
BY

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DECLARATION

I, Lucky Bassie Bangidza, declare that this thesis is my own work. All citations, references and borrowed ideas have been duly acknowledged. This study is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Studies, in the Department of Political Administration at the University of Zimbabwe. None of the present work has been submitted previously for any degree or examination to any other university except in publications done by the author in support of this Doctoral study.

Candidate’s Signature …………………………………………………………..

Date …………………………………………………………………………..

Associate Supervisors Signature ……………………………………………

Date …………………………………………………………………………..
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my parents Amon Mureyani Bangidza, late Unice Bangidza (Nee Chiwambutsa) my wife Lilian Maonei Bangidza (Nee Muzambwa), my sons Anesu Vhusani Bangidza, Gondai Ronald Bangidza, my daughter Rumbidzai Audrey Bangidza, my grandson Anesu (Jr) Bangidza and all the liberation war heroes, freedom fighters, war collaborators, ex-detainees, those who died in the struggle for Zimbabwe and the next generation which considers themselves equally as ‘social reformers’. Through the powers and blessings of the almighty God, may this thesis forever remain a source of inspiration in security sector studies.
I would like to express my appreciation to my supervisor, Prof Hasu H Patel for his consideration and training, constructive criticism and leadership from the day he stated supervising me as a DPhil candidate. His critiques, academic direction in assisting and perfecting the direction of my doctoral programme at the University of Zimbabwe are highly appreciated. I specifically appreciate the encouragement not to lose heart and hope during the challenging phase of writing and defending the thesis.

I remain deeply grateful to the following individuals for their key inputs that made the beginning and completion of this thesis possible: Professor Levy Nyagura, Vice Chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe for the encouragement to register for the D Phil when I was the Director Centre for Defence Studies at The University of Zimbabwe. I humbly appreciate the regular positive encouragement from Secretary of Defence Comrade Rushwaya and General (Dr) C. G. Chiwenga the Commander Zimbabwe Defence Forces for the University fees, the research grant, authority to carry out the research in the defence forces; Major General Mugoba for the discussions on Gender Reforms in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces; Professors Gavin Cawthra of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Witwatersrand for the encouragement to carry out an endogenous research from an Afrocentric perspective of Security Sector Reform (SSR). I also thank Professor Andre Du Pissani of the Department of Political Science at the University of Namibia for his encouraging words ‘If it were not for hope the heart would break”. I also thank Group Captain A.V. Murove and Paul Mangwana for their inputs in analysing the legal frameworks and its implications to the Zimbabwe Defence Forces from the Zimbabwe Constitution (2013). My sincere appreciation is also extended to Dr F. K. Chung for her suggestion to look into the ZDF’s future roles; and Mathew Paradza, Senior Science Laboratory University of Zimbabwe, for his assistance in the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) package. Inputs from Phyllis Johnson of Southern African Research and Documentation Centre are also appreciated. I respectfully respect and appreciate the participants’ responses to the quester-view and the focus groups’ discussions during data collection process and finally to Dr Augustine Tirivangana for his comments and critics.

Therefore, the views expressed in this study do not; in any way represent the official policy of the Zimbabwean government and the ZDF. It is purely an academic prescription of the research report findings for a doctoral study, a case of the ZDF 1980-2008.
ABSTRACT

This thesis examined the origins, concepts and practices of the security sector reform (SSR), as the independent variable, using state security (SS) and human security (HS) as the dependent variables for analysis. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) period 1980-2008 was the main focus of the case study. Findings of the study showed that the ZDF senior officers perceive SSR differently from the external and internal Western drivers of the SSR, who popularise it. In its current form SSR is an externally and internally driven prescriptive exercise which differentiates civilians from the military. The ZDF senior officer’s perception is that SSR is a process with its origins from the liberation struggle (historical) as an indigenous and non-prescriptive process. In 1980 the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR), the amalgamation of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Forces (ZANLA), Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) into a single force was one of a successful SSR process as the second level of consciousness. Operation dissident flash in the 1980s, regional operations and peace support operations in the 1990s, ‘Operation Murambatsvina or Restore Order’ of the 2000s and the professionalization process of the ZDF thereafter, remains an SSR process which is indigenous. The Ubuntu philosophy shapes the major theoretical conceptual framework of this case study. This case study used quester-views, participant observation and focus group discussions as major data collection instruments. The data was managed with the use of the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) package, which is a qualitative data-management and analysis tool. This thesis found that the way in which security sector reform (SSR) was introduced to Zimbabwe betrays the motives of internal and external Western drivers of the concept and its ideology as a donor-driven security model. Findings showed that separating the ZDF from direct national, regional, international, security and political involvement is seen as tantamount to militating against the ideas of the liberation struggle. Effective functioning state structures are prerequisites and preconditions for successful defence management system. These should be based on the essentials of defence institution building process. As a result, the concept of the ‘apolitical’ soldier is a euphemism for something else because the gun cannot be divorced from the cause for which it stands. For that reason, the ZDF is part of the state security machinery and therefore is co-dependent on the politics from which it derives its authority. On the contrary the current character of SSR is such that it is based on Western formulae and hence has caused the development of massive mutual mistrust and suspicion. And yet properly understood, SSR was mooted during the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe as a concept and continues to be so as a process uniting civilians and the military. Thus, SSR is not an issue because it is being practised as a process in the ZDF. As a word SSR is new in its content, philosophy and ideology but as a concept in the ZDF it is not new. The thesis showed that realism in some cases is the means, as in the 1980s on national reconciliation, operation dissident Flash, the Unity Agreement of 1987 and the Global Political Agreement of 15 September 2008, and Ubuntu as the process and goal in SR, SS and HS relations in terms of uniting the population as a family in SSR, SS and HS relations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION........................................... i  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................... iii  
ABSTRACT............................................. iv  
LIST OF TABLES......................................... xii  
LIST OF FIGURES........................................ xiii  
DEFINITION OF TERMS................................... xiv  
RELATED TERMS........................................ xv  
LIST OF ACRONYMS....................................... xvi  
LIST OF APPENDICES AND PUBLICATIONS................. xx  

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY........... 1  
1.1 INTRODUCTION........................................ 1  
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY........................... 1  
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY............................ 4  
1.4 AREA OF STUDY....................................... 6  
1.5 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM......................... 7  
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY.... 7  
1.7 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY................................ 9  
1.8 HYPOTHESES.......................................... 9  
1.8.1 The null hypothesis................................ 9  
1.8.2 The alternative hypothesis......................... 9  
1.9 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES................................ 9  
1.10 CRITICAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS....................... 9  
1.11 DELIMITATIONS..................................... 10  
1.12 LIMITATIONS...................................... 10  
1.13 EXPECTED OUTCOME.................................. 11  
1.14 METHODOLOGY..................................... 11  
1.15 PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH............................ 13  
1.16 RESEARCH STYLE AND TECHNIQUE IN SSR............. 14
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>METHODOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>RESEARCH DESIGN MATRIX</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>QUALITATIVE APPROACH</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.20.1</td>
<td>Quester-views</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.20.2</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.20.3</td>
<td>Focus group discussions</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.20.4</td>
<td>Data collection and sampling</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.20.5</td>
<td>The sample</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.20.6</td>
<td>Justification of the sampling procedure</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>FIELDWORK DURATION</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>FIELDWORK TOOLS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>DATA ANALYSIS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>CONCEPTUALISING SECURITY</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SSR</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS’ SSR CHALLENGENS</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>CHALLENGES OF THE AFRICAN UNION IN SSR</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.1</td>
<td>African ownership</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.2</td>
<td>SADC and SSR settings</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>THE POLITICAL SECTOR</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>STATE SECURITY AND HUMAN SECURITY LINKAGES</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.1</td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.2</td>
<td>Idealism</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.3</td>
<td>Ubuntu</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.4</td>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>THE CRITICAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>THE GENESIS OF SSR IN ZIMBABWE</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1</td>
<td>The revolutionary system</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2</td>
<td>The national challenges</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3</td>
<td>The determination to fight</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4</td>
<td>The People’s war</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.5</td>
<td>The military philosophy</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SYSTEMS</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>STRUGGLES-WITHIN-THE STRUGGLE</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1</td>
<td>The Nhari rebellion 1974-1975</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2</td>
<td>The Herbert Chitepo demise 1975</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.3</td>
<td>Mgagao Declaration, October 1975</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.4</td>
<td>The Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) 1976-1977</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.5</td>
<td>The Front Line States (FLS) relations</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCES (ZDF) FORMATION</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1</td>
<td>National Policy of Reconciliation</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.3</td>
<td>The Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ)</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.4</td>
<td>The ZDF Professionalization process</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.5</td>
<td>ZDF Education and training</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.6</td>
<td>Identifying strategies</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>ZDF PERIOD 1980-1990</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.1</td>
<td>‘Operation Merger’ process 1980 - 1987</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.2</td>
<td>Operation ‘Soldiers Engaged in Economic Development (SEED)’ 1980-1981</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.3</td>
<td>The dilemma of intentions</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.4</td>
<td>Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) 1980-19992</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.5</td>
<td>A developmental DDR policy</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.6</td>
<td>The reintegration programmes</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.7</td>
<td>Operation Dissident Flash (1981-1987)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.8</td>
<td>Apartheid South Africa’s destabilisation policy</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>ZDF 1991 TO 2000</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7.1</td>
<td>ZDF in UN operations</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7.2</td>
<td>Regional operations and peace support operations (PSO)</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>THE ZDF 2001-2008</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.1</td>
<td>The ‘straitjacket approach’ 2002</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.2</td>
<td>‘Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order’ 2005</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.3</td>
<td>Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle (Stay Well) 2005-2007</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.4</td>
<td>Operation Maguta/Inala 2005-2010</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>THE ZDF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9.2</td>
<td>The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013)</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>DEFENCE COUNCILS AND COMMITTEES SYSTEMS</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS (CMR)</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>SSR IN THE ZNDP</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>THE ZDF AND GENDER REFORMS</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.1.5 Education and training

4.4.1.6 Medical services

4.5 BEYOND THE BASIC NEEDS

4.6 CONTRIBUTION TO THE SADC REGION

4.7 CONCLUSION

CHAPTER FIVE: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.2 DATA ANALYSIS

5.3 INFLUENCES AND CHALLENGES OF SSR

5.3.1 Establishing SSR

5.3.2 SSR as a priority

5.3.3 SSR as donor or locally driven

5.4 SS AND HS LINKAGES

5.4.1 Linkages

5.4.2 Basic human needs (BHN)

5.4.3 ZDF’s role in basic human needs

5.5 PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES

5.5.1 ZDF being political and partisan

5.5.2 HS in ZDF roles and functions

5.6 CRITICAL REVIEW OF SUBMISSIONS

5.7 GENDER RESPONSES TO THE ZDF CONFIGURATION

5.7.1 Gender: recasting ZDF in normalising structures

5.7.2 Gender focus group discussion (GFGD)

5.8 REFORMS IN THE ZDF

5.8.1 ZDF statutory instruments

5.8.2 ZDF as part of the social fabric

5.8.3 Oversight of the ZDF
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Research design matrix .................................................................16
Table 5.1: Response rate statistics ...............................................................148
Table 5.2: Dependability and reliability statistics ........................................148
Table 5.3: Frequency of responses on SSR priority in Zimbabwe (n=50) ....151
Table 5.4: Frequency of responses: SSR being donor or locally driven (n=50)....152
Table 5.5: SS and HS linkages .....................................................................154
Table 5.6: Frequency of responses on ZDF role in basic human needs (n=50) ..158
Table 5.7: ZDF roles and human needs .........................................................159
Table 5.8: Response frequency on whether there were reforms in the ZDF (n=50) ....171
Table 5.9: Responses on reviewing the ZDF statutory instruments .................172
Table 5.10: Response on ZDF as part of the social fabric (n=50) ..................173
Table 5.11: Oversight of the ZDF ................................................................174
**LIST OF FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:1</td>
<td>The ZDF flag and map of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:2</td>
<td>Link between independent and dependent variables</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:3</td>
<td>Research design map</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:4</td>
<td>Convenience sampling of participants</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>The new concept of security</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:2</td>
<td>The five elements of national power</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:1</td>
<td>CMR, Societal Hierarchy</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:1</td>
<td>Responses to the establishments of SSR (n=50)</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:2</td>
<td>Percentage of responses on basic human needs (n=50)</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:3</td>
<td>ZDF being political and partisan (n=50)</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:4</td>
<td>HS in the ZDF roles and functions (n=50)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:5</td>
<td>SEX responses in normalising structures (n=50)</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:6</td>
<td>Employment in each rank for 1993, 2000 and 2008</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:7</td>
<td><em>Ubuntu</em>: Four levels of consciousness</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEFINITION OF TERMS


**Eurocentric**: Reveals an impression to praise, rejoice, celebrate, and defend the idea of Western civilization.

**Finger theory**: A web of reciprocal delicate relationships of interdependence.

**Human Security**: Assurance of the survival of human beings through the provision of basic human needs.

**Operational Orders**: Authorised and confirmed military action under specified terms and conditions of operation as a legally binding contract.

**Reform**: Enhancement as a productive modification for development, improvement and not a retributive measure.

**Security Sector Reform**: An internal and external driven “regime change agenda” aiming at power configuration in the interests of Eurocentric liberal notions.

**Security**: The establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensures a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. It is the protection from the threats of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, and environmental hazards (UNDP Human Development Report: 1994:22)

**State security**: Strategic statutory agencies of the state and its citizen’s survival and enhancement; also referred to as the security sector.

**State**: An integrated populace occupying a particular space of land under government authority and control constitutionally.

**Tenets**: These are the standard values and moral principles that strengthen a theory into application.
**Ubuntu**: An African theory of self-identity formed through symbiotic and cooperative relationships.

### RELATED TERMS

**Asymmetric warfare**: An indirect approach of force, influencing mental tactical operational strength to achieve an inconsistent effect. (Banks 2013)

**Basic Human Needs**: These are the basic need for subsistence or survival such as food, shelter, health, employment and security and changes over time, across cultures through strategies by which these needs are satisfied.

**Collective security**: Capability in security building measures through secure partnership and collaboration at individual, family, community, national, regional, and international level.

**Economic security**: Having stable income or other resources to support a standard of living now and in the foreseeable future from productive and remunerative work.

**Environmental security**: Maintaining the local and ecological biosphere as the essential support means on which all other human enterprises depend for their sustainable growth performance like food production. Barnett (2001)

**Food Security**: Access, at all times, to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. (MacDonald 2010)

**Interests**: Commitment to one’s individual and national concerns through attitude and behaviour that safeguard the national objectives.

**Political Security**: Associated with the self-control and capacity of strategies linking economic, social, cultural, and technological factors for human survival in peace and stability.

**Security Sector Alignment**: A level of consciousness or a framework for conceptualising actors and factors relevant to a progressive developmental national security path.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFZ</td>
<td>Air Force of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHNA</td>
<td>Basic Human Needs Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory and Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAQDAS</td>
<td>Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Commander Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Centre for Defence Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Commonwealth Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Cease-Fire Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligent Agent</td>
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<td>CIO</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>Commonwealth Monitoring Force</td>
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<td>CMR</td>
<td>Civil Military Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Democratic Control of the Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilisation Disarmament and integration,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECESS</td>
<td>Empowerment, Cooperation, Equity, Sustainability, and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Forças Armadas Angolanas</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROLIZI</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>Frontline States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTLRP</td>
<td>Fast Track Land Reform Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMB</td>
<td>Grain Marketing Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBO</td>
<td>International Business Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICNSS</td>
<td>International Centre for National Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGTP</td>
<td>Love, Gain, Threat, and Power</td>
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<td>LHA</td>
<td>Lancaster House Agreement</td>
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<td>M16</td>
<td>British Secret Intelligence Service’s</td>
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<td>MACP</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC-T</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>Mutual Defence Pact</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Resistência nacional de Moçambique</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mossad</td>
<td>Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks in Israel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Defence College</td>
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<td>NDF</td>
<td>Namibian Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Defence Policy</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ on Politics Defence and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSL</td>
<td>Operation Sovereign Legitimacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF-ZAPU</td>
<td>Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African Peoples Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>Rhodesian African Rifles,</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana</td>
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RSF   Rhodesian Security Forces
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SADC-RPTC Southern African Development Community (SADC) Regional Peacekeeping
      Training Centre)
SADSEM Southern Africa Defence and Security Management Network
SARPCCO Southern African Regional Police Chief Cooperation Organisation
SEED   Soldiers Engaged in Economic Development
SS    State Security
SSA   Security Sector Alignment
SSR   Security Sector Reform
TAF   Turkey Armed Forces
UA    Unity Accord
UK    United Kingdom
UN    United Nations
UNAVEM II United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDHR United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
USA   United States of America
UZ-CDS University of Zimbabwe- Centre for Defence Studies
WB    World Bank
WVWF  War Veterans’ Welfare Fund
ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZDF   Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZDP   Zimbabwe Demobilisation Programme
ZIPA  Zimbabwe People Army
ZIPRA Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
ZLC   Zimbabwe Liberation Council
ZLM   Zimbabwe Liberation Movement
ZNA   Zimbabwe National Army
ZNDP  Zimbabwe National Defence Policy
ZNDU  Zimbabwe National Defence University
ZNSC  Zimbabwe National Security Council
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ZPCS</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Services</td>
</tr>
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<td>ZRP</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Republic Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZSC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Staff Colleges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF APPENDICES AND PUBLICATIONS

APPENDIX A: Letter of Authority 212
APPENDIX B: Quest-view 213
APPENDIX C: Security Sector Reaffirmation 217
APPENDIX D: Civil Military Relations (ZNDP-1997) 218

PUBLICATION A: Asymmetric Warfare: Experiences, Perspectives, Inkling and Challenges with a Focus on Zimbabwe 225

PUBLICATION B: Modernisation in Process: Considering the Future Role of the Armed Forces a case of Zimbabwe 244
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The thesis develops from chapter one as the introduction and the methodology, chapter two: literature review and the theoretical frameworks, chapter three: security sector reform (SSR) process, consciousness and critical responses in Zimbabwe, chapter four: Comparative perspectives on the future role of the ZDF, chapter five: data analyses and interpretation, chapter six: findings, conclusions and recommendations, references and appendices. Chapter one focuses on the background to the study, the problem statement, aims, objectives, and methodology. The latter entails methods, research approach and research ethics. The main theoretical framework underlying this study is *Ubuntu* and its tenets. The basic tenet is ‘I am because we are’ which is a collective approach. This study made use of *Ubuntu* concepts, which is an African-centred approach to the study of the security sector reform (SSR): state security (SS) and human security (HS) relations using the ZDF as a case study.

Currently, the inclination towards SSR as a process is scanty. Apart from the absence of political will, there is an immense deficit of institutional energy, which is needed to carry out the requisite reforms based on *Ubuntu* conceptions. Therefore, establishing a favourable SSR environment in the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) is a contested terrain because SSR as a concept is Western-centric and Euro-centric in nature. Europe and the Western countries are perceived generally as the main cause of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe. Cave and Manoharan (2009: 1) argued that “reforms in the security sector require a serious re-look at establishing a favourable security environment.” However, in a State, some processes are more important than sponsored differences on the politics of the moment. Therefore, instituting a constructive, safe, and sound environment is a challenge that should explain and justify SSR as a process, not a punitive measure from an Afro-centric perspective.

1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Enlightening the ZDF officer corps to identify influences and challenges, linkages and attitudes towards SSR, HS, and SS relations in the ZDF would encourage developmental strategic recommendations. A qualitative case study of the ZDF was used to study the
phenomena because the overriding concern is that SSR is a European and Western based approach. This is a value-laden problem that the ZDF considers ethically and morally meaningless to pursue over other desirable approaches. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), internal and external, national and international interference and opposition parties, have increasingly become vehicles to threaten, mock and humiliate an Afro-centric SSR processes for their own interest. In order to understand the complexities of SSR, HS, and SS relations, a case study was conducted to determine the ill-effect of foreign driven SSR agenda by collecting and analysing data from the ZDF senior officers. The ZDF was chosen because it is the institution most affected in this regard. A possible cause of this misunderstanding of SSR is the failure to account and document the ZDF SSR activities from the liberation struggle and thereafter. The question that arises is whether the ZDF needs reformers, governors, transformers, enhancers, or aligners?

The shortcoming of the Western concept of SSR is that it is inclined to overemphasise and generalise the hostility between state security organs and the citizens. Therefore, SSR, as it stands, is associated with imperialism and its motivation centres on imperial state institutions, aiming at specific class configurations. In this case, SSR is for specific class configuration of removing particular office holders and not as a process for enhancement and empowerment. Examining the opportunities, strengths, weakness, and threats faced by the ZDF in terms of the SSR concept would promote and enlighten state security and human security relations for economic empowerment, security, and stability. However, some of the questions that arise include whether SSR involves a regime change; a social change; or a human security agenda.

Teschke (2003: 308) observed that “the notion of security has transformed practically from the time when the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 was signed which marked the history of contemporary state foundations”. The traditional idea of security concentrated on the security of the government. This is supported by Nilsson and Tetreault (2000: 149) who stated that “the engineers of the state classification focussed on survival of the state.” As a result, survival of the state system is power-centred. Fullinwider (1999: 415) observe that “the governing elites are strategic reference sockets, and the determination of the government policies is not to make general public threatened, but to uphold the elite’s control of influence using the state security apparatus.” Thus, Fullinwider’s notion of security is that the fortitude of government (State) and the elite matters most. This condition is assured by means of robust national state security institutions and interprets the perception
of self-assurance in militarist positions isolated from the social fabric as a capitalist approach, which is Western and European.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s gave birth to the contest for democracy, human rights, and rule of law around the globe as the objective of European and Western states, predominantly those of United Kingdom, United States of America, and France. This appears to have offered scholars of security studies an opportunity to focus on human security. As a result, the struggle for democracy, good governance, and rule of law around the globe affected Zimbabwe in 2008.

In 2003, Zimbabwe declared a Look East Policy, thereby turning her back to the Westerners who control the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The land issue of the late 1990’s in Zimbabwe angered the Westerners, particularly Britain and her allies, when the whites were driven out of the land through the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP). This can be understood as the trigger for SSR based on a ‘regime change agenda.’ The question arises as to how this regime agenda relates to human security and state security relations. This is the socio-political environment that brought the call for SSR to the forefront in Zimbabwe. For that reason, the whole concept of SSR was politicised and internationalised as a regime-change agenda targeting specific office holders and not for the benefit of the security sector and the populace.

Developments in Zimbabwe indicate that the security sector and the ZDF, in particular, implemented SSR through the military measures in dislodging the colonial system. In this case, ZDF is the supreme central force behind the development of human security structures of pre-post-independent Zimbabwe. Currently, the National Defence Policy (1997: 12) noted that “Civil Military Relations (CMR) denotes the pyramid of power concerning the Executive, Members of Assembly and the Defence Forces.” This is an SSR process in action, and the fundamental principle is that the ZDF is obedient to national authority. This is the government position with its own dynamics.

The NDP (1997: 12-13) offered that “the Head of State is the Commander-in-Chief of the ZDF, with the authority to uphold or to make peace; to enter into any intercontinental agreement, treaty; to proclaim or dismiss martial law and to deliberate honours.” The Commander-in-Chief of the ZDF and the Minister of Defence are political civilian authorities underlining the concept of civil authority. The NDP (1997: 14) noted that “the
ZDF function and exercise power solely in the national interest by upholding the constitution; providing for the defence of the republic and ensuring the security of the nation and its citizens.”

This protection of inhabitants is part of HS processes. As a result, the military has acknowledged the moral and monetary provision from Government to provide for its tasks and wages. The military has exercised its commitment to peace, security, stability and as a guarantor for national development in a peaceful environment. This study examines the concept of SSR, human security, and state security and how they relate to the citizens of Zimbabwe and those in transit. On perceptions and conceptions of SSR, Teresa (2014: 152) observes that “security sector reform aims to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, and good governance in particular, the growth of democratic states and institutions based on the rule of law.” The question is about the origins of rule of law and its tenets. Monk and Hanson (2010: 8) observe that “human security addresses more local dimensions, although they involve large masses of humanity and it also addresses global issues that affect humanity, such as political, social, economic, environmental matters and pandemics.” The question is whether societal arrangements are focusing on human security and, also, what the role of the security sector is in the equation? In respect of human security, Kofi (2000: 1) observe that,

human security, in its broadest sense embraces far more than just the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights (needs), good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards poverty eradication, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict.

The above factors are the interconnectors for human security and, the state security apparatus as societal arrangements should focus on human needs, good governance, access to education and health care and guaranteeing opportunities and choices for success. However, the challenge is that there exists no single universally accepted definition of SSR, SS, and HS because these are concepts which are socially constructed within a given context.

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The primary objective of this study is to analyse the perceptions, conceptions, content and sensitivity of the security sector reform (the actor); state security and human security (the acted-upon) relations. Conducting this study at various levels should yield additional knowledge that would contribute to the ongoing debates on security studies. The intention is
to strengthen an independent practice that responds to the quest for human dignity, peace, stability, and development in Zimbabwe. This study seeks to encourage the traditional state-centric approach to security in combination with human security as a modernisation process. It conceptualises state security towards human security in the evolution of security studies with specific reference to attitudes, arrangements, and strategies in Zimbabwe for the period 1980-2008. This period was chosen for the reason that the discourse on SSR was not an issue until 2008. This thesis focuses in short on the pre-independence and mainly on post-independence (1980-2008) in order to draw parallels. The reason is that SSR was also experienced during the liberation struggle and continues to be exercised up to the present time.

The period 1980-2008 was characterised by economic prosperity, economic decline, uncertainties, confusion, suspicions and misunderstanding. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) were fighting for political space. As a result, the outcry for and against SSR in 2008 by the two foremost political rivals brought conflicting approaches to the forefront. ZANU-PF viewed the MDC-T SSR agenda as encompassing regime change based on internal and external foreign prescriptive approaches. Therefore, the challenge was ideological and theoretical in nature. ZANU-PF opposed SSR calls arguing that it was a regime security agenda as opposed to a human security agenda. MDC-T’s call for a regime change agenda was through removing specific revolutionary office holders in the ZDF. This approach was viewed as constituting a security threat as most of the office bearers are freedom fighters and combatants.

Magnus and Grey (2011: 244) ask the following important questions; “What is security sector reform? Do we have security or (in) security?” From these questions, the exploratory impression is primarily about the politicisation and internationalisation of SSR, forgetting the designated role of the state security in human security endeavours. Therefore, the term SSR is ambiguous in that it refers to different concepts and values. There is no universally agreed definition of SSR. As a concern, is SSR a goal, an issue, a concept, a research program, or a discipline? The problem with the term SSR is that it is detached from the people involved, the citizens, and the state security sector who are the actors in the equation for human security. Therefore, SSR should view issues through the lenses of the
relationships between state security organs and their role towards HS as the building blocks for the survival of Zimbabweans.

The Zimbabwe National Security Council Act (2006: 1) explains that the ZDF, Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Service (ZPCS) are the security sector’s statutory machinery. These organisations are known as the statutory security agents. There are also non-statutory security sectors publicly known as private security companies. The objectives are to identify, analyse, examine, influences and challenges of SSR, its linkages to SS and HS, the ZDF perceptions and attitudes in order to set out strategic recommendations for the re-conceptualisation of SSR, SS and HS. The ZDF does not operate in a vacuum given social and political context for protecting the citizens of Zimbabwe and this cannot be taken away from them.

1.4 AREA OF STUDY

Zimbabwe is the country area of study, focussing on the ZDF. The preliminary results of the population census indicate a population of 13.6 million (Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office 2012: 4), and the CIA World Fact (2012: 1) stated that “Zimbabwe is a land locked nation with a land area of 390 757 km\(^2\) of which 85% is agrarian and the remainder comprises national parks, state forests and urban land.” Zimbabwe borders on Zambia to the North, Mozambique to the East, South Africa to the South, Botswana and Namibia to the West. Zimbabwe gained her independence in 1980 and this ushered in a black majority government where Zimbabweans became masters of their own destiny in respect of security, political, and economic issues.

Figure 1.1 The ZDF flag and map of Zimbabwe.

Source: http://www.freeworldmaps.net (Accessed 10 June 2011)
1.5 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In its content, philosophy and ideology, the SSR does not address the needs of the ZDF officers. It is not adapted to the local realities and neither adapted to the local definitions and perceptions. Hence, it has inherent limitations and inadequacies that compromise its acceptance. Therefore, the ZDF generally see the process as mainly targeting the removal of senior officers from office. SSR has generally been politicised and internationalised as a regime change agenda targeting senior officers and this perception solicits investigation.

The statement of the problem is that SSR in its current form is an external and internal foreign prescriptive process, not an endogenous a threat to SS and HS relation in Zimbabwe.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

So much discourse exists regarding SSR in the third world countries and Zimbabwe in particular. Before effective policies and programs to evaluate SSR and its source can be formulated, more specific knowledge of SSR characteristics, its origin, content, and ideology is required. The significance and justification of the study are essentially to establish the ZDF perceptions of SSR, and highlight its strengths and inadequacies and whether it enhances SS and HS relations. The results would form a basis for generalisation regarding perceptions within the ZDF. The inspiration to evaluate SSR, HS, and SS stems from the challenges posed by these concepts. This current study is based on the contestation that to understand SSR there is a need to comprehend its meaning as understood by the ZDF officers (the acted upon). Understanding its meaning inevitably entails knowing its causes, manifestations and consequently offering solutions to its aims and objectives. The wisdom and practical insights of SSR by the ZDF officers is realised through the enhanced understanding of universal perceptions of local perspectives. Efforts to look critically at assumptions and learn from experience are essential prerequisites to understanding SSR, HS, and SS relations. There is a need to apply the “mind, heart and soul” approach to understanding SSR, SS and HS at the local level.

This means that it is necessary to employ mental resources to comprehend SSR, and the ‘heart’ brings in the passion and commitment that drives faith towards such development. The ‘soul’ is the dimension underpinning the mind. Consequently, the study of SSR, HS, and SS among the ZDF helps to establish the critical common value systems that define the phenomenon. In other words, SS and HS are the soul, and SSR is the body which should be
in a healthy state, otherwise the soul will disappear. The case study approach adopted in this research is effective, as it provides an understanding of complex issues. It can extend experience or add strength to what is known already through previous research. Case studies emphasise detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of conditions and their relationships. Social scientists in particular have made wide use of qualitative research methods to examine contemporary real life situations and provide the basis for the application of ideas and extension of methods.

Yin (1994:13) defines the case study research method as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” The choice of the case study in this current research is deliberate in the examination of how the ZDF officers define SSR, HS and SS relations. It is both an exploratory and explanatory study that examines whether or not the ZDF members share the same perceptions. If they differ, then that justifies the need to make a case for the updating of the SSR definition in order to direct intervention practices constructively.

The choice of the ZDF study is based on several considerations. Firstly, its familiar to the researcher (a Colonel in the ZDF) makes the topic easily accessible. Examination of the cause-effect relationship of the SSR independent variable (subject, active agent), and SS and HS dependant variables (the objects, acted upon), should not weaken the ZDF’s combat capability and must not dissolve into ‘tell tales’ of road construction and food production. It should rather involve interrelated roles between independent and dependant variables as illustrated in the figure below.

**Figure 1.1: Link between independent and dependent variables**

![Diagram showing the link between independent and dependent variables](Author's own construct (2012))
1.7 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to analyse the challenges and opportunities of SSR, SS and HS relations with a view of indigenising how they are perceived, how SSR, SS and HS relations can be owned and driven endogenously.

1.8 HYPOTHESES

It is all encompassing, constitutionally accepted, and enlightening that indigenised locally owned system of SSR, SS, and HS relations advances a culture of *Ubuntu* than that of the internal and external westerners who conceived it and continue to popularise SSR.

3.4.1 The null hypothesis

SSR is an external and internal foreign prescriptive process.

3.4.2 The alternative hypothesis

SSR is an indigenous and non-prescriptive process based on *Ubuntu*.

1.9 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of this study is to identify, analyse, examine and present recommendations in understanding why SSR (actor) is a disputed concept in contrast to the roles of state security and human security (acted upon) in Zimbabwe. The case of the ZDF is selected in order to demonstrate how specific policies, issues, and processes affect the ZDF organisation. The study seeks to reach conclusions and make recommendations to direct the future of SSR in the ZDF. The specific objectives are to:

- Identify influences and challenges of SSR in Zimbabwe;
- Analyse SSR linkages to SS and HS;
- Examine ZDF perceptions and attitudes about SSR, SS and HS relations; and
- Set out strategic recommendations for the re-conceptualisation of SSR, SS and HS relations.

1.10 CRITICAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What are the influences and challenges of SSR in the ZDF?
- Are there any linkages between SS and HS in Zimbabwe?
• What are the ZDF Senior Officers perceptions and attitudes about SSR, SS and HS relations?
• What strategic recommendations can be presented?

1.11 DELIMITATIONS
This empirical study comprises the statutory security sector, and in particular the ZDF as one of the pillars of national power. The respondents in this study are senior officers from the ZDF, Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ). The study of SSR, HS, and SS relations is broad and is based on a social survey, confined to an analysis of the perceptions of the ZDF officers. The research design is mainly qualitative although some quantitative techniques of charts and graphs were also applied for purposes of triangulation. The methodology comprises an exploratory case study and the main data-gathering instruments used consisted of quester-view, observation, and focus group discussions.

1.12 LIMITATIONS
The limitations in this study are basically constraints such as time, money, and access to critical information from the ZDF, which is protected by the Official Secrets Act. The researcher had to obtain authorisation from service chiefs since the ZDF is highly secretive in respect of critical information. The first constraint existed purely because of the sensitivity of ZDF officers towards SSR. Equally critical was the coding of data, the computer-assisted data capturing and analysis which were constantly disrupted by frequent power cuts.

The second major constraint was the methodological limitations. Given that the study was based on a case study approach to a social survey of the ZDF, it follows that it was inevitably affected by the limitations of the method. Critics of the case study method of research believe that it can offer no grounds for establishing reliability or generalisation of findings. Others feel that the intense exposure to the environment of the study, in particular the researcher’s familiarity with the environment as is the case here, may prejudice the findings. This notwithstanding, the familiarity proved quite useful in terms of observations and discussions. However, the number of 50 quester-views and the chosen focus groups for detailed consideration may be too small to allow for generalisation.

Lastly, the preparation of research instruments as well as the general administration of the study was affected by the politicisation of the topic and the environment was not moderately conducive and at times hostile. It adversely affected the researcher in purposive sampling as
well as in the availability of quester-view respondents. Despite these huddles, the research went through as a result of careful planning that took into account possible barriers of hostilities i.e. being labelled as an SSR and regime change driver. To ease the fears raised above, authority was granted (See Appendix A), different data collection techniques such as direct observation, quester-views, and focus group discussions were used in order to improve the validity of data through triangulation. The researcher is a former ZANLA combatant and some of the detail may be biased or limited to the analysis of ZANLA activities in some cases.

1.13 EXPECTED OUTCOME

The expected outcomes are insights, awareness and a contribution to existing literature in the area of security studies and alert academics, students in security studies about SSR, SS and HS relations. It envisaged to achieve this through developing new ideas, knowledge and strategic recommendations to establish an SSR model that promotes SS and HS relations from an Afrocentric perspective.

1.14 METHODOLOGY

In this study, a qualitative approach is used to gain insight into the ZDF attitudes, perceptions, and views on SSR. Therefore, the researcher originated the technique of fact gathering with planned inquiries or conceptions. Schurink (1998: 258) notes that “an investigator needs to cultivate essential interactive skills for effective facts gathering.” The significance of the described facts depends on the comprehensive aptitude of the investigator to identify facts, probe queries, and observe human actions. Therefore, the observation approach was employed to achieve the desired objectives. Schurink (1998: 241) states that ‘the foundation of the qualitative technique is the significance of the qualitative features of human concert, perceptions and conduct.’ Quester-views were conducted at the work place, a location convenient to the participants, in a friendly and free environment and the researcher was not new to the ZDF organisation and its stakeholders.

The sample was deliberately small owing to purposive sampling and the restrictive environment of the subject under study that permits only a few privileged members of the ZDF to discuss topics under the oath of the Official Secrets Act. Data was obtained from senior officers in the ZDF using quester-views, discussions, observation, and focus groups. Subsequently, the data was managed by a CAQDAS package, a data management and
analysis tool to establish interpretive results from the responses of participants. The results from the current phenomenological study of human experiences of SSR, SS and HS relations should shed light on attitudes and challenges in indigenising and promoting the phenomena based on African values. Information gathered includes the understanding of content concepts, complementarities, enhancement and institutionalisation of human security of basic human needs in the ZDF roles and functions. The involvement of ZDF in politics, the economy, and social issues were analysed in an effort to ascertain the experiences that contributed to the participants’ attitudes and challenges of SSR, SS and HS relations.

This case study of the ZDF is based on a qualitative approach and is used to determine the overriding problem of the ZDF regarding SSR processes, perceived as mainly targeting the removal of senior officers of the liberation struggle cohort (aged 50 years and above) from office. This perception required investigation. The SSR concept and its practice are not new to Zimbabwe. During this period under review the word SSR is new in the ZDF, but in practices the concept was being practised. The idea of taking up arms for the liberation struggle, struggles within the-struggle, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) in the 1980s. The transformation of the three armies into a single uniformed defence force in the early 1980s and the professionalization thereafter are confirmations of an SSR process.

As a result, the lack of research in this area with short-term oversight and political interests can limit the vision of SSR (as a concept), and inhibit the achievement of long-term improvement thereof. This is a value challenge where the ZDF should consider the ethical and moral aspects, and the worthiness of SSR over prescriptive and undesirable approaches. In order to be able to understand the complexities of SSR, HS and SS relations, this case study aims to determine the ill effects of foreign-driven SSR agendas. Senior ZDF officers need a comprehensive understanding of the background of SSR, theory, its drivers and the implications in fostering positive outcomes. Consequently, the researcher chose to collect and analyse data from the ZDF Senior officers. This case study could be repeated with a new population over the passage of time. The ZDF was chosen because they are the acted upon, and are human beings who also need security.

The researcher in this case study is a serving Colonel in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) and therefore, an observer-as-participant approach was employed. Patton (2002: 206)
observes that “roles symbolise the level of involvement of the investigator, from being totally separated and acting as an outsider, or being totally engrossed and fitting to the group as a full contributor.” However, this involves manageability and the competence to transform procedures during the process to justify the ends through data collection method and analysis.

1.15 PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

The term epistemology in qualitative research design relates to the means for acquiring knowledge and justification. It is the study of our method of acquiring knowledge. Creswell, (2012: 13) said that “epistemology directs the methodological choices of a qualitative case study research design.” Accordingly, methodology justifies different approaches that produce data and analysis. In this study, the knowledge was shaped from data analysis and phenomenology was the appropriate approach for exploring research questions aligned to human experiences and consciousness. As a result, the goal of this qualitative case study research design describes a ‘lived experience’ of SSR, SS and HS relations.

This is a qualitative analysis of descriptive data. Baxter and Jack (2008: 547) observe that “descriptive case study is used to describe an intervention or phenomenon and in the real-life context in which it occurred.” In this case it is SSR which is the phenomenon, SS and HS is the environment in which it is taking place, the variables or the acted upon. Therefore, it is a holistic single case study using a purposeful sampling strategy based on the principle of idea convergence while taking into consideration how SSR is influenced by SS and HS within a specific context. The underlying philosophical assumption in this study according to Diriwächter and Valsiner (2005) is based on epistemology (where evidence is assembled based on individual views), phenomenology (where acquiring knowledge and justification is practised) and methodology (where a method is used in the process of research). Therefore, the philosophical assumptions (epistemology, phenomenology and methodology) are embedded within the interpretive frameworks used in this study. In order to carry out any kind of research that uses either part or all qualitative methods, it is important to consider the philosophical assumptions as well as the interpretive framework. In this study the interpretive framework comprises an analysis of descriptive case study data.
1.16 RESEARCH STYLE AND TECHNIQUE IN SSR

SSR is a process where SS and HS concepts are negotiated and the preferred approaches for addressing challenges are aligned. Effective SSR research should focus on reducing insecurities and also strengthening the basic human needs. This involves a capacity for renewal and adaptation. In this study, SSR research involved objective and subjective systematic collection of data to obtain knowledge. It consists of theory and practice for impact, which is called ‘soft details’ because the subject matter (humans) are fluid and difficult to measure precisely.

It is an empirical research because facts are assumed to exist prior to the theories that explain them. Therefore, it is an evidence-based research. The nature of the state security over issues of power and human security brings challenges. Thus, failure to consider the social and political implications, the ideology, content, threats, advantages and disadvantages of SSR will, in many cases, exacerbate those same insecurities. SSR researchers seek to understand and mitigate threats because state security no longer has the monopoly over security issues due to the dynamic changes in societal values. Citizens’ priorities what they see as core values of importance and these values are always changing, for example family values, cultural values and changes in the international environment.

For that matter, are countries like Britain, Canada, China, Brazil and the USA secure when there is a severe threat to their health, food, environment and human security, among others? These threats are directly applicable at the individual, national, regional and global levels. The domestic environment can at one level threaten a weak, unprepared society but may be less threatening or entirely none threatening to a strong prepared state. Domestic factors can have a profound and direct effect on the capability of an entity to cope with threats. This encourages pure research by means of a combination of empirical enquiry and the application of theory for responsiveness, with the aim to develop a body of general knowledge in the understanding of SSR through SS and HS relations.

What is the nature of SSR? What are the basic elements of SSR, SS, and HS? What constitutes SSR and how does it appear? These are the ontological ways of considering SSR in this study and how it influences what we think can be known about it. Is SSR open to investigation? These strategies of inquiry lead us to the methodological ways of gathering information in order to know what constitutes SSR and the instruments or tools to be used in collecting the information. The research sample in this study comprises Senior ZDF officers.
As a result, ontological questions help us to know what constitutes SSR through focusing on attitudes and perceptions and the interpretation of the meanings of SSR, SS, and HS in a constructivist, hermeneutical nature. SSR and its meaning is realised through the SS and HS relationship that exists. These relations are through social interaction and are in a constant state of social change. The epistemological viewpoint used was the critical approach that is interested in understanding SSR in the social context in which it operates, and to identify structural relationships and ideological issues. Therefore, methodology, ontology, and epistemology questions facilitate a particular understanding of SSR, SS and HS relations.

Qualitative techniques for collecting data were used specifically for investigation through quester-views (See Appendix B), focus groups, army archives, primary and secondary sources, library and its resources, computers and appropriate software. The units of analysis were the responses of individuals and groups, and their attitudes toward SSR, for the purpose of demystifying security relations, using ZDF senior officers from the rank of a Major or Squadron Leader and above. Basically, this was an exploratory qualitative research in generating ideas in order to develop tentative theories and assumptions in an attempt to become familiar with the basic facts from the ZDF Senior Officer’s attitudes and perceptions as the affected.

This study is explanatory and exploratory in term of the perceptions of ZDF senior officers regarding SSR, SS, and HS; how they define these concepts and what the concepts mean to them as individuals, groups or as an organisation. The appropriate models of SSR that would work better in the ZDF context and circumstances were also evaluated. The evaluation focused on collecting data to ascertain the effects of some form of planned change. The examination of the internal generalisation of ideas from the population comprised a search for validity.

1.17 METHODOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION

The research methodology in this qualitative approach was influenced by exploratory, explanatory and hermeneutic views. The methodology involved a study of human social behaviour; therefore, a qualitative approach proved best for data gathering in this study. Patton (2002: 28) observes that “phenomenological analysis emphases are on the inquiry of what is the phenomenon?” What are the structures, culture, and nature of SSR, SS and HS relations? If one is to understand the broad-spectrum of the public philosophy and culture in which one is functioning, it would involve a plan of coherent explanation. Thus, a justified
quantitative analysis was used only for cross-tabulation of bio-data against recurring thematic patterns observed in the qualitative data. The quester-views with 50 senior ZDF officers yielded valid responses.

1.18 RESEARCH DESIGN MATRIX

Choguil (2005: IV) posited that “the research design matrix is a system of rows and columns into which the components of a research project fit, including the goal, objectives, definitions, hypotheses, variables, methods of analysis and anticipated conclusions.” Thus, the matrix encapsulates what the researcher intends to do in the investigation of logic from the beginning of the planning process. The research design map; as illustrated in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.3 below also enhances the process.

Table 1.1: Research design matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Objectives</th>
<th>Specific Research Questions</th>
<th>Key variable indicators</th>
<th>Specific research instruments</th>
<th>Target groups</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify influences and challenges of SSR in Zimbabwe</td>
<td>What does the literature say about SSR, SS, and HS?</td>
<td>Definitions of SS and HS; aims of SSR; and indicators of SS and HS</td>
<td>Books on internet; forums; books; conferences and symposiums</td>
<td>Key informants, senior ZDF officers</td>
<td>Geo-strategic conditions conducive to the research. Authority granted to carry out the study. Relevant literature available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyse SSR linkages to SS and HS</td>
<td>What are SSR, SS and HS indicators?</td>
<td>How are SSR, SS, and HS viewed by ZDF members?</td>
<td>Suitable sampling; focus groups; in-depth quester-views; and review of related literature</td>
<td>Any key policy informants and decision influencers in the ZDF</td>
<td>Relevant literature, material and information available in Archives; and from ZDF senior members and respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examine ZDF attitudes about SSR, HS and SS</td>
<td>SSR as conceptualised by ZDF members</td>
<td>ZDFs’ CMR and gender reform, Historical background to SSR</td>
<td>In-depth quester-views; focus groups; and review of related literature</td>
<td>Key informants from ZDF members</td>
<td>Relevant socio-political literature and material; available and key informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulate strategic recommendations</td>
<td>What are the linkages between SS and HS in the conception of SSR?</td>
<td>Localised linkages; reviews; mechanisms; and policies</td>
<td>Quester-views; focus groups; and observation</td>
<td>Key data analysis</td>
<td>Findings warrant the review of current indicators and policy adjustments as strategic recommendation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own construct (2012)
1.19 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This study reports on activities and responses of some senior members of the security sector in the ZDF who are under the purview of the Official Secrets Act. The researcher was constantly aware of the required moral and ethical behaviour. For this reason, participants were made to be at comfort during the course of the interview. Individual confidentiality was secured through the understanding of the researcher, who abstained from probing into matters that would intrude upon the Official Secrets Act. Sikes and Pots (2008: 44) observed that, “secrecy in research means that collected data must not be linked with an individual”. In this dissertation, anonymity was achieved through concealing the names of the participants and co-workers. Privacy was employed in the captured transcriptions of the quester-views since no designations or names were used. Ethical issues among others were respect for privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity of data sources. All participants were acquainted with the purpose, goals, and nature of the investigation and were informed that the study concerned SSR, SS, and HS relations. The researcher handled the facts given by the participating members as acceptable to the criteria of ‘informed consent’.
1.20 QUALITATIVE APPROACH

Quester-views were administered successfully to 50 respondents instead of the 64 calculated initially. The quester-views were designed in such a manner as to produce qualitative data about the ZDF senior officer’s perceptions on SSR, HS, and SS relations to project their own local definitions and perceptions of the same (See Appendix B). The perceptions were used as a basis for comparative correlations between different variables of SSR, HS, and SS. Qualitative inquiry is an approach permitting detailed qualitative descriptions (dialectical, ideographical, and hermeneutical in nature), observations and explanations were carried out in instantaneous association. In this approach, quester-views and focus group discussions were the technique of data collection. The quester-view with participants guaranteed an in-depth appreciation of the topic under study. Therefore, the dialogue or discussions vary on a continuum beginning as very informal to very formal. In very casual discussions, the questions were flexible and upheld an open receptiveness to the response. On the further end of the continuum, the quester-view included discussions and opinions. This study used the quester-view from formal towards an informal conversational system.

3.4.3 Quester-views

Quester-views were used to gather data and included a range of questions probing the broad research concerns of the study. The structured quester-view began with demographic profiles of respondents and the rest of the quester-view tested the participants’ perceptions to SSR, HS, and SS. The quester-view proved to be a practical and appropriate way of collecting data. The administration emphasised anonymity even though the researcher administered the quester-view in the form of face-to-face interviews. The quantitative data produced results that were confirmed by the quester-view and focus group discussions.

3.4.4 Direct observation

In instances where quester-views were administered by the researcher, direct discussions and observations complemented the results of the quester-views and focus group discussions. Observation and general discussions provided fresh insights. The data gathered was used to confirm the ZDF’s responses from the quester-view and focus group discussions.

3.4.5 Focus group discussions

The focus group discussions were held with two groups of members of the ZDF; one focussing on the quester-view and the second group on gender issues in the ZDF. The FGDs
permitted participants to agree or disagree with each other. They provided a suitable platform to brainstorm all the SSR, HS, and SS relation indicators in the context of ZDF officers’ perceptions. According to Kothari (2009: 40), “a focus group is a technique of qualitative investigation in which groupings of people are questioned about their perceptions.” In this current case study it was about SSR, SS and HS relations.

The questions were asked in a collaborative setting in which participants were permitted to talk openly with other group members. Therefore, focus groups were used for gaining access to various ideas, perceptions, and attitudes. Grounded on the idea that the qualitative approach is relatively easy to comprehend, the results were credible. Kothari (2009: 8) notes that “focus groups could be a selected qualified group of respondents who gather in the same room to focus on the research objectives.”

The researcher used the quester-view to guide the focus group through discussions which would probe attitudes, perceptions, and moral outcomes. Focus group discussions provided accurate information and were less expensive than quester-views. In this case, the researcher used members of the ZDF’s Senior Management Workshop held in Harare on 23 March 2012. The fundamental challenges experienced with focus groups were the issue Official Secrets Act. On observer dependency, the results achieved were opinionated by the researcher, increasing questions of validity. The design of the focus group study e.g. respondent variation, the questions asked, how they were formulated, posed to respondents, in what setting, by whom, and so on, had an emotional impact on the answers gained from the participants. However, the environment was mentally conducive, motivating and valid.

3.4.6 Data collection and sampling

This study used the convenient procedure of sample collection, also known as ‘purposive sampling’ where samples are selected in a non-random manner. The focus was on policy influencers, decision makers, command elements and executive staff. Therefore, this approach included persons in policy and decision making processes in the ZDF senior officers corp.

3.4.7 The sample

The focus of this study was on attitudes, perceptions, and reactions to SSR, HS, and SS relations. Choosing the respondents was a challenge because of the Official Secrets Act but the researcher’s letter of authority from the Ministry of Defence created a favourable
environment. Non-probability sampling was used for this qualitative approach paradigm. Patton (2002: 181) notes that “the fundamental approach of a purposive sample, is selecting information-rich cases.” Schurink (1998: 253) observes that “a qualitative researcher selects people who are reachable and useful in selecting especially informative subjects and is not about representativeness of a population but purpose for a particular reason.” Figure 4 below represents the triangulation of the sampling process that produced 50 respondents from the quester-views.

**Figure 1.4: Convenience sampling of participants**

![Convenience sampling of participants diagram](source: Researcher’s own construct (2012)).

**3.4.8 Justification of the sampling procedure**

The identification of ZDF was purpose-driven by practicality concerns; any other security organ in Zimbabwe would have served the same purpose. The researcher is familiar to the ZDF being his working environment, and it was therefore easy to access. The convenience sampling technique was employed in the selection of quester-view informants. The justification for purposive sampling is mainly the realisation that representativeness in the research of this type is, largely, a sociological and cultural experience generally shared by all who belong to the same organisation, especially the officer’s corp. The basic assumption was, therefore, that substantive facts about SSR, HS, and SS relations indicators are known by senior ZDF officers as policy drivers and administrators.
1.21 FIELDWORK DURATION

The duration of the fieldwork was an on-going process and the researcher maintained an open mind throughout. There was controllability in the research design, before and after the information gathering. Patton (2002: 193) observes that “purity of technique or method is less significant than commitment to important and valuable data”

1.22 FIELDWORK TOOLS

The researcher was meticulous in keeping comprehensive and correct records in a methodical manner. For that reason, authentic elucidation of extracted raw data was the qualitative inquiry in fieldwork approaches. The fieldwork tools used were quester-views, participation-observations, discussions, GFGDs and FDGs.

1.23 DATA ANALYSIS

The qualitative data was analysed using a CAQDAS computer software package as a data management and analytical tool to produce descriptive statistical data in the form of tables, graphs, and charts. The thematic and content analysis technique was subsequently used in interpreting the data and the triangulation was essential as an interpretive tool.

Thematic analysis identified themes, through examining, and documenting patterns across data sets that are important to the description of SSR, SS and HS relations to specific research questions. Content analysis was used as an examination of numbers and percentages of specific research question responses so as to simplify the detection of trends. These patterned responses across data sets are themes that are important to the description of a phenomenon and are also associated to specific research questions.

The triangulation of the content and thematic analysis involved the interpretive component of determining meaningful terms of the research quester-view. In this study, the content and thematic components were triangulated to analyse the qualitative data in order to achieve the set objectives and answer from critical questions.

1.24 CONCLUSIONS

The qualitative approach emphasis was on SSR, SS and HS as a multifaceted phenomenon within the specific context of the ZDF’s perception that SSR is a regime change agenda focusing on removing specific senior officers from office. Quester-views, observation, and focus groups represented the tools as a source sampling technique for effective revelation of
sufficient data for interpretation that would yield valid outcomes. The research relied on material from both primary and secondary sources, including internet searches. Questerviews with senior officers who administer the ZDF policy and implementing the decisions were conducted and qualitative data obtained. The seminars and workshops the researcher participated in were conducted in the SSR, Peace and Building. This facilitated in obtaining valuable inputs from local, regional and international sources.

