa empire, but was of considerable economic importance in itself, running as it did through some of the biggest goldfields still being worked in the early part of the century and across river valleys running west from the watershed that were full of elephants. The great Ndebele efforts of 1860-8 in this area hit the inhabitants very hard. The Ngezi dynasty of Rimuka partly broke up, and the Mashayamombe and Chivero people of the Umfuli valley also suffered, and at one point their rulers were forced to flee to the land to the north. However, Mashayamombe at least appears to have returned to his land by 1866, in time to be raided once more. Mzilikazi's attempt to trade for ivory later that year suggests economic motives. Economic motives almost certainly lay behind the very determined efforts made to subject the Hwata trading centre. For four years from 1860-1 the Ndebele attacked, even sending Lotshe to raid Hwata's associate and neighbour Chiweshe at a time when the greatest need for men lay on the Ngwato front to the south-west in 1863. Finally Hwata surrendered in 1864, and was captured to be returned to his home as a tributary ruler. However, Hwata like the Mambo Tohwechipi appears to have attempted to break away from this relationship, because a major campaign was required in 1868 to subject him again. Even in 1870 his allegiance to the Ndebele was thought to be superficial, but he remained at least nominally tributary until 1889.

The wars of the 1850s established the dominance of the Ndebele in the vicinity of the old Changamire state. The campaigns of the 1860s wiped out the last power of the Rozvi and gave the Ndebele strong economic advantages in the north. In spite of the dissensions of the succession crisis of 1868-72, in terms of relations between the Shona and the Ndebele, the latter wore by 1873 at the zenith of their power. It is thus ironic, in view of the myths of Ndebele supremacy, to note that their first serious defeat, and the first sign of a reversal of the balance of power that was to lead in the end to the revolt of many of the Shona tributaries, occurred only four years later, in 1877. Ironic, but not surprising. The Shona after all were descendants of the creators of the most impressive Iron Age material culture in Southern Africa, the Zimbabwe-Khami culture. They owned what was left of considerable goldfields, and had many elephants available. Their political institutions and territories were small only by comparison with the few super-states of Southern, Central and East Africa. By comparison with most politics of that area many Shona rulers held quite big territories. Most of them owned superb defensive sites. Moreover, developments to the south were beginning to aid the Shona. The opening of the Kimberley diamond fields
in 1867, the increased availability of guns as Europeans adopted rifles, the expansionist ambitions of Britain and the Afrikaners - and Portuguese counter-moves - all tended to aid the Shona in the short run, though not in the long. Under the circumstances it is surprising that the Ndebele accomplished as much as they did.

Before describing Ndebele reactions to the revival of Shona economic and military power, the extent of Ndebele domination should be noted, with special reference to the alliances between the Ndebele and local Shona interest-groups upon whose presence they partly relied to maintain their influence in the border tributary lands. By 'tributary land' is meant a land whose people entered into a relationship with a more powerful people paying some kind of tribute in return for immunity from raids at regular intervals. The tribute generally involved symbolic articles or services, such as skins, feathers, hoes, spears, tobacco or the building of huts. These articles and services did not involve such a serious economic burden as the permanent removal of cattle or young people, but they represented a considerable diversion of valuable man-hours nonetheless. Consequently there was an understandable desire among many people to avoid paying tribute that ran counter to the strong attraction of Nguni society to those who for various reasons found their own insufficient for their needs. The dividing-line between those who were tributaries and those who were not was not absolutely rigid. Some groups occasionally paid tribute in order to escape raids, but generally resisted. Others who paid tribute were occasionally raided in spite of this by raiders not under the overlord's control.

As mentioned above, the Hwange area came under the military domination of the Ndebele in the early 1850s. After the death of Hwange Lusumbami in 1853, most of the Nambiye fled to the Zambezi, but shortly after his accession Lobengula persuaded most of these refugees to return as his tributaries. The Shangwe of the Mafungabusi plateau under Chireya were raided twice in Mzilikazi's reign, before coming under Lobengula's rule at the price of a tribute in tobacco. The Urungwe area between the Umniati and Angwa rivers was subjected to a few raids along the Zambezi, in which some groups collaborated with the Ndebele and others resisted with considerable success, but no permanent tributary relationships seem to have existed.

