SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY’S PREPAREDNESS TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE 2008-2016

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Ernest Dube, declare that I am the sole author of this dissertation and also confirm that during the period of registered study, I have neither been registered for another academic award or qualification, nor has any of the material been submitted wholly or partly for any other award. This dissertation is a result of my own research work and where other people’s efforts were used, they have been duly acknowledged.
DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my family; wife Bethia and to my daughters Qi, Zi, Sane and Fortue. Their patience on my inept family leadership responsibility is highly appreciated. It is without doubt that my academic journey was that of a role model decision which my family will live to benefit throughout their lives. ‘My sacrifice in doing what others could not do was entirely and only for you’.
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ABSTRACT

The study is an investigation on the concern by some section of the Western European social commentators that sub-Sahara, including Zimbabwe, offers a conducive environment for terrorists’ safe haven’. Further complicating this predicament is these accusers, allege that region’s security sector, does not have an effective counter-terrorist strategy. In fact, their conclusion was that African Union’s (AU) counter-terrorism policy is not working. It is on this background that the enquiry was interested in establishing Zimbabwe’s prepared to combat the threat of terrorism and extremism.

An understanding of the concept of terrorism, albeit the failure by historians on terrorism to come up with a standard definition, was identified by many authors, falling mainly into what they termed ‘sub-state terrorism’ which is divided into five categories: (a) social revolutionary terrorism, (b) right-wing terrorism, (c) nationalist-separatist terrorism, (d) religious extremist terrorism, and (e) single-issue terrorism. According to the proponents of sub-state terrorism, each type tends to be associated with its own social-psychological dynamics.

Regarding the objectives of the study, the enquiry was to: (a) analyse the international counter-terrorism legal instruments, African Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and that of SADC; (b) determine the level of extremist/terrorist threat facing SADC countries vis-à-vis the region’s capacity to effectively respond to such threats; and lastly (c) establish Zimbabwe’s preparedness to counter terrorism and extremism.

The AU’s guiding policy framework on counter-terrorism was established to be the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999, which the majority of the African states ratified. The threat of terrorism and extremism besides being a destabilising factor in the Equator regions of Africa namely; Western, Sahel/Maghreb, and Eastern regions, similar threat developments have been reported in the SADC region especially Zambia and South Africa where the Muslim jihad-led terrorism is instigated by al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab terrorism gangs.

Zimbabwe, together with the rest of the member states of SADC, are reported to have sought to fight all facets of terrorism through regional cooperation. The regional body has thus identified the international dimensions of terrorist being the ones among others, which
range from terrorist recruitment and training, financing, and operations that include sleeper cells operatives and human traffickers. As a result, the region’s combat posture necessitated the formation of regional statutory bodies like; Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA), Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), Ministerial Committee Organisation (MCO) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services for Africa (CISSA) Southern Region among a host of other counter combat initiatives which Zimbabwe is a member.

Regarding Zimbabwe’s preparedness in terms of institutional and legal frameworks, it was established that the country has since enacted laws that help curb the threat of terrorism and extremism-related activities. The laws are; Foreign Subversive Organisations Act Chapter 11: 05, Emergency Powers Act, Unlawful Organisation Act Chapter 11: 13 (1980), and ‘the Post and Telecommunication Services Act Chapter 12: 02 (1988), mentioning these few. The study also established that the SADC Harmonised Regional Strategy to curb extremism and terrorism emanating from the illegal migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons was being mooted whose operationalisation will help Zimbabwe’s combat readiness. Zimbabwe is established to have further shown some resolve in its fight against the threat of terrorism and extremism, by its institutionalisation of Inter-Ministerial and Inter-Security Services Committees. These Committees meet regularly to strategise on the way forward to combat the alluded threat(s).
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the Study

The UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy having been crafted in 2006 as a resolution and activated in September 2008 by the UN General Assembly through Resolution (A/RES/62/272) and as such, affirmed by member states thereafter, impliedly signified the genesis of a collective-declared war against terrorism. Since the Twin Tower bombing of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the US on 9 September 2008 (9/11) by al-Qaeda inspired terrorists, the US and the rest of European Union (EU) member states have gone to great lengths in expanding the Doctrine of Counter-Terrorism which has included counter-radicalisation (Zimmerman and Rosenau, 2009:10).

According to UN Development of Public Information (2006:1) prior to the 9/11 attacks, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of September 2006, was simply a resolution and an annexed Plan of Action which was never put to real test. However, further debates in European political circles inferred to by Zimmerman and Rosenau (ibid:12) which focused on pragmatic counter-terrorism measures aimed at curbing jihadists in the Muslim communities themselves, gathered intensity subsequent to the 7 July 2005 attack, also known as ‘the 7/7 London attacks’. It is without doubt that the mooted measures, that entailed expulsions of terrorist plotters in America, vindicated the West-European citizens’ imagination that the Muslim’s doctrine of power politics was the real cause for a human security worry. This view is as well justified by John Wright (2015:11) through his article ‘From Failure to Disaster: The West and (ISIS)’ where he argues that “Iran, Syria and Hezbollah are currently leading the ‘real’ struggle against the savagery of IS yet each of them is regarded as the threat to regional stability and Western interests, and seemed as such.” Never-the-less, contemporary global-terrorism, that has not only survived the Western powers repudiation but unleashes into Africa untold destruction to human life, is believed from the West-European stand-point to be that of Muslim inspired groups like al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups. It is from this skewed perception about terrorism that President George Bush [senior], on commissioning his strategy against global terrorism coined what later became popular maxim; ‘It is either you are with Us or with Them’ which marked the beginning of an all-out-war against al-Qaeda and other jihadist inspired terrorists.
The African perception about the gravity of extremism is highlighted in Botha (2014:3) comment where he observes that, “Only a few officials accepted that Kenya was experiencing an internal problem that needed to be addressed”. To the contrary, the first significant manifestation of the growing threat of extremism in post-independent East Africa can be traced back to the 7 August 1998 twin bomb attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es Salaam, Tanzania, which were linked to al-Qaeda (Botha ibid). The Kenyan denial, thus, claim those involved in the bombings had a foreign character where East Africa was simply the battleground meant to target the US and its interests, which signifies the basis upon which Somalia was seen as the sanctuary to the Muslim jihadists.

Following the terrorist attacks in East Africa, the preparedness of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in the aftermath of its unilateral affirmation of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy 2006, is now seriously questioned. Menkhaus in Zimmermann and William (2009:98) makes some inference on SADC in that is offers a conducive terrorist-prone environment in that “Sub-Saharan-Africa’s weak security sector and failed states also provide some non-African diasporas with safe heaven beyond the easy reach of counter-terrorism operations”. He thus, cites Haroon Rashid Aswat, an Indian-born citizen of the UK, a suspect in the 2005 London bombings, who sought safe haven in Zambia, as a vindication of his argument (Menkhaus in Zimmermann and William, ibid). Also of note is the 2015 South African media report on the arrest of a would-be terrorist who was arrested before her flight to join ISIL of Syria. One would assume that the regional member states have since adopted their own National Counter-Terrorism Strategy as individual entities. The writer’s rude awakening was a result an acknowledgement by Botha and Solomon (2014: 14) that the real threat to Southern Africa is Islamic terrorism. To learn that Zambia even broke diplomatic relations with Iran and Iraq during 1993 after accusing the two countries of sponsoring religious and political disturbances in an attempt to make Zambia ungovernable, in (Botha and Solomon, ibid: 15) and that; at least, 23 South African citizens have travelled to Iraq and Syria to join terrorists, (www.aljazeera.comnews/2015) leaves the writer with an inquisitive mind with regard to what Zimbabwe’s counter-measure is like. Since the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in both Kenya and Tanzania and the 2010 Boko Haram’s upsurge of terrorist war against the Nigerian Federal Government, Zimbabwe, like other SADC member states, has handled many refugee or asylum seekers and other types of immigrants from these countries including those of Somali origin.
This development presents a unique question as a vindication to Menkhaus (ibid) view that Sub-Sahara offers a conducive environment for terrorist safe haven.

The preparedness of Zimbabwe, on its counter-terrorism strategy, amid the claim that “The African Union’s (AU) counter-terrorism policy isn’t working” The Herald, [Zimbabwe] 1 February, 2016, is the hallmark question against the backdrop of Menkhaus’ assertion that the presence of non-African diasporas in Africa is by far posing the greatest terrorist threat, (ibid). Zimbabwe[see map in Figure 1] is a signatory to ‘the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001) and the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, that was preceded by the international community’s promulgation of 12 of the current 13 international counter-terrorism instruments’, (UN Department of Public Information, September 2006). To learn that ‘the rate of adherence to these conventions and protocols by UN member states was low’, according to (ibid) invokes some interests on where Zimbabwe stands as regards to its practical implementation of efforts to fight terrorism and extremism. To doubt that the AU’s counter-terrorism policy is not working, to which Zimbabwe is a member, Menkhaus is (ibid) impliedly tells us that even that of Zimbabwe is not working and thus provokes this inquiry to pursue the matter further. More complex anxiety arise thereof in learning from Al Jazeera news of 29 May 2015, that there is growing concern as more South Africans have been recruited to join ISIS. Given the Kenyan experience on the mall bombing where the some of the culprits were of foreign nationality the implicit questions that many Zimbabweans may be pondering are: How far is Zimbabwe from a Kenyan type attack? Should terrorists attack Zimbabwe how prepared is the country?
1.1 Statement of the Problem

This study explores the concern by (Mankhaus, 2009:98) that sub-Sahara [inclusive of Zimbabwe and the rest of SADC states] “offers a conducive environment for terrorists’ safe haven”, and as a result of “its weak security sector, does not have effective counter strategy”. To compound the alluded concern is the argument by Alison (2016:9) that states “The African Union’s (AU) counter-terrorism policy is not working”. Impliedly, both the above conclusions suggest that Zimbabwe, given its weak security sector, is not well prepared to combat terrorism threat.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are:

a. To analyse the international counter-terrorism legal instruments, African Union’s Counter-Terrorism Policy, and SADC’s Counter-Terrorism Policy;

b. To determine the level of terrorist threat facing SADC countries vis-à-vis the region’s capacity to effectively respond to such threats and,

c. To establish Zimbabwe’s institutional preparedness to counter terrorism in the event that such threats emerge in the country.

1.3 Literature Review
A lot of effort meant to understand terrorism, extremism and counter-terrorist measures that provide human security, have since time immemorial been given much focus by both international and African writers. Of late, such studies have tended to dig deeper not only the modus operandi of terrorists but other specificities. In the case of Botha and Solomon (2014) ‘Terrorism In Africa’, Botha, (2014) ‘Radicalisation in Kenya, Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council’, they have provided a scholarly understanding of terrorist activities of the modern time between 1998 to 2015 that have been recorded in East Africa and SADC. The same researchers have gone further to record the financing of terrorism where they identify motivational factors that result in the growth of terrorism on a regional standpoint. They have as well managed to describe to their audience how contextual and contestable terrorism, as a definition, has stood the test of debate. Their argument that speculates that the terrorist modus of suicide, being seen as a cultural taboo in Southern Africa, implies that terrorism growth is far from gesturing, seem to be a rushed conclusion. However, such works, despite not addressing the preparedness of SADC member states, was of great help for the study of the Zimbabwean case as ascertained the continuity of the debate on the matter.

As for Guelke (2006) ‘Terrorism and Global Disorder’, he holds the threat to human security being that arising from jihadist movements which are associated with Islamic radicalism. A similar problem analysis is discussed in Zimmerman and Rosenau (2009) ‘The Radicalisation of Diasporas and Terrorism’, as well by Alison (2016), ‘African Union and the scourge of terrorism’, who both insist that Africa, given its weaker economic resources, has no capacity to counter jihad-terrorism. Given these studies, it was necessary to tackle the Zimbabwean case where radicalisation was an underpinning area of enquiry. The presence in Zimbabwe of foreign nationals from terrorist-prone Muslim countries like Somalia, Pakistan, Nigeria, to name just these few, will justify the importance of this study.