The study faced a number of restraints, such as some people fearing to respond to the questerviews due to the politicisation and internationalisation of the SSR. The area was new, as a regime change agenda in trying to remove senior security service chiefs from office. However, the study was a pioneering one and authority was granted by the ZDF as a way of sanctioning because many researchers are interested in carrying out research in the ZDF for their own interpretation and interests, which are not locally driven.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a literature review on SSR, SS and HS focusing on the concept of security, United Nation (UN), African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) challenges in SSR, the local ownership concept and the political sector. The aim is to determine secondary (existing) knowledge about the SSR, SS and HS. The theoretical framework, critical theory and an amalgamation of the literature review serves to draw parallels to the case study.

Regrettably, security sector service is an honour that too few Zimbabweans appreciate and is even beyond their appreciation, conceptualisation, and understanding. There are now fewer Zimbabweans with fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, in the security sector, wearing a uniform, because they live largely in a peaceful environment. If it weren’t for unemployment, few families would approve if a family member joined the security sector because the tendency to define state security organs as the reference object of national security concern. Contemporary concern of security begins at the individual level, focusing on the basic human needs approach (BHNA) in the areas of food, health, security, unemployment, and shelter that must be nurtured to achieve general peace, security and development by the SS.

2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

There are challenges within the literature review on SSR, HS, and SS relations. In order to establish a theoretical framework, Mehler (2012: 49) observes that, “little attention has been paid to the factual contribution of the state security forces to the physical security of the citizens.” The problem is that the protectors are becoming violators, and their appearance in public causes fear and insecurity. In many African countries, the realisation of enlightened state security forces appears to be an elusive goal because colonialism, prescriptive idea, ideology, theories, greed and corruption. In addition, the lack of Afrocentric good governance practices based on communal interests undermines human security and dignity in the process.

Mahler’s observation on the physical security of the populace generates new knowledge and awareness in searching for the importance of SS and HS relations. Providing physical security and satisfying human needs of a country’s citizens are vitally important aspects of
government’s task. Its mechanisms and policy review processes are generally written from a particular perspective of the SS and not from western methodologies. Mabee (2003: 35) states that,

> security studies have suffered from a lack of analysis of the state and its relation to historical change. When this attitude is challenged, it can be seen that the particular ‘state’ of security studies fits into a particular historical logic that structured states and which is susceptible to change. A historical sociological analysis of the development of the state-society surrounding security can provide a historical analysis of the state, in order to better articulate its continuing relevance to political life and security, its relationship with individuals and society, and the complexities of contemporary citizenship.

In addition to Mabee’s postulation, Udin (2009: 1) observes that, “all countries have both external and internal security concerns.” As far as internal security is concerned, it appears that the security sector in Zimbabwe has been accountable, transparent, and efficient. Adequate and coherent measures for a holistic reform in the security sector have been evident. Additionally, there remains a lack of information, coordination and accountability in the security sector reforms undertaken. The effectiveness of any measures taken is compromised further by rampant bureaucratic apathy.

In Zimbabwe, there is a lack of scholarly analysis, coordination and accountability of the reforms that were undertaken by the indigenous Zimbabweans against colonialism. However, the privilege of providing these security concerns is an issue that has yet to be fully exploited, analysed, evaluated and researched. The assumption is that the state security forces remain the principal manager of security, whatever its final reference objective is. This is a regrettable inheritance of a state system known as the ‘Westphalia model’ that encouraged a ‘military dominant notion’ of security. One may assume that the military domination of security issues encouraged the practice of acquiring a large stock of arms at the expense of human security concerns because of the legacy of colonialism.

Akinrinade (1999: 224) observes that “this assumption justifies the procurement and maintenance of big military institutions, habitually without much threat analysis or orientation to other demanding needs of the state and its citizens.” This is a trend where the colonialists were still struggling for resources in former colonies. Ochoche (1998: 17) states that “there was little to show that African leaders in the recently self-governing states tried to comprehend or define security beyond what was left to them by the colonialists.” However, the challenge is about how threats and appropriate responses are constructed, how the
objectives of security are shaped, and what the possibilities are for the adjustment of security challenges in creating a peaceful environment from a people-centred approach. Africans have attempted to be in the forefront in establishing new definitions of security. The Kampala Document (1991: 7) declared that “the concept of security goes beyond military considerations; it holds all facets of the society comprising economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, and community, local and national life.”

This approach suggests that the confidence of a state must be understood in terms of the security of the individual to live in harmony with access to basic human needs of life while fully contributing to the development and growth of his/her society. This may be referred to as a community approach summarised as the ‘finger theory’ or ‘constructive approach’, meaning that state power which is people-centred leads to an Afrocentric approach to social order. The ‘finger theory’ and ‘constructive approach’ is going to be explained later in this chapter.

Agyeman-Duah (1994: 200) posited that “security should be redefined in human security developmental terms.” The challenge is much about the government’s obsession with colonial state-centric models of security, which emphasises foreign threats and internal conflict; side-lining individual security in terms of basic human needs. Molutsi (1999: 81) maintained that “uncertainty in Africa is openly interconnected to poverty, material and moral deprivation.” A solution is advocated by Adekanye (1999: 107) who observes that “true security in Africa is about helping people regain their jobs, income, food, health, shelter, individual security and the security of life itself.” This observation is people-centred because security in contemporary terms is largely about a justifiable conviction of self-determination from threats in the prevention and protection of a level of well-being by securing the basic human needs.

Marlies (2008: 31) contended that “human security which is generally concerned with ‘downside risks’ that ‘threaten human survival more than human security' has been entirely absorbed and emasculated by the state security concept.” Marlies (2008: 32) further advocated that “state security may threaten individual security and is merely a euphemism for the preservation of power by small and the often unrepresentative elite that presumes to speak for the state and its people.” Therefore, SSR should be a process that transforms, enhances, and builds a state’s security sector to provide effective security to the state and its
people in assuring satisfaction of basic human needs; not as a prescriptive agenda in character.

Makoa (2005: 122) argues that “the state is central to the discourse on security for the reason that universally it is the institution for preserving a given social order.” Makoa is advocating a realist approach of survival through the power-centred approach as a means of achieving peace and security because the state has become the central organ of social, political and economic life of all societies. Molutsi (1999: 186) suggested that “the experience of post-colonial state-society relations should be a system of a collective security approach concerning SS and HS linkages.” As a result, SSR conceptions and practices should be based on fundamentals of SS and HS conceptions for national harmony, interests, and values that are Afrocentric and endogenously driven because national security is critical to national destiny. Thomas (2007: 16) observes that “national security and economic integration have generally been the missing link in security studies.” Thomas’ hypothesis has recently been applied to the practice of economic and security considerations because the concept of security can no longer be treated primarily as a state security issue alone. The challenge requires the transformation of the entire social structure and ways of thinking in upholding a given social order. Filder (2007: 42) maintains that “the upholding of a given social order as a ‘securitisation phase’ is the convergence of narrow and broad conceptions of security and interest and value-based approaches to national security.” Therefore, what is security?

2.3 CONCEPTUALISING SECURITY

The concept ‘security’ is complex because there is no single all-encompassing definition in security studies available. In specific terms, the primary debate centres on the mostly social constructivist methods that have faced up to realist theories. In the realist theories a number of dynamic new methodologies for the examination of security studies are actually being developed, in the realm of the theoretical debate-taking place.

The subject of security is now at the centre of a political struggle to come to a decision about the prospect of world order. The debate surrounding security is intertwined with the individual, communal, national, regional, and the international world order as it is socially constructed. Weaver (2004: 56) argues that,

security is a subjective concept because the act of securitisation begins when a security actor, an authoritative figure in government, bureaucracy or civil society, identifies an existentialist risk to a referent entity ‘with an inherent right to survive.’ It is a ‘speech act’ which designates the threat to warrant
extraordinary measures beyond those of ‘normal politics’. If the targeted audience is convinced of the authenticity of the threat, the securitisation act is successful.

It can be contended that security becomes the centre of a political, social and economic struggle for the reason that it is moving away from the state as the sole referent allowing for non-state actors to be securitising actors. Hence, society is experiencing issues like food security, political security, human security, environmental security, among others. It can easily be determined that security is the state of being free from survival vulnerabilities.

All thing being equal, the populace should support, enhance, and empower the security sector in the name of national security for survival in terms of developing the basic human needs approach which could be measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage hunger, health, food, human and environmental challenges. With these challenges, the behaviour of the citizens is unpredictable. As a correlation, one can observe that ‘the poor refuse to sleep because they are hungry and the rich refuse to sleep because the poor are awake’. Therefore, nobody is sleeping because of insecurity that is the state of being subject to danger.

Of note is the connection between HS and development. In order to better distinguish between the concepts, in this study, human security is interpreted narrowly as territory secured from external aggression, or as the protection of national interests in foreign policy. The concept of SSR in security can defined as a necessary but not sufficient precondition for human development, a suggestion that ‘if SSR and human security could cover the most urgent threats to development, it would address societal well-being.’

Human security can also be understood using a mainly normative orientation, and from a political perspective where it is conceptualised in close relation to basic human needs. While the literature on HS acknowledges the importance of human rights, there has been little evidence that human rights theory has responded accordingly for basic human needs. Therefore, human rights should be redefined as human basic needs in an Afrocentric approach. One of the main tasks for security analysts is to investigate how some threats come to have priority over others and become the focus of security, and not human needs. The referent objects of security should be the people, state and basic human needs because threats are defined in close association with the security of states and its people. Military threats can pose major threats to the state and affect all its components, as the use of force is
involved. The UN has acknowledged the widening of the concept of security by identifying new security threats, such as poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation, war and violence within states. Thus, with this conceptualisation of state security and human security, it is necessary to examine the origins and implications of SSR in security studies.

2.4 ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SSR

The origins and implications of SSR are many and the term SSR is new in Western conception. In Africa and Zimbabwe, in particular, the phrase security sector reform is new, but as a concept it was long-established by Africans. Bryden and Hanggi (2004: 3) observe that,

the notion of security sector reform emerged in the late 1990s and is exclusively Eurocentric in origin with a remarkably similar content emanating largely from the Nordic States, Europe, the USA, Canada, and Britain. The EU has notably stood out as a clear net exporter of the security sector reform concept and provides most of the funding for security sector reform activities worldwide.

In this view, the absence of other major international powers including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) in the security sector equation involves challenging ideological and theoretical viewpoints. In this context Bryden and Hanggi (2004: 24) observe that “this should not disqualify security sector reform at the philosophical level from being introduced and implemented into the security sector discourse because there is no generally acknowledged definition and meaning of security sector reform.”

Some actors embrace a broader or narrower understanding of SSR and sometimes express it in different terms because there is no universally agreed upon definition, because it’s contextual and can be socially constructed. The ZDF prefers to define it as security sector alignment of systems to enhance, reaffirm and empower by confirming it to its important role (See appendix C). It can be argued that the SSR concept appears to be socially constructed internationally and driven to regions and nations by the actors from Europe and not from Africa. Hence, it creates what can be termed as Eurocentric and Afrocentric predicaments which are problematic in the SSR approach.

According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Sixth Annual Forum in France, Paris (2-3 May 2005: 4) “security sector reform has a far-reaching impact in not only arresting insecurity, but also a forum for long-lasting national security, economic, political and social development.” This assumption is hopeful and less frightening as it views SSR as the bedrock in enhancing the SS and HS relations. Nevertheless,
responsiveness to SSR remains unclear in terms of whether it has arrested insecurity. Therefore, hindrances to the translation of the SSR agenda into practical and operational realities are the politicisation, regionalisation, and internationalisation of SSR debate based on Western values. Therefore, the important question is whose conception of SSR is used in Zimbabwe? The differing conceptions of SSR are the fundamental malady or tragedy of the whole debate on SSR in Zimbabwe.

Brazoska (2003: 4) observe that,

the study of SSR is a relatively young field, as the phrase ‘security sector reform’ can be traced back only as far as 1998. The primary objective of SSR is to instil the principles and the framework of democratic civilian control over a state’s security sector system.

The problem with SSR principles, norms and framework of democratic civilian control does not distinguish whether these principles and the framework are transferable or applicable to the cultures of other societies. In this case, states and societies should define and pursue SSR according to their own particular context, history, culture, threats, and needs. This is what can be defined as an Afrocentric approach to SSR, which should be locally driven and owned as a practice embedded in the specific requirements and circumstances of the state security forces and its populace. Much as SSR may be relevant to Africa and Zimbabwe, in particular, hitherto the concept is not entirely African or Zimbabwean in origin. It is about those who invented the concept and continue to popularise it. They have a reason for doing so because they are the primary beneficiaries of the gains of its adoption. The SSR, in particular, is secondary in the scheme of its realisation. Currently, there is no officially articulated African or Zimbabwean theory or position that explains SSR.

Rukavishnikov and Pugh (2006: 131) observe that,

the relationship between civilians (‘people without arms’), the society at large, and the military (‘people with arms’) was established as a separate armed body in order to protect a society? This question is long-standing and probably dates back to antiquity, to the very beginnings of military organisation in civilian societies. In each country, the answer to this question is deeply influenced by national history, sentiments, and traditions. It depends on the role of the army as a state institution in the relevant country, subordination of the military to political authorities as defined in laws and constitutional arrangements, and so on. Public perceptions of military personnel, the prestige of the military officer’s profession, public opinion towards defence and foreign policy of the regime and certain activities of the army, determine it. The very nature of the problem is permanently changing because both society and the military are constantly changing as well.
Rukavishnikov and Pugh focused on the relationship of SSR, SS and HS as a process, not as an end, based on public perceptions as defined in laws and constitutional provisions. The challenge is that most research on SSR is adhering to the Western normative model of what constitutes security development in a liberal democracy. This perception of the SSR concept does not constitute an African-centred approach. The OECD (2005: 64) notes that,

although practice varies from region to region, SSR is generally perceived to be a foreign driven, often ‘political process’, more concerned with spreading ‘Western norms and practices’ to inform how security institutions should be governed, often at the expense of a sustained injection of technical and financial support, contrary to the priorities of the local population who desire concrete improvements of security in the physical sense.

Therefore, SSR approaches should emphasise the need for national ownership, responsibility, and commitment to security sector reform and development. It should also address sensitive and often controversial questions, including what are the most critical security needs; how should SSR be implemented to best meet those needs and how to get there. SSR should be reformulated to coincide with the needs or wishes of the recipients of reform and those who suffer from insecurity, and not through threats of the ZDF officers’ removal from office.

The Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) workshop (Geneva, Switzerland: April 24-25, 2001) found that “SSR is not a question of laws, rules, regulations and formal institutional arrangement, but a thorough transformation of minds and patterns of behaviour, modes of thinking and creation of new values and habits.” Nevertheless, the question remains, if it is not a question of law, rules and regulations then it is fraud and whose modes of thinking, values, and habits are used? Bond (2003:16) argues that “the SSR culture determines the pace and success.”

As a result, SSR culture should not be imposed or prescribed but be locally owned and driven by the indigenous people. This is so because the local ownership of SSR is declared in the political, social, and economic processes by the citizens themselves. Nathan (2007: 26) asserted that “a major problem in SSR has been the lack of local input to and ownership of the emerging reform agenda.” The proposition is that the current call for SSR in Zimbabwe is deeply a political endeavour that changes and redistributes the dynamic balance of power that exists; creating winners and losers. Therefore, convincing the security sector and its citizens of the sincerity and probable effectiveness of SSR processes that are not locally
driven is a major undertaking. Brazoska (2003:23) notes that “the most important conceptual disagreement in the reform agenda is the weight given to the provision of physical security versus more democratic control over decision-making in the security sector.”

It can reasonably be assumed that the democratic control over decision-making does not ‘stand-alone’, but is part of the political, culture, economic and social order for survival of the indigenous people. Hence, they should own and control SSR in the equation supporting SS and HS relations. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Conference (Oslo, Norway: 10-11 April 2003: 7) settled for,

the need to strengthen national capabilities, plan the sector’s activities, manage with utmost effectiveness in order to have the defence mission accomplished, supervised, administered with coordinated information flows, in terms of its effectiveness and performance.

There is therefore, a need for conceptual clarity in Zimbabwe’s policy frameworks in the Constitution, the Defence Act, Discipline Regulations and the Conditions of Service objectives, balanced with the historical and cultural norms of a security sector in which reform is being attempted. If this is not practised, it exposes the ZDF to liberal forces that push for democracy as practiced in the West, contrary to African culture, politics, economics, interests, values, and beliefs. This means that there is a real need to indigenise the SSR process according to local threats analyses and interests. In Zimbabwe, this entails dispelling the polarisation that has characterised SSR, of severe mutual mistrust and suspicion, instead of mutual trust among members of the same family.

SSR studies are also influenced by economic concerns and the struggle to control valuable resources. Indeed, in many conflicts around the world, valuable resources are often exchanged for weapons that are trafficked to conflict zones, an area that also needs examination during and after the conflict. From a realist view, security is often a process of the worlds’ powerful exploiting the worlds’ weak. Therefore, capitalism is a system that is highly exploitative in nature and has no colour. Capitalism as an economic policy has wider implications on SS and HS issues. Whilst it offers lucrative opportunities to those that own the means of production to multiply their fortunes, it creates unequal distribution of resources. It leaves the security sector vulnerable especially in developing countries and prone to suffering and living in abject poverty. The momentum of the distribution of wealth maintains the advantage of the rich elite, together with their relatives and coterie in comprador relations.
Therefore, the way forward is to move mentally from the traditional definition of security that has the state at the core or apex to encompass human security, food security, political, and economic security issues, just to mention a few. There is a need for a collective security approach in order to fill deep gaps in attitudes and beliefs between individuals in society, politicians and members of the security sector. The ZDF inherited structures that were not dealing with issues of HS but issues related to the minority ‘Rhodesians’ own survival and re-accommodation of colonial interests. In principle, the ZDF should be connected to HS as it experienced during the liberation struggle where they fought for concrete things, concrete benefits for the masses of the people as a whole.

It can be suggested that the current SSR is not bringing operational effectiveness to the boundaries of the security plan, and better policy management on the side of civil authorities. As a result, current SSR calls do not form a basis for the relationship between SS and HS. In fact, it is threatening the majority of the ZDF survival. Metz (2000: 11) maintained that “the security sector should develop a well-conceived national security strategy or module of security sector reform that provides coherent paths towards identifying, advancing and protecting people’s needs.” The ZDF is doing this through its Defence Policy, the Defence Act and the Conditions of Service; the governing statute instruments. If there is a gap, it is in the practice, management and mechanism in implementation.

As it stands, SSR is a concept that invokes different and often strong reactions and emotions from different persons depending on what they perceive in respect of its objectives, content, and purpose. As a result, the debate on SSR is often characterised by misconceptions, misunderstanding, misinterpretation, assumptions and general confusion about when it should apply, and to whom. As a result, the human mind tends to resent, fear and reject that which it does not comprehend.

2.5 UNITED NATIONS’ SSR CHALLENGES

Globally, SSR is pivotal to the global debate, in challenges within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) itself. UN reform is also a subject debated constantly on the UN agenda and it is extremely complex and widely contested. However, UNSC reforms are necessary in order to strengthen the UN’s effectiveness as a multilateral organisation, providing greater transparency to the institution and enhancing its credibility. The focus is on the reform of the UNSC, as this is the most powerful institution with the greatest potential for bringing peace and security at international, continental, regional and national levels.
Further literature reviews of the existing problems of SSR in respect of why it is currently a challenge in reforming UNSC reveal that the implementation of the reforms should originate within UNSC itself. Cassese (2005:320) observed that “the UN was set up with the principal aim of maintaining world peace and security.” The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2005: 16) observes that “no reform of the UN would be complete without the reform of the Security Council.” Gareis and Varwick (2005: 225) observe that “the Security Council (SC) is the UN’s main executive body with the primary responsibility for international peace and security.” Therefore, it is necessary to reform the UNSC. Gareis and Varwick (2005: 15) observes that “the UN itself still consists of five permanent members, notably China, France, Russia, UK and USA with ten non-permanent members; thus reflecting a realist hierarchy within the UN system.”

Taylor and Curtis (2008: 317) stated that, in spite of rapid growth during the decolonisation process and increasing pressures for UNSC expansion, strong cases for permanent membership of major member states’ powers, such as Germany and Japan, as well as of developing countries, such as South Africa, India, Egypt and Nigeria, have been unsuccessful so far.

This is expanded by Luck (2006: 122) who observes that, while there are arguments that an expansion of the UNSC would make it more representatives of the 192 UN members, in fact most members would still remain unaffected by UNSC enlargement, even if it were to allow seats for developing countries such as South Africa, India, Egypt, Brazil or Nigeria. Furthermore, it would be difficult to justify which states were, and which were not, awarded seats. Japan, for instance, is the second biggest financial contributor to the UN but still has not been awarded a seat the UNSC.

It can be concluded that reform of the UN, in particular the UNSC, is essential for a more effective UN decision-making process. However, this reform is extremely difficult to implement due to the veto rights of the Permanent Big Five or P5 which are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

2.6 CHALLENGES OF THE AFRICAN UNION IN SSR

Just as there are challenges of reform at the UNSC level, so are the challenges of security sector reform at the AU level. The debate in Africa on SSR is similar to the international reform process challenges of the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), contained in a UN General Assembly Resolution 61/291/2007 report. The report indicates that the security and wellbeing of people and states are fundamentally intertwined. Therefore, the report
indicates that SSR should be based on shared understanding of the goals and objectives of SSR, while respecting different ways in which they are addressed by national actors. The goals and objectives in this case are prescriptive and cannot be respected. Following the publication of the UN Report, the UN General Assembly Resolution 62/659 of 2008 observed that “SSR seeks to increase the ability of states to meet the range of both internal and external security needs in a way consistent with independent norms and sound principles of good governance, human rights, transparency and rule of law.”

The challenge remains, whose goals, objectives, independent norms and sound principles of good governance are they? Those who designed them have a purpose. The question as to who should carry out SSR in member states of the AU. Although there are lessons learnt from the UN report, its prescriptive aspect is a challenge for African countries. The AU was established in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, as a successor to the Organisation of African Union (OAU). One of the AU’s objectives is the development of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which indicates that, on the institutional side, APSA has established a number of organs in Addis Ababa that spans the continent, thereby creating a regional and sub-regional system of governance. This is a unique system in that the AU is supposed to function as a pan-African coordinator for the different Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in five African regions (North, East, Central, West, and South Africa). Classically APSA comprises the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund (PF) (APSA).

Thus, the AU has established itself as a formal institution for upholding peace and security in Africa. As a result, APSA is constructed on the notion of African proprietorship. However, the challenge is considerably more than the ownership of the content of APSA, including SSR, in that it is not Afrocentric in theory, ideology, content and methodology. It is a prescriptive copycat of a Eurocentric SSR conceptual framework.

3.4.9 2.6.1 African ownership

Generally, the idea of African ownership finds its origins in Pan-African ideologies and the struggle against colonial rule in the last century. While Western regional establishments were engrossed in their own specific colonisation capability, African nations did not have the opportunity to claim proprietorship and ownership of their ideas, land and institutions.
Nevertheless, outside the historical aspect, ownership has many practical and realistic characteristics.

The AU Libya: Tripoli Declaration (2009: 2) reinforces the ownership awareness when it observed that,

Africans comprehend the predicament and challenges better than those who approach SSR from far away, since they are on familiar terms with solutions which can be employed, and how they are able to get there, because basically these challenges are theirs and they will live with their consequences.

Thus, Africans should develop their SSR path in relation to SS and HS relations from their own contextual perspectives which are Afrocentric in nature because they will have to live with the consequences. The question of ownership is far from being straightforward. The decision is about who has the commitment because various players could produce reasonable statements of proprietorship. However, Africa is arguably disjointed doctrinally with numerous overlapping regional establishments which can brand their own genuine proprietorship entitlements of the SSR process. However, the issue of ownership can develop a supplementary serious hurdle when players or actors hold different views and concerns. Therefore, African ownership without a united Africa behind it might thus undermine collective peace efforts. Furthermore, sub-regional competences in Africa are far from clear-cut. For that reason, owing to its status as efforts in progress, the ownership has often been considered from the perspective of institutional dimensions. Undeniably, devoid of this capability to act, the ownership concept turns out to be Eurocentric, focusing on SSR only and not analysing its relationship to SS and HS. This would insentient leave the field to others, undermining Africa’s own desire for the maxim of African solutions to African problems.

Disconnected ownership, unclear security strategic policies and guidelines, and limited resources will continue to hamper the AU from accomplishing its full potential. The solution to these challenges requires the implementation of decentralised authority configurations and integrative management styles. What the AU can accomplish depends on combined collective efforts. A collective effort means, first of all, the capacity to express mutual positions derived from internal considerations and true obligations to AU member states.
The AU and APSA in particular need to be reformed and renewed before considering and advocating for SSR in African states. The AU’s Draft SSR Policy Document (2011: 5) indicated that,

SSR refers to the process by which states and societies re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient and responsive to democratic control of the security and justice needs of the people.

However, components of the security sector vary according its national context and it appears that the AU’s Draft SSR Policy Document is prescriptive and hurried. It is a top-down approach. Therefore, the AU’s Draft SSR policy document needs to be effective in sovereign African states. The AU clung tenaciously to the principle of ‘non-interference in the internal affairs’ of sovereign states. The AU Draft SSR Policy is regarded as interference in internal affairs of African states.

Thus, SSR is a contested subject and it may be argued that AU is taking steps in trying to promote SSR prescriptively. However, the AU should be moving away from the maintenance of regime security through understanding the ownership principle and exercising human security practices. The AU’s SSR Draft Policy reflects the liberal approach to security sector reform. It is clear that the UN’s and AU’s approaches to SSR do not strengthen the basic human needs approach. It should focus on needs not rights as the foundation towards an African centred SSR. The missing element about needs is therefore, the challenge. The definition of the SSR is not encapsulating the role of SS and HS because it is sensitive only to rights (privileges) and not to human needs (necessities).

The AU’s SSR Draft Policy Document framework (2011) indicated that it was prepared by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), a non-governmental organisation within the APSA framework in 2008. A decision by the AU Assembly on the AU’s SSR concept is for some reason not yet accepted. It may be argued that these frameworks will trigger debates involving African scholars and practitioners over the Western perspective of SSR. The AU and the UN seem to be labouring under the assumption that SSR is inevitable and that all they can do is to determine what their roles are in the scheme of things. Therefore, the policy, basically, is a guideline as to how SSR should be implemented. As a result, these guidelines are not treaties that would, upon signing, be legally binding to all regional players.

Dembiniski, Krempel, and Berenike (2012: 15) observed that “the AU response to the emerging SSR norms is influenced by two of its own principles based on a restricted
interpretation of sovereignty which emphasises peace and security together with democracy and good governance.” It now depends on whose definition and conception it is and who owns it. Selassie (1963: 285) notes “Africa should be able to come up with African solutions to African problems.” Dembinski and Peinold (2011: 11) observe that “this demonstrates African emancipation from Northern tutelage which is in tandem with the Western and Eurocentric approach.” Hutchful and Fayen (2005: 16) maintained that in keeping with this standpoint many African critics of the SSR concept claim that it is a Western concept which only serves as a vehicle for foreign intervention, and demand the development of a non-western approach to SSR.” In the same vein, Mlambo (2010: 173) posited that “the AU policy framework on SSR has identified principles which don’t seem to differ from the UN SSR concept and Africans had difficulties in identifying specific African principles.”

According to Bryden and Olonisakin (2012: 40), “many African scholars and practitioners are pointing to the need for enhancement, transformation or governance rather than security sector reform.” However, this could be a matter of serving for recognition and attraction. Equally, it may be concluded that SSR is divisive and would ultimately change the target countries’ political power balance because it lacks national ownership, it is a Western approach and not African. It is bound to be queried and meet with open or concealed resistance because people want a better way of life, not that which threatens their survival. Africans should own the SSR process and drive it according to their threats, needs, and aspirations.

3.4.10 2.6.2 SADC and SSR settings

The most important SADC legal documents guiding the organisation’s role in peace and security in the region is the Mutual Defence Pact of 2003, which provides a framework for defence cooperation and represents a tangible move towards establishing a security community. The Organ on Peace Defence Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) are for the implementation of the objectives set out in the Mutual Defence Pact. Since then, many of SADC’s peace and security endeavours have been military-related. The SADC-BRIG currently could easily undertake observer-like missions and less complex peacekeeping, peace-building operations, peace enforcement and humanitarian interventions in critical circumstances.
Leaders of SADC approved a Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) at their summit in Tanzania on 26 August 2003, for providing a framework for further cooperation on politics, defence, and security matters focusing on crime prevention, intelligence, peace-making and peacekeeping enforcement, human rights, conflict management, conflict prevention and resolution. These processes could possibly be a higher level of Afrocentric security consciousness in SSR toward SS and HS relations.

The SADC’s MDP Article (9) Protocol on Politics Defence and Security Co-operation (2001: 4) indicates that,

in order to realise the objective of this Pact, state parties shall co-operate in defence matters and facilitate interaction among their armed forces and defence related industries and any other areas of mutual interest; the training of armed personnel in any field of military endeavour and, to that end, from time to time hold joint military exercises in one another’s territory; and exchange military intelligence and information in all significant matters.

This is SADC’s SSR process through a collective security approach. Consequently, SADC occupies a fairly strong position as one of the designers of SSR in the AU security architecture. The SADC is broadening its approach to understanding the basic realisation of politics, economics, diplomacy, international relations and collective security co-operation among other dimensions. The notion is that ideal can be realised only in the fertile conditions of peace and stability.

Security cooperation as an SSR process is interrelated to values and strong institutional capacity; member states’ guarding of their sovereignty; strong systems of governance in respect of democracy and security, and basic human needs with emphasises on economic, political, social, food, environmental and human security. SADC should develop institutional capacity for good governance. However, clarity seems to have been gained on the relationship between the Organ on Peace, Defence and Security (OPDS).

The SADC’s challenge is primarily about removing major Western donors from the security decision-making process; although a significant level of African power politics prevails in creating solutions to solving African problems. The SADS’s exclusion of donors from security decision-making indicates that SADC is not yet fully convinced of the Western and Eurocentric SSR approaches. When SADC members signed the OPDS, the aim was to enhance stability, advance security cooperation and improve collective defence and peace keeping efforts.
To put this objective into practice, the SADC’s Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) was signed on 14 August 2004 in Blantyre, Malawi, in order to operationalise the objectives set forth in the Protocol of OPDSC. The implementation of SIPO involved strengthening and deepening the co-operation in the areas of politics, defence, and security. This contribution could figuratively be referred to as commitment to an Afrocentric perspective of SSR processes within the SADC region. The SSR in the SADC region is evidenced in the SADC Protocol on OPDSC with priority given to transforming liberation guerrilla movements into professional armed forces.

It can be concluded that in the SADC region there is a determination to establish an operational entity at the political level, in close co-operation with the security sector. This is a move to a security community, as Thompson (1998: 18) observe that “united we stand, divided we beg; united we fight and divided we run.” The OPDSC exists and is used by heads of state to defend each other and to protect the people of the SADC region. Nevertheless, SADC is moving in the right direction when the OPDSC harmonised SADC’s SIPO to focus on the strategies for sustainability in the political, defence, state security, police and public security sectors. These plans bring to the fore the SSR concept, which is regionally and locally driven. It is necessary to keep in mind that politics drives the state security sector and both are symbiotic.

2.7 THE POLITICAL SECTOR

To exacerbate matters, the political sector overlaps with the defence sector, state security sector, police sector and the public security sector. Political sectors have common characteristics with SS, in essence including political parties and different individual politicians. The environment of political methods varies. In the SADC, two prototypes do exist: a single party, normally a former liberation movement, and weak political parties influenced by influential, often affluent individuals pursuing personal and not ideological agendas. (Cawthra, 2006).

Consequently, it may be construed that African governing political parties are lean in policy making capability relative to security issues. As an outcome, African states remain at the mercy of donor involvement and SSR programmes in terms of local conditions and ownership. Therefore, the challenge is that of reinforcement in the capabilities of political parties and parliaments to deal with security matters from a national perspective. As a result, there could be at least four possible arguments that can be made to support the logic of MDP
within the operational framework of the OPDSC within the regional collective security approach in the direction of SS and HS relations.

Baregu (2000: 4-6) advanced the love, gain, threat and power (LGTP) models and stated that, the Love Model postulated that the SADC countries are natural allies not only because of common history that binds them together, but also because of the complex filial bonds of brotherhood and sisterhood, that cut across the borders of the individual countries in the region. This school of thought indicates that regional collective security should come easily once one invokes the historical connections and filial bonds of SADC countries. This is the model which, though not explicit, has partly dominated thinking among SADC members;

the Gain Model emphasises the potential for mutual economic benefits that can be gained from collective security. This school of thought maintains that regional collective security is the natural choice if countries in the region wish to benefit from the collective security relations. Failure of collective security arrangements may be explained by a lack of rationality on the part of the countries since there exists plenty of scope for all to gain in a win-win arrangement. This argument has been at the centre of security challenges in the SADC;

the Threat Model stresses necessity rather than choice. The natural response to this challenge should be inward looking regional integration with the aim of creating new regional divisions of labour and stimulation of their dormant markets by producing goods for the region. In this context, globalisation is perceived as essentially threatening to the region as a whole. Whereas globalisation has an integrating and centralising tendency in the North, it manifests a disintegration and fragmentation tendency in the South.

the Power Model essentially suggests collective security collaboration and integration, under the aegis of a dominant member in the region who is willing and able to impose hegemony and sustain costs. The postulation is that the natural dominating force in the region is South Africa, a model associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States as the hegemon. However, nobody has the will, capacity or legitimacy to impose a viable hegemony in the African region.

Each of the above models embodies some features applicable to the SSR process as an Afrocentric approach in SADC. The threat model’s argument is the most applicable to the SADC collective security cooperation approach. It is illusory and short sighted for any country in the region to imagine that its long-term security, political and economic prosperity is tied to the West and Europe outside of a strong African and regional economic block which has to be created, nurtured, and integrated from an Africa-centred methodology and ideology.
The implementation of international standards, norms, values, reforms and security issues of the UK, EU, USA, UN, AU and, to a lesser extent, SADC at the declaratory level, does in essence, not result in augmented efficiency at the local level. Dembinski, M., Krempel and Schottl (2012: 34) observes that,

taking global scripts and applying them as effective local solutions might be hampered by three types of friction. Firstly, adherence to global norms encourages a ‘one size fits all’ mentality. Secondly, global norms and values are translated into practice by international actors but do not mesh with the interests of local actors and thus do not penetrate deeply enough to the local level to effect the behaviour of respective actors. Thirdly, regional actors adopt global norms and values, standards and security issues in formal terms but implement them in a way that compromises the intention of the local norms and values.

Ownership is essential in offering an evaluation of SSR, SS, and HS relations based on SADC’s agreement through the Organ on PDSC and SIPO. However, it is also problematic to recognise the SADC’s position on SSR strategies because it has been politicised and internationalised. The way forward is through an indigenous Afrocentric approach that should encompass human security practices and the role of the state security machineries in a symbiotic relationship.

2.8 STATE SECURITY AND HUMAN SECURITY LINKAGES

Do we need the state? Are individuals or a group being able to refuse to belong to a state or to form their own state? These are difficult and controversial questions to answer because no individual single-handedly can be responsible for his or her own security and survival; the principle of nature prescribes that people should come together for mutual benefit. Therefore, the ‘finger theory’ a collective approach is that SS and HS are primary concerns of a government as they are socially constructed and should come together for existence just as good as finger forms a fisticuff.

Hence, the working connotation of HS encompasses safeguarding human basic needs, human well-being and happiness. Alkire (2003: 1) observe that,

human security is the safeguarding of the vibrant fundamentals of all human existences, from life-threatening and prevalent threats, in a way that is consistent with durable human realisation with the objective of constructing political, economic, social, and cultural and environment settings in which people live knowing that their vital liberties and freedoms are secure.

It is this human security realisation in a peaceful environmental setting that construct a security paradigm for a more practical and cultural understanding of security studies. For
example, many states defy their own national interests by opting for more regional and international approaches to security. As more states opt for collective approaches, this paradigm begins to pose questions about the very nature of security in the world. From a practical perspective, who is being secured? Who is securing whom? What is being secured? These questions require answers to justify security options taken by different states.

According to Buzan (1991: 370), “security is of vital importance and is frequently used to help raise consciousness of the importance of particular issues, which are then so labelled in the minds of the population at large. However, security is an essentially contested concept.” Buzan (1983: 6) stated that “security is a concept on which no consensus exists and this conceptual vagueness makes it difficult to find a common ground for discussion.” Hence the definition of ‘security’ is contextual and socially constructed. Williams (2008: 5) observes that “security as a feature shared by most definitions is some form of threat to cherished values especially those threats that endanger a particular referent object’s survival in the near future.”

Art (1993: 821) posited that “security is a concern for survival which entails a preoccupation with confidence.” Brauch (2003: 52) stated that “security is not an independent concept. It is always related to individual or societal value systems.” The point is about keeping critical pervasive threats from invading the vital essentials of all human lives and keeping them away through using the state security machinery in collaboration with individual or societal value systems.

Rusagara (2011: 107) maintained that,

the principal actors are, of course, the executive and the administration that include the armed forces and security services. Within the executive, in most African countries, the president is the designated commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and there are usually ministers responsible for defence, policing, intelligence, and justice, although sometimes the president may take on these roles or they may be combined.

In this context of the principal actors SSR, in the field of state security (SS) and human security (HS), has been a subject of considerable debate. Attempts to broaden and deepen the scope of the field beyond its traditional focus on state security and encompassing human security have raised fundamental theoretical and practical issues. Khagram, Sanjeev, Clark and Dana (2003: 293) found that “there are numerous interconnections among people (social
systems), plants and animals (natural systems) and livelihood opportunities (economic systems), that are frequently linked to political empowerment.”

The focus, therefore, is on social and economic issues including the security sector as elements of the societal fabric for political and economic empowerment as a process based on African value systems. The challenge is about locating the role of state security in this equation. It could be said that, within the state, security is a combination of military power, economic, social, technological, and moral factors. Therefore, SS and HS require a new consensus that acknowledges the linkages and interdependencies between them. There is a need to broaden the concepts of SS and HS against the background that SSR is a level of consciousness. SS and HS relations are interlinked and the final resolution is to augment and advance social cohesion and livelihood.

The UN Secretary General in the UN Report: In Larger Freedom (2005: 16) observes that, “state security and human security are inseparable, imperative and mutually reinforcing factors in social reality.” Therefore, SS and HS relations should sustain order, peace, and stability and their relationship entails a connection between them. The challenge is about the definitions: who owns, and created, these definitions? In the direction of conceptually understanding human security Alkire (2003: 40) stated that,

while human security is an unfamiliar concept and while it overlaps considerably with notions that underlie systems of state security, its distinctive emphasis makes valuable contributions that the present altered security environment requires.

Therefore, SSR, HS, and SS relations contribute significantly to contemporary security as they are mutually interconnected. Consequently, HS encompasses threats from hunger, jobs, human fulfilment, protection, and security of the people. The focus is on safeguarding the citizens from unexpected and hurtful distractions in the patterns of daily life whether in jobs, in homes or in communities. It is clear that security involves two interconnected concepts that are the state’s role in safeguarding its borders from external threats and ensuring human security for its citizens. This signifies that each individual is empowered or entitled to be free from repression, violence, starvation, shortages, and illness in order to live in hygienic and healthy surroundings. This freedom does not imply indiscipline and insubordination.

The intention of HS is to protect the vital fundamentals of all human existences through methods that improve human happiness and advance empowerment in enabling people to act
on their own. Practising human security is not a stand-alone concept; it involves the role of state security in ensuring security for its citizens against internal and external threats. Many scholars in Africa and Zimbabwe are Eurocentric in nature because of colonial backgrounds and therefore miss the Afrocentric approach. Chimanikire (2001: 2) linked SS and HS at the regional level and observes that “without common security in the region, development may not be possible, since it needs to be accompanied by security.” Chimanikire’s perspective is state-centric in approach because he overlooks the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who seek security in their daily lives at the local level, since security starts with the individual.

The basic human needs approach is the point of entry in the direction of collective and regional security. People may ask collective security for whom? Though the state is the source of security, it has every now and then failed to provide security. It may be proposed that security in the 21st century has been viewed through the advancement of modern, more sophisticated weaponry, yet the very arms and weapons meant to increase security have served to endanger human survival. The UN Human Development Report: New Dimension of Human Security (1994: 42) perceives that,

"it will not be possible for the community of nations to achieve any of its major goals, not peace, not environmental protection, not human rights or democratisation, not fertility reduction, nor social integration, except in the context of development that leads to human security."

To this end, the state has a duty to make the shift from a state-centric approach to combine human security in the equation of security. The UN Human Development Report: New Dimension of Human Security (1994: 43) observes that “development of human security occurs within a sociological context of needs, motives, values and norm which are always in a dynamic state of relation.” These are relevant issues to be addressed nationally for development to be realised. It should be understood that a lack of development breeds poverty, and poverty itself is a major cause of insecurity and a threat to national security and human security.

Attention should turn to the correlation between security and human needs at political, economic, military and social levels. Understanding these connections, correlations, and complementaries is necessary to ensure favourable outcomes. It is at this crossing point that the relations are attained and nurtured. The protection of borders and generally the status-quo are good but human security calls for social change and adaptation to new priorities that
create empowerment strategies that enable people to develop their resilience in difficult conditions. Human security would embrace empowerment if defined in terms of improving self-esteem, individual competence, self-confidence, self-awareness, self-development and an improved quality of life.

SS strengthens HS through the ability to choose and increase one’s capacity to define, analyse, and act upon one’s challenges peacefully. Peace, human and political security is the mainstay of a socio-economic development process. It is in pursuance of this noble and constant desire that, in 2001, SADC concluded the OPDSC as an instrument for dealing with the region’s politics, defence and security challenges. There is also an element of ‘common security’ based on the argument that for a state to feel safe and secure, its neighbours should also feel secure. It may, therefore, be argued that an adequate conceptualisation of SS should link with HS because it is not possible to have one without the other.

Endeavours to realise socio-economic objectives through delivering basic human needs and the fight against corruption are good examples. In the human security equation, the SADC region based on PDSC is working on transnational crimes, terrorism, HIV and AIDS, human trafficking, money laundering, small arms trafficking and drug dealing. In advancing these issues, the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) signed the Protocols on Extradition, Against Corruption and on Mutual Legal Assistance in Matters of Crime in Maseru, Lesotho in 2006.

This regional organisation is supported by the Sub-Regional Bureau of International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) in Harare which coordinates its activities and programmes. Therefore, the objectives of these protocols cascade and cut across SS and HS existing relations. It is through this realisation that many scholars, such as Stiglitz (2003: 16) and Boutros-Ghali (1995:18) understood that “peace, conflict, security and development are fundamentally linked and have to be observed from unified perspective for sustainable conflict transformation, peace-building and development.” As a result, development activities are not only confined to conflict transformation and peace building but to socio-economic growth that permeates other realms such as the provision of security, health, education, food and shelter.

In other words, development extends beyond material wealth. It involves different players including governments, civil society organisations, grassroots institutions, and state security
as well as international development agencies whose objectives converge on the creation of favourable conditions for all-round development. This is supported by Kishe (2003: 219) who observed that “development is a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, attitudes and national institutions.” The challenge is, basically, the acceleration of economic development and the eradication of poverty. Therefore, Kishe’s focus relates to security, based on a human needs approach.

Since the 1990s, security as a concept and practice has changed and now includes the attempt to address non-military aspects that affect the security of individuals, communities, and nations. These include resource-based conflicts and poverty alleviation. “It is a realisation that has shifted the emphasis from state security to human security, which is concerned with the welfare of ordinary people.” Paris (2001: 87). Therefore, security studies can be placed on a two-way matrix with an axis that distinguishes studies concerned exclusively with state security, and the other axis about non-state security threats, respectively. At the same time, there has been a move to institutionalise the involvement of military forces in non-military issues, i.e. humanitarian, disaster management, peace building, and development activities. The overall emphasis is on political stability and security to facilitate the delivery of HS through SS actors, and to establish the conditions for peace-building processes. This involves environmental security, health security, economic security, and political security, among others.

As a result, national security and inter-state security are being redefined because human security is an attempt to avoid, reduce, prevent, or resolve conflict that emanates from individual, community, national, regional, and international levels. This approach to security reflects a multiplicity of voices and actors including that of military, police, judiciary, and security organisations. Security and defence as concepts in security studies are increasingly being informed by related and previously unconnected disciplines and approaches such as sociology, feminism, political science, environmentalism, peace and security studies. State security or national security, as interchangeably used in this study, is now being redefined in order to encompass that which affects humanity. The state and non-state beneficiaries of security, military and non-military, indicate a paradigm shift that, in practice, means that state security and human security are increasingly linked as building blocks of human dignity. The need to broaden the linkages comes against the background that human security
and development fields have the ultimate purpose of seeking to enhance the human condition.

Kofi (2005: 18) acknowledge that “development, human security and human needs are inseparable, imperative and mutually reinforcing factors in social reality.” Therefore, shortage of basic human needs, inequality, scarce health delivery, and under-development generate and replicate disorders of unpredictability. This renders underprivileged countries vulnerable to civil disgruntlement. However, the mere presence of strong state security does not guarantee peace and stability because human security issues without development are hollow and likely to lead to a situation characterised by high crime rates, political instability, and anarchy. Hovland (2003: 49) advances the view that “peace agreements which do not tackle the economic needs of communities are not easily implemented.”

Thus, SSR that fails to tackle the political, social, and economic needs of the local citizens is also difficult to implement. In order to build development, peace, and stability, both sectors SS and HS have to be conscious of the need to promote inclusive and participatory developmental activities. Conflict arises when some proportion of the people, clusters, or sectors feel left out from the developmental undertakings. The challenge is in addressing the deepening environmental crisis as well as the cumulative social and economic inequities that divide society by investigating the fundamental political and economic roots of misinterpretations, which embraces inequality, poverty, and dominance by the elite at the expense of the populace. The solution here is much about the basic human needs approach as the entry point from a traditional security approach towards a new concept of security in the areas of politics, economics, society and the environment. This encompasses state and non-state actors, military and non-military security issues from traditional security to the current new concept of security as the scope of security enlarges.

War in future will be waged on different, parallel levels: diplomatic, economic, financial, political and military realignments and strikes, depending on the conditions and necessities of the moment. One of the main problems is the sensitivity of religion and climatic change where there is a need to access correct and relevant religious beliefs. In respect of climate, information is critical for planning purposes as it allows the state and citizens to prepare for any weather-related disasters such as floods, storms, and famines that affect human security.
It becomes necessary to identify the new concept of security, how it can be distinguished and how to act according to the new concept of security. These are essential logical inquiries in a deep-seated and unique system of existing security. Security is a precious instrumental value that gives individuals and groups the opportunity to pursue the creation of humanity rather than live in weakened circumstances. As a result, SSR should inform SS activities towards HS and it should not be a threat and a tool to remove office bearers. Security may be considered a prerequisite for development, empowerment, and enhancement of human needs and the quality of life as the best strategic approach. Therefore, there is a need to move from the traditional forms of security to the new concept of security as demonstrated in Figure 2.1 below.

**Figure 2.1: The new concept of security**

**Beneficiaries of security**
- State and non-state
- Societal security
- Human security
- National security

**Scope of the security:**
- Military security
- Military and non-military security
  - Political
  - Economic
  - Social/Cultural
  - Environment

**Source:** Adapted from ICNSS Conference, Galilee College Israel (2006: June 15-26)

Furthermore, the nexus between human security and human development is also unpacked by Boutros-Ghali (1995: 26) who observe that “building and maintaining security should be reinforced by development, and vice versa.” In this case, Boutros-Ghali is integrating the aspects of multi-dimensional development into what is termed peace building. The challenge posed by the new paradigm was to strengthen internal security by mainstreaming development and peace-building in defence and security matters, based on the basic human needs approach. This encompasses state security and non-state actors, military and non-military actors. Therefore, the creation of capable state security is also imperative in the
security and development discourse in order for critical social value systems to develop clearly the basis of SS and HS courses of action.

In the realm of health security, deadly diseases such as cancer, HIV and AIDS, diabetics, Ebola and malaria, among others, pose HS threats. For example, these diseases curtail security and development through infecting and affecting the ordinary people who are important to the development of a country. These casualties include leaders, teachers, soldiers, police, intelligence personnel, doctors, lawyers, farmers, drivers and nurses in their most productive years. Michael (2005: 64) wrote “AIDS is causing social and economic crises which in turn threaten political stability.” If this pandemic is allowed to proliferate, the consequences would be disastrous, leading to more infections and more conflict. Existence and survival are now motivating forces behind the connection between SS and HS and, by definition, the pursuit for promotion of this relationship requires no justification. Larrinaga and Doucet (2008: 530) indicate that “life through the lens of human security is understood primarily in terms of providing for the basic sustenance of day to day life.” Basic sustenance depends largely upon political culture, dominant ideology, tradition, physical conditions, and national aspirations, economic and administrative capacities, among others.

In addition, every basic interest is subject to periodic review by the society that upholds it. The ICNSS Conference June 15-26 (2006: 4-5) observes that,

the concept of national security is a composite concept, with the following outstanding aspects: the territorial configuration of the state size, climate, topography and borders; national assets, natural resources, infrastructure and industrial capability; the society, its cohesion, moral strength, and degree of stability; the government, its character, legitimacy, style of leadership and formal pattern of rule; the population and its size, pattern of dispersal birth and death rates; the economy, its capital, financial returns, rate of growth and potential for development; international standing, its power of deterrence, foreign relations (overt and covert), and military and political treaties; the military force, its capability, state of readiness and relations with the political rank and file; and the nation’s strength which are measured in terms of its ability to mobilise the physical and human resources at its disposal.

This composite concept is a central element of a nation’s security paradigm. It encompasses components of the political, economic, societal, technological, legal, and gender issues. A government that decides to enlarge the military budget at the expense of the education, health, and agriculture budget may well find itself with a strong military dependent on a weak or undeveloped society. However, Duffield (2001: 45) observes that “too much emphasis on the state misses how such interventions must depend upon strategic complexes
of national governance that bring together state and non-state actors, military and non-military security and civilian organisations.”

It can be concluded that the most challenging task for state security policymakers is to pursue society’s cohesion, moral strength, and state of readiness in relation to the political mechanisms. The danger of mystifying the system that upholds state security is real, especially in countries which hold the military in disproportionately high esteem. It is universally the case; however, security considerations and interpretation of interests deeply influence the life of a nation. This is a HS approach focused on interests, standard of living, and allocation of resources. However, there are two main international relations theories of HS that are at opposite ends of a continuum. Thompson (2000:7) suggested that,

at one end it is based on a realist theoretical framework which maintains continued emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broader conceptualisation of human security. On the other end, is the critical human security approach, based on a set of assumptions that aim to dislodge the state as the primary purveyor of security and puts emphasis on the interdependence of individuals and non-state actors.

Realists maintain that the sovereign state should play a singularly central role in providing effective security. Idealists, *Ubuntu* and constructivists question the idea of the state as a vanguard of security and advocate the cooperation of all state and non-state actors in society. They advocate an approach where everybody plays a part in ensuring the relationship concerning SS and HS. The UN Commission Report: Human Security Now (2003: 24) supported this point in that,

human security complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and to empower them to act on their own behalf. It seeks to forge a global alliance to strengthen the institutional policies that link individuals and the state with a global world. Human security thus brings together the human elements.

While state security still takes into cognisance protection of the state and its citizens from external aggression, the most serious threats facing many countries today derive from internal causes, e.g. scarce resources, and lack of basic human needs. Patterson and Renner (1997: 22) postulated that,

the traditional image of war and state security clashing on a defined battlefield has since been replaced by protagonists fighting within, rather than between countries. The battlefield can be anywhere and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is blurred. Civilians are not accidental victims but explicit targets and pawns of insecurity and violence.
The contemporary challenges in general is to examine the relationships between defence, development, domestic and external security in an integrated way that points to a policy framework for security in the developing world and how these may be secured. At a macro level, the challenge is to focus on security that undeniably would be served by placing the individual at the core of the security equation in order to build peace. Freks and Goldewijk (2009: 58) observe that “it is most constructive to speak of a peace building approach moving from state-centric approach to human security starting with the individual security.”

It can be said that the peace building security approach can only be attained in an environment that nurtures basic human needs between the SS and HS relations. This approach to HS does not hinder security organisations such as the security sector from being involved in the basic human needs. The dominant question is not whether the security sector should be involved in politics, economy, health, and social issues, but rather, in what form. For instance, what is wrong if the security sector assists the nation in food production at a time when people need food?

Food security should be viewed as the production, availability and accessibility of adequate and safe food. Nutritional food security exists when all individuals, at all times, have access to adequate, safe food to meet their dietary need for an active and healthy lifestyle. Fertile land and water are fundamental resources for human well-being. However, these fundamental resources are increasingly abused and under a threat of depletion. This problem is compounded by the ever-multiplying population. It can be said that SS and HS relations should be guided, developed, and advanced through clear principles, practices and mechanisms within an endogenous legal framework based on human needs approach. The UNDP Report: Human Development (1994: 18) observes five aspects to human development that need to be recognised and practised as follows:

**Empowerment:** The expansion of the capabilities of men and women and increasing their ability to exercise selections, free of hunger, want and deprivation. It also increases their opportunity to participate in, or endorse, decision-making that affects their lives.

**Co-operation:** With a sense of belonging important for personal well-being and a sense of purpose and meaning, human development is concerned with the ways in which people work together and interact.

**Equity:** The expansion of capabilities and opportunities means more than income; it also means equity.

**Sustainability:** The need of future generations must be met without compromising the right of forthcoming generations to be free of poverty and deprivation.
Security: particularly the security of livelihood. People need to be free from chronic threats, such as malnutrition, infection, and repression from sudden harmful disruptions in their life.