The Ndebele had a surprisingly good relationship with the Shona spirit mediums of the Umfuli and Hunyani valleys. They paid tribute themselves to the great mediums of the Nyamuswa-Wanewawa cluster of spirits, as well as to the Chikono medium of the Neuso group at the Umfuli-Umniati confluence. It is claimed that this situation came about by 1868. Nemakonde, the local overlord of the area, came to pay
tribute to Lobengula, and it is possible that by 1886 he too was receiving a counter-tribute from the Ndebele. Evidently the Ndebele found themselves reliant to some extent on the religious powers of the Shona to the north of them, although Nemakonde's position in a rich gold and ivory-producing area may also have been important. The Ndebele also had a cordial relationship with the great Chaminuka medium who lived in the Rwizi polity on the Umfuli, of which more will be said below.

The situation with regard to the Nemakonde and Rwizi areas, where the Ndebele relied upon certain Shona religious forces was repeated almost all the way down their north-eastern and eastern frontiers of influence. In the Hwata tributary area the dynasty was divided into houses descended from Hwata Shayachimwe, and the protracted succession struggle between them after Hwata Gwindi's death in c.1887 suggests that he may have relied upon Ndebele aid to maintain himself after he surrendered in 1864. The same was true in Mutekedza's land, where the house of Mueonza had managed to secure the title for themselves in the face of opposition from the older Masarirambi house, and submitted to the Ndebele, and in the Chirumanzu dynasty, where the house of Simba managed to maintain an almost continuous succession from father to son from 1857 to 1954, cutting out uncles, brothers and cousins with the help of various powers, including the Ndebele. The point is that although it is true that all of these political interest groups relied upon Ndebele help to maintain themselves, it is also true that the presence of these interest groups made it much easier for the Ndebele to maintain their own influence on the frontiers of their empire.

In a similar way the Ndebele interacted with the Shona to deal with external threats. Thus they made an agreement with Adam Render, the son-in-law of Mabika, a powerful sub-ruler of Charumbira, that he would help to keep the Duma from advancing further west. In the great Matibi polity of the lowveld, the ruler called in the Ndebele to drive back the advancing Tsonga Hlengwe under Vurumela in return for becoming a tributary, which they did. It seems likely that this occurred after Lobengula succeeded to the Ndebele kingship, for it is surprising but apparently true that although the Ndebele penetrated for hundreds of miles to the north-west and north-east before that date, it was only from 1870 onwards that they established their power in the hills of the Mpateni and modern Belingwe and Shabani districts. One raid was made to the south-east in 1869, and in the 1860s a raid was made against the Rozvi ruler Mtubayedzi who was suspected of conspiring with the Afrikaners, but according to Insiza traditions a raid on Mpateni was defeated in 1869 and dominance was only established in 1870. The reasons for this late advance may lie in the difficulty of the area, its
relative lack of importance compared with other areas, or to the power of the Dumbuseya, a quasi-Nguni people who dominated much of the lands west of the Lundi and were only defeated in the 1880s by an alliance of Lemba, Ngowa and Ndebele. Once more it can be seen that local factors made the task of the Ndebele easier, for they could rely upon the support of such rulers as Mposi of the Lemba, who were indebted to them. And, although it is not the purpose of this paper to deal with affairs well inside the Ndebele state, it is worth noting that just as the Ndebele were aided by Rozvi support in the establishment of their kingdom, so they continued to rely upon it in at least one case, that of Lukuluba, whose ruling house in the nineteenth century, relying upon Ndebele support against its rivals, was itself a factor aiding the Ndebele.