The issue of terrorism financing discussed by Hubschle (2007), ‘Terrorist financing in Southern Africa: Are we making a mountain out of a molehill?’ and Makinda and Okumu, (2008), ‘The African Union’s Challenges of Globalisation, Security and Governance’, is bemoaned being a real challenge to Southern Africa. The study’s interest in the financial allegations, does not seem to have the governments’ acknowledgement given the fact no SADC state has made any arrest. Such assessments became handy to this writer to enquire the counter measures put in place by the Zimbabwean financial sector to deal with terrorism should the above findings be true.
With the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) (2006) works titled ‘UN Action to Counter Terrorism’, and ‘International Counter-Terrorism Legal Instruments’, signify the efforts from a global standpoint, that has been initiated to legislate the combating of world terrorism. These legal instruments were thus the hallmark of the study underpinning the terrorism-counter measures to the Zimbabwean case.

1.4 Justification of the Study

This exploratory enquiry determines the feasibility of both terrorist attack in Zimbabwe and the reciprocal national counter response. The outcome of the study should generate a refocus by SADC member states, especially the security sector authorities, that terrorist radicalization in this region is a process whose end state is that of a terrorist attack which should be planned against rather than self-denial of the looming threat by national authorities. Equally, the study’s findings will not only enhance scholarly debate, but will add to existing literature on the dynamic subject.

1.5 Research Questions

The research sought to explore the following questions:

a. On the advent of the General Assembly’s affirmation of the various legal instruments namely, the ‘UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006/2008’ and the ‘African Union’s Counter Terrorism Policy’, what national efforts were adopted by both SADC member states including Zimbabwe to combat the threat of terrorism and extremism?

b. How does the migrant non-Christian political and social life impact the Zimbabwean and regional people’s ethos, customs and political culture?

c. To what extent has the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and African Union’s Counter-Terrorism Policy been naturalised into Zimbabwean law or debated as a strategy to combat the threat of global terrorism?

d. How is the Western doctrine of combating terrorism being perceived or addressed in SADC member states with particular mention to Zimbabwe?

e. To what extent is Zimbabwe an exception to the assertion that the AU’s Counter-Terrorism policy is not working?
f. What measures are in place to Zimbabwe on its efforts to combat all facets of terrorism including the curbing of the financing and criminal activities linked to terrorism?

1.6 Methodology

1.6.0 Research Design

The research design was a case study which sought to explore counter-terrorism in SADC using the Zimbabwean case. Part of the emphasis was an ethnographic inquiry on what people think, belief, or ponder about Zimbabwe’s security sector preparedness to combat the threat of global terrorism. Zimbabwe’s preparedness against global terrorism was analysed in terms of the legal frameworks that the country enacted at the backdrop that the UN community of states had since 2001, adopted 12 counter-terrorism resolutions (UN Department of Public Information, September 2006). By adopting this design, the research was driven by the desire to venture into the security policy dimension of government’s commitment to combat terrorism with the sole wish to formulate a clear picture. According to Panneerselvam (2005: 12) a research design provides complete guidelines for data collection and its essence covers: selection of research approach, design of sampling, design of experiment and design of questionnaire. Neuman (2007:276) and Robson (1993) in Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (1997: 76) posit that a case study is a development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single ‘case’ or a number of related ‘cases’.

1.6.1 Sampling

To come up with an accurate interpretation of the real threat of terrorism to Zimbabwe and its counter-terrorism position, the study adopted the nonprobability sampling which was a combination of purposive and snowball techniques. The relevancy of these techniques was that they allow the researcher to ‘walk in the respondents’ shoes’ and affords more chances of capturing more data from related case-respondents. According to Neuman (2007:141) in a Purposive/Judgmental sampling, the researcher uses a wide range of methods to locate all possible cases of a highly specific and difficult-to-reach population. On Snowball Sampling, Neuman (ibid) posits that the researcher begins with one case, and then based on information about interrelationships from that case, identifies other cases and repeats the process again and again.
In targeting these difficult-to-reach population; government agencies, the Muslim community, the foreign embassies, refugees and the academia, the research from onset realised the pertinent role these groups currently play towards terrorism and counter-terrorism coercive development. The logic of targeting these groups was a result of, in the case government agencies, academia and embassies; they influence policy directions as well having privileged information whereas with the Muslim community they are the victims of such policy directives whereby in their reaction to such directives they end up taking some radical core-habitant positions ripe for terrorist manipulation.

1.6.2 Data Collection

To acquire an insider’s point of view with regard to the government’s policy on contemporary global terrorism and counter-measures, the researcher used a combination of data collection instruments; the structured questionnaires, indepth interviews and desk collection. The targeted respondents were; the Zimbabwean Government security agencies that encompassed the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Civil Aviation Authority of Zimbabwe (CAAZ); the foreign embassies (US, Iran, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa), the renowned scholarly research institutes in particular the International Security Studies-Africa (ISS) Africa and the religious faith communities, which were the Muslim and Christian faith communities. To a limited extent, the researcher administered other collection tools like the web survey (internet) and print media.

Interviews, are defined by (Neuman 2007: 296-297) as, they go by many names; unstructured, depth, ethnographic, open-ended, informal, long, to a large extent and generally, they involve one or more people being present, occur in the field, and are informal and non-directive (i.e. the respondent may take the interview in various directions). The un-easiness of the respondents to this sensitive discourse, whilst could have constrained quite a number of respondents, it however helped the researcher to capture a lot of real issues as well from the body language communications. Furthermore, the print media record, especially the newspapers, immensely helped the researcher in building the sought data base. Primary data was mainly collected through questionnaires whose usefulness were as follows: they permitted respondents time to consider their responses carefully without interference or fear of victimisation. It was easier to administer questionnaires to a large number of people simultaneously and the format is familiar to most respondents, and they
maintain the objectivity of the study. However, the 50% response rate, showed why questionnaires are known for low response rates.

1.6.3 Data Analysis

After data was collected, it was edited, coded and analysed following thematic analysis steps. The process of thematic analysis, defined by Neuman (ibid: 327-329) follows four steps which are; identifying the main themes, assigning codes to the main themes, classifying responses and their integration. The detailed step-by-step process, based on the questionnaire questions and those of interviews, was conducted as follows; step 1, the researcher identified the main themes which were then utilised as the basis for analysing the text. In Step 2, assigning codes to the main themes presented as questions were then assigned a code each using keywords. As for Step 3, that is, the classification of responses under the main themes: the responses the different themes or questions were summarised. The last, Step 4, integrate themes and responses: was the actual integration of all the other steps and coming up with the finding and a report.

1.7 Limitations

Accessibility; into government agencies, mosques and refugee camp-information banks was a challenge. Also to pose a challenge, was the disclosure risk on the objective of the study to the target population given the government’s institutional red-tape tradition and the sensitivity of the study to some respondents like the Muslim community, migrants and refugees. To address this challenge, three different sets of purposeful questionnaires were designed with each targeting a particular population. Firstly, to the Muslim community, noted for their sensitivity to the topic, hence an array of covert data-seeking questions only focussed on the instructions enshrined in the Holy Quran book. Secondly, the state agencies were another community of interest. The last targeted population was the general public which was also of importance in establishing their assertion. The selection of questionnaire distributors to targeted population was done through utilising some assistance of volunteers who were carefully considered.

1.8 Delimitations
With the study focus being the Zimbabwe case, the study control identified Harare as the hub of the study population. The rationality of picking up Harare was necessitated by the six months’ time upon which the finalisation of the dissertation was to be completed. However, it was presumed that the findings from Harare, which was the epicentre of the population representation of Zimbabwe, was then generalised as a reflection of the national picture. The same Zimbabwean finding was also generalised as reflective of SADC position. Overall, the study period was 2008-2015.

Given the vastness of Harare, the organization of the research was such that the research sites were carefully selected with the main target sites being; the government ministries of National Security, Home Affairs, Immigration and their agencies like the Interpol, CIO and ZRP; the religious faith communities (Christians and Muslims) and foreign embassies.


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**CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUALISING TERRORISM, EXTREMISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM**

2.0 Introduction
This chapter presents a theoretical understanding of central concepts underpinning the study: terrorism and counter-terrorism. In an effort to reflect on the understanding of terrorism and counter-terrorism, the discourse covers two theories; Coercive-Power Theory that explains why individuals, and organisations, be it state or non-state actors like terrorist organisations, in their quest to seek or consolidate political power, see coercive means as an ideal option to achieve political objectives, and Conspiracy Theory, which is identifiable with the early developmental stage of terrorism and to date thrives through radicalisation and fundamentalisation as precursory to either delegitimise a government or suicide-bombing undertakings. In the context of this study, the terrorist threat under enquiry is that of terror-related activities preceded by extremism and radicalism with the al-Qaeda sponsored-type terrorism that include such groups like al-Shabaab and Boko Haram as the main real focus.

2.1 Understanding terrorism and extremism

The definition of the word ‘terrorism’, since history, has been a contested one with many countries and scholars differing in directing what it is. However, the word ‘terrorism’ has its roots in a Latin word ‘terrere’ which means ‘to make tremble’ (Chaliand and Blin, 2007:8). These two further point out that whilst the historians of terrorism conclude that the word ‘terror’ applies to the state terror of the French Revolution of 1794, the same have often neglected to acknowledge that the phenomenon was a constant of earlier eras and has been prevalent since then. The world over, terrorism is deemed to be illegal and as such, there is always a dangerous confusion between the moral interpretation of a political act and the act itself that clouds one’s understanding of the terrorist phenomenon (Chaliand and Blin, ibid:16). The definite explanation of the word particularly its definition has remained a contestable area hence the likes of Schmid (1983) in Victoroff (2005:4) has identified 109 academic definitions of terrorism. Notably though, the definition of terrorism has remained a contestable term as noted by Botha (2004:5) where she impresses that, the Mozambican legislation defines terrorism as follows:

To place, or cause to be placed, on any ship or aircraft, in public or private places or premises, as well as inside equipment for public or private use, any artefact or device capable of destroying or damaging them, putting at risk the safety of property, places and human or animal lives, with the purpose of creating social insecurity, terror or panic among the population, or of pressuring the state or any
organisation of an economic, social or political character to undertake or not to undertake certain activities.

In Botha’s incisive observation, the Mozambique definition deviates from the generally accepted scholarly definition and is thus indicative of how contestable the word terrorism has been since time immemorial. Learning from Cartalacci (2016: 11), we also understand that terrorists can be of own creation as alludes to the US-NATO invasion of Libya to fight terrorists of own creation. This critique shows how contestable the definition has evolved in contemporary political sphere.

Botha (ibid) further alludes that in Zimbabwe the Public Order and Security Act, (POSA) 2002, defines an act of or terrorism as an act “committed for the purpose of causing or furthering an insurrection in Zimbabwe or causing the forcible resistance to the government or procuring by force the alteration of any law or policy of the government”. Some further perspectives about terrorism as defined in POSA has the following acts banned: (i) training a person to be a terrorist, as defined in the Act; (ii) training as a terrorist; (iii) supplying weapons to terrorists, as defined; (iv) possessing weaponry for purposes of terrorism; and (v) harbouring, concealing or failing to report a terrorist, Botha (ibid). In Botha’s (ibid) observation the POSA’s definition encompasses actions to do with: killing or injuring a person, damaging or destroying property, inflicting financial loss on another person, obstructing the free movement of traffic in Zimbabwe and disrupting or interfering with an essential service.

Extremism is not simply terrorism. It is an adherence to strict interpretation, application and implementation of the community’s belief or perception on social and political life. Such extremism in the religious world has led to the coining of unique terms like radicalism and fundamentalism which impliedly infer to the strict abidance to the religious laws or codes. On the political arena, extremism has manifested in the form of xenophobia (extreme hate of other nationalities). Extremism of any kind, radicalism, fundamentalism or xenophobia, are fertile grounds for the birth of terrorism. The development in the Southern Region, particularly South Africa (2015) and Zambia (2016) where the worst xenophobia attacks on foreign nationals surfaced is a reflection that the Region is faced with a home grown threat of terror worse than Jihad-inspired terrorism.