In addition to the above, eradicating poverty, generating jobs, and supporting livelihoods, safeguarding and restoring the environment, and encouraging the progress of women are challenges that require deliberation and action in order to augment empowerment, cooperation, equity, sustainability and security. Therefore, SADC’s OPDS is focusing on politics, economics, diplomacy, gender equity, international relations, and collective security cooperation in order to maintain national and regional peace and security. Thus, as shown in Figure 2.2, complete human security can be defined through five basic elements, namely: the security sector, society, economics (education, health and agriculture), foreign relations (diplomacy), and leadership are the operational epicentre, which should effectively and efficiently combine the other four elements.

**Figure 2.2: The five elements of national power**

![Figure 2.2: The five elements of national power](image)

**Source:** Adapted from ICNSS Conference Israel: Galilee (2006: 4) June 15-26.

Leadership is the epicentre as politics is the decisive part in regulating interdependencies between societies, national and regional areas and in the broader international system. It is also important to note that security is relative, not absolute, and it is socially constructed. Literature review on SSR, SS, and HS relations reveals that SSR should essentially aims at the efficient, effective, and non-discriminatory provision of SS and HS relations is a point being missed by the drivers of SSR in Zimbabwe. The problem is much about the politicisation, internationalisation, and the prescriptive character of the concept of SSR to the population of Zimbabwe especially the security sector. From a revolutionary perspective the army is the people army, like the People Liberation Army (PLA) of China. Therefore, the goal of providing SS and HS relations is a challenge because; experiences of SSR in
Afghanistan triggered a debate on the advantages of providing human security rather than state security in the process of peace building (Security Sector Reform). The holistic understanding of SSR should be based on the role of SS on HS moral principles not removing people out of employment.

Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998: 8) posited that “societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions of development through traditional patterns of language, culture, religious, national identity and custom as practiced.” This suggestion is inclined towards an idealist or constructivist approach that should be achieved through the five pillars (elements) of national power which are the building blocks of SS and HS relations.

In Africa and Zimbabwe in particular the definition of SSR is profoundly a Western and European concept. The term SSR is new to Africans but the concept is not. It is similar to the regime change agenda. The war of liberation was about reforming a colonial system. It was constructive because it brought positive regime changes and the current usage of the term is destructive because it causes negative regime changes.

In the review of international security studies, the process of SSR in Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Afghanistan and Sudan, just to mention a few, is not yet complete. Indeed, there has been some normative progress through the enactment of new legislation in their SS and there has been more space for public participation up to a certain level in the parliament and government policy making process. However, security actors (military, police and intelligence) tend to be resistant and respond negatively towards SSR because it has been politicised, nationally, regionally, and internationalised as a Western ideology. Critical to the resurgence of the call for SSR in Zimbabwe is the need to understand why SSR has currently become important. Some of the questions that beg answers include: where were the SSR ‘entrepreneurs’ in the 1960s up till the 1990s when the reform of the SS went through the liberation straggle? Who is calling for this reform? Why are the calls for SSR being made now? What are the obstacles, challenges, and opportunities?

It is clear that SSR is propelled by the Western liberals; consequently, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces treat it with suspicion. The current calls for SSR are viewed as a threat against national integrity in that it is driven by external powers bent on influencing local politics as an external approach for Western gains. Genuine reforms could be achieved by
adopting SSR as the basis of SS and HS relations because legitimate SSR can be a transformative SS governing process. Therefore, the governing process of SSR in Zimbabwe should be in line with the Constitution, Defence Policy and subsequent Acts.

There is a caveat in the transformative integration of SSR, SS, and HS. Given the debates on HS, there must be a careful and sensitive application of an indigenous home grown SSR framework to ensure that the security forces do not end up performing unorthodox security functions. Donais (2009: 20) observe that “the issue of local ownership refers to the extent to which domestic actors control the design and the implementation of the political processes.” This should be based on local threats, analysis, and demands driven by the indigenous people as they are the local stakeholders and beneficiaries of the reform. If not, SSR becomes exogenous prescriptive in its approach, because little effort is made to understand the multifaceted political, social, and economic arguments that shape the relationships between civilians and the security sector.

The point is that the military personnel and, indeed, some academics in Zimbabwe treat the recent resurgence of SSR with suspicion. The nervousness and fears are not without justification. In Shona there is a proverb: Inyasho dzei tsimboro wekubvisa mwana wemvana dzihwa? (What goodwill is there in a widower cleaning the child of a widow’s mucus?). This implies that gesture, however good, can be treated with suspicion if it is extended, particularly by an erstwhile enemy. That is the fate of SSR in Zimbabwe; coming as it does through former colonizers, it is bound to meet with suspicion and resistance.

The problematic of SSR models is that they are externally imposed and do not respond to the needs of the acted upon. However, it is possible to construct a genealogy and set of characteristics of an African approach to SSR, based on the revolutionary concept developed by freedom fighters during the liberation of Zimbabwe. SSR in Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, among others, were achieved flawed apprehension. The politicisation, internationalisation, and dramatisations are the agents of misunderstanding concerning SSR in Africa. Zimbabwe is widely regarded, internationally, as an authoritarian state in desperate need of SSR. But the question is who these judges are? The answer is the Western liberal actors. Furley and May (2006: 228) observe that,

Guinea-Bissau went through a militarised liberation struggle and it was difficult to practice SSR, given the status and powerful positions of the
armed forces and the relationship between military and political power brokers and the citizens.

Little was achieved in Guinea-Bissau because of the prescriptive nature of SSR. The argument is that any theory and prescription that emerge from a particular place, history, culture and worldview, its application or imposition outside the locale of its relevance is like fitting a square peg into a round hole; the result is disfigurement of either the hole or the peg. SSR will continuously fail because the process is prescriptive, dominated and controlled by powerful external actors who happen to be promoting the re-colonisation of Zimbabwe and her resources.

2.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

The literature review on SSR, HS, and SS provides acknowledgement that the field of security studies is interdisciplinary, closely relates to history, psychology, philosophy, economics, and sociology, among others. Some leading theories in international security and traditional studies of SS shifted their focus in the current world order to embrace the security of the individual person, subsequently known as human security. However, literature still indicates that dominant theories are realism, idealism and constructivism which are Western in nature. Therefore, a possible African theory of *Ubuntu* can be used to navigate SSR, SS and HS relations as grounded, located and practiced by Zimbabweans.

3.4.11 Realism

According to Plano and Olton (1979: 18), “realists are power-centred, but idealists reject the power-centred approach and advocate a people-centred approach.” The cutting-edge is that in realism, power is in the control of man and is through the state security organs from a liberal viewpoint. Wendt (1999:194) argues that “realism is one such theory which builds on a materialist and individual ontology.” Therefore, realism is the representation of a coherent and autonomous reality that uses everyday perceptions and experiences as its springboard for survival through authority and dominance.

Realism from a traditional sense uses the anarchic muscle of authority and power for survival in the current world order. In reality, people surrender power to the state for their security. The concern is how that power is used by the state for the benefit of that society. Realists believe that there are no collective principles used by all states to guide their actions. Therefore, realists focus on the self-interest of the nation state rather than the moral laws.
Thus realism is the means and idealism is the goal; realism knocks you and idealism calms you.

Snyder (2002: 150) observes that “all realists stress the centrality of military threat and the use of force.” Therefore, the referent object of security is the state; states act as strategic, self-interested units which seek to ensure own security also. The problem is how power and authority are used for the elite’s own interests rather than for the people’s interests. It is also very necessary to have a clear understanding as to what exactly interests are, and whether these interests ever conflict with other interests within and outside the state.

How much do states spend on military expenditure compared to other national interests such as food, health and shelter? Which is the ideal approach? Realists ‘entrepreneurs’ are externally driven and sponsored by external state-centric governments: their SSR is embedded in the foreign policy of those governments. As a result, realism helps the researcher understand the nature of SSR from both the sponsor and the recipient’s point of view.

3.4.12 Idealism

Zacarias (1999: 225) postulated that “the idealist school of thought derives its principles from the human security concept advocating a people-centred approach to security and not the state.” The most important critique to idealism is that it ignores the role of power. Lemanski (2012: 63) observes that “human security implies a locally centred approach on human needs and experiences.” However, human security research has largely been policy based, with a tendency towards a top down response which is realism.

In this case, the bottom-up approach is based on idealism to HS in identifying and meeting the basic human needs as a collective entity which is people centred. Consequently, the individual, local, and bottom up evaluations and approaches have been overlooked in analyses and in practice. The idealists emphasise a people-centred approach by placing the individual at the centre of the HS research. From the Western perspective, realism is the means of achieving an objective, and idealism is the goal. Is this combination ideal for the SSR process in Africa, or is it prescriptive in nature? A further question is how this theory can be helpful in relation to SS and HS relations. Are idealist’s elements suitable to the implementation of SSR in an African context? As it stands, the people centred conception can be associated with Ubuntu.
3.4.13 Ubuntu

With reference to *Ubuntu* comprehension, Fourie (2007: 3) observed that, 

*Ubuntu* is a normative theory which should be seen in the context of the African Renaissance as part of an intellectual quest to rediscover and re-establish idealised values of traditional African cultures, communities and to apply it to contemporary phenomena of security studies.

Similarly, Nyaumwe and Mkabela (2007: 152) stated that “*Ubuntu* is a moral philosophy of traditional African societies that bound together African community.” Nyaumwe and Mkabela (2007: 158) observes that, in security terms, the values initially perceived as modernisation later turned to be a weapon that promoted the perpetration of individualism, greed and erosion of some traditional African cultural and values leading to moral decadence in some citizens.

Mangalismo (2001: 1) advanced that “African people share not merely a common history but a common destiny through collective self-reliance.” People should talk to each other not about each other. For that reason, the concept of *Ubuntu* implies a family unity, values, and socialisation as the foundation of personhood. The focus is on interdependence, co-existence, inclusiveness, reconciliation, shared values and collective security. Therefore, SSR, SS, and HS issues should be shared and experienced through a collective approach.

The essence of *Ubuntu* is transformative and therapeutic because it focuses on changing the attitude and the mind-set of viewing Africans as subjects and not as objects. Therefore, in this context, *Ubuntu* represents cultural, historical, spiritual and shared values that are the product of African civilisation and the struggle against slavery, racism, colonialism and neo-colonialism driving deep down to the fundamental block of social value systems.

*Ubuntu* could be summarised as an interconnected human approach to social value systems. The significance is that one cannot keep a man down on the ground without getting down on the ground with him and we cannot treat other people like animals without becoming animals ourselves. This theory can assist in formulating an African perspective on SSR, HS, and SS relations because it is the means as well as the goal.

However, the limitations of the African Ubuntu philosophy are that it is based on oral practice. Unlike the Western and Eastern ideologies, which are well documented, African Ubuntu philosophy does not have an ancient written tradition, which makes it very difficult to exercise the fully. Lately, a range of studies has been conducted in order to help people to
understand and appreciate the Ubuntu philosophy. Although the Ubuntu philosophy is associated with encouraging attributes, it is not well disseminated to people within African societies. The African Ubuntu philosophy is challenged by the proliferation of foreign ideologies, methodologies and concepts.

3.4.14 Constructivism

The basic tenet of constructivism perspective, according to Morgan (2005: 84) is that,

security is dependent on the prior conceptions of local people, as well as the powerful, of the public experience. They must all together construct their collective meaning of security which they are confident will enhance security at personal, group, communal, national and at international level.

This conception of constructivism is based on how different groups comprehend their identities and interests and how others perceive these constructs. These are also known as physiological requirements; not very different from the ones listed as basic human needs. Wendt (1992: 396) stated that “the fundamental principle of constructivism theory is that people act towards objects including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that the objects have for them.” Therefore, if SSR, SS, and HS relation do not have an intrinsic meaning for its adoption then the whole process is meaningless.

This current study views constructivism as a theory that emphasises: the role of ideologies, identities, persuasion, values, ethos and national networks as most relevant in understanding security studies. This can be fully used in the human basic needs approach. In this conception of constructivism, there is an element of Ubuntu. Wendt (1999: 16) observes that, constructivism is based on two primary tenets which are the structures of human association determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces; and the identities and interests of purposive actors that are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.

Constructivism represents the main difference between realism and idealism and appears not to uphold the idea that relations are determined primarily by nature. Constructivism, picture relations as constructed by human beings and it can easily be said that constructivism occupies the middle ground between realism and idealism. The relevance of constructivism emerges more starkly if one imagines someone trying to argue in favour of instituting liberal policies into a nation whose culture and beliefs are not liberal. One cannot dictate to others in the name of liberalism and still be a consistent liberal. Adler (1997: 319) argues that, “constructivism occupies the middle ground between rationalist approaches (whether realist
or liberal) and interpretive approaches (mainly postmodernist, and poststructuralist), and creates new areas for theoretical and empirical investigation.”

Therefore, in this study, constructivism is regarded as an essential part of the theoretical framework especially in terms of the idea that relations are based upon social constructs and on shared values. To some extent, realism and constructivism are complementary because constructivism inserts socio-political intervention into institutions created by realism. However, the constructivist approach seems to encapsulate *Ubuntu* because the central issue is how different groups view their identities, interests, re-establish their values, and how others perceive these conditions. One may establish that constructivism argues for empowerment and protection through the people’s culture and identity, just as well as *Ubuntu*.

In this study, the focus is on the centrality of *leimotifs* or themes from each theory. The central theme of realism is power, competitive interests and material self-interests. Idealism bases its argument on ideas that are people-centred. Constructivism centres on socially constructed issues, ideology, culture and ethics. Therefore, the fundamental critical theoretical framework in this study is based on the themes of *Ubuntu* as the epicentre of the theoretical framework.

**2.10 THE CRITICAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The critical theoretical framework in this study is the *Ubuntu*, its tenets, principles and how they should be applied in the context of security sector reform, human security, and state security relations. Broodryk (2002: 1) posited that “*Ubuntu* is based on the primary values of intense humanness, caring, sharing, respect, compassion and associated values, ensuring a happy and quality community life in the spirit of family.”

This observation informed the development of the theoretical framework as a practical tool for the purposes of this study. In other words, how does *Ubuntu* manifest itself in application? Anything that may undermine, hurt, threaten, or destroy human beings is not accommodated and is frowned upon as it affects the very foundation of society just as much as the Western SSR driven agenda. *Ubuntu* represents a holistic and compassionate view. In this regard, a person with *Ubuntu* is friendly, hospitable, affectionate, generous, and eager to share. *Ubuntu* may be viewed as a vision guiding the pattern of life and behaviour. Therefore, *Ubuntu* is the means, and a set of desired goals.
Ubuntu is a value system comprising the backbone of many African societies and the fountain from which many actions and attitudes flow because it creates a familial atmosphere; a type of philosophical affinity and kinship amongst and between the indigenous people of Africa, and Zimbabwe, in particular. However, there is a common concurrence among writers on Ubuntu that it represents an alternative voice to the western perspective. In other words, we need each other because people are wired for interdependency. Focusing on SSR, HS, and SS relations, the Ubuntu practical application is based on valuing ourselves through our relationship in nation and consensus building, encouraging collective work, and the impact on organisational effectiveness and productivity as the basic elements. This is supported by Chinkanda (1994: 1) who observes that “the word Ubuntu defines a positive quality supposedly possessed by a person. It is an internal state of being or the very essence of being.”

According to Shutte (1993: 16),

Ubuntu is a web of reciprocal relationships in which subject and object become indistinguishable, and in which the Descartes aphorism ‘I think, therefore I am ‘is substituted for ‘I participate, therefore I am.’ It is a concept that has particular resonance with those concerned about building a civil society, enhancing community relations and promoting social cohesion.

In this context the role of Ubuntu in community development is about the ‘we’ and our ability to accomplish things that we can only do with others. It is about building “a network of delicate relationships of interdependence.” These are networks that are marked by the ‘affirmation and acceptance’ of others.

In this case, was the war of liberation not about Ubuntu? Other studies into the working of Ubuntu pointed out the different cultural dimensions, and the crucial role of appropriate leadership styles in determining the success of community initiatives and successful Ubuntu communities, dependent on sensitive and receptive leaders. One cannot but recognise that the values and attributes inherent in Ubuntu can play a valuable role in helping individuals in community development and nation-building initiatives through understanding SS and HS relations. Mbigi (1997: 32) refers to Ubuntu as “the collective finger’s theory that is best explained by the African proverb ‘a thumb, although it is strong, cannot kill aphids on its own’. It needs the collective help and co-operation of the other fingers on the hand.”

The lesson of this saying is that the fingers are individuals who need to work together to achieve a collective goal. As a result, the fingers represent core values that are
interdependent and synergistic and need to come together to build and maintain the collective effort or culture. Therefore, *Ubuntu* is also about building a collective understanding through the sharing of ideas between community members. This builds on the perception that ideas are not property owned by individuals but are, instead, a common resource that should be shared willingly.

SSR (the thesis) alone cannot develop relations without HS and SS (antithesis) it also need the synthesis (*Ubuntu*). As a result, *Ubuntu* is helpful because of the way it emphasises reciprocal relationships that people contribute more to the common good if they are valued, and that achievement of goals is more likely when consensus is achieved thereby creating another thesis. Mangalismo (2001: 42) identified some practical guidelines for consideration when implementing *Ubuntu*:

- treat others with dignity and respect (this is a central element of *Ubuntu* and its role in creating the appropriate environment); be willing to negotiate in good faith (taking time to listen when negotiating because listening is essential in the process of acknowledgement, which in turn can then lead to real trust and co-operation); provide opportunities for self-expression (honour achievements, affirm values etc.); understand the beliefs and practices (different cultural perspectives, understand different belief systems, also be careful not to suppress a specific culture in favour of the dominant culture); honour seniority—especially in leadership choices (age, experience, etc.); promote equity (ensure that recruitment decisions are clear and fair); and be flexible and acknowledge the organic nature of *Ubuntu*, which in itself is a balanced blend of different approaches and ideas.

The Times of Zambia (29 October 2007) observed that “the spirit of *Ubuntu* is so strong that there is no such thing as a self-made man in Africa for everyone who has ascended to great heights has done so with the help of others in the community.” SSR, HS, and SS should assist in promoting the elements inherent in *Ubuntu* as the core values and activities of the relations. It is therefore both an asset and a philosophy that lies at the heart of this theoretical framework.

The tenets of *Ubuntu* essential to this current study are dignity and respect, flexibility and accommodation, equity, reconciliation, honour, participative interaction, reciprocal relationships, compassion and care. The focus is on affirmation and acceptance, enhancing community relations and promoting social cohesion. This includes the collective work of nation-building, consensus building and their impact on effectiveness and productivity, encouragement of interdependency among others through family spirit. The individual behaviour is the means, and community relation is the goal.
The theoretical term of *Ubuntu* exemplifies a particular worldview, or ethos, a viewpoint that demands critical community relations, principles, and ideals. This appears to have a collective appeal and resonates with peoples of all cultures at a very deep level. However, it is also clear that *Ubuntu* is not a behaviour that can be ascribed nor imposed. It involves a set of values that have to be cultivated and accepted through a gradually evolving process. *Ubuntu is evidently a living philosophy.*

It has not been merely imported from the West like realism and, idealism among others in academic explanations and strategic reviews; but is an endogenous African theoretical approach which can be applied to SSR, HS, and SS relations. Thus, promoting the values inherent in *Ubuntu* should be one of the core activities of the ZDF in this study. It is, therefore, both an asset and a philosophy that must be established at the heart of the ZDF’s effort in building security sector systems because ‘*a person is a person through other person.*’

2.11 THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This philosophical theoretical framework approach to support the *Ubuntu* philosophy is the Hegelian and Marxian dialectical process. Hally (2012: 171) stated that,

> the Hegelian dialectic is an interpretive method, originally used to relate specific entities or events to the absolute idea, in which an acceptable proposition (thesis) is necessarily opposed by its apparent contradiction (antithesis), and both reconciled on a higher level of truth by a third proposition (synthesis).

Marx used Hegelian dialectics in a modified form. With Marx, Hegel dialectics is a process on its head. Therefore, Marx’s modification was to turn it ‘right’ side up. It is necessary to note that unlike Hegel, Marx believed the dialectical process will come to an end ‘*end of history*’ and is revolutionary. As with Hegel, the dialectics is a process from thesis to antithesis and as soon as the synthesis appears, it will turn into a new thesis, producing its own antithesis; thus it is evolutionary in nature. As a result, this Hegelian approach is the style of the philosophical theoretical framework in this study of reasoning for solving contradiction as a fundamental moving principle of society. It is a method of arriving at the truth through analytical arguments, as a system of a thought process.
2.12 CONCLUSION

The literature review revealed that, despite laudable intentions and notwithstanding some of the grounding noble normative principles, SSR is exclusively Western and Eurocentric in origin. This should not disqualify SSR, at a philosophical level, as introduced into the political discourses of Africa. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces were largely constituted from indigenous guerrilla armies. However, SSR SS and HS relations, culture, traditions, and corporate identity have remained strongly influenced by the discourses and ideological themes of the West through a realist theoretical framework, in particular. Practically, this requires a series of strategies to determine how SSR can be internalised through Ubuntu within the political and institutional discourses as Zimbabweans.

Traditional security actors (military, police and intelligence) tend to be resistant and respond negatively toward something that is externally and internally driven by Eurocentric conceptions. The literature reveals that the real problem is ideological and conceptual; that is to say whose conception of SSR, SS, and HS is being used in political discourse in Zimbabwe? This fundamental malady dodges the whole debate about SSR in Africa in general and in Zimbabwe, in particular. Theoretically, as much as SSR may be relevant to Africa, the literature review revealed that the concepts are not of African origin but of those who invented them and continue to promote them.

The literature review indicated that there is an African theory which can explain SSR which is Ubuntu; although there is no articulated position that explains SSR. It is emphasised that the concept of SSR is not new to Africa. The SSR and Ubuntu existed in pre and after-independence through nationalism, the armed struggles against slavery and colonialism. The question of centrality and ownership of concepts, their content and ranking, is the major challenge. What is lacking is the African interpretation of SSR as a community-based approach through Ubuntu. Contemporary SSR is shaped according to Western design and, as a result, there is real need to indigenise it and explain it in our own Zimbabwean philosophy.

This entails dispelling the polarisation that has characterised SSR in Zimbabwe that solicited large scale mistruts and suspicion instead of mutual trust among members of the same family - the Zimbabwean family. The theoretical framework used in this study applied Ubuntu as the theoretical framework epicentre with an amalgamation of some tenets of realism, idealism and constructivism where necessary. These theories at times do not exist apart from each other because they are, indeed the creation and expression of men and
women in the contemporary world order. Leading theories are numerous in international security studies of state security that has shifted in the current world order to embrace the security of the individual based on the concept of SS and HS relations. Therefore, *Ubuntu* and its tenets are used as the critical theoretical framework for studying SSR, SS and HS relations. This *Ubuntu* philosophy is cutting the umbilical cord from Western theoretical frameworks solving contradiction as a fundamental moving principle of the society through cooperation.
CHAPTER THREE

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) PROCESS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND CRITICAL RESPONSES IN ZIMBABWE

Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery.

Ernesto and Davies (1997: 52)

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines SSR, SS and HS consciousness in pre-independence as the foundation to the study, and post-independent Zimbabwe as the main thesis by the freedom fighters as social reformers; it explores the critical responses through an analysis of the theoretical framework use of Ubuntu. Critical and major thematic areas are highlighted to amplify SSR as a concept in the ZDF. Zimbabwe had its humble origin in the 1960s by nationalists and in the 1970s through school-age youths, driven by an in-born yearning for the emancipation and genuine freedom of their communities and the nation as a collective approach in dislodging the colonial system of social and security reformers. These school-age youths used the ‘finger theory’, a collective help and co-operation of each other. The pre-independence revolutionary struggle is the genesis of SSR through the Chinese-Mao-Model of a revolutionary system, living through ‘struggles-within-the-struggle’ as a colonial reform process by the freedom fighters as social reformers.

This chapter cannot exhaust all reform activities but is focussing on pre-independence critical issues and post-independence critical outstanding activities (1980-2008) and the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) 1 (2013) is scrutinised to qualify the role of the ZDF in the legal frameworks. Critical observations and opinions are proffered on the consciousness and responses because the liberation struggle was a consciousness of reforming the colonial security system. The post–independence integration of ZANLA, ZIPRA and RSF was an SSR process through the reconciliation policy - operational dissident flash among others is examined. Some elements of realism, idealism and constructivism used were appropriate, because most youths perceived the national liberation struggle as a consciousness in which a socio-economic whole rejected the governance process. In other words, the national liberation of a people is the regaining of the historical personality of the
mind, thought and soul as the first level of consciousness. It was a return to the historical foundation through the destruction of the imperialist domination in dislodging the colonial system. The philosophy, therefore, was to regain Zimbabwean historical personality by reforming the colonial system through the barrel of a gun as the genesis of SSR SS and HS relations.

3.2 THE GENESIS OF SSR IN ZIMBABWE

The Rhodesian security forces (RSF) were not promoting the majority's aspirations, but the white minority regime vision, values and interests instead. As a result, the need for an *Ubuntu* approach in dislodging the colonial system was essential. This was through the barrel of a gun, a constructive positive regime change agenda. The Rhodesian security system was directly challenged by ZNLA forces on the 28 April 1966 when the renowned Battle of Chinhoyi was fought. This signalled the beginning of an endogenous collective SSR of the colonial security sector using the *Ubuntu* philosophy. This concept from an *Ubuntu* philosophy remains the genesis of the SSR process in dislodging the colonialist regime system, as a practical response.

ZAPU’s military wing, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) fighters in 1965 had formed a coalition with the African National Congress (ANC) *Umkhonto we Siswe* guerrillas of South Africa in offering passage services through Rhodesia *en route* to a revolutionary fight in South Africa. Elis and Sechaba (1992: 49) argue that “it was their collective armed forces that had an encounter with combined RSF and Apartheid defence forces in 1967.” As with the 1966 Chinhoyi encounter, the RSF and Apartheid defence forces were victors. A platoon warrant officer by the name Herod, of the Rhodesian African Rifles, on 18th March, 1968 observed that “the RAR used to laugh at your soldiers. To us they looked like boys. But they have showed us how to fight. They have the faces of boys, but they fight like lions.” [http://farm5.staticflickr.com. Accessed 13 March, 2013].

This brought to the fore South Africa's military involvement in Rhodesia throughout the liberation war. This was a heavy challenge and a big lesson for the liberation fighters. These costly experiences enlightened and trained the liberation freedom fighters to advance the concept of winning the hearts and minds of the peasants in revolutionary political warfare, circumventing conventional warfare. This critical military and political response had a collective appeal and resonated with people at a very deep level. This conceptualisation generated a people's war in promoting social cohesion and consensus building. These are the
origins of an indigenous SSR process, a constructive positive regime change agenda for nation building through encouraging collective effort. Based on the awareness of a revolutionary system, philosophy and national challenges, this organisation was the genesis of SSR as a concept in Zimbabwe.

3.4.15 3.2.1 The revolutionary system

The awareness of the masses about the revolutionary system completely raised the value of the willpower to support the armed freedom fighters. The philosophy was to distinguish friend from foe. This revolutionary philosophy facilitated the liberation armed forces to organise the people and prevail. The consciousness of the revolutionary system had to be resolutely secured. Therefore, the revolutionary system of the political education comprised four components, i.e. national challenges, determination to fight, the people's war and the military philosophy.

Mhanda (2011: 20) notes that “the purpose of the primary module was to expose and develop national grievances; to discover the fundamental predicaments in Zimbabwe; and to comprehend its distinctiveness.” The motivation was to increase the political consciousness of the revolutionary freedom fighters and the people, to full realisation of the purpose of the training in understanding the national grievances in order to fight the enemy. This consciousness was basically a participative constructive interaction through consensus building with compassion and care as part of Ubuntu beliefs. As a result, in revolutionary guerrilla warfare, the ‘combat field’ is the political faithfulness of the masses.

3.4.16 3.2.2 The national challenges

It was essential for all troops to offer an account of their individual experience that filled them with anger, bitterness and determination to join the ranks of the liberation struggle. Mhanda (2011: 20) states that,

this crammed the fighters with nausea and the enthusiasm to engage in the struggle which gave birth to the comprehension of the requirement for a revolution to remove the enemy and establish a new order that would transform the systems through serving people's interests.

This was an Ubuntu collective community security approach, in that there is no such entity as a self-made man in Africa. Assistance by others in a community is necessary for individuals to reach great heights with the determination to fight.
3.4.17 3.2.3 The determination to fight

Once the trainees were convinced that the system oppressing them could not be defeated through peaceful means, they had to become the enemy of the RSF. Mhanda (2011: 20) states that "the liberation fighters had to formulate a different fighting strategy, a force with a revolutionary focus." Mhanda further noted that it involves engaging in building the people's armed forces to be self-sufficient in provisions of meeting its necessities and still remain a fighting force. This amplified the collective help and co-operation of each other i.e. ‘finger theory’ as a web of reciprocal delicate relationships of interdependence. It was necessary because the minority regime in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, had unleashed indiscriminate violence against the black civilian population. Therefore, the people’s war was the only way out.

3.4.18 3.2.4 The People's war

The combatants had to understand how to confront the enemy once the revolutionary armed forces had grasped that the enemy bullying them was evil and the need for a protracted war was justified. Every recruit had to be psychologically organised to contest in a long war that would unavoidably entail enormous sacrifice on the part of the fighters and the people. The freedom fighters were in two groups, the armed freedom fighters (fish) who were very few, and the unarmed freedom fighters, the vast majority of people who provided logistical intelligence and the medium (water) in which the armed freedom fighters survived. This approach is a Chinese Model which was based on Mao's revolutionary military philosophy.

3.4.19 3.2.5 The military philosophy

Guerrilla warfare in pre-independent Zimbabwe was based on the concept of reforming a highly equipped Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF), emphasising shock, strike and thrashing the enemy where it hurt most, such as attacking strategic enemy infrastructures, e.g. fuel storages. Therefore, the armed revolutionary fighters and the unarmed revolutionary fighters were the same. The armed military fighters mobilised the people through political commissars who had the responsibility for maintaining the confidence and morale of the fighters, as well as the political direction of the masses and those who were positioned at every level of the political organised structures of the party; ZANU-PF. Political commissars comprised educated men and women who had received basic military training before specialising in a political direction. They raised the political aware-ness and consciousness of the fighters and the people as a whole.
For the advancement of the political revolutionary military philosophies and concepts, Martin and Johnson (2012: 73) observe that “the first shots of the decisive phase of the war were fired on Altena Farm in the Centenary, Mt Darwin area in the northern border of Zimbabwe on 21 December 1972.” This was the first shot signifying the revolutionary reform of the colonial system providing an example to the white farmers that the armed freedom fighters in reforming the colonial system had arrived. This was carried out under the command of the revolutionary council system.

3.3 THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SYSTEMS

The High Command (HC) was the ZANLA military engine in the course of the Second Chimurenga in Zimbabwe 1966-1979 with the responsibility to plan, conduct and organise the operations of the liberation struggle. The high command (HC) was represented in the Dare Re-Chimurenga (War Council) by the leader of the HC, i.e. the secretary of defence or chief of defence. A political commissar was introduced into the HC to increase politicisation and recruitment. The Dare Re-Chimurenga and the HC were symbiotic, although the military wing was subordinate. Therefore, Dare Re-Chimurenga had control and influence over the HC. However, the Nhari rebellion, Chitepo’s assassination, Mgagao Declaration, ZIPA and the ‘Vashandi’ which broke out in 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977 respectively were the episodes of struggles-within-the-struggle, a call for control, authority and influence. These were contradictions which were reforms in a struggle. These episodes could be considered as SSR because they were contradictions and as indicators of a correct process. One can conclude that they were simply tactical manoeuvrings by two sides (Rhodesia and Zimbabwe) in a war situation, but as contradictions for an acceptable correct process. Therefore struggles-within-the struggle was a reform process.

3.4 STRUGGLES-WITHIN-THE STRUGGLE

Resentment and antagonism branded the liberation struggle and currently it seems as if the liberation struggle experiences are confined to a ‘black box’. This has been linked to a phenomenon according to Sithole’s (1999) monograph “Zimbabwe: Struggles-within-the-Struggle” and Kriger’s (1988) article “Zimbabwian war of liberation: struggles within the struggle.” In this study this phenomenon assumes that, during the liberation struggle, there were reforms which were indigenous and exogenous, where blows and scuffles, power struggles, tribal discriminations and executions were a way of life as contradictions within a reform process. Struggles-within-the-struggle was a phenomenon of unrest that bedevilled
different nationalist political parties struggling for independence. It is a phenomenon mainly about ZANU and ZAPU and for the short-lived episodes of the Front Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) 1971-1974 and African National Council (ANC) 1971-1979, all fighting a common enemy.

Therefore, reforms through conflicts are only an indicator of a correct process. This was part of the struggles-within-the struggle, where conflicts and animosity within the struggle was a way of life which also devoured its own children. Infiltrations by the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) and the Central Intelligent Organisation (CIO) of the colonial regime also played a major role. On numerous occasions the liberation movements struggled against each other. At some stages participants disagreed and fought among themselves, i.e. in the ZANLA forces, the Nhari rebellion was the first major conflicting episode.

3.4.20 The Nhari rebellion 1974-1975

On the Nhari rebellion, Martin and Johnson (2012: 159) observe that a junior SB man met clandestinely with two senior ZANLA commanders, Thomas Nhari and Dakarai Badza, on 21 September 1974 and 9-10 November 1974 near Mukumbura just over the border with Mozambique." This coincidence with the eruption of the Nhari rebellion November 1974 to January 1975 was no coincident as the major episode of testing the efficiency of the Dare Re-Chimurenga (War Council) disciplinary committee. In this case, it is suggested or envisaged that Dare Re-Chimurenga was subordinated by the High Command which took control of the rebellion through a successful military operation. This internal rebel reform process at Chifombo in Zambia was against the leadership of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Mazarire (2011: 578) observes that,

Nhari and Badza contended that the High Command and the Dare Re-Chimurenga (War Council) was abandoning guerrillas therefore, they saw the requirement to present their own position in an insubordinate or rebellious method. The allegation was that senior ZANU members were good in traveling at the expense of the combatants.

The rebellion can be viewed as struggles within a struggle between individuals in power and the fighting cadres. They captured ZANU and ZANLA leaders at Chifombo Training Camp in Zambia. In this case the Nhari and Badza rebellion lacked the honour of seniority—especially in leadership and experience and willing to negotiate in good faith.

The disciplined armed freedom fighters who thought treating others with dignity and respect is part of Ubuntu philosophy managed to control the rebellion. Nhari and Badza surrendered and
punishment was meted out on all those who participated and conspired with these two. Sithole (1999: 77) indicates that “real and suspected participants in the rebellion were rounded up to face retributive justice through sustained kidnapping, mass trials and execution the ZANU Dare set up a committee of enquiry into the Nhari rebellion. Although the committee sat and carried out several interviews it never concluded its proceedings.” The failure to conclude proceedings and report on the Nhari rebellion enquiry was the assassination of Chitepo.

3.4.21 The Herbert Chitepo demise 1975

The death of Chitepo was possibly a manifestation by the Rhodesian CIO to cause confusion. According to APG (2015: 70), “Chitepo was certainly killed by imperialists using their agents who may have been white or black.” To support this assertion, Sithole (1999: 78) observes that "in the midst of the reprisal against the Nhari (his real name [was] Raphel Chinyanganya) group and its associates, Herbert Chitepo was killed in a bomb blast on March 18, 1975." The killing of Chitepo and the detention of the Dare re-Chimurenga (War Council) thereafter subsequently disrupted the progress of the struggle because it created confusion and uncertainty among the fighters.

The Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Chitepo Commissioned by the Zambian Government (1976: 5) states that "the crisis later deteriorated into a civilian-military crisis.” According to the Report (1976: 36), "the Zambian government also arrested members of Dare and High Command. Those arrested were Josiah Tongogara, Kumbirai Kangai, Kudzai Mudzi and Henry Hamadziripi, among others as they were labelled suspects in the report. According to Moorcraft and McLaughlin (2008: 41) “the blame was placed upon ZANLA and a number of leaders, including the unfortunate Tongogara, were tortured and imprisoned in Zambia. The war effort was forced into low gear for a year.”

The Dare Re-Chimurenga was brought to trial in Lusaka for the alleged murder of Chitepo. They were acquitted and released in time to attend the Geneva Conference (1976) when ZANU threatened not to attend the Geneva Conference without them. After the conference those released, among them Josiah Tongogara, Kumbirai Kangai, Kudzai Mudzi and Henry Hamadziripi and others, did not return to Zambia and relocated to Mozambique to set up a revolutionary launching base for the armed struggle. The objective of the Chitepo assassination was to halt the revolutionary war. The Nhari rebellion and Chitepo
assassination was part of the same process initiated by Rhodesian CIO. Much to the detriment of the war, the arrest stopped the war for over a year which effectively prolonged Smith’s hold on power. According to Martin and Johnson (2012: 159),

a senior member of the Rhodesian Special Branch later confirmed that the entire sequence of events from the “Nhari rebellion” to the death of Chitepo was interrelated, but, he said, “we had a great deal of luck”. The motivation was intelligence and to “strike a blow at the heart of the matter; if there was friction in the Central Committee we could turn it to our advantage.

Analysis from these episodes indicates that the Rhodesian CIO was the master mind of the Nhari rebellion and Chitepo assignation. Martin and Johnson (1985: 105) in an interview with other Rhodesian CIO officers Chuck Hind was the officer behind the Chitepo assassination. According to Martin and Johnson (1985: 40), “Chitepo was seen as the ‘brains’ behind the military offensive, the ‘brains’ behind the political line, and the ‘brains running ZANU. The major miscalculation was that without him the war would stop.”

It is frequently said ‘a fall in a pit is a gain in a wit’ meaning that if you think about Nhari rebellion and Chitepo assassination something good happened on the side of the Rhodesians drawing back the war into a low gear and something bad happened on the side of ZANU, killings brothers and assassination of leaders. Therefore ZANU learnt a lesson and a lesson learnt reforms your behaviour to a higher synthesis so is a gain in a wit. Therefore, contradictions are a manifestation of a ‘correct process’.

3.4.22 Mgagao Declaration, October 1975

The consultation with the leaders in Mpima prison in Zambia informed the Mgagao Declaration. Martin and Johnson (2012: 197-198) observe that,

On 11 September 1975 Tongogara’s wife, Kumbirai, accompanied four of the young commanders, Sadza, Nyikadzinasho and Parker Chipoera visited Mpima prison, where they pretended to be relatives. The commanders Mpima prison had prepared a document on the necessity of a united front in the Zimbabwe struggle. The document containing the leaders ides on unity was handed to the young commanders. Unknown to the young ZANLA commanders, their leaders at Mpima prison had already had meetings at the prison with Jason Moyo to discuss military unity.

Definitely ZANU and ZAPU needed a display of military unity if they were to press forward politically in their struggle. According to (AGP: 69),

… we held discussions in prison with the late Jason Moyo, then leader of the external wing of ZAPU. We sponsored and approved the formation of the
joint Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), for the purpose of continuing the armed struggle.

During the same period (1975), the freedom fighters (ZANLA officers and soldiers) registered their concerns in the Mgagao Declaration in December 31, 1975 which was sent to the Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee (OAULC). The Mgagao Declaration October 1975, 4 (h) specified that,

in our opinion the three; Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and James Chikerema are incapable of leading the ANC. An Executive Member who has been outstanding is Robert Mugabe. He has demonstrated this by defying the rigors of guerrilla life in the jungles of Mozambique. Since we respect him most, in all our dealings with the ANC leadership, he is the only person who can act as the middle man. We will not accept any direct discussions with any of the leading members of the ANC we have described above. We can only talk through Mugabe to them.

Mugabe’s springboard into ZANU leadership was through what became known as the Mgagao Declaration written by young military officers and soldiers at the main ZANLA training camp of Mgagao in Tanzania at the height of the liberation struggle in 1975. The Mgagao Declaration formed the basis for the dismissal of Rev Ndabaningi Sithole and, correspondingly the basis for the promotion of Robert Mugabe as the leader of ZANU at its Congress in Chimoio, Mozambique in 31 August 1977. This was a crucial decision by the military as result of the Mgagao Declaration. This was a reform by the ZANLA as a result of contradictions in a manifestation of a correct process.

3.4.23 The Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) 1976-1977

The leaders in Mpima prison, especially Tongara and J. Z. Moyo, created a new liberation force known as the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA). This was an amalgamation of ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. ZIPA was formed due to the appreciation of the mood of FLS leaders and their need to resume the war. Nyerere and Machel, the presidents of Tanzania and Mozambique respectively, were very concerned about ZANU and ZAPU disunion, each with its own army, and they took the initiative to unite ZANLA and ZIPRA into a united army. Chung (2007:145) observes “that it appeared to Nyerere and Machel that it was the political leaders who continually caused the division that beset the Zimbabwean liberation movement, whereas the young army commanders were more focused on attaining the objectives of the liberation war.” Chung is mistaken; the young commanders were focusing on personal interests and are proved by the failure of ZIPA (This will be discussed later).
According to Martin and Johnson (2012: 221), “ZIPA had nine ZANLA and nine ZIPRA leaders forming the Joint High Command.” In this case, the formation of ZIPA rescued the Zimbabwe liberation struggle from the chaotic situation and resumed the armed struggle, intensified the armed struggle in establishing a just and popular socio-political order serving the interest of the people as an SSR process. The AGP (2015: 69) observes that, “we have put behind us any possibilities of a major military conflict between ZANLA and ZIPRA, although there may be mischievous and self-seeking individuals who may try to incite one army against the other.”

According to Chung (2007: 147),

the unification of the two separate armies into ZIPA provided the opportunity to try to amalgamate the two liberation movements in two camps in Tanzania, in Morogoro and Mgagao. This well-meaning gesture by the Tanzanian authorities ended in the tragic massacre of ZIPRA guerrillas by ZANLA guerrillas at both locations. Tensions were high and ended in violence. A number of ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas, were killed.

The characterisation by Chung of the conflict in the Tanzania as a massacre is oversimplified. It was a conflict between two trained groups who had access to arms, not the killing of one by the other.

According to Martin and Johnson (2012:245), “Nyerere said the frontline States had decided to give all their political, military and diplomatic support to ZIPA, and he added that Mugabe and Nkomo should meet to thrash out the problems in ZIPA.” However, with all these efforts According to Martin and Johnson (2012: 258),

Machingura, ZIPA Deputy Political Commissar and a member of the ZANLA High Command, said that the transformation of ZIPA into a political movement was an investable process … ZIPA is a unique and revolution into a political movement … we have to establish a formal political structure in order to give better political direction to the armed body that is now fighting inside Zimbabwe. And moves to do this are already well underway, moves to transform this organisation into a revolutionary vanguard for the people’s struggle.

As a result the members of the ZANLA High Command released from detention in Zambia were deprived of entrance to the camps in Mozambique by the ZIPA commanders. This simmering ZIPA crisis erupted in Mozambique with the intention of arresting ZANU leadership. This group from ZIPA known as the Vashandi was the demise of ZIPA. The challenge to Vashandi became clear when ZANU leaders were released from Zambia prison to attend the constitutional conference October 1976 in Geneva. The Vashandi was a name
given to the left wing radicals in ZANU during ZIPA. They were composed of young men and women inspired by the ideas of Marx and Lenin. They thought of participating in a revolution that would replace colonialism and the bourgeois capitalist form of government. Chung (2007: 148) states that “the formation of the Chitepo Academy in 1976 as the ideological think tank of the struggle brought about a decidedly left wing flavour to the liberation struggle.” The problem was that the young left wingers tried to transform their Marxist-Leninist ideal into a practical reality of a radical approach.

Chung (2007: 159) argues that,

Vashandi commander Wilfred Mhanda, like many other left-wing analysts, believed that the constitutional talks had been organised to sabotage the armed struggle just at a time when the Rhodesian forces were about to be defeated. The aim was to provide a neo-colonialist solution to Zimbabwe, through the installation of leaders who could easily compromise the welfare of the majority of Zimbabweans in a bid to promote their own political careers. Narrow-minded Mhanda made it clear that ZIPA owed no loyalty to traditional nationalist parties or leaders.

According to Chung (2007: 149-150),

it was clear that both the old external leadership of ZANU, known as the Dare, comprising Henry Hamadziripi, Mukudzei Mudzi, Rugare Gumbo and Kumbirai Kangai, as well as the old military high command led by Tongogara regarded the Vashandi as dissidents. Before the Dare arrest in March 1975, the political and military leaders of ZANU had been at loggerheads, but now they were temporarily united against their young critics. The Vashandi were openly called bandits because they refused to accept the political leadership of their elders and this would include a brutal suppression of the Vashandi group, who could suffer the same fate as the Nhari group.

It was this conceptual stubbornness and tactical strategic stiffness that caused the Vashandi downfall as they were dismissive of the old-style politicians who were not prepared to side with the Vashandi. All these contradictions lacked the Ubuntu philosophy on the side of Vashandi to honour seniority, especially in leadership choices that are flexible and acknowledging the organic nature of Ubuntu, which in itself is a balanced blend of cooperation by accepting that contradiction is a fundamental moving principle of the society.

AGP (2015: 69) indicates that,

ZIPA rose to the occasion and did an excellent job of re-organising the armed struggle and opening new areas, and launching of new offensive, but they forgot that they had commanders more senior and experienced than themselves and they lacked the political maturity to move to the next stage.
3.4.24 The Front Line States (FLS) relations

Mozambique provided a base for guerrilla operations; Zambia and Tanzania were the hot houses of political manoeuvring. Both ZANU and ZAPU and their military wings ‘grew’ to political and military maturity in Zambia and Tanzania. Each of these two countries had their preferences towards one of the main political parties in Zimbabwe. Hence, reforms during the liberation struggle were both indigenous and exogenous in nature. In this case, the struggle for independence was contained within the military and political relationship of ZANU and ZAPU who were continuously at the forefront.

Ian Smith, then Rhodesian Prime Minister, depended on his military strength until the regime caved in and submitted. The internal ZANU and ZAPU struggles were every now and then ideological. ZANU’s alliance with China, with the ideology that the decisive factor was the people against ZAPU’s alliance with Soviet Union, with the ideology that the decisive factor of the war is the weapon raised dissimilarities of both political and military methodologies. If this were to be the Zimbabwean politics that would form the country’s government, what better could be expected of the government, and how would it have reflected the present in those formative years? The OAU had errors also in defining “authentic” liberation movements as those supported by the Soviet Union. This generated conflict as in the case of Zimbabwe, the army most active on the ground in organising the population for the war effort, was ZANU supported by China and initially regarded as a “non-authentic”.

The impact of Chinese training as the entire methodology of the liberation struggle, the transition, the unification and the post-independence military until today are shaped by the philosophy working with the people, and the military as an important player in society, but always under political leadership “politics rules the gun, the gun does not rule politics”. The FLS played a major role in reforming the revolutionary fighters in achieving the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 that implemented the amalgamation of ZANLA, ZIPRA and RSF in creating what is now known as the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF).

3.5 THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCES (ZDF) FORMATION

The ceasefire following Lancaster house agreement brought in the creation of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) in 1980. The history of the ZDF mirrors the country’s military and political events emerging from ZANLA, ZIPRA and RSF militaries with politically diverse factions who were to be amalgamated into one formidable force. The history of the ZDF is
that veterans of the country’s liberation struggle helped shape the evolution of Zimbabwe’s security forces by shaking off the shackles of the repressive Rhodesian regime. The unification of the armed forces of ZANLA, ZIPRA and the Rhodesian security forces from 1980 was a major security sector reform process. This will be discussed in 3.6.4 on Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) 1980-1992 with the help of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT).

The ZDF navigated through a complicated route that saw the departure of the colonial military designers. In fact the RSF were defeated on the battlefield, although Sir Walter Walker, former North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Commander, in Moorcraft and McLaughlin (2008: 107) observed that “the Rhodesian army cannot be defeated in the field, either by terrorists or even a more sophisticated enemy. In my professional judgment, based on more than 20 years’ experience of counter-insurgency and guerrilla type operations, there is no doubt that Rhodesia now has the most professional and battle-worthy army in the world for this type of warfare.”

ZANLA and ZIPRA played a critical role in the liberation struggle against the colonial regime. The approach was to reform the colonial system that had favoured the minority white regime at the expense of the black majority Zimbabweans. It is true to say that, without the participation of the revolutionary political soldiers, Zimbabwe would have taken longer to gain her independence.

3.5.1 National Policy of Reconciliation

In an address to the nation, then Prime Minister Designate, Robert Mugabe, on the 4 March (1980: 3) presented the concept of national reconciliation when he said,

I urge you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity, and together as Zimbabweans, trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism, and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society…Let us deepen our sense of belonging and engender a common interest that knows no race, colour or creed. Let us truly become Zimbabweans with a single loyalty.

The discourse of national reconciliation signified an attitude of ethical openness, which was aimed at stimulating a frame of mind of all Zimbabweans in the interest of peaceful coexistence and national reconstruction; a principle philosophy of *Ubuntu*, based on the tenet of dignity and respect. General Peter Walls was appointed as Commander of the Joint High Command (JHC) and tasked to integrate the three forces and establish a national army.”
General Peter Walls commander of the RSF was appointed the Commander of the new national army; under him were Rex Nhongo ZANLA and Lookout Masuku ZIPRA as deputy commanders. Air Vice-Marshal Norman Walsh formerly from the Rhodesian Air force (RAF) was appointed to command (AFZ). Both former RSF officers were now being saluted by former ZANLA and ZIPRA officers and men as a reform process. This was a new dispensation of SSR, SS and HS relations within the *Ubuntu* philosophy of being open and available to others; affirming of others and togetherness was being developed. This was a new national identity with a commonality of interests. For that reason, national reconciliation provided a possible position of inventiveness and originality in race relations. The Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, 18 February (1997: col 3415) stated: “Reconciliation is extended by blacks and blacks only, as if we are apologising they [whites] are supposed to apologise to the blacks for what happened during the colonial era. They are the ones who should have responded positively when the policy of reconciliation was extended.”

This indicates that whites were not even near the *Ubuntu* philosophy of working together as one family in advancing human security tenets. Reconciliation is not apologising, it is a change of the mind-set, understanding and behaving like a normal human being. Conversely, the *Ubuntu* philosophy was advanced when the Herald (18 April 1980: 4) observes that,

> Zimbabweans should not be backward looking men of yesterday, regressive, and must strive to adapt ourselves, intellectually and spiritually, to the reality of our political change and to relate to each other as brothers bound to one another by a bond of national comradeship. The wrongs of the past must stand forgiven and forgotten.

The challenge in advancing the spirit of national reconciliation was that the RSF were in barracks, the liberation fighters were in Assembly Points (APs) and some remained in the bush for strategic reasons due to a culture of distrust and suspicion. Therefore, the process leading to the formation of ZDF was a difficult SSR process calling for discipline, patience and determination by all liberation movements and the colonial regime to dispel a culture of distrust and suspicion which had developed over the years of colonialism and the liberation struggle. The policy of national reconciliation was a manifestation of the *Ubuntu* philosophy amongst the liberation movements, the colonial regime and the majority of Zimbabweans. This was an SSR process for SS and HS relations.

### 3.5.2 Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)

The ZNA had a mammoth task of integrating three different armies. According to Nyambuya (1996: 1) there were approximately 60 000 ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants in Assembly
Points (APs) throughout the country and 15 000 Rhodesian Security Forces confined to barracks. These men and women were all anxious about their future. A speedy integration process, therefore, was urgently called for.

For that reason, the JHC was formed to administer the integration and development of different forces. Nyambuya (1996: 1) observes that “a Joint High Command (JHC), comprising high ranking officers from all three groups, was formed to supervise the command and control of troops in APs and barracks. The JHC was to supervise the implementation of the amalgamation process, a considerable task to undertake on its own.” The Government of Zimbabwe subsequently requested the British Government to provide advisors from the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) to complement the JHC’s efforts in the integration process. The task ahead for the JHC and BMATT was a unique combined effort in the history of arms, which called for rigorous impartiality and a sensitive approach to the process of integration.

The British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) was involved in battalion establishment and leadership training. The challenge was about supporting combatants managerially and logistically in the APs awaiting integration; failure would generate animosity. The BMATT were helping to reorient and rewrite the military training curriculum for the Senior Command and Staff Course, Senior NCOs and Junior NCOs; improve the human resources; equip the Zimbabwe Staff College facilities and oversee the training. These are the fundamental foundations of the SSR in the military, embedded in the reconciliation policy.

3.5.3 The Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ)

The apartheid government sponsored destabilisation activities, managed to destroy ten aircrafts just after the arrival of the Hawks military aircraft from Britain, on 25 July 1982. (https://www.issafrica.org/country-file-zimbabwe/security-situation). This was a sabotage attack by senior air force officers who had been involved in obtaining the Hawks and were detained. After international pressure the men were brought to trial in the High Court and were released and discharged from the service. The policy of national reconciliation was challenged because the Zimbabwean government no longer trusted the colonial white officers. As a result of this sabotage, Walsh was substituted by Air Marshal Azim Daudpota from Pakistan in 1983 to 1986. ZDF endured the test of time and Pakistan gave Zimbabwe much needed technical support. The Pakistan Air Force trained most of the Zimbabwean
pilots in the initial days. These were the foundations of reforming AFZ under the reconciliation policy coupled with the Apartheid South Africa destabilisation policy (to be discussed later).