In outlining the limits of Ndebele power in this way, it will be noticed that some tributary areas lay well outside the main body of Ndebele influence. Some, such as Nemakonde and Chireya, lay beyond almost uninhabitably waterless, fly-infested or sandy lands, but Rwata and Mutekedza were separated from their overlords by independent territory. This may seem odd to Europeans accustomed to neatly-bordered modern states, but in fact such enclaves are common in both African and European history where government was not on such rigid lines as to prevent access to them. Indeed, the Dumbuseya appear to have operated as an independent sub-empire ruling the Ngowa, Romwe and Lemba homelands while being themselves almost surrounded by Ndebele power. In another way the realities of African politics differed from European preconceptions. On several occasions the Ndebele claimed that their limit of power was the Sabi river. If they were talking about the upper thirty miles from its source, where their tributary Mutekedza bordered on independent Svosve’s Mbire, then they were correct, but if they meant the whole river, as Europeans assumed they did, then they were boasting. It is perfectly clear from local oral traditions as well as from Portuguese sources that they generally respected the Mtilikwe river as their border with the Gaza Nguni, regardless of their actual power on each side of it. In practice, the Gaza were the only power with any effective tribute-relations with any of the Duma. There may have been one Ndebele raid into the Rozvi refuge in Bikita. North of the Duma, neither the Ndebele nor the Gaza achieved any permanent hold on Gutu or Nyashanu, while north of the Sabi Gaza influence was limited to tribute-collection as far as Mbava’s Rozvi in the Ruzawi-Sabi angle and one extremely destructive raid up to Mangwende’s and Chinamhora’s lands, probably in the 1860s. South of the Duma, Ndebele and Gaza raiders overlapped in the Lundi-Tokwe confluence area and clashed among the Tsonga Hlengwe in the lowveld, most of whom followed the Gaza.
It has been argued before, and will be argued again, that the balance of power between the independent Shona and the Ndebele was beginning to change in the favour of the former in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The sale of gold and ivory and the labour opportunities of Kimberley and the Rand made it possible for the Shona, who in the 1860s had been fatally short of guns in the face of the Ndebele, who possessed them, to re-arm. Guns, which entered the Shona country in the hands of 'Portuguese' traders, Venda mercenaties and gun-runners from the Ndebele kingdom, as well as through Shona long-distance traders and migrant labourers, made the hill strongholds of the Shona a most impregnable even against gun-using Ndebele and Europeans, as the 1896-7 risings were to show.

As mentioned above, only four years were to elapse between the final victory of the Ndebele over the Rozvi and their first really significant defeat. In 1879 the missionary Cockin wrote that 'latterly some of the kraals attacked have shown fight and being many days away and the towns denser, the Amandebele are becoming afraid to go there so much. Cattle and sheep and slaves (are) not coming in so freely now from these distant raids...' and it is probable that he was referring in particular to the war with Chivi. In the 1860s Chivi was evidently tributary to the Ndebele, but in the reign of Mazorodze, who ruled from 1870 at the latest, the Mhari began to acquire guns from the Venda and to build up a considerable herd of cattle, guarded by a group of men. This represented a threat to Ndebele power in the area, and in 1877 a major force under Lotshe and Manyewu attacked the Mhari capital of Nyaningwe. Although the Ndebele force consisted of the Mbizo ibuto and probably outnumbered the defenders of Nyaningwe, they were repulsed with the loss of 20 men, their only success being the capture of Chivi himself on an outlying hill. The loss of twenty men was not significant in itself, but the defeat was, and even the execution of Chivi in 1879 did not hide the fact that although the Ndebele could operate over the open ground, they could not take the hill-strongholds of the Mhari, who were henceforth independent.

The year 1880 saw the defeat of the Gaza by Gutu in the similar battle of Rasa mountain, and the beginning of a rift between the Ndebele and their ally the Chaminuka medium of the upper Umfuli. Up to then, Lobengula had paid the medium tribute in return for religious services, and in that year they combined to raid the Shona north of the Hunyani. But at the same time the Chaminuka medium claimed that he, and not Lobengula, had the power to grant hunting-rights to Europeans in the area, and his son Jugu 'had said that his father would now show Lobengula that the country beyond the Umniati river belonged to him, Chamaluga' and that if necessary he could drive away the Europeans by his magic. It is therefore not surprising to find that in 1883...
Lobengula had the Chaminuka medium killed, his men raiding as far as the Shawasha country of Chinamhora, whose people had taken Chaminuka's cattle, which in all probability had been taken from them in 1880.

In 1882 Selous noted that Ndebele had reached the Mukwadzi river west of the Umvukwe range, and in 1887 there was a major raid on the Umvukwe area that was probably the one led by Gwasagwasa against the Shona ruler Chipuriro, far to the north. This may have represented a revival of the policy of the 1860s of gaining control of the trade routes to the Zambezi, for beyond Chipuriro lay the praazo of Matakenya, José de Araujo Lobo, who had earlier been in contact with the Ndebele, buying their ivory. But there is a possibility that Chipuriro, like Chivi, was becoming a local military power and thus a rival to the Ndebele: a tradition stated that Chipuriro was attacked because he had built up an army of eunuchs whose energies were presumably concentrated on warfare.