2.2 The Concept of Terrorism
Albeit the debate on the threat of terrorism, the historians on the subject have failed to come up with a standard definition. However, Post (2004) in Victoroff (2005:5) has divided political sub-state terrorism into five categories: (1) social revolutionary terrorism, (2) right-wing terrorism, (3) nationalist-separatist terrorism, (4) religious extremist terrorism, and (5) single-issue (e.g., animal rights) terrorism, proposing that each type tends to be associated with its own social-psychological dynamics. In his discourse ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, Victoroff (ibid: 3) citing Friedland (1985), points out that terrorism has surely existed since before the dawn of recorded history. He as well defines terrorism from a social-psychological dimension and thus argues that to understand the terrorist aggression; one must study the mind of the terrorist. To him, the mind of the terrorist festered with such factors as: the greed and grievance radicalised/conspirator mind, secularity trend and religious fundamentalism, consequentially breeds the terrorist aggression. It is thus held that individuals and communities whose environment has a gestation of the named signatures, is naturally embittered hence the mind-set becomes the embryo that develops terrorism.

Given their grievance versus their survivability, terrorist operatives are careful to avoid government security detection and often operate in compartmentalised segments that comprise: Core segment, Action segment, Active support segment and Passive support segment (Kgosi, in Committee for Intelligence and Security Services of Africa [CISSA] 2013: 58-60). According to Kgosi in CISSA (ibid) each of these segments is then divided into cells that operate on a strictly ‘need-to-know’ policy. This measure is intended to ensure the terrorist plans and operatives remain under tight security safety and strictly known by the few among themselves. It is on this basis that many of the terrorist attacks, despite being well planned, often become pre-mature or abruptly initiated once a member of non-combatants and (2) that the terrorist action in itself is not expected to by its perpetrators to accomplish a political goal but rather to influence a target audience. From the aforementioned discourse analysis, Victoroff (ibid:5) through his dimension of terrorism factor consideration, illustrates the variables and classification discussion shown in the table below;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Perpetrator number</td>
<td>Individual or group</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sponsorship</td>
<td>State vs sub-state vs individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Relation to authority</td>
<td>Anti-state/ anti-establishment / separatist vs pro-state / pro-establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Locale [Locality]</td>
<td>Intra-state vs transnational</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Military status</td>
<td>Civilian vs paramilitary or military</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Spiritual motivation</td>
<td>Secular vs religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Financial motivation</td>
<td>Idealistic vs entrepreneurial</td>
</tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Political ideology</td>
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</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Hierarchical role</td>
<td>Sponsor vs leader vs middle management vs follower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Willingness to die</td>
<td>Suicidal or non-suicidal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Property (incl data) vs individuals vs masses of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Bombing, assassination, kidnapping/hostage taking, mass poisoning, rape, other e.g. (bioterrorism, cyber-terrorism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Victoroff (2005: 5)

### 2.3 Coercive Power Theory

Coercive Power Theory explains why individuals, and organisations, be it state or non-state actors, in their quest to seek or consolidate political power, see coercive means as an ideal option to win a political office. According to Chaliand and Blin (2007: vii) “Throughout history, power has more often than not been wielded through terror, that is, by inciting fear. On the same debate, Kydd and Walter (2006: 56) make an objective analysis of terrorists’ strategy and thus concur with Thomas Thornton’s five proximate terror objectives to usurp power: morale building, advertising, dis-orientation (of the target population), elimination of opposing forces and provocation. All these objectives are either a strategy or means to coercively delegitimise a sitting government or its officials so that it adopts a costly decision which could be in the form of policy or political paradigms. When the al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the US’s World Trade Centre, the 9/11 incidence, in all purpose and intent, the US President Bush administration was expected to change its policy on Israeli who see the generality of muslim administrations being pro-terrorist architects. Similarly, when the al-
Shabaab terrorists attacked the Nairobi Westgate Shopping Mall in 21st September 2013 its objective was to force the Kenya Government to pull out of Somalia. In the case of the Somali's al-Shabaab’s war against the sitting government, its end-state vision is to usurp power through coercive strategy and establish an Islamic pro-sharia political system. Whilst winning office by the terrorist groups or seeing an immediate change of policy by the government, is not expected to be a quick encounter, the planners of terror objectives know well of the attritional costs that go along with their selected strategy.

When terrorist organisations drop their snap-shots of their high profile action in the internet (twitter or email) for example, the Nigerian Chimbok girls reciting the Quran verses or show of force (Odenogbo, 2016: 8), such action will be intended not only to delegitimise a government but to advertise their own cause, build morale among their followers, dis-orient the pro-government population and provoke a costly government response action. It is thus noted in the analysis by Kydd and Walter (2006: 59) that any government action intended to promote trustworthiness is often quickly spoiled by the terrorist gangs. To the target population, the strategy is equally to nurture: intimidation, outbidding and provocation (Kydd and Walter, ibid). The provocation, as a strategy, is thus vindicated in Bancroft-Hinchey’s (2015: 9) article ‘Russia bombs terrorists, America bombs hospitals’.

With terrorists engaging in bombings and elimination of government officials clearly testifies how pertinent coercive-power-theory is to terrorists as it is to the sitting government. Etzioni (1968) discusses the meaning of Coercive-Power Theory by eluding it as the use of power that involves forcing someone to comply with one’s wishes. Lebow, (2007:225) gives his readership an easier explanation about coercion-power consequence where he posits that “Successful threats must hold out the prospect of enough loss to make compliance more attractive than noncompliance”. The application of coercive power-theory can be inimically juxtaposed thereof from a media commentary titled ‘From Paris to Mali: Nightmare continues’ whose analysis highlights how the Muslim radicals barricaded in the luxury Raddison Hotel in Mali capital, Bamako, holding more than 100 people hostage (Lando, 2015:7). The coercion effect is thus noted when several hostages got freed because they were able to recite verses in Quran. In the violent aftermath, reportedly, 28 people have already been killed”. The survivors of such an incidence including the general populace find themselves being insecure and vulnerable and this feeling delineates them from the government’s response action, a situation which favours the terrorist organisation(s).
The coercive power theory is amplified by Neuman’s (2007:26) concept definition which illustrates that “Concepts, contain built-in assumptions, statements about the nature of things that are not observable or testable” and as such the following concepts spice the above theory: (a) Terrorism has a high infiltration rate on nationals who flee their own sovereign to other states, (b) Terrorism radicalization, entails psychological passing over to the would-be recruit of one’s belief system or ethos, (c) Coercive power, is the employment of threat where the victim feels insecure to deny compliance to the recruiter, and (d) Terrorism threat, is the use of force through killings and violence outside the law. From the above concepts that manifest themselves as terrorist modus operandi, nations find themselves obliged, under the responsibility to protect, to adopt counter-terrorist strategies for their own survivability.

It is an-undeniable maxim fact, that, terrorism flourishes through some form of coercive-radicalisation recruitment process. In addition to the above, Botha (2004:1) argues that misconceived counter-terrorism measures can instead result in fuelling terrorism and providing justification for the involvement of those associated with transnational terrorism. In the case of Nigeria’s incomprehensive counter-terrorist measures, each passing year since 2009, Boko Haram has become more violent (Ford, 2015: 3-5). The magnitude of the Boko Haram coercive terror tactics, according to Ford (ibid) is an example of their increasingly senseless violence.

He further notes that Boko Haram has begun terrorizing motorists in the North and has used chainsaws to behead truck drivers who pass through areas where Boko Haram is strong. In the case of the 300 Chimbok girls of Nigeria abducted from Maiduguri State by Boko Haram terrorists, [see Figure 2] extensively discussed by Ford, (ibid), Miangwa, (2015:41-57) and Padan 2008), it was incredulous to see the girls surrendering their human rights to the fantasy of Boko Haram’s coercive propaganda. This dictum was to help in contrasting Menkhaus’ assertion (cited in Zimmermann and William, 2009:98) that ‘the terrorist suicide mind’ will not work in the case Southern African culture which disdains suicidal radicalisation. Never-the-less, Nigeria’s political counter-terrorism debacle has been that of coercive-power-theory characterised by Muslimism sermons that increasingly became anti-government since the late 1970s and a heavy-handed government cracked down on any dissenting voice (Padan, ibid). According to Padan (ibid) the death toll from the 1982 riots and subsequent military crackdown was over 4,000 and it is argued that the same number could have been inflicted on the government forces and officials, which is the price
coercive-power tactics as a vehicle to hold or wrestle power by the respective belligerent forces.

**Figure 2 Rescue Chimbok Girls Campaign**

![Rescue Chimbok Girls Campaign](image)


In their consideration of how Zimbabwe suppressed her domestic instability since 2008 in the name of counter-terrorism vis-à-vis application of coercive power, Botha and Solomon,(2004: 15) question whether the actions of the Zimbabwean government could not have been classified as state-sponsored terrorism. In addition, they further advance that the government’s "anti-terrorism" bill threatens the death penalty for anyone convicted of acts of "insurgency, banditry, sabotage and terrorism"(Botha and Solomon, ibid). It their belief that the bill is widely perceived to be a tool to crack down on the opposition party, and in so doing, creating a threat to the honouring of basic human rights, (ibid).

This view, thus, vindicates the dilemma that in the quest to coercive wrestle power from terrorists, in the name of counter-terrorism, human rights abuses are bound to be committed by the state hence its actions then qualify to be seen as state terrorism.

### 2.4 Conspiracy Theory

Conspiracy Theory is identifiable with the early developmental stage of terrorism. In the context of this study it was understood to mean the presence of an under-cover party or interest in a political party or organisation driven by the desire to undermine the system’s ideology or objectives which serve as guiding principle. Learning from the modus operandi of the Kenyan al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups, there is evidence, according to the (CISSA 10th Conference, 2013) that the terror groups have been increasingly adapting to emerging realities, that include; shunning outward appearance for example long beards, not indulging in activities that betray their extremism, involving females in their operations and
communicating through means that are difficult to track that include dropping messages in
draft e-mails whose passwords are known by cell members only.

Further conspiracy assertion albeit on a local Zimbabwean perspective, is exemplified by
Wafawarova’s(2016:4) argument that ZANU-PF cannot take people for granted on the mere
basis that its power prospects are not under threat. Another encounter vindicating the
presence of such conspiring terror-cell in Southern Africa is that of Samantha Lewthwaite, a
white woman-suspect who is alleged to have master-minded the Westgate Mall bombing in
Nairobi, Kenya, who prior to the attack, had stayed in South Africa and travelled on a South
African passport, (Kgosi, 2014). According to (ibid), reports suggest that the al-Qaeda and
al-Shabaab elements could be using the [SADC] region to facilitate safe passage of their
operatives and their critical material to other places in the world cannot be disputed given
the huge inflow into the region of nationals from Somalia, Pakistan, Kenya and Nigeria.
However, to the contrary, there is a view that suggests that for any conspiring political
activities to take off in Zimbabwe, it may be a result of pursuing incompatible goals by local
parties who are believed will only succeed once they have a foreign hand. To vindicate this
view, befitting this theory is an article by Azikiwe’s(2015:13) ‘Mali and the US, French
smoking gun’ postulates “Nonetheless, the war on terrorism is a by-product of successive
failed imperialist interventions from Afghanistan to Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The so-
called extremist organisations were natured, funded and coordinated since the early 1980s
when the administration of President Jimmy Carter worked vigorously to overthrow the
socialist government in Afghanistan which was supported by the former Soviet Union”.
Furthermore, Europe, especially the US, UK and France, are accused of harbouring some
conspiracy agenda, (Lyman, ibid). Against the concept that says ‘Terrorism underground
activities are more receptive on nationals who reside in foreign sovereign states in the same
circumstances they thrive in aggrieved communities’ conjures any informed person on
terrorism to acknowledge that, the influx of migrants and other forms of refugees from the
terrorist-prone countries into Zimbabwe and the rest of SADC member states, comes with it
‘the danger of underground terrorist conspiracy’. Such dangers could range from financial
mobilization, drug/human trafficking to radicalisation-recruitment.