3.5.4 The ZDF Professionalization process

The ZDF inherited professionalization process was a Western conceptual framework for the eradication of all politics from the liberation forces. Yet the revolutionary political struggle never was conceived of, or carried out, merely as a military process. The liberation forces were highly political, fighting for the liberation of Zimbabwe. These forces included a number of aspects of development, with each military team comprising officers in charge of political mobilisation, education, agriculture, and health services played an important role in the rear camps. Health services were provided in both military operations and rear camps by the forces. The liberation struggle comprised a holistic approach covering all areas of human security and development through the concept of education with production. The implication was that the Ubuntu philosophy of the revolutionary accepted wisdom was moving towards an apolitical Army; a western philosophy.

3.5.5 ZDF Education and training

Three types of education take place in the ZDF; general education, specialised education and military education. The ZDF has been professionalizing its members through higher learning in its career advancement objectives in command and control, administration, management, logistics, peace and security. General education focuses on literacy, and communal knowledge; it is basically a broad understanding of the educational needs of the civilians and providing scholarships from high school through college to provide in these needs. Focussed education addresses public skills in common with civilian and military working environments such as education, engineering, social science, administration, economics and medical studies. Since 1990, Zimbabwe has a Centre for Defence Studies (CDS) at the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) that offers courses designed for the security sector; similar institutions exist in most SADC countries. The internal and external opposition drivers of SSR sponsor this education through NGOs instead of enhancing and in partnership with the state.

Questions arose as to why Zimbabwe wants reformers, governors, transformers, enhancers, or aligners, and why it is the only country in the SADC region that needs all these. The CDS
Report (2008) indicates that “since 2004 the CDS trained 320 security sector personnel, civil society and parliamentarians in courses designed for the security sector in civil military relations, among others.’ The training process comprised nationally and regionally owned projects of the Southern Africa Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM), in partnership with SADC-OPDSCDS under the auspices of a specific country university. This training and mentoring programme benefited the security sector, parliamentarians, and civil society, among others in the region. Therefore, any unfounded frenzy about SSR in Zimbabwe is probably about something else.

Good examples of ZDF’s professionalization are UZ’s admission of ZDF officers and men in degree programmes for example, international relations, security studies, medicine and law. The National Defence College (NDC) established in 2012 which would become the National Defence University (NDU) by the end of 2015 offers Masters Courses in International Studies and national security programmes to selected senior officers. This is a testimony of focused education of the military’s professionalization process.

Military education addresses military line of work in operational art, command and control, and operations design. These are acquired through military education institutions; the Zimbabwe Military Academy (ZMA) in Gweru and the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC) in Harare. This is a professionalization process, augmented by the security sector alignment process for SS and HS relations during and after military service. An encouraging development was the institutional approach towards the ZDF by the UZ that has, and continues to admit qualified ZDF members into their post-graduate International Relations and undergraduate Political Science degree programmes. The issue of the admission of ZDF members is not about rebuilding the SS institution from scratch, or dismantling it, but rather a professional developmental process in that the ZDF is part of the social fabric and has vested interests in existing power relationships. A good example is Air Vice-Marshal Basutu, now Zimbabwean Ambassador to Japan, and Maj. General Dube, Ambassador to Mozambique who obtained an MSc degree in International Relations from UZ. Participation in societal duties by the armed forces in HS endeavours, displays a multifaceted approach of the individual at domestic, national, regional and international levels.

Those who advocate internal and external SSR in Zimbabwe need to be aware that the ZDF’s professionalization process already is at an advanced stage. While some are calling for SSR the ZDF is advancing Security Sector Alignment (SSA) for enhancement, empowerment and
development. The concept of alignment is humanitarian and security orientated in nature because it advocates reciprocal relationships, compassion and care, progress, respect, and equality as tenets of the *Ubuntu* philosophy.

3.5.6 Identifying strategies

The post-independence period has brought about many notable achievements in peace, stability, and basic human needs. Satisfying these needs of shelter, food, health, employment, and security need to be strengthened. There were also areas of failure in conditions of service, food, health care, equipment and transport. These areas should be analysed so that mistakes are not repeated. Furthermore, there are new areas of development that need attention. These need to be identified, and strategies devised as to how they are to be addressed, especially the relationship between SS and HS for peace, unity and development.

Identifying these strategies and threats can be divided into ‘software’ challenges dealing with ideas, values, attitudes and habits, and ‘hardware’ challenges such as infrastructure including roads, dams, energy, industrialisation, large scale industries, machinery and equipment, irrigation and water supply. The aspects, ‘software’ and ‘hardware’, are closely interlinked and need to be incorporated into all other areas of development. For example, the conditions of service through good management systems in the ZDF should ensure that all members are able to contribute actively to the growth of the economy during and after their military service.

The ZDF members must continue to be educated and value the work ethic as the basis for human security and wealth, as opposed to developing parasitical tendencies and education without production. This is a strategic thought regarding development and practical issues among academics. Such an approach would ensure that ZDF members will be able to earn a future living through their knowledge, skills and work.

3.6 ZDF PERIOD 1980-1990

The period 1980 to 1990 was the first decade of independence during which the imperative of national reconciliation and nation building strategies were disseminated to all sectors across the country. The strategy was interventionist and social welfare-oriented in enhancing security and community relations. This period laid the foundation of Zimbabwe’s developmental trajectory to be re-positioned, economically, politically, historically and
socially. The identity from the perspective of Zimbabwean people was therefore, centred, located, oriented and grounded; from the armed struggle into the challenges of a new Zimbabwe dispensation.


The first step taken was to ensure that the revolutionary forces were integrated with the existing Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). The terms of reference remained the same as they had been under the Rhodesian system. This means that steps were not taken to neutralise the dominant role of RSF but that of the revolutionary political soldiers. Thus, the Rhodesian system was retained intact, whilst the revolutionary soldiers’ system had to adjust to fit into the RSF system. Little effort was made to analyse the positive and negative aspects of the inherited system.

Rupiah (1995) observes that “Operation Merger was the officially designated name of the exercises for the formation of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).” According to Moorcraft and McLaughlin (1982:241),

at the basis of the integration exercise was the realisation that, for every armed combatant, irrespective of his political views, the new Government had to meet two basic requirements: first, it had to assure his/her perception of personal security, and secondly, eventually provide employment either in or out of the armed forces. The integration exercise welcomed all those who wished to take up a military career in an organisation initially targeted at a strength of between 30 000 and 35 000.

The creation of ZNA was a precondition for the establishment of post-colonial Zimbabwe for nation building. Disillusionment in trust, confidence, development and the way forward among the different forces of different backgrounds could mean civil war, whilst success would be wonderful for equitable integration. The elements of conflict were high because political and socio-economic transformation would be worthless in the absence of significant military amalgamation.

If the national reconciliation strategy would have failed, so would nation building. This level of consciousness (reconciliation) in reforming the structures and systems through forgiveness, unity, freedom and work is a principle of the Ubuntu philosophy. The practical response was through a reconciliation policy - a developmental paradigm shift.


Operation SEED is an acronym for ‘the Operation of Soldiers Employed in Economic Development’ introduced in 1981. It was designed to encourage ex-combatants to swap their guns for picks and shovels and to work on land acquired by the government.

The aim was to engage soldiers and ex-combatants in economic development, a capacity building process, very noble and well-meaning with objectives that could have gone a long way. However, this operation was not well executed because ZANLA, ZIPRA and RSF armies saw themselves as gallant fighters not to be bothered with participating in agricultural production. Units of ZNA were allocated a government farm, complete with agricultural equipment. The government’s demobilisation package was in fact ‘notorious’ for falling far short of adequately preparing ex-combatants to returning to civilian society.’ It was an impulsively designed programme that disregarded the different socio-economic needs of each and every demobilised ex-combatant. Very little if anything was done to assess the extent to which society at large was prepared to absorb them. Some ex-combatants had practical problems, such as not having a place they could call home (Musemwa 1995).

Its weaknesses included poor planning and administration, the lack of a clear objective, the diverse nature of the needs of ex-combatants, resource inadequacies, inaccurate information on the number of the forces, reluctance to employ ex-combatants in the private sector, discrimination against female combatants, the poor design of the operation and lack of leadership effectiveness. It became critical to meet the socio-economic needs of ex-combatants to avoid future social and political tension. This was a noble SSR process for economic enhancement although it was not successful.

Because of the lack of trust and confidence among the former ZNA factions of ZANLA and ZIPRA, they abandoned the farms to return to places where they considered the environment was safe. The ZNA members got arms from the armouries and went back to the Assembly Points. This effectively destroyed any potential materialisation of operation SEED, closing out one lucrative alternative for self-reliance in food production and empowerment for the betterment of SS and HS relations.
3.6.3 The dilemma of intentions

In the 1980s, the supporters of the independence programme of nation-building, for the most part, also accepted the strategy of national reconciliation in Zimbabwe immediately after the achievement of independence. The strategy of national reconciliation was based on the call for building sustainable harmony, equal opportunity and nonviolent co-existence involving races and ethnic groups in Zimbabwe. This signified a fundamentally different approach from the previous Rhodesian era of prejudice. National reconciliation was originally formed by the relationships between blacks and Rhodesian whites, with most important nationalist movements i.e. the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (PF-ZAPU). Dignified as the strategy was, the unfolding proceedings in the following years created pressure in the accomplishment of the national reconciliation strategy and the political uneasiness amongst PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF members and their former military combatants remained prominent in the midst of ‘Operation Dissident Flash’ which will be discussed later.

However, mutual understanding was attained eventually through the marking of the Unity Accord (UA) between PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF in 1987. Events prior to UA comprised a depressing episode in Zimbabwe’s post-independence history. In particular, the accomplishment of the national reconciliation strategy was beset with problems surrounding a number of ethnic minority groups. Therefore, the strategy of national reconciliation received mixed views. Mandaza (1986: 16) observes that the strategy reflects the situation of the governing elites rather than the consent of the majority. Some however read public good motives in the policy of nation reconciliation, viewing it as reflecting concerted efforts to manage a possibly volatile socio-political environment created by the recent change of government.

This process could barely prosper in the unbalanced socio-political environments typified and characterised by suspicion and hostility. National reconciliation strategy managed to calm down the high tension, contradictions and hostilities among the populace and the militants through demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) to a lesser extent.

3.6.4 Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) 1980-191992

A significant element of the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration process was the facilitation of British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT). They played a
significant role in the integration between the three forces ZANLA, ZIPRA, and RSF. In addition, the BMATT trained the officer corps of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) during the period March 1980 to 1992. The challenge according to Dzinesa (2000: 3) was that,

there was no elaborate reintegration policy designed, besides the provision of a grant of $400. The opportunity to plan a comprehensive DDR strategy at the earliest possible stage was lost. The limited reintegration strategy resulted in ineffective integration of these demobilised combatants, the majority of whom registered under the Demobilisation Programme of 1981.

This was one of the post-independence SSR processes which was an internally and externally driven process recorded without an elaborate reintegration policy as indicated by Dzinesa above. However, Nye (1995: 17) observes that,

the British Foreign Policy objectives were, to support democratisation and human rights, nurturing regional security arrangements and conflict resolution, pursuing a regional defence strategy that aims at empowering African states and organisations with a capacity to achieve the political and economic growth necessary for long-term stability.

Therefore, the BMATT assistance throughout the world is supported by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as a foreign policy instrument. Therefore, DDR was both an externally as well as an internally driven SSR process because the BMATT accommodated the ZANLA, ZIPRA and RSF’s interests politically and militarily. According to Luckham (1994: 35),

the achievement of foreign policy objectives world-wide is a complex process involving a range of approaches and activities from diplomatic exchanges, lobbying, to a more active ‘hands on approach’ in the form of aid. Slotted into the aid funding, is military aid … to underpin our Foreign Policy in Zimbabwe and the region … A strong, disciplined and loyal military is an essential component in the makeup of a peaceful and stable country. Its mere existence is a symbol of nationhood and unity.

To achieve the British foreign policy objectives as indicated by Nye above, the BMATT comprised knowledgeable and proficient officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and field commanders. These officers taught a series of wide-ranging courses to all levels of commanding officers, company commanders, NCOs, drill trainers, administrators, and other tactical courses. These courses were basically for reforming and transforming the amalgamated forces into the ZNA and AFZ.

Francis (2008: 242) states that “the process of DDR is one of the most immediate and complex challenges faced in post-conflict situations.” DDR is part of an SSR process in post-
conflict situations because the programmes are essential in that they do not only reintegrate armed groups, but also serve as a transitional safety net for ex-combatants to return to civilian society. This is a HS approach. Durable peace and stability can be achieved only if DDR processes are viewed from a developmental perspective and seen as facets of the human security process. Therefore, DDR is a first step in the transition from war to peace and is designed to ensure that ex-combatants are disarmed and reintegrated into society; it is a process, not an end in itself.

As a process, DDR is supposed to ensure a safe environment, enabling the ex-combatants to earn livelihoods through peaceful means instead of war. The immediate goal of the process is to restore security and stability through the management of ex-combatants and their weapons. The challenge is the failure to enable former combatants to become productive members of their local communities through social and economic reintegration. Hence, DDR should be seen as a comprehensive developmental project that should not be regarded as a temporary measure. DDR has the potential to facilitate human security of ex-combatants through the establishment of long-term sustainable reintegration. For a successful DDR, it is important to ensure that human security and development are interconnected during the entire process for a credible security environment. DDR processes must ensure that former combatants do not become idle after demobilisation because this can manifest into a security threat, for example the Operation Dissident Flash, which will be discussed later.

### 3.6.5 A developmental DDR policy

A DDR policy makes specific provisions for demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration as a developmental trajectory. Newman and Schnabel (2002: 201) observe that “case studies from Africa depict that some of the DDR programmes, rarely reach all the groups returning to civilian society.” Even if the ex-combatants were able to access demobilisation and reintegration programmes, their needs were often ignored due to stigmatisation, psychological and physical trauma, and the burden of dependents. Mazarire and Rupiya (2000: 3) come to an understanding that,

> given the impact of resources at the individual level, set at Z$185,00 per month over 24 months, the sums were generally far short of what was required to adequately assist former combatants to ease themselves back into the capitalist economy inherited from Rhodesia.

Many former combatants lacked the necessary skills while those in command of the economy spurned the new entrants. Furthermore, serious government corruption was later
uncovered in the selection and allocation of scholarships. As a result, these did not really benefit the intended beneficiaries – the former combatants.

A lack of broad and consistent socio-economic profiling of combatants, failure to implement financial management and skills training for the many inexperienced in handling money affected the good implementation of the DDR project. In Zimbabwe, this was possibly reinforced by incompetent and corrupt directorate staff due to the absence of an effective and workable support mechanism. The ex-combatants were thrown into a complicated world with insufficient groundwork, thus to some extent the DDR process disintegrated before reintegration.

It is against this background that contemporary demobilisation and reintegration programmes in practice underscore the importance of monitoring and implementation. There is a need to focus more on the social reintegration of ex-combatants through a carefully planned project. Therefore, SSR, SS and HS linkages manifest itself in the DDR programme. From a developmental perspective, disarmament without reintegration, and demobilisation without planned economic and social reintegration, remains unsustainable. As an initial DDR process of SSR the elements for success should include a credible plan of implementation to oversee the programme at the national, community, and individual level.

The coalescing of all the above factors sheds light on the linkage between SS and HS. It is arguable in this study that, if DDR is without economic development, then security may remain elusive. Failure to link the DDR to the economic needs of ex-combatants can jeopardize the entire reform process, and obstruct economic recovery. Ex-combatants who are not successfully demobilised and reintegrated can easily fuel new violence, and may return to conflict as the only possible way to survive economically and socially. A new escalation in violence could potentially destroy the results of the DDR process. A good example of this is the ‘dissident era’ in Zimbabwe during 1982-1987 which will be discussed later. Disgruntled veterans can play an influential role in subverting the social order by gratifying easy objectives of populists, bigoted, and fanatical movements. Furthermore, their rehabilitation should go along with psychological provision and trauma therapy, apart from the delivery of education and training. For that reason, a DDR process has to address both the immediate and long-term needs of the former combatants.
During a phase of reintegration, short-term needs are often addressed in relief arrangements as a safety net for the demobilised combatants. The limited monetary strategy resulted in the ineffective reintegration of those demobilised who re-registered under the Zimbabwe Demobilisation Programme Act of 1980, which offered education and professional training, public employment, skills development and micro-credit support. The SSR in this case was focusing on the human security and in the *Ubuntu* context; it is the acquired quality of humanity as the characteristic of a fully developed person within the community.

### 3.6.6 The reintegration programmes

The ex-combatants misused cash payments and programmes mainly for consumption and pleasure without long-term development perspectives. There were no accurate plans for reintegration (going back to civilian life) programmes. Francis (2008: 125) states that “it is important to involve other players in reintegration phases to implement initiatives aimed at self-sustained social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants.” Such initiatives must follow temporary reinsertion assistance programmes and should provide ex-combatants with re-orientation into society in order for them to be visionary with a futuristic view for peace, prosperity and development. This process creates an ‘ex-combatant’ who is financially independent through employment, education, and professional training. Furthermore, Pham (2000: 150) observes that “the costs of awarding allowances to ex-combatants without proper planning and management usually spirals into the country’s broader economy and, consequently, the fruits of development expected from the DDR process are not realised.”

Successful DDR requires an enabling environment that focuses on development. The Zimbabwean case demonstrates the perils of delaying DDR and leaving ex-combatants to lie idle while they are still in possession of weapons. The retention of weapons by ex-combatants awaiting integration and demobilisation proved catastrophic as evidenced by ‘Operation Dissident Flash’ to be discussed later. The Zimbabwe case demonstrates that successful DDR should not simply sidestep issues of development, empowerment, and social reintegration because ignoring such factors will only create ‘negative peace’. Failure to plan and release resources for social and economic productive projects makes the internal security a threat and the search for durable peace elusive.

However, this was an SSR process when the Demobilisation Directorate in July 1981 was set up, under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. Zimbabwe’s demobilisation strategy revolved around the provision of further education for the demobilised combatants, technical
and vocational skills training, and encashment of demobilisation funds. From the foregoing discussion, it is imperative that any discussion of the DDR process should be anchored in development discourse and practice because the two are mutually reinforcing. While DDR is dependent on a sound economic environment and availability of resources, Mehreteab (2004: 180) notes that “it is equally true that successful DDR is a harbinger of development efforts as ex-combatants partake in civilian activities that promote socio-economic and political advancement.”

3.6.7 Operation Dissident Flash (1981-1987)

Integrating a community that had serious divisions within itself would not be an easy task. One of the security threats posed by the retention of weapons and idle ex-combatants at the Assembly Points was the clashes between the ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants i.e. the Entumbane disturbance, 8-12 February 1981. This was the earliest catastrophe that struck the post-colonial nation building developmental objective. This misfortune was probably connected to political and ethnic issues which took place during the armed struggle. This tragedy, which began in the ranks of the armed forces, developed into open exchange of fire between the Shona-dominant ZANLA and the Ndebele-dominated ZIPRA in Connemara (Gweru) and Entumbane (Bulawayo). Many ZIPRA cadres defected after Entumbane, fearing retribution, and deserters fought pitched battles with the ZNA. This was the threat which resulted in the government’s ‘Operation Dissident Flash’ in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces. Operation Dissident Flash was conducted as a joint operation with the Support Unit, President Department and 5th Brigade and it was mandatory to have a Ndebele speaker in each military section.

In military terms ‘Operation Dissident Flash’ was carried out in Matabeleland and the Midlands Provinces to deal with a growing number of dissidents who were killing civilians, farmers, and missionaries, destroying property, robbing stores, banks and mines. In political terms this operation was nicknamed ‘Gukurahundi’. Nyarota (2006:134) stated “Gukurahundi means the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains.” In opposition to ZANU-PF, as a guessing game during that period, one would think of murder massacres and genocide. This was exacerbated by the apartheid South Africa’s collaboration with dissidents, ‘super ZAPU’, in the destruction of arsenals at Inkomo Barracks in Harare, August 1981; attempts to murder Mugabe in December 1981; the six tourists who were
abducted and buried in shallow graves in July 1982; and the sabotage at Thornhill Air Base in Gweru, July 25, 1982. Rwafa (2012: 313) observes that,

the epistemic conditions for ‘Gukurahundi’ could be traced back from the period of colonialism and Zimbabwe’s armed struggle. Zimbabwe’s liberation war was one of the bloodiest and brutal wars in Southern Africa and its repercussions were equally disastrous. The war bestowed a culture of violence and murder upon black leadership.

ZIPRA and ZANLA tossed hand grenades at each other and pistols were also used. ZIPRA and ZANLA murdered their colleagues. The very people who were called victims of ‘Gukurahundi’ were the very people also killed by ‘super ZAPU’ dissidents.

This violence was almost an inevitable consequence of the way nationalism had evolved and how the nationalist armies were formed. Bhebe (2004:256) in his monograph on Simon Vengayi Muzenda and the Struggle… observed that “it is not unreasonable for readers to ask how such close allies [as ZANU and ZAPU] could be involved in a civil war that saw many lives being lost in Matabeleland.” However, Bhebe describes the factional conflict in Zimbabwe or among Zimbabweans, as immaterial whether people belong to the same party… the situation is worse when people belong to different political parties met.

The ZIPA experiment in Mozambique collapsed for just the same reason. In Libya, ZAPU and ZANU were put in the same training camps and they killed each other. The reason was very simple. These young men and women were trained to hate each other by their leaders who wanted to justify the separate existence of their parties. Each party had its own Commissariat Department whose task was to teach recruits the history of the party, who the leaders were and how they were different from the less revolutionary or sell-out leaders of the rival party. Thus, the cadres were brought up to hate.

‘Operation Dissident Flash’ was characterised by massive political, social, economic and militarily mistrust. The militants were not talking to each other but talking about each other. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008: 48) observed that “Gukurahundi violence provoked radical Ndebele cultural nationalism as well as radical Ndebele politics that sometimes contested the whole idea of a unitary Zimbabwe state. These organisations came into being in the wake of the swallowing up of PF-ZAPU by ZANU-PF in the Unity Accord of 1987.” Violence was committed by both ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants, sometimes against civilians and against each other. The allegations of killing innocent people were repudiated, the foreign press
was accused of hostility and fabricating stories because the allegations failed to give proper weight to the violence used by dissidents.

According to De Baests (2002: 624), “the Dumbutshena and Chihambakwe reports were the result of the commission of inquiry appointed by the government of Zimbabwe. The first enquiry reported on clashes between guerrillas of the two former liberation armies in Bulawayo in 1981, and the second on the killings in Matabeleland in 1983. Neither of these reports had ever been published. The reports were not published because of government censorship; for reasons better known by the authorities - either because it could have sparked violence over past wrongs. President R. G. Mugabe concluded that the disturbances were a ‘moment of madness’. [www.modop.org/uploads/File/Essay_Munjodzi]. A ‘moment of madness’ amplifies the idea of acting outside operational orders.

Outside the government’s Dumbutshena and Chihambakwe commission, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) in Zimbabwe (1997) released its own report to break the silence surrounding the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces. The report, Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988, has been possible because Zimbabwe was enjoying stability and national unity although it had a history tainted by internal conflict. “The existing state of peace in the nation is exceptional and the signing of the Unity Accord in December 1987 brought an end to the disturbances” (Catholic Commission Report 1997). Furthermore, the report stated that Zimbabwe did not come to Independence easily. Critics pointed out that in April 1980, Mr Mugabe made a magnanimous speech, in which he ‘drew a line through the past’ and forgave those whites and others who had persecuted the black majority in the country, particularly during 10 years of an increasingly bitter war in the 1970s. Why then it is asked, does this report seek to hold the very Government, which was so forgiving, accountable for its own shortcomings in the next decade?

Although the report claimed that bodies were known to have been thrown down mineshafts by the Zimbabwean army in the 1980s, the response of the government was that those were the Rhodesian victims. The Catholic Commission Report (1997) acknowledged the historical context within which events of the 1980s occurred and claimed, “it did not seek to apportion blame. It seeks merely to break the silence surrounding the disturbances in the nation’s history.” If the report merely sought to break the silence, then it was a story telling and not a report.
In the same vein, the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987 effectively dissolved ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU resulting in ZANU-PF. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008: 48) observes that “the Unity Accord [was] a surrender document where the PF-ZAPU politicians threw in the towel and allowed PF-ZAPU to be swallowed by ZANU-PF.” Depending on one’s perspective, the 1987 Unity Accord was a unifying document where people believed in *Ubuntu*; ‘I am because we are’, a collective approach to peace and stability as Zimbabweans because of the idea that ‘I participate, therefore I am’. The strategy of realism reflects itself through the *Nhari* rebellion 1974, Chitepo Assassination 1975, Mgagao Declaration 1975 and ZIPA 1976. Zhou and Zvoushe (2012: 214) state that “this strategy of realism that was alive in the 1980s of national reconciliation reflects itself through the Unity Agreement of 1987 and the Global Political Agreement of 15 September 2008.” On 18 April 1988 during Zimbabwe’s Independence Day, an amnesty was advocated by the government and 122 dissidents surrendered and the disturbances were finally laid to rest. These were the dynamics of integration as part of an indigenous SSR process where contradictions were a manifestation of a correcting process.

3.6.8 Apartheid South Africa’s destabilisation policy

The destabilisation policy preserved apartheid's capitalist hegemony, and imperialist control in Southern Africa. The people of Southern Africa were struggling to disentangle themselves from capitalist exploitation and racial repression. Threatened by a deep-rooted predicament since the early 1970s, the chauvinistic minority regime was regionalising apartheid and turned Southern Africa into a battleground. The idea was to prevent the Southern African states from becoming economically independent. The apartheid regime used many ways and means to destabilise Zimbabwe. Patel (1988: 9) argues that “destabilisation represents the "outward move" of the militarised state even while it continued to suppress and oppress the majority of South Africans and indeed destabilisation is the perfect linkage between the apartheid states’ domestic and foreign policies.” Martin and Johnson (1986: 43) observe that, South Africa’s destabilization of Zimbabwe can be subdivided into seven categories-direct military action including sabotage, clandestine support for banditry, assassination, espionage, economic sabotage, propaganda and disinformation. All of these have been used to varying degrees since Zimbabwe’s independence on 18 April 1980.

The ZANU’s victory left a plethora of embittered parties and individuals in its wake and the National army had to deal with the effects i.e. on 18 December a 10-15-kilogram bomb exploded on the roof of the Zanu party Headquarters at 88 Manica
Patel (1987: 303) perceives the following activities of South African destabilisation policy among others:

- disinformation (e.g. hundreds of letters and anti-government leaflets were sent to Zimbabwe in 1983 and 1984);
- attacks on oil installations and routes (e.g. in Mozambique 1980);
- attacks on military installations (e.g. Inkomo Barracks and Thornhill Air Base in Zimbabwe, August 16, 1981 and July 25, 1982 respectively);
- training, supplying, directing surrogate armies in neighbouring states (e.g. (Renamo) in Mozambique, (Unita) in Angola, Super-ZAPU in Zimbabwe);
- attacks on transport routes (the Zimbabwe-Maputo line, the Malawi-Nacala line, the Malawi-Beira line, and attacks on the Zimbabwe-Beira road/rail line, during 1975-1980); and
- limiting the use of South African railways, for example by manipulating the availability of railway wagons (to Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia).

As a result, the ZDF in 1980-1990 had to deal with the consequences of the South African destabilisation policy, national reconciliation policy, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, and ‘Operation Dissident Flash’ for peace and harmony, prosperity and development. This effort is basically an SSR, SS and HS approach through the professionalization of the ZDF in protecting the interests of Zimbabwe.

3.7 ZDF 1991 TO 2000

The period 1991 to 2000 was the second decade that the Zimbabwean state experienced an economic crisis. The economic strategies were through intervention with low notes on local ownership and social acceptance in promoting social cohesion. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was emerging as an opposition front to ZANU-PF not to govern. MDC was focusing on Eurocentric approaches (a liberal perspective) about democracy, rule of law, human rights and regime change as viewed by ZANU-PF - a revolutionary party. The problem with MDC was that it had a mentality of fixing and scoring points rather than focusing on serious issues. Thus, they were constantly looking for faults within ZANU-PF instead of focusing on developmental issues. Whilst MDC was focusing on SSR, ZANU-PF was engaged in Security Sector Alignment (SSA) of the value systems. The LHA did not chase the RSF senior officers and men from offices. The MDC wanted to remove officers and men from the ZDF using Western concepts of SSR; it is no coincidence that SSR was
popularised in the 1990s and the MDC formed. However, the ZDF was concentrating on alignment, enhancement, empowerment and development rather than chasing political, capitalist, egocentric ideologies and concepts about SSR.

In the 1990s two major military interventions were launched under SADC auspices. In August 1998, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia sent troops into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to assist in countering an incursion from Rwanda and Uganda that endangered the DRC's government under President Laurent Desiré Kabila. One month later, South Africa and Botswana got militarily involved in Lesotho to support the government of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili against internal unrest and an army revolt following a contentious general election. Both interventions, i.e. ‘Operation Sovereign Legitimacy’ (OSL) and ‘Operation Boleas’, correspondingly, had SADC’s backing. These two military interventions, facilitated to define SADC’s role in regional peace enforcement. Therefore, in Zimbabwe SS and HS relations involve domestic, regional, and international processes in providing peace and security for the people especially with peace and safety, food, clean water, electricity and health care.

During the elections (2000) in Zimbabwe the military said that it was going to respect the results. In 2002 after the ‘Straight Jacket’ concept to be discussed later, sanctions, ZIDERA and regime change agendas were introduced by US and EU. SS adapt to or confront the system when it develops into politics of hate. A point to note is that democracies are not universal and are implemented and enforced in different ways. Zimbabwe is the only African country that has dislodging the white power. The challenge for MDC was that it supported Eurocentric perspectives and wanted the US and EU to keep the land they expropriated from the blacks, with no economic policy, no education policy, no agricultural or health policy. Politically, MDC was saying ‘don’t touch the land the whites have stolen’. Zimbabwe never committed any act of terror against the UK and the US. Why then the politics of hate?

3.7.1 ZDF in UN operations

Southern Africa, under the auspices of SADC, had indeed put a mechanism in place to deal with conflicts that arose in the region through the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) and security, through the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS). According to Patel (1992: 4)

The region saw the independence of Angola and Mozambique followed by that of Zimbabwe and Namibia in the 1980s. In all these countries the basic conflict was between white settlerism and African nationalism and was
resolved through the process of armed struggle and negotiation between contesting forces.

All these conflicts affect the role of the Defence Forces in Southern Africa and they have to focus on the insecurities. Article 2 of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (2003: 4) indicates that, cooperation in defence matters and interaction through training of military personnel, hold joint military exercises in one another’s territory; exchange military intelligence and information; and joint research, development and production to facilitate the supply of, or the procurement of, defence equipment and services among defence-related industries.

Peters (2010: 141) states that “the OPDS was established in 1996 at a SADC summit in Gaborone. The main objective of the OPDS was the promotion of peace and security in the SADC region.” This was a new process to build and maintain security in the region through a formal institution. Article 2 of the OPDS (2003: 3) states that,

the objectives of OPDS are; promote peace and security in the region, protect the people and safeguard the development of the region; promote regional co-ordination and co-operation in security and defence; participation of State parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations; promote peace making and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security; develop a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact for responding to external threats; and develop a regional peacekeeping capacity with national armies, that could be called upon to deal with conflict in the region or elsewhere.

As a result, the ZDF participated in the UN peacekeeping operations in the UN, AU and SADC missions providing mission leadership and troops. This is a professionalization process as part of the Ubuntu philosophy based on participative interaction for reciprocal relationships at regional and international level. The rationale of the ZDF involvement in peace missions was linked to organisations such as the UN, AU and SADC in terms of the ZDF’s commitment in respect of their obligation to international and regional peace, stability and development. This was a typical SSR process linked to SS and HS relations at regional level.

The Zimbabwean participation in peace and security operations, the justification is in line with its Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 86) Article 213 (3) (a) in respect of deploying the Defence Forces. Therefore, SSR is not removing senior officers from their position but aligning the role and functions of the ZDF to national objectives. A stable country has a reciprocally positive effect on its neighbouring countries in a given region. Most of the countries in the SADC region had the same experience of colonialism and the armed struggle therefore; they belong to the same group in a region. The region had a responsibility...
to create stability and to make it prosper. This is an *Ubuntu* approach as a collective effort at the regional level.

In this case, the ZDF obtained success at home and the region in training the South African Defence Forces (SADF), Namibia Defence Forces (NDF), Malawian Defence Forces (MDF) and Tanzania Defence Forces (TDF) through guarantying defence and human security relations in the region. The confidence of regional defence forces in the ZDF is an indication of the ZDF security sector reform, professionalism and expertise. Therefore, ZDF is contributing intellectual, human resources, material and military capability because of joint training among the SADC member states. It enabled the region to carry out successful operations and strengthening ties. President Mugabe’s speech, on the 34th Anniversary of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces August 12, 2014 referred to the cordial relations of the defence force with their regional counterparts in that,

The ZDF is currently involved in setting up the Southern African Development Community and African Union standby or rapid response forces. Zimbabwean soldiers have served in regional campaigns in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo and also continued doing peace-keeping duties under the United Nations in countries like South Sudan and Nepal. To date, the Zimbabwe Defence Force has deployed more than 5,000 soldiers to various countries on UN peace-keeping missions. Apart from their security duties the armed forces were also transforming people’s lives through community services such as constructing schools and providing food like ‘Operation Maguta’.

As a result, the personnel from the Zimbabwe country’s uniformed forces, comprising the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Services (ZPS), took part in UN missions as mentioned earlier. The government and individuals deployed in the UN missions have gained economically and substantially from the remunerations offered by the UN. Through the UN missions at individual levels the personnel developed their professional status.

3.7.2 Regional operations and peace support operations (PSO)

Patel (2006: 177) observes that,

> in pursuit of its own sovereignty, independence, economic and strategic interests, and Pan-Africanism, in the 1980s Zimbabwe sent its defence forces to protect the Beira Corridor in Mozambique from South African attacks and later assisted Mozambique in checkmating its rebel force and the latter’s South African support.

Zimbabwe performed major functions in regional military operations, peace missions and
through regional organisations such as the SADC’s ‘Operation Sovereign-Legitimacy’ OSL in the DRC 1998-2002; ‘Operation ‘Butterfly’ in Mozambique 1980-1992 to assist the Mozambican government to counter RENAMO, protecting the corridor running to the Beira port in Mozambique. According to Patel (1993: 120),

It appears that Zimbabwean’s role as an official mediator began when President Joaquim Chissano, at his meeting in Beira, Mozambique on 9 July 1989, with President Robert Mugabe who was accompanied by his military service chiefs asked for the latter’s help in bringing peace to Mozambique, and that President Daniel Arap Moi was also asked to be an official mediator at a subsequent meeting with Chissano in Mozambique in mid–July 1989.

Zimbabwe played a major role in Mozambique counter RENAMO, protecting the corridor and in a mediatary role and adding momentum to the search for peace. The DRC operation is understood by its critics (non SADC) as an independent multilateral intervention by SADC member states. Mbuende (2001:46) observed that,

peace efforts supported by SADC, the OAU and the UN, and coordinated by Zambia were therefore initiated and eventually resulted in the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire and peace agreement in 1999 by the Heads of State of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola, as well as the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and Rally for a Democratic Congo (RDC). The peace agreement required that all foreign forces should withdraw before a UN peacekeeping operation would be deployed to the DRC. SADCs political endeavours have been focused on conflict resolution, mediation and ‘quiet diplomacy’.

The above mentioned interventions are a liberation legacy accepted by many SADC states, which are evident in the political life within the region; the liberation struggle and ideology, is hailed amongst the African liberation movements. Adolfo (2009:16) postulates that,

*comradeship* between ruling groups that commonly fought for the anticolonialist cause; *African solidarity* (ideas of pan-Africanism and “African solutions to African problems”, including resentment against Western actors who attempt to influence or dictate African politics); *Legitimacy to rule* (based on the sacrifices made in the liberation struggle and the idea that the party that founded the nation is, in fact, the nation); *Self-preservation* (criticising the liberation struggle might lead to criticism of own regime); *Resource redistribution* (a notion that the land reform in Zimbabwe is a legitimate attempt to create socio-economic justice and a realisation that criticising the reform could undermine political stability in other SADC states facing similar problems); and the ‘racial’ framing of the Zimbabwean crisis (the related notion that the land-reform in Zimbabwe is a legitimate attempt to address a racist system.

The choice to deploy the ZDF rests on deliberations of defending national security, national interests and assisting disturbed countries in the region. Zimbabwe’s involvement in PSO has
been modest and understood as an advantage by the Zimbabwean government and by the ZDF enhancing the image of the country’s security personnel. The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC-RPTC) was established in 1996 in Harare Zimbabwe. SADC-RPTC played a pivotal role in regional security through providing training programmes to civilians, police and military personnel from SADC states for possible deployment in peace missions. These trained participants are anticipated to form part of SADC’s contingent of the SADC’s Standby Force. The SADC-RPTC has contributed to regional peace missions through Sabinet Exercise GOLFINHO, the Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade (SADBRIG), held in South Africa and Namibia on 13 October 2009; Exercise Blue Crane in South Africa 12 to 30 April 1999 and Exercise Blue Hungwe in Zimbabwe in April 1997. Zimbabwe’s involvement in peace missions is reinforced by Article 213 (3) of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe. Patel (2006: 177) observes that,

in pursuit of multilateralism, Pan-Africanism, good international citizenship, and peaceful resolution of conflicts, Zimbabwe participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Angola (including as UN Force Commander), Somalia (including as UN Deputy Force Commander) and Uganda/Rwanda in the 1990s. It also participated in mediation in Mozambique and Angola (1989–91): 93; in UN police contingents in Bosnia, East Timor, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Darfur in the Sudan and in bilateral and multilateral training of defence forces from the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The South African government has requested AFZ instructors’ help in training and modernising the South African Air Force. At regional level, this is the professionalization of SS for human security enhancement. According to Patel (1993: 127), “Zimbabwe’s role in the Angolan peace process was more of a regional one, primarily through a series of summit meeting.” Zimbabwe’s first PSO was the UN deployment in June 1991 at the United Nations Angola Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM II) under the command of General P. V. Sibanda of Zimbabwe. UNAVEM II was established on May 1991 and lasted until February 1995 (UNAVEM II 1991). The respectable discipline, conduct and performance of the ZDF units warranted Zimbabwe a dependable character that managed to further the UN demand for its personnel. This is a testimony of an SSR process at regional and international level in PSO. In this case the SS in Zimbabwe is being enhanced, governed and empowered, based on the strategic threat and needs analysis and not the prescriptive type of SSR from the West which is punitive in nature.
Whilst involved in the internal and regional operations, the ZDF also participated in PSOs in Somalia where General Nyambuya served as the Deputy Force Commander of UNOSOM II of March 1995 (Monographs No. 21 1998). These efforts testify ZDF’s commitment to domestic, regional, and international peace and security and the SSR level of consciousness and process at regional and continental levels in enhancing the professionalization of the SS based on a collective security approach as one of the tenets of the *Ubuntu* philosophy. For that reason, the interventions were essentially part of the SS professionalization process.

### 3.8 THE ZDF 2001-2008

The period 2001 to 2008, was the third decade where security strategy was not completely tenable because of the social, political, and economically difficult conditions. The security strategy was uncertain due to the socio-economic environment in which restrictions and nervousness pervaded state security processes and the society. The opposition parties, internal and external regime change forces perceived security as the protection of the ZANU-PF party and government. In fact, SS and HS are dependent on the armed forces as one of the pillars of power and SS is inherently part of the social fabric.

#### 3.8.1 The ‘straitjacket approach’ 2002

The challenge of SSR without SS and HS relations manifested itself in political, economic, and military questions during this period. Rupiya (2003: 257) observes that,

> on 9 January 2002, the military chiefs made an extraordinary statement setting out the criteria for candidates to contest the country’s presidential office. As they put it, “this was a straightjacket office” whose incumbent had to meet defined criteria. In other words, the action was designed to impact favourably on the prospects of the ruling party’s candidature.

The hypothesis of a ‘straitjacket approach’ was designed to support the revolutionary ethics which brought the independence of Zimbabwe. The reliance on the army to advance political objectives was synonymous to the liberation movement’s model of civil-military relations, the ‘fish and the water’ concept. It should be stated categorically that a prescriptive SSR stands in opposition to and is a threat to SS and HS relations. However, Rupiah’s biased assumption failed to define the contemporary linkages between politics and military as revolutionary entities in Zimbabwe. The liberation movement’s interwoven politico-military relationship acts in support of the survival of the party. This was demonstrated, historically and psychologically, during the liberation epoch in the Nhari Rebellion November 1974 and the Mgagau Declaration October 1975 and ZIPA 1976-78. Therefore, the view that the
The challenge is that, on the one hand, there are those who work tirelessly to try to resolve some of the societal problems in Zimbabwe whilst, on the other hand, there are those who work hard to put emphasis on the given predicament in order to achieve political mileage. From a revolutionary perspective, the ‘strait-jacket approach’ is a logical expansion of the role of the military in the contemporary Zimbabwean politics. SSR consciousness and critical responses to SS and HS relations require a shared struggle. The idea is to influence the way Zimbabweans view their identity as centred, located, oriented, and grounded in order to be re-located economically, politically, historically and socially. Therefore, the Afrocentric approach in the *Ubuntu* framework, seeks to change the Zimbabwean mind-set into regarding themselves as agents in human history in a struggle to eradicate the misconceptions that exist.

### 3.8.2 ‘Operation *Murambatsvina*/Restore Order’ 2005

‘Operation *Murambatsvina*/Restore Order’ 2005 was a social security challenge. However, resolving and accepting contradictions as a way of life can also be a corrective measure. According to the Zimbabwe National Television, 19 May 2005 “the Government of Zimbabwe initiated ‘Operation *Murambatsvina*/Restore Order.” The literal explanation of *Murambatsvina* is ‘getting rid of the filth’ which is restoring order anyway. The operation touched almost each town and rural business centre in Zimbabwe. According to the Zimbabwe National Television, 20 May 2005, “the operation was jointly organised by Local Government and Urban Housing, Home Affairs, and ZRP and Metropolitan cities and councils. The justification was in restoring order and sanity.”

There are criticisms that the destruction of illegal structures and the closure of various informal sector businesses made people homeless and lost their source of livelihood, food and shelter, and disrupted family units’ education. Where the operation constituted serious violations of peoples’ rights, it constituted a contradiction of a correct process, as for instance in Thailand. According to a report by the Associated Press of 9 July 2014

> On Wednesday, July 9, 2014, soldiers in full combat uniforms, some armed, were deployed by Thailand's military junta to one of the country's most crowded beaches to clear away food stalls, massage huts and other illegal vending operations as part of a campaign to clean up the country's image. Troops trudged past surprised tourists along the white sands of Patong Beach
on the popular southern island of Phuket to evict vendors who for years have cluttered the wide beach, making it nearly impossible to walk in some areas. The vendors were blocking the public from using the beach. The beach belongs to the public, not to all the vendors who set up their umbrellas and mats and shops on the beach (Thai soldiers hit beach clean-up campaign 2014).

The ‘Thai clean-up campaign’ was not condemned internally, externally, regionally or internationally. ‘Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order’ was condemned internally by opposition elements and internationally by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues. The UN Special Envoy (2005: 71) indicates that,

The unplanned and over-zealous manner in which the operation was carried out has unleashed chaos and untold human suffering. It has created a state of emergency as tens of thousands of families and vulnerable women and children were left in the open without protection from the elements, without access to adequate water and sanitation or health care, and without food security.” Such conditions are clearly life-threatening. In human settlement terms, the operation has rendered over half a million people, previously housed in so-called substandard dwellings, either homeless or living with friends and relatives in overcrowded and health-threatening conditions. In economic terms, the operation has destroyed and seriously disrupted the livelihoods of millions of people who were coping, however poorly, with the consequences of a prolonged economic crisis.

Nationally these operations had clearance from the authorities as a clean-up campaign to restore order and sanity. From a military perspective, the ‘Thai clean-up campaign’ and Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order’ were designed to evict thieves, vendors, and scoring successes against criminals and restore sanity in both cases. In Zimbabwe, a UN Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe, Report: 2005 observed that “the operation was to prevent mass uprisings against deepening food insecurity and worsening economic conditions.” If it were to prevent mass uprisings, then the state achieved its aim. The challenge was that ‘Operation Restore Order’ was neither conceived collectively in the Cabinet and Parliament (http://hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/SR24-The-Aftermath-of-a-Disastrous-Venture-A-Follow-up-report-on-Operation-Murambatsvina.pdf).

However, it is said that Operation Murambatsvina does not constitute a crime against humanity under the Rome statute; a combination with other factors may have. As a result, the message was clear to those who would build houses without implementing the building by-laws and protecting criminals, that it would be regarded as a national security threat. Consequently ‘Operation Garikayi’ was conceived to settle the effects of Operation Restore Order.
3.8.3 Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle (Stay Well) 2005-2007

*The Herald*, 15 July, 2005, reported that on June 29, the government announced a new phase of the operation called “Operation Garikai” (reconstruction), reportedly to provide decent accommodation to those affected by the evictions and to substantially reduce the urban housing waiting list.

Therefore, ‘Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle’ was a critical response to reinstate those whose homes had been destroyed in the manifestations of a correcting process. Therefore, ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ victims would be provided with better houses under Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle. This is where the Army Engineers Corps was involved in building houses to alleviate the predicament in housing to those whose homes had been destroyed. In this case, the *Ubuntu* philosophy was challenged into modernising the SS and HS relations in providing houses for the community. Although the relations had ups and downs they could not be abandoned because it required a constructive and collective approach with a human face. The challenges of Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle’ process involved SS building community houses. Zami and Lee (2008: 1) observed that misconceptions of the meaning and understanding of ‘Housing’ and ‘House’, and government policy of squatter settlement, inappropriate contextual factors, choice of inappropriate building materials and construction techniques, user participation, obsolescence and overcrowding and inappropriate building standard and by laws are some of the forgotten dimensions [http://www.irbnet.de/daten/iconda/CIB14773.pdf](http://www.irbnet.de/daten/iconda/CIB14773.pdf).

As a result of wrong housing strategies and policies, discrimination in the allocation of new housing was possible. According to Zimbabwe Millennium Development Goals 2000-2007 Mid-Term Progress Report (2009: 81),

the provision of urban accommodation has not kept pace with the increase in demand for housing. Economic challenges have also slowed down the construction of new houses. The Ministry of Local Government has a target of building 250 000 housing units per year, but even with “Operation Garikai/Hlalani kuhle”, has in the past years constructed on average 10 000-15 000 units only.

However, accommodating conflicts as a way of life is also a demonstration of a correct procedure. ‘Operation Garikai/HlalaniKuhle’ was carried out under heavy top-down approaches without any input from concerned people. Therefore, the operations were good for the society but failed in terms of participatory development. It is recommended that the
approach to these challenging issues should be top-down and horizontal in terms of a participatory development approach as an *Ubuntu* philosophical methodology.

### 3.8.4 Operation *Maguta/Inala* 2005-2010

In November 2005, the Zimbabwean Government began the implementation of “Operation *Maguta/Inala*” meaning ‘bumper harvest.’ On 20 November, 20:00 hours (2005), the Zimbabwe national television (ZTV) stated that “the idea was to place the vital process of food production under the control of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and boosting food security through consolidating national strategic grain reserves and reduce food imports.”

Government has decided to intervene in food security and mitigating the threat to peace that normally arises from food shortages because of the attitude of some farmers and enterprises since the start of the Fast Track Land Reform programme. Food security is linked to political stability. To achieve this, it is equally essential for the ZDF to be involved in mainstreaming economic activity as it does in training for and fighting wars in defence of the country. The operational project was carried out in consultation with the Agricultural Extension Service. This meant that the SS had been transformed to suit this HS requirement. According to Operation Maguta Concept Note (2005: 1),

> the ZDF identified former commercial farms and irrigation projects, including state owned irrigation projects that were not producing sufficient food crops. Where there were existing tenants on the land, especially in the irrigation schemes, the tenants were encouraged to grow maize and wheat.

Without adequate food security, defence of the country is untenable. Therefore, food security is the first line of defence. Operation Maguta Concept Note (2005: 2) indicates that, “tillage services were provided by the state under the supervision by ZDF on the condition that the produce was to be sold to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB).” In this instance, the threat of food insecurity demanded that measures be undertaken to achieve food security for a peaceful and stable environment. The challenge is how the Parliament, should support military’s operations in housing projects and food security campaigns as part of SS and HS relations based on *Ubuntu* philosophy. The new Constitution of Zimbabwe No. 20 (2013: 86) state that “the powers to deploy ZDF internally and externally are invested in the Commander-in-chief of the Defence Force.”

The Constitution of Zimbabwe No. 20 (212) (2013: 10) indicates that, “the function of the ZDF is to protect Zimbabwe, its people, its national security and interest and its territorial
integrity and to uphold this constitution.” Therefore, this is the protection and safeguarding of the people, the structures and institutions of the society from insecurity which is interwoven in a network of systems and sub-systems of social, cultural, economic, political, judicial, scientific, technological, and military strategic relationships.

The ZDF did not stand in the SADC region alone; it was involved in humanitarian and natural disaster rescue, internally and regionally in Namibia, Zambia and Mozambique. (www.pindula.co.zw/Zimbabwe_National_Army). This is an SSR process within the SADC region. The challenge is that SSR calls are prescriptive, ideological and destructive as negative regime change agenda. Africa is probably the earliest habitat in the world, but it is the last to be made truly habitable. African societies are not the closest culturally to the Western world, but they have been undergoing the most rapid westernisation. It is the most centrally located continent in the world, but it is the most peripheral politically” (vibeghana.com/.../the-map-of-ghana-sits-precariously-on-africas-left-lower). Westernisation therefore is a threat to African norms and value systems within and outside the security sector and social realms.

Bellamy (2003:1) postulates that, “although the reforms of regional security sectors along democratic lines provide an important opportunity to improve regional peace and security it is fraught with problems.” The challenge is that any holistic transformation in Africa is basically of Western origin. In this case the aim of Western philosophy in security studies is to separate the civil from the military institutions.

The ZDF legal framework based on the new Constitution of Zimbabwe No. 20 of 2013, provides the Zimbabwe National Defence Policy (1997), Defence Act 96 (1) [Chapter 11:02], Defence Committee Systems and Parliamentary Oversights as practical legal mechanisms for the ZDF. These are the regulatory management instruments for command and control of the ZDF. Without the adherence to these frameworks there is a danger that the ZDF may become a ‘runaway gun’. That is why Zimbabwe is currently experiencing peace and stability.

Zimbabwe’s economy began to degenerate in the 1990s, owing primarily to prevalent corruption, failure to exploit and account for the natural resources of minerals and declining foreign investment (African Economic Outlook 2013.) In this environment state security evolves and adapts to the changes and needs of its immediate internal and external environment. Thus, in the process of mutating roles, the SS addresses the wider human needs
as enshrined in HS security concept; comprehensively understood to include helping victims of floods, feeding the hungry, caring for the sick, and housing the needy.

In (CMR) terms this approach is understood as Military Assistance to a Civil Ministry. In this case the military assistance was in Agriculture. Gono (2006: 2) states that,

Zimbabweans should applaud the Zimbabwe Defence Forces for taking up the challenge by strapping their guns on their backs and rolling up their sleeves to till the land under Operation Maguta. Under this programme, no doubt, a huge food gap will be closed, effectively saving foreign exchange to go towards other priority sectors of the economy.

In China, Cheung (2001: 27) observes

the production of PLA rules should not be confined to agriculture and sideline production. PLA units that have the necessary conditions may exploit mines with local support or undertake paid construction jobs for the localities such as the construction of roads, or electric power stations.

Duff (2011: 259) states that “Zimbabwe has faced a food deficit of about 1.2 million tonnes of cereals and non-food requirement.” This has happened for several consecutive years, and fears of food riots and the desire to be less dependent on international aid for reasons of sovereignty, also provided motives for the ZNA to be involved in food security programmes. History has signposted the role of the military in housing, clean up campaigns and agriculture.

According to Decker and Flynn (2009:1), “agricultural investments are substantially higher in countries where a military fort is present, suggesting that military forts stimulated agricultural development on the Great Plains.” Therefore, military forts stimulated agricultural development in America. Nichols (1970: 213) states that
during the decade following the war in 1812, the military in America became pioneer farmers. They ploughed, planted, cultivated, and harvested many common crops and also raised large herds of cattle and hogs.

Therefore, whether stimulating or sustaining agricultural development, it demonstrates the extent of military contribution to agricultural products. In Uganda, Olekma (2014:2) observed that Museveni deployed the army to save the agriculture sector from collapse (http://m.news24.com/kenya/MyNews24/). In pre-colonial Africa, in general, traditional warriors during peace time were involved in shelter and agricultural projects. Therefore, SSR is not a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe but a process which is indigenously driven, centred and located in the *Ubuntu* philosophy as part of the warriors and human security relations although there were no written legal frameworks but taken as value systems.
3.9 THE ZDF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

The liberation struggle was turning the victims of imperialism and colonialism into defenders of their own national gains, interests, values for peace and security. There are many rules and laws that pertain to a society, but none of them can ever overrule the ones that are clearly stated in that country's constitution.


The main focus of the LHA Constitution 1979 was the defence force, establishment, structure, responsibility, operations and administration and the role of the Defence Forces Commission (DFC). Thereafter the LHA Constitution was amplified by the Zimbabwe Defence Act 1986 [Chapter: 11:02] and any State Instruments made by Parliament. The period 1980 to 2000 saw major changes through Statutory Instruments (IS), amplified by circulars.