In 1888 a major raid struck at the Mashayamombe and Rwizi people of the Umfuli valley. The reason for this is not known. The attack on Rwizi may have been to prevent a renewal of the Chaminuka cult, while the fact that a very large number of people were removed from Mashayamombe's may mean that this was the raid recalled in tradition that resulted from a civil war among Mashayamombe's people in which one side called in the Ndebele. But it may also have resulted from the fact that the Shona were undeniably growing stronger. Isolated Ndebele were liable to be killed if they were discovered. In 1887 a whole party of Ndebele was killed, and indeed the 1888 raid 'suffered so severely that Lobengula was very angry and another one was sent out in another direction.' Montagu Kerr, with his preconceived ideas, was amazed to hear the Shona at the head of the Mazoe valley in 1884 coolly discussing their chances of success, with some hope of victory, but it seems that in the 1880s the Shona were indeed beginning to turn the tide of Ndebele power.

In view of the general role of the Portuguese in African history it is strange to find that the general effect of their efforts to take over the whole northern, eastern and central parts of the Shona country in 1889 was beneficial to the Shona. Partly this was because they were driven out by the British in 1890, who then assumed the role of colonial overlords, but it was also because of the strength and adaptability of Shona political institutions. The effect of the Andrade and Cordon was to give nearly every Shona polity north of the Umniati a considerable increase in the size of its armoury. The 'Portuguese' zungu expedition to the whole Charumbira-Mapanzuro-Bere group of peoples in 1872 had only 48 guns for sale, but the 1889 expeditions would give this many to a
single ruler. Even the small polities would get ten guns, and powder and ammunition were supplied as well. This was a huge increase in Shona fighting strength, and from both oral traditions and some of Cordon's treaties there is no doubt that the whole tenor of this major political development was anti-Ndebele. The implications of this in Shona history proper cannot be discussed here, but the effect on the balance of power between the Ndebele and the Shona was immense. Hwata, divided into factions after Gwindi's death, Nemakonde and Mutekedza all abandoned their allegiance to Lobengula and accepted the Portuguese guns and flag, which were to be found as far south as the Njanja country and beyond. No major raiding forces of Ndebele ever again entered the central Shona country. There are strong suggestions that the revolt against Ndebele power even extended as far south as Gutu, where from 1889 the rulers no longer had the Gaza state to balance against the Ndebele, and to Chirumanzu, where the death of Bangure allowed his brother Chatikobo, aided by some Rozvi, to lead the people into their first revolt since 1857.

It is equally strange to find that in the deceit and treachery that surrounded the arrival of Rhodes' British South Africa Company from the granting of the Rudd Concession in 1888 to the foundation of Salisbury in 1890 the Ndebele actually benefited from the Occupation in any respect at all. Yet it is true that although there can be no doubt that Lobengula was thoroughly opposed to the arrival of the British on his eastern frontier, he remained functionally neutral to the extent that he did not attack Rhodes' column, and that once the British had driven away the Portuguese and captured the formidable Couveia, Manoel Antonio de Sousa, he took advantage of the British presence to regain control over Nemakonde and Chirumanzu, although Hwata and Mutekedza remained lost to him. Even so, this was only possible with the co-operation of Shona interest groups. In a coup d'état in 1891 Chinyama, son of Bangure, drove out his uncle Chatikobo and became the new Chirumanzu with Ndebele aid. At the end of the year an Ndebele force visited the Nemakonde area and, after consultation with the most important spirit medium, killed Nemakonde Hodza and four others in an action that has all the marks of a coup d'état by an internal group. During 1892 a similar split in the Gutu dynasty and an appeal for Ndebele help by Makuwaza led to a joint Chirumanzu-Ndebele force installing him as ruler, and at this time a small party of Ndebele even reached the highlands across the Sabi, perhaps the furthest point ever attained in that direction, in this last rather feeble demonstration of Ndebele power.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the events and
negotiations that led to the 1893 War that broke the Ndebele state, except insofar as they concern the Shona. The lowveld area had been subjected to raiding for years, partly at least by unofficial raiding parties, causing Matibi to move away from his northern lands into the remote lowveld in the late 1880s. But the decisive area was around Chivi and Zimuto. Chivi was raided in late 1891, to the delight of Rhodes, who was trying to prove Lobengula's dominance of the area, but in July and August 1892 a major raid on the recalcitrant Chivi and Zimuto led to an appeal by Chivi to Rhodes' deputy Jameson. This in turn led to a demand that Ndebele raiders stay away from the town of Victoria and the main road, a demand that was fully complied with, as far as the Ndebele ruler was concerned, until the crucial raid of July 1893. Even this raid came about partly as a result of Shona actions. In early June 1893 a joint party of raiders from Bere and the Makamure house of Zimuto stole cattle from Mpakame, a Shona tributary of the Ndebele at Guruguru hill. He complained to his overlord, the Ndebele-ized Rozvi, Lukuluba at the Ghoko range. Lukuluba raided Bere in retaliation, but on being turned back by Rhodes' police, reported in turn to his superior, Mgandane of Nxa. This led directly to the famous July raid on Bere and Zimuto near Victoria, to the fight of 18 July and Rhodes' decision to overthrow the Ndebele kingdom.