The danger to Zimbabwe, on its open-door immigration policy to communities and
individuals given the limited vetting capacity of the developed countries like the US, is
feared for the lapses in effectively monitoring such people’s conspiracy activities. Whether
Menkhaus in Zimmermann and William (2009:98) assertion that SADC offers a conducive terrorist-prone environment where he cites Haroon Rashid Aswat, an Indian-born citizen of the UK, a suspect in the 2005 London bombings, who sought safe haven in Zambia, is indeed a challenge that is hard to sweep away. As for the EU, their active wooing of immigrant communities and the provision of some form of integration inducement which appeared to bear fruit in the immediate post 9/11, their national-level efforts to establish a water-tight internal security move, has been sometimes seen as inflammatory to the growth of terrorist radicalisation (Menkhaus, ibid). Zimmerman and Rosenou, (ibid: 10) thus, note how, at the level of EU, progress in developing effective policies has remained both slow and reactive. In the same effort, Belgium intention to foster a workable anti-terrorist inclined internal security, (ibid) which entails an event-driven anti-terrorist intergovernmental action, was criticised and rejected by world peace-democrats for its perceived lack of democratic accountability. All the strategies alluded to in the above discourses, shows some deep rooted fear on the conspiracy burden that immigrants bring with them into the EU member states, which thus gave this study the zeal to implore if the same fear could be haunting the Zimbabwean Government.

On why banks have challenges to effectively monitor terrorist financial conspiracies with regard to the banking and financial sector, Hübschle (2007: 4) advocates for ‘know your customer’ and goes on to discuss that indeed Southern Africa face certain challenges in this regard. He thus, allays poor counter-terrorism efforts by the states on the following pertinent areas: the absence of systems of; national identification, birth certificates, use of passports, driving licences as a means of identification, employment job cards, residential addresses in informal settlements, un-demarcated townships and rural areas (a surprisingly large number of African metropolis and cities only have physical addresses in the city centre); and access to utilities, and utility bills, (ibid). With the new Zimbabwean laws that have repealed many identification and movement conditions, it is very possible monitoring terrorist-induced conspiracy activities is no longer that easy.

2.5 Evolution of Counter-terrorism legal frameworks: international perspective
The most fascinating publication on counter-terrorism legal frameworks was the one by (United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI), 2006) titled ‘Counter-Terrorism’ which posits that “Prior to the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001) and the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the international community had already promulgated 12 of the current 13 international counter-terrorism instruments”. The summary of some of the 13 major conventions and protocols dealing with terrorism in their order of seniority, referred to by the (UNDPI: ibid) are: (1) Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, 1963 ‘Tokyo Convention’; (2) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970 ‘Hague Convention’; (3) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971 ‘Montreal Convention’; (4) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 1973; (5) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979 ‘Hostages Convention’; (10) Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1991; (11) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997; (12) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999; and (13) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005. The most captivating dimension from the researcher stand point has to do with compliance by the UN member states in terms of application of these UN conventions. It was of interest to establish whether these conventions were still pertinent to African States particularly Zimbabwe. These conventions formed the fulcrum upon which all the conceptualisation inquiry was to be based.

2.6 Conclusion

Chapter 2 presented a conceptual understanding of the word terrorism and the dimensional classification of terrorism. The conceptual discourse dwelt on two theories; Coercive-Power Theory that explains why individuals, and organisations, be it state or non-state actors, in their quest to seek or consolidate political power, see coercive means as an ideal option to win a political office and Conspiracy Theory, which is identifiable with the early developmental stage of terrorism. Coercive power was thus explains from Thomas Thornton’s five proximate terror objectives to usurp power: morale building, advertising, dis-orientation (of the target population), elimination of opposing forces and provocation.

The concepts that characterise the theory were highlighted being; (a) Terrorism has a high infiltration rate on nationals who flee their own sovereign to other states, (b) Terrorism
radicalization, entails psychological passing over to the would-be recruit of one’s belief system or ethos, (c) Coercive power, is the employment of threat where the victim feels insecure to deny compliance to the recruiter, and (d) Terrorism threat, is the use of force through killings and violence outside the law. On the Conspiracy Theory, the concept suggests that terrorist underground activities are more receptive on nationals who reside in foreign sovereign states in the same circumstances they thrive in aggrieved communities. Against all the terrorist objectives of coercive-power and conspiracy the UN has since the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, promulgated 12 of the current 13 international counter-terrorism instruments. These instruments now play the regulatory role on member states on their fight against terrorism.
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CHAPTER 3: AFRICAN RESPONSES TO THE THREAT OF TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM

3.0 Introduction

Africa, being a continent with the largest Muslim population appear to have a conducive environment for the growth and spread of violence and terrorism associated with the radical interpretation of Islam. There is however, an academic contention that singled out Islam being the real threat to the internal and external security of countries in Africa. The threat of terrorism to Africa, mainly the Islamic inspired ones, being under discussion, has been recorded mainly in the regions of Maghreb (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Chad), West Africa (Nigeria, Mali), Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania) and SADC (South Africa). The Chapter notes that both the African Union’s and that of SADC’s positions on counter-terrorism are lukewarm despite the continent’s ratification of the UN Charter on Counter-terrorism.

3.1 Terrorism in Africa

According to Lyman (2016) “The war on terrorism in Africa did not begin on September 11, 2001, but in the 1990s, when Osama bin Laden who operated in the Horn organised an attack on the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.” He further posits that, three years later, in 1998, al-Qaeda cells blew up US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es Salaam, Tanzania. Botha and Solomon (2014: 3) concur that since 1995, Africa has been subjected to an increase in the number of terrorist attacks against foreigners or foreign interests. This is based on two factors: firstly, Africa, provides the nurturing ground for transnational terrorist activities; and secondly, the lack of interest and definite commitment by both the developed world and African governments to pro-actively counter the threat. Botha and Solomon (ibid) further associate the latest developments in transnational terrorism with the 1998 US’ based Kenyan and Tanzanian embassies bombings, to Muslims jihadists. Some notable data from the 10th Conference of Committee for Intelligence and Security Services for Africa (CISSA) Southern Region Report, 2013, reveal that terrorism and extremism have escalated in Africa, are simply an indication that this situation is a fertile ground for the growth of jihad-terrorism. The Nigerian case, where Boko Haram leapt onto the world’s agenda in August 2011, when it bombed the UN compound in Abuja, killing twenty-three, was long simmering given
the long history of conflict between the Muslims and Christian communities (Walker, 2012:2) To the contrary, the Muslims, as observed by Botha and Solomon (ibid) reject any link between Islam and extremist groups, but point out that the Saudi-Wahabite doctrine has helped the terrorist phenomenon emerge with the Islamic Salafi organizations.

Salafi, as a term developed in the Sunni theological schools in recognition of the ninth century, IbnHanbal of Syria, emphasise a fundamentalist view of the application of the principles of Islam, insisting on strict conformity with the example set by the Salaf, or “ancient ones” of Medina, as the Prophet’s first followers were known.

According to Botha and Solomon (2014: 3), Africa is the continent with the largest Muslim population and as such, presents fertile ground for the growth and spread of violence and terrorism associated with Islam. The same writers note that the trend has remained primarily noticeable in the Northern African region, where the majority of the population is either predominantly or totally Muslim, in contrast to the predominantly non-Muslim sub-Saharan Africa, where Islamic militancy is a growing phenomenon. In their hotspot identification, Botha and Solomon (ibid) observe that since the late 1990s Islamic extremism has grown from strength to strength into two different areas on the African continent: in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania) and West Africa region (Nigeria, Mali, Chad and Senegal). Chossudovsky (2015: 11) reportage also reflects that jihadist group’s attack on Bamako’s Radisson Blue Hotel, was collaborated with the Saharan Emirate of al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb. The fall-out effects, noticeable on other nationals migrating to peaceful states to the South of the Sub-Sahara, has consequently spread like a heat wave hence triggering some intense activities of radicalisation in the Southern region. As a result, it is likely to manifest into a terrorist-inspired violence.

On the recorded data on terrorist attacks in Africa, Islam is deemed a real threat to the internal and external security of countries in Africa (see Figure 3). The findings according to Botha and Solomon (ibid), shown in Figure 3 show that only 8% of international acts of terrorism were committed on African soil from 1995 till 2001, making it the fifth most targeted continent after Latin America, Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East. This data is expected to have changed as a result of the US’ ‘War against terror’ following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US Twin Towers that prompted the Bush administration to pursue the
terror groups and their networks in Asia and Africa respectively. During the period 2001 to 2016, Africa has witnessed

the worst political turbulence with terrorist cell operatives being on the offensive and this is true with the Salafist inspired attacks in the Maghreb states (Libya, Tunisia, Mali, Chad, Egypt), West Africa region (Nigeria) and East African region (Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania). Never before had Africa faced such a heightened magnitude of Islamic-terrorist attacks. To buttress their assessment on security threat, Botha and Solomon (ibid), concede that the Islamic revival in Africa has led to the establishment of more radical Muslim groups, which according to authorities, are aimed at subverting their rule. The second phenomenon to emerge in Africa has been clashes between rival Islamic groups. They further note that, with the formation of transnational terror networks, this development has become a secondary threat to national security. Many questions are thus asked about the African states resource capacity to contain this threat to their national security.

Figure 3: International Acts of Terrorism by Region, 1995-2001

Source: Botha and Solomon (2014: 3)

On whether Africa is real under the threat of terrorism, Lyman (www.cfr.org) argues that Africa is no more immune to the threat from terrorism than any other continent. Lyman’s observation is as well shared by Botha (2004: 1) and Guelke (2006: 215) where the former
notes that ‘In Africa, the real threat of transnational terrorism is a reality and the later, also concedes that ‘It is during the autumn of 2001 when al-Qaeda cells, previously un-detected, were discovered in scores of many countries’. It is not surprising thereof to hear that terrorism-radicalisation is part of the recruitment process (Botha, 2014:4). A study on terrorism-radicalisation in East African tracks how Kenyan cell operatives, having been radicalised, struck an Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa. From the investigators’ report, according to Botha, (ibid), it turned out that the culprits were Fumo Mohamed Fumo and Haruni Barusa who were both Kenyan nationals. However, the Kenyan national leadership opinion remained adamant that both the 1998 and 2002 attacks were orchestrated from abroad (Botha, ibid). Botha (ibid) asserts that as a result of the Kenyan Government denial, this negatively impacts on proficiently efforts meant to address the growing radicalisation which could have prevented the increase in both attacks and radicalisation. Besides Kenyan statistics, Botha and Solomon (2014: 3) make effort to quantify Africa’s rating in terms of global terrorist attacks distribution through Figure 4. However, the recent upsurge of terrorism in Nigeria where Boko Haram is on the rampage since 2009 and Egypt since the coming into power of President al-Sisi military-led junta, imply that the frequency figures could have risen.

**Figure 4: African countries frequently attacked by terrorists**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Countries freq targeted by terrorism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia 12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan 8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria 26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Leone 9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria 16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Botha and Solomon (2014: 21)

Whilst the cost of terrorism in terms of loss to human life to Africa, captured from Botha and Solomon (ibid) Figure 5 shows a record of 5, 932 casualties out of 194 acts of terrorism between 1995 and 2001. This figure does not however take aboard the casualty record beyond 2001 for example, from the case of the 2011 attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, to that of the recent Boko Haram’s activities in the Maiduguri state, Nigeria. The brunt of such a high African casualty figure has since encouraged states, in the case of Kenya (11 October,
2011), Nigeria (2015) and Egypt to take costly decision by going into a full scale war against terrorists operating in the respective countries. Kgosi in 10th Conference CISSA Southern Region Report (2013: 83) notes that, given the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) offensive in Somalia, terrorist groups, including al-Shabaab, operating in compartmentalised segments that comprise; (1) Core segment, (2) Action segment, (3) Active support segment and (4) Passive support segment, have these segments further dividing themselves into cells that operate on a strictly ‘need-to-know policy’. Their emerging social character trends have been that of adaptation to the emerging realities, that include; (1) shunning outward appearances like long beards, (2) not indulging in extremist activities, (3) involving female operatives and (4) communicating through drop messages in draft emails whose passwords will be known by cell members only and using WhatsApp (Kgosi, in CISSA 2013, ibid). Figures 5 to 7 show data ranging from the number of attacks / casualty statistics to the preferred methods/ forms of attacks which vindicates how much Africa is immersed in the ‘War against terror’.
Figure 5: Number of attacks versus casualties in Africa, 1995-2001

Source: Botha and Solomon (2014: 4)

Figure 6: Terrorism in Africa: Target selection, 1992-2001

Source: Botha and Solomon (2014: 19)
3.2 African Union’s (AU) Position On Counter-Terrorism

The position of AU on counter-terrorism was conceptualised from the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. In this Convention, a terrorist act, cited in Botha (2004: 5) is defined as:(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or(iii) create general insurrection in a State, and; (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii). In Botha (ibid)’s
assertion that this definition made provisions for individuals, groups and states to be regarded as agents of terrorism. Thus there was need to establish counter measures in place to deal with the state as an agent of terrorism.