The Draft Constitution of 2000 tried to present a break from colonialism legal settings, but unfortunately it ended in a 'no vote'. However, it set the basic foundation of an indigenous not exogenous constitution. The Kariba Draft Constitution of 2007, although with some political conflict among the politicians, brought a new era for the ZDF in that the Constitution of 2013’s provisions did not change anything. It was just a replica of the Kariba Draft Constitution 2007. Chapter 1, part 1 of 206 (1) states that, “national security objectives of Zimbabwe must reflect the determination of Zimbabweans to live as equals in liberty, peace and harmony, free from fear and in prosperity.” It details the founding values and principles, national security objectives and political accountability as a human security aspect.

3.9.2 The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013)

A clear hierarchy of authority on defence matters rests with the Supreme Command vested in the President as Commander-in-Chief. The Commander Defence Forces (CDF) and every Commander of ZDF branches are appointed by the President as prescribed by the Defence Act 1996. The Commander of the Defence Forces (CDF) enjoys executive command implemented under the direction of the Minister of Defence (MoD) in times of peace and under the direction of the President during times of national defence. However, for operational purposes, the Defence Councils and Committee Systems are the operational
bodies for national security. Section 212 of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 86) has expanded the mandate of the ZDF in such a way as to necessitate a review of the activities and operational concepts within SS and HS relations especially on interests. Section 212 of the Constitution (2013: 86) provides the function of the Defence Forces as “to protect Zimbabwe, its people, its national security, interests, territorial integrity and to uphold the Constitution”. In this context, the ZDF is the only institution that has this mandate.

The above mentioned primary mandate does not mean that, the ZDF should be confined to the barracks, or to one activity or specific area of human endeavour. It is not in tandem with the letter and spirit of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013). Interpreting and explaining the implications of the programme, as well as operational concepts of the ZDF in view of the mandate of the ZDF as contained in Section 212 of the new Constitution Zimbabwe (2013) is essential.

Protection is the notion of keeping the population from harm and, in legal terms, Zimbabwe refers to the geographical entity and boundaries as well its airspace. This entails taking an interest in the protection of the environment, mineral resources, water bodies and other natural resources. The idea of ‘its people’ applies to all those who are its citizens and residents with work permits, visitors and those in transit. What constitutes a people of a nation is, not only the physical human beings but includes those peoples’ identities, values, culture, aspirations and vision. Protection of a people extends to preservation of the people’s concepts, practices, traditions and ideas. The use of the term ‘safeguarding’ when referring to people extends to keeping them safe. This entails rescuing, when necessary, or taking proactive measures to ensure protection and safeguarding them from endangerment.

The ZDF is legitimately prepared to embark on operations or missions to perform this duty in times of national disasters and incidents of xenophobia, to mention a few. Other countries such as the USA, in particular, is so patriotic that its Government makes an effort to identify and ascertain the conditions of its nationals worldwide whenever there is a disaster or upheaval in a particular country and it is prepared to facilitate repatriation of its nationals seeking assistance with respect, courtesy, and promptness. The USA has an intimate understanding and clarity regarding its values, vision, and national interests.
There is a need to develop and articulate a national vision in Zimbabwe that will engender a sense of pride, belonging, and patriotism. The UK has a vision to influence the world and call itself Great Britain despite a smaller population than China or India; English is also the language of business all over the world. The Chinese, despite their superiority in numbers and robust economy and development, are learning English. One aspect that the Western ideas inculcated in Africans as a people was an idea of inferiority in respect of our culture, language, food, security system, and philosophy. Zimbabweans should create their own values in the security sector, politics, sports, and economics of life and human activity.

Accordingly, as part of the social fabric, the ZDF’s functions and roles should include the articulation, dissemination and dispersal of a national vision and values which are protected and defended for the safety of its people. It is also pertinent to note that the duty or obligation to safeguard is not only restricted to the physical entities such as borders, airspace, territory or people but extends to issues such as values, culture and or ‘national interests’ which can be economic, political, cultural, social etc. Assuming that warfare is now asymmetric, as well as winning the hearts and minds of the citizens, the obligation to safeguard and protect ‘its people’ now includes, or implies, that the ZDF activities in the discharge of its mandate should extend to taking active participation in ensuring that its people are also protected from all forms of warfare, harm, and physical and psychological harm.

The new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 86) takes mandate of the ZDF as encapsulated in Section 212 of cognisance of the changes and development in the methods of warfare. The ZDF has a duty to ensure that in the discharge of its mandate it is proactive in safeguarding the people, and their interests through the identification and preservation of society’s national vision values, and culture. The new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013:87) provides for the authority of the President to deploy forces in defence of Zimbabwe; in support of the Police in the maintenance of public order; and in the occurrence of emergency or disaster management. In this case, the SS is functioning in tandem with HS issues.

According to the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 86), section 213, only the President as Commander-in-chief of the Defence Forces has power to authorise the deployment of the Defence Forces, determine the operational use of the Defence Forces, in support of the Police Service in maintenance of public order in support of other civilian authorities in the event of an emergency or disaster. With the authority of the President, the Defence Forces
may be deployed outside Zimbabwe on peace-keeping missions, operations under the auspices of the UN organisation, of which Zimbabwe is a member; and defence of the territorial integrity of a foreign country in fulfilment of an international commitment, or in defence of Zimbabwe’s national security or national interests.

Therefore ‘national interests’ in this case, given that it has been identified and singled out in specific terms as an element which the ZDF is mandated to defend, focuses on the country’s goals and ambitions whether economic, military, social, cultural etc. National security, another aspect that the ZDF is constitutionally mandated to defend, is the requirement to maintain the survival of the State through the use of military, political, economic, and diplomatic power projection. Therefore, security threats involve not only conventional foes, but also include national disasters and environmental damage, among others.

In view of the given definitions of ‘national interests’ and ‘security interests’, the question that arises is whether there is any justification for the inclusion of sub-section 4 of Section 208 of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 85) which “prohibits the employment or engagement of members of the security services in civilian institutions, except in periods of public emergency.” However, the moment the SS acts in periods of public emergency they become part of the social fabric. Therefore, should members of the ZDF be confined to barracks despite them having skills, knowledge, and competencies that can be effectively utilized in civilian institutions simply because they are in the ZDF? What of the qualities of discipline, integrity, commitment, a culture of hard work and record of accomplishment with excellence of execution that the ZDF is reputed to have? Should the ZDF not be used to the fullest extent? Are such qualities not required particularly in those fields of endeavour where civilians would have failed the nation, in particular where corruption has been endemic?

Through attachment or deployment of its members to national institutions such as the National Railways of Zimbabwe, Air Zimbabwe, or parastatals institutions in mining, agriculture or environment and institutions of economic interests to the nation, ZDF secure these institutions through their superior training, discipline, sense of commitment and patriotism as well as effective utilisation and application of their skills, knowledge and competencies. Is the ZDF not fulfilling its constitutional mandate, as defined by Section 212 of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 86), to ensure that such institutions do not collapse through corrupt activities or mismanagement?
Contrary to this narrow view, as sub-section 4 of Section 208 of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 85) would imply, that “the function of the ZDF should be restricted to, or limited to, defence of the borders and air space of Zimbabwe,” a closer look at Section 212 of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 86) reveals that “the protection of the territorial integrity of Zimbabwe is but one of the elements that the Defence Forces are mandated to protect.” Should it not be the role and mandate of the military to develop and establish institutions that specialise in research on issues such as food production, among others? Section 208, of the Constitution (2013:85) which seeks to “prohibit the military from attachment to civilian institutions” has no place as it runs contrary to the mandate as espoused in Section 212 of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 86).

Deployment of the ZDF outside Zimbabwe ‘in defence of Zimbabwe’s national security or national interests’ as provided for in Section 213 (3) (d) of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013: 86) should see more members of the ZDF being attached to international governmental organisations such as SADC, AU and the UN, to mention a few. Their presence in such organisations would, *inter alia*, serve as an early warning system in terms of the thinking behind the formulation of certain positions on issues that will be decided or debated upon, and certain crucial decisions taken.

It is in the SADC, AU and the UN, organisations that policies are formulated, ideas are generated, resolutions and decisions made, which result in the signing and adoption of treaties and conventions which are more often than not designed to further, and or protect the economic, social and political interests of those states whose nationals hold positions or serve in the said organisations. It is therefore necessary for Zimbabwe to carry out a study on the number of Zimbabwean nationals who are office bearers in SADC, AU and UN in order to justifiably conclude that Zimbabwe is under-represented in most of these organisations. It is the Constitutional mandate of the ZDF to ensure that Zimbabwe’s national security and national interests are not only defended but also enhanced by taking a conscious and deliberate decision to deploy and attach its members in such organisations to help in the formulation of ideas, policies, resolutions, and decisions which would ensure the protection of Zimbabwe’s interests. The USA ensure that the UN is well packed with its nationals and West African States fight tooth and nail to ensure that the AU is staffed by their nationals. Why not Zimbabwe?
It could be arguably said that those states with a majority of office bearers in SADC, AU, and UN have identified what their national interests are, and how effectively their involvement and participation in such organisations enhances and protects them at regional, continental, or international levels. A possible entry point is for the ZDF, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), to intensify the identification and engagement of those Zimbabwean nationals in International Governmental Organizations (IGO), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), International Business Organisations (IBO), etc. Offer them moral support where they need it so that they, reciprocally, develop some attachment of the Zimbabwean fundamental values, national vision, security, values and interests in order to assist their country of origin politically, economic, social and cultural.

Another responsibility of the ZDF as espoused by the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013:86) is “to uphold this Constitution”. The term ‘uphold’, specifically means support, sustain, maintain, defend, advocate, endorse, espouse, hold up, encourage, finance, sponsor or boost. What this implies is that the ZDF should study and have an intimate knowledge of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) in order to champion its cause through, *inter alia*, ensuring that every other institution adheres to these provisions. It is and will also remain the responsibility of the ZDF to remind other institutions ‘to uphold’ the constitution and the need to adhere to its provisions, particularly in times of crisis, be they political or otherwise.

In Zimbabwe if the ZDF stands out on these issues it is viewed by some international actors as supporting the political structure of the day. But as demonstrated and strengthened in Malawi during the political crisis that followed the sudden death of President Bingu wa Mutharika on 5 April 2012, the Ministry of Defence upheld the Malawian Constitution and advocated adherence to its provisions in a situation where politicians would have, if they had their own way, acted unconstitutionally to seize power.

The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) Chapter 11 part 1, 208 (2) (a), 208 (4), 211 (3), should be read in conjunction with 60 (1) and 67 (1) (b). Article 208 (2) (a) states that ‘the ZDF should not act in a partisan manner.’ As it stands, it means not to be prejudiced in favour of a particular party when on duty or in uniform. Article 208 (4) indicates that “serving members of the security service must not be employed or engaged in civilian institutions except in periods of public emergency.” Therefore, emergencies are incidents that threaten public safety. In the ZDF, members are already employed by the government and do not engage in civil institutions, they are seconded to civilian institution on request to assist, promote and
support strategic key issues. The request is normally through the National Security Council which is not a preview of the general public. As a result, there is no need for article 211 (3) on non-partisan behaviour because the security services are not allowed to act in a partisan manner in the exercise of their duty. What our constitution needs in order to bring coherence is to pronounce a clear definition of public emergency, non-partisan and articulation of the key components. If one is allowed to vote, obviously he/she is partisan and supported by article 60 (1) on the freedom of conscience to include freedom of thought, opinion, religion and belief. This, consequently, is so because article 67 (1) (b) indicates that “every Zimbabwean citizen has the right to make political choice freely.” In the Uganda, constitution 1995 article 78 (1) (ii) in the 9th Parliament there are 10 parliamentary posts for the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPF) in Parliament. In Burma (Myanmar) memberships of the House of Representatives consist of 440 members of which 330 are directly elected and 110 appointed by the Myanmar Armed Forces. The PLA in China hold about 9 percent of the total delegate seats in Parliament (The People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) is the armed force of China under the leadership of the Communist Party).

The challenge is that our Constitution of Zimbabwe is Eurocentric and should be Afrocentric, grounded on the founding values and principles of Zimbabweans as enshrined in the Constitution article (3). The survival and continuity of a constitution and constitutional democracy lies squarely in the hands of the ZDF. Through its institutions such as National Defence College (NDC), Zimbabwe Staff Colleges (ZSC), various ZDF schools, the ZDF is duty-bound to champion the cause of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013). Through such institutions, the ZDF ensures that there is a thorough and intimate knowledge and understanding of its provisions by all and sundry. Otherwise, how can the ZDF defend, advocate and uphold the Constitution unless its members fully understand what it provides. This is a responsibility that the ZDF takes seriously with deliberate and intentional steps to ensure that the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) in its entirety is not only protected and defended but upheld, sustained and supported at all times.

The professionalism of the ZDF is through proper mechanisms and practices based on national ethos; ‘to protect and uphold’ means issues of values, vision, national security and interests of the country as the founding values and principles. It is not associated with corruption, laziness, dependency, moral decadency, theft, greed, and selfishness. For that reason, ZDFs functions, roles and objectives have to entail the definition, articulation,
dissemination, and inculcation of the national values, vision and national interest to ensure that people are protected and defended for the benefit of the future generation.

The above mentioned ideals are a responsibility that the ZDF must take seriously through deliberate and intentional steps to ensure that the Constitution, in its entirety, is not only protected and defended but upheld, sustained and supported at all times. This is about the self-realisation and manifestation of human beings in harmonious relations with each other. This is where the Defence Council (policy) and Defence Committee (exercises powers of command and administrative control) systems come into play. The formulation of policies is a constant process of assessment, reviewing, monitoring, evaluation, and implementation process of adaptation. As a result, the ZNDP of 1997 should be reviewed and developed in line with the contemporary geo-strategic environmental developments nationally, regionally and internationally.

3.10 DEFENCE COUNCILS AND COMMITTEES SYSTEMS

Various defence councils and committee systems are presided over by, or are mainly organised or influenced by civilians in strict adherence to the Constitution of Zimbabwe, ZNDP, legislation, and international law. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) basic guidelines according to the ZNDP (1997: 17) are that “the civilians formulate Defence Policy (Council) and the Military executes the policy (committee). Civilians are responsible for the political dimensions of the ZDF and senior military officers assist the civilians on a collaborative basis (operational).” The MoD according to the ZNDP (1997: 17) also respects “the right and duty of Parliament to exercise independent and critical judgment on ZNDP mechanisms, and practices” and is very clear on the necessity for the promotion of gender balance in the ZDF.

The Zimbabwe Defence Amendment Bill (1993) saw the creation of a single command of the ZDF. The restructuring of the ZDF programme was introduced in response to the changing demands of the national and regional security environment. The changing demands were through a restructuring exercise which included the establishment of an integrated MoD Headquarters with civilian and military personnel working side by side cementing the civil-military relations aspect.

The command structure was to streamline the direction and co-coordinating the functions of the ZNA and the AFZ under the Commander Defence Forces (CDF), based at the Ministry
of Defence. As an indigenous reform process the ZDF Annual Report (1993) indicated that the reduction of the ZNA from 51 000 to 40 000 officers and troops, and an increase in the AFZ from 4 000 to 5000 was achieved. The ZNDP's vision is to provide the nation with a Defence Force that is responsive, versatile, strong, resilient and sustainable as a source of pride for the nation. The ZNDP (1997: 12-20) laid down the provisions which outline the principles, structures, responsibilities, and relationships necessary to secure sound civil-military relations in that the MoD is accountable to Parliament for the activities of the ZDF (See Appendix D on Civil Military Relations).

The SSR concept is a challenge in terms of what it is, and what constitutes its objectives, intentions, and purposes. SSR in Zimbabwe is not accepted as it stands and has no provision in the relevant legislation, and one can observe the professionalization in the ZNDP (1997). Operational provisions are through the Defence Councils and Committees systems as essential tools of defence institution building and management. The Zimbabwe National Defence Policy (1997:15-16) indicated at strategic level four defence councils which ensure implementation of the Zimbabwe government policy on defence:

- **State Defence Council**, the President is the Chairman with the Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance, State Security and CDF, Ex-Office are Commander ZNA, AFZ, Commissioner ZRP and Director General President’s Office. AFZ. They formulate National Security objectives and devise the Grand National Strategy among others);

- **Defence Policy Council**, the Minister of Defence is the Chairman with the Commander Defence Forces, Commander ZNA, AFZ and Minister of Finance as the Ex-Office, approves Defence Command Council resolutions on strategy, military doctrine and other policy papers;

- **Defence Command Council**, the CDF is the Chairman with Commander ZNA, AFZ, Chiefs of Staff Operation and Plans, Support Services and Logistics. They develop military strategies to conform with the Grand National Strategy and design the Military Doctrine among others;

- **Programming and Planning Council**, the Permanent Secretary is the Chairman, CDF Chief of Operation and Plans, Deputy Secretaries for Administration and Finance,
Policy and Procurement. In attendance are the Chiefs of Staff of ZNA and AFZ who approve, revise and update Staff Committee plans, among others.

At military operational level there are seven Defence Committee systems which implement the policy and monitor operations. Membership and functional are not designated in the ZNDP (1997), however, they are the Operations Staff Committee, Programming and Planning Staff Committee, Policy Staff Committee, Logistic Staff Committee, Manpower Resource Staff Committee, Equipment Approvals Staff Committee and Acquisition Staff Committee.

Within these systems approach, the bulk of decision-making takes place on debates about major issues as an accountability framework in defence matters. These structures are a testimony of an SSR critical response process locally owned, managed and sustained at a high level of consciousness. As a result, the *Ubuntu* philosophy, based on the elements of excellence, sense of responsibility, creativity, innovation, hard work, morality, honesty, fairness, courage, selflessness, and focus is the means as well as the goal through the defence councils, committees systems and civil military relations.

### 3.11 CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS (CMR)

CMR, essentially, is a process for SS and HS relations, whose primary purpose is to explore the challenges of establishing self-government, accountability, and civilian control over the military (See Appendix D of the ZNDP 1997, Civil Military Relations). The challenge is that there is no universally acknowledged definition of CMR. People tend to attach an understanding of the concept of CMR as an instrument for relations between the military and society. CMR is in fact very context specific. Therefore, local ownership of CMR is central, although implementation is problematic in that CMR should move gradually in stages to eliminate the deep-rooted division between the states, the security sectors and society.

Bryden (2010:187) observes that

> CMR is about altering the relations of power within the security sector in the direction of civil and constitutional controls to transform the institutional culture, promote professionalism, and improve personnel management, resource utilisation, and operational effectiveness on the side of the security forces and better policy management on the side of civil authorities.

Authority and control of the ZDF require the active role of a properly qualified civil authority with a sense of national vision, values, interest, and sense of belonging that can properly manage and monitor the defence management system because the ZDF is subordinate to the elected civil authority. The complication concerns functional effective structures, processes, standards
and attitudes that shape decisions about the CMR. Parliamentarians should exercise their functional power and attitudes in relation to the duty of representing the whole spectrum of their citizens’ interests including the ZDF. Turner and Hogan (2006: 29) observe that, political issues always involve compelling interests that need to be reconciled. Political party discipline leaves politicians with little, if any room to depart from the sanctioned policy of the ruling party. Party discipline effectively transfers the negotiation, bargaining and compromise from the parliamentary chamber to the internal party debating room. This erodes the capacity of politicians to assess individually what is best in the public interest.

It may be assumed that generally the parliamentarians are more absorbed in ensuring their political safety through party discipline than the national interests and safety of the citizens. At the individual level, the parliamentarians are often eager to remain in the good books of influential officials in both civilian and military decision-making bodies. They are more concerned about maintaining good relations with the President or Prime Minister rather than looking after those who elected them. Turner and Hogan (2006:29) state that “the effect of such a disempowerment attitude is that parliamentary oversight often comes across as being ornamental, decorative, rubber stamped and appendages of their respective executives.”

Thus, parliamentary oversight may not be the ‘cure-all’. One may say that there is need for effective and practical mechanisms to be considered and enforced in addressing the functional role of parliamentary oversight. The ZDF’s basic needs approaches are the entry point through professionalism driven by national concerns, threats, and needs, respecting its revolutionary professional responsibilities. The development of such professionalism should be founded on a close relationship with the society through institutionalized principles, mechanism and practices that are locally owned and shaped.

Such a process will entail the strengthening of the executive and legislative bodies, justice institutions, statutory security services, civil organisations, and independent oversight bodies in the direction of CMR. In other words, the assumption is that there is a need for a collective approach and understanding of the role of the CMR. The issue is more about administration and management through the legal framework in order to enhance the professional performance of the ZDF. The struggle for independence, freedom, and self-governance remains the core purpose of the revolutionary people of Zimbabwe. The struggle was essentially about freedom, land, livelihood, adequate food, employment, shelter, basic health, and education, among others.
According to Rebecca (1995: 7), “three partners, the military, the political elite and the citizenry have a duty to aim for a relationship.” During the liberation struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the three components were also distinct. Thus, Rebecca proposed a high level of harmony between the politicians, military and the society as civil-military relationships that should be established and strengthened see Figure 3.1 below.

**Figure 3.1: CMR, Societal Hierarchy**

The Politicians

Security sector

Society

**Source:** Rebecca (1995:7)

Hyden (1967:29) states that

the answer to the relationship between politicians, military and society is deeply influenced by national history, interests, values, culture and traditions. The situation depends on the role of the army as a state institution in a given country, subordination of the military to political authorities as defined in laws and constitutional arrangements. Public perceptions of military personnel, the respect of the military officer’s profession, public opinion and certain actions of the army, determine it.

Therefore, the relationship is permanently changing because both society and the military are constantly changing as well.

If SSR is should be deeply influenced by national history, interests, values, culture, national security and interests. Nilufer (2000: 22) states that “the relationship assumes accommodation and shared objectives among the military, political elites, and the citizenry.” Therefore, the relationship is viewed in the same vein as the constructivist theoretical framework through the idea of shared objectives, and values as part of the *Ubuntu* tenets. For that reason, as a people-centred approach, dialogue and accommodation explains the relationship between the politicians, the security sector, and society as a civil-military relation process.
It is encouraging that parliamentary oversight of the ZDF through the Portfolio Committee on Defence, Peace and Security, manage and oversee the activities of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The capacity among the civil authorities could be enhanced through educational training and mentoring programmes between the politicians, security sector and the society. Capacity building leading to the identification of legitimate local notions and the provision of crucial legitimacy to outcomes of the *Ubuntu* tenets should be discussed. The attention should be on material resources, personnel management, financial resources, information technologies, improved conditions of service, and preserving external and internal relations in accordance with the laws and statutory instruments and the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

The role of the SS as freedom fighters should have been inherited as part of CMR. Instead, the freedom fighters CMR revolutionary model has been narrowed down to settler-colonial roles. The use of SS since 1980 was probably seen as the instrument through which the revolutionaries, general populace, war veterans and the ruling elite could remain in power. The developmental role of the liberation fighters during and after independence degenerated from its previous position as the peoples force. Ambert (1997: 21) observes that “if development paradigms are to respond to the requirements of new economic conditions and constraints, issues surrounding human safety and national security will have to be reconciled with the wider development agenda.” The challenge is about establishing the relationship between SS and HS in carrying out SSR processes linking the relationship to development.

### 3.12 SSR IN THE ZNDP

The accomplishment and challenge of the ZDF and SSR policy framework is contained in the ZNDP of 1997. In fact the ZNDP (1997) indicates that the ZDF is considerably more advanced in SSR when in its foreword in the ZNDP (1997: iii) the Defence Minister, the late Moven Mahachi observes that,

> over the past years, the Defence Forces have undergone major reforms such as re-structuring the Defence Forces in line with the country’s economic reforms undertaken in the 1990s coupled with the development of new capabilities in the area of international peace-keeping operations.

This was confirmed by the then Secretary for Defence, Job Whabira, ZNDP (1997: vii-ix) who observed that the policy document shows that Zimbabwe has embarked upon fundamental transformations of her military organisational structures and policies in order to meet new security challenges that emerge in Southern Africa. The use of the words ‘reforms’
and ‘transformations’ respectively by Whabira and Mahachi, indicate that the ZDF was at an advanced stage about the levels of consciousness in SSR as a process.

The challenge is more about ownership. Who owns the SSR? The voices calling for SSR in Zimbabwe most likely are unaware of the challenges, opportunities and developments that took place in the Zimbabwean security sector. The introduction of the CMR Directorate on the 18th April (2006) is part of the SSR process and is provided for in the ZNDP 1997 (See Appendix D). Additionally, the approval for the establishment of a School of Military Law in August 2008 under the Directorate of Litigation and Training, and the School of Military Intelligence on 18 April 1990 is further evidence of SSR in the ZDF. Metz (2000: 11) believed that there is a need to “develop a well-conceived national, sub-regional and regional security strategy that provides coherent paths towards identifying, advancing and protecting the society’s security.”

3.13 THE ZDF AND GENDER REFORMS

Men and women are equal, although different in terms of bringing human life into being. Therefore, gender reform has become an important and unavoidable subject nationally, regionally, and internationally and, accordingly, gender reforms are intrinsically part of the SSR process in the ZDF. Gender reform in the SS is determined by the culture of a country and how its institutional and legal framework provides for these principles. Gender reforms in the security services have become a subject for debate and consideration. In Ubuntu values, gender concerns are collectively constructed roles, actions, and characteristics that a given society sees as appropriate. The issue is that distinct roles and behaviour may give rise to gender inequalities, e.g. differences between men and women. In turn, such inequalities can lead to inequities between men and women in political participation, status, access to education, health care, resources and opportunities in the security sector.

One of the contemporary challenges, therefore, is about gender governance in the defence and security management systems. In fact, the quest for gender equity has often raised questions as to whether combat readiness is not sacrificed in favour of foreign gender perspectives that ignore scientific and natural basics. Can women be an effective component of the armed forces? Shields (1996: 99) held that “the employment of women in combat related roles will not involve an unacceptable costly adjustment to pressure from modernistic civil society at the expense of operational expediency.”
The ZDF’s emphasis is grounded in the Zimbabwean government’s commitment to a working environment that upholds equal opportunity for all. The gender debate has not been based on the strength of the female force but on optimal utilisation of women in certain fields that are judged to be challenging. In the ZDF women are not appointed to positions that could result in close combat conditions that entail substantial risk of coming under direct enemy fire. The women’s functional roles have been linked to supportive duties such as finance, logistics, intelligence, medical services and social welfare. The issue of combat, in its natural form, has been used in the ZDF as the reason for excluding women from combat appointments.

3.13.1 Female combatants in the military

The historiography of women’s employment in the military in Zimbabwe stretches as far back as the days of settler conquest. Segal (1998: 757) indicates that,

the utilisation of women in the military has been influenced by factors such as the national security situation, combat support ratio and prevailing social value systems at given historical epochs. It became fashionable for those termed as radical feminists to blame the perceived exploitation of women on men. They viewed society as patriarchal, dominated and ruled by men who are the main beneficiaries of women’s subordination.

Hardy and Clegg (1999: 369) note that,

the definition of gender, which presents the negative rather than the positive aspects of power, has been challenged, critiqued, extended and rebuffed over the years but, nonetheless, remains the starting point for a diversity of literature. In this case, it seems that radical feminists propose to see a social order based on female values, and thus recognising the special qualities of women.

Segal (1998: 776) argues that,

Marxists and social feminists see capitalism as the source of women’s oppression and they argue that capitalists gain from women’s unpaid work as housewives and the sexual division of work that relegates women into lowly paid inferior status jobs.

Stuart (1992:173) argues that, Marxian philosophy proposes cooperation between women and the working class (men) to fight capitalist exploitation.” This may be the rationale behind the incorporation of women as frontline combatants during the armed struggle. It can be said definitely that ZANLA and ZIPRA women combatants performed very well in most battles during the war of liberation.
3.13.2 Operational effectiveness of women in combat

Women’s effectiveness should be linked to job performance if operational effectiveness of female combatants is to be part of gender reforms in the ZDF. There are views that, women are less effective in combat operations. Those taking a biological perspective, such as Heinecken (1998: 6) argues that, “the combat performance of women is inhibited by gynaecological imperatives; their comparative lack of physical strength and endurance.” The general assumption is that women get exhausted sooner than men and women take longer to regain their full strength to the extent that they cannot cope with the physical demands of the operational environment. However, technological advancements are now placing emphasis on mental capabilities and cognitive functions as factors essential for operational proficiency and effectiveness.

3.13.3 Challenges of gender equity

The quest for gender equality in the military and related security establishments has raised complex institutional challenges. In the ZDF, observation indicated that social demands of motherhood and those of duty effectiveness in the military are difficult to balance considering the fact that some appointments and missions in the military take long to accomplish. The growing number of single parent families and lack of child-care facilities in the ZDF also can be a distressing social issue. Experience in the ZDF has shown that the rationale behind most women leaving the ZDF before their pensionable period seems to be the fact that women often face difficulties in balancing the demands of motherhood and martial life.

The ZDF’s experiences of women combatants in combat roles stretches back to the days of the liberation struggle. At the attainment of independence in 1980, a significant number of those women who participated in the armed struggle joined the ZDF at various levels of command. According to the ZNDP (1997: 49), “Government recognizes the important role played by women during the struggle for and after independence. The Government acknowledges the right of women to compete for all ranks and posts including combat positions, depending on their capabilities. Currently, the Zimbabwe Military Academy (ZMA) is in the process of selecting and training women in the 1996-97 regular cadet training programme.”
This is in line with the Zimbabwe government’s deliberate policy of promoting gender equality, which significantly responded to national societal demands on gender balance without necessarily compromising combat effectiveness. The ZNDP (1997: 51) acknowledge that “in order to ensure participation of women in the Defence Forces at different levels, a deliberate quota system policy for recruitment, promotion and assignment in special missions should be adopted in the Defence forces.”

This upholds the right for women to serve in all ranks and positions. The deliberate quota system is still a challenge and this will be discussed in the chapter on findings of this thesis. However, the ZNDP (1997: 50) observe that “women will continue to have an important role to play in the Defence Forces.” Women have been employed in a variety of duties such as administration, logistics, intelligence, signals, education and other related professional fields with outstanding results.

The above statement strengthens the notion that women are not yet employed in combat roles. The ZDF Annual Report (2008: 9) indicates that,

By 2008, the highest rank attained by women in the ZDF was that of a Colonel in the Army and Group Captain in the Air Force. In the army, three women against the backdrop of sixty male Colonels held the appointments of Colonel Careers, Colonel Director Protocol and Colonel Combat Capabilities.

A number of women were in positions of lieutenant colonels, majors and captains. When the ZDF effectively increased efforts on gender balance, efforts were made to recruit women on regular officers’ cadet courses, both in the ZNA and AFZ. The numbers of women employed in different ranks will be discussed in Chapter five as findings of gender focus group.

Women cadets underwent the same rigorous training, requiring physical and mental demands for 18 months with their male counterparts. The first cadet course that trained the first female pilot was in 1996, according to the ZDF records. The ZDF Annual Report (2008: 8) indicates that,

no favours were extended to either sex or, where allegations of sexual abuse were made instant commissions of inquiry were appointed. What made the training more effective was a balance of women and male instructors at both Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officer levels. Quality was not compromised at all because, among the graduates of initial 200 cadets, 50 were women. Out of the 100 commissioned by the Commander-in-Chief of the ZDF, 20 were women. The dropout rate of women to men was 3:7 respectively.
Whilst issues pertaining to gender balance have surfaced, and challenges have been encountered, the ZDF successfully promoted the government policy on gender balance without necessarily compromising quality and efficiency particularly in operations. The ZDF has been recruiting, promoting, and appointing women to positions commensurate with their ability. The ZDF Board of Enquiry (2006:16) has shown that, there has been some interference from other quarters such as women’s pressure groups and NGOs which were, perhaps, misled by some incompetent females who, after failing to make the required grade in particular appointments or during recruitment, selection and promotion examinations, misrepresented facts to settle personal scores. The ZDF is managing gender equity as grounded and located within the *Ubuntu* philosophy as an Afrocentric approach and notes that gender equity is a dimension of defence, selection, and promotion in security management under the ‘equal opportunities’ conception.

### 3.13.4 Critical observations and opinions

The ZDF has long been involved in SSR. Calls by internal and external political forces for SSR and gender reforms in Zimbabwe are viewed by the military as an asymmetric warfare between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. SSR in Zimbabwe should be SSA through a theoretical framework of *Ubuntu*, based on national vision, values and interests acting as lenses through which facts are organised, understood and developed. Gender equity is one of the dimensions of defence and security management under the ‘equal opportunities’ concept and is a part of the SSR process. There have been challenges over how the enrolment and promotion of women in the defence and security departments can be balanced against the aspect of operational effectiveness. During the Zimbabwean armed struggle, the liberation forces were holistically focused, with each military team comprising officers in charge of political mobilisation, health, education, logistics, and military strategy. Thus, a holistic approach to SSR based on a collective approach - ‘finger theory.’

SSR begins by strengthening ZDF national capacity in defence, diplomacy, economics, development, and intelligence in order to pursue security, values, and interests for national and security interests. Enhancing security involves effective management of emergencies, engaging with people, securing cyber space, investing in people and technology, and strengthening partnerships, as well as building cooperation with international partners, increasing investment in development and spending taxpayers’ dollars wisely through
increased transparency and strengthening norms and acting against corruption is the spirit of *Ubuntu* philosophy.

### 3.14 SSR AS AN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE MATRIX

In Zimbabwe, SSR as a Eurocentric manifestation could be viewed as an asymmetric warfare matrix where an enemy thinks or acts differently from the traditional warfare matrix. Asymmetric approaches can generate dramatic outcomes for a weaker power. Likewise, the ZDF should strengthen processes that constantly keep the prospects of asymmetric threat at a distance. It could be easily argued that asymmetric warfare is part of soft power with more precedence than soft power. Copeland (2010: 1) observes that “hard power is about compelling your adversary to comply with your will through the threat or use of force. Soft power is about attracting your partner to share your goals through dialogue and exchange.”

To date, Zimbabwe is under asymmetric attacks and economic disruptions from the West. Zimbabwe needs to acknowledge contemporary realities and employ soft power, the full range of tools at its disposal including diplomatic, economic, political, legal, and cultural solutions, and selecting the right tool, or a combination of tools, for each situation. In order for any state, Zimbabwe included, to keep extremism and asymmetric threat at bay, elements of soft power must be exploited. Conclusively, as long as any state prefers other means, especially hard power over soft power to solving disputes or quarrels in domestic and international relations, the scourge of terrorism and its asymmetric threat would haunt it because unrest, domestic or international, will accentuate the threat and resources. Asymmetric warfare preys on unrest.

Paul (2001: 5) observes that “asymmetric warfare is a conflict between two sides that have a large disparity in political, economic and military power.” As a result, in asymmetric warfare, fighting occurs on the economic, political, diplomatic, social, and military fronts when conducive. Fagan and Munck (2009: 286) observed that “asymmetric warfare is mostly characterised by the battle of the mind; those who do battle knowing this, will win and those who do battle without knowing this, will lose.”

Generally, in interstate affairs asymmetric warfare can be a conflict involving two states with unequal overall military and economic power resources and could comprise individuals, groups, or communities. Realising some of these shortcomings in defining asymmetric warfare, Hess and Orthmann (2012: 382) define asymmetric warfare as “Leveraging inferior
tactical or operational strength against the vulnerabilities of an opponent to achieve disproportionate effects with the aim of undermining the opponents’ will in order to achieve asymmetric actors’ strategic objectives.”

Unfortunately, in this definition only the bigger nations are seen as the victims and objects of asymmetric warfare, yet the reality, especially for those in the developing world, is that the bigger nations unleash their superior tactical or operational as well as political, diplomatic, economic and social strength against the vulnerable or weaker nations. It is, therefore, clear that every society, regardless of size, is equally worried about asymmetric warfare. People can, and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilisations are changing. The Eurocentric SSR is a soft power approach as an asymmetric warfare from the West.

In Zimbabwe, the calls for SSR by external and internal forces in removing specific office bearers in the ZDF and the destruction of anything considered as ‘government property by the MDC’ in the run-up to the 2000 general election and 2002 presidential election was evidence of asymmetric warfare. The defacing of road signs and destruction of basic structures like the rail, electric line, bus terminus and telecommunication lines appeared on the surface to be just acts of civil disobedience but in fact that was the real face of asymmetric warfare on the economic front. Asymmetric warfare generally seeks a major psychological impact; it is the battle of the minds.

Any state or non-state actors who wish to be successful in countering asymmetric threats or attacks must have a productive and accurate intelligence system in place. Only with accurate, timely, and complete intelligence can an organisation, state or non-state, hope to protect itself against asymmetric threats such as SSR approaches which are not locally driven, owned and practiced theoretically and ideologically.

The assumption is that asymmetric warfare is not something new because wars are never fought by equal opponents. The objective of asymmetric warfare is to weaken political muscle on the economic, political, diplomatic, social and the military (SSR) fronts when it is conducive. Therefore, asymmetric warfare encompasses a wide range of theory, experience, conjecture, and definition, and the implicit premise is that it deals with the unknown, with surprise in terms of ends, ways and means.
3.15 CONCLUSION

The SSR process is a Eurocentric idea with its origins in the 1990s. Therefore, is it coincidental that the evolution of MDC and SSR revolves around the 1990s? From an Afrocentric viewpoint SSR as a concept dates back to the 1960s when the idea of dislodging the colonial system was advanced. SSR, SS and HS relations involve different versions of facts as to who really made what happen, and why. In all these scenarios, contradictions were a manifestation of a correct process. This is of particular importance if one is to understand the role of the liberation fighters in the decision making process. As revolutionaries would have it, it is the ‘gun that follows the politics, not the politics that follows the gun’. Therefore, the current SSR is entrenched in the role played by the armed freedom fighters through the revolutionary political philosophies, goals and values of the revolution. To the revolutionary fighter, SSR is a new word of the 1990s, but as a concept it is a continuous process, not an end in itself, which was developed in the 1960s as one of the levels of consciousness.

The capacity to manage the ZDF issues effectively is in line with basic principles of law, Acts and Statutory Instruments and Regulations and provisions of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013). Security organisations are subordinate and obliged to explain and justify their actions to the civil authorities, and civil society and are subject to sanction for inappropriate actions or inadequate explanations. So, too, is the capability amongst civil authorities to exercise political control and constitutional oversight of the ZDF under established principles, mechanisms and practices.

The concept of SSR as articulated in this study is externally driven; it is not locally owned and endogenously driven. If locally owned and driven it should not be restricted only to the military, but also involves all individuals, institutions, and groups responsible for the provision and management of national interests. SSR is a complex concept because there is no universally agreed definition. SSR is a process inter alia intended to involve society and should centre on national ownership and co-ordinated as a ‘national responsibility’ not as a foreign driven and imposed agenda.

The MoD’s CMR approach is committed to dialogue within Parliament, political parties, interested groups, NGOs and citizens to forge a national consensus on defence matters. Therefore, SSR as a concept is viewed within the Ubuntu philosophy; if not SSR manifests itself in the Western concept through asymmetric warfare. Any hype about SSR is outside
the origins, evolutions and revolutions of SSR as a concept in Zimbabwe that went through ‘struggles-within-the struggle’ under the Revolutionary Council systems. Contradictions are a manifestation of a correct process violent or non-violent. Any internal and external hype about SSR is clearly a euphemism or an idiom for something else. The current SSR drive by internal and external actors is not an issue and this is discussed later in the findings.

In this case *Ubuntu* is different from other approaches because a guerrilla fighter in the Zimbabwean situation was a social reformer, fighting in order to change the social system that kept the society in ignominy and misery. As a result, the idea is to treat others with dignity and respect in creating the appropriate environment, willing to negotiate in good faith, taking time to listen when negotiating because listening is essential in the process of acknowledgement - which in turn can then lead to real trust and co-operation. *Ubuntu* provides opportunities for self-expression through understanding the beliefs and practices of different belief systems. *Ubuntu* honours seniority, especially in leadership choices, flexible and acknowledges the organic nature of *Ubuntu* that in itself is a balanced blend of cooperation in accepting that contradiction is a fundamental moving principle of the society. In this case the philosophical thought process is that SSR (thesis) is in crises with SS and HS (antithesis) and the need for *Ubuntu* (synthesis) is necessary as a process.
CHAPTER FOUR

SOME COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE ZDF

4.1 OVERVIEW

The various roles and functions of defence forces are contextual and entrenched in politics, ideology, threat, vision and strategy. Shambaugh (1991: 1) observes that,

"The military is a key factor in the political life of many nations. Across the developing and socialist worlds, the armed forces have served as far more than guarantors of national security as they sustain civilian elites in power or often seize it themselves."

As a result, Shambaugh (1991) observation, the roles and functions of a defence force are profoundly political and legitimate in contributing to the cause of national construction. This chapter debates the tasks of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) which can include assisting with socio-economic development, poverty reduction, and natural disaster response and mitigation. Institutions, civic culture, political economy, and demographic factors affect the stability of a country, but few studies have explored the role of the military as an institution that can influence the process of national construction. In this case the role of the security sector is largely neglected in determining constructive outcomes.

It is clear that from a nationalistic perspective special attention to developing the values, interests, concepts and skills of the military needs to be included with other areas of development. This chapter covers development prototypes of the defence forces, Zimbabwe’s future challenges, the basic needs approach and beyond, the possible contributions to the region; and, lastly, the synthesis in order to bring to the focus an Afrocentric approach through applying Ubuntu tenets as SS and HS relations. As a result, In Zimbabwe, three decades after independence, it is essential to examine many notable achievements of that period that need to be strengthened, and areas of failure that need to be scrutinised so that they are not repeated.

4.2 INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant development capacities is that of building national unity. The philosophy of socialism was understood as encouraging and supportive of the welfare of all the people. It was not difficult to obtain national consensus on the provision of education, health, and water etc. However, in the 1990s national unity and national consensus broke down when the ideology of socialism was replaced by the Economic Structural
Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The Commonwealth Foundation (2000:7) reported, ‘ESAP brought with it increasing unemployment for masses and corruption amongst the elite.’ This contaminated combination of unemployment, corruption saw the mushrooming of political divergence. This is where the armed forces could have played a major role, taking their revolutionary values into the contemporary modern world as the people’s army building the nation through *Ubuntu*.

In terms of the *Ubuntu* philosophy, it would be expected from the ZDF to return to the progressive developmental roles they inherited from the liberation struggle. The ZDF acknowledges itself as accountable for ‘security’ and has to obey its constitutional obligation. This fundamental dichotomy of the liberation struggle, and the inherited colonial system has not been resolved fully, although the ZDF can play an important role in bridging this gap. At this particular period of economic liberation, the ZDF also needs to play a key role in the economy. This is part of an SSR process that can be played by the SS for HS. In this regard, it is important to look at the developmental role played by some armed forces in respect of the economic growth of their motherland.

**4.3 PROTOTYPES OF DEFENCE FORCES ROLES IN DEVELOPMENT**

The armed forces have played a critical role in national development in virtually all nations. Only three models in which the armed forces went beyond a nation-building role in economic development will be scrutinised. China, ostensibly a communist country and South Korea and Turkey, admittedly capitalist countries are examined. In all three cases the armed forces played and China is playing a key role in the development of a modern society. There is a lot of detail on the role of the military in historical and modern phases; in this case a summary highlighting critical issues is proffered as a verification of the roles and functions of the defence forces from China, South Korea and Turkey.

**3.15.1 China**

4.3.1.1 Historical imperatives

The example of China is appropriate to Zimbabwe for two reasons: first, because China had a long-drawn-out liberation war in which military strategy and victory brought the revolutionary government into power in 1949; second, Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle trailed the model pioneered by Mao Zedong of China in terms of mobilising the peasants so that they would support the liberation struggle. Mao styled China’s liberation forces as ‘fish
Swimming in water consisting of the peasantry. For reasons of historical perspectives, it is important to note that military strategy and victory comprised only one aspect of the liberation struggle. This is made clear in the emphasis on the inclusion of agriculture, industry, science and technology in China’s forces’ roles and functions. China believes that economic development is of critical importance. This was emphasised in President Jiang Zemin’s address to the 15th Communist Party Congress in 1997. Wortzel (1998: 4) stated that “Jiang made it clear that the focus will be on the “economic, scientific and technical” sphere rather than concentrating on strengthening China’s military power.” This emphasis on economic advancement being achieved before military advancement could be prioritised is linked to the Chinese government’s analysis of what happened in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union’s prioritisation of military competition with the United States ended tragically in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In a 1964 essay on the subject of China’s military potential Wortzel (1998:23) observes that,

General Griffith believed that one need not labour the obvious fact that a nation’s military potential in the contemporary age is a complex amalgam of many diverse elements. Among the most important are her size, terrain and environmental situation; her national philosophy; the number, character, standards of literacy and morale of her population; her natural resources; the capacity of her indigenous science, technology and industry to develop these resources advantageously; the quality of her leadership at directive levels; the viability of her alliances, the material and other assistance she receives from allies; her internal communications, her strategic doctrine, and size, nature and quality of her armed forces, including their supporting requirements.

This contemporary holistic view of the role of the military in overall national development meant that, from the very beginning, the Chinese liberation forces were seen not only as the defenders of the people against foreign, as well as internal oppression, but as also having a critically important role to play in moving the country forward politically and economically. As a result, in the 1960s the Chinese liberation forces were sent into the countryside and cities to mobilise workers in the reconstruction of Chinese political, economic, and cultural infrastructure and to train local militias.

The armed forces were deployed in every village in establishing a sound modern development model as well as providing services to the people. One of the most important aspects of their work was to move the people away from narrow, old-fashioned feudal and ethnic views to embrace broader and more-universal values. The liberation forces were responsible for trying to establish a more democratic form of governance, such as elections at
village level. Thus the villagers could vote for people who were formerly amongst the poorest people in the village instead of just electing the richest man in the village. Many women were elected as village chiefs, an example of modernisation unknown in China’s past, when women held an inferior position in society and were not allowed to hold any real power.

In terms of the economy, the armed forces were able to grow food using more progressive agricultural methods. They were also able to establish small factories, which served as a model for industrialisation all over the country. They provided services to the local people, such as medical services, which were greatly appreciated, as villagers were previously only able to access the services of traditional doctors. However, in this case, the Chinese military doctors combined both modern and traditional medicine. Qingren (2014: 5) observed that “the goals of the [Chinese] reforms were to modernise the military organisational structure and to build a system of modern military forces with Chinese characteristics.” Chinese characteristics mattered because the conditions facing countries were quite different, and still are.

4.3.1.2 Modern perspective

In the twenty-first century, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing a comprehensive reconstruction stemming from China’s sustained economic growth based on historical imperatives. Morrison (2015: 1) observes that,

Prior to the initiation of economic reforms and trade liberalization 36 years ago, China maintained policies that kept the economy very poor, stagnant, centrally-controlled, vastly inefficient, and relatively isolated from the global economy. Since opening up to foreign trade and investment and implementing free market reforms in 1979, China has been among the world’s fastest-growing economies, with real annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging nearly 10% through 2014. In recent years, China has emerged as a major global economic power. It is now the world’s largest economy (on a purchasing power parity basis), manufacturer, merchandise trader, and holder of foreign exchange reserves.

This growth has enabled China to focus greater resources on building, equipping and training the PLA. The PLA’s official budget, therefore, is increasing, without qualms because the PLA is part of the socio-economic process.

The scope of China’s military transformation has increased as the acquisition of advanced weapons technology has continued owing to high rates of investment in domestic defence
and technological industries, and sustained organisational and doctrinal reforms of the PLA. Over the past several years, China has begun to pursue a new phase of military development by taking on roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond the immediate territorial integrity of China itself. In fact, the development of the Chinese military in recent years has attracted scepticism and even fear in respect of its purposes, especially in East Asia but also in Europe and North America. The impact of what constitutes China's ‘military transformation’ on the regional and global power balance is a point of contention (Neretnieks, Swanström & Lee 2014) However, the movement from the historical imperative to modern necessity is quintessentially part of a security-sector reform process that the ZDF should take as a cue in implementing socio-economic development in Zimbabwe.

The current economic role of the PLA is now in the development of technology, industries, humanitarian duties, agriculture, infrastructure and socio-economic activities - a move away from the historical imperative to modern necessity within the same ideology. The PLA model is important because it is an enduring model that is quite different from that of Western countries and is more appropriate for the ZDF.

3.15.2 South Korea

4.3.1.3 Historical imperatives

The development of South Korea is one of the most important examples of the role of the military in shaping a country’s destiny. The period 1950 to 1961 Chung (2007: 396) observes that “many other conflicts emanated from fundamental differences in the appraisal of South Koreans needs and the orientation and management of funds when the bulk of aid was granted.” As a result, these conflicts were characterised by corruption, paralysis, under-achievement, hyperinflation and general chaos. South Korea realised that nothing would be achieved unless there was a strong, uncorrupted and modernised state.

The government in South Korea realised that it needed to learn and adopt Western science and technology, as well as management systems, but within a system of South Korean culture. Chung (2007: 191) notes that “the South Korean economic machine was lubricated with bribes and reciprocal favours which in turn tempted government officials to engage in corrupt practices.” South Korea was particularly aware of the importance of a good management system and ideology as a way of uniting people. The solution was an emphasis
on linking the state to the different social classes under an ideology of nationalist patriotism. In particular, South Korea saw the middle class, the up-and-coming ‘captains of industry’, as important allies in development, and the regime was prepared to accept them as long as they contributed to the development programme and refrained from corruption.

South Korea was a very strong ally of the USA during the Cold War, and arguably this is what made its ‘developmental state’ possible. The USA provided massive financial and military support to counter North Korea and China, and tolerated Park’s dictatorship because of his strong anti-communism stance. There was massive and continuous social unrest during his rule, but the armed forces played a major role in development.

In his own words, Park, in Amsden (1989: 49) said,

> the economic, social and political goals we set after the revolution are: promotion of the public welfare, freedom from exploitation, and the fair distribution of an income among the people. It is obvious that these goals cannot be reached overnight. They are, nevertheless, the fundamental goals of the economic order towards which we strive. Before these goals can be achieved, it is necessary to ensure that after more than a decade of stagnation, the poor economic power is greatly strengthened and that the heretofore shrunken or undeveloped power of productivity is fully utilised. It is also necessary to take a great leap forward toward economic growth. It is imperative to have an economic plan or a long-range development program through which reasonable allocation of all resources is feasible.

Park was able to envision an industrialisation system that would favour large companies, small-scale entrepreneurs and trade unions equally. While he favoured the capitalist system of economic development as promoting greater creativity and productivity through competition, he also realised the need for co-ordination and supervisory guidance by the developmental state, an approach that Japan, Taiwan and Malaysia also followed. Park saw the need for the state to undertake long-range economic planning. Park in Amsden (1989: 50-51) observed that,

> the economic planning or long-range development program must not be allowed to stifle creativity or spontaneity of private enterprise. The overall national development program may necessitate, for the rational operation of the economy, reluctantly imposed administrative controls over the regional relocation of various industries and planning for investment. Yet it is necessary to optimally utilise the merits usually introduced by the price machinery of free competition, thus avoiding the possible damages accompanying a monopolistic system.

Park realised that this vision could not be implemented in the absence of a strong state, and he understood that the military was the only group that could establish such a strong state at
the time in South Korea’s history. Park also realised that the ‘captains of industry’ could not undertake the task of industrialisation without state assistance. With respect to consumers, Park (1989: 131) states that,

> It is desirable that the state should give special attention to possible dangers to the public interest presented by some industries which face no competition to prevent their trespassing on the interests of the consumers. The state may grant some consumer groups a kind of admonitory voice over industrial operations.

Park also foresaw the dangers of monopolistic capitalism, which could minimise or even destroy the creativity of workers, and he understood the need for the state to support trade unions, provided they were under close political control. Eventually, the unions were responsible, with students, for popular protests that led to his overthrow. Therefore, the South Korean model of development relied heavily on the military discipline imposed by Park although his regime was seen as authoritarian and dictatorial. South Korea is now a multi-party democracy, yet it still continues its economic success story. Park is recognised today as the founder of the modern system of governance and of the high-performance economic system; although authoritarian and dictatorial in using the armed forces for socio-economic development. It is generally observed by the older generations who spent their adulthood during Park's rule to credit Park for building the economic foundation of the country.

4.3.1.4 Modern perspective

For many in the contemporary world’s liberal democracies, the institutionalisation of civilian control over the military is a crucial task for democratic consolidation. This is true for South Korea because as Croissant (2004: 1) indicates “After South Korea gained independence in 1948 the military was the most powerful player in Korean politics. However, in the 1990s, the pattern of civil–military relations changed dramatically from military dominance over civilian politics to civilian supremacy over the military.”

Croissant (2004) explored the dynamics of the institutionalisation of civilian control in South Korea, clarifying the concept of civilian control, formulating an analytical frame of favourable and unfavourable conditions for successful institutionalisation of civilian control, and illuminating the evolution and state of civil-military relations in South Korea before and after democratisation. Croissant (2004) drew conclusions ‘about why civilian control successfully became institutionalised in democratising South Korea. The ZDF can take a cue
from the military domination of South Korea in economic development from a historical perspective into the modern necessity, but in the spirit of an Afrocentric Ubuntu approach.

### 3.15.3 Turkey

#### 4.3.1.5 Historical imperatives

During the last decades of the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1917 and from the establishment of the Turkish Republic Kemal Ataturk in 1922, the military had practiced a comparatively significant place in the political landscape. Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) contributed to the nation-building practice; therefore, the modernisation era was also motivated by the Army, because the armed forces from the very beginning of the Republicans to the present have not been experiencing any difficulties in placing themselves in the political life. Arslan (2006: 3) posited that,

> The army has been one of the most important institutions in Turkish society and the military elites have been one of the most considerable and powerful elite groups in the Turkish power structure. Army and military elites have achieved significant duties either in the defence of the country or the modernization and development of society. As a natural result of this, very strong and good relations were established between the Turkish army and the Turkish people. Turkish military elite and the Turkish army as an institution have always had a very esteemed and honourable place in the eyes of the Turkish people. The Turkish people have always nominated the army as the most reliable and trustworthy institution of the society.