Even before the British columns set out, however, Shona raiders were moving in to take Ndebele cattle. As the Victoria column began to move towards its rendezvous in the north with the Salisbury column, it was joined by large forces of Shona. Zimuto sent 120, Madziviri 50, and Gutu abandoned the Ndebele who had put him in power the previous year and sent 80. As the force approached Chirumanzu its ruler Chinyama followed Gutu's example and offered 300 men. A few days later Chivi's men marched through Victoria to catch up with the advancing columns. These Shona, acting in concert for the first time in their particular histories, fought at the Shangani battle with some success, considering that they were left outside the defensive laagers. Meanwhile in the south Matibi, whose relations with the Ndebele have been deteriorating to the point of outright war as he was repeatedly raided, experienced a further raid in late 1893 and retaliated in force with the police at the post station who had also suffered, and penetrated deep into Godhlwayo. These Anglo-Shona alliances of 1893 had a profound effect on the subsequent history of the southern Shona, especially in 1896. As the Ndebele state fell, Shona raiders from all over the southern Shona country and from as far as the upper Sabi valley began to move towards the Ndebele herds, and the end of Ndebele power in the summer of 1893-4, as in the early 1850s, saw Shona raiders striking deep into the Ndebele kingdom.
This paper was written as part of a much bigger study of Shona history. It has proved necessary to write it because the fact of Ndebele power was of tremendous importance to the Shona, as indeed were the facts of Portuguese, Gaza and European power. Yet in spite of the numerous studies of the Ndebele completed and in progress, none so far seen has attempted to sum up the total effect of the Ndebele upon the Shona. This paper has tried to do so, and to provide a framework for discussion and for modification in the light of that discussion. It has several obvious limitations. Because it is written as part of a study of Shona history, it has not been possible to study some of the traditional sources such as the documents in the London Missionary Society and Society of Jesus archives which might modify many of the conclusions. It is deliberately written exclusively from the Shona point of view, and almost ignores the relations between the Ndebele and the Tswana, Lozi, Tonga, Ila, Portuguese, Gaza, Venda, Sotho, Zulu, Afrikaners and British. It assumed for the sake of argument what the writer believes to be totally incorrect, that the Ndebele were a single, centralised unified state with a single external policy.

But it is suggested that of all the factors that affected the Ndebele, that of the Shona was the most important. It can be seen that the Ndebele are themselves largely Shona in descent, that they lived in an environment that had been dominated by the Shona for about 800 years. Much of their economy was based upon the economy of the Shona. Much of their success in establishing themselves derived from their skill in manipulating Shona rivalries, and much of their expansion in the 1850s and 1860s was in response to Shona threats. Finally, it can be seen that, although evidence of further raids may come to light and although some known raids cannot be located or explained, the great majority of Ndebele raids were logical responses to particular needs imposed by Shona politics and the Shona economy, and that they were anything but the expressions of savagery or militarism that they have been depicted as by the myths. In this respect this paper may be making a contribution to the internal history of the Ndebele themselves.