On the historical perspective of Africa’s security quagmire compounded by the diversity of African culture and religious beliefs, vis-a-vis the US’ War on Terror campaign which arraign the Muslim community as conduits for terrorism, the complexity of the African position on where to fit in on counter-terrorism strategy was long looming. The cardinal counter-terrorism legal frames summarised as being 13 major UN Conventions and Protocols, which states either ratified or not, show a mixed African response position. Given these major UN Conventions and Protocols, the AU also crafted its own. Of particular note is the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. On the counter-terrorism challenges that the AU states are faced with in the area of banking and finance, pertinent areas were highlighted among which were: the absence of systems of national identification, birth certificates, use of passports, driving licences as a means of identification, and employment job cards. The absence of formidable systems weaken Africa’s endeavours to fight terrorism.

The genesis for the calls for Africa to seriously consider counter-terrorism initiatives is traced in Lyman (2010:1) observation that, ‘The war on terrorism in Africa did not begin on September 11, 2001 but in the 1990s when Osama bin Laden operated and where an attack against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was organised. After the 9/11, the US focus on terrorism in Africa became much pronounced with President Bush of US announcing a $100 million Counter-Terrorism Initiative for East Africa and the Horn, 2003’. This initiative was further complimented in 2007 by US establishment of a new united Africa Command (AFRICOM), a US military command founded at the backdrop that Africa was significantly susceptible to the growth of terrorism-radicalisation (Lyman, ibid). However, serve for Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Botswana, the generality of African statesmen have rebuked the US AFRICOM initiative resulting in America funding selected countries on a bilateral cooperation that formally establish AFRICOM. This US-Africa policy resolve, became arguably more conspicuous in the Horn since the coming into power of the then Islamic Court in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2006 (Lyman, ibid). Lyman’s work was helpful in this study in relation to what could have happened should Zimbabwe and the rest of SADC member states have agreed to the US Counter-Terrorism Initiative. Also of concern is, had SADC acceded to the US Counter-Terrorism Initiative, could it not have had skirmishes
already with the jihadist terrorists whose war against the US and its allies have been easier to be engaged in the African soil than in Europe?

Commenting on the loath of AU response, Lyman (ibid: 2) illustrates how the international community recognises financial controls as essential anti-terrorism tools. He thus describes the main sources of international obligations in combating the financing of terrorism being the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for example, Resolution 1373 of 2001 (referred to as ‘the Resolution’) and the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Finance on Terrorist Financing. Notably though, the Convention, according to Lyman (ibid) which opened for signature on 9 December 1999, stipulating the criminalisation of direct involvement or complicity in the financing or collection of funds for terrorist activity, no suspects have been arrested since then.

On the nature of terrorist-threats; an African dimension of security (Makinda and Okumu, 2008:5), disparagingly posit their perspective in that “security in Africa, should be viewed in terms of identity and interests with regard to the protection of people and the preservation of their norms, rules, institutions, and resources, in the face of military and non-military threats”. Whilst the above discourse is partly concerned with how the AU can promote peace, security and stability on the continent, it seems to benchmark its condemnation of the AU security flaws on bad governance and thus carry the language of Western scholarly way of understanding Africa. It does not, per se, see terrorism as a contemporary real threat to Africa’s security. Makinda and Okumu (ibid) findings were pertinent in understanding the Africa dimensions of security which since the post-OAU has remained so complex. The diversity of African culture and religious beliefs, against the US’ War on Terror campaign which arraign the Muslim community, was believed to have compounded the complexity of the African position on counter-terrorism preparedness. Besides Kenya, Botha and Solomon (2014: 3) posit that; African countries, as with the rest of the third world, lack the resources to prevent acts of terrorism, making it a “suitable” playing field, although the primary target might be the United States, Israel and the Western world.

3.3 Terrorism in the SADC Region

On the 8% of Africa’s global terrorist attacks record shown on Figure 3 above, SADC seem to have been an exception, which suggests that this could be a result of the small Muslim community when compared to the other regions. However, the period beyond 2001, has
shown a steady growth of terrorism threat. This observation does not include other types of terrorism arising from secessionist to clan pacification calls recorded in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. These area type-terrorism have caused some minor political instability which cannot be compared to the perceived danger of Islamic-funded terrorism. There is however, serious scepticism on SADC Region which is feared for being the launch pad for Salafist/ al-Qaeda terrorists and this is testified in Hubschle’s (2007) discourse ‘Terrorist financing in Southern Africa’ reveals the nature of some conspirator underground activities terrorists might be engaging themselves in.

Closer to Hubschle’s observation, pertinent developments simmering in SADC have been reported by *The Lusaka Times* and *The Times* [both of Zambia] (Apr 2015), that the developments in Zambia and South Africa respectively, are undergoing similar threat quagmire, for example; ‘ISIS Recruitment 2015: Zambia Muslims Warn Youths of Islam’ and ‘Terrorist incursions from Zambia, (http://www.thetimes.htm.).’ There is however, heightened activity in South Africa conceptualized as follows; ‘Is a terrorist attack imminent in South Africa’ (http://isisafrica.org/isis-today.), ‘South Africa could be at risk of terrorist attacks: Security Experts’ (http://www.news24.com/south Africa/news/sa.) and ’23 South African families among the ISIL’s newest recruits, (Patel and Essa, 29.05. 2015 Al Jazeera Twitter). Whilst the threat level reportage between Zambia and South Africa, who both have a sizeable Muslim communities, seem to be markedly different, there is however a noticeable renewed migrant population arriving in South Africa than Zambia. This disparity might be a key factor in the terrorists’ recruitment process and radicalisation. The CISSA 10th Conference Report (Kgosi, 2013: 83) warns that the al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab elements could be using the region to facilitate safe passage of their operatives and critical material to other places in the world. This position was arrived at based on varied CISSA evidences of terrorist-linked activities, for example,

the case of Samantha Lewthwaite, a suspect in the recent bombings at Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, who prior to the attack had stayed in South Africa and travelled on a South African passport;

in Botswana, some migrants of Somali, Kenyan, and Egyptian origin with suspicious movements and financial transactions were arrested; and some Tabligh Jamaat activists were found to have approached some youth from
Botswana in an endeavor to recruit them to join extremist groups outside the country.

The immediate threat of attack coming from al-Shabaab elements, according to Kgosi (ibid) is thus allayed to Somali nationals due to their greater influx into the region. Further case in point includes visits between 2003-2005 of a British citizen with links to al-Qaeda, Haroon Aswat and that of a Jamaican cleric, Abdullah al-Faisal in 2009, known for being an al-Qaeda fund-raiser, (Kgosi, ibid). On a related security discourse, Wafawarova’s (2016:4) argues that Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) cannot take people for granted on the mere basis that its power prospects are not under threat. This view was impliedly interpreted as inferring to the threat manifesting itself within ZANU-PF, a political party whose current philosophy, is dodged by dissent. In Wafawarova’s perspective that ZANU-PF does not realise the existence of a threat and thus, is not making any preparations to combat such threats, was the crux of this study. Such media reportage helped the researcher in analysing Zimbabwe’s state of preparedness against terrorist threat whose genesis was conceptualized as being transnational, emanating from jihadist conspiracy complimented by local dissent.

In addition to these global terrorist incidences, African countries are plagued by periods of domestic terrorism, with devastating effects on human life, stability and development. In the case of Zimbabwe, the dark moments reminiscent of terrorism brings into mind the Matabeleland dissidents and that of state terror reprisals which has left behind scars of dissent being championed by Mthwakazi movement, accused by the government of harbouring terrorist intentions. The looming danger of the radicalisation process to terrorism, highlighted in Zimmermann and Rosenau (2009), ‘… contemporary global terrorism, militant Islamism, and in particular, its Salafist-Jihadist variant, serves as the most important ideational source of radicalization within diasporas in Western Europe and North America’ has remarkable lessons to learn not only to Zimbabwe but the rest of SADC states whose terrorism activism is assumed to be at incubation stage. From such lessons the study was thus faced with a daunting task to establish the counter-terrorism measures given this background information. This view prompts the researcher to juxtapose the Kenyan unpreparedness as a result of national leadership negative attitude to that of Zimbabwe’s lukewarm approach on terrorism threat.
Some controversy arise though, from (Menkhaus in Zimmermann and William, 2009:98) opinion that terrorism in this region has not thrived on simple logic; “the SADC peoples’ culture shuns suicides tendencies and its repudiation of Salafist Islamic doctrine of radicalization”. In Menkhaus’ findings, the terrorist activities or gestation of ‘the terrorist suicide mind’ will not work on simple logic of cultural disdain. He seems to have overlooked the presence of foreign nationals from the terrorist-conflict states whose theatre of operation is not limited to the space of conflict origin. The argument by Menkhaus will also draw particular attention in this inquiry just to confirm the authenticity of this view once I start ‘walking in the respondents’ shoes’ (Neuman 2007:186-196).

SADC’s Counter-terrorism posture, derives its legitimacy from a host of counter-terrorism legal frameworks ranging from the 13 major UN Conventions and Protocols which the AU states either ratified or are still to do so (United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI), 2006). Out of the 13 major UN Conventions and Protocols already discussed in Chapter 2: 9, the AU also crafted its own ‘The Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999’. To effect counter-terrorism monitoring, SADC states complement their efforts through their inter-state Defence and Security Committees that closely cooperate with other international and non-governmental agencies like the ‘Committee for Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) Southern Africa Region’ whose 2013 conference was held in Harare, Zimbabwe (CISSA Journal, 2013). In this conference, the respective African chiefs of counter-intelligence and security organisations colluded that the threat of international terrorism remained a source of concern to the Southern Africa region. The CISSA, 10th Conference, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, whose theme was ‘The current trends and manifestation of terrorism and extremism’, was, according to the Executive Chairman’s Report, a follow up to another workshop held in Windhoek, Namibia, on the 19th-20th August 2013 whose agenda was ‘Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. The CISSA, Zimbabwe Conference Report (2013: 2-4) conceded that, the measures to enact Anti-Terrorism legislation, Anti-Money Laundering legislation, establishment of Financial Intelligence Agencies or units and the enhancement of cooperation between states Services and beyond, were either acted upon or still to be, many of the SADC states, serve for South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, have not enacted the first Anti-Terrorist legislation as planned.
On Africa’s capability, implying to SADC as well, Lyman (2016) infers to the rationality of establishing the AFRICOM being a result of the US fear that Africa’s weak states, its poverty and in many places its ‘ungoverned space’, all lending Africa to become a significant susceptibility to the growth of radicalism. Against the denial by some sections of Africa’s political leadership bemoaned by Lyman (ibid), CISSA (ibid) recommended: (1) Full incorporation of the UN Global Counter-terrorism strategy into their national policies and programs, (2) Strengthening national institutional mechanisms for inter-agency cooperation, coordination and exchange of information, (3) Member states to report regularly to Regional Early Warning Centre on terror-related developments in their countries and (4) Implementation of strict immigration controls; and the development of versatile immigration control systems and data bases of terror suspects. Until the above recommendations are implemented, it will be deemed that a country is un-prepared to combat terrorism. Allied to CISSA recommendations are the resolutions that came out of the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) held at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, in July 2015 that among other things, called for the crafting of a Regional Action Plan to address the threat of mixed and irregular migration (MIDSA in Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence Report, Feb 2016). These recommendations and resolutions are thus the underpinning factors to determine Zimbabwe’s preparedness to combat the threat of terrorism as well as extremism which chapter 4 will cover in detail.