Thus, the Kemalist transformation scheme also saw the armed forces as the foremost instrument that was competent to assume the protection of the Republican values, mainly the secularist character of the regime. The TAF saw themselves as the ultimate guarantors of the regime. Should the military elite transform their behaviour and threat sensitivities for the sake of democratic cooperation in Turkey? Burak (2011: 3) observes,

> the role of the military in Turkish politics is chiefly derived from its guardianship of the Turkish Republic and Kemalist principles. It can be asserted that this kind of guardianship dates back to the Army’s activities in shaping the parameters of the social and political realms in the state-building process.

#### 4.3.1.6 Modern perspective

With the exception of the 1989 to 1993 period, in which President Turgut Ozal tried and partially succeeded in imposing his political superiority over the military in foreign policy and security issues, the military maintained control over party leaders and political
development in the country. Karabelis (198: 39) observes that “in Turkey there is a military class, just as there is a worker and peasants’ class, and the officer corps constitute the backbone of the class.” Therefore, the relative absence of ‘civil society’ in Turkey’s political structure was that the political power of the military exceeded that of civil institutions.

The politicians, influenced by the non-democratic political culture viewed the Turkish elections as a “zero-sum game”. This appeared to give greater priority in building own image and increasing own power rather than concentrating efforts on finding a solution to the country’s major economic, political and social problems. In this case, the Parliament has been relegated to the status of a yes-man that approves decisions taken by the National Security Council. Only the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association appeared to be a growing political force in the country, capable, of challenging the political supremacy of the military. As a result, the capability of the Turkish elite to withstand pressures from foreign powers on the conduct of its domestic political life is a lesson learnt from the Army.

This observation seems to contradict the view that sees foreign aid as a tool of the donor government designed to serve its political, strategic, and/or economic self-interest. As the offspring of the ruling civil-military bureaucratic class of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish statist elite carried both the experiences and historical lessons of its predecessor. Kedourie (2000: 142) suggested that “the military modernisation and the westernisation of political institutions that the Ottoman and the Kemalist regimes had initiated were regarded as essential measures of self-defence against foreign intervention.” Hence, despite the benefits that Turkey received from its entrance into the Western camp during the post-war period, a realisation of the ruling elite’s long-time dream, it did not mean that the country’s political life became a toy in the hands of foreign powers. It is generally concluded by academics like Burak (2011: 143) that “the TAF played a major key role in the nation building process; hence the modernisation era was stimulated by the military, which still continues today.”

The BBC News 28 April 2007 observes that “TAF stood ready to intervene if the secular nature of the Turkish Constitution is compromised, stating that "the Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute.” Fox News 21 August 2014 Observes that,

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the President of Turkey, previously served as the Prime Minister of Turkey from 2003 to 2014 and as President since 2014. A
self-described conservative democrat, has overseen social conservative and liberal economic policies. Led three general election victories in 2002, 2007 and 2011 and elected as President in 2014.

During Erdogan era, Aydinli (2009: 581) observes that,

Turkey has been undergoing major democratic transformations in recent years, but one issue remains in question is the role of the military. Have these democratic changes also included an irreversible, structural change for the Turkish military's political role? Are the Turks reconceptualising their special bond with the armed forces and most importantly, is the military leadership ready to go along with this paradigm shift? A traditional Turkish civil-military relation was a system in which society maintains a direct, special bond with its military, keeping politics and politicians in a secondary position. Shifting into a more democratic one, in which society places its trust in politics, thus forcing the military into the secondary position. Turkey may very well be leaving the coup era behind.

Before Erdogan there were many coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. Currently, the role of the military in Turkey politics is declining because of Erdogan’s conservative democratic stance in which society is now placing its trust in politics, thus forcing the military into the secondary position. However, the basic premise is that the TAF from the Ottoman Empire into a modern nation state, in other words, Turkey's modernisation process was led by the military. It is the modernisation process which the ZDF can take a cue not the coups.

3.15.4 Prototypes for the ZDF role

The ZDF can draw lessons from the Chinese, South Korean and Turkish experiences in that their military has been having a comparatively significant place in the political and societal landscape. The ZDF is perceived by ZANU PF, War Veterans and their local and external allies as the only legitimate guarantor of the revolutionary. As a result, Zimbabwe should reform her SS from a revolutionary perception, modernise sensitivities for economic growth and development in the name of consensus building, influence organisational effectiveness, productivity, and interdependency. The main societal challenge facing Zimbabwe today is the transformation of the economic system. The settler governments had built up a small modern economy that could cater adequately for settler needs, but this economy had never catered for the needs of the population as a whole.

The Rhodesian economy, as formulated and organised, had no capacity to handle a large expansion successfully as it was heavily dependent on a form of import substitution that required the use of imported materials. The Rhodesians had developed industries for a wide variety of goods and these industries thrived because they were protected from outside
competition. After independence in 1980 and especially in the 1990’s ESAP, in effect removed all protection from these industries, many of which collapsed as they were not competitive in price or quality as compared to goods from larger and more technologically advanced economies.

The white farmers, who had been enthusiastic supporters of ZANU PF in the first two decades after Zimbabwe’s independence, as they had retained their land, became increasingly threatened by the potential and actual take-over of their farms under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) since 2000, and decided to throw in their financial and logistical support with the MDC which was formed in September 1999. The MDC was also supported by many Anglophone Western powers that looked down on the land reforms. It is clear that the problems Zimbabwe faces are fundamentally economic in nature, and unless the economy is revamped, it is unlikely that Zimbabwe will be able to develop well. So far, Zimbabwe has only had two models of economic development, neither of which has been able to resolve the challenges faced by the country. In comparison, the Rhodesian model, small and archaic though it was, was better suited to the needs of a developing country than the de-industrialization model of the Washington Consensus, although nurturing an economy for a minority.

While the Rhodesian model of industrialization through import substitution was based on out-dated technologies, it was superior to the de-industrialization model of ESAP, which took Zimbabwe further back to being a primary producer economy. Repetition of the past, whether of the settler colonial economic framework or the failed Washington Consensus framework, will not lead Zimbabwe out of its present economic doldrums. Moreover, all sectors of development need to work together in a united way within an agreed developmental context.

Over the past two decades, Zimbabwe has remained either stagnant or has actually gone backwards. Moreover, there have been varying and confused views about how to define development, and how to go about the processes of development. Zimbabweans have been confused and disunited, and the situation worsened by the failure of the economy to provide for the basic needs of the population such as food, water, shelter and medical services etc. The over-printing of money in 2008 led to the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar due to the resultant hyperinflation. Another impact of the loss of confidence in the value of the Zimbabwe dollar was the refusal of people with access to foreign exchange, such as external
investors and the diaspora, to transfer money into Zimbabwe through the official channels. Instead, Zimbabweans from outside the country transferred money to neighbouring countries in order to enable their relatives to buy food and other goods to take home. Corruption increased the cost of business, whilst slowing down the process of getting government approval of development and business projects. External models, like the ESAP model, that took Zimbabwe further back to a primary producer economy, should be viewed with suspicion. Whether the ZDF will remain the armed wing of whoever comes into power using the Western model or the liberation struggle model or the Asian model is a challenge for the way forward.

4.4 THE FUTURE OF THE ZDF

Poverty and economic downturns are the greatest and most fundamental causes of insecurity in Zimbabwe. The security environment has been seriously threatened in the past two decades due to poor economic performance, partly due to sanctions and, partly due to corruption, and etc. The fundamental problem was that the relocation of millions of dollars of donor funds from the country in the early 2000s created an economic and political crisis, and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme and the country's responses to this crisis, which were emotionally planned and executed, exacerbated the problems. The ESAP model is a much more problematic model. Zimbabwe as a primary productive economic model dependent wholly on agriculture and mining, easily falls victim to international markets, and fluctuations in market prices will bring cycles of economic disaster. Self-reliance and creativity through the use of the ZDF in socio-economics programmes is a possible way out.

3.15.5 Basic human needs

For future development, it is essential to identify developmental objectives. A beginning is basic human needs that include food clean water employment, clothing, education and training and medical services among others. Unity of purpose and national unity are required if these basic needs are to be satisfied. At the same time, a stable and workable economic system must be established. These basic needs are in fact also human rights as enshrined in the United Nations (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and should be included in the future role of the ZDF These roles can be established through the defence policy and enshrined in the legal frameworks and this should be considered as part of positive transformative SSR process for SS and HS relations.
4.3.1.7 Food

Zimbabwe was, in the past, self-sufficient in food. Zimbabwe's staple diet, maize, has been produced by Communal farmers, and wheat by Commercial farmers. Operation Maguta/Inhala conceptualisation, was to strengthen the capacity for food production. Higher productivity entailed a partnership between the Government, ZDF infantry battalions around the country and the farmers. The role of the Government was to increase the production of fertilizer in the country in such a way as to reduce the price and make it affordable. This was indeed the custom in Zimbabwe before the introduction of ESAP and has been adopted by Malawi and Zambia more recently, leading to their position as a food exporting country, based on the production of small-scale farmers.

The production of wheat should increase although it is a winter crop requiring irrigation. It is essential for ZESA's improved and reliable capacity to generate electricity. For several decades, the State has under-invested in power supply, yet Zimbabwe has an abundance of coal, water, sunshine and wind which can be utilised to provide the necessary increase in power generation. Even a simple regulation for all urban households to utilise solar panels for generating energy for hot water geysers would enable the more efficient use of electricity. In order to improve productivity, it is also essential to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to provide extension services to all farmers. Following the AU decision signed by the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), 10 to 12 July, 2003; that at least 10% of state budget should be reserved for agriculture would enable Zimbabwe to achieve food security very speedily. This process in food security should partner with the infantry battalions located all over Zimbabwe in food production because food security is the first line of defence.

4.3.1.8 Clean water and sanitation

On 28 July 2010, through Resolution 64/292, the United Nations General Comment No. 15 indicates the right to water. This is a fundamental resolution because all people have the right to food clean water employment, clothing, education and training and medical services among others. Regular and dependable investment into clean water and good sanitation by both the State and by Local Government is needed in these areas that have long been neglected because people still do not have sufficient access to safe drinking water. The ZDF’s Army Engineers Corp can be reformed to take a leading role in providing these basic requirements. These areas can be well supported the Army Engineers Corp if the ZDF and
the state prioritise these needs. A successful system could be devised by which ZDF, donors, local authorities and central government form a partnership and do the work. This investment into basic infrastructure would enable local authorities to engage in much more ambitious housing and industrial parks construction programmes jointly with the ZDF. The PLA is doing the same with villagers in China. Why not Zimbabwe?

4.3.1.9 Employment

The right to employment is the most fundamental human need. Zimbabwe has failed to address this area; due in part to the ESAP ideology, which says that government, should do as little as possible, and employment left to private enterprise. Whilst this is the Washington Consensus, this was not done in Asian countries that have managed to pull themselves out of poverty, such as Japan, China, and South Korea. Moreover, if the very small and weak private sector in Zimbabwe is to be responsible for employment, the Western model stipulates that it is the State's responsibility to provide social security for all the unemployed.

This model of providing social security for all the unemployed is very impractical and, indeed, impossible for Zimbabwe to undertake, given its’ financial downturn. Instead, Zimbabwe would do better to adopt the Asian model that includes all stakeholders including the military, in developmental goals. This model guarantees some form of work for everyone, through public work programmes such as dam and road building, and all kinds of infrastructural construction and maintenance. If the ZDF reforms to accept developmental economic growth goals, it becomes an employer and an instrument for human security, not an instrument of fear, as some locals have viewed it.

4.3.1.10 Clothing

Zimbabwe's textile and clothing industries are decimated by poverty and competition from mainly Asian countries especially China. There is a need to examine, upgrade and resuscitate textile industries to see how they can be nationally as well as internationally vibrant and competitive. Formerly, these industries were protected from foreign competition and, as a result, they were characterised by out-of-date technology and design, as well as being more expensive. These challenges now need to be tackled and the ZDF’s Army Ordinance Corps can take a leading role in the clothing manufacturing industry as a partner.
4.3.1.11 Education and training

Whilst Zimbabwe's education and training systems were the envy of the region in the 1980s and 1990s, it is currently affected by a decade of serious underinvestment and neglect. Moreover, the systems were always problematic in that they retained the colonial framework characterised by the British "O" and "A" levels, such that all students prepared for university study when in fact only a tiny fraction of them will be able to attend university. The irrelevance and high cost of this out-dated system has led to a high dropout rate prior to secondary education due to poverty, high school fees, uniforms etc. There is a need for the education and training systems to be more varied and it is essential that all young people can enjoy the basic human right to education and job training through national service.

Teachers' salaries have shrunk and this has created suffering for teachers who have to choose between feeding their family and paying the rent etc. Most teachers do not own housing, and have to rent low quality housing from the parents of their students. Teachers cannot afford basic medical services nor pay for the school fees of their own children. These problems need to be resolved in practical and cooperative ways. An ambitious housing scheme for teachers and other civil servants could help to improve and stabilise the teaching fraternity and the civil service. The ZDF’s Army Education Corps is educating and training its own officers and men, their children and mothers, in basic education up to university level. The army complement the education system by opening its schools to civilians as well. The role of the Education corps can take the challenge of national service.

4.3.1.12 Medical services

The right to medical services is a basic human right. This basic human right has been contravened because few Zimbabweans can afford the cost of medical services; primary health care has been compromised, and the number of women who die whilst giving birth has trebled in the last decade. Health care has also been an area that donors are willing to support, particularly primary health care. The ZDF’s Army Medical Corps can complement the health delivery system by opening its services to the citizens of Zimbabwe and should manufacturing medical drugs. During the medical strikes in Zimbabwe in the 1990s and 2000s, the ZDF’s Army Medical Doctors assisted in filling the gap. This is part of the SSR process that is indigenously driven by the locals in developing the HS and SS relations.
4.5 BEYOND THE BASIC NEEDS

Emphasis on basic human needs is an essential starting point for Zimbabwe's economic growth and it is possible, through a united and focused nation, to satisfy the population's basic needs. However, it is also necessary for Zimbabwe to be more ambitious, and it is essential to look at the sub-region of SADC for guidelines as Zimbabwe is too small to be able to sufficiently effective on its own. Zimbabwe has a number of advantages that could be utilised to mark out its contribution to the region. These advantages include the highly disciplined well-trained ZDF members, with combat experience that is sufficient to enable Zimbabwe to establish the peace and stability that are the essential pre-requisites for development. The ZDF can also play a major role in this area. Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe (2008) postulated that the diasporas were providing about US$1.4 billion a year to the country. It is clear today that the US$250 million a year of donor funds was not utilised to sufficiently increase and improve the economy over two decades.

The new sources of foreign aid would need to be utilised more effectively to bring about sound economic growth. Zimbabwe has a number of professional associations such as those of engineers, doctors, teachers and farmers. Zimbabwean doctors are also renowned for their capabilities and experience, and Zimbabwe could be a medical centre for the whole SADC region. The Rhodesian industrial system, whilst unable to expand to cater for the whole population, nevertheless, led to the development of an industrialised workforce accustomed to the requirements of a market economy. Things have changed since the 1980s, when Zimbabwe was enjoying the euphoria linked to the liberation struggle and the gaining of independence.

There are now a number of competitive political parties, and return to the de facto one-party state is impossible. However, the building up a national consensus across all party lines becomes is a possibility because people are now exhausted, critical, and sceptical of all political parties, they are fearful of the rise of political violence and killings and with it the dominance of unemployed youths, some of who cover up criminal activities in the name of politics. It is essential for Zimbabwe to move away from dependency, and towards self-reliance and self-sufficiency and, in particular, to rely more on the work and earnings of our own people.

It is to be noted that Zimbabwe's disadvantages as identified above are basically ideological, such as the rejection of the Liberation Struggle ideology of socialism and its replacement...
with some perverted form of capitalism under ESAP, which led to the disintegration of national unity. Today the general population distrusts politics and politicians, believing that all politicians are there to enrich themselves and not to support the poor.

Politicians of different parties are perceived as spending little time addressing the problems faced by the citizens (e.g. lack of employment, unaffordable costs of agricultural inputs, school and examination fees, high medical fees, lack of adequate housing and health service delivery, offering the people palliatives such as bottles of cooking oil, little bags of sugar and mealie-meal). Yet the answer from the ruling elite of major political parties is that the problem is due to a lack of funds, and the answer is foreign investment. Actually foreign investment can be retrogressive if Zimbabwe itself has not clearly worked out where it is going and what it wants to do.

4.6 CONTRIBUTION TO THE SADC REGION

Given Zimbabwe's many strengths, there are obvious areas for future development in the SADC region. This expertise could be made available to the SADC region, beginning with Zimbabwe itself, and then the ZDF can expand its engineering capabilities to participate in joint efforts. Zimbabwe can benefit from having a small dam for every village, with training of the villagers in fish farming and dam maintenance, thus creating jobs in situ for the youths. Such a partnership between the State, the private sector, the ZDF and the local communities, will do much to re-build national unity whilst at the same time creating new wealth in the villages themselves. With State support and references regarding the quality and dependability of Zimbabwean companies, the private engineering sector can venture into building similar structures in the SADC region.

Zimbabwe has many qualified and experienced medical personnel. Zimbabwe can also contribute in this area through a combination of the ZDF and private sector partnership. This is definitely an area where the ZDF could provide medical personnel to remote rural areas where they are stationed. We can build on this strength, and create programmes to provide teachers and lecturers in specialist areas, in particular in science, technology, technical and vocational education for the SADC region dependent on Zimbabwean teachers maintaining a high standard of achievement and dedication.

At present Africa gets most of its medicines from overseas, yet Zimbabwe has a number of pharmaceutical companies that could be supported to provide medicines for the SADC
region. The ZDF can do a great deal to teach and coordinate such environmental improvement programmes, and this should bring it closer to communities. Zimbabwe has not supported its fertilizer companies to modernise and lower costs. Given that the population of Sub-Saharan Africa is about 700 million people, and half of them are children, there is ample room for Zimbabwe to utilise its training facilities to provide teachers, doctors, engineers, social workers, military officers for peacekeeping in the SADC region and beyond.

4.7 CONCLUSION

The fundamental reason for the problems that have arisen around elections in Zimbabwe is the fact that political power has not translated into economic power. Given the weakening of so many Zimbabwean institutions, it is essential that the ZDF plays a more progressive and aggressive role in development, just as the military is doing in China, South Korea and Turkey as explained in this study, Zambia, Senegal and Ethiopia just to mention some in Africa. Therefore, a people-centred approach, which is an *Ubuntu* concept with its tenets, places the individual at the centre of analysis in considering threats to survival, livelihood, development, dignity etc. The ZDF has a duty to be people-centred, multi-sectorial, comprehensive, content-specific and prevention-oriented in its HS approach through identifying risks, threats, and hazards and addressing the root causes of poverty etc.

The focus should be on preventive responses through protection and empowerment frameworks in the areas such as food, clean water, education and training, employment economics, health, environment and security. After all, the task at hand is in cultural, economic, and political arenas, as well as in military matters to build a new Zimbabwe through modernising industry, agriculture and national cohesion. Consequently, this has to be considered as part of the positive transformative SSR, one which is needs driven and, therefore, both forward looking and proactive as a cutting-edge approach in human security.

The first line of defence is food because the military moves on its stomach. For this reason, the ZDF should develop and establish institutions that specialise in research on issues such as food production, infrastructure development, medical service, national service, among others. A closer look at the function of the Defence Forces as reveals that the protection of ‘territorial integrity’ of Zimbabwe is just but one of the elements that the Defence Forces are mandated to protect. Territorial integrity should promote economic, political, social, health, personal, community and food security. As a result, the ZDF’s high status and prestige is grounded in cultural and historical experiences because they were at the forefront in the
liberation of Zimbabwe. The challenge is to move from political liberation to economic liberation where economics rules politics and not politics ruling economics.
CHAPTER FIVE
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the quest-views, focus group discussions, observations and informal discussions held with participants in the ZDF. The first part analyses the qualitative data from quest-views on influences, challenges and linkages between SS and HS. It further presents the statistical data in graphic and tabular form on the perceptions and attitudes of the respondents. The second part of this chapter discusses all the data findings using thematic content analysis tools. The data is subsequently triangulated in order to draw parallels and to highlight the key findings.

5.2 DATA ANALYSIS

Table 5.1: Response rate statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaires distributed</th>
<th>Questionnaires returned</th>
<th>Questionnaires Spoiled</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field data June (2012)

Table 5.1 above shows that 60 quest-views were distributed. Out of these, 54 quest-views were completed. However, four were spoilt in the sense that they held no worthwhile data, and were not considered suitable for analysis. As a result, fifty questionnaires were considered for analysis and interpretation.

Table 5.2: Dependability and reliability statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha</th>
<th>No of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors Field data June (2012)

Table 5.2 reveals the level of reliability of the questionnaire used in this study in which Cronbach’s Alpha reliability statistics tool was utilised for this purpose. A value of 0.935 obtained was high enough to warrant the instrument validity as reliable, according to Cronbach, a value of 0.7 is acceptable to justify the instrument as reliable enough for dependability.
5.3 INFLUENCES AND CHALLENGES OF SSR

3.15.6 Establishing SSR

The discussions, question-views on influences and challenges of SSR to the ZDF reveal that SSR is influenced by liberal Eurocentric ideas, concepts, ideologies and interests. The influences and challenges were observed as a threat to Zimbabwean national integrity. The FGDs were on senior ZDF officers’ perceptions of SSR as it relates to them. Generally, ZDF members single out SSR with a myriad of reactions. The 77% of ZDF senior officers’ opinion was that SSR refers to regime change agenda not adjusting and aligning establishments to meet modern security challenges, in its present form it is about removing a group of revolutionary people from offices; it is not an enhancing process. The challenge regarding SSR is its Eurocentric nature and its destructive negative agenda from the external and internal drivers of SSR.

Figure 5.1: Responses to the establishments of SSR (n=50)

![Bar chart showing responses to SSR establishments]

Source: Authors File data July (2012)

Figure 5.1 above demonstrates different ZDF Senior officers’ opinions of participants in the question-views. It is an analysis of participants’ responses according to age ranges. From the total age range, 64% observed that SSR in its form is not constructive and positive. Those who said no were mostly in the 40-49-year age group. Those who replied yes were mostly in the 30-39-year age range. The difference in opinions according to age group is ascribed to those who experienced the liberation war and answered ‘no’, and those who never experienced the liberation war saying ‘yes’. What emerged is that 77% of the senior officers in the 50+ have the perception that SSR should not be established because: the SSR is externally driven and accepted by internal Eurocentric liberal forces of SSR; it is not endogenously driven; not locally owned; and it is prescriptive in content, methodology and
ideology. Genuine reforms are achieved through adopting an Afrocentric perspective in line with the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Defence Policy and relevant Acts.

On internal and external SSR driven challenges a ZDF senior officer in a quester-view Harare, 10 June 2012 observed that,

the external and internal drivers of SSR have singled out Zimbabwe’s security sector as the main impediment to its regime change agenda. The idea is to reform the ZDF mind-set from being revolutionary into a corrupt sector in abandoning the objectives of the liberation struggle. Furthermore, pushing the security sector into Eurocentric assertiveness away from Afrocentric accepted wisdom of the security sector which played a major role in liberating Zimbabwe from the shackles of colonialism. Bear in mind that freedom fighter or revolutionary fighter were and still are social reformers who should now move from revolutionary notions to economic conceptions.

A ZDF senior officer in Harare 11 June 2012 strengthened the above observation by indicating that,

the internal and external drivers in Zimbabwe are funding SSR through NGOs instead of being in partnership with the Zimbabwe Government. Is it also coincidental that SSR was popularised in the late 1990s and MDC was also formed in the late 1990s?

This implies that gesture, however good, can be treated with suspicion if it is extended, particularly, by an erstwhile enemy. Any theory or prescription that emerges outside the locale of its relevance is like fitting a square peg into a round hole; the result is disfigurement of either the hole or the peg. In the literature review, Bryden and Hanggi (2004: 3) observed that, “the absence of other major international powers including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) in the security sector equation involves challenging ideological and theoretical viewpoints.” The challenges of practical and operational realities of SSR are the politicisation, regionalisation, and internationalisation of SSR debate based on Western values.

This suggests that SSR is a concept which is not based in African interests and values. Most ZDF senior officers perceived that, SSR invoked different and sometimes very strong, reactions and emotions from different people depending on what people perceive it to be in terms of its objectives, content, and purpose. It is characterised by misconceptions, misinterpretations, expectations, and general confusion about when it should be applied and to whom because the internal and external SSR drivers are chasing concepts which are not theirs.
As a result, because of this Eurocentric approach to SSR in Zimbabwe and towards the ZDF, the human mind tends to hate, fear, and feel bitter about that which it does not comprehend because it does not fall within Afrocentric realities.

3.15.7 SSR as a priority

Table 5.3 illustrates the opinions of the ZDF senior officers as to whether SSR should be a priority in the ZDF.

Table 5.3: Frequency of responses on SSR priority in Zimbabwe (n=50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors Field data June (2012)

Fifty two per cent (52%) of the ZDF officers observed that SSR is not a priority in Zimbabwe because it is a Western agenda, Eurocentric in nature and not a regulated process which is Afrocentric in terms of its origin, content, ideology and methodology. Constitutionally, a legal process is not stagnant but rather a developmental level of consciousness. There is no visible requirement of a dysfunctional security sector reform. In the 1980s, the integration of the three-warring factions into one ZDF and subsequently the continuation and training of the force was a SSR process.

The opinions of these ZDF senior officers are that SSR should aim at achieving clear national objectives. There is not sufficient evidence that state security organs are flagrantly violating rights and operating outside the confines of the law in Zimbabwe. A ZDF senior officer in a quester view June 2012 observed that “the SSR process, in the ZDF is moving in the right direction from the late 1960s. The roles and functions are clear although they need to be periodically redefined and reviewed in order for the ZDF to continually enable a stable environment.” The ZDF officers’ opinion on whether SSR should be a priority in the ZDF is that SSR is not a priority in Zimbabwe because it is a Western agenda for regime change. In the ZDF, SSR is a process and the process is not a priority but part of governance and a developmental level of consciousness.
3.15.8 SSR as donor or locally driven

This topic interprets the results of an aspect on whether SSR is donor-driven or locally driven. Table 5.4 below shows that 68% of the ZDF senior officers observed that it is possible to have SSR driven from within, arguing that internal oversight and locally driven are major aspect of ownership of SSR. It ensures local civilian input into the operations of the security sector. The 68% ZDF senior officers observed that the ZDF reforms of pre- and post-independence were internally induced and agreed upon. As a result, the current calls for SSR are externally driven. The current drive of SSR has no link to the social fabric of the nation at large and, ideally, the nation decides the reforms and in which direction they should move. This, however, is not the case with the current calls for reforms as, currently; the loudest calls are from outside and inside the country from the donors and local opposition parties.

This suggests that the current push for SSR is foreign and locally driven by donors, and opposition parties which put the country at risk because it is not locally accepted by the acted upon. It is a mask for foreign negative regime change plans and as a result the ZDF senior officers see it as a threat.

Table 5.4: Frequency of responses: SSR being donor or locally driven (n=50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99.00</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field data July (2012)

In its current thrust, SSR is Western in origin, conceptually and ideologically. One ZDF senior officer in Harare 6 July 2012 said,

Properly understood, SSR should be called security sector alignment, security sector enhancement or security sector empowerment within the progressive levels of consciousness and those who criticize internal and external driven SSR insist that Zimbabweans know what they want; they see SSR as another game of opposition politics which is prescriptive in nature.

This indicates that donors and NGOs would like to dictate the state activities to fulfil the master agenda and, consequently, SSR is donor driven. Ideally, reforms should be locally driven by the needs of a particular country, and not prescribed. If accepted in its original
Eurocentric form, Africans would have historically lost control of their identity, self-awareness and ownership of SSR. One ZDF senior officer in Harare, 6 July 2012 responded that,

he who owns the means of ownership and its origination has the power and control of his/her own whims. For that reason, any reform should be initiated by those who control the sector in accordance with the Constitutional standards and ideology in national building strategies.

The Western powers seem to be most concerned with the operationalization of SSR in Zimbabwe and, therefore, have a different agenda. The major challenge is the conflict between progressive and counter-progressive forces in Zimbabwe, as they comprehend the situation differently. According to one ZDF senior officer in Harare 10 July 2012 observed that,

an SSR that relies on political bickering is a disaster to any nation. SSR should be a normal enhancement, empowerment and alignment mechanism that should include normative defence reviews and modernisation. Therefore, the legal policy frameworks are significant in modernising the ZDF, through an ownership process that is endogenously driven. If SSR is undertaken, it should address identified concerns of the actors, relevance to their requirements and the country at large. SSR should be a home grown, locally owned and a locally driven process for HS and SS relations not as prescriptive foreign driven agenda.

It is critical to realise the above assertion that SSR should be home grown, and may be revised or reviewed when necessary within the legal framework of the acted upon. The ZDF reforms from pre- and post-independence were internally induced and agreed by the liberation forces as a concept.

5.4 SS AND HS LINKAGES

3.15.9 Linkages

The content analysis is about the SS and HS linkages because they are mutually reinforcing and dependent on each other; academic consensus recognises the linkages and the interdependencies between the relationships. Table 5.5 below show the respondents’ conceptualisation and considerations regarding SS and HS linkages.
Table 5.5: SS and HS linkages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Did not indicate</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s Field data July (2012)

A ZDF senior officers in Harare 13 July 2012 observed that, “human security elements are key to the survival of any nation and these elements are the prerogative of the state security machinery.” Accordingly, the (80%) group indicated that a society that has confidence in its state security machinery is highly motivated and hence can transform confidence into development. Ideally, SS should be enhanced and improved for the citizen’s happiness. Once this is guaranteed, SS and HS linkages become an integrated process of self-consciousness.

This implies that the two concepts of SS and HS complement each other because SS is the means whilst HS is the goal. If the needs of a society are satisfied and insecurity addressed, an enabling environment for development is created. Therefore, the ZDF should create a peaceful environment for investment, productivity and economic growth in Zimbabwe as one of its attributes. In this case HS should be institutionalised in the ZDF legal frameworks as the first line of defence. 80% of the ZDF senior officers indicated that state security function should deliver HS, which, when it exists, leads to developmental activities. All developmental issues rely on motivated human beings. A contented population with cohesion offers the first line of defence in human security conception. HS elements are fundamental to the survival of any nation and these elements are the prerogative of the SS machinery.

This denotes that a society that has confidence in its SS machinery is highly motivated and hence can transform confidence into development. Ideally, SS should be enhanced, empowered and enriched to safeguard its citizens. The literature review in Chapter two indicated that SS and HS relationship enhances human needs and strengthens human happiness. The senior officers working connotation of SS and HS linkages indicates that the linkages encompass maintenance of human basic needs, human well-being and happiness with the objective of constructing political, economic, social, cultural and environmental
settings in which people live knowing that their vital independences and self-determinations are secure.

This implies that SS and HS linkages are social, political, cultural and economic issues located and centred on empowerment, based on African value systems. Most ZDF senior officers observed that within the state, security is a combination of military power, economic, social, technological, and moral factors. For that reason, SS and HS relations require a new consensus that acknowledges the linkages and interdependencies between them because state security and human security are inseparable, vital and mutually reinforcing factors in social reality. HS occurs within a sociological context of needs, motives, values and norms which are always in a dynamic state of relation in the context of improvement that leads to human security and happiness.’

Developmental activities in relation to SS and HS relations also involve socio-economic growth that permeates other realms such as the provision of security, health, education, food and shelter. In this context, the roles of the ZDF are contextual and entrenched in politics, ideology, threat, vision and strategy. A ZDF senior officer in Masvingo 20 July 2012 said that,

the roles and functions of a defence force are profoundly political and legitimate in contributing to the cause of national construction. In terms of socio-economics, the ZDF should be able to grow food, establish small factories, which can serve as a model for industrialisation in promoting SS and HS relations.

The ZDF can take notice of the Chinas PLA’s role in respect of economic development, technology, industry, humanitarian duties, agriculture, infrastructure and socio-economic activities as a good example of changing the mind-set, moving from the historical imperative to modern necessity within the national security strategic policy of Zimbabwe. A ZDF senior officer in Masvingo 20 July 2012 observed that,

SS and HS linkages is the safety and protection of the state against harm from the threat of war, incursion and human forms of insecurity from external and internal disturbances due to political or economic asymmetric destabilisation process.

This explanation concerns survival through economic diplomacy, power projection and political power for the protection of people, their human needs and development as well as their right to choose their leadership endogenously. A ZDF senior officer in Harare 25 July 2012 stated that,
the organs of military power are the ones which ensure that security in all its features, is preserved because it is the assurance that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country, including the rights of citizens to pursue legitimate interests, exist without undue duress from external and internal disruptive elements.

This position was reiterated by most of the respondents. They consensually agreed on the definition of security as encompassing, and including the availability of food and other necessary resources required for human existence in providing the citizens with an all-rounded security in food, health, employment and shelter. The general observation was that of safeguarding the hard won independence and sovereignty that in turn guarantees the SS and HS linkages. As a result, the blend is that SS is for the safety and protection of the state against human forms of insecurity for self-determination as a nation to pursue legitimate interests without undue duress from disruptive elements. As a result HS and enhancement in the context of the ZDF should currently focus on the basic human needs, and this will ultimately develop human security and enhancement as the entry point. The general observation from the participants is that, Human security is a context-specific concept; it gives a positive response that insecurities differ all the way through different situations. Consequently, HS cannot be accomplished without active contributions of SS, because HS is about protecting people from threats so that they can build on their strength in addressing their own needs.

This implies that the professional ZDF member should protect people from threats such as poverty, unemployment, famine, infectious diseases, malnutrition, lack of access to basic needs and health care, resource depletion, natural disasters, violence, crime, terrorism, other identity based tensions, repression and human abuses. This type of a professional soldier would be an asset to the citizens of Zimbabwe. The ZDF should be enhanced and empowered to participate in HS enhancement. The SS should complement human security, once separated there is the danger of creating poverty, hunger and ill-health. ZDF should be involved in such noble ideas because it is part of the social fabric, ‘a fish and water’ relationship. What emerged is that the ZDF should be involved in the basic human needs activities that will ultimately develop the ZDF into the people’s defence forces in total, from an Afrocentric perspective for the interests of Zimbabweans.

3.15.10Basic human needs (BHN)

It is a fact of life that all have certain basic human needs (BHN). Understanding, considering and advancing these needs are important imperatives because they assist in revealing what
drives human behaviour. This subject of basic human needs evaluate what the participants consider as BHN.

**Figure 5.2: Percentage of responses on basic human needs (n=50)**

![Chart showing percentages of responses on basic human needs]

Source: Author's Field Data July (2012)

Figure 5.2 above shows the opinions of the participants on what they considered to be basic human needs. Respondents evaluated food (84%), shelter (84%), health (80%), education (76%), and employment (76%) as the basic human needs. Therefore, the ZDF senior officers are aware of the critical basic needs. The challenge is more about how these needs should be enhanced and accommodated in the legal framework? In addition, the ZDF senior officers added freedom of speech and political rights and physical security. The participants indicate that the ZDF should play a major role in basic human needs. The human basic needs approach comprises five major areas in food, shelter, health, education and employment.

### 3.15.1 ZDF’s role in basic human needs

ZDF senior officers 88% perceived that the in BHN, ZDF should ensure that the needs of individuals are upheld otherwise ZDF would cease to have reason for existence because the basic human needs are the foundations for human security as the first line of defence. With this in mind, the HS threat becomes less and development becomes a process of a functioning system. When all government departments stop functioning due to strikes and stay-a-ways, it is only the ZDF and other security institutions that can rise to the occasion.
Table 5.6: Frequency of responses on ZDF role in basic human needs (n=50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not indicate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field data July (2012)

The ZDF respondents (88%) noticed that the roles and functions of ZDF should enhance and provide basic human needs to ensure national cohesion and peaceful co-existence is maintained. Most ZDF senior officer 88% in summary maintained that strengthening basic human needs approach is the first line of defence, based on interest, values and national objectives and were it not for basic human needs, there would be nothing else for the ZDF to achieve? All activities should centre on the basic human needs and develop, depending on the legal framework and balance of power.

Only 8% of the ZDF senior officers in summation indicate that basic human needs are the prerogative of the politicians and not the ZDF. This assumption is narrow-minded because if it were not for human beings, why would the ZDF have been established and for whose security? The observations from this theme are that if basic human needs are not managed without humanity, the needs can also become a national security threat. ZDF’s secondary role according to the Constitution is to maintain peace and security and thus fulfilling the aspects of human security through the provision of BHN. Therefore, the ZDF roles and functions should provide basic human needs to ensure peaceful co-existence of Zimbabweans.

From Table 5.7 below it is clear that 84% of the respondents supported the view that the ZDF should be involved in and enhance the basic human needs which are HS tenets. This is part of the ZDF’s social obligation in strengthening peace and security. A ZDF senior officer 25 July 2012 observed that,

there is a positive correlation between the ZDF and human needs and it is in tandem with the modern security model which projects security as multi-dimensional. The ZDF complements and enhances security for human needs. Only when human needs are secure the Nation and Zimbabwe in particular can prosper. The absence of the ZDF role in human needs exposes people to internal and external threats and manipulations to the detriment of Zimbabweans developmental capacities.
Table 5.7: ZDF roles and human needs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No clue</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field data July (2012)

84% said yes and (8%) indicated no and 8% had no clue. The 84% as a summation are aware of modern security variances, that if there is tranquillity in the country and people enjoy their security through r basic human needs, there is bound to be development. A ZDF senior officer 25 July 2012 observed that,

in this socio-political matrix, the ZDF defends the people (the means) whilst human security (the goal) provides the much needed happiness. A nation that has peace, or whose security is enhanced, will in most cases witness human security and development traits. People who feel secure are able to develop themselves socially and economically. They have the freedom and space to engage in developmental activities at individual, community and national level.

Ideally, peace should naturally translate into business and therefore development. The ZDF must engage in developmental projects. Human needs take place in an environment of peace and opportunities. Likewise, any economy will succeed where economic, political, food, environment, personal, community, and health security are flourishing. A ZDF senior officer in Harare, 30 July 2012 said that “solid state security guarantees human security needs and enhances human opportunities and privileges.”

What materialises is that the BHN conceptions should be institutionalised as HS tenets into the ZDF roles and functions. Participation in this area is a part of professionalism in civic duties, thus blending the military and the civilian in interdependence that is conducive to mutual co-operation.

5.4 PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES

3.15.12 ZDF being political and partisan

ZDF senior officers 48% responded by indicating that the ZDF is an arm of the Government that is responsible for the defence of national sovereignty and territorial integrity and they stand to be political in nature. Figure 5.3 below captures the general pattern of responses
from the respondents, according to their age group, on whether ZDF should be political, partisan or non-partisan. In total 52% said no and this was affected by the age group between 30-39 with a 100% no to being political and partisan.

**Figure 5.3: ZDF being political and partisan (n=50)**

![Figure 5.3: ZDF being political and partisan (n=50)](image)

**Source:** Authors Field data July 2012

Figure 5.3 is a summary of the perceptions of ZDF senior officers in respect of being political and partisan according to different age categories. Age therefore, had a bearing on their attitude and approach to the issue. Most ZDF senior ZDF officers aged 39 years and below 100% said that the ZDF should be neither political nor partisan.

This young generation was born before and just after independence; have not experienced the armed struggle for Zimbabwe; and are not concerned with the politics of the day or with being partisan or nonpartisan inclined. This implies that there is a hidden impetus of a critical cohort which needs attention. These young officers want employment and are not concerned with politics; this is a challenge to the revolutionary legacy.

Those ZDF Senior officers aged 40-49 years (71%) and 50 years and above (54%) felt that the ZDF should be aligned to a particular party and ideological orientation. One may argue that those who said the ZDF should be political and partisan participated in the struggle for independence of Zimbabwe; an experience that imbued them with a strong partisan-cum-nationalist sensibility which explains why they continue to play a role within the ruling party ZANU PF and government. For this group, the gun cannot be divorced from the cause for which it stands. One ZDF senior officer 4 August (2012) observed that, “Politics is what affects people and what affects people affects equally the ZDF.”
The age group 30-39 (100%), who said no to be political and nonpartisan understandably, can indulge in neoliberal politics of apolitical allegiance that tends more towards favouring neutrality as realists. As a summation the 30-39 age group believe that political allegiance was reasonable in the context of the struggle for independence. They argue that, after 1980, the ZDF needed to be professional in its approach to protect state ideology and must support whoever is in power in line with the Defence Act (1996: 20) that prohibits all professional soldiers from active politics and forbids them to attend political meetings.

The perception of the latter takes its authority from the Defence Act (1996: 20) that attests that ZDF was created as a body whose allegiance is to the government and not to the party. Unfortunately, this prohibition does not appreciate the paradox that all Zimbabwean citizens (including the professional soldiers) have a stake and an interest in the direction of Zimbabwean politics. Part of the paradox alluded to above, is the fact that political power, by its very nature, is a constituent among many other duties of the ZDF based on national security interests. Political power is founded in part within the state security; hence, examining whether or not the ZDF should be partisan, may be interpreted as discussing functionary issues of state security organs. One ZDF senior officer 10 August 2012r said that, the state security organs including ZDF, to be relevant, should include the protection of people’s identity, values, culture, aspirations and vision. This extends to preservation of concepts, practices, traditions and ideas. It should have a clear focus in as far as the past, present and future aspirations of Zimbabweans are concerned. The dilemma that arises is the fact that the ZDF is part of the state security machinery and therefore cannot be independent of the politics from which it derives its authority.

Some ZDF senior officers 29 % pointed out that the ZDF must not be political, but politically conscious. While it sounds quite academic, this point is far from making anything easier for the analyst. First, one wonders what difference there is in the premise of the statement. Is it possible to be apolitical and politically conscious simultaneously? Is it possible to talk of impartiality when in fact the military is the means towards political ends from the perspective of a freedom fighter as a social reformer?

One ZDF senior officer 19 August 2012 said that, clearly, the mandate and role of the ZDF is national and allegiance should be for national security and not for, or to, particular individuals. The ZDF should not be biased towards specific political parties because if it becomes so it will fail in its mandate to protect citizens equally. It should be politically conscious so that it is able to defend any democratically elected government.
and to allow freedom of association and divergence of views amongst citizens.

The above view is a liberal Eurocentric perspective. However, in practice, this is easier said than done. The ZDF as an organisation should take keen interest in public affairs whose security it preserves. When one traces the origin of some of the partisan positions by some respondents, one realizes that their attitudes emanate from their long-time participation in the armed struggle. For this reason, any attempt to divorce their sensibilities from partisan linkages is like drawing life out of them. By the same logic, it is difficult for ZDF not to be partisan given that its mandate is to protect the values and institutions of the nation that are reflected by the government. When in uniform performing national duties yes the ZDF should not be partisan but as an individual definitely the right to or not are their prerogative.

The ZDF, in particular, is unique in that its composition is still predominantly composed of liberation war veterans with major stakes to protect as individuals and as members of the liberation movements (ZANLA and ZIPRA) which were integral military wings of previous ZANU and ZAPU now ZANU PF. What emerged is that political power is embedded within the state security, hence examining whether or not it should be partisan may be interpreted as discussing functional issues of state security organs. Any politics that moves away from the concept of Zimbabwe as enshrined in the people’s ethos would not be perceived as serving the interests of the state and its citizens. It is better for the ZDF to enhance the *Ubuntu* frameworks which certainly is not associated with corruption, laziness, moral decadency, theft, greed, and selfishness. The *Ubuntu* theory, based on the elements of excellence, sense of responsibility, creativity, innovation, hard work, morality, honesty and focus should be the means as well as the goal of the ZDF which is political anyway.

3.15.13 HS in ZDF roles and functions

The bar graph in Figure 5.4 below, illustrates the institutionalisation of HS into the ZDF’s roles and functions. 82% of the ZDF male officers and 100% of the ZDF female officers concurred that there is a correlation between the ZDF’s activities and HS goals. The latter 100% concurrence of women could be attributed to the idea of women bringing life into being. One ZDF senior officer 16 August 2012 confirmed that,

> The ZDF is responsible for the human security aspects of the people so as to allow development to be carried out in an environment of peace and harmonious conditions that are imperative to the attainment of happiness. The current scenario is locally and internationally, dominated by the preponderance of non-traditional security threats. These include natural
disasters, widespread disease and hunger, which need various responses by both civic society and the military.

Non-traditional threats are part of the ZDF’s roles and functions. The ZDF’s involvement in non-traditional threats should take cognisance of the roles played by TAF and PLA in eliminating the negative comments from the general populace of Zimbabwe in that the ZDF should be confined to military barracks in peace time. In fact peace begins with the ‘self’. Those who disagreed (16%) with the institutionalisation process of HS into the ZDF roles and functions were not aware of the NDP (1997: V) which states that “security provides an enabling atmosphere for investment and development.” Therefore, the general summation on the ZDF roles and function is that, a stable civil-military relation depends to a greater extent on the professionalism of the ZDF. The challenge is to define and promote an approach to military professionalism consistent with the constitution, national vision, interests and the fundamental founding values and principles of Zimbabwe. The entry point is to start with the self. The self in this case is the cognitive, representation of one's identity as the centre of experience moving to the community, the nation, region and international arena at large.

Figure 5.4: HS in the ZDF roles and functions (n=50)

Source: Authors Field data 16 August (2012)

One ZDF senior 16 August 2012 respondent observed that,

HS roles are part of professionalism in civic duties that blend the military man with the civilian, thus creating interdependence which is conducive to mutual cooperation, collaboration, mutual trust, understanding and commitment. There is also evidence of the ZDF going beyond just non-traditional security provision. For instance, the ZDF has been involved in a number of operations for human security such as in ‘Operation Maguta’ for food security and the ZDF secondment to national strategic institutions for example the National Railways of Zimbabwe, University of Zimbabwe-Centre for Defence Studies.

It is in the interest of the ZDF to have a stable nation therefore HS tenets need to be ensured in its roles and functions as part of protecting national and security interests. To this end one
can conclude that while the primary role of ZDF is to provide ‘security’, it should also play a role in social improvement projects as social reformers. However, one ZDF senior officer 16 August 2012 observed that “if these roles are not properly synchronized, this may create a defence and security dilemma.” As shown in figure 10 the general perception from the participants was that the concerns in Zimbabwe are not whether the ZDF should be involved in politics, economy, food production but rather the form.

Figure 10 above shows that 84% of the respondents across the sex range concur that the ZDF should be involved in socio-economic issues. A ZDF senior officer 20 August 2012 said that, “the implication is clear in that the security sector should be involved in the political affairs of the land and that it is the nature of involvement that needs contestation and clarification.” A follow-up explanatory of ZDF senior officers 16% specifies that soldiers should be confined to barracks. The 16% emphasized that while soldiers should have the same opportunity as all other members of the society they should not involve themselves in socio-economic activities. But are socio-economic activities not politics? How do you differentiate politics, security and socio-economics activities? Those, ZDF senior officers whose response was (84%) to the above assertion, differed from the (16%) group in the form of ZDF’s involvement in socio economic. A ZDF senior officer 20 August 2012 observed that,

the ZDF in Zimbabwe is a result of a political socio-economic armed struggle and therefore the two may not be separated. The state in its current constitution was a direct product of liberation war and some are officers in the ZDF hence, they continue to protect the political dispensation they stood for in the past, present and for future national inspiration.

The general observation by the ZDF senior officers (84%) of the respondents was that the ZDF should foster security in tandem with the recognition of national values, interests, national objectives as derived from Zimbabwe’s historical characteristics, future perspectives and imperatives. This implies that failure to do so would amount to ‘shooting themselves in the foot.’ The 84% group’s position on ZDF involvement in socio-economic activities is categorically ascribed to the liberation struggle, because the ZDF emerged from it as the peoples’ armies because ZANLA and ZIPRA were social reformers and political commissars in developing political consciousness for the liberation of Zimbabwe based on the politics of the day. Hence, any attempt to divorce the ZDF from direct political socio-economic involvement is seen as tantamount to reversing the gains of independence. One ZDF senior
officer 20 August 2012 stated “in Uganda, the Defence Forces have got 10 reserved parliamentary seats and the Western liberals have not said anything about it.”

An analysis of these submissions shows an overriding concern about splitting the argument in terms of perspectives guided by competing ideologies of the liberation movements, former colonial sympathisers, and the liberals seeking their own interests. The respondents who said no (16%) shared the views of NGOs and other civic pressure groups. The 84% respondents regarded the ZDF involvement in socio-economic activities and politics as a complimentary role whilst the other 16% group was against any involvement as they saw it as meddling or overstepping the ZDF’s mandate. The composite concept that emerged is that the state in its current form is a direct product of the liberation war. For that reason, the ZDF’s continues to protect the political and socio-economic dispensation they stood for in the past.

5.5 CRITICAL REVIEW OF SUBMISSIONS

ZDF as an organisation is a grouping of people from the communities scattered around the country, and issues of political, economic, and a social nature affects ZDF directly. Not being sensitive to these issues is like waiting helplessly before a brewing storm. The summation is that as individual serving members of the ZDF can be involved in ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ politics which should not compromise the members’ fulfilment of his/her professional mandate to protect all citizens.

The ZDF members have got to engage in socio-economic activities such as ‘Operation Maguta’, offer medical services to civilians in times of crises, evacuate floods affected victims to safe grounds, resources such as endangered animals in conservancies such as Gonarezhou, Wankie national parks and participate in diamond mining (Chiyadzwa) etc. rather than be confined to barracks during peace time as some Zimbabweans suggest. The submissions thus far also pose the critical question: “what is politics?” Do all people understand it in the same way? It is not possible to talk of security and separating it from politics. Politics is the science of power and the exercise of it in the running of national affairs. To exercise such power over the affairs of people one needs the ZDF as the source of such power. This fact alone means that it is not possible to separate the ZDF from politics because it is part of the pillars of political power. The ZDF’s involvement should be guided always by policy and legal parameters as an influence in the operations of the geo-politics of the day. The role of the military is simply a question of identity from the perspective of Zimbabwean people as
positioned, located, focused and grounded through repositioning the ZDF economically, politically, historically, culturally and socially based on an Afrocentric *Ubuntu* philosophy.

**5.6 GENDER RESPONSES TO THE ZDF CONFIGURATION**

**3.15.14 Gender: recasting ZDF in normalising structures**

Figure 5.5 below is an analysis of responses in recasting ZDF in respect of normalising structures on gender. The graph below shows that 100% of ZDF women senior officers said YES in recasting and normalising gender in the ZDF structures whilst 59% ZDF male senior officers said yes and 41% ZDF male senior officers said NO. An examination of the explanatory responses shows that the reasons for the NO response have something to do with the observation made by one ZDF senior male officer 20 August 2012 observed that,

> the ZDF have lived in the constraints of the European's world and have been oppressed by the misunderstanding that we are at work for own ethical interests; in fact, we are the main advocates for Europe’s gender packages. Gender improvement in the defence forces is a cultural intangible heritage valued and practised from generation to generation through African values and interests, which respect the security of the self, gender and cultural diversity as a collective approach, let us be careful not to chase the Gods which are not ours.

In its current form, gender is used to meet personal agendas, rather than national agendas. If done legally, it is a process meant to improve the ZDF agendas and is not a threat. Within the power structures of the state, there is apportionment of responsibility and powers to the SS that act in the interests of the state. Therefore, gender should also act in the interest of the state and its citizens. In this case, gender enhancement acts as a constructive and positive process in regulating the developmental process of the ZDF. The respondents in the YES (64%) category believe that gender approaches entail far more than general oratory.
Figure 5.5: SEX responses in normalising structures (n=50)

Source: Authors Field data August (2012)

The total of ZDF senior officers 36% respondents said NO was vehement in their rejection of the term gender structural enhancement. One ZDF senior officer 24 August 2012 observed that “gender issues are not of African origin.” The total of ZDF senior officers who said YES (64%) in summary observed that gender enhancement is a process based on the levels of consciousness as was the case during the liberation struggle. This is an on-going process that should ensure the ZDF is in line with the needs and aspirations of its citizens. Gender enhancement in normalising structures as a concept should be a developmental process because women have been employed in a variety of duties such as administration, logistics, intelligence, signals, education and other related professional fields in the ZDF with outstanding results since the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe.

3.15.15 Gender focus group discussion (GFGD)

The gender GFGD considerations of gender were conducted once with a group of 6 female and 4 male making a total of 10 ZDF senior officers and a combination of on-going observations. The GFGD examination shaped facts and gave significance to the study, with a critical analysis in concluding the findings based on the ZDF perceptions about gender. The general entry point to gender was the idea that men and women are equal but different humans in bringing life into being. As a result, the quester-view was engaged. This is a powerful statement in that gender demand is a question of acceptance and attitude.

The focus is on role acceptance in reciprocity of inter-personal relations which implies that people are dependent on one another for success. Role and norms are behaviours determined by societal expectations and attitudes. Further, roles provide the means through which
values, norms and goals translate into action. In summary the GFGD was comfortable in observing that the ZDF gender perceptions are underpinned by the fundamental values, norms, and attitudes of the environment that determines the acceptance of an individual within a particular role.

Women in the ZDF have taken half the challenge of the available opportunities as enlisted into the traditional male role in military and have penetrated into military structures since the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe. Men regarded general combat related activities as non-traditional for women. The struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe proved this assertion wrong. Although women believed that they were qualified for combat, and were willing to serve in it, they did not want to be excluded from, or forced into it.