Note. An appendix is in preparation which will attempt to provide a fully-referenced list of all known Ndebele wars and raids, both major and minor. This appendix will be attached to later versions of this paper. It is worth noting, however, that the picture of the raids given by the documents is very closely corroborated by two raid-lists collected at the turn of the century, and to a lesser extent by two collected in the 1930s. (Driver, in NB 6/1/1; Campbell, 84-6, 99-100, 103-4, 136-141, 145, 146, 151, 156, 166-173; Hist. Mss. W1 8/1/1 Ginyalitsha and Hist. Mss. W1 8/1/2 Ntabeni.)
References.

1. Some statements are myths, being completely fictitious; others are legends, being founded on fact but greatly exaggerated. In this paper the term 'myth' will apply to both.


9. Hist. Mas. CO 4/1/1 F. Rutherford Harris to J.W. Colenbrander, 9 Feb 1892. Unless otherwise stated all reference codes will relate to the National Archives of Rhodesia, Salisbury.

10. Robert Moffat 1, 234.


14. .

15. John Moffat, 110


18. I am indebted to Mr. T.N. Huffman for much of the archaeological information, and for this correlation in particular, which is examined in his doctoral thesis (in presentation.) Any misinterpretations and abuses are of course my own responsibility.

19. T.N. Huffman, 'Iron Age Archaeology', in Runde Expedition, Rhod. Schools Exploration Soc., 1971, 40. I am indebted to Mr Huffman for the radiocarbon date.


22. This interpretation, which differs radically from that generally made previously, was made independently by Mr Mudenge (Mudenge, 40-2, 55 - 70) and myself (D.N. Beach, 'Historians and the Shona Empire, ii, 3, *The Changamire Problem*, U.R. Hist. Dept. Henderson Seminar Paper 20, 1972) but to Dr Mudenge belongs the credit for convincingly identifying the Khami culture in its earlier phase with the Torwa dynasty.

23. Personal communication from Mr T.N. Huffma.


26. Mudenge, 52, 70, 159 - 160 and 115.


31. On this question, see Rennie, 138 - 146 for the Ndau/Gaza example and H. Von Sicard, 'The Dumbuseya', *MABA* ix, 5, 1968 for a Shona/ Maseko Ngoni example.

32. Mudenge, 264.

33. Mudenge, 287 - 291. Dr Mudenge's use of Portuguese documents to date Rozvi reigns in the late 18th century is one of the most important breakthroughs in the study of Rozvi history. His explanation of the origins of the Jiri-Gumunyu dispute is another, and his argument is generally supported by and has influenced my use of the evidence cited below.

34. J.W. Posselt, in N 3/33/8; F.W.T. Posselt, 4-5; Mudenge, 287 - 291.
F.W.T. Posselt, 5.


The simplest and most convincing explanation of the dispute is that the modern Jiri group are descended from Mutinhima, son of Gumboremvura, and that the Gumunyu group are descended from Chirisamhuru. The co-operation of the Mutinhima house with the main house in the 1850s is described below. The death of Mambo Tohwechipi Chibambamu in c.1873 after his defeat in 1866 led to the political eclipse of his house and the rise of Mutinhima's.

The earliest known reference to Tohwechipi's son or brother Chikore makes it clear that he was not regarded as Mambo - although this reference must be regarded with caution on this point because it comes from a traditionally-pro-Mutinhima area, (A 3/18/23, F.C. Elliott, N.C. Selukwe to C.N.C. Bulawayo, 19 May 1906.) By 1890 the people near Zimbabwe stated that 'Tihina' (Mutinhima) was ruling the Bikita Rozvi, (Argief van die N.C. Kerk, Cape Town, Report of S.P. Helm, 1891.) In 1896 the Gumunyu-descended Chiduku group joined the ritual-position holder Mavudzi and the Mbava group in the installation of a Mutinhima-house member, Chikohore Chingombe, as Rozvi Mambo in the Mavangwe hills, Buhera, (N 1/1/8, N.C. Ndanga to C.N.C. Salisbury, 2 Mar 1897.) Subsequently the Mutinhima house dominated the Buhera and Bikita Rozvi until the revival of the Chirisamhuru-Gumunyu house in Bikita in the 1950s.