3.4 Conclusion

Regarding the imminence of terrorism, many of the historians specialising in terrorism, concede that Africa, provides the nurturing ground for transnational terrorist activities. The second notable fact suggests that the lack of interest and definite commitment by both the developed world and African governments to pro-actively counter this threat has contributed to African governments’ insecurity. The Chapter established that the war on terrorism in Africa did not begin on September 11, 2001, but in the 1990s, when Osama bin Laden who operated in the Horn organised an attack on the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Further established by this chapter is that, in 1998, following the Egyptian incidence, al-Qaeda cells blew up US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es Salaam, Tanzania. Botha and Solomon also concur with the historical background of terrorism in Africa in that since 1995 Africa has been subjected to an increase in the number of terrorist attacks against foreigners or foreign interests. Notably, though, only 8% of international acts of terrorism were committed on African soil from 1995 till 2001, making it the fifth most targeted continent.
after Latin America, Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East. During the period 2001 to 2016, Africa has witnessed the worst political turbulence with terrorist cell operatives being on the offensive and this is true with the Salafist inspired attacks in; the Maghreb states, West Africa region and East African region.

In as far as the AU position on counter-terrorism is concerned, it was established that the continent’s mandate is underpinned in the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 1999. After the 9/11 attack, the US focus on terrorism in Africa became much pronounced with President Bush of US announcing a $100 million Counter-Terrorism Initiative for East Africa and the Horn, 2003. This initiative was further complimented in 2007 by US establishment of a new united Africa Command (AFRICOM) a US military command founded against the backdrop that Africa is significantly susceptible to the growth of terrorism-radicalisation. However, in spite of the US’ AFRICOM sponsorship initiative, which many of the African countries rebuked, Africa has not effectively combatted terrorism. To effect counter-terrorism monitoring, AU states complement their efforts through some regional governmental agency known by the name ‘Committee for Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) [for example, Southern Africa region]’ whose 2013 conference was held in Harare, Zimbabwe. The major challenge on the speedy combating of terrorism being observed by the CISSA Harare Conference is that of the failure by African states to legislate Anti-Terrorism laws, thus making Africa’s response capacity become weak.
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CHAPTER 4: PREPAREDNESS OF ZIMBABWE TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT OF EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

4.0 Introduction

This chapter gives overview findings on the level of the threat of extremism and terrorism facing SADC countries vis-à-vis Zimbabwe’s combat preparedness in terms of security measures to curb both national dissent, extremism and any other forms of terrorist threat to its national security. Furthermore, the chapter interrogates the pragmatic issues, perceived from the Government standpoint, that have been designed to prevent or combat the threat of terrorism. Most of the findings were generated from questionnaires and interviews with key security service institutions (Defence, President’s Office, Defence attaches), and other security stakeholders like the Immigration Department. The findings were synthesised into themes which were then analysed to determine Zimbabwe’s preparedness to combat the threat of extremism and terrorism.

4.1 Zimbabwe’s preparedness to combat the threat of extremism and terrorism

4.1.0 Institutional and legal frameworks.

Zimbabwe and the rest of SADC member states, was acknowledged as having fully complied with the UN’ Global Counter-terrorism Strategy 2008 in that it has enacted a wholesome of laws that are earmarked to counter any forms of threat arising from terrorism. SADC member states, in particular South Africa and Zimbabwe have since established institutions like Institute of Security Studies (ISS) in the case of South Africa whilst Zimbabwe has the National Early Warning Centre, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), schools on intelligence at both national and Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) levels respectively. The other key result effort since 9/11 terrorist bombing of the Twin Tower, US, is that of international and regional cooperation on intelligence matters through such forum like the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) Southern Region, and bilateral intelligence briefings between member states. Zimbabwe, through its National Defence Policy 1997, directs the Special Air Service (SAS) Unit to continue maintaining a highly respected capacity for counter-terrorism operations and works in close cooperation with state authorities, (Hon Mahachi, 1997: 45).
According to Manase (2004) and some key respondents, Zimbabwe has enacted anti-terrorist legislations that encompass; ‘Public Order and Security Act 11: 17’, January 22, 2002. Section 6-11 of the Act which deals specifically on terrorism bans the following acts; (a) training a person to be a terrorist, (b) training as a terrorist, (c) supplying weapons to terrorists, among other things. The other law enacted during the period under the study, include ‘The Bank Use and Suppression of Money Laundering Act Chapter 24: 24 no 2/2004’. This Act is meant to criminalise among other things activities that money laundering feared for being conducive to financing of terrorism. However, there are complimentary legislations that equally litigate other aspects of security that have been in place well before the period of study, and these are; ‘The Prevention of Corruption Act Chapter 9: 16 (1994)’, ‘Aircraft (offences) Act Chapter 549 (1972/92)’, ‘Fire Arms Act Chapter 10: 09 (1972)’, ‘Law and Order (Maintenance) Act Chapter 11: 07 (1971)’, ‘Emergency Powers Act Chapter 11: 04’, ‘Unlawful Organisation Act Chapter 11: 13 (1980), ‘the Post and Telecommunication Services Act Chapter 12:02 (1988) criminalises the unlawful interception of communications and at the same time provides for by-laws, legalising certain interceptions, particularly for purposes of national security, and ‘Foreign Subversive Organisations Act Chapter 11: 05’. Notably though, most of the laws alluded to were crafted whilst the dimensions of terrorism were unique to that time and space. It is without doubt that these laws are now not effective in addressing the contemporary dimensions. Since these laws are not cast iron their revision is thus critically a necessity if they are to be of institutional value.

The above two paragraphs criticise Allison’s (2016: 9) position that contends that the AU Counter-terrorism policy is not working. With Zimbabwe and South Africa being reported as having enacted some enabling laws to combat the threat of extremism and terrorism, as well cooperating with the rest of the world in intelligence as was the case on their participation at CISSA 10th Conference of 2013, Harare, one is left with no doubt that the legal instruments are now there. Evidence that buttress the above view can be traced to Zimbabwe’s laws such as; ‘Foreign Subversive Organisations Act Chapter 11: 05’, ‘Emergency Powers Act Chapter 11: 04’, ‘Unlawful Organisation Act Chapter 11: 13 (1980), and ‘the Post and Telecommunication Services Act Chapter 12:02 (1988) as well as the imposition of a mandatory term for offences related to poaching and wildlife trafficking which Zimbabwe, according to (CISSA National Intelligence Bureau reports, 2013), had the tenacity to stop any source of financing of terrorism. Whilst Menkhaus in Zimmermann and
William, 2009: 98) opines that the SADC peoples’ culture shuns suicides tendencies and its repudiation of Salafist Islamic doctrine of radicalization, is a fact, admittance should also acknowledge that this fact is not a stand-alone but is complemented by the institutional and legal frameworks to combat the threat of terrorism and extremism that Zimbabwe and other SADC member states have put in place. The non-workability of the AU’s Counter-terrorism policy, being the concern of the research problem contrasted against the data showing Africa having the least world record of terrorism (Figure 3 Chapter 3), seem to be void and lacking pragmatic analysis. The reportage on the syphoning of large sums of money out of the country by many Zimbabwean corporate companies and individuals, indicates the lack of tight monitoring of financial sector which logically is the reason why the Anti Money Laundering Act was enacted. Notably unspoken of in Zimbabwe are statutory instruments that address the peripheral issues that feed the sprouting of terrorism, namely, extremism, xenophobia and hate speeches among other areas.

4.1.1 Combating the extremist/ radical groups.

Regarding the steps that Zimbabwe has taken in combating the threat associated with extremist/ radical groups, the research noted that the country is party to a number of regional statutory bodies namely; Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA), Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), Ministerial Committee Organisation (MCO) among others. Such statutory bodies hold series of coordinating meetings on a regular basis. According to the SADC senior officials meeting of Public Security, Police, State Security Defence Sectors Meeting held at Gaborone, Botswana, in March 2016 (Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence Report, April 14, 2016) the EU’s memorandum of cooperation with North and West Africa in blocking the inflow into their respective countries of refugees and asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq and East Asia, implied that Southern Africa was braced for a refugee/ asylum seeker crisis. At odds given this assessment is that such people normally bring with them extremism and radicals which terrorist organisations take advantage of. Furthermore, similar concerns according to South Africa Broadcast Corporation (SABC) news (Sat, 0700 hours, 7 May 2016) have been raised with regard to the migrant inflows into Southern Africa following Kenya’s closing down of all refugee camps belonging to Somali nationals. Zimbabwe security services, were however acknowledged by most respondents for being effective in monitoring such developments. Given the recent meeting by the Security Services (ZDF,
CIO, Zimbabwe Republic Police [ZRP], Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Services [ZPCS]) with Immigration senior officers, (Ministry of Defence Report: ibid) it is prudent that the mooted SADC Harmonised Regional Strategy to curb extremism and terrorism emanating from the illegal migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons will soon become an instrument that enhance Zimbabwe’s combat effectiveness. These institutional efforts manifest Zimbabwe’s determination, notwithstanding the migrant impact to the people’s social life in terms of consequences to national ethos, customs and political culture, to put in place, by capacitating all the security stakeholders, with policy direction on Harmonised Regional Strategy.

On some of the respondents’ arguments that concern themselves with the fear that the country’s failure to arrest sleeper terrorist cell operatives, xenophobia attack planners and other terrorist related underground activities, is indicative of lacking monitoring capacity, one may argue rather, that Zimbabwe is no exception to the rest of the world faced with similar predicament. It was however, noted that despite the paucity of resources, Zimbabwe’s institutions are to a limited extent able to monitor any new trends linked to extremism and terrorism as well as get such capacity through sharing intelligence with other international intelligence bureaus. The arrest of Simon Mann’s terror gang at the Harare International Airport in April 2004 whilst destined for Equatorial Guinea vindicates Zimbabwe’s combat readiness. However, many key respondents could not, with certainty, acknowledge whether Zimbabwe had a particular law to deal with cyber terrorism observed by the CISSA 10th Conference of 2013 as the daring instruments favoured by terrorist gangs the world over. Some related institutions caring for this aspect, in the case of Zimbabwe, are conceded to be a specialised area for Post and Telecommunications of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ), Central Intelligence Organisation and Zimbabwe Defence Force intelligence assets.

The amalgamation of effort from a cocktail of Zimbabwe’s security instruments should dispel the nation’s security sector is weak and thus, not capable to combat the threat of terrorism and extremism. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces Special Air Service-led field training exercise of 2015 held at Saton Mine, approximately 100 kms to the West of Harare, Mashonaland West Province, was a capacitation rescue operation exercise meant to check the combat proficiency of the specialised departments of Zimbabwe Sector in combating the most daring terrorist stinger operations. The bottom line on the effectiveness of
Zimbabwe’s counter-terrorism efforts is that, the fact that the country is party to a regional intelligence bureau where they collate and analyse information on terrorism and extremism, dispels the allegations that perceive terrorist live in the region unmolested.

On the inquiry on Zimbabwe’s capacity in dealing with the danger posed by the easy way the informal traders transit their funds, which makes it possible for terrorist-prone gangs to do the same, it was established that the country was a member to the East and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering body. As a result, besides having enacted the Anti Money Laundering Law, Zimbabwe has security agencies monitoring all entry and exit points including un-official border crossing points. It is however argued that the effectiveness of this law is questionable and unconvincing.