Men, similarly, did not like to force women into combat as they did to fellow men. This seems to have been resolved as the ZDF has deployed women to Peace Keeping Operations in Angola 1991. This was Zimbabwe’s first UN deployment in the UN Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM II) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998. In these deployments, women were not involved in combat roles but as nurses, bar tenders, logistics, cleaning and other such roles. Thousands of men and women dedicated themselves to the liberation struggle where women died in camp raids in Zambia, Angola and Mozambique, and perished on the battlefields in Zimbabwe. Women in the liberation struggle were accorded the same status as with men because the enemy’s bullets had no gender distinctions.

More women who enlisted into the ZDF are serving in various capacities in different corps. New laws of partially granting paid maternity leave and breast feeding hours were pronounced. The Defence Act (1996) addresses forces as members or persons and not according to their gender sexuality. Similarly, the Zimbabwe Labour Relations Act 16/85 forbids discrimination on the grounds, among other attributes, of gender in aspects such as employment and promotion.

The NDP (1997) F recruitment policy and other guidelines do not prescribe unfair criteria such as gender, race, and religion. The perception, attitudes, and role acceptances should not hinder or prohibit women in combat roles. It is also clear that technology is now making it easier for women to be involved in combat related roles. On non-military courses the ZDF has encouraged men and women to enrol in academic courses for personal and professional
development. Many women have taken up this challenge and have acquired certificates, diplomas, and degrees. The challenge is to give women the chance to train in combat related courses.

Women in the ZDF have not experienced the same waves and heights of promotion as they have witnessed among their male counterparts. Women in the ZDF rose to the highest rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the 1980s. In the ZDF ZNA in particular, for the years 1993, 2000 and 2008 the comparison of the number of females and their corresponding total enrolment for each rank are shown in Figure 5.6 below.

**Figure 5.6: Employment in each rank for 1993, 2000 and 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Authors Field Data 20 August 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were no females in the policy-decision making ranks of full colonel and above in 1993 to 2000 but the achievements made by women in the same period are clearly revealed as member or persons of the ZDF. A female ZDF officer won a gold medal award by the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry after obtaining the highest mark among students from all over the world for the High Audit Examination in August 1986.

A female senior member of the ZDF during the period 1993-2000 came first of the 24 competitors in the District Eliminating shooting competition in 1998. Another junior female
member, married with two children, passed the rigorous parachute selection course achieving 48th place out of 80 ZDF members and was the only woman who successfully graduated from the course in 1996. She has this to say, this parachute course requires devotion, courage and it is nothing like spot para-dropping done for leisure, this is for combat and defence of the nation.” She went on to be the only woman in a group of 68 members who graduated in the USA Special Forces Airborne Operation and Para-Troop training in 1997.

This should have a positive bearing on women to avail themselves of equal opportunities to take up the challenges of military life alongside their male counter-parts. Women should be treated as individuals not as a group, and policies should protect women from decisions taken based on personal attitudes. The G FGD brought the perception that women in the ZDF have taken are trying to take the challenge of the available opportunities as enlisted into the traditional male role in military. Women have proved that they are as knowledgeable and competent as their male counterparts. It is recommended that all practices that do not empower women and render them partially accepted into the ZDF need to be reviewed. ZDF policies should be reviewed in accordance with current legal provisions. As an observation, the ZDF is overemphasising the role of humanity rather than the role of partnerships in creating robust relations. It appears that the ZDF is not driven into hurriedly move women into higher positions. Figure 5.6 above indicates a progressive development trajectory.

5.7 REFORMS IN THE ZDF

SSR as a concept in the ZDF had its humble origin in the 1960s through school-age youths, driven by an in-born yearning for the emancipation and genuine freedom of their communities and the nation as a collective approach in dislodging the colonial system through the Chinese-Mao-Model of revolution. In other words, the national liberation of a people is the regaining of the historical personality of the mind and soul, as the first level of conscious of social reform. This analysis focuses on the respondents’ perceptions in the area of SSR in the ZDF for the period 1980-2008. Table 5.8 below indicates the frequency on whether there were reforms in the ZDF 1980-2008.
Table 5.8: Response frequency on whether there were reforms in the ZDF (n=50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not indicate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors Field data August (2012)

The ZDF reform process is evident in the struggle against colonialism and through its public appearances (Defence Forces Day/Independence Celebrations) with a view to educating and relating with communities in respect of the function and history of the ZDF. A ZDF senior officer Harare, 20 August 2012 said that,

the idea of the ZDF Day is commendable and went on to say misconceptions about ZDF involvement in politics are of a colonial nature because ZDF is part of the social fabric as a stakeholder, and the ZDF should not be a passenger in politics directly or indirect.

A ZDF senior officer on 20 August 2012 termed, “the ZDF as an invisible government under the Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe.” The 92% of the respondents conceded that there have been significant ZDF reforms before and after the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 and it has been difficult for detractors to destabilise Zimbabwe. The constitution and other legal instruments are already in place, what is required is the continued governance and implementation from a Zimbabwean perspective that is locally driven and owned.

The ZDF has transformed its roles to cater for contemporary situations and solutions. Major thematic reforms were the struggles-within-the-struggle, the formation of the ZNA and AFZ, DDR, operations merger, dissident flash, Murambatsvina/restore order, Garikai/Hlalanihuhle, Maguta/Inala, reactions to South African apartheid destabilisation policy, and regional and peace keeping operations. These were all SSR processes aligned to the national security interests, a developmental consciousness, known as Security Sector Alignment (SSA). Therefore, the institutionalisation of these activities in the ZDF duties and responsibilities through the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), Defence Act (1997) and the Defence Policy (1997) is a professionalization and modernisation process.
3.15.16 ZDF statutory instruments

The ZDF senior officers’ perceptions were analysed in evaluating the Statutory Instruments (SI) to SSR, HS, and SS relations. The results in Table 5.9 below indicate that 44% ZDF senior officers were of the view that the ZDF need to be reviewed and enforced. Reviewing the instrument is necessary as a way of transforming, guiding and modernising the ZDF in line with regional defence developmental processes. The current NDP (1997) was crafted in 1997 and since then no single edition or Amendment has been published. What a challenge to the ZDF in the 21st century.

Table 5.9: Responses on reviewing the ZDF statutory instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors Field data August (2012)

Thirty-six per cent (36%) respondents were of the view that the current environment should focus on issues of bringing food to the table for the citizens. There are more challenging issues in the areas of economics and the health service delivery system. It is a matter of evaluating and prioritising the challenging issues. The current NDP 1997 is still functional and it should definitely be reviewed.

However, evaluating the priorities is also a review of the challenges ZDF is facing. What emerged is that reviewing the ZDF SI is necessary as a way of transforming and modernising the ZDF in line with the national strategic policy framework as a national and regional defence development process. The (36%) ZDF senior officers group were of the opinion that the current geo-political environment should focus on issues of creating food, shelter, employment, education and health for the citizens. Therefore, transforming and modernising the ZDF is a process which should move in the direction of providing basic human needs as the first line of defence from an Afrocentric approach based on Ubuntu philosophy.
3.15.17 ZDF as part of the social fabric

This section evaluates the sensitivity of the ZDF as part of the social fabric in providing basic human needs. The table below indicates the frequency, percentages, and cumulative percentages of responses. A ZDF senior officer 20 August 2012 stated that “the ZDF is part of the social fabric and should be responsible for the political and socio-economic challenges to avoid backlashes.”

Table 5.10: Response on ZDF as part of the social fabric (n=50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No clue</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors Field data August 2012

The majority respondents (76%) of the ZDF’s senior officers were of the general opinion that ZDF is part of the social fabric as it is part of the five pillars of national power. Once this is conceptualised, the whole process is simply a strait-jacket approach. A few respondents (12%) of the ZDF’s senior officers who said NO draw their facts from the idea that the ZDF should stand alone and view the idea as part of attracting politics into the ZDF.

However, societal and political security is part of the ZDF’s roles and functions. What emerged is that the ZDF is part of the social fabric in providing national security; members of the ZDF come from the community. Hence the ZDF is part and parcel of the social fabric and should be involved in the political, social, economic and cultural security activities of their communities.

3.15.18 Oversight of the ZDF

Parliamentary oversight of the SS does not appreciate their role in supplying material resources, personnel management, financial resources, information resources, technology, and the preservation of internal issues through professionalising the security sector. This section evaluates the concept of oversight of the security sector and draws on ZDF perceptions in that regard. Table 5.11 below indicates the response regarding whether parliamentary oversight exists and assists the ZDF.
A great number of respondents (68%) among ZDF senior officers were of the general opinion that the Parliamentary oversight of the ZDF should exist in respect of accountability, transparency and improvement of the ZDF functions according to the legal provisions. They went on to observe that, the parliamentary oversight body should provide directions as to where the ZDF needs to go the extra mile and to assist and enhance the ZDF functions in accordance with the legal framework.

Nearly a quarter (24%) of ZDF senior officers who responded NO were of the opinion that the ZDF is for professionals who should always be scanning the horizon for the defence of the nation. Parliamentary oversights should react to the reports on checks and balances so that ZDF can go forward as an organisation. The parliamentary oversights should put in place mechanisms, practices, and principles to be legally followed and administered, especially through the utilisation of the defence councils and committees in professionalising the ZDF’s operational and strategic roles.

The thematic issue on oversight of the ZDF is that the parliamentary oversight body on the ZDF must emphasise professionalization, accountability, transparency, and improving the conditions of service, roles and functions of ZDF according to the legal provisions and not spend time participating in political bickering about SSR and forgetting SS and HS relations in the equation. The challenge to be addressed is about a disunited population that is very critical of government. Much work is required to build up a consensus on ruling principles. What is missing is the shared ideology that should characterise Zimbabwe.

5.8 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (FGD): SSR, SS AND HS

The perceptions in respect of the concepts SSR, HS, and SS were discussed and evaluated. The FGDs of senior ZDF officers were made up two groups comprised of 8 ZDF senior officers. The FGDs were brainstorming exercises which started with SSR, SS and HS
relations’ influences and challenges in the ZDF pre independence and thereafter. After the brain storming exercise participants were involved in discussing the quester-view questionnaire.

Many thought-provoking ideas and experiences were raised, suggestions and proposals made. SSR was observed as an asymmetric warfare, Western agenda whose goal is to remove all revolutionary minded personnel from the ZDF in order to place liberal notions into the system. Therefore, the threat is in reversal of the gains of the revolution. The SSR should be locally driven and owned by the ZDF and not be imposed upon it.

FGDs amalgamate perceptions, discussions and draw parallels to this study as a critical thematic content analysis leading to the explanation of facts. The FGDs were of the view that the current call for security sector reform is a design to strengthen the pillars of opposition by removing those in office, especially the executive echelons. The power structures of the state determine the ZDF’s roles and functions.

Reforms are a process, not a punitive measure which should be people-driven or ZDF driven and the enhanced for efficiency in national security interests based on local threat analysis. Reforms are an internal process which depends on threat analysis to a particular state. Reforms are tools for enhancing the provision of security for all and, in this regard, it comprises policies and legislative instruments as a means to developmental goals hence the term security sector alignment.

On HS, the FGDs were of the opinion that the ZDF should be used in tackling issues which affect security on a daily basis, for instance poverty, inequalities, unemployment, food, health and the lack of access to education, health delivery system and meeting the needs of the poorest (a community centred approach). The ZDF is subordinate to a democratically elected civil authority. The challenges concern effective structures, processes, values, standards and attitudes that shape decisions about the ZDF.

In respect of the parliamentary oversight of the ZDF, the FGD emphasised the need to promote discipline and dignity by meeting basic human needs (food, health, employment, shelter, and security) of the forces, enhancing conditions of service and ensure strong alliances by strengthening relations with the regional systems through prior investigation into regional capabilities. Defence reviews should be an on-going process and must lead to SS
capacity building, identifying legitimate local notions of CMR and providing decisive legitimacy.

The SSR process is a political will derived from the development of local leadership to own the process, and to review the capacity and technical needs of the ZDF through constructive measures and not punitive measures. The FGD raised the idea that SSR is not about rebuilding the security institutions from scratch or dismantling them, but is rather a developmental process and inherently a political process that challenges the existing power relationships in a positive and constructive manner. Therefore, liberal political sensitivity of SSR creates resistance because statutory securities are traditional cornerstones of the state sovereignty and one of the pillars of power.

The challenge faced by the SS is about ‘regime change’ in the face of economic hardships. The Constitution and policies serve as the guidance and administrative tools. The ZDF is part of the surrounding political, social, and economic process of any given country and its significance depends on the professional, educational, physical, and moral attributes of the ZDF personnel. The ZDF has been promoting social reform initiatives through participating in a number of operations such as Dissident Flash and Maguta.

The ZDF council and committee systems are the administrative systems that are the driving tools. Parliamentary oversight should be shaped through the reports from the council and committee systems through national vision and ethos within the Constitutional legal framework. The FGDs stressed the idea that, ZDF without standards and a common frame of reference dissolves into nothing more than contending factions. The current SSR drive by the internal and external players is not connected to SS and HS relations. The FGDs indicated that the developmental trajectory of the current SSR drive is not reinforced by legal standards, mechanisms, practice and principles. As a result, it is a political gimmick for something else.

The FGDs observed that there are than 40 professions in the ZDF which are useful to the nation. The human resources are underutilised during peace time, and the ZDF should not be confined to barracks. Members of the ZDF should display their potential with the civil sector and take a major role in providing for peace and human security needs. There should be consensus for utilising the skills of ZDF members such as that of doctors, engineers, nurses, teachers, strategic planners and pilots outside the ZDF.
This is taking place in developed nations where the military is used in industries etc. The FGDs observed that the professional conduct of the ZDF in contributing to HS should be through professionalising the sector, equipping and training them for integrity, creativity and leadership development, encompassing respect for human needs, discipline, vigilance and obedience, visionary, loyalty, patriotism and dedication, competence and impartiality, honesty and consistency, fairness and effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. These observations are tenets of the **Ubuntu**.

The focus group discussions also brought to the fore new knowledge in developing an **Ubuntu** about the place of SSR in the four levels of consciousness. Consciousness, functions as a quality of awareness or of being aware of an external object or something within oneself. Self-determination of the mind and soul, free from oppression, deprivation and discrimination and seek forgiveness, unity, freedom and sound work ethics is essential. Furthermore develop a code of conduct and developmental characteristics based on the essentials roles and functions of the ZDF.

The level of consciousness must find some process of transforming the dynamic power of releasing the conscious within the level of expanding the consciousness to a higher level. This is the result of the philosophical theoretical framework of the thesis - the antithesis and the synthesis aspects thereof. It is a conceptual framework of a qualitative nature on the levels of consciousness based on the elements of **Ubuntu** theory which one of the FGDs group developed.

Figure 5.7 below shows the end result of the promotion of defence management systems which is self-regulatory in nature. Therefore, SSR should not be prescriptive but an indigenous process inherent in the levels of consciousness within critical responses, levels of consciousness and consciousness itself based on practical use of available apparatuses. The defence management system is a self-regulatory system that uses principles and mechanisms that are endogenous and locally driven. This is so because tenets of **Ubuntu** are human dignity and respect, flexibility and accommodation, and participative interaction among others.

The four levels below forms a basis from which SSR could be structured with a heavy concentration on the 3rd and 4th levels of security consciousness. The tendency has been to
cloud conversations and decisions around the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} levels barely scratching the fundamental building block of a social value system.

Figure 5.7: Ubuntu: Four levels of consciousness

**Levels of consciousness**

- **Level One:** Consciousness, liberation and emancipation (Thesis)
  - Practical Response: Liberation war, peace building, conflict transformation and dialogue.
  - Freedom of the mind and soul from oppression, deprivation and discrimination.

- **Level Two:** Developmental consciousness of security sector structures and systems (ant-thesis)
  - DDR, training, human security and development paradigm shift.
  - Justice, forgive/forget, unity, freedom and work

- **Level Three:** Security sector transformation, enhancement and modernisation of critical values (sythesus)
  - Vision, national interests, norms, values, nationhood - Ubuntu
  - Code of ethics/conduct and technology, developmental characteristics

- **Level four:** Good governance, policy reviews and human resource management with good conditions of service (theses)
  - Operational systems, monitoring and evaluation with a clear period.
  - Essentials of security sector governance, appraisals, and structures of good governance

Practical use of the tools for defence management systems as a self-regulatory process through principles and mechanisms which are endogenous and locally driven.

**Source:** Authors Field data 20 August (2012)
5.9 CONCLUSION

In this research the qualitative approach was used to analyse the ZDF’s protest against implementing SSR as a regime change agenda, focusing on removing specific senior officers from office. Emphasis was placed on SSR, SS and HS multi-faceted phenomena within a specific context of the ZDF perceptions on reform. SSR as a term was new, politicised and internationalised as a security threat in trying to remove senior security service chiefs from office. Practically, this requires a series of strategies to determine how SSR can be internalised within the political and institutional discourses.

Case studies of SSR also revealed progress in the enactment of new legislations in the security sector. More space was allowed for public participation, up to a certain level, through parliamentary and governmental policy-making processes. The SSR, HS and SS concepts are based on realism and idealism, which are Eurocentric concepts. Leading theories are numerous in international security studies of SS, which has shifted in the current world order to embrace the security of the individual person based on the concept of human security and state security relations.

Using Ubuntu as the critical theoretical framework for studying SSR, SS and HS relations will cut the umbilical cord from the Western theoretical frameworks. The Ubuntu approach and its tenets can assist in substituting Eurocentric Western aphorisms through advocating the LGTP model. The ZDF approach has a duty to be people-centred, multi-sectored, comprehensive, content-specific and prevention orientated in its HS approach through identifying risks, threats, hazards to addresses their root causes. The ZDF should be proactive instead of being reactive. The focus should be on preventive responses through protection and empowerment frameworks in the areas of food, economics, health, environment, personal, community, and political security that are part of necessary human survival activities. Territorial integrity should promote economic, political, social, health, personal, community and food security. This is the ZDF role based on the Ubuntu approach to SSR and human security relations through professionalization in the interest of Zimbabweans as a family.
CHAPTER SIX

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this case study was to analyse the influence and challenges of Security Sector Reform (SSR), linkages of State Security (SS) and Human Security (HS) relations with a view to ascertain the perceptions and attitudes of the ZDF in respect SSR as the actor and SS and HS as the acted upon. The search for knowledge regarding SSR, SS and HS relations in Zimbabwe spans from the pre-independence era as the basis to the post-independence period, 1980 to 2008. The political forces that emerged within Zimbabwe were highly politicised and tended to follow the ideological aspirations of the period.

The ZDF currently consists of the indigenous guerrilla army with its own, non-Western traditions and doctrines. In this regard, the ZDF is part and parcel of the social, political, and economic fabric with mixed feelings and contradictory views because they make contacts and establish alliances, and experience a sense of belonging. They are conscientious individuals who act as a group and regard the process of SSR as advocated by opposition groups in Zimbabwe, as a foreign prescriptive process, mainly targeting the removal of revolutionary senior ZDF officers from office. Such an approach to SSR does not relate to HS and SS relations, because SSR was politicised internally and externally by those who invented it and continue to popularise it.

As a result, speaking out about the SSR was and is often regarded as taboo because it is not an indigenous and locally driven process. This formed the basis for undertaking this study. This study’s objectives were achieved through identifying influences and challenges of SSR in Zimbabwe, and examining the ZDF’s perceptions and attitudes regarding the SSR and its linkages to HS and SS relations before formulating strategic proposals. The analysis was made possible through concealed voices and the freeing up of meaning, manipulating the data, seeking persistent words, key phrases, common and unusual ideas, themes and patterns, categorising the trajectories of the phenomenon.

This study reached some conclusions and makes recommendations, which are envisaged to map the way forward on the future of SSR, HS and SS relations in Zimbabwe from an Afrocentric approach. The concept of SSR is essentially Western in origin, context, content and ideology, despite its laudable intentions and its predication on noble normative
principles. Members of the ZDF may transform the defence establishment according to national ideas, objectives, and principles through relevant legislation. Therefore, the objectives of the study were achieved as reflected in the summary of the main findings from the academic literature review, research quester-views, focus group discussions and observations. The state of the nation under the prescriptive nature of SSR is not healthy and it is time to ensure that all Zimbabweans are healthy, secure, educated, employed and nourished as the fundamental basic pre-requisites for the maintenance of a harmonious SS and HS relations.

6.2 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

It is in the interest of the ZDF to have a stable nation; therefore, human security tenets need to be enshrined in the ZDF’s roles and functions as part of its social obligation. This is in tandem with the contemporary security model that projects security as multi-dimensional and guarantees security for both citizens and the state because SS defends, whilst HS supports security sector enhancement and empowerment. A contented population offers the first line of defence; thus, SSR should be the first level of consciousness not a regime change agenda.

The following are the major findings:

- SSR emerged in the late 1990s and is essentially Eurocentric in origin with a remarkably similar content emanating largely from the Nordic States, Europe, the USA, Canada and Britain. The EU has notably stood out as a clear net exporter of the SSR concept and provides most of the funding for SSR activities worldwide.
- The absence of other major international powers including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) in the security sector reform equation involves challenging ideological and theoretical viewpoints because they are Eurocentric.
- SSR as often articulated in academia and political discourse is not Zimbabwean in origin, it is about those who invented the concept and continue to popularise it, and they have a reason for doing so because they are the primary beneficiaries of the gains of its acceptance. Therefore, SSR, in particular, is secondary in the scheme of its realisation because there is no officially articulated Zimbabwean theory or position that explains SSR.
- The relations between civilians (‘people without arms’), the society at large, and the ZDF (‘people with arms’) is not a ‘separate body’ in order to protect the society (‘human
security’). If separated, the human mind tends to hate, fear and feel bitter about that which it does not comprehend.

- The ZDF comprehend SSR, SS and HS relations in an indigenous way as a concept than the foreign (internal and external westerners) prescriptive way of those who invented it and continue to popularise it.

- SS and HS are inseparable, imperative and mutually reinforcing factors in social reality. Solid state security guarantees human security and enhances human opportunities and privileges and this is the scenario aspired by the ZDF. If SS is separated from HS, it poses a threat that creates poverty, hunger and unnecessary deaths.

- The ZDF should be dedicated to the Zimbabwean vision, ethos, values and traditions and should focus clearly on the origins and political dimensions of Zimbabwe, its present circumstances and future concerns and aspirations. Any politics that move away from the concept of Zimbabwe as enshrined in the people’s ethos would certainly not be perceived as serving the interests of the state, at least as it is understood to mean structures that prop a people-driven approach.

- The institutionalisation of human security in the roles and functions of the ZDF must be effectively synchronised in order not to create a security dilemma. ZDF must complement human needs because there is a positive correlation between SS and HS.

- The term ‘apolitical’ tends to lean more towards favouring neutrality. ZDF must provide protection and security to the citizens as part of their social obligation. The ZDF is a people’s army extending from the liberation armies (ZANLA and ZIPRA) who were fighters and political commissars that assisted the masses in developing political consciousness. Hence, the ZDF is part of the state security machinery.

- In the political and security discourse in Zimbabwe, it appears SSR is a new word which gained currents emanating from variety internal and external factors. However, this SSR has been an ongoing process beginning with the armed struggle for independence as social reformers, where contradictions in a revolutionary process were usually treated as ‘struggles-within-the struggle’, and a manifestation of a ‘correct process’ of SSR.

- The calls by external and internal political forces for SSR in Zimbabwe are viewed as ‘weasel- words’ for something else and as an asymmetric war between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries in the eyes of the ZDF; Eurocentric ideologies against Afrocentric ideologies.
• The liberation forces were highly politicised, with each military team comprising officers in charge of political mobilisation, health, education, logistics and military strategy. This was a holistic approach for national security interests based on a collective approach using the collective ‘finger theory’ framework.

• The ZDF views SSR as a regime change agenda which is not adjusting and aligning to modern security challenges. In its present form it is perceived to be about removing a group of revolutionary people from offices as an external driven process accepted by internal Eurocentric liberal forces. It is not endogenously driven and locally owned, it is prescriptive in content, methodology and ideology.

• The supporters of SSR have singled the ZDF in order to change and destroy the ZDF’s mind-set from being revolutionary into a corrupt sector, abandoning the objectives of the liberation struggle aiming to push the security sector into liberal assertiveness, away from Afrocentric accepted wisdom of the security sector which played a major role in liberating Zimbabwe from the shackles of colonialism.

• Genuine reform of the ZDF would be achieved through adopting an Afrocentric perspective in line with the Constitution, Defence Policy and subsequent Acts of Zimbabwe.

• SSR invokes different and often significantly strong reactions and emotions from different people depending on what people perceive it to be in terms of its objectives, content, and purpose. As a result, SSR is characterised by misconceptions, misinterpretations, expectations and a general confusion about when it should be applied and to whom it should be applied, because the external and internal SSR drivers are chasing concepts which are not theirs.

• State security roles and functions should be to deliver HS, which, when it exists, leads to developmental activities. All developmental issues rely on motivated human beings. A contented and cohesive population forms the first line of defence as a human security conception. HS elements are fundamental to the survival of any nation and these elements are the prerogatives of the SS machinery.

• The linkages of SS and HS in the ZDF encompasses the maintenance of human basic needs, human well-being and happiness with the objective of constructing political, economic, social, cultural and environmental settings in which people live, knowing that their vital independences and self-determinations are secure.
• SS and HS relations require a new consensus that acknowledges the linkages and interdependencies between the SS and HS because state security and human security are inseparable, vital and mutually reinforcing factors in social reality that leads to human security and happiness.

• SS and HS linkages are about securing conditions of safety. The organs of SS are the ones which ensure that security in all its forms is preserved because it is the assurance that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country pursue legitimate interests without undue duress from external and internal disruptive elements in addressing the people’s needs.

• The ZDF complements and enhances human needs. The absence of the ZDF and human needs legal frameworks exposes people to internal and external threats and manipulations detriment to human happiness. People who feel secure are able to develop themselves socially and economically. They have the freedom and space to engage in developmental activities at individual, community and national level.

• The ZDF in practice protects people’s identity, values, culture, aspirations and vision. In this case ZDF is part of the social fabric as the state security machinery and cannot be independent of the politics from which it derives its authority. The current scenario, both local and international, is dominated by the preponderance of non-traditional security threats.

• The ZDF is a result of a revolutionary, political and socio-economic armed struggle; therefore, the two cannot be separated. The Zimbabwe state in its current form is a direct product of liberation war; hence, the ZDF continues to protect the political dispensation they stood for in the past, for the present and future inspiration.

• Gender improvement in the ZDF is a cultural intangible heritage valued and practiced from generation to generation through African values, interests, which respect the security of the self, gender and cultural diversity as a collective approach.

• The ZDF’s gender perceptions are underpinned by the fundamental values, norms, and attitudes of the environment that determines the acceptance of an individual within a particular role. Women in the ZDF have taken half the challenge of the available opportunities and enlisted into the traditional male roles in the ZDF and penetrated military structures since the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe.

• The ZDF has a duty in tackling issues which affect insecurity on a daily basis i.e. the challenges concern effective structures, processes, values, standards and attitudes that
shape decisions of and about the ZDF. A defence force without standards and a common frame of reference would dissolve into nothing more than contending factions affecting security issues.

- The ZDF’s human resources potential is not fully utilised during peace time and the general perception and attitude is that the ZDF should be confined to barracks. Confining the ZDF to barracks seems to indicate that the ZDF members are mentally and physically ‘challenged’. Members of the ZDF should display their potential within the civil sector, especially members with skills such as doctors, engineers, nurses, teachers, strategic planners and pilots. If developed nations utilise their military in industries, diplomacy and other areas, why not the ZDF?

- The ZDF’s conduct in contributing to HS should be through professionalising the security sector, equipping and providing training for integrity, creativity and leadership development, encompassing respect of human needs, discipline, vigilance and obedience, vision, loyalty, patriotism and dedication, competence and impartiality, honesty and consistency, fairness and effectiveness, efficiency and transparency as nation building tenets.

- The four levels of consciousness based on *Ubuntu* forms a basis from which SSR could be structured in Zimbabwe with a specific focus on the 3\textsuperscript{rd} (security sector alignment, enhancement and modernisation of critical values) and 4\textsuperscript{th} (governance, policy reviews and human resource management with good conditions of service) levels of security consciousness. The tendency has been to cloud conversations, discussions and decisions around the 1\textsuperscript{st} (consciousness, liberation and emancipation) and 2\textsuperscript{nd} (developmental consciousness of security sector structures and systems) levels barely scratching the fundamental building blocks of a social value system.

- Nation building is a process where the ZDF should take a cue from the PLA, TAF and South Korean in the modernisation process. The ZDF can base the modernisation process drumming at the 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} levels of security consciousness.

- The ZDF is duty-bound to be people centred, multi-sectored, comprehensive, content-specific and prevention-orientated through identifying risks, threats, hazards and to addresses their root causes; therefore, the ZDF should be proactive instead of being reactive.

- Territorial integrity should promote economic, political, social, health, personal, community and food security. This should be the ZDF’s role based on the *Ubuntu*
approach to SS and HS relations through professionalization in the interests of Zimbabweans as a family.

- Parliamentarians do not always exercise their duty of oversight and representing the ZDF and the citizens of Zimbabwe. Instead, in many cases, they are absorbed in party political interests and party discipline. At the individual level, parliamentarians are often eager to remain in the ‘good books’ of influential officials of both civilian and military decision-making bodies.

6.3 CONCLUSION

SS defends the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zimbabwe, HS supports the process through alignment, enhancement and empowerment procedures. SS and HS relations is a multi-faceted phenomenon within the specific context of the ZDF’s complaint against the implementation of SSR as a regime change agenda; an agenda focusing on the removal of specific senior officers from office. The ZDF does not perceive SSR in the same way as the internal and external Western actors who conceived it. As a result SSR is a process that is not of Zimbabwean origin; it is far removed from an *Ubuntu* level of consciousness. Data collection through question-views, observation, and focus groups indicates that SSR in the ZDF is known as Security Sector Alignment (SSA) based on the 3rd and 4th levels of security consciousness.

Any politics that moves away from the concept of *Ubuntu* as enshrined in the people’s ethos would certainly not be perceived as serving the interests of the state; at least as it is understood to mean structures that supports a people-driven government. The relationship between SS and HS ensures the survival of the country and its people; ensuring the elements of survival is the prerogative of the state security machinery. The ZDF must provide protection and security to the citizens as part of the ZDF’s social obligation in a holistic and collective security approach, using the ‘finger theory’ framework.

The linkages of the ZDF and HS encompasses the enhanced satisfaction of human basic needs, human well-being and happiness with the objective of constructing political, economic, social, cultural and environmental settings in which people live, knowing that their vital independences and self-determinations are secure. This requires a new consensus that acknowledges the linkages and interdependencies because SS and HS are inseparable, vital and mutually reinforcing factors in social reality. The reason that the ZDF is so
challenging to control is not because the ZDF does not want to subject itself to civilian control, but because civilians cannot decide how to use the ZDF for development.

The opposition, civil society, and external drivers of SSR have singled out the ZDF in order to change and destroy the ZDF mind-set of being revolutionary, abandoning the objectives of the liberation struggle and pushing the security sector into liberal assertiveness. From a revolutionary determination, gender improvement in the ZDF’s is a cultural, intangible heritage valued and practiced from generation to generation through Zimbabwean values, interests, which respect the security of the self, gender and cultural diversity as a collective approach. The ZDF gender perceptions are underpinned by the fundamental values, norms, and attitudes of the environment that determines the acceptance of an individual within a particular role. The thesis addresses the threat of SSR to SS and HS relations as both an externally and internally driven process and also that SSR should be an indigenous non-prescriptive process based on Ubuntu. The thesis examined both hypotheses and the result is that the alternative hypothesis is based on Ubuntu an indigenous knowledge approach

6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

The ZDF is profoundly political and legitimate in contributing to the cause of nation building. It is in the interests of the ZDF to have a stable nation, therefore, human security tenets need to be enshrined in the ZDF roles and functions as part of its social obligation. The following are strategic recommendations:

- Align the ZDF with the Ubuntu four levels of consciousness with specific attention to the 3rd (security sector alignment, enhancement and modernisation of critical values) and 4th (governance, policy reviews and human resource management with good conditions of service) levels of security consciousness as security sector alignment (SSA) for national security interests in building the fundamental building blocks of a national social value system.

- Enhance policy dialogue and public awareness through civil military relations (CMR) in order to strengthen the conceptualisation of SS and HS relations to national and local public officials, community and civil society leaders based on national interests and values through national service. Taking note of Zimbabwe’s Constitution Section 2013 20 (1) on the commitment to youth development, to go through national service to protect the values of the country.
• Task the NDC to enrol, train, educate civil servants, chief executive officers and strategically position Zimbabweans in developing a societal comprehension of defence and security challenges in advocating a model based on empowerment, cooperation, equity, and security. The theoretical framework should be “Ubuntu as the means and as a goal” based on the Chinese model of modernisation modified by local, national security interests.

• Acknowledge the linkages and interdependencies between SS and HS as they are inseparable, vital and mutually reinforcing factors in social reality that leads to human security and happiness with the objective of constructing political, economic, social, cultural and environmental settings in which people live, knowing that their vital independences and self-determinations are secure.

• Determine the impact and effectiveness of SS and HS relations which emphasize institutional capacity, and human capacity from an Afrocentric approach.

• ZDF must work with research institutions to improve the conceptual understanding of national security in relation to HS. This requires making the necessary investments to locally generate new knowledge on national security issue.

• Zimbabweans must ensure a national unity approach from elected representatives in parliament.

• Frequency meetings of the council and committee systems as stipulated by the NDP 1997 should meet statutory meetings supported by ordinary meetings more often for continuity and effectiveness.

• The Zimbabwe Defence Forces should continue vigorously to pursue the principles of engagement and cooperation rather than isolationism engage with like-minded nations, both in the region and beyond while balancing the dictates of sovereignty, national security and economic well-being.

• The ZDF should prevent strategic failures, course of action inconsistencies and inappropriate development priorities, by basing sound decision on scientific research evidence determined by the depth and quality of information and knowledge researched to avoid sycophant and continue to move from revolution conceptions to modernisation notions emphasizing economic considerations over politics.
6.5 ZDF FUTURE PROSPECTS

An understanding of the political and socio-economic dynamics of the country and the world is imperative for a professional soldier, as this knowledge put soldiers on a proper footing to fulfil national obligations. The ZDF establishments may possibly be forward-facing toward a very uncommon kind of battle, therefore; it should be proactive and not reactive in the root causes of political, economic, social and environmental security challenges. The ZDF is a group of people with remarkable unison, self-control, dynamism, with training capability and competence for getting things done.

6.6 POSSIBLE FURTHER RESEARCH AREAS

The underlying principle of research in security strategy is to evaluate the security research entities to provide insightful independent strategic analysis. This research urges further insightful investigations in the following areas:

- Security sector alignment: Modernising the ZDF through professionalization as social reformers for socio-economic enhancement.
- Gender equity: Experiences, influences and challenges in the ZDF legal frameworks.
- Implications and accomplishments in national service: pedagogical and non-pedagogical overheads for national security interests in Zimbabwe.
- The fundamentals of defence institutions: training capability and competence for getting things done.
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A quester-view with a ZDF senior Officer in Harare 16 August 2012.
A quester-view with a ZDF senior Officer in Harare 20 August 2012.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Letter of Authority

All official communications should be addressed to the Commander Defence Forces

Fax: 706661,252039
Telegraphic address: Defence Harare 04-
Telephone: 251203-56.04-251570-3
04-700155-8.04-700977-8

Lt Colonel LB Bangidza
Centre for Defence Studies
University of Zimbabwe
Mt Pleasant
HARARE

MINISTRY OF DEFEN
P. Bag 7713. Causeway
Harare
Zimbabwe

19 November 2008

DPhil STUDY JRO LT COL LBANGIDZA (781971S) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE 2009 -2011

Reference:

A. Your letter dated 06 November 2008 is hereby acknowledged.

1. The CDI has authorised that you approach the requested target group/population mentioned for your thesis: Security Sector Reforms: State security and Human security relations in Zimbabwe. The case of Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) 1980-2008. during your study research. You are therefore advised to make the necessary arrangements with individual interviewees.

2. It is our sincere hope that your research would be most successful and the findings would be of valuable in developing the country.

3. Wish you the best in your future endeavours.

T MAKAVI 'psc' ZW
Lt Col
for CDI

From the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Headquarters
APPENDIX B: Quest-view

Quest-view


My name is Colonel Bassie Lucky Bangidza. I am carrying out a research study on the topic “Security Sector Reform: An examination of the linkages between State Security, Human security and sustainable Development in Zimbabwe 1980-2008”. This is in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the Faculty Social Studies at the University of Zimbabwe.

I have secured authority from ZDF to carry out the study (CDI letter dated 19 November 2008). The purpose of this study is to examine security sector reform processes linking them to the relationships between state security and human security using the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) as a case study. This Quest-view has been designed with you in mind and therefore your responses are being solicited in order to successfully conclude this study. Please can you spare a few minutes and complete this questionnaire as objectively as possible. There is no right or wrong responses to the questions. Your identity remains anonymous and theses research questions answers will be used for academic purposes only. Any error or omissions on the questionnaire are the responsibility of the researcher. I remain your humble and obedient ZDF officer.

Demographics of the respondent

1. Sex  □ Male  □ Female

2. Age  □ 30-39  □ 40-49  □ 50 and above

3. Number of years in service of the organisation
   □ 11-15   □ 16-20   □ Permanent
Now I would like to ask you questions on your understanding of critical themes.

4. Influences and Challenges

4.1 What do you view as the influences and challenges of SSR in the ZDF?

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4.2 Do you think there is need to establish SSR in the ZDF? Yes/No?

Validate your answer
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4.3 In your observation is SSR donor Driven and locally owned? Yes/No?

Justify your answer
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5. SS and HS linkages

5.1 In your opinion, are SS and HS linked Yes/No?

Simply your answer
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5.2 Basic Human needs are the foundations of Security Yes/No?

Explain your answer
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5.3 The ZDF must be involved and play a major role in BHN Yes/NO.

Clarify your answer
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6 Perceptions and attitude

6.1 In your view, is the ZDF political and partisan Yes/No?
Explain your answer.

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6.2 The ZDF is obligated to play a role in HS concerns Yes/No.

Give details to your answer.

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6.3 The ZDF must be employed in socio-economic matters Yes/No

Provide remarks on your answer.

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7 Gender configurations

7.1 Is the ZDF experiencing gender configurations Yes/No

Explain your answer

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7.2 The ZDF is recasting and normalising gender issues Yes/No

Explain your answer

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8. Reforms in the ZDF

8.1 Did the ZDF experience reforms Yes/No

Explain your answer

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8.2 The ZDF statutory instruments need to be reviewed Yes/No

Explain your answer.

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8.3 The ZDF is part and parcel of the social fabric Yes/no

*Explain your answer*

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8.4 The Parliamentary Oversight is assisting tremendously the ZDF Yes/No

*Explain your answer.*

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Comments on strategic recommendation

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Thank you for your co-operation
APPENDIX C: Security Sector Reaffirmation
APPENDIX D: Civil Military Relations (ZNDP-1997)

CHAPTER THREE

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

Constitutional Provisions

1. The Constitution outlines the principles, structures, responsibilities and relationships that are necessary to secure sound civil-military relations. Civil military relations refer to the hierarchy of authority between the Executive, Parliament, and the Defence Forces. A Cardinal Principle is that the Defence Forces are subordinate to civilian authority.

Zimbabwe Parliament in session

2. In this regard, the Constitution provides that:

2.1 The President is the Commander-in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces.

2.11 The Zimbabwe Defence Forces performs their function, and exercise their powers solely in the national interest by:

- Upholding the Constitution;
- Providing for the defence of the Republic;
- Ensuring the protection of the inhabitants of the Republic.
Authority and Powers

3. Section 97 of the Constitution outlines a clear hierarchy of authority on defence matters: the supreme command of the Defence Forces shall vest in the President as Commander-in-Chief and in the exercise of his functions as such, the President has power to determine the operational use of the Defence Forces.

4. The Commander of the Defence Forces, and every Commander of a branch of the Defence Forces, is appointed by the President after consultation with such persons or authority as prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.

5. The Commander of the Defence Forces enjoys executive military command of the Defence Forces; under the direction of the Minister of Defence in times of peace and of the President during a state of national defence.

6. An Act of Parliament makes provision for the organization, administration, and discipline of the Defence Forces, including the appointment of persons to offices or ranks in the Defence Forces; their removal from office or reduction in rank; the punishment for breaches of discipline; and the fixing of their conditions of services.

7. There is a State Defence Council consisting of such persons who will perform such functions and duties as the President determines. The Commander Defence Forces and the Secretary for Defence serve on the Defence Council as members.
8. There is a **Defence Policy Council** chaired by the Minister of Defence. The Commander of Defence Forces, the Secretary for Defence, the Commander of the Army, and the Commander of the Air Force serve on the Policy Council as members. The Minister of Finance is an ex-officio member of the Defence Policy Council.

9. There is a **Defence Command Council** chaired by the Commander Defence Forces. The Commander of the Army; the Commander of the Air Force; the Chief of Staff Operations and Plans; and the Chief of Staff Logistics and Supporting Services serve as members on the Defence Command Council. The Commandant of the Zimbabwe Staff College serves as a member when required.

10. There is a **Programming and Planning Council** chaired by the Secretary for Defence. The Commander Defence Forces; the Chief of Staff Operations and Plans; the Chief of Staff Logistics and Supporting Services; the Deputy Secretary for Finance; and the deputy Secretary Policy and Procurement serve as members.

**Ministry of Defence**

11. The Minister of Defence is the political head of the Ministry of Defence.

12. The Secretary for Defence is the Principal Accounting Officer for the Ministry of Defence.

13. The Commander of the Defence Forces (CDF) is the professional head of all the Defence Forces and carries out the following functions:

   - Commanding and controlling the members and equipment of the Defence Forces and using them to best advantage;
   - Maintaining proper discipline within the Defence Forces;
   - Improving or simplifying the organization, methods, and procedures of the Defence Forces;
   - Securing the most economic and efficient utilisation of the resources provided for the maintenance of the Defence Forces.

14. The CDF reports to the Minister of Defence on all matters under his charge in the day-to-day discharge of his duties.

15. The CDF advises the Minister of Defence on matters of general policy relating to the Defence Forces, and carries out any other duties that the President, acting through the Minister of Defence, may require of him.
16. The CDF accounts to the Secretary for Defence for the efficient and economic use of the fund assets of the Defence Forces.

17. The CDF executes Defence Policy; directs the work of the Defence Forces' Headquarters; and manages the overall functioning and operations of the Defence Forces. He is the principal adviser to the Minister of Defence on military, operational, and administrative matters concerning the Defence forces.

18. In determining the respective functions of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), there are two basic guidelines:

   Civilians formulate defence policy and the military executes this policy, and civilians are responsible for the political dimensions of defence;

   Senior defence military officers assist civilians on a collaborative basis on the basis of their functional expertise in the formulation of Defence Policy.

19. The MoD respects the right and duty of Parliament to exercise independent and critical judgement on Defence Policy and practice.

20. The MoD is committed to building a close and co-operative relationship with the Parliamentary Committee on Defence. To this end, the Ministry engages in on-going communication with the Committee in order to convey information, solicit comment, and forge common positions. The fulfilment of these responsibilities requires the building of a close and co-operative relationship between the MoD and Parliamentary Committees. The need to safeguard national security interests; the lives of military personnel; and the integrity of military operations will, however, impose some restrictions on the types of information that can be made publicly available.
Military Professionalism.

21. Stable civil-military relations depend to a great extent on the professionalism of the Defence Forces. The challenge is to define and promote an approach to military professionalism that is consistent with democracy, the Constitution, and international standards.

22. The military professionalism required of the regular and reserve components of the Defence Forces includes the following political, ethical, and organizational features:

   Adherence and acceptance by military personnel of the principle of civilian control of the Defence Forces;

   The maintenance of technical, managerial and organizational skills and resources that enable the Defence Forces to perform their primary and secondary functions effectively and efficiently;

   Strict adherence to the Constitution, National Legislation, International law and treaties;

   Respect for democratic political processes and human rights;

   Operating according to established policies, procedures and rules in times of war and peace;

   A commitment to public service, chiefly in defence of the Republic and its citizens;

   Non-partnership in relation to politics.
Responsibilities of Government to the Defence Forces

23. The Government recognises that civil-military relations will only be stable if the requisite control accompanies the fulfilment of certain responsibilities towards the Defence Forces.

These responsibilities include the following:

- That the Government does not interfere in the Defence Forces' operational chain of command, and the application of the military disciplinary code;
- The CDF supervises and exercises control over operations and preparations for operations subject to the relevant laws; national policy; parliamentary provisions; and the directions of the Minister of Defence and/or the President;
- The Government requests from Parliament sufficient funds to enable the Defence Forces to perform their tasks efficiently and effectively;
- The Government seeks to ensure that military personnel are remunerated adequately.

Rights and Duties of Military Personnel

24. Members of the Defence Forces are citizens and therefore enjoy the same fundamental rights as any other citizen. Nonetheless, certain exceptions to this principle are necessary because of the unique nature of the defence forces and military service. The exceptions are limited and specific, and covered by Defence legislation. The exceptions conform to the Constitutional provisions on limitation of fundamental rights in that such limitations are permissible only if they are reasonable; justifiable in an open and democratic society; and do not negate the essential content of the right in question.

25. Military personnel are prohibited from active participation in politics. They may, however, exercise their democratic right to vote for a party or candidate of their choice but are not permitted to hold office in any political party or political organization.

26. Military personnel may not attend political meetings in uniform unless they are on official military duty in support of the police or the civil powers.

27. No member of the Defence Forces is allowed to take part in industrial action.
28 No member of the Defence Forces is allowed to form, or be a member, of a trade union while serving the Defence Forces. However, members may join or be members of recognised professional organisations such as the Chartered Institute of Accountants, etc.
PUBLICATIONS

PUBLICATION A: Asymmetric Warfare: Experiences, Perspectives, Inkling and Challenges with a Focus on Zimbabwe

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ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: EXPERIENCES, PERSPECTIVES, INKLING AND CHALLENGES WITH A FOCUS ON ZIMBABWE

Raymond Mharapara¹, Lucky Bassie Bangidza² and Steven Gwekwerere³

Introduction
The world has become dependent on interdependence and globalization because the processes that promote worldwide exchanges of national and cultural resources are generating further interdependence of economic and cultural activities (Robertson 2000). Therefore, one can state that religion and culture are no longer only important ingredients of civilization, but potential causes of division and isolation. A good example is that only a few Muslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many Arab States privately cheered him on, and he was highly popular among large sections of Arab populaces. When invoking parallels and using them as strong rallying points, Muslims contrasted Western actions against Iraq with the West’s failure to protect Bosnia against Serbs and also to impose sanctions on Israel for violating UN resolutions (Huntington 2006, 447). As a result, differences in power and struggles for

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³ Gwekwerere is Colonel of General Staff (GS) in the Zimbabwe National Army Headquarters.
military, economic and institutional power are now sources of conflict between the West and other civilisations. Consequently, it could be assumed that fundamental economic reforms give rise to necessary political transformation.

During the Cold War, the concept of “collective security” gained popularity and significance when it meant balancing the military strength of the United States and its allies against, on the other side, Soviet Union and countries of the Eastern Bloc (Shils 1955. 105). Now that the definition refers to those non-Western countries seeking to match and/or torpedo the balance with Western nations, it is becoming increasingly clear that any state not towing U.S. path is classified an enemy. As there is asymmetric threat to Zimbabwe, the nation should however not lose sight of the fact that the presence of a threat could develop rapidly and form very dynamic circumstances. Just a misguided or misplaced machine gun could turn out to be a runaway gun or a statement to the media casting aspersions on a certain civilisation and/or religion and, therefore, could trigger such an immediate threat.

Likewise, the Zimbabwean government should strengthen processes that constantly keep at a distance the prospects of asymmetric threat. Zimbabwe should embrace collective security concept with neighboring states. Morgenthau (1954. 126) asserts that such collective security organisations typically require “that all nations come to the aid of a victim of aggression with all means necessary.” A successful response would call for an approach that leverages the partnerships with diverse non-government actors and wields a range of disciplines, including communication, law enforcement, business and academy. It could be easily argued that soft power should have more precedence than military solutions because even as a state amass a high-tech arsenal, asymmetric threat does not necessarily allows its successful use. United States, as a hegemon, is being subtly challenged by multiple states that have strengthened their economies, enhanced their militaries, and gained increased credibility. The danger is that these rising powers and non-state actors are increasingly gaining or achieving parity and the ability to assert coveted local and regional hegemony.

To mitigate asymmetric threat there should be a grand strategy to reduce poverty and its accompanying scarcity of resources; water, food, health, employment and energy because this threat is grounded in a clash of civilization. To date we have not heard any asymmetric attacks or disruptions
on Chinese soil, which implies that China is correctly applying its soft power and hard power approach to international relations. All states aiming at attaining hegemony status like U.S. should learn not to alienate others due to civilization or religion differences, for to do so would be creating unnecessary enmity and foster fertile ground for asymmetry from non-state actors and extremist groups, external and internal. For that reason, defensive soft power serves to keep at bay adversarial preferences, attitudes, perspectives, objectives, and modes of behavior. The recent bombings in Boston, Massachusetts (2013) indicates and proves beyond doubt that U.S. hard power would never prevail over asymmetric attacks by non-state actors and extremist groups as long as global poverty, indifference to other civilisations and religions, and failed/failing states exist. Therefore, Zimbabwe must wake up to today’s realities and employ soft power: the full range of tools at disposal, diplomatic, economic, political, legal, and cultural – picking the right tool, or a combination of tools, for each situation.

In order for any state, Zimbabwe included, to realistically keep extremism and asymmetric threat at bay, elements of soft power must be exploited. Nye, Jr. (2004) defines soft power as, “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies”. When a state’s policies are perceived as legitimate and just in the eyes of others, that state’s soft power is enhanced. In the view of many a state’s foreign policy, in particular of those states viewed as outcasts by the USA, is inherently hegemonic and designed to superintend other civilisations, religion and culture. A befitting example is the U.S.’ military invasion and attack on Iraq. The U.S. managed to remove a “tyrant” but dismally failed to resolve its vulnerability to terrorism and asymmetric threat. Conclusively, as long as any state prefers other means, especially hard power, than soft power to solving problems, disputes or quarrels in international relations, the scourge of terrorism and asymmetric threat would haunt it.
Asymmetric Challenges

The concept of asymmetric struggle has been around the world for a long time, but has become a topical issue of recent. The defence setting has been considerably complicated in recent years by rise of what has become known as “asymmetric warfare threat”. In his remarks to the graduating class of the US military academy West Point, President J F Kennedy (1962) observed that “there is another type of warfare new in its intensity, ancient in its origin. War by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him... it preys on unrest”.

Simply defined, Paul (2005, 5) observed that

(...) asymmetric warfare is a conflict between two sides, which have a large disparity in political, economic and military power. The weaker opponent may not necessarily be a nation and increasingly could be a group representing ethnic, religious or criminal interests.

It can be simply said that its aim therefore is to weaken political resolve rather than military power and attacks could be expected far from any conventional battlefield. In asymmetric warfare, fighting occurs on the economic, political, diplomatic, social and the military front when conducive. Therefore one can conclude that major weapon used by the stronger sides is mainly economic, political and diplomatic through the battle for the minds. The weaker sides in turn tend to resort to generally insurgent tactics to kill the mightier power’s will to fight. Seethaler et al (2013, 117) observed that “information and communication technologies have emerged as one of the major weapons employed by both sides engaged in asymmetric warfare”.

Understanding Asymmetric Warfare

Fagan and Munck (2009, 286) indicated that “asymmetric warfare is mostly characterised with the battle for the mind. Always associated with the weak, asymmetric warfare has changed its form because it no longer has defined objectives”. Messinger (2001, 101) observes that “asymmetric warfare is more a reaction than a cause”. Therefore, the definition of the ‘weak’ has also changed.
In simplistic terms, strategy is made up battle for the minds. If it is the battle for the minds, the interaction often involves strategies and tactics outside the bounds of conventional warfare. Tsu (2003) stated that if you employ soldiers without sorting out the skilled and unskilled, the brave and the timid, you are bringing defeat on yourself. The contour of the land is an aid to an army: sizing up opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and distances, are the proper course of action for military leaders. Those who do battle knowing these will win those who do battle without knowing these will lose.

Generally asymmetric warfare can be a conflict involving two states with unequal overall military and economic power resources and could be individuals, groups and communities. The obvious shortcomings of this definition are to confine wars to state actors when non-state actors such as al-Qaeda are involved in war against states not defined geographically, but as a diaspora entity. It can easily be concluded that al-Qaeda is not concerned about attacking the territory of the state alone, but also anything associated with the state in question across the globe. The other drawback is to perceive asymmetry in terms of “overall military and economic power” sidelifing the potential effect of inequalities in political and social resources, which also play an equally important role in defining the degree of asymmetry between any opponents. Realising some of these deficiencies in defining asymmetric warfare, Hess and Orthmann (2012, 382) defined asymmetric warfare as “leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against the vulnerabilities of a superior opponent to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining the opponents will in order to achieve asymmetric actors’ strategic objectives.”

Unfortunately this definition only sees the bigger nations as the victims and objects of asymmetric warfare, yet the reality, especially for us in the developing world, is that the bigger nations unleash their superior tactical or operational, as well as political, diplomatic, economic and social strength against the vulnerable or weaker nations. Their aim is to undermine the weaker nations in order to achieve their strategic objectives. Chinyamakobvu (2011, 108) observed that

the Zimbabwe Democracy Economic and Recovery Act (ZDERA), is a punitive sanction measure, imposing bill hastily passed by the American Congress in December 2001. Passed into law by President George W Bush, putting a blanket
ban on all fresh financial lending to Zimbabwe and the rescheduling of its debts by International financial institutions such as, the IMF, World Bank and the African Development Bank of which the U.S. is a member.