J.W. Posselt in N 3/33/8; F.W.T. Posselt, 5.


Stuart in A 3/18/28

A 3/18/28 passim; F.W.T. Posselt, 6; Sr Mary Aquina, O.P. 'The tribes in Chilimanzi Reserve and their relation to the Rozvi,' NADA, ix, 2, 1965, 41; Fortune, 72.


N.B. 6/1/1 S.N.G. Jackson, N.C. Belingwe to C.N.C. Bulawayo, 31 Mar 1898.


56. Hist. Mss. W1 8/1/1 Ngungu 2; T.M. Thomas, Eleven years in Central South Africa, London 1873, 165; S.N.G. Jackson in NB 6/1/1; 'Mziki' (pseudonym of A.A. Campbell), 'Mlumo, Pietermaritzburg, 1926, 85. This latter account, which existed in draft form in 1905 and in a final form in 1911, has been described by Mr. R. Kent Rasmussen as a fabrication (personal communication.) But the presence of information about Lukuluba and Chizema in particular and about the affairs of the eastern Ndebele in general suggests that it is indeed a body of genuine tradition collected in Insiza 1897 - 1905 and added to a fictional romantic story.


60. Robert Moffat i, 214-5, 224, 265, ii, 158.


62. F.W.T. Posselt, 6; Stuart in A 3/18/28; Lloyd and Muhlanga, 'Mbava and others,' 92.


64. W. Edwards, 'The Wanoe,' NADA 4, 1926, 18. Edwards gives Nyandoro's Fungwi origins correctly (Morris, in N 3/33/8), but omits the period in which he ruled Tsunga under the Rozvi.

65. Robert Moffat i, 233, 240, 369. Moffat originally used the term 'Shona' to mean, principally, 'Rozvi', and 'Bamakalaka' to mean 'Kalanga.'


68. Leask 81, 88.


72. c.g. A 1/9/1 H. Paulet to L.S. Jameson 28 July 1892.


74. Baines i, 163.

75. Robert Moffat, i, 224, 234, 250, 361, ii, 79 - 80, 104.

76. Robert Moffat, i, 241.

77. Mudenge, 117-8. Zumbo sent two guns every three years.


79. See 75 and 78.

80. Selous, Adventure, 474.

81. Baines, ii, 469.

82. Robert Moffat, i, 241.


86. See 53.

87. See 85.


89. D.J. van der Merwe, 'Some history of the Vakaranga in the Gutu Reserve,' NADA 14, 1936-7, 73. The episode described immediately preceded the Jiri Rozvi move to Bikita in the late nineteenth century; Marodzi, 90. By 'this country of the Batonga' he meant the upper Sabi valley; for Hwata, see below.


91. Robert Moffat i, 369; Campbell, 103.

92. S.N.G. Jackson in NE 6/1/1. 93. Leask, 114.


96. I am indebted to Mr. A. Samasuwo for his translation of this Rozvi dialect word.


99. Ibid.


102. Izidoro Correia Pereira, 'Carta das minas conhecidas na distrito de Senna', 31 Jul 1857, in Memoria e Documentos acerca dos Direitos de Portugal aos territórios de Machona e Nyassa 1890, Lisbon, 1890, 296.

103. Pereira, 296.

105. Mauch, 220; Public Record Office, London, CO 417(14) South Africa 1887, ii, Mandy to Jones 8 Feb 1887, 46. I am indebted to Dr N.M.B. Bhebe for this reference and for having drawn my attention to the importance of Hwata's trade system.


108. Pereira, 296.


111. Campbell, 139.

112. Leask, 86.

113. John Moffat 136-7, 152; T.M. Thomas, Eleven Years; I am indebted to Mr J.D. White for his help on this point.

114. Campbell, 137.

115. Leask, 86-8. Ibid.

116. Mauch, 176-8

117. John Moffat, 152.

118. Beach, 'Adendorff', 38-9; Driver in NB 6/1/1.

119. Pereira, 296.

120. MLA Delin. Report, Bikita, 1964; Fortune, '73.

121. Leask, 102; T.M. Thomas, Eleven Years, 339-40.


124. Baines, ii, 413. 125. Ibid.

126. N 3/33/8 W. Edwards, N.C. Mrewa to Ag. C.N.C. Salisbury, 11 Dec 1903, encl. 'A Short History of Mangwendi's People, 13 Apr 1898.'