The porousness in the Zimbabwean Financial Sector, namely the reliance in the use of hard currencies instead of plastic money, is believed to be the brunt of the externalisation money to foreign countries through national banks or other means and disappearance of moneys in circulation, is in all intent defeating the Anti Money Laundering Act. Until this area is addressed, the Western anti-terrorist strategists’ fear that Southern Africa (inclusive of Zimbabwe), offers heaven sanctuary to the terrorist-fund mobilisers cannot be disputed. This heaven-sanctuary weakness should not however, as tantamount to the AU’s Counter-terrorism Strategy not working but simply a reflection of resource capacitation challenge.

4.1.2 Zimbabwe’s counter combat posture and the regional cooperation.

Zimbabwe, together with the rest of the members of SADC, have sought to fight all facets of terrorism through regional cooperation. The regional body has ceaselessly identified the international dimensions of terrorist that range from their recruitment and training, financing, operations to human trafficking. As a result, the region combat posture was instrumental in the formation of inter-state committees like those already discussed in Section 4.1.1 above that include the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) Southern Region among a host of other counter combat initiatives. CISSA Southern Region, like its sister committees, has since included in their threat basket aspects to do with poaching of wildlife, emigration of refugees and asylum seekers from the conflict zones of North and West Africa and East Central Africa to peaceful regions with Southern Africa coming top. The hosting of the 2013 CISSA 10th Conference by Zimbabwe, the establishment of an Early Warning Centre in Harare and the installation plans of ICT
monitors at all entry and exit points suffice the regional efforts to effectively respond to a wide gamut of terrorist threat. Through sharing of intelligence, the regional security bureaus, have already alerted their nationalities on how passports have become the latest terrorist targets simply because of their internationally recognised user-friendliness. It is thus noted that the regional cooperation has since been heightened, a clear indication that SADC member states are fully aware of how vulnerable their security has become since 9/11 US terrorist attacks. In spite of the realisation that terrorism debate is not yet a public domain in most SADC countries, it is nevertheless clear that issues of terrorism the world over are treated as intelligence matter whose too early disclosure can compromise the national intelligence bureaus’ monitoring efforts.

The paper encapsulates the need for Zimbabwe to heighten its efforts of combating terrorism and extremism on the realisation of the threat from three dimensions, these being traced firstly from: Zambia and South Africa whose sizeable communities of Muslims have been reported as being active in the jihad war against the West should be perceived to have a causal effect on Zimbabwe. The second dimension is that as refugees and asylum seeker migrants swell in Zimbabwe, extremism and xenophobic tension will gather momentum whose control will not be easy. The third dimension, similar to the April Belgian airport attacks by terrorism, suggest that the day Zimbabwe bursts a sleeper terrorist cell operative that’s the day the nation should brace up for a reprisal terrorist attack. The present threat should be viewed being lukewarm or colour coded amber on the rationale that Zimbabwe remains peaceful until any one of the above dimensions bursts into a conflict mode.

The dimension on refugees and asylum seeker migrants swell in Zimbabwe vis-a-vis extremism and xenophobic tension had some key respondents specialised in intelligence concluding that Zimbabwe is a culturally diverse country, and as such should not have any problems with foreign migrants. Furthermore, it was established that all efforts to monitor all religious faith groups’ activities are already in place. The enquiry also established from the Muslim respondents that; their religion is the fastest growing religion in the world, a result of the availability of Muslim scholars and other learning resources. Also established was that 33% against 73% of the respondents who were born Muslims, were born Christians before being recruited into Islam. The fact that CISSA evidently identified the white woman terrorist Samantha Lewthwaite, a suspect in the 2015 bombing at Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, who prior to the attack had stayed in South Africa and travelled on a South African
passport, is indicative that the national intelligence bureaus should not have problems in tracking the threat posed these Muslim migrants including the sleeper cells. It is thus arguably a fact that there is some form of recruitment and radicalisation which consequently can be viewed being conducive for further terrorist motives. However, logic suggests that as long Zimbabwe is an enemy of Western Europe and EU, the imminence of terrorist attacks may not be soon hence the country will remain presumably a quiet country.

4.2 Conclusion

The inquiry concedes that Zimbabwe and the rest of SADC member states, has to a large extent complied with the UN’ Global Counter-terrorism Strategy 2008 in that it has enacted a wholesome of laws that are earmarked to counter any forms of threat arising from terrorism. However, the currency of such laws to combat the modern dimensions of terrorism and extremism brings to doubt whether these laws are combat effective to curb the threat. Furthermore, it has been established that Zimbabwe’s security architecture is configured to address both conventional and asymmetric threats such as terrorism. Many key respondents could not with certainty acknowledge whether Zimbabwe had a particular law to deal with cyber terrorism which was observed by the CISSA 10th Conference of 2013 that cyber communication is the most daring instruments favoured by terrorist gangs the world over. Notwithstanding the economic downturn Zimbabwe is experiencing, resulting in the paucity of funds to capacitate the institutions legislated to combat asymmetric forms of terrorism, it is therefore encapsulated that Zimbabwe has the capacity as well as preparedness to combat the threat of terrorism and extremism within its jurisdictional space.
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Interviews, with anonymous respondents, were all held in Harare, April 18 - May 4, 2016 [annexure attached]
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the conclusions of the study and goes further to highlight recommendations. The conclusions were arrived at based on the findings in chapter 4 which were guided by the research objectives and questions while recommendations were made from the researcher’s analysis of the problem issues that need more clarity. The implications for further research are both consequences as well as suggestions which were made on the realisation that they were challenges in collecting data from the Security Sector Departments and the line Ministries. As a result, this section ‘implications for further research’ reminds all the researchers interested to make further studies on the subject of extremism and terrorism of the challenges of red tape by the key respondents to which the way forward is advised. Given the integrity of the respondents, the objectives of the study were met.

5.1 Conclusions

5.1.0 The threat facing SADC states and the Region’s response.

According to some of the key respondents, SADC member states have resolved to fight all facets of extremism and terrorism through regional cooperation. To this effect, the regional body has identified international terrorism spearheaded by jihadists with affiliations to al-Qaeda (al-Shabaab of East Africa region, Salafists of the Sahel region and Boko Haram of Nigeria) being the real threat (Botha and Solomon, 2014: 3). From the desk research it was established that the developments in Zambia and South Africa respectively, evidently reflect some terrorist underground activity, for example these media reports; ‘ISIS Recruitment 2015: Zambia Muslims Warn Youths of Islam’ and ‘Terrorist incursions from Zambia (http://www.thetimes.htm.). Allied to the media reportage, the 10th Conference discussion paper by the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) Southern Region held in 2013, Harare, Zimbabwe, was also alarmed on the region’s experience in the rise in organised crime that include drug trafficking, poaching of game (elephants tasks and rhino horns among others), cigarette smuggling, theft of vehicles and human trafficking. All these crimes proceeds were feared that they could be channeled to finance terrorism.

According to the Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence Report, April 14, 2016, inferring to the SADC senior officials meeting of Public Security, Police, State Security Defence Sectors
Meeting held at Gaborone, Botswana, in March, it was established that the other serious threat was that of illegal migrants. This threat alarm was a result of the EU’s memorandum of cooperation with North and West Africa in blocking the inflow into their respective countries of refugees and asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq and East Asia, implied that Southern Africa was braced for a refugee/ asylum seeker crisis. With the South Africa Broadcast Corporation (SABC) news (Sat, 0700 hours, 7 May 2016) that Kenya had closed down all refugee camps belonging to Somali nationals, the imminence of the threat could not be wished away. The paper is in concurrence with the respondents’ concern that these migrants, especially when they are a sizeable number, normally bring with them extremism and radicals which terrorist organisations take advantage of.

As a result of the complexity of the threat, the region’s combat posture was initiated that resulted in the formation of the inter-state committees like Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA), Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), Ministerial Committee Organisation (MCO) and others that include the likes of the Committee for Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) Southern Region among the host of counter combat efforts.

5.1.1 SADC’s Counter-terrorism Strategy.

The enquiry established that, whilst the region has been mooting for the enaction of several measures in effort to counter terrorism such as Anti-terrorism law, Anti-Money Laundering law, establishment of Financial Intelligence Agencies or units and enhancement of cooperation between Services in the region and beyond, Zambia, South Africa and Zimbabwe were named among several SADC member states, as having already enacted Anti-Terrorism legislation (CISSA Southern Region, 10th Conference, 2013). With CISSA’s institutional challenging recommendations, the enquiry was of no doubt that the regional leaders have since started looking into those measures meant to tighten the Counter-terrorism strategy.

On the other hand, the study established that the Ministry of Defence Report: (ibid) urges for speedy completion of the SADC Harmonised Regional Strategy to curb extremism and terrorism emanating from the illegal migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons. Should this effort come into fruition, this Strategy as an instrument will not only enhance SADC’s combat effectiveness but the rest of its member states.
5.1.2 An overview of Zimbabwe’s preparedness in terms of institutional and legal frameworks.

Zimbabwe’s laws such as; ‘Foreign Subversive Organisations Act Chapter 11: 05’, ‘Emergency Powers Act Chapter 11: 04’, ‘Unlawful Organisation Act Chapter 11: 13 (1980), and ‘the Post and Telecommunication Services Act Chapter 12:02 (1988) as well as the imposition of a mandatory term for offences related to poaching and wildlife trafficking which, according to (CISSA National Intelligence Bureau reports, 2013 and other key respondents), were established that they have the resolve to stop any facet of terrorism inclusive of the financing of terrorism. Notably unspoken of in Zimbabwe are statutory instruments that address the peripheral issues that feed the sprouting of terrorism, namely, extremism, xenophobia and hate speeches among other areas.

The porousness in the Zimbabwean Financial Sector, namely the reliance in the use of hard currencies instead of plastic money, is believed to be the brunt of the externalisation of moneys to foreign countries through either national banks or other means. Similarly, this loophole links well with the disappearance of moneys in circulation and other forms of starving the circulation system which is, in all intent, a scheme to defeat the operationalisation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

It was however, established that, despite the paucity of resources, Zimbabwe’s security institutions are at the national extent, able to curtail any new trends linked to extremism and terrorism. Such capacity is further enhanced through sharing of intelligence with other international intelligence bureaus.

5.2 Recommendations

The national Portfolio committees on Defence and Security need to make follow ups and consider the recommendations that come from inter-state thematic discussing groups like the 10th Conference of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) Southern Region, the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA), among others. Zimbabwe and other regional members need to come up some statutory instruments that address the peripheral issues that feed the sprouting of terrorism, namely, extremism, xenophobic insinuations and hate speeches being among other areas.

Against the consequences of the EU’s memorandum of cooperation with North and West Africa in blocking the inflow into their respective countries of refugees and asylum seekers
from the terrorist conflict regions and that of Kenya’s shutting down of refugee camps for Somali nationals, it is prudent that SADC speedily completes the Harmonised Strategy that fosters the regional solution.

5.3 Implications For Further Research

The challenges in collecting data to do with terrorism, extremism, human trafficking and poaching, being the preserve of the Security Sector departments and the line Ministries, are subject not only to red-tape but strictly classified information. As a result, loath response from the key respondents stall much of the research efforts. Where covert means to acquire such information, the researcher, being mindful of the implication of the Secret Act, eventually opts for inferred data gathering. With the terrorist and extremist related developments in the region shaping up, the lead countries with intense extremism and xenophobic insinuations being South Africa and Zambia, there is need to continue following these trends as the regional inter-state committees of Defence and Security discussion papers are now resourcefully availing the needed data. This is the hype time that the region is faced with a large movement of migrants from the North (not to scale of the 16th century movement of the Nguni people (Imfecane)) renowned for their linkage with jihad extremism and terrorism, that most researchers would dare not miss this opportunity.
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APPENDICE

APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE

RESPONDENT………………
DATE…………………….
TIME…………………….
PLACE……………………

INTERVIEW GUIDE TO KEY INFORMANTS ON ZIMBABWE’S PREPAREDNESS AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM

The objectives of the study are:

a. To analyse the international counter-terrorism legal instruments, African Union’s Counter-Terrorism Policy, and SADC’s Counter-Terrorism Policy;

b. To determine the level of terrorist threat facing SADC countries vis-à-vis the region’s capacity to effectively respond to such threats and,

c. To establish Zimbabwe’s institutional preparedness to counter terrorism in the event that such threats emerge in the country.

QS1. To what extent is Zimbabwe faced with the threat of terrorism and extremism as from 2001 to 2016: Islamic or other motivated groups?

Comment

QS2. On the advent of the General Assembly’s affirmation of the various legal instruments namely, the ‘UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006/2008’ and the ‘African Union’s Counter Terrorism Policy’, what national efforts were adopted by both SADC member states including Zimbabwe to combat terrorism threat?

Comment

QS3. How does the migrant non-Christian political and social life impact the Zimbabwean and regional people’s ethos, customs and political culture?
QS4. To what extent has the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and African Union’s Counter-Terrorism Policy been naturalised into Zimbabwean law or debated as a strategy to combat the threat of global terrorism?

Comment

QS5. How is the Western doctrine of combating terrorism being perceived or addressed in SADC member states with particular mention to Zimbabwe?

Comment

QS6. To what extent is Zimbabwe an exception to the assertion that the AU’s Counter-Terrorism policy is not working?

Comment

QS7. How is the influx of migrants/ refugees/ asylum seekers from terrorist-prone countries versus radical politics associated with terrorism likely to impact the social/political life of Zimbabweans?

Comment

QS8. What is Zimbabwe’s combat readiness, unlike the flaws experienced in East African states (Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia) on the growth of radical and extremist groups prone to terrorism?

Comment

QS9. How do you respond from the general assertion that Zimbabwe like the rest of SADC states’ offer conducive environment to the terrorist underground activities?
Comment

QS10. What is your comment on the readiness of Zimbabwe Government program of action meant to curb religious and ethnic radicalism?

Comment

QS11. Both Zambia and South Africa feared for the fermentation of terrorism by some sections of its citizens of Islamic faith versus Zimbabwe’s safety.

Comment

QS12. The findings by Botha and Solomon (South African researchers imply that only 8% of international acts of terrorism were committed on African soil from 1995 till 2001, any recorded data of terrorist incidences in Zimbabwe period 2001 -2016.

Comment

QS13. In the event of a terrorist attack in any location in Zimbabwe, as what happened in Kenya, are Zimbabwe’s security agencies capable to contain the situation i.e. accounting for the attackers and rescuing the captives?

Comment

QS14. The danger posed by the easy way the informal traders transit their funds makes it possible for terrorist-prone gangs to do the same, versus monitoring of suspected terrorist funding activities.

Comment

QS15. What is your comment that the threat of terrorist suicide bombings in Zimbabwe is imminent given the size of the migrant communities fleeing conflict regions renowned for extremist and radical jihad-insinuated terrorism?
Comment

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QS16. Southern Africa, being symbiotic to a growing transnational terrorist threat versus Zimbabwe’s international cooperation on the subject; what legislation efforts or strategies are in place or being mooted to curb this threat.

Comment

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QS17. What efforts has Zimbabwe taken to address the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa Southern Region, Harare Conference (01-08 May 2013) that recommended states to: (1) Full incorporate of the UN Global Counter-terrorism strategy into their national policies and programs, (2) Strengthen national institutional mechanisms for inter-agency cooperation, coordination and exchange of information, (3) Member states to report regularly to Regional Early Warning Centre on terror-related developments in their countries and (4) Implement strict immigration controls; and the development of versatile immigration control systems and data bases of terror suspects.

Comment

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APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE

RESPONDENT………………..
DATE………………………..
TIME……………………….
PLACE……………………….

QUESTIONNAIRE TO MUSLIM FAITH FOLLOWERS

Ernest Dube is a University of Zimbabwe student pursuing a Master Science Degree in International Relations (MScIR) program 2015-16 whose culmination of the study is on condition that he carries out a research dissertation on the topic ‘PERMISSION IS GIVEN TO THOSE WHO FIGHT ISLAM BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN WRONGED’. It is on the afore-said background that you are requested to honestly partner him on his research by answering the below questions. Your views and identity will be accorded the academic code of confidentiality hence there will be no need for you to provide more than the question details sought. The researcher is contactable on line 069-505 or 0712237049 or email mganda2007@yahoo.com. Just tick your answer and where possible put your comment (s).

1. How long have you been a faith follower of Muslim?
   Ans □ less than 6 years □ more than 6 years
   Comment...........................................................................................................................................

2. What do you explain about Jihad and War?
   Comment...........................................................................................................................................

3. Who recruited you into Muslim faith?
   Ans □ Muslim friend □ parental upbringing
   Comment...........................................................................................................................................

4. What does Quran say upon Muslims who leave Islam?
   Answer □ fight them □ is silent
   Comment...........................................................................................................................................

5. As a Muslim faith to what extent is your mosque connected to the other faith missions in other countries and how often you relate with such connection?
6. What does (Sure 2: 193) mean when it reads “Fight them so that there be no more seduction?”

Comment

7. What revelations were given to Prophet Mohammed about those who refuse to worship Allah and Self defence?

Comment

8. To what extent do you follow twits and e-mail social network communication with other Muslim brothers the world over?

Ans

Comment

9. How has the US War on Terror, an issue to your Muslim Community?

Ans

Comment

10. How do you, as a Muslim, interpret people who volunteer to commit suicide in the name of Allah as what happened to the United States of America’s bombings of Twin Tower buildings in 2001?

Ans

Comment

11. Some commentators accuse Zimbabwe of laxity in adopting the UN Anti-Global Terrorism strategy hence they allege the possibility of attack on Europeans and their sympathisers could happen any time soon in Zimbabwe.
12. The same commentators allege that Zimbabwe is facing a fast growth of Muslim faith followers including new mosques.

13. Any other comment you would want to share with the researcher on matters the political rights of Muslims.
APPENDIX 3: QUESTIONNAIRE

RESPONDENT………………
DATE………………………
TIME………………………
PLACE……………………

QUESTIONNAIRE ON ZIMBABWE’S PREPAREDNESS AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM

Ernest Dube is a University of Zimbabwe student pursuing a Master Science Degree in International Relations (MScIR) program 2015-16 whose culmination of the study is on condition that he carries out a research dissertation on the topic ‘Zimbabwe’s Preparedness Against Global Terrorism’. It is on the afore-said background that you are requested to honestly partner him on his research by answering the below questions. Your views and identity will be accorded the academic code of confidentiality hence there will be no need for you to provide more than the question details sought. The researcher is contactable on line 069-505 or 0712237049 or email mganda2007@yahoo.com. Just tick your answer and where possible put your comment(s).

QS1 Zimbabwe is not among the SADC states (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania) that ratified the 1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; what is the states’ legal position to this regard?

Ans. □ Zim is still bound by □ Zim not bound

Convention despite not ratifying

Comment

QS2 The influx of migrants/ refugees/ asylum seekers from terrorist-prone countries may bring with it radical politics associated with terrorism conflict of their countries.

Ans. □ Quite possible □ Not possible

Comment

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
QS3  Zimbabwe, like East African states (Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia) is not immune to terrorist attacks.

Ans.  ☐ Agree  ☐ Disagree

Comment

QS4  SADC states are feared for their hospitality to the terrorist underground activities where in the case of Zimbabwe has no capacity to account for such covert activities

Ans.  ☐ Zim has capacity  ☐ Not sure  ☐

Comment

QS5  Religious and ethnic radicalism is feared by many social analysts for their influence on fundamental politics that incite terrorism.

Ans.  ☐ Quite possible  ☐ Not sure

Comment

QS6  Zambia once accused Iran of fermenting terrorism by funding radical religion of Islamic faith; is Zimbabwe safe from such a historical lesson?

Ans.  ☐ Quite safe  ☐ Not sure

Comment

QS7  In the event of a terrorist attack in any location in Zimbabwe, as what happened in Kenya, Zimbabwe’s security agencies may not contain the situation i.e. accounting for the attackers and rescuing the captives.

Ans.  ☐ It may be true  ☐ Not true  ☐

Comment
QS8  The danger posed by the easy way the informal traders transit their funds makes it possible for terrorist-prone gangs to do the same, which implies that terrorist funding activities are not easy to monitor.

Ans.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quite possible</th>
<th>Not possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Comment

QS9  The threat of suicide bombings is not synonymous with the Zimbabwean culture; therefore Zimbabweans are not likely to accept such tactics as a form of a political sacrifice against one’s political opponent.

Ans.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes I agree</th>
<th>Not agreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Comment

QS10  If Zimbabwe was to get financial assistance to combat terrorism e.g. from the United States’ sponsored anti-terrorism fund, then the country can claim that it has the capacity to combat terrorism.

Ans.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>Not agreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Comment

QS11  What else can you comment about Zimbabwe’s capacity to combat terrorism.

Ans.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Over all Zim is safe</th>
<th>Not safe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Comment
APPENDIX 3: QUESTIONNAIRE

RESPONDENT......................
DATE..............................
TIME..............................
PLACE..............................

QUESTIONNAIRE ON ZIMBABWE’S PREPAREDNESS AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM

Ernest Dube is a University of Zimbabwe student pursuing a Master Science Degree in International Relations (MScIR) program 2015-16 whose culmination of the study is on condition that he carries out a research dissertation on the topic ‘Zimbabwe’s Preparedness Against Global Terrorism’. It is on the afore-said background that you are requested to honestly partner him on his research by answering the below questions. Your views and identity will be accorded the academic code of confidentiality hence there will be no need for you to provide more than the question details sought. The researcher is contactable on line 069-505 or 0712237049 or email mganda2007@yahoo.com. Just tick your answer and where possible put your comment(s).

QS1 Zimbabwe, of recent is plagued by political dissent within the ruling ZANU PF Party which if not well managed, can result on those being victims of state adopt some radical stance which are likely to foment the rise of either state terrorism or group terrorism; do you subscribe to this view?

Ans. ☐ Yes ☐ No

Comment

QS2 The influx of migrants/ refugees/ asylum seekers from terrorist-prone countries may bring with it radical/extremist politics associated with terrorism conflicts of their countries.

Ans. ☐ Quite possible ☐ Not possible

Comment

QS3 Zimbabwe, like East African states (Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia) is not immune to terrorist attacks.

Ans. ☐ Agree ☐ Disagree
Comment

QS4  SADC states are feared for their conducive hospitality to the terrorist underground activities where in the case of Zimbabwe it is perceived by some critiques that it has no capacity to account for such covert activities

Ans.  Zim has capacity  Not sure

Comment

QS5  Religious and ethnic extremism/radicalism as a process of the development of terrorism is not known by many Zimbabweans hence the Government must educate its citizens to ensure they are not recruited.

Ans.  I agree  Not sure

Comment

QS6  Zambia once accused Iran of fermenting terrorism by funding radical religion of Islamic faith; is Zimbabwe safe from such a historical lesson?

Ans.  Quite safe  Not sure

Comment

QS7  In the event of a terrorist attack in any location in Zimbabwe, as what happened in Kenya, Zimbabwe’s security agencies may not contain the situation i.e. accounting for the attackers and rescuing the captives.

Ans.  It may be true  Not true

Comment

QS8  The danger posed by the easy way the informal traders transit their funds makes it possible for terrorist-prone gangs to do the same, which implies that terrorist funding activities are not easy to monitor.

Ans.  Quite possible  Not possible

Comment

QS9  The threat of suicide bombings is not synonymous with the Zimbabwean culture, therefore Zimbabweans are not likely to accept such tactics as a form of a political sacrifice against one’s political opponent.

Ans.  Yes I agree  Not agreeing
Comment

QS10  Zimbabwe, because of its Christian value norms that go contrary to Muslim values in social walks of life (marriage customs, religious ethics and Western stance) is in danger, amid the growing Muslim community, of a radical political fundamentalism.

Ans.  □ I agree  □ Not agreeing

Comment

QS11 What else can you comment about Zimbabwe’s capacity to combat terrorism including its institutional and legal frameworks.

Ans.  □ Over all Zim has laws and is safe  □ Not safe

Comment