This piece of legislation is precisely meant to achieve the strategic objectives of the U.S.’ interests and their values.

This is obviously a lesson learnt from their adventures in the Vietnam, Iraqi wars and other campaigns where they used excessive and unnecessary force, but still incurred heavy casualties, much to the humiliation of their population back home. When an attack on Iraq was imminent in 1990 following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Stroilov (2011, 103) described asymmetric warfare from the perspective of a weaker adversary by saying:

If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. However, we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you.

Therefore, it is clear that everyone, big or small, is equally worried about asymmetric warfare. In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological and physical dimensions. The history of asymmetry in warfare can be traced back to the antiquities and origins of war. Smith (2004, 1) observed Sun Tzu in The Art of War saying that “all war is based on deception”. This is based on strengths and weaknesses, which today we call the threat-response dynamic. Since the time of Sun Tzu, we have seen asymmetric approaches used in every conflict.
Significances of Asymmetric Warfare
It is important to study asymmetric warfare since it might be waged upon us when we are not aware of it like what has been the case of Zimbabwe during the past 13 years. The war sometimes assumes violence as both acceptable, necessary and draws no distinction between military and civilian targets. The enemy could inflict mass causalities on a large scale. How many people died owing to lack of proper medical care during the last couple of years as a direct or indirect effect of the illegal sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the West? How many Zimbabweans were eaten by crocodiles and drowned in the Limpopo trying to cross into South Africa in search of greener pastures? How many were killed or maimed in political-related violence incendence including the notorious xenophobic attacks in the Republic of South Africa? Could all these have sacrificed their precious lives if there was no sanctions and Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) imposed by the U.S.?

Nevertheless, asymmetric warfare will not end at an appointed hour by signing of peace agreement or declaration of a ceasefire. The arrival of this day will not be apparent at the time, but will become ever clear as the absence of mass fatality and destruction of property diminishes. Therefore, it is important to study asymmetric warfare because it is now a factor of strategic significance. It poses great challenges to defence transformation. To answer the challenges requires a shift in paradigms.

Patterns of Asymmetric Warfare
The utmost problematic pebble dashing human development today is that society is losing deep human values – integrity, compassion and respect. The society is constantly faced with temptations to compromise ethics and take a short-cut road to riches. The desires for money, sex, power and fame often translate into corruption, lies, love-affairs or crime. A minute of pleasure leads to many years of suffering. And by valuing wealth above ethics we lose everything (Nematandani 2012). World politics is entering a new phase, where we seem to be returning to traditional rivalries between nation states and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism, interdependence and globalisation among others. The fundamental source of
struggles in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economic as was during the cold war. The great divisions among mankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations. Therefore, the next pattern of conflict is the clash of civilisations as the battle lines. Is it a clash of civilisation or a clash of interests?

Conflict between Civilisations
Crothers and Lockhart (2000, 100) observed that the “conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world”. Conflicts of the western world were largely among princes, emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and most important, the territory they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and, beginning with the French Revolution, the principal lines of conflicts were between nations rather than princesses, until the end of World War I. As a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism, Nazism, liberal democracy and capitalism/imperialism. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which a nation state in the classical sense defined more in terms of ideology.

These conflicts between princesses, nation states and ideologies were, for the West, primarily regarded as “the clash of civilisations or western civil wars”. This was also true for the cold war and the earlier wars of the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moved out of its Western phase, and its centre-piece became the interaction between the west and among non-western civilisations. In the politics of civilisations, the people and governments of non-western civilisations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of western colonialism, but join the West as movers and shapers of history.
Nature of Civilisation
During the Cold War, the world was divided into the first, the second and the third worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilisation. Huntington (2000, 43) observes that “civilisation is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels”. The culture of a village in southern Zimbabwe may be different from that of a village in northern Zimbabwe, but both will share in common Zimbabwean culture that distinguishes them from Malawian villages. Huntington also observed that

European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from African, Arab or Chinese communities. Civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have, short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions and by the subjective self-identification of people (Huntington 2000, 43).

People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilisations change. One can now put the onslaught of Britain and her allies, from Australia to the U.S., on Zimbabwe into context. They constitute the western civilisation.

Civilisations may involve a large number of people, as with China, or a very small number of people such as Swaziland a country in a womb of another country. Huntington (1993) says that

(...) a civilisation may include several nation states, as is the case with western and Islamic civilisations, or only one, as is the case with the Japanese civilisation. Civilisations obviously blend and overlap, and may include sub civilisations. Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principle actors in global affairs.

Westerners have been like that, however, for only a few centuries. But the broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilisations, development and progress.
Torn Countries
In general, parliamentarians exercise their power and attitudes to the duty of representing the citizen’s interests. Instead, in many cases, according to Santoni and Mair (2005),

(…) parliamentarians are interested in party political interests and discipline. At the individual level, the parliamentarians are often eager to remain in the good books of influential officials of both civilian and military decision-making bodies. They worry more about maintaining good relations with the President or Prime Minister rather than looking after those who elected them.

With such a scenario, it can be safely interpreted as asymmetric warfare by our own citizens, because of being partocratic than being nationalistic in approach. This is another form of dangerous warfare, sometimes more difficult to determine and define.

It can effortlessly be pointed out that states can just as systematically be disrupted and destroyed by internal challenges (at the sub-state or from the national level) as they can be by external forces. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a good example of domestic rebellion (such as the repeated secession attempts by Katanga during the 1960s), predatory governance (under Mobuto Sese Seko) and foreign invasion (by Uganda and Rwanda in 1998) – all three of which undermined national security. It could be easily said that the challenge in Africa today is that national security is equated with that of the governing elite - ‘governing’ in the interests of their own preservation and advancement, with limited provision of human security for their citizenry.

However, some countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilisation or another. These are torn countries. Their leaders typically wish to pursue a strategy and to make their countries member of the west, but the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-western. Crothers and Lockhart (2000, 113) said that, “the most obvious and prototypical torn country is Turkey”. Turkish leaders have defined Turkey as a modern, secular, western nation state, allying Turkey with the west in NATO. During the Gulf War, Turkey applied for membership in the European Community but elements in the Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival arguing that Turkey is basically a
Middle Eastern Muslim society. The elite of the west also refuse to accept Turkey as part of the western society. In Crothers and Lockhart (2000, 13), one of the Turkey Presidents said that, “Turkey will not become a member of the European community and the real reason is that we are Muslim and they are Christian and they don’t say that”. Encouraged by the west, Turkey is making strenuous effort to carve out this new identity for itself.

The Clash of Civilisations
Civilisation identity will possibly increase its important in the future. Fox (2001) observed that “the world will be shaped mainly by interactions among seven or eight major civilisations and they are Western, Confucian (Chinese), Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic orthodox, Buddhist and possibly African civilisation”. Why will this be the case? Huntington (1993) pointed out that differences among civilisations are not only real; they are basic, clans taking care of their own. Civilisations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and most important religion. Hatem (2000) said that

(…) people of different civilisations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries and will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence.

Huntington (2002) said that, “over the centuries however, differences among civilisations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts”. Does this idea attempt to explain the upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa?

In International Relations, the elaboration is on the theory of interdependence to break down boundaries and differences in order to enhance economic and social interactions. Huntington (1993) observed that, the world is becoming a smaller place and interactions between peoples of different
civilisations increasing thus intensifying consciousness and awareness of differences between civilisations and commonalities within civilisations. A Mumanyika could be Mujindwi, Mugarwe, Mundau, Barwe, Manyika, in Manicaland, simply Samanyika in Harare, a Zimbabwean in Windhoek and an African in Beijing. Ulusoy (2004) observed that “the interactions among peoples of different civilisations therefore enhance the civilisation-consciousness of people and, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history”. Does this explain the Hutu Tutsi issue?

Huntington (1993) observed that economic modernisation and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities and weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world, religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labelled fundamentalist. Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. General observation according to Huntington indicates that, in most countries and most religions, the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. Does this explain the emergence of the Makandiwas, Pastor Chris, and Dr. Utaunashe groups in Zimbabwe?

Ritzer and Atalay (2010) observed that the growth of civilisation, consciousness in the west is at the peak of power, whilst there is a tendency of returning to the roots phenomenon occurring among non-western civilisations. Hence, increasingly we hear of the “Hindunisation” “Westernisation versus Russianisation in Russia”. Does this explains the emerging alliances like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and the waning of the non-aligned movement? In the past, the elites of the Zimbabwean society were usually the people who were most involved with the west. They were educated at Oxford and trained at Sand Hurst, and absorbed western attitudes and values whilst the populace remained deeply imbued with or inspired by indigenous culture. There is need to de-westernise and indigenise the minds of the elites in Zimbabwe and at the same time that American cultures, styles and habits should not become more popular among the people. Does this explain the Look East Policy vs. Zhing Zhong mentality in Zimbabwe?
Multi-Dimensional Challenges
Different nations understand asymmetric warfare differently and according to their environment. It can be concluded that for the British and Americans, asymmetric warfare is a multi-dimensional conflict which is fought simultaneously on the economic, political, diplomatic, social and sometimes concurrently on the military front. These are termed the instructions of power, commonly known for diplomatic (and political), information, military and economy. In Zimbabwe, the wanton destruction of anything considered to be “government property” in the run-up to the 2000 general election and 2002 presidential election was evidence of an economic front in asymmetric warfare. The defacing of road signs and destruction of basic structures like the rail, electric line, bus terminals and telecommunication lines appeared on the surface to be just other acts of civil disobedience, but that was the real face of asymmetric warfare on the economic front. The objective here was to exploit the weakness identified within the nation and use the local people to destroy their own economy. Zimbabweans were complicit with the destruction of the Zimbabwean economy between 2000 and 2008. The so-called captains of industry were steering the economy off course. An analysis of the situation in Zimbabwe during the period 2000-2008, shows that the country had been attacked on the economic front by the imposition of sanctions, ZDERA, economic sabotage, illegal money deals which resulted in what the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe DR Gono would call the casino economy in 2008.

The flight of skilled labour to other countries, maladministration, hoarding of basic commodities, and closure of the production industry characterised that period and there is no classical economic theory which explains why the Zimbabwean Dollar would lose its value at such a rate. In the morning the exchange rate would be 1:15 million, by noon, it is 1:100 million. In all these activities, you will see that locals were the foot soldiers against their own economy, some knowingly but some specifically or specially recruited for that campaign against the Zimbabwean state. The conditions of the civil servants were and are still horrendous; the basic human approach was the target. The result was a shortage of nearly everything from the very sensitive things like sanitary pads, medicines etc. Our opponents then used these
shortages as a reason to argue that Mugabe had lost all legitimacy to rule. Zimbabweans also executed field burials at ‘Mbudzi’ cemetery against our culture owing to fuel shortages, cash or both. Attacks on the political and diplomatic front capitalising on weakness or shortfalls, which were blown out of proportion and politically internationalised. In recent years and in many countries the focus has been on constitution making. What was the interest of the EU and its allies in Zimbabwean constitution making process?

Terrorism and Insurgents
While many terrorist actions are relatively low in technology, one should not assume that weak opponents would not have access to high technology. Perhaps the only characteristics of asymmetric warfare that can be stated with certitude are that it is applied suddenly and unexpectedly. Examples are 9/11, Bali, Kenya and Tanzania bombings, just to mention a few. Asymmetric approaches employ or affect one or more of the elements of national power (military, political, diplomatic, economic and information). Asymmetric warfare generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom of action or will. Asymmetric approaches often employ innovative, non-traditional tactics, weapons, or technologies and can be applied at all levels of warfare and across the spectrum of military operations. It is generally employed to achieve results disproportionate to invested effort.

Now that we have examined the characteristics, weapons, and forms of asymmetric warfare, how is it possible to protect or plan against an asymmetrical attack? The nature of the "threat-response dynamic" is to analyze all real and perceived threats and vulnerabilities to produce a counter measure or reinforcement to a vulnerability. It will never be possible to fully protect against an asymmetric attack, as there are limited resources and an almost infinite number of scenarios to be considered. The best that any state or non-state can hope for is that intelligence is leveraged in such a way to create a list of most likely scenarios to guard against. It is a vicious circle, for the act of analysis and response constantly produces additional threats and vulnerabilities as resources are shifted to compensate for perceived or real threats and vulnerabilities. At the core of this dynamic is intelligence; not the quantity of
intelligence, but the quality of both the data and the analysis. Any state or non-state that wishes to be successful in countering asymmetric threats or attacks must have a productive and accurate intelligence system in place. This intelligence system should be responsible for the collection, dissemination, and analysis of data in response to balanced priorities set by the states or organisations leadership. The leadership can be either centralised or decentralised from the perspective of the intelligence system.

In addition to a normal collection, analysis and reporting process, an alerting system based on the concept of "management by exception" must be put in place and tied to early warning systems, which are designed to monitor changes in antagonist activities and escalate reports via a separate and distinct chain of command. Only with accurate, timely, and complete intelligence can an organization, state or non-state, hope to protect itself against asymmetric threats.

Conclusion
Asymmetric warfare is not something new, since wars have never been fought by equal opponents. Enemies will always have some political, social and economic asymmetry, or in terms of overall military capability. Asymmetric warfare’s objective is to weaken political resolve rather than military power through attacks away from any conventional battlefield. It is fought on the economic, political, diplomatic, social and military fronts when it is conducted. It is the battle for the minds, and, therefore, tactics vary constantly, since each application is unique. It is important to study asymmetric warfare to avoid surprises. It is a war of ideas where the centre of gravity lies in the hearts and minds.

Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, they all have distinct cultures at different levels. A civilisation is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity. Civilizational identity will be increasingly important in the future, and future conflicts are likely to be civilisation-oriented as peoples scramble for resources.

Different nations understand asymmetric warfare in distinct ways. Weaker sides, however, could use other tactics – including terrorism – to
achieve the same goals. Asymmetric approaches employ or affect one or more of the elements of national power, besides seeking a major psychological impact. Innovative, non-traditional tactics, weapons, or technologies are applied at all levels, from strategy down to tactics, in order to achieve results disproportionate to invested effort. It is a mental battle, exploiting your strength against an enemy’s weakness and recognizing that all areas of human endeavor are part of the battleground and counterbalance any lack of conventional force. It cuts across all human spectrums: political, economic and social. Asymmetric warfare can hit anytime, anything, anywhere. It might occur through greed and failing moral character, and can be used surreptitiously, maintaining the outward appearance of peace while softening up the opponent. Therefore, asymmetric warfare encompasses a wide scope of theory, experience, conjecture and definition. The implicit premise is that it deals with the unknown, with the surprise in terms of ends, ways and means.
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ABSTRACT
This article offers an asymmetric warfare analytic conception through suggesting that asymmetric threats should be viewed in terms of the battle for the minds. With reference to the knowledge of asymmetric struggle, its patterns, conflict between civilisation and its nature in torn countries, clash of civilisation and its challenges, terrorism and insurgents, this work presents examples from the international level with the main thematic focus on Zimbabwe. The article suggests that there is a high level of asymmetric warfare ignorance among many and that asymmetric threats serve elite’s national economic interests. It also suggests possibilities of protection or planning against an asymmetrical attack, bearing in mind that asymmetric warfare is a war of ideas where the center of gravity lies in the hearts and minds of the people.

KEYWORDS
Asymmetric Warfare; Civilisation; Interdependence; Globalization; Culture.

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Dear Lucky,

SUBJECT: Book Chapter by Lucky Bassie Bangidza

I am pleased to inform you that your book Chapter titled “Modernization in Process: Considering the Future Role of the Armed Forces a case of Zimbabwe” was edited and revised in February 2015.

The book chapter has been accepted for publication in the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme (ZPST) book, “Exploring Peace and Security in Africa: National and Regional Perspectives”, to be published by the end of December 2016. Please see the attached book chapter which has been accepted by the editors for publication.

Best regards

[Signature]

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Modernisation in Process: Considering the Future Role of the Armed Forces a case of Zimbabwe

Lucky Bassie Bangidza is a Colonel in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. The views in this article do not represent the Zimbabwe Defence Forces position. It is an academic prescription from the finding and views based on his DPhil thesis.

The various roles of the defence force are contextual and entrenched in politics, ideology, threat, vision and strategy. The end state of any roles and functions of a defence force is profoundly political and legitimate in marking a contribution to the cause of national construction. This chapter argues that the tasks of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) can include assisting with socio-economic development, poverty reduction and natural disaster response and mitigation.

Empirical research has shown how the role of institutions, civic culture, political economy, and demographic factors affect the stability of a country, but few studies have explored the role of the military as an institution that can drastically influence the process of national consolidation. Many scholars notice the state-centric nature of how the security sector is largely neglected in determining constructive outcomes. It is clear that special attention in developing the values, interests, concepts and skills of the military need to be incorporated into all other areas of development from a nationalistic perspective.

The use of military forces in economic development, food security, and humanitarian assistance among others is primarily political rather than legal. How do you keep the military out of domestic politics? This practice raises policy questions on the proper role of military in civilian governance. In theory the military role is to keep peace. Therefore, peace begins with the individual and brings development, growth, stability, collective effort and democracy. In the twentieth century, armed forces in the developing world adopted roles as owners and managers of economic enterprises that constitute an important source of financial and institutional self-sufficiency for the state and society. The challenge is about the role of military entrepreneurship and its development. This depends on patterns of state capacity, military professionalization, and threat conditions facing the country. However, another perspective is that military entrepreneurship is harmful to the achievement or maintenance of military professionalism and that it is quite durable because it adapts to prevailing market conditions and therefore can weather major shifts toward democracy.
The challenge that the defence function should not engage in economic development needs some interrogation. There are problems involved in this approach, e.g. development is profoundly political, it can have negative effects on military professionalism and civil-military relations and it is unclear whether it is economically sound to do so.

Despite the recent shift to democracy the military retains important economic roles as owner, manager, and stakeholder in economic enterprises. Such military entrepreneurship poses a challenge to the development of democratic civil-military relations from a Eurocentric prescription. Scholars have distinguished the different types of military entrepreneurship, which reflect distinct historical patterns and implications. There are many different types of military entrepreneurs, industrialisers determined to build national defence capabilities and compete for international prestige; nation builders, seeking to promote economic development that can foster social development and cohesion (Mani2007). The challenge is to determine significant differences between these two types in their origins, theory, ideology, context, paths, and political consequences. Therefore, the future role of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) as nation builders, seeking to promote economic development that can foster social development and cohesion is the task at hand.

Post Zimbabwe’s independence

Three decades after Zimbabwe’s independence as from 1980, it is essential to examine many notable achievements which need to be strengthened and areas of failure which need to be analysed so that they are not repeated. Additionally there are new areas of development which must be tackled. During the past three decades Zimbabwe’s challenges were in two modes. According to Singh (2005: 1) “the first deals with ideas, values, attitudes and habits, the second one deals with infrastructure including roads and dams; energy, industrialization including both large scale industries; machinery and equipment; irrigation and water supply just to mention a few.” These areas are intertwined. Some non-Western countries including some African countries like Zambia, Senegal and Ghana have used the military in determining constructive outcomes in economic development. Other non-Western and Western countries do not use the defence force in this role.

It is clear that the economy requires very special attention to the practical issues involved in development: concepts and skills need to be incorporated into all other areas of development. For example the education and training system would need to be revamped to ensure that all
students will be able to contribute actively to the growth of the economy during their schooling and after graduation. Students need learn to value the work ethic as the basis for wealth, as opposed to developing parasitical tendencies such as depending on charity or corruption. Such an approach will guarantee that school leavers and graduates will be able to earn a living through their knowledge, skills and work. For that reason, industrialisation should focus first on providing basic human needs for the society as a whole, and on this basis move into export market (Fligstein, 2001).

Values and attitudes should be those that will contribute to the welfare of all, including those that will help to improve the economy from an Ubuntu perspective (an African philosophy characterized by a strong sense of community and belonging, supportiveness and solidarity) approach (Christie, Mbigi, and Lessem 1994: 122). In this context, Ubuntu suggest that the moral problem facing African military is a lack of an indigenous security value theory. Current civil military relations approaches are largely a manifestation of the effects of the ideological weight of Western modernity on the African collective security value and attitude system (Mungwini 2011).

Therefore, one of the most significant developmental capacities is that of building national unity. Throughout the 1980s, Zimbabwe was unquestionably had national unity grounded on the shared values of the liberation struggle. However, challenges to human dignity did not measure up as the Zimbabwe’s Matabeland dissident operations of the 1980s were hardly a shining example of national unity because it was a manifestation of an internal and external Eurocentric approach. However, the philosophy of socialism was understood as encouraging and supporting the welfare of all the people, and so was capitalism with some social welfare components (health, education etc.). At the time, it was not difficult to build a national consensus on the provision of education, health and water for all. National unity and national consensus broke down when it was replaced by Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) in the 1990s. Conversely, the rhetoric of socialism remained even when ESAP was adopted. Zimbabwe since independence has pursued socialism as rhetoric or an ideology but in practice has been capitalist.

This article argues that the armed forces can play a major role taking its revolutionary values into the contemporary modern world as the people’s army. There should be a paradigm shift from opinionated personalised partisan machination within the security sector to repositioning the security sector as a national instrument of power in
developmental terms. There are problems involved in the role of the military in economic development because development is profoundly political and can have negative effects on military professionalism and civil-military relations if not evaluated. Nevertheless, it is necessary for the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) to return the progressive developmental roles they played during the liberation struggle. There is need for the ZDF to move beyond its narrow inherited terms of reference, which should deliberately make the ZDF into the people’s army based on a collective security approach which is Afrocentric. At this particular period of economic liberation, the ZDF also needs to play a key role in the economy. In this regard, it is important to look at the developmental role played by certain armed forces in the growth of their motherlands.

Prototypes for a defence role in development

The armed forces have played a critical role in national development in virtually all nations. The idea is to scrutinise only three models in which the armed forces went beyond a nation-building role to involvement in economic development. China, a nominally communist country and South Korea, an avowedly capitalist one, are examined. In both cases the armed forces played a key role in the development of a modern society.

China

Historical perspective

The example of China is appropriate to Zimbabwe for two reasons; one is for the reason that China had a long-drawn-out liberation war in which military strategy and victory brought into power the revolutionary government in 1949: Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle trailed the model pioneered by Mao Zedong in China in terms of mobilizing the peasants so that they would support the liberation struggle. Mao termed the liberation forces as fish swimming in the water consisting of the peasantry. For the reason of this shared historical perspective, it is important to note that military strategy and victory comprised only one aspect of the liberation struggle. Indeed it was not necessarily the most important factor. This is made clear in the emphasis of the inclusion of agriculture, industry, science and technology, in defence roles and functions. Chinese leaders believe that economic development is of critical importance. Wortzel (1998: 4) observes that

This was again emphasized in the 1997 15th Communist Party Congress, where President Jiang Zemin made it clear that the focus will be on the
"economic, scientific and technical" sphere rather than concentrating on strengthening China's military power. This emphasis on economic advancement being achieved before military advancement could be prioritized as linked to the Chinese Government's analysis of what happened in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's prioritisation of military competition with the United States ended up tragically in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Wortzel (1998:23) observes that:

One need not labour the obvious fact that a nation's military potential in the contemporary age is a complex amalgam of many diverse elements. Among the most important are her size, terrain and environmental situation; her national philosophy; the number, character, standards of literacy and morale of her population; her natural resources; the capacity of her indigenous science, technology and industry to develop these resources advantageously; the quality of her leadership at directive levels; the viability of her alliances, the material and other assistance she receives from allies; her internal communications, therefore, her strategic doctrine, size, nature and quality of her armed forces, including their supporting requirements.

This contemporary holistic view of the role of the military in overall national development meant that from the very beginning the liberation forces were seen not only as the defenders of the people against foreign as well as internal oppression, but as also having a critically important role to play in moving the country forward politically and economically. In China 1949, the armed forces were deployed in every village. Their role included establishing a sound modern development model as well as providing services to the people. One of the most important aspects of their work was to move the people away from narrow old-fashioned feudal and ethnic worldviews to embrace much broader and more universal values. One reason for China's backwardness was its backward ideology which emphasised only family values and obedience to authority. It should be remembered that warlords dominated the political scene before the liberation forces took over. The liberation forces were responsible for trying to establish a more democratic form of governance, such as elections at village level. Thus the villagers could vote for people who were formerly amongst the poorest people in the village, instead of electing the richest man in the village. Many women were elected as village chiefs, an example of modernization unknown in the past, where women held an inferior position in society, and were not allowed to hold real power.

In terms of the economy, the armed forces were able to grow food using more progressive agricultural methods. They were also able to establish small factories which served as a
model for industrialization all over the country. They provided services to the local people, such as medical services. Such services were very much appreciated, as previously villagers were only able to access the services of traditional doctors. However in this case, the Chinese military doctors combined both modern and traditional medicine. Qingren (2014:7) observes that “the goals of the Chinese reform are to modernize the military organizational structure and to build a system of modern military forces with Chinese characteristics as socio-economic implementers.” Chinese characteristics matter because the conditions facing countries are quite different.

**Modern perspective**

In the twenty-first century, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing a comprehensive reconstruction deriving from China's sustained economic growth based on the historical imperatives. This growth has enabled China to focus greater resources on building, equipping, and training the PLA. The PLA's official budget therefore is increasing and PLA is part of the socio-economic process.

The scope of China's military transformation has increased as acquisition of advanced weapons technology, has continued due to high rates of investment in domestic defence and technology industries, and sustained organizational and doctrinal reforms of the PLA as a process have progressed. Over the past several years, China has begun to pursue a new phase of military development by taking on roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond the immediate territorial integrity of China itself. In fact, the development of the Chinese military in recent years has drawn scepticism and even fear over its purpose, especially in East Asia, but also in Europe and North America. The impact of what constitutes of China's "Military Transformation" on the regional and global power balance is a point of contention. However the movement from the historical imperative to modern necessities is part and parcel of security sector reform process which the Zimbabwe Defence Forces should take a cue as socio-economic development implementers.

The current role of PLA in economic development is now in technology industries, humanitarian duties, agriculture, infrastructure, and socio-economic activities. This is a movement from the historical imperative to modern necessities within the same ideology. The PLA model is important because it is an enduring model which is quite different to that of the Western countries. Therefore, SSR really needs rethinking in this context.
South Korea

Historical imperatives

The development of South Korea is one of the most important examples of the role of military in shaping the destiny of a country. In particular the period 1950 - 1961 was characterized by corruption, paralysis, under-achievement, hyper-inflation, and general chaos. South Korea realized that nothing would be achieved unless there was a strong, uncorrupted and modernizing state.

This was the Japanese model of modernisation militarisation (although it ultimately led to Japan’s defeat in World War II). The government in Japan realized that it needed to learn and adopt Western science and technology, as well as management systems, but within a Japanese culture system. Without modernization, in particular industrialization, Japan would become the slaves of the Western imperial powers. South Korea was particularly aware of the importance of ideology as a way of uniting Japan towards becoming a modern society. Thus, the emphasize of linking the state to the different social classes within society under an ideology of nationalist patriotism. In particular South Korea saw the middle class, the up and coming" captains of industry" as important allies in development, and the regime was prepared to accept them as long as they contributed to the development programme and refrained from corruption.

The government of South Korea was taken over, initially in a military coup in the 1960s, but this was followed immediately by an election where Park Chung–Hee won. There followed a number of elections which Park won albeit by very narrow margins. Eventually he declared martial law and ruled as a dictator and was later assassinated by his own security. South Korea was also a very strong ally of the USA in the Cold War and arguably this is what made its “developmental state” possible. The US provided massive financial and military support to counter North Korea and China and tolerated Park’s dictatorship because of his strong anti-communism. There was massive and continuous social unrest during his rule but the armed forces played a major role in development.

In his own words Park (1962: 224) observes that

The economic, social and political goals we set after the revolution are: promotion of the public welfare freedom from exploitation, and the fair distribution of an income among the people. It is obvious that these goals cannot be reached overnight. They are, nevertheless, the fundamental aims of the economic order towards which we must move. Before these goals can be achieved, we must see to it that after more than a decade of stagnation, our poor
economic power is greatly strengthened and that the shrunken or undeveloped power of productivity is fully utilized. We must take a great leap forward toward economic growth... It is urgently necessary to have an economic plan or a long-range development program through which reasonable allocation of all our resources is feasible.

Park was able to envision an industrialization system which would equally favour very large companies, small scale entrepreneurs and trade unions. Whilst Park favoured the capitalist system of economic development as promoting greater creativity and productivity through competition, he also realized the need for coordination and supervisory guidance by the developmental state, an approach that include Japan, Taiwan and Malaysia. Park saw the need for the State to undertake long range economic planning. Park (1963:224) observes that

The economic planning or long-range development program must not be allowed to stifle creativity or spontaneity of private enterprise. The overall national development program may necessitate, for the rational operation of the economy, reluctantly imposed administrative controls over the regional relocation of various industries and planning for investment. Yet we should utilize to the maximum extent the merits usually introduced by the price machinery of free competition, thus avoiding the possible damage accompanying a monopoly system.

Park realized that this vision could not be implemented in the absence of a strong state and he understood that the military was the only group which could establish such a strong state at that period of South Korea's history. He was fortunate that an ambitious programme of land resettlement had already been carried out by the occupying Americans, thus making it possible for the peasantry to provide the agricultural foundation for food security. Park also realized that the "captains of industry" could not undertake the task of industrialization without state assistance. With respect to consumers, Park (1962: 236) observes that

It is desirable that the state should give special attention to possible dangers to the public interest presented by some industries which face no competition to prevent their trespassing on the interests of the consumers. The state must grant some consumer groups a kind of admonitory voice over industrial operations.

He also foresaw the dangers of monopoly capitalism which could minimize or even destroy the creativity of workers, and he understood the need for the state to support trade unions provided they were under close political control. Eventually, the unions were responsible, with students, for popular protests that led to his overthrow. Park (1962: 26) observes that
To protect against the mounting power of big enterprises, employees should be allowed, with reasonable backing of the state, to have equality with management. Special measures should be worked out so that skilled labourers and others can utilize their creativity individually and collectively to contribute to the improvement of the industry. By so doing, the state will be able to protect the interests of the employed and rally strongly the voluntary support of workers for the improvement and expansion of industry.

The South Korean model of development, based on the Japanese model of modernisation, relied heavily on the military discipline imposed by Park Chung-Hee. His regime was seen as authoritarian and dictatorial. South Korea is now a multi-party democracy yet it is still continues its economic success story. Park is recognized today as the founder of the modern system of governance and of the high performance economic system although authoritarian and dictatorial - in using the armed forces for socio-economic development. The UNDP Human Development Report (2006: 331) observes that “the per capita income in 1961 was US$72 per annum, as compared to US$14 136 in 2004, an almost 200 fold increase.”

**Modern perspective**

For many in the modern contemporary world’s liberal democracies, the institutionalization of civilian control over the military is a crucial task for democratic consolidation. This is especially true for South Korea. After South Korea gained independence in 1948, the military was the most powerful player in Korean politics. However, in the 1990s, the pattern of civil-military relations changed dramatically from military dominance over civilian politics to civilian supremacy over the military. The dynamics of the institutionalization of civilian control in South Korea was focused on clarifying the concept of civilian control; formulating an analytical frame of favourable and unfavourable conditions for successful institutionalization of civilian control. The evolution and state of civil-military relations in South Korea before and after democratization is illuminating for Zimbabwe. What conclusions are drawn about why civilian control successfully became institutionalized in democratizing South Korea? (Croissant 2004).The ZDF can take a cue from the military domination of South Korea in economic development from the historical perspective driving into the modern necessities but in the spirit of an Afrocentric Ubuntu approach.
Lessons for Zimbabwe

The ZDF is the most important player in safeguarding the state from external and internal threats dealing with major unconstitutional and violent threats in building a nation-state. Employ it for modernization, economic growth and development from an Afrocentric approach in the name of consensus-building and given its impact on organisational effectiveness, productivity and promotion of interdependence. This should bring into context the historical, theoretical as well as legal and institutional traits from a Zimbabwean perspective, borrowing concepts from the prototypes for a defence role in development as in China and South Korea. The issue is about building our own Zimbabwean conceptual framework about the role of the defence forces in modernisation.

An analysis of Zimbabwe's challenges in brief

Generally Zimbabweans now consider the first decade of independence, the 1980s, as the best decade after independence. However, there were already serious problems at the time. The main challenge Zimbabwe faced was the transformation of the economic system. The Lancaster House Agreement gave political power to the incoming liberation movements, but ensured that economic power would remain with the settlers and the multinational companies, through the strict retention of the existing economic system. Neither had ZANU-PF itself worked out any details of how, once in power as a government, it could transform the settler economy into one that could cater for the majority of its population. Over hundred years of colonialism, the settler governments had built up a small modern economy that could cater adequately for settler needs, but this economy had never catered for the needs of the population as a whole. The Rhodesian economy, as it was formulated and organized, had no capacity to handle a large expansion successfully. It was heavily dependent on a form of import substitution which nevertheless required the use of imported materials. Many of these import substitutes were luxury goods, which could benefit only a small minority of the population.

In order to cater for the country as a whole, it is necessary to re-conceptualise and re-engineer the whole system. This was never done, as the underlying idea of the incoming government was to take over what already existed, rather than create new systems. There was little recognition that the old system would always be problematic, and indeed would become more problematic as time passed.
In the 1990s the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered what looked like an attractive possible solution, the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), based on the Washington Consensus. ESAP emphasized an export orientated growth (interestingly, this was the model that was so successful in South Korea) away from the import substitution model of the Rhodesians. The Rhodesians had developed industries for a wide variety of goods, and these industries thrived because they were protected from outside competition. ESAP in effect removed all protection from these industries, many of which died as they were not competitive in price or quality as compared to goods from larger and more technologically advanced economies. ESAP thus led to a huge process of de-industrialization in the next two decades.

By the end of the 1990s de-industrialization had led to increasing unemployment in the industrial sector. Those who had retained their employment were poorer than before as the prices of consumer goods had increased. Urban unrest led to the rise of new political force, the movement for Democratic Change (MDC), with its roots in the trade union movement. The long-neglected land resettlement programme was resuscitated in 2000 after former freedom fighters launched a campaign to occupy white farms. This renewed programme was hastily adopted by the ZANU PF Government, but it failed to rise outside funding because of donor opposition to fast track land reform programme (FTLRP) and the DRC war. The DRC war was an open conflict over mineral resources and involved the South African Development Committee (SADC) allies – Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. The SADC allies won the DRC war, but it has turned out to be a pyrrhic victory because although the goal was gained it was very costly in character.

When white Zimbabwean farmers, some of whom had been enthusiastic supporters of national reconciliation, although others stayed away from politics, had their land taken, many decided to throw in their financial and logistical support for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC was also supported by many Anglophone Western powers that had opposed Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) and DRC victory. It was not surprising that donor aid ended abruptly. Zimbabwe had become very aid-dependent, and found that without donor assistance it could not do as well as it had done before. Economic problems led to further disaffection from the electorate, with ZANU-PF suffering major losses in the 2008 elections although it regained momentum in the 2013 elections.

It is clear that the problems Zimbabwe faces are fundamentally economic and governance
challenges, unless the challenges are revamped, it is unlikely that Zimbabwe will be able to develop. So far Zimbabwe has only had two models of economic development: neither of them was able to resolve the challenges faced by the country. The Rhodesian model, small and archaic, was only suited to the needs of a minority. ESAP aimed to boost manufacturing (and did for a couple of years) had the unforeseen consequences of de-industrialization. That was not the intention, the aim was to develop export-oriented industry and agriculture (along the South Korean lines) through the Washington Consensus, but it did not produce the desired results. Although the Rhodesian model of industrialization was based on out-dated technologies, it was superior to the ESAP model, which took Zimbabwe further back to being a primary producer economy.

For the economy to grow it is essential for a new conceptualisation the way forward. A repetition of the past, whether of the settler colonial economic framework or of the failed Washington Consensus framework, will not lead Zimbabwe out of its present economic doldrums. Moreover, all sectors need to work together in a united way within an agreed development context if Zimbabwe is to go forward. Over the past two decades Zimbabwe has either remained stagnant or has gone backwards. Moreover there have been varying and confused views about how to define development, and how to go about the processes.

Zimbabweans have been confused and disunited, and the situation has been exacerbated by the failure of the economy to provide basic needs of the population, such as food, water, employment, education and medical services. The over-printing of money led to the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar and hyper-inflation. Another impact of the loss of confidence in the value of the Zimbabwe dollar was the refusal of people with access to foreign exchange, such as investors and the diasporas, to transfer money into Zimbabwe through the official channels. Instead, Zimbabweans from inside and outside the country transferred money to neighbouring countries in order to enable their relatives to buy food and other goods to take home. This led to bankruptcy of the foreign exchange reserve. Border trading replaced actual production within the country.

Another effect of pauperisation and inflation was the increase of corruption, which affected the country at all levels. Government officials who were once known for their integrity now became rampantly corrupt, with the police for example taking petty bribes. Corruption increased the cost of business whilst slowing down the process of getting government approval of development and business projects. In this situation of virtual chaos, the Armed Forces played a critical role in maintaining some modicum of order taking cues from the
Chinese model. The armed forces will also necessarily play a critical role in the recovery of the country. At this point it is essential to examine what role can be played by the armed forces in the future development of Zimbabwe.

**The future of Zimbabwe**

Relative deprivation, impoverishment of people becoming poorer quickly, unemployment and economic downturns are the greatest and most fundamental causes of insecurity in a country. Growing unemployment is a key cause of political disaffection. Zimbabwe's security has been seriously threatened in the past decade as a result of poor economic performance, partly due to sanctions, and also partly due to poor governance of the parastatals, and the private sector. The fundamental problem was the removal of the donor funds in the early 2000s. This created an economic and political crisis in the country. The country's responses to this crisis were very emotional, not properly planned and inadequately executed, and exacerbated the problems. The reasons for this inadequate response to the crisis have still to be analysed accurately. Suffice it to say that the main response of printing more and more paper money had the effect of cutting foreign exchange incomes drastically, leading to the demise of the Zimbabwe dollar in a short space of time.

It is clear that a return to the past, to the Rhodesian model of economic development, cannot be the answer. The Rhodesian model can only work for a small proportion of the population. The ESAP model, which took Zimbabwe away from industrialisation back to primary production, is a much more problematic model, as an economy dependent wholly on agriculture and mining easily falls victim to international markets, and fluctuations in market prices will bring cycles of economic disaster. The ESAP model has also caused political destabilization in a number of countries, including Zimbabwe. It is important to identify the successes of the past and to include these successes in building the future. There are some aspects of the Rhodesian model which may help us to build a better future. It will be more difficult to find positive aspects of the ESAP model that should be retained, but even this model should be carefully analysed for lessons to be learnt. There is need to analyse Zimbabwe's response to the economic challenges post-2000 to learn valuable lessons of the positive gains as well as the negative impact of that period in order to focus on basic human security needs.

**The basic human security needs approach**

In order to work out future development, it is essential to identify developmental
objectives. A beginning can be made by looking at basic human needs which include food, clean water and good sanitation, work, clothing, education, training and medical services among others. Unity of purpose and national unity are required if these basic needs are to be satisfied. At the same time a stable and workable economic system must be established. These basic needs are in fact also basic human rights identified in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. How can each of these basic needs be satisfied?

Food

Zimbabwe has, in the past, been self-sufficient in food. Zimbabwe's staple diet, maize, has been produced by communal farmers. Wheat has been produced by commercial farmers. The Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme did not strengthen food production, but substantially weakened it because of the opposition to FTLRP. However, it aimed to strengthen the capacity for basic food production through higher productivity and this entailed a partnership between the government and the farmers. One of the role government can play is to increase the production of fertilizer in the country in such as way as to reduce the price and make it affordable to communal farmers. This was indeed the custom in Zimbabwe before the introduction of ESAP. It has been adopted by Malawi more recently, leading to Malawi becoming a food exporting country, based on the production of small-scale farmers.

The production of wheat can and should increase. However, because it is winter crop requiring irrigation using electricity, it is essential for the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority’s (ZESA) capacity to generate electricity and for its reliability to increase. For several decades, the state has under-invested in electricity, yet Zimbabwe has an abundance of coal, water, sunshine and wind which can be utilised to provide the necessary increase in electricity generation. The ZDF through the Zimbabwe Defence Industry can be empowered to partner with interested stakeholders in this area. The Chinese investment in domestic defense and technology industries and sustained organizational and doctrinal reforms of the PLA can be a good model. Even a simple regulation for all urban households to utilize solar panels for generating energy for hot water geysers would enable electricity to be used more efficiently. In order to improve productivity it is also essential to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to provide extension services to all farmers. The armed forces can play a major role through building dams
using its army engineer’s personnel.

**Clean water and good sanitation**

Regular and dependable investment into clean water and good sanitation by both the State and by local government is needed. This is an area which has long been neglected. It is also an area which can be well-supported by donor funding, if the state itself prioritizes the area. A successful system by which donors and central government form a partnership to fund local authorities to do the work can be devised. The army medical corps can be fully exploited in the supply of clean water and sanitation. This investment into basic infrastructure would enable local authorities to engage in much more ambitious housing and industrial construction programmes. The armed forces can be modernised to effectively play a major role in agriculture, industry, science and technology.

**Employment**

The right to work is the most fundamental human right, and is supported by the United Nations. This is an area which Zimbabwe has failed to address; due in part to the ESAP ideology, which says that government should do as little as possible, and employment should be left to private enterprise. This is not what has been done in Asian countries which have managed to pull themselves out of poverty, such as Japan, China, and South Korea. Moreover, even if the very small and weak private sector in Zimbabwe is to be responsible for employment, the Western model stipulates that it is the state's responsibility to provide social security for all the unemployed. This model is totally impractical and indeed impossible for Zimbabwe to undertake. Instead Zimbabwe would do better to adopt one of the developmental Asian Chinese models (defence civil relations). This model guarantees some form of work for everyone, through public works programmes such as dam and road building, and all sorts of infrastructure construction and maintenance. If for example 20% of the state budget were allocated for public works and employment creation programmes, including programmes which would enable private enterprise to expand the number of workers it employs, this would be an enormous investment into both infrastructure and into private enterprise expansion and improvement in partnership with the ZDF, possibly through the National Service Programme (NSP). In this case the ZDF will be seen as national developer and employee.

**Clothing**
Zimbabwe's textile and clothing industries have been decimated by competition from mainly Asian countries. There is need to examine these industries to see how they can be nationally as well as internationally competitive. Previously these industries were protected from foreign competition. As a result they were characterised by out-of-date technology and design, as well as being more expensive. These challenges now need to be tackled challenging the Zimbabwe Defence Industry (ZDI) to work in partnership with the textile and clothing industries and upgrade the out-of-date technology.

**Education and training**

Whilst Zimbabwe's education and training systems were the envy of the region in the 1980s and 1990s, they have now been affected by a decade of serious underinvestment and neglect. Moreover, the systems were always problematic in that they retained the colonial framework characterised by the British "O" and "A" levels, such that all students were being prepared for university study when in fact only a tiny fraction of them were able to go to university. The irrelevance and high cost of this outdated system has led to a high dropout rate. There is need for the education and training systems to be much more varied. It is also essential that all young people can enjoy the basic human right to education and job training. The National Service Programme could be an entry point.

Teachers' salaries have shrunk and this has created suffering for teachers who have to choose either to feed their family or to pay the rent. Most teachers do not own housing, and have to rent low quality housing from the parents of their students. Teachers cannot afford basic medical services nor pay for the school fees of their own children. These problems are not insuperable, and need to be resolved in practical and cooperative ways. An ambitious housing scheme for teachers and other civil servants in co-operating the army engineer’s corps could help to improve and stabilise the teaching force and the civil service. The ZDF has been involved in building houses, schools and clinics. However this concept should be institutionalised into the military’s role.

**Medical services**

The right to medical services is a basic human right. This basic right has been contravened because few people can afford the cost of medical services. Primary health care has been compromised, and the number of women who die whilst giving birth has trebled in the last decade. Health care has also been an area that donors are willing to support, particularly
primary health care linked to the Millennium Development Goals. In partnership with the Zimbabwe Army Medical Corps (ZAMC) the health delivery care system can be enhanced as part of security sector transformation and human security.

**Beyond the basic human security needs approach**

Emphasis on basic human needs is an essential starting point for Zimbabwe's economic growth. It is possible, if the nation is united and focused, to have the population's basic needs satisfied. However, it is also necessary for Zimbabwe to be more ambitious, to see itself as one of the most advanced countries in the world. In order to aim so high, it is essential to look at the sub-region of SADC and at the whole region of Africa. Zimbabwe is too small to be able to do exceptionally well on its own.

It is also important to break away from the dependence on the former colonising countries, the Western and European nations. Self-reliance should be an essential principle, looking at regional collaboration as the key to the future. Zimbabwe has a number of advantages which could be utilized to mark out its contribution to the region. These advantages include:

- The highly disciplined and well trained armed force with combat experience is sufficient to enable Zimbabwe to establish the peace and stability that are the essential pre-requisites for development. However, it is essential to identify security and stability as fundamentally dependent on satisfying basic human needs. When people are able to satisfy their basic human needs, it is much easier to establish peace and stability. Indeed it is virtually impossible to have peace and security if basic needs are not satisfied.

- Zimbabwe enjoys a relatively high level of human resource development, with about half the population having some secondary education, and a many having tertiary education. Although the education and training situation has deteriorated over the past ten years, it is still sufficiently sound to provide human resources for an economic breakthrough.

- The recent discovery of mineral resources such as platinum and diamonds can be utilized for economic improvement and expansion. There is of course the danger of the ‘resource curse’ which would mean that the mineral wealth will contribute to further de-
industrialization and underdevelopment.

- Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Zimbabwe (UNDP 2010) has observed that “the diasporas were providing about US$1.4 billion a year to the country. This is far more than the US$250 million that was previously provided by donor funds. This can be the main source of development funds if it is judiciously utilized. It is clear today that the US$250 million a year of donor funds was not utilised to sufficiently increase and improve the economy over two decades.” The new sources of foreign exchange would need to be utilized better if they are to bring about greater and sounder economic growth.

- Zimbabwe has a number of professional associations such as of engineers, doctors, teachers, farmers, etc. These associations are of great importance, and can help to spearhead development within the region, of course with close collaboration and support from the state. For example Zimbabwean engineers have very sound experience in a number of areas, and can provide such services to the whole of Africa. Zimbabwean doctors are also renowned for their capabilities and experience, and Zimbabwe could be a medical centre for the whole of Africa as well as elsewhere.

Zimbabwe’s disadvantages include the following:

- A disunited population which is heavily critical of government. A lot of work has to be done to build up a consensus on certain key principles. What is missing is the shared ideology which characterised Zimbabwe in 1980’s. Today there are widely differing views about the way forward. Such as consensus cannot be built merely by use of fear and force. Things have changed since the 1980s, when Zimbabwe was enjoying the euphoria linked to the liberation struggle and the gaining of independence.

- There are now a number of competing political parties, and a return to the de facto one-party state is impossible. However, the possibility of building up a national consensus across all party lines is a possibility. This is because people are now exhausted, critical and sceptical of all political parties. They are fearful of the rise of political violence and killings, and with it the dominance of unemployed youths, some of whom cover up criminal activities in the name of politics. The ideology of violence against political
opponents is highly destructive of the fabric of society.

- A high level of corruption and parasitical behaviour pervades both the ruling class and society as a whole. The work ethic has been eroded, including amongst the young, who are impatient to enjoy a high quality of life without the benefit of higher qualifications, skills or hard work. This is popularly known as the “kiya-kiya” philosophy, based on short-term survival without long term planning.

- A dependence on patronage. Many people are more dependent than ever on hand-outs, whether from the donors, NGOs or political contestants. This dependency syndrome is a dangerous disease, and totally the opposite of the hard-working Zimbabwean society in the past.

Another reason may be that the Zimbabwean state decision-making system did not prioritise economic growth programmes and channel funds to private sector growth, and instead invested in state buildings. There are quite a large number of unused or underutilized buildings at this point. However, it is essential for us to break away from this dependency, and move towards self-reliance and self-sufficiency. In particular we need to rely more on the work and earnings of our own people.

It is to be noted that Zimbabwe's disadvantages as identified above are basically ideological, as the rejection of the liberation struggle ideology of socialism and its replacement with some perverted form of capitalism under ESAP led to the disintegration of national unity. Today the general population distrusts politics and politicians, believing that all politicians are there to enrich themselves and not to support the poor. This serious disaffection, with the growing tendency of politicians to bribe the electorate with "gifts" of fertilizer, sugar and mealie meal, has further weakened social cohesion. The poor have been reduced to beggars, losing their dignity and independence. Meanwhile politicians of different parties are perceived as spending little time addressing the problems faced by the people (no jobs, unaffordable costs of agricultural inputs, unaffordable school and examination fees, high medical fees, no housing, etc.), offering the people palliatives instead (such as little bottles of cooking oil, little bags of sugar and mealie meal). Politicians are seen as travelling overseas and building luxurious 20-bedroom houses for themselves. The gap between the rich and the poor is greater than ever, and a cause for destabilisation and insecurity. Yet the answer from the ruling elite of major political parties is that the problem is due to lack of funds, and the answer is foreign investment. Actually foreign investment
can be retrogressive if Zimbabwe itself has not clearly worked out where it is going and what it wants to do. Zimbabweans need to work out their future direction in concrete ways, and then investors can fit into this plan. Without an agreed national plan, outside investors could bring about new forms of neo-colonialism.

**Zimbabwe's contribution to the region**

Zimbabwe will have to work out its future within the context of the region. Given Zimbabwe's many strengths, there are obvious areas for future development on behalf of the whole region. The armed forces as part of the social fabric can be incorporated into some of these developmental trajectories. Some of the possibilities include:

- Zimbabwe is able to build medium sized and small dams. It has had many decades of experience, both in the state and private sectors. This expertise can be made available to the whole region, beginning with Zimbabwe itself. The military can expand its engineering capabilities to participate in joint efforts. Zimbabwe can benefit from having a small dam for every village, with training of the villagers in fish-farming and dam maintenance, thus creating jobs on the spot for the youths. The villagers themselves can and should participate in building their own dams as they did in constructing their own schools in the early days of independence. Such a partnership between the state, the private sector, the armed forces and the local communities, will do much to re-build national unity whilst at the same time creating new wealth in the villages themselves. Neighbouring countries have a similar need for small dams. With state support and references regarding the quality and dependability of Zimbabwean companies, the private engineering sector can venture to build similar structures in the region and call it engineers civil relations.

- Zimbabwe has many qualified and experienced medical personnel. There is no reason why Zimbabwe cannot make itself into a medical specialist centre for the whole of Africa. At present only South Africa and Kenya can boast to be world-class medical centres. Zimbabwe can also compete in this area. This too will require a combination of the military medical personnel (their discipline) and private sector partnership.

- Medical facilities for the poor in Zimbabwe are weak. This is definitely an area where the armed forces could provide medical personnel to remote rural areas where they are stationed. It would do much to build up good relations between the armed forces and
the local communities and call it medical civil relation.

- Zimbabwe's educators have a good reputation. We can build on this strength, and create programmes to provide teachers and lecturers in specialist areas, in particular in science, technology, technical and vocational education for the whole of Africa. That of course is dependent on our teachers maintaining a high standard of achievement and dedication. Given that the population of Sub-Saharan Africa is about 700 million, and half of them are children, there is ample room for Zimbabwe to utilise its training facilities to provide teachers for the region and call it education civil relations.

- At present Africa gets most of its medicines from overseas, yet Zimbabwe has a number of pharmaceutical companies which could be supported to provide medicines for the whole of Africa. The state would have to ensure that the quality is high.

- Environmental improvement programmes, particularly tree-planting and tree care can provide thousands of jobs and at the same time improve the availability of wood for construction and furniture, firewood and fruits. The armed forces can do a great deal to teach and coordinate such environmental improvement programmes, and this will bring it closer to communities as part of civil military relations.

- Zimbabwe must feed itself. To do this it must have strong agriculture support industries, such as fertilizer producers, seed producers, equipment and machinery industries, etc. Zimbabwe has not supported its fertilizer companies to modernise and lower costs. It has failed to support industries to produce tractors and other machinery because of sanctions and call it agricultural civil relation.

Conclusion

Zimbabwe needs to break out of its present impasse. It needs to go beyond the dependence merely on elections as a way forward. Whilst elections are an important institution for testing people's views and for political change, they have also definitely proved to be problematic. The role of the ZDF during and after elections brought in to consideration SSR challenges. The fundamental reasons for the problems, which have arisen around elections, are the fact that political power has not been translated into economic power. Instead election candidates indulge in populist manoeuvres such as making wild promises which cannot be fulfilled; emphasises short-term projects without examining medium-term and
long term programmes needed for real progress; use politically-motivated violence and intimidation, so unleashing the powers of criminal elements against ordinary people, especially women; and use "projects" and "gifts" to buy votes.

One of the long-term outcomes of ESAP has been the weakening of the civil service, so that it is now virtually impossible to achieve the level of success of the 1980s. Parastatals have weakened. The private sector was also weakened through a combination of de-industrialisation and lack of coordination with and support from the state. Instead parastatals and private sector opportunities were seen as opportunities for self-enrichment, with little regard for expansion or improvement of the economy.

Given the weakening of so many Zimbabwean institutions, it is essential that the armed forces play a more progressive and aggressive role in development just as good as the military is doing in China and did in South Korea and some non-Western countries, although none of these models are without their challenges. Clearly a new approach is needed. The Ubuntu approach can assist in advocating a model based on empowerment, cooperation, equity, sustainability and security. The theoretical framework should be, “Ubuntuism as the means and constructiveness as the goal” based on the Chinese model within the Zimbabwean Afrocentric Ubuntu local tenets.
References