130. Leask, 74, 221.

131. Leask, 86.

132. Large-scale ivory shooting by European hunters in these valleys began in 1865 (Tabler, 271), and by 1884 African gunment had decimated the game there (Kerr, i, 44.)

133. N 3/33/8 S.N.G. Jackson, N.C. Hartley to Ag. C.N.C. Salisbury, c.l Jan 1904; PRO FO 179/279 No. 57, 'Memorandum on the Rights of Portugal in the territories to the south of the Zambezi, communicated by M. de Freitas, '12 Jul 1890; Baines ii, 498.


135. Baines, ii, 498. T.M. Thomas (Eleven Years, 325) incorrectly made the date 1863, but Baines was closer to the event in time and places, as well as being backed up by John Moffat.

136. Baines, i, xxxvii; Selous, Adventure, 47, 295.
142. Baines, ii, 498.
143. Mandy, in PRO CO 417(14) South Africa 1887, ii.
145. One tribute load observed consisted of 300 hoes and some tobacco. J.G. Wood, Through Matabeleland, Grahamstown, 1893, 137.
146. Beach, 'Adendorff', 40.
148. Tabler, 212.
152. MIA Delineation Reports, Lomagundi and Gatooma, 165-6.
154. Wood, 111.
155. MIA PER/5 Hwata, Genealogies and accounts dated c.1935, 1936, 1955; Freitas, in PRO FO 179/279 No. 57.
156. Beach, 'Rising', 130-1.
158. Mauch 183.
159. Mauch 183.
162. S.N.G. Jackson in NB 6/1/1. I am indebted to Mr J.D. White for his help on this point.
164. 'Dyke Neuk' (Pseudonym for C. Bull ock), 'Dumbghe', NADA 1, 1923; von Sicard, 'The Dumbuseya'. I am indebted to Mr J.D. White for access to his work on the Dumbuseya.
166. Coillard, 36; Anderson, 348.
168. Freitas, in PRO FO 179/279 No. 57.
169. Personal communication from Mr R.M.G. Mtetwa, currently working for a postgraduate these on the Duma Confederacy.
171. Van der Merwe, 74; URHD Texts 12 Gtu, 77 - 85 Bha and 87 - 91 Gtu.
175.
185. Selous, Adventure, 113-6.
187. Selous, Adventure, 50-3.
188. Gold and the Gospel, 32, 34.
189. Driver in NB 6/1/1; Hist. Mss. W1 8/1/2, Ntabeni 53-5. Gwasagwasa
visited Chipuriro in 1892 (A 1/9/1, Lendy to Jameson, Jan - Feb
1893), probably to investigate the removal of Chipuriro by the
Portuguese (A 1/9/1, document dated late 1892; L. Doole, Three
Years in Savage Africa, London, 1898, 217.)
190. Gold and the Gospel, 51; Doole, 141.
192. D.N. Beach, 'Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro', Rhodesiana, 27, 1972, 38n.
194. Gold and the Gospel, 27-8, 31; Kerr, i, 64.
197. Kerr, i, 151.
198. Mauch, 213.
199. "Vassallagem dos Povos de "Chipembere, regulo Inhpunga"", 12 Aug
1889, 'Vassallagem dos Povos de Monga', 31 Aug 1889, 'Vassallagem
dos Povos de Moié, do territorio de Sicaunha "Zumbo"', 31 Aug
1889, 'Vassallagem dos Povos de Lofua "Zumbo"', 31 Aug 1889,
'Vassallagem dos Povos de Changue, "Zumbo"', 5 Sep 1889,
'Vassallagem dos Povos de Nmansa, "Zumbo"', 12 Sep 1889,
'Vassallagem dos Povos de Massáua' 12 Sep 1889, in Memoria e
Documentos, 271-6.
200. I am indebted to Mr J.D. Cobbing for access to his paper on Ndebele
negotiations with Rhodes' group, 1888 - 1890.
201. Unless otherwise indicated, all the information between references
197 and 202 can be found in Beach, 'Rising', chs. 4 and 5